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com

1 NAME, CIPHER MF OKR, BASE,

CONTRACTOR AND TERMS OF COMPLETION
1.1 The name of the R&D midrange: “Development of hardware and software
a complex for training specialists of information warfare units and
subunits.
1.2 Code midrange OCD: "Crystal-2V".
1.3 The basis for the implementation of the SC R & D - State
contract number 6734 /20.18 dated February 16, 2018, tactical and technical assignment for
ROC "Crystal-2".
1.4 The lead R&D contractor is FSUE Rostov-on-Don
Research Institute of Radio Communications (FGUP RNIIRS).
Performer of the R&D Center: Scientific and Technical Center Vulkan
LLC (STC Vulkan LLC)
1.5 Deadlines for the implementation of the R&D mid-range

Start - April 2018, end - October 25, 2020

2 PURPOSE OF PERFORMANCE SC ECD, NAME AND

PRODUCT INDEX
2.1 The purpose of the implementation of the mid-R&D

Creation of SC hardware and software (HPS) to provide

comprehensive training of specialists in the field of information security.
2.2 Full (abbreviated) product name
2.2.1 Full name of the product - MF APS preparation
IS specialists.
2.2.2 The abbreviated name of the product is SC APS PSIB.
2.2.3 Scope of the product: comprehensive preparation
information security specialists in the following areas:
blocking access to resources of the global public information
system (hereinafter - GIS OP);
incapacitation of railway and air (maritime) transport control
systems;
violation of the normal operation of power supply and life support
systems;
identification of vulnerabilities of critical information
infrastructure objects to information and technical impacts.
Note:
1. The list of life support systems is specified at the stage
technical design (TP) with the execution of a separate decision, which is
agreed and approved by the Lead Contractor.
3 TACTICAL AND TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PRODUCT

3.1 Composition of the product:

MF APS PSIB should ensure simultaneous work of up to 30

trainees.
The composition of the midrange APS PSIB:
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subsystem for processing scenarios for blocking access to GIS OP

resources (POS-GIS);
subsystem for working out scenarios to counter the disruption of
the functioning of railway and air (sea) transport control systems (POS-
T);
subsystem for working out scenarios to counter the disruption of
the functioning of power supply and life support systems (POS-ES);

subsystem for processing scenarios of typical IS tasks (POS-Z);

training aids (UTS) for POS-GIS, POS-T, POS-ES, POS-Z subsystems;

set of operational and program documentation (ED and

PD);
a set of general software (OPS), application software after
software (APS) and special software (SPO);

ZIP-O SC APS PSIB.

Note:
1. Composition, completeness, characteristics and procedure
the interaction of technical means, general and special software of the
MF APS are specified at the stage of technical design (TP) and are
agreed with the Lead Contractor with the execution of a separate
solution.
2. List, manufacturers, versions, characteristics, validity period
and the procedure for prolongation of HIF and PPO licenses are specified at
the TA stage and agreed with the Lead Contractor. OPPO and PPO licenses
must expire no earlier than November 31, 2021.
3. A set of HPO, PPO and SPO MF APS must be delivered to
recorded digital media with the appropriate marking.
4. At the stage of development of working design documentation
(RKD) options for the supply of SC APS PSIB should be developed and
agreed with the Lead Contractor.
3.1.1 Composition of POS-GIS:
GIS virtualization server OP with no worse characteristics: 2xlntel
Xeon X5680 processor 3.33 GHz / RAM 64 GB / HDD 8 TB, rack mounting
kit;
Application software consisting of: GIS OP management
software; APS GIS OP.
SPO subsystems PPA and PTT APK "Amezit". 3.1.2
Composition of POS-T:
virtualization server systems management transport With
no worse performance: 2xIntel Xeon X5680 processor 3.33 GHz / RAM
64 GB / HDD 8 TB, rack mounting kit;
APS of transport management systems;
Open source software for simulating the functions of managing a transport
infrastructure object.
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3.1.3 Composition of POS-ES:

power and life support systems virtualization server with no
worse characteristics: 2xlntel Xeon X5680 processor 3.33 GHz / RAM 64
GB / HDD 8 TB, rack mounting kit;
APS of power supply and life support systems; Open source
software for simulating the functions of managing power systems
supply and life support facilities.
3.1.4 Composition of POS-Z:
server with no worse characteristics: 2xlntel Xeon X5680 processor
3.33 GHz / RAM 64 GB / HDD 8 TB, rack-mount kit; SPO POS-Z, including
elements of the subsystems PMS, PRD and PRR of the APK "Amezit".

3.1.5 The composition of the TCB:

3.1.5.1 e-learning aids;

3.1.5.2 simulators for practicing and consolidating technical
problem solving skills in terms of the areas specified in clause 2.2.3;
3.1.5.3 control programs designed to
verification (assessment) of the quality of knowledge of trainees in terms of the areas
specified in clause 2.3.1;
3.1.5.4 Training slides (PowerPoint presentations) on
features of the construction and functioning of objects of influence in terms
of the directions specified in clause 2.3.1;
3.1.5.5 programs of seminars and laboratory work on testing
activities in terms of the areas specified in clause 2.3.1.
3.1.5.6 training materials for conducting
seminars and laboratory work to develop activities in terms of the areas
specified in paragraph 2.3.1.
3.1.5.7 demonstration examples, if available
due to the nature of the training seminar (laboratory work) and the
technology of the activities being worked out.
3.1.5.8 qualification requirements, curricula and
programs for each direction specified in paragraph 2.3.1.
Note: TCBs are developed and agreed upon at the stages of
development of design documentation and production of a prototype
product and are agreed with the Lead Contractor.
3.1.6 The final composition of the MF APS PSIB, including
the nomenclature and technical characteristics of telecommunications equipment
and hardware, the list and versions of HPS, software and open source software, is
determined by the Contractor based on the results of the TP and is agreed with the
Lead Contractor.
3.2 Appointment requirements
3.2.1 MF APC PSIPbS PSIB should ensure the implementation
the following features:
3.2.1.1 In terms of working out measures to block access
in GIS OP:
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3.2.1.1.1 Imitation of the operation of a group of individual (subscriber)

access nodes in GIS OP;
3.2.1.1.2 Simulation of the work of the collective access node in the GIS OP;
3.2.1.1.3 Simulation of the operation of the access node in the GIS OP
telecommunications operator of the territorial level;
3.2.1.1.4 Development of measures to block access to the GIS
OP through the implementation of denial of service attacks on the bandwidth of
network equipment;
3.2.1.1.5 Development of measures to block access to the GIS
OP through the implementation of denial of service attacks on the exhaustion of
computing resources of network equipment;
3.2.1.1.6 Development of measures to block access to the GIS
EP using the open source software of APK "Amezit" and methods of their application;
3.2.1.2 In terms of working out measures to disable systems
management of rail, air and sea transport:
3.2.1.2.1 Simulation of the operation of railway automation systems
node;
3.2.1.2.2 Simulation of the operation of the elements of the control system
by air transport at the technological sections of the air terminal
complex (airport, aerodrome);
3.2.1.2.3 Simulation of the operation of the elements of the control system
sea transport of the sea (river) port;
3.2.1.2.4 Practice methods for obtaining unauthorized
access to local computer and technological networks of transport
infrastructure facilities;
3.2.1.2.5 Development of methods of intervention in technological
transport management processes;
3.2.1.2.6 Development of the application of the open source software of the APK "Amezit" in order to
incapacitation (impairment of performance) of control systems for
railway, air and sea transport;
3.2.1.3 In terms of developing measures to counteract
violation of the normal operation of power supply and life support
systems:
3.2.1.3.1 Simulation of the operation of power supply management systems;
3.2.1.3.2 Simulation of the operation of the elements of the control system
water supply;
3.2.1.3.3 Practice methods for obtaining unauthorized
access to local computer and technological networks of infrastructure
and life support facilities of settlements and industrial zones;

3.2.1.3.4 Development of methods of intervention in technological

management processes at infrastructure and life support facilities;
3.2.1.3.5 Development of the application of the open source software of the APK "Amezit" in order to
violations of the normal operation of control systems at infrastructure
and life support facilities;
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3.2.1.4 In terms of working out measures to identify vulnerabilities

objects of critical information infrastructure to information and
technical impacts:
3.2.1.4.1 Imitation of the work of elements of objects of critical
information infrastructure of the RF Armed Forces;
3.2.1.4.2 Simulation of information technology implementation scenarios
technical impacts on critical information infrastructure facilities of the
RF Armed Forces;
3.2.1.4.3 Development of measures to identify vulnerabilities
objects of critical information infrastructure of the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation to information and technical impacts;
3.2.1.4.4 Development of the application of the open source software of the APK "Amezit" for
identifying vulnerabilities in system and application software;

3.2.1.5 The possibility of using (simulating) various

combinations of information security tools to simulate the operation of
cybersecurity systems at the objects of impact;
3.2.1.6 In terms of organizing group lessons (with the participation of two and
more segments):
3.2.1.6.1 Organization of game teaching methods in terms of
directions specified in paragraph 2.3.1, in the following forms:
search for vulnerabilities in the infrastructure of the opposing
side;
solving practical problems;
3.2.1.6.2 Formation of a virtual playing field;
3.2.1.6.3 Communication with subsystems
working out scenarios for working out changes in the situation in the process of
a group lesson;
3.2.1.6.4 Evaluation of the effectiveness of trainees' actions;
3.2.1.7 In terms of ensuring the educational process:
3.2.1.7.1 theoretical training and implementation of practical
works (modeling, design, problem solving, etc.) in the areas specified in
clause 2.3.1;
3.2.1.7.2 determination of the level of knowledge of trainees and control
their assimilation of materials;
3.2.1.7.3 switching of hardware components in
single LAN;
3.2.1.7.4 ensuring continuous operation of the MF APS
PSIB;
3.2.2 Providing backup and recovery
data.
3.2.3 When using in the educational process landscape
layouts with actuator simulators, it should be possible to broadcast the
video image of the layout to a collective display device (LCD TV,
projector) in real time.
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3.2.4 At the TA stage, it is necessary to explore the possibility

organization of distance learning.
3.3 Electronic protection requirements
3.3.1 The requirements for electronic protection are determined at the stage
TP development.
3.4 Requirements for survivability and resistance to external influences
3.4.1 Apparatus and equipment must be stable
to the impact of mechanical and climatic factors in accordance with the
requirements for equipment according to group 1.1 of GOST RV 20.39.304-98,
version "UHL" with the following restrictions:
operating temperature range from +15°С to +35°С;
relative humidity up to 80%;
storage and transportation temperature range from 0°C to
+ 40°С.
3.4.2 Requirements for the hardware of the product for resistance to
exposure to random broadband vibration, acoustic noise, single and
multiple mechanical shock, snow load, low atmospheric pressure, mold
fungi, salt fog, atmospheric precipitation and condensed precipitation,
static and dynamic dust, solar radiation, special environments and
corrosive agents of the atmosphere , the damaging factors of nuclear
explosions and changes in the temperature of the environment are not
presented.
3.4.3 For open source software supplied on a CD-ROM (carrier), the requirements
resistance to external influences are presented in accordance with the
requirements for the operation and storage of CDs (media).
3.4.4 Purchased components must comply with
conditions for using the product. The resistance of computer
equipment (hereinafter - CVT) to the effects of mechanical and climatic
factors must be confirmed by their specifications or other
accompanying documentation. Additional tests are not carried out.
3.5 Reliability requirements
3.5.1 Equipment of the product in accordance with GOST 20.39.303-98
should refer to general-purpose products, type I in terms of the
number of permissible operable states, continuous long-term use,
recoverable, serviceable, with failures of a faulty nature, controlled
before use, worn out and aging at the same time, repaired in an
impersonal way.
3.5.2 The reliability of the product should be characterized by the following
indicator values:
the mean time between failures must be at least 10,000 hours; the
average recovery time of the technical means of the complexes that
make up the product should be no more than 0.5 hours (using spare parts);

the average service life of the product and the complexes included in its
composition must be at least 7 years.
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3.5.3 Criteria and characteristics of failures of component parts of the product

must be developed in accordance with GOST RV 27.2.01-2005 and given
in the relevant operational documentation (ED).
Note: the list of equipment of the complex, the failure of which leads to
the need to decommission the complex for its restoration and replacement,
should be determined at the stage of development of the design
documentation.
3.5.4 Reliability tests are not carried out. Characteristics
reliability during preliminary tests are confirmed by the calculation and
experimental method in accordance with the requirements of GOST RV
0027-009-2008.
3.5.5 The means of MF APS ISIS should exclude the loss
configuration information due to failures and failures of the hardware
platform.
3.5.6 To assess the conformity of the equipment of products with the requirements for
reliability and ensure the required level of reliability, the following
documents should be developed:
reliability calculation - at the stage of development of design documentation;

reliability assurance program for the development stage in accordance

with the requirements of GOST RV 20.39.302-98 and GOST RV 27.1.02-2005 - at
the TP stage.
The decision on the need to develop a reliability program for the
production stage of products should be made at state tests, taking into
account the results of manufacturing.
3.5.7 At the TA stage, the possibility of
ensuring the maintainability of the product MF APS PSIB according to GOST RV
20.39.309.
3.5.8 At the TA stage, a program to ensure
reliability at the development stage (PONr). The content of measures to
ensure reliability must comply with the requirements of GOST RV
27.1.02-2005.
3.6 Requirements for ergonomics, habitability and technical aesthetics
3.6.1 Ergonomic requirements are not required. Program
Ergonomic support of the created product is not being developed.
3.6.2 There are no habitability requirements.
3.6.3 There are no requirements for technical aesthetics.
3.7 Requirements for operation, storage, convenience of technical
maintenance and repair
3.7.1 The operational documentation for the product must be
developed in accordance with the requirements of GOST 2.601 and GOST R VD
2.601. At the TP stage, the developer submits proposals on the composition of
operational documentation to the Lead Contractor for approval.
3.7.2 In the event of emergencies related to
failure of the power supply, it must be possible to operate the product's
APS for at least 15 minutes to provide opportunities for the correct
completion of work.
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3.7.3 Composition of instruments, measuring instruments of the military

purpose and devices should be sufficient for monitoring the technical
condition, maintenance and repair of the complex, performed by the
crew, without the use of additional equipment that is not part of the
complex.
3.8 No portability requirements
3.9 Safety requirements
3.9.1 During the operation of the technical means of the product
the safety of all types of work must be ensured subject to the
requirements of the operation manual, safety regulations and fire
prevention measures in accordance with the following documents:
GOST RV 20.39.107-98, GOST 12.2.007.0, GOST 12.4.124, GOST 12.1.018,
GOST 12.1.038.
3.9.2 In accordance with GOST RV 20.39.309-98 design
technical means of the product must ensure the protection of personnel:
from the effects of electrical voltage;
from hazardous factors of fire and possible explosion of explosive
elements;
from thermal influence.
3.9.3 The product must be provided with a lock,
excluding the possibility of self-operation and damage when exposed to
static electricity and overloads, as well as unauthorized switching on /
off.
3.9.4 The operational documentation for the product must contain
the following information is given:
recommendations for the safe performance of operations (works) on
products during their maintenance, adjustment and repair;
on safety measures during the operation of products;
the procedure for personnel to extinguish a fire with standard fire
extinguishing equipment.
3.9.5 Requirements for bulletproof and anti-fragmentation armor,
protection from the effects of toxic and radioactive substances, fire
resistance and explosion safety of the developed complex are not
presented.
3.10 Secrecy requirements
3.10.1 The purpose of secrecy is to exclude
receipt by the enemy of information constituting a state secret about
the product at all stages of its life cycle.
3.10.2 The task of ensuring secrecy is to conduct
organizational, regime and technical measures to prevent the
disclosure of information constituting a state secret.

3.10.3 To achieve the set goal, there must be carried out

the following measures to ensure secrecy:
an analysis of the channels of leakage of information constituting a state
secret was carried out;
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hidden data on the purpose of the sample, its components, the total
performance characteristics that determine its combat use;
possible channels of information leakage are closed. 3.10.4 List of
product information and information processed
in it, in accordance with the "List of information of the Armed Forces of the
Russian Federation subject to classification", approved by order of the
Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation in 2013 No. 046 (hereinafter -
the "List ..."):

No. Name of information about the product and item number Degree
p/p information processed (paragraph, column) secrecy
(circulating in it) "List..."

1 Purpose, composition, capabilities of the 95 par. 3 secret

MF APS PSIB
Intelligence, revealing requirements
absolutely
2 normative documents By 375 para. 1
secret
information confrontation
Information on individual events that do
3 not reveal the plans (concepts) of 375 para. 2 secret
information confrontation

The list of information is specified by the executor at each stage of

the R&D SC (if necessary) and agreed with the Lead Executor.
3.10.5At the TP stage, the list of information about
products to be classified, with the determination of their degree of secrecy,
and an analysis of possible channels for the leakage of classified information
during the operation of the device was carried out. Measures for their closure
should be reflected in the operational documentation.
3.10.6 All media used during operation
products must have an appropriate secrecy label.
3.10.7 Specific composition of the product information security system
is determined at the TP stage, taking into account the requirements of the
"Guidelines for the protection of information from unauthorized access in the
Armed Forces of the Russian Federation", approved by order of the Minister of
Defense of the Russian Federation in 2013 No. 011, and relevant guidance
documents.
3.10.8 The design of the MF APS FSIB should not contain a secret
information, secret components, devices, nodes and elements.
3.10.9 Marking and inscriptions on the MF APS PSIB and packaging are not
should carry information revealing its functional purpose. The mention
of classified information in unclassified correspondence and
negotiations should be excluded.
3.10.10 Control and evaluation of the adequacy of the measures taken to
the protection of protected information about the sample is carried out by the
supervisors of works and the regime-secret bodies of the executors in accordance with
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“Instructions for Ensuring the Secret Mode in the Russian Federation”,

approved by Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation No.
3-1 dated January 5, 2004 (for civilian organizations), instructions for
ensuring the secrecy regime in the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation, approved by order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian
Federation 2005 year No. 010, other regulatory legal acts and orders in
the field of protection of state secrets.
3.10.11 Representatives of organizations (enterprises) of industry
and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, which are not
direct executors, may be allowed to familiarize themselves with the
documentation and information security tools only with the permission
of the Lead Executor in the prescribed manner.
3.10.12 In unclassified correspondence, only
cipher MF R&D without disclosing information about the work being done.
3.10.13 In the course of the implementation of the R&D MF, the
organizational and technical measures that exclude unauthorized
access to product documentation containing protected information.

3.10 Requirements for protection against engineering and technical personnel

3.10.1 According to the degree of importance of protection against ITR to the product MF APS
PSIB, as a model of weapons and military equipment, the third category of protection
against ITR is established. For technical means of processing and transmitting information
from the composition of the MF APS PSIS, the category of protection against ITR is not
established.
The categories of protection from engineering and technical equipment for newly created SC products are specified in

the TOR for the implementation of SC R&D for their creation.

3.10.2 The purpose of providing protection against foreign technical

intelligence (hereinafter referred to as ITR) is the exclusion of possible channels
for the leakage of protected information, as well as the exclusion (significant
difficulty) of obtaining protected information by the enemy through technical
means of intelligence (TCP).
3.10.3 The intent of protection should be to develop and
implementation of measures that ensure the elimination of signs that
reveal information protected from engineers. VT samples, under which the
legend should be carried out, should be determined at the TP stage.

3.10.4 To achieve the goal in the execution stages

The following works should be carried out by the R&D Center:
instructions for counteracting engineering and technical personnel during mid-range
R&D within a month after the conclusion of the contract;
instructions for counteracting engineering and technical personnel during
preliminary and interdepartmental tests of the product - 2 months before the start of
the tests;
draft Instructions for countermeasures from engineering and technical personnel
during the operation of the product at facilities - 2 months before the start of
interdepartmental tests.
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3.10.5 All documents and measures to protect against engineering and technical risks must
comply with GOST RV 50859-96, GOST RV 50934-96, STR-97, as well as current
regulatory documents on countering engineering and technical personnel.
3.10.6 Protection of the MF APS of the PSIB from ITR during operation should
be organized in accordance with the requirements of the orders of the
Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation of 1996 No. 008 "On the
organization of the protection of information from technical means of
intelligence of foreign states in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation"
and 1996 No. 020 "On the approval of special requirements and
recommendations for the protection of information processed by technical
means transmission and processing of information in the Armed Forces of
the Russian Federation”, “Regulations on the state system for protecting
information in the Russian Federation from foreign technical intelligence and
from its leakage through technical channels”, approved by Decree of the
Government of the Russian Federation of September 15, 1993 No. 912-51 and
GOST-RV 50934-2010.
3.11 Standardization, unification and cataloging requirements
3.11.1 Standardization and unification of document forms,
circulating in the product should be ensured by improving the forms
and reducing the variety of documents of the same functional purpose.

3.11.2 Product development must meet the requirements

on standardization and unification, the order of assignment and the composition of
which must comply with GOST B 15.207, GOST B 20.39.105.
3.11.3 The TP materials must contain information about
existing analogues of the developed product.
3.11.4 MF APS PSIS should be developed as a basic,
ensuring the use of developed and promising solutions for its
implementation, the possibility of systematic modernization and the
creation of various modifications. At the same time, the maximum
unification of samples should be ensured in the complex.
3.11.5 Development and production of MF APS FSIB should
be carried out taking into account the use of standard and unified
technological equipment, tooling and tools, as well as standard test
tools and methods.
3.11.6 Cataloging requirements
3.11.6.1 Cataloging work is carried out in accordance with
the procedure and rules established by the requirements of GOST RV
0044-015-2012 and other standards (regulatory documents) of the
product cataloging system for federal state needs.
1.11.6.2 Samples of military equipment, their components and components
items classified as supplies must be registered in the federal catalog of
products (for federal state needs) with the assignment of the taxpayer's
tax to them.
3.12 Manufacturability requirements There are no
manufacturability requirements.
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3.13 Design requirements

3.13.1 Structurally, the equipment of the product must be
made according to the modular principle (should provide the possibility of
rational configuration depending on the tasks being solved).
3.13.2 The equipment of the product must provide measures
protection against overloads and against static electricity.
3.13.3 Blocks and modules of the equipment of the product must have
markings, serial numbers.
3.13.4 The design of the product should provide the possibility
replacement of special software without changing the design of the
main device, interchangeability of units and blocks of the same type
with the exception of incorrect replacement, the possibility of sealing
(sealing).
3.13.5 The product must have product status indicators:
“ready for operation”, “emergency”, etc., as well as a sufficient number
of I / O connectors and expansion slots for connecting peripheral
(interfacing) equipment.
3.13.6 Electrical connections between blocks and nodes
equipment must be made by means of connectors. All cables, wires and
connectors must be marked so that the connection points can be
quickly and accurately located.
3.13.7 LAN servers, databases, LAN network equipment with
stationary placement should be placed in standard racks equipped with
doors that ensure their locking and sealing.

3.13.8 Technical means (components) of products containing

non-volatile storage devices must be equipped with sealers for
enclosures, ports, and I/O devices.

4 TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC REQUIREMENTS

4.1 The cost of the Kristall-2V R&D midrange is thousand rubles,
is limiting and is not subject to indexation. The type of price and its value by stages are
determined by the contract for the implementation of the R&D midrange.
4.2 At the IMC stage when preparing the final report on the MF ROC
the executor provides the results of the feasibility study and determines
the following indicators:
estimated cost, duration of preparation and development of serial
production of the product;
the estimated price of the product in mass production; limiting
labor intensity of manufacturing a product in mass production;

the limiting value of the standard labor intensity of the product

maintenance during operation;
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the marginal average annual cost of operating the product and

maintaining it during long-term storage.

5 REQUIREMENTS FOR TYPES OF SECURITY

5.1 Regulatory requirements
5.1.1 The operational documentation for the product must be
developed in accordance with the requirements of GOST 2.601, GOST R VD
2.601 and ESPD. At the stage of TP development, the Contractor develops and
submits proposals for the composition of operational documentation for
approval by the Lead Contractor.
5.1.2 Reporting documentation submitted for the stages of R&D SC,
must comply with the requirements of GOST RV 15.110-2003, GOST RV
15.203-2001, GOST RV 2.902-2005, GOST RV 15.211-2002 and GOST
2.601-2006.
5.1.3 Normative and technical support work should
carried out in accordance with the requirements of the GOST system
ESKD, ESPD (when developing software), GOST series RV 20.39.301–
20.39.305-98, GOST RV 20.57.304-98, OTT 7.1.203-90, GOST RV 2.902-2005 ,
GOST RV 15.203-2001.
5.1.4 Necessity and requirements for timing and content
work on:
the analysis of the existing fund of normative documentation on
standardization in order to assess its capabilities for normative support
of the product life cycle stages is not presented;
development of new standardization programs or proposals-
applications for the development of new or updating existing regulatory
documents for standardization in accordance with the requirements of GOST
RV 1.0-98 and PR B 50.1.013-98 are not presented;
the formation of an electronic catalog of products under development is
not presented.
5.2 Requirements for metrological assurance
5.2.1 Metrological assurance must comply with
requirements of GOST RV 1.1-96, GOST RV 20.39.309-98, GOST RV 20.57.310, OTT
1.1.7-89, OTT 1.2.7-89.
5.2.2 Metrological assurance of product testing should
comply with the requirements of GOST RV 8.570-98.
5.2.3 Testing of measuring instruments and certification of the test
equipment and TSCP used as measuring instruments must be carried
out before the start of the relevant tests.
In the manufacture of MF APS PSIB, it is allowed to use certified
measuring instruments of foreign production, included in the State
Register and providing the necessary measurement accuracy.
5.2.4 Measurement procedures shall be validated
or standardized, and provide the required accuracy, reliability and
reproducibility of product test results.
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5.2.5 At the TA stage, a program should be developed

metrological support in accordance with GOST RV 1.1-96.
5.2.6 Metrological examination should be carried out in
in accordance with the requirements of GOST RV 8.573-2000 and the "Guidelines on the
procedure for conducting metrological examination of weapons and military
equipment", as well as in accordance with the order of the RF Ministry of Defense of
2012 No. 222.
5.2.7 The list of measuring instruments included in the product,
agreed and approved by the Lead Contractor at the stage of development of the design
documentation.
The design and placement of measuring instruments should
ensure the convenience of their use, verification and repair.
Verification of measuring instruments should be carried out in accordance with
GOST RV 8.576-2000.
5.2.8 Names and designations of physical quantities and their
units in the RKD must comply with the requirements of GOST 8.417-2002,
RMG 29-99.
5.3 Diagnostic software requirements
5.3.1 Product diagnostic support must
be carried out in accordance with GOST 26656, GOST 27518 and other
applicable NTD.
5.3.2 At the TP stage, the
performer the following requirements for diagnostic support:
quantitative values of indicators of technical diagnostics;
requirements for suitability for technical diagnostics (traceability) of the
sample;
requirements for the range of diagnosed (monitored) parameters
and their characteristics;
requirements for the means of technical diagnostics (technical
condition monitoring);
requirements for methods and rules of technical diagnostics
(technical condition monitoring);
conditional probabilities of undetected and false failures (faults) in
the product with an accuracy to which the location of the failure (fault)
is determined;
conditional probability of erroneous prediction of safe operation;

periodicity And duration technical

diagnostics (technical condition control);
depth of troubleshooting and completeness of technical
diagnostics (technical condition monitoring).
5.3.3 Justification of the requirements for diagnostic support,
indicators of technical diagnostics, as well as restrictions on these
indicators, should be carried out on the basis of achieving the
maximum possible efficiency of the product.
 15

5.3.4 To provide operational monitoring and diagnostics

faults in the developed product, software methods for detecting and
localizing faults in subsystem software should be provided.

5.4 Requirements for mathematical, software and

information and linguistic support
5.4.1 Software requirements
5.4.1.1 Software should include in its
composition methods and calculation algorithms for information-analytical and
information-calculation components of the product, including:
mathematical methods and data processing algorithms; mathematical
methods and algorithms for visual presentation of information about
the results of data processing.
5.4.1.2 Methods, models and algorithms should be detailed
are described, documented and independent of their software implementation.
5.4.1.3 The development of models and algorithms should be carried out with
maximum use of proven standard models, methods and algorithms.

5.4.2 Software requirements

5.4.2.1 The common software (GSS) of the product shall
function and ensure the organization of the computing process on the
computing facilities of the system.
5.4.2.2 The HPS should include:
operating systems (OS);
database management systems (DBMS);
drivers that ensure the operation of peripheral devices and the
correct processing of various types of information data;
information security tools (ISP), including anti-virus tools (such as
DrWeb or Kaspersky Anti-Virus).
5.4.2.3 Antivirus protection tools used (SAVZ)
must be certified in the system of certification of information security
tools of the Ministry of Defense of Russia, checked for the possibility of
using in the product (including compatibility with software and
hardware and meet the specified requirements for anti-virus
protection) and included in the software of the product in the
prescribed manner.
Note: at the stage of developing the TP, the contractor, together
with the Lead Contractor, should prepare a decision on the procedure for
submitting, applying and periodically updating the CAD.
5.4.2.4 The selected BACS must not conflict with
installed general and special software.
5.4.2.5 HPF must be installed in the minimum required
for the configuration to work and should not contain game programs.

5.4.2.6 Personal computer operating systems used,

should have a full set of services for linking software
 16

modules, network interaction, inclusion in and exclusion from systems

of various hardware, control of information security, display of
information and ensuring the functioning of distributed databases,
regardless of what computer technology they work on.

5.4.2.7 The software of the product shall support

reference model of open systems interconnection and ensure the independence
of application-level programs from the network environment.
5.4.2.8 The software included in the product must
be compatible with each other.
5.4.2.9 The product software interface shall have
semantic transparency, unambiguity and intuitive accessibility for
various categories of users, regardless of the computer technology
used and the operating environment.
Note : screen forms are agreed with the Lead Contractor at the
stage of TP development and are specified at the stage of prototype
manufacturing.
5.4.2.10 To ensure product software quality
automated debugging tools should be used that support syntactic and
semantic control of the correctness of modules written in programming
languages of various levels and languages of information systems
(database management systems, spreadsheets, etc.) and control of
their translation into machine code of computer commands. Automated
debugging tools should perform the following functions:

control of the correctness of the source texts of programs and the issuance of
information about the place and nature of errors;
issuance of debugging results and necessary intermediate data in the
debugging language after their preliminary processing;
the ability to correct the debugged program in order to correct
the detected errors.
5.4.2.11 It shall be possible to expand
functionality without significant modifications to the program code
(building on a modular basis).
5.4.2.12 Extension programming interfaces shall be clearly
documented and included in the program documentation.
5.4.2.13 Development and operation of software
must be carried out in compliance with the requirements of GOST R 56939.
5.4.3 Requirements To information-linguistic
security.
5.4.3.1 All functions of the open source software must support the Russian language and
provide a Russian-language user interface (taking into account the
legend requirements).
5.4.3.2 The open source software must ensure the processing of information
documents in supported Unicode languages.
 17

5.4.3.3 Open source software must support advanced language features

search queries sufficient to solve information problems.
Note : requirements for information and linguistic support are
specified based on the results of the TA.
6 REQUIREMENTS FOR RAW MATERIALS, MATERIALS AND KIMP

6.1 The materials and coatings used must comply with

the requirements of section 8 of GOST RV 20.39.309-98 and the standards of the
unified corrosion and aging protection system (ESZKS).
6.2 Use of materials and components is allowed
foreign production.
Components of foreign (joint) production must be subjected to a
special check for the presence of possibly embedded electronic devices
for intercepting (distorting, destroying) information.

The requirements of the instruction on the control of the use of

foreign-made ECB in systems, complexes, samples of military equipment
(approved by order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation in
2012 No. 1555) are not presented.
6.3 Use of materials and components of foreign
production is drawn up by a separate decision and agreed with the
Lead Contractor.
6.4 It is allowed to use the product components and
purchased equipment of domestic production with acceptance by the Quality Control Department (as agreed with the VP of the

Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation).

6.5 Materials and coatings used in apparatus should be

ensure compliance with the requirements for resistance to external
influences.

7 REQUIREMENTS TO CONSERVATIONS, PACKAGING AND

MARKING
7.1 Product marking must meet the requirements of GOST RV
20.39.309-98. The marking must be stable during the entire service life
of the product, mechanically strong and must not be erased or washed
off by liquids used during operation.

8 REQUIREMENTS FOR TRAINING EQUIPMENT

8.1 There are no requirements.

9 SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS
9.1 Terminology when creating a product should be applied with
taking into account the requirements of the Manual on Information
Confrontation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the Concept for
the Creation of Means of Software and Hardware Influence in the Armed Forces
of the Russian Federation, approved on June 20, 2008 by the Chief of the General
 18

Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation - First Deputy

Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Concept of Information
Confrontation, approved on May 7, 2010 by the Minister of Defense of the
Russian Federation and based on the latest achievements in the field of
information and telecommunications technologies.
9.2 When performing midrange R&D, the results of
implementation of R&D "Amezit".
9.3 Requirements for the types and composition of special equipment and
tooling necessary to ensure the operation and maintenance of the
product, repair and technological equipment intended for the
acquisition of repair bodies, the development of test equipment for the
product, test methods and the development of a mathematical model
are not presented.
9.4 Requirements for patentability and patentability
products
9.4.1 When performing SC R & D, patent
research in accordance with GOST R-15.011 “SRPP. Patent research.
Content and procedure”, completed by putting down a report on them.
The patent research report is included in the reporting scientific and
technical documentation submitted at the TP stage.

9.5 Requirements for protecting information from unauthorized

access
9.5.1 Degree of secrecy of processed and stored information
in the product - "top secret".
9.5.2 Data processing mode - multi-user.
9.5.3 The rights to access the processed information are different.
9.5.4 The class of information protection against unauthorized access is defined - 1B, c
in accordance with the requirements of the governing document of the State
Technical Commission of Russia “Automated systems. Protection against
unauthorized access to information. Classification of automated systems and
requirements for information protection”.
General and special software, including information security
software, must comply with the requirements of the Guideline
“Protection against unauthorized access to information. Part 1.
Information security software. Classification by the level of control of
the absence of undeclared capabilities ”(State Technical Commission of
Russia, 1999) - not lower than 2 levels of control (when processing “top
secret” information).

Computer facilities must comply with the requirements of the

Guiding document “Computer facilities. Protection against
unauthorized access to information” (State Technical Commission of
Russia, 1992) - not lower than 3rd class.
Computer equipment, as well as servers, must be equipped with
means (modules) of trusted download of the Russian
 19

production having a valid certificate of conformity for class 1B in accordance with the
requirements of the Federal Security Service of Russia for hardware and software modules
of trusted computer boot or for class 2 protection in accordance with the requirements of
the order of the FSTEC of Russia dated September 27, 2013 No. 119.
9.5.5 When developing a product and operational documentation for
it must take into account the Requirements for the technical protection of
information containing information constituting a state secret, approved
by order of the FSTEC of Russia dated October 20, 2016 No. 025
(hereinafter - TTZI-2016).
All OTSS, as well as all VTSS, installed jointly with OTSS at distances
smaller than Zone 1 and having an exit from the controlled zone, must
undergo special studies to identify technical channels for information
leakage (including voice information) and have instructions for
operation (certificates) issued by organizations licensed by the FSB and
(or) FSTEC of Russia, and technical means of foreign (joint) production, a
special check for the presence of possibly embedded radio-electronic
devices for intercepting (destroying) information and have conclusions
based on the results of a special check issued by organizations that
have licensed by the FSB of Russia.

The conclusions based on the results of a special inspection should

indicate the category of allocated premises in which the installation of these
technical means is allowed, not lower than the second.
Materials based on the results of special inspections, special
studies and on-site special studies must be sent to the equipment
object determined by the Lead Contractor.
9.6 Requirements for building a data transmission network, pairing
and interaction with other automated systems (hereinafter referred to as AS)
are not presented.
9.7 Location, installation and equipment requirements
technical means
9.7.1 Placement and installation of technical means of the product must
exclude the possibility of their uncontrolled use and viewing of information
by persons who do not have the right to do so.
9.7.2 Racks with equipment should be equipped
devices for sealing, built-in locks.
9.7.3 To control unauthorized access to the electrical installation of technical equipment,
not equipped with means of software or electromechanical alarm
signaling, there must be places (devices) for sealing blocks and nodes
through which access to the processed information can be made.

9.7.4 The possibility of

unauthorized copying of information on a hard copy. The number of
information output devices on a hard copy should be as limited as
possible.
 20

9.8 In the course of implementation of the MF R&D should be developed and

the following documents on protecting information from unauthorized access have been agreed with
the Lead Contractor:
draft instructions for protecting information from unauthorized access in the product being
created;
a control example (method) of setting up the information security system during the operation of the
product;
programs and methods for conducting tests in terms of protecting information from
unauthorized access;
network administrator's manual (description of the information
processing process, composition of hardware and software,
maintenance (installation, configuration, operation) of general and
special software);
user manual (instruction on the use of available general and
special software, information protection tools, as well as a description
of actions in case of access denial or incorrect operation of information
protection tools);
security administrator's guide (description of the basic principles
of the information security system, the composition and layout of
information security tools, the procedure for their installation,
configuration, testing, recovery and operation);
instructions of the security administrator (appointment of the information security facility,
conditions for the application of the information security facility at the VT facility, tasks of the security
administrator for working with the installed information protection system to fulfill the requirements of the
State Customs Committee RD for the corresponding security class, algorithms for the work of the security
administrator with the components of the information security facility);
the act of installing, configuring and operating software, special
general
software and information security tools with a protocol for calculating
the checksums of the main executable files and dynamic libraries
according to selected criteria;

calculation of the required number of officials responsible for

behind information protection (full-time / non-staff) and maintenance
automated systems in accordance Withactive
regulations of the Federation. ministries defense Russian

9.9 The product must be certified according to the requirements

information security for compliance with the stated requirements in the
certification system of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

10 REQUIREMENTS FOR THE PROTECTION OF STATE SECRETS WHEN

PERFORMING SC OCD
10.1 Secrecy requirements
10.1.1Planning work to ensure secrecy
carried out in accordance with GOST RV 15.203-2001.
 21

10.1.2 The purpose of maintaining secrecy during execution

MF ROC is to prevent the dissemination of information about the nature
of the work being done, intermediate and final results, as well as
directions for their use. The main task of ensuring the secrecy regime in
the process of performing work is to identify possible channels for the
leakage of information constituting a state secret during the
performance of the R&D and their closure.
10.1.3 When performing midrange R&D, the performer is guided by
the requirements of the Law of the Russian Federation of July 21, 1993
No. 5485-1 “On State Secrets” and the “Instruction on Ensuring the
Secrecy Regime in the Russian Federation”, approved by Decree of the
Government of the Russian Federation of January 5, 2004 No. 3-1, as
well as orders and instructions for ensuring the secrecy regime in force
at the performer.
Working with secret documents on product must
be carried out in sensitive premises that meet the requirements of the
"Instructions for ensuring the secrecy regime in the Russian Federation",
approved by the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation
dated 05.0E2004 No. 3-1.
Organization of work at the specified objects of computer technology,
Andimplementation of measures to protect information should
correspond:
for military units and organizations of the Russian Ministry of Defense -
the requirements of the Instruction on the regime of secrecy in the Armed
Forces of the Russian Federation (IRS-2005), approved by order of the
Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation in 2005 No. 010, Guidelines for
protecting information from unauthorized access in the Armed Forces of the
Russian Federation, approved by order Minister of Defense of the Russian
Federation in 2013 No. 011, Special requirements and recommendations for
the protection of information processed by technical means of transmitting
and processing information in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
(STR VS-96), approved by order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian
Federation in 1996 No. 020, "Guidelines for technical protection of
information in the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RTZI-2016)”,
approved by order of the Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation dated
January 23, 2016 No.No. 01;
for enterprises and organizations of other ministries and departments to the
requirements of the Instruction on ensuring the regime of secrecy in the Russian
Federation, approved by the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation
dated January 5, 2004 No. 3-1 and the Standard Instruction on
Ensuring the Secrecy Mode when Processing Secret Information (On
Ensuring Information Security) Using Computer Equipment, approved
by the decision of the Interdepartmental Commission for the Protection
of State Secrets dated October 9, 2009 No. 172, Special requirements
and recommendations for the protection of information constituting a
state secret from leakage through technical channels
 22

(STR), approved by the decision of the State Technical Commission under the President of
the Russian Federation of May 23, 1997 No. 55.
10.1.4 Classification of information constituting the state
the secret contained in the SC ROC is carried out in accordance with the
"List ...".
10.1.5 In the course of the implementation of the MF, ROCs are subject to protection by special
organizational and regime measures and technical means the following
information:
information about the main directions of using the MF APS PSIB,
revealing its purpose and technical capabilities - “secret”, clause 95, par.
3 "List...";
information disclosing the content of the SC ROC (including the
name, goals and objectives) - “secret”, paragraph 375, par. 2 "List...";
information disclosing the content of the current correspondence or
documentation on the issues of passing the SC R & D, if they contain
general data about the prototype - “secret”, clause 97 par. 3 "List...";
information disclosing the planned, ongoing measures to protect
state secrets, the results of their implementation, their analysis -
"secret", clause 267 par. 2 "List...";
information disclosing the organization or state of information
protection, measures taken to protect information from unauthorized
access, foreign technical intelligence, from leakage through technical
channels, the results of their implementation - “secret”, paragraph 273
par. 1 (column 7) of the "List...";
information disclosing the planned, ongoing measures to counter
the technical means of reconnaissance during the creation of special
equipment and their results - “secret”, paragraph 281, par. 1 (column 7) of
the "List...";
information revealing the relationship of ongoing work or
activities to countering technical means of reconnaissance - "secret",
paragraph 288 of the "List ...".
The list of protected information, the degree of secrecy of the R&D MC, as
well as the stages and components of the work can be specified on the basis of the
act of the joint commission of the contractor for assessing the secrecy of
information used (obtained) in the course of the R&D MC.
Note: if during the performance of work information is revealed
that is new design or technological solutions, but according to the
current lists, this information is not subject to classification, is not
classified as secret, then the developer must make it preliminary
classified. The final decision on the degree of secrecy of information is
made by an expert commission.
10.1.6Before the actual start of specific activities
according to the R&D SC, the contractor develops an action plan to ensure the
protection of state secrets during the performance of work, which, among other
things, reflects:
 23

a list of departments and employees involved in the implementation of the

R&D SC;
a list of computer equipment objects (computer facilities) used to
process classified information when performing SC R & D (type and
number of the CT object, number and date of the certificate of conformity,
room number, list of employees admitted to work at the specified CT
facilities);
the procedure for involving co-executing organizations (if any)
and the amount of information provided to them;
requirements for the regime of secrecy, co- presented To
executors;
a set of organizational and technical measures aimed at ensuring the
regime of secrecy in the process of implementing the R&D midrange.
The activities of the plan to ensure the protection of state secrets are
agreed with the Lead Executor, the plan is approved by the Lead Executor and
communicated to the Executor of the R&D Center in the part related to it.
10.1.7 When performing midrange R&D must be provided
the maximum restriction and stability of the contingent of performers
admitted to the performed midrange R&D. The information constituting
a state secret and the performance of work related to its use should be
involved only persons from among the permanent staff who are directly
related to the ROC SC and if they have the appropriate form of access to
classified information.
10.1.8 When conducting unclassified official correspondence and in the course of
negotiations using open technical means of communication, only the
code name (code) of the work and the symbols (indices) of the products
being developed should be used.
10.1.9 Processing of information on the R&D MF, containing information,
constituting a state secret, to carry out at the objects of military
technology, put into operation in accordance with the requirements of the
governing documents, and having the appropriate security class. When
transferring information constituting a state secret using technical means
of communication, use only closed communication channels.
10.1.10 Holding scientific conferences, seminars,
meetings, publications and demonstrations of products during the implementation of the R
& D mid-range should be carried out only in agreement with the Lead Contractor and in
compliance with the secrecy regime.
10.1.11 SC ROC state and other registration is not
subject to.
10.1.12 Responsibility for ensuring secrecy when
the implementation of the R&D midrange is assigned to the head of the
enterprise - the performer of the R&D midrange. Responsibility for the
implementation of the planned activities and the requirements defined in this
ToR for the protection of state secrets rests with the head of the R&D SC.
10.1.13 Monitoring and evaluation of sufficiency and effectiveness
measures taken to protect state secrets
 24

carried out by the head of the work and secret regime bodies of the
contractor, as well as co-executors involved by him, insofar as they
concern them.
10.1.14 Engagement by the contractor of other enterprises and
organizations as co-contractors should be carried out only after
agreement with the Lead Contractor. All enterprises involved in
activities related to the preservation of state secrets during the
implementation of the R&D SC must have licenses to carry out the
corresponding type of activity.
10.1.15 Lead performer at all stages of the implementation of the midrange
The ROC controls the availability and validity of such licenses for the
performer of the ROC SC (if he is involved in the relevant types of
activities).
10.1.16 Contractor at all stages of the implementation of the R&D midrange
controls the availability of such licenses from co-executing enterprises (in
case they are involved in the relevant types of activities).
10.1.17 In the event of suspension, expiration
of the relevant license or its cancellation in the course of the R&D SC,
work on the above types of activities with enterprises - co-executors
(including the contractor) to stop.
10.1.18 Scope of information about the MF ROC set out in
terms of reference for co-executors, must strictly correspond to the role and
place of the co-executor in the R&D SC.
10.1.19 To this statement of work in full
only responsible persons of the executor, determined by the order of the
head of the organization (enterprise), may be admitted. The direct executors
of the R&D SC should be allowed to the TK only in the part that concerns
them.
Representatives of organizations (enterprises) of industry and the
Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, who are not direct
executors, may be allowed to familiarize themselves with the
documentation and information security tools only with the permission
of the Lead Executor in the prescribed manner.
10.1.20 Classification of works and reporting materials on SC
OKR should correspond to the degree of secrecy of the information included in
them.
10.1.21 The Contractor cannot, without receiving in the prescribed
by the written consent of the Lead Contractor to publish in the press,
transfer to third parties the results obtained in the course of work, and
use them to engage in any activity, including in the interests of other
persons.

10.2 Requirements for countering engineering

10.2.1 The purpose of countering technical reconnaissance means during
implementation of the R&D midrange should be the timely implementation
of a set of organizational and technical measures aimed at
 25

to exclude the acquisition by foreign intelligence services of protected information

about the work being carried out and its content with the help of technical means.

10.2.2 The goal of defense against STIs is to identify and close

possible channels for the leakage of information specified in clause 10.1.5.
10.2.3 In the course of the implementation of measures for the AP ITR, it is necessary
be guided by the requirements of the “Regulations on the state system for
protecting information in the Russian Federation from foreign technical
intelligence and from leakage through technical channels”, approved by the
Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the Government of the Russian
Federation of September 15, 2003 No. 912-51, “Special requirements and
recommendations for information protection against leakage through
technical channels, approved by the decision of the State Technical
Commission under the President of the Russian Federation dated May 23,
1997 No. 55, GOST-RV 50934-2010, GOST-RV 50859-2010, STR VS-96.
10.2.4 Requirements for countering engineering and technical operations are established in
in accordance with the "Guidelines for organizing counteraction to technical means
of intelligence of foreign states in the Armed Forces of the Russian
Federation" (RPDTSR-96) and GOST RV 50934-2010.
10.2.5 In the process of performing the SC R & D, compliance is ensured
requirements of the "Regulations on Comprehensive Counteraction to Foreign Technical
Intelligence in the Development, Production and Testing of Weapons and Military
Equipment" (IKP ITR-78, Regulation-34).
10.2.6 Before the start of the actual performance of work, the contractor
conducts an analysis of possible channels for leaking information about the
ongoing SC R&D with the determination of their information content (degree
of secrecy) and develops organizational and technical measures to close
them for each stage of the MC R&D.
10.2.7 To ensure the effectiveness of the PD Engineering at the development stage
TP should analyze the technical revealing features (TDP) of the VT product,
revealing protected information about it, as well as an analysis of the
capabilities of engineers to open these TDPs, and develop a list of
organizational and technical measures for PD Engineering.
The results of such an analysis and substantiated proposals for specific
measures of PD ITR should be taken into account in the Instructions for the
protection against ITR of a prototype, developed in accordance with the
requirements of GOST RV 50859-2010.
10.2.8 Processing of information containing information constituting
state secret, should be carried out at the objects of technical means of
transmission and processing of information of the corresponding category
certified according to the requirements of information security.
10.2.9 Transfer of information containing information constituting
state secret, by unsecured and uncertified technical means of
communication is not allowed.
10.2.10 Meetings, negotiations, discussions on Topics,
disclosing information that state a secret
 26

is allowed to be carried out only in certified dedicated premises,

certified according to information security requirements.
10.2.11 Visual display devices information
should be placed in places that exclude accidental or deliberate
acquaintance with the displayed information containing information
constituting a state secret.

eleven TO
REQUIREMENTS ORDER DEVELOPMENTS
DESIGN DOCUMENTATION FOR WAR TIME
There are no requirements.

12 STAGES OF PERFORMING SC R&D

No. Stage name Issued by scientific Performers

p/p Content of work by stage technical products
1 Development technical Joint work plan. Executor
project Action plan for HRT and instructions MF ROC
for ZI from engineers.
TP list.
Explanatory note TP.
The scheme for dividing OO into
components.
Patent report
research
2 Development working RKD set. Executor
design ED projects. MF ROC
(software) documentation PD and SPO OO.
PIM PI OO

3 Production of an experienced Product prototype Executor

product sample and ED kit MF ROC
carrying out preliminary Act PI
tests Corrected RKD
letters "O"
Modified by results
PI prototype
ICC Act
Program and methods
MVI
4 Holding State act Executor
interdepartmental tests MF ROC
tests joint decision on
approval of the act
state tests
 27

No. Stage name Issued by scientific Performers

p/p Content of work by stage technical products
5 RKD approval for Certificate of Completion Executor
organization of industrial adjustments to the RKD and
MF ROC
(serial) production. Carrying refinement of a prototype product
out certification according to based on the results of GI
requirements (of necessity).
information security in the Set of RKD letters "O1»
certification system Act of MVK
Ministry of Defense of Russia joint decision on
approval of the MVK act
Scientific and technical report on
OKR

The deadlines for completing the stages of the R&D mid-range are determined by the contract for the
performance of the Kristall-2V mid-range R&D.

13 PROCEDURE FOR PERFORMANCE AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE STAGES OF SC R&D

13.1 Rules and procedure for the implementation and acceptance of the stages of the SC R&D
must comply with the requirements of GOST RV 15.203-2001.
MF
Reporting scientific and technical documentation is drawn up in OKR
accordance with the requirements of ESKD, ESTD, ESPD, GOST RV
15.110-2003, GOST 2.105-95, GOST RV 15.203-2001 and GOST RV 2.902-2005.

13.2 Reporting scientific and technical documentation is carried out

typewritten or developed on a PC (in text editors Word and / or Excel) in
triplicate. Documentation is provided by the GI on paper and computer
media.
The nomenclature, the number of copies of the STTD and the calculation of its distribution can be
specified by the CI based on the results of the consideration and acceptance of the stages and the R&D SC
as a whole.
A copy of the design (including working design, operational and
program documentation) created in the course of the implementation
of the R&D SC and complying with the requirements of ESKD, ESPD and
ESTD is supplied to the GI on machine media.
13.3 Within a month after the completion of the mid-range R&D (stage of the mid-range R&D)
The Contractor is obliged to submit on paper information carriers in a single
copy the GIs drawn up in accordance with the procedure established in the
Russian Federation (in form 1, approved by order of the Ministry of Justice of
the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Industry and Science of the
Russian Federation dated July 17, 2003 No. 173/178 “On approval of the forms
of documents required for maintaining a unified register of the results of
research, development and technological work for military, special and dual-
use, the rights to which belong to the Russian Federation”) and documents
agreed with the VP of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation
necessary for state accounting of the results of intellectual activity, if such
results are obtained in during the implementation of R&D (R&D stage), in
 28

in accordance with the requirements of Decree of the Government of the Russian

Federation of 2002 No. 131.
13.4 If necessary, the contractor to select the final
technical solutions at the TP stage, prototyping can be carried out. The
composition of the mock-up products is coordinated with the head contractor.
13.5 Consideration of the TP is carried out in accordance with
the requirements of paragraphs 5.2.8.1 and 5.3.6 of GOST RV 15.203-2001. The TP
materials are presented to the main contractor no later than 30 days before the end
of the relevant stage. The calculation of the distribution of TP can be specified in
agreement with the head contractor.
13.6 For preliminary and interdepartmental
testing, one prototype product is manufactured. The decision on the
composition of the prototype is developed by the contractor and submitted
for approval to the lead contractor during the development stage of the
design documentation.
13.7 Preliminary and interdepartmental tests of SC OO
products performed by co-executors must be completed before the start of
preliminary tests of the TOE of the product as a whole.
13.8 Preliminary tests of the OO product are carried out by the commission,
appointed by the performer. The procedure and place for conducting the PI is established in the program
and methods of the PI, agreed with the head contractor and the 5th GOU of the General Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Russian Federation. The PI commission includes representatives of the prime contractor, the
5th Main Educational Institution of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and
military unit 76835 (as agreed).
Preliminary testing of the TOE must be completed no later than one
month before the end of the stage "Manufacturing of a prototype product and
conducting preliminary tests." The deadline for submitting the PI program and
methods for approval is the stage of the design documentation.
13.9 Program and methods of interdepartmental tests
are developed by the contractor, coordinated with the 5th GOU of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Russian Federation and submitted for approval to the head contractor before the completion of the
stage of manufacturing the OO product and conducting the PI.
13.10 Programs and test methods for TOE products should
comply with GOST RV 15.211-2002.
13.11 Acceptance of the stages and SC R & D as a whole is carried out by the commission
in accordance with GOST RV 15.203-2001.
13.12 Certain provisions and requirements of this TOR may
be changed and supplemented by the procedure established in GOST RV
15.201-2003.
13.13 Certification tests experienced sample
are carried out in the manner established by the order of the Minister of Defense of
the Russian Federation of 1996 No. 058.

From 5 Offices From NTC Vulkan LLC From FSUE "RNIIRS"

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GOU GSh