HALOWELL, A. I. The History of Anthropology As An Anthropological Problem
HALOWELL, A. I. The History of Anthropology As An Anthropological Problem
HALOWELL, A. I. The History of Anthropology As An Anthropological Problem
24
THE HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY AS AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROBLEM 25
8Goodenough, e.g., (p. 110) points out that, ‘‘ . . . . practical and empirical in their approach, the
Carolinian people belie the frequent assumption that man evervwhere is awed by the marvels of
nature and, stirred to speculate thereon, seeks to formulate a coherent theory as to the origin and
meaning of the cosmos. . . . Rooted in navigation, aimed at determining directions and predicting the
weather, native astronomy is perhaps too important for personal safety t o permit its being removed
from an empirical context.”
9cf. Butterfield (Man . . . . , p. 32) who writes: “The history of science could never be adequately
reconstructed by a student who confined his attention to the few men of supreme genius. We should
produce a misleading diagram of the whole course of things if we merely drew direct lines from one of
these mighty peaks to another. The great books are undoubtedly preferable to the reader, more
serviceable in education, and more enriching to the mind; but, if we restrict ourselves t o these, the
result is likely to be a rope of sand; and in any case this is not the way in which to make discoveries
in the history of any science. In reality, the technical historian, bent on discovery-proceeding there-
fore from the known to the unknown-tends to find himself drawn rather in the opposite direction.”
‘OHodgen, p. 50 and Chapter 1, The Classical Heritage.
28 A. IRVING HALLOWELL
mage about in the storehouses of antiquity, were now reinforced by additional ones,
brand-new and highly coloured. See them just arrived from abroad, all ready for
use!”i3
In many respects an adequate temporal dimension relevant for the study of
man lagged far behind a global geographical perspective. It could not become sig-
nificant until the traditional view that the whole of creation and man’s entire history
could be encompassed within the span of 6000 years was displaced. It was con-
tingent upon a reconsideration of the chronology of human historyli4a revitalization,
linked with material evidence, of the Three Age system of man’s industrial develop-
ment, (stone, bronze, iron ages),15the periodization of the history of the earth, in
terms of geological and paleontological evidenceIi6and the empirical demonstration
of man’s “prehistory”, a term used for the first time in 1851.i7 It will be recalled
that John Frere, who sent some flint hand axes to the Secretary of the Society of
Antiquaries of London in 1797, remarked in his accompanying letter that the situa-
tion in which they were found tempted one “to refer them to a very remote period
indeed; even beyond that of the present world”. (Italics ours.) But these remarks were
ignored. Although modern archaeologists would place these tools in the Lower
Paleolithic, no one took Frere’s speculations seriously.i8 At this time there was no
temporal frame of reference into which they could be fitted. But more than this was
involved: there was no archeological frame of reference, either. As Heizer points
out, certain preconditions had to be met, “stone tools had to be admitted as having
13Hazard,p. 10. Cf. Butterfield (Origins. . . . , pp. 183-184), who makes the point that changes
in European thought and value towards the end of the seventeenth century were not only due to
developments in physical science but were affected by widely read books of travel that reported
discoveries in distant lands. See also Shapiro.
14Haberrecalls (p. 33) that Joseph Justus Scaliger (1540-1609) revolutionized chronology in his
De emendatrione temporum (1583). “He showed that ancient history was not confined to that of the
Greeks and Romans, but should include Persian, Bablylonian, Egyptian, and the secular Jewish his-
tory. He gathered extant fragments of ancient history, succeeded in reconstructing the lost Chronicle
of Eusebius . . . and studied the ancient systems of time keeping. He was thus able to compile for the
first time in the modern period a sound-though sometimes erroneous-universal chronology of pro-
fane history, as distinguished from the uncritical and somewhat mythological sacred history of tra-
ditional chronology.” The attempt of B. G. Niebuhr (1776-1831) to substitute historical scholarship
(in his History of Rome, 1811-1832, see Stern, p. 46 ff .) for the folk history of Livy, is comparable .in
principle to the transcendence of the level of folk anthropology which had scarcely begun. But his-
torical scholarship was not prepared to deal with such large questions as “universal” or “general”
.
history. (See Butterfield, Man . . . , chapter 2, “The Rise of the German Historical School”). “In
reality”, he writes, (p. 103) “the work of providing a rational account of man on the earth would seem
to have been taken over from the theologians by the general philosophers in the eighteenth century.
The need to know how mankind had come from primitive conditions to its existing state would appear
to have been felt before the historians were in a condition to supply what was wanted. Man‘s re-
flection on the matter marched ahead of his researches; and it was the philosophes-the ‘general
thinkers’ as we might call them-who attempted to map out the course of things in time. And this
would appear to be the reason why the philosophy of history, as it was called, came to its climax before
the study of history had reached its modern form. The Gttingen school resented the facile general-
izations which the men of the enlightenment produced without research, and imposed upon human
history from the outside.” General history, of course, did not include archaeological prehistory; the
necessary temporal frame of reference had to be radically expanded.
‘6See Daniel (1943, 1950) and, in particular, Heizer, (1962). Also Sanford.
’%See Gillispie. Charles Lye11 (1797-1875) published the first volume of his Principles of Geology
in 1830. Despite resistance in orthodox circles, by the middle of the next decade the age of the earth
had been extended to millions of years. “With Lyell’s Antiquity of Man, [1863]and Lubbock’s Pre-
Historic Times [1865]” says Haber (p. 287), “the last step had been taken in the overthrow of Biblical
chronology as an all inclusive time span for the work of creation”. For a concrete example of how the
Mosaic Time Scale hindered and distorted the development of a temporal framework required for.an
intelligible interpretation of racial and cultural events, see Mulvaney’s discussion of the Austrahan
material.
17By Daniel Wilson. See Daniel (1964), p. 9.
”%ee Daniel (1964), pp. 40-41. Heizer (1959) publishes Frere’s letter.
30 A. IRVING HALLOWELL
been made by man. The correction of the idea that flaked and polished stone tools
were thunderbolts which fell from the sky came about slowly through the discovery
and awareness of savage peoples, particularly those of the New World following its
discovery by Columbus, and the realization that these peoples who used stone tools
lived in a pre-metal stage and were living as modern man once had lived.”1g In other
words, sixteenth century published accounts of the manufacture of stone tools by
living American aborigines, circulated as a consequence of the Age of Discovery,
provided an initial clue relevant to the question of man’s antiquity. These revelations
planted the seeds of the classical “comparative method”, for in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, Montaigne, Hobbes and Locke were already expressing the
view that American Indians were existing representatives of an earlier general stage
of human cultural development. However tentative and extraneous, a t first, to
anthropology as we think of it now, this line of thought anticipated the establish-
ment of a firm spatio-temporal framework as a necessary foundation for the orderly
investigation and solution of anthropological questions that were to become more
and more clearly focused in the future.
While the Age of Discovery and the expansion of European peoples provided an
essential condition for the direct, first-hand observation of the living peoples of the
world, this was not a sufficient condition for the accumulation of reliable informa-
tion of a high order. What has not been carefully investigated are the factors that
retarded the reliability of observation and the motives, techniques, concepts, and
other factors which promoted reliability. What seems to have happened is that
for a considerable time the new observational facts concerning man’s physical traits,
cultures and languages, continued to be rationalized in relation to the persisting
tradition of folk anthropology or other concepts. Besides this, European ethno-
centrism created fictitious images of native peoples-the image of the Noble Savage
on the one hand, and the ignoble or bestial savage on the other. Seen in modern
anthropological perspective these images are the kind of phenomena which might
be expected to be one of the consequences of superficial contact with, or secondhand
knowledge of, exotic peoples prior to any systematic or scholarly study of them.1°
Although lack of written records and pictorial material makes the problem difficult
to study, the images of primitive man projected by Europeans are counter-balanced
by the images of civilized man and European culture for which we have evidence
lPHeiaer (1962), p. 260.
201nthe 4th century B. C. Theopompus (born ca. 378), a Greek historian, wrote about the E-
truscans in a manner which reminds us of some of the early reports of the people of the South Pacific.
According t o him sexual promiscuity existed, sexual intercourse sometimes occurred publicly, and
children did not know their own parents. For quotation see Hus (pp. 157-158). The first work t o
present the sexual mores of the people of the South Seas for the English reader was Hawkesworth’s
Account of the Voyages . . . i n the Southern Hemisphere . . . Drawn up from the Journals which were kept
by the Several Commanders . . . etc. 1773. He was a man of letters and had not been on any of the
voyages. As a matter of fact, his book was condemned for inaccuracy and indecency, yet it obtained
wide circulation. Boswell met Capt. Cook a t dinner in 1776 and asked him about the book. Boswell
reports in his Journal (p. 308) that Cook said, “Hawkesworth made in his book a general conclusion
from a particular fact, and wonld take as a fact what they had only heard . . . . . He said that a dis-
regard of chastity in unmarried women was by no means general at Otaheite, and he said Hawkes-
worth’s story of an initiation he had no reason to believe.” “Why, Sir,” Boswell goes on t o say,
“Hawkesworth has used your narrative as a London tavern keeper does wine. He has brewed it (i.e.
mixed other ingredients with it)”. Boswell also says (p. 341) that Cook “candidly confessed to me that
he and his companions who visited the South Sea Islands could not be certain of any information they
got, or supposed they got, except as t o objects falling under the observations of the senses, their
knowledge of the language was so imperfect they required the aid of their senses, and anything which
they learnt about religion, government, or traditions might be quire erroneous.”
THE HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY AS AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROBLEM 31
authorities back to Pliny. In the sixteenth century it was even thought by some that
Mandeville was more reliable than Marco Polo, Columbus and Cortez.26 Banks and
Cook did not find giants in Patagonia. Yet their more reliable observations were
not, at the time, considered superior evidence to the testimony of others. One of the
interesting factors here is that, in support of the existence of giants, pictorial material
had appeared plainly showing the difference in height between Europeans and
Pata$onians.26 The question of the validity of observations is of anthropological
interest both with respect to the steps by which a higher level of reliability was
achieved and the role played by persistent traditions of any kind which retarded
the progress of objective knowledge?’ Even in this century overtones of this old
problem-although in a more refined form-are sometimes heard. A decade ago
Kluckhohn said: “In cultural anthropology we are still too close to the phase in
linguistics when non-European languages were being forcibly recast into the cate-
gories of Latin grammar”.28
Among the positive contributions that emerged from the Age of Discovery was
the fact that, it became more and more apparent that many of the anthropological
observations reported could not be reconciled with traditional folk anthropology.
While all the many revolutionary new questions which arose could not be satis-
factorily answered or, if they were, do not seem adequately treated to us today,
nevertheless, many of them were legitimate anthropological questions : the influence
of climate, the diffusion of customs and social and cultural development. We still
are faced with many of the same questions today and the answers are controversial.
I n order to place some of these questions in their historical context, I wish to quote
here a passage from an unpublished manuscript of Katherine George who some
years ago systematically surveyed the African travel literature from the fifteenth
through the eighteenth century.
Among other things, Dr. George points out that “The Age of Discovery not
only confronted the travellers with an astonishing array of cultural diversities which
“For information on Mandeville consult Letts and particularly Bennett, cf. Hodgen, pp. 69-71.
‘6“Making faithful records of the native eoples of the Pacific proved to be more difficult than
making accurate records of plants, animals, or fandscapes”, writes Smith (pp. 20-21). “There was, for
example, the question of size . . . . there had accumulated by 1768 a formidable body of evidence that
the natives of Patagonia were giants. The Captains, Harrington and Carmen, had come back in 1704
with stories of giants. Byron, in 1764, only four years before Cook sailed in the Endeavour, corroborat-
ed their story . . . . . Byron’s meeting m t h this chief was illustrated in Hawkesworth’s Voyages, the
chief being made, in accordance with Byron’s description, to tower above the Englishman.”
However, since Byron had no professional artist with him, this was “simply an illustration based on a
written statement”. Banks, accompanying Cook, did have artists and was anxious to correct mis-
conceptions about the size of the Patagonians. He wrote in his J O U Tthat ~ the men were from five
feet eight inches t o five feet ten inches in height, while the women were smaller, seldom exceeding
five feet. Furthermore, Buchan and Parkinson both made drawings of the Fuegians showing them t o
be normal in height. Nevertheless, a belief in the giantism of the Patagonians persisted. Lord Mon-
boddo claimed that Hawkesworth’s summary weighed heavily in this direction and even after the
publication of the latter’s Vugu.ges, there was an English collection which illustrated a giantess and a
French collection showing a giant Fuegian receiving Commodore Byron. See Smith (p. 255 and
Plates 167, 168, 169 for the transformation wrought after the invention of photography by Daguerre
(1789-1851) and the use of instrumentaqion and modelling. See Smith, too, for example of the articu-
lation of the general need for more preclse observation on men by such eighteenth century writers as
Ferguson, Monboddo and Herder, as well as the more detailed and explicit instructions given La
PBrouse (1785) as compared with Cook (pp. 100-102).
mAccording t o Smith (see pp. 30, 34) the acceptance of the idea of giants in Fuegia probably re-
flects a long tradition in Europe of antipodal inversion i.e., “the long-standing belief that things in the
southern hemisphere were somehow invested or at least governed by laws which differed from those
governing the northern parts of the world.”
2sKluckhohn, 1953, p. 508.
T H E HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY AS A N ANTHROPOLOGICAL PROBLEM 33
seemed to call for explanation, but after these had been considered and somewhat
assimilated, it also disclosed the presence of cultural correspondences or parallels;
correspondences such as that between a familiar homeland society and one in
Africa, between a custom or culture and a similar trait or condition among the Old
Testament Hebrews, or between African society and the social life of the classical
peoples of European antiquity. Often these parallels, which were recognized as
both contemporary and historical, were merely noted but not explained. But oc-
casionally in early reports, and more frequently in later, notation was accompanied
by efforts on the part of travellers to place them in broader context of theory. In
other words, such parallels were accounted for as the outcome of either diffusion or
development. The travellers who adopted the diff usionist position emerged with
explanations inferring contact at some period in past time; while those who ascribed
similarities to a uniformly operative process of social development noted correspond-
ences between existing African custom and earlier cultural conditions among Euro-
pean or other historical peoples. The latter assumed, in short, that the primitive folk
encountered in Africa were an early stage of progressive or developmental change
like that which was once manifested during the course of the history of some civil-
ized p e ~ p l e ~ ’ . ~ ~
In addition to the posing and answering of anthropological questions which Dr.
George documents in the African travel literature, she also notes a radical shift in
attitude towards Africans in the eighteenth century. The concept of “the bestial
African primitive,” and “the lawless, promiscuous society peculiarly associated with
him,” disappears. “The institutions and customs of the African primitive are not
merely accepted with a new tolerance by the eighteenth century traveller; they are
even fairly often upheld as models to be admired and emulated by the civilized world.
For the ‘noble savage’ is indubitably a personage in these acounts.” Admittedly a
romanticism which, “in its extremer forms, at least, can and does distort objectivity.”
George concludes that the errors “to be chalked up against this new positive pre-
judice in favor of the African primitive are as nothing beside the almost countless
errors of commission and omission attributable to the earlier negative prejudice.”
Consequently, she thinks that the concept of the “noble savage” “became of neces-
sity a friend rather than an enemy to the advance of knowledge about the primitive.
A bias it might remain, with capacities to distort . . . . ., (nevertheless) it introduced
a compulsion to go forth and observe.” It may have been “a door to objectivity,”
if not objectivity itself.30
So far as genuine anthropological concepts are concerned, there are clearly
defined historical links with a past which long antedated the rise of any variety of
anthropological discipline. Radcliffe-Brown found that his distinction between
ethnology and social anthropology had its roots in seventeenth and eighteenth
century writers. These two interests, he says, were clearly recognized by William
Robertson in his History of America (1777) where this author “gives one of the
earliest definitions of the study that later came to be called social anthropology,
and distinguished from the investigation of the origins of peoples which we now call
aQSocial Theory in the early literature of voyage and exploratim in Africa. Doctoral Dissertation,
Dept. of Social Institutions, Univ. of California, Berkeley, 1944. Katherine B. Oakes (Mrs. H. C.
George).
aoGeorge(1958), pp. 71-72..
34 A. IRVING HALLOWELL
in the distant past. Physical science concentrated upon what Simpson has called
immanent, or nonhistorical processes and principles, inherent in the very nature of
matter-energy (gravity, energy, radiation). However, “the actual state of the uni-
verse, or any part of it at a given time, its configuration, is not immanent and is
constantly changing . . . . . . History may be defined as configurational change
through time, a sequence of real, individual, but interrelated events.”34 Simpson
points out that before the eighteenth century most people thought that the con-
figurational aspects of natural phenomena were likewise unchanging (the hills are
LLeverlasting”) both aspects being simply given, “probably by the creative acts of
And, since until Darwin living species were thought to be immutable, each
occupying its assigned niche in the Great Chain of Being, a time dimension in early
observationable and classificatory biology was not of central importance.
What is of special interest historically, and particularly from an anthropological
point of view, are the two main sources from which the knowledge and intellectual
stimulus came which required an explicit differentiation between immanent and
configurational characteristics. These were geology and human history. “No matter
what they thought of causes,11Simpson points out, ‘(the pioneer geologists learned
that the configuration of the earth is constantly changing, that it has a history.
Hence it follows that the structure of the earth-and, by an extension quickly made,
that of the whole physical universe-is not immanent but is at any moment a
transient state within a historical sequence.” And, “in the field of human history,
change in social structure and the human condition were generally evident, so that
a thoroughgoing belief in static configuration was hardly possible to even the earliest
~ ~ a linear conception of a sequence of irreversible events in time
h i s t o ~ i a n s . ” Thus
more and more deeply permeated the thinking of western man not only in the
humanities, but in the physical and biological sciences and the incipient social
sciences from the eighteenth century onward.
While there are traces of cyclical theories in the Middle Ages and later, as a
consequence of the influence of Arabic and Classical learning, they did not prove
viable. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the belief that a general
process of degeneration was taking place had its But, from the seventeenth
century forward, writes Eliade, “linearism and the progressivistic conception of
history assert themselves more and more, inaugurating faith in an infinite progress,
a faith already proclaimed by Leibniz, predominent in the century of ‘enlightenment’
and popularized in the nineteenth century by the triumph of the ideas of the evolu-
ti0nists.”3~It was within the intellectual climate engendered by the early phase of
the conceptualization of the history of man as progressive that the cultural data
already accumulated in the Age of Discovery began to be fitted into this new frame
of universal temporal reference. General stages, or grades, of cultural development
were discerned and articulated, notably by the Scots of the eighteenth century, in
terms of “conjectural h i ~ t 0 r y . l ’ Associated
~~ with the reconstruction of cultural
stages in the development of mankind, without the benefit of prehistoric archaeology,
___
”Simpson, 1964, p. 122 in chapter 7, “The Historical Factor in Science.”
“Simpson, 1960, p. 118.
a9Tbid, p. 118.
a7SeeHarris and Hodgen, p. 263 8.
**Eliade,pp. 145-146.
8gSee Bryson. The term “conjectural history” was introduced by Dugald Stewart.
36 A . IRVING HALLOWELL
detailed investigation of the history of the study of man. Yet, it has been in western
culture t ha t man has become most completely aware of his own unique being and
the possibility of making himself the subject of rational objective inquiry. The
historical and cultural factors that led to this type of inquiry are a n important part
of the history of anthropology. However, as Margaret T . Hodgen has observed re-
~ e n t l ywe
, ~ have
~ not yet probed far enough, nor deeply enough into the past. Partic-
ularly at a time, too, when there is such an upsurge of interest in the history of
science, the history of anthropology should not be viewed as antiquarianism, or
even marginal to current interests. A historical orientation to the development of
anthropological knowledge should provide a point of departure for a sounder ap-
praisal of current trends of thought and further research, as well as clarifying our
professional role in relation to other disciplines concerned with the study of man.
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