Katz RestorationRedesignEthical 1991
Katz RestorationRedesignEthical 1991
Katz RestorationRedesignEthical 1991
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area would be of less value than the original, for the newly was just the starting point for a thought-experiment about
restored natural area would be analogous to an art forgery. the value of natural processes. After all, who could possi-
Two points seem crucial to Elliot's argument. First, the bly believe that a land developer or a strip mining com-
value of objects can be explained "in terms of their origins, pany could - or would - actually restore a natural area to
in terms of the kinds of processes that brought them into its original condition? But now it is clear that serious
being."7 We value an art work in part because of the fact environmentalists and ecological scientists argue for a
that a particular artist, a human individual, created the position similar to Elliot's "restoration thesis." The resto-
work at a precise moment in historical time. Similarly, he ration of a damaged landscape is seen not only as a
argued, we value a natural area because of its "special kind practical option for environmental policy but also as a
of continuity with the past." But to understand the art work moral obligation for right-thinking environmentalists. If
or the natural area in their historical contexts we require a we are to continue human projects which (unfortunately)
special kind of insight or knowledge. Thus, the second impinge on the natural environment (it is claimed), then
crucial point of Elliot's argument is the co-existence of we must repair the damage. In a few short years a "sea-
"understanding and evaluation." The art expert brings to change" has occurred: what Elliot attacked as both a
the analysis and evaluation of a work of art a full range of physical impossibility and a moral mistake is now
information about the artist, the period, the intentions of advocated as proper environmental policy.
the work, and so forth. In a similar way, the evaluation of Thus, we need to re-examine the idea of recreating and
a natural area is informed by a detailed knowledge of restoring a natural landscape. In what sense is this action
ecological processes, a knowledge that can be acquired really analogous to the forging of a work of art? Perhaps
through education and experience, just as one learns the we need to push beyond Elliot's analysis, to use his argu-
history of art.8 To value the restored landscape as much as ments as a starting point for a deeper investigation into the
the original is thus a kind of ignorance; we are being fooled fundamental philosophical assumptions of restoration
by the superficial similarities to the natural area, just as policy.
the ignorant art "appreciator" is fooled by the appearance
of the art forgery. Ill
Although Elliot's argument has had a profound effect My initial reaction to the prospect of environmental policy
on my own thinking about environmental issues,9 I be- based on a program of restoration is almost entirely vis-
lieved that the problem he uses as a starting point is purely ceral: I am outraged by the idea that a technologically
theoretical, almost fanciful. Elliot's "restoration thesis" created "nature" will be passed off as reality. The human
guage to describe their work. They should talk about their 26 Packard, p. 14.
The point of my argument here is that we must not misun- 28 L. B. Cebik, "Forging Issues from Forged Art," Southern Journal of
Philosophy 27 (1989): 331-46.
derstand what we humans are doing when we attempt to
29 Cebik, p. 342.
restore or repair natural areas. We are not restoring nature;
Taylor, p. 177. The rule of noninterference is discussed on pp. 173-179.
we are not making it whole and healthy again. Ecological Note that Packard, for example, does not put aside his personal prefer-
restoration is a compromise; it should not be a basic policy ences: he is unwilling to wait two hundred years for nature to take its
course, and so accelerates the burn; see notes 23 and 24 above.
goal. It is a policy that makes the best of a bad situation;
31 J.S. Mill, "Nature," in Three Essays on Religion (London: 1874).
it cleans up our mess. We are putting a piece of furniture 32
Andrew Brennan, Thinking About Nature: An Investigation of Nature,
over the stain in the carpet for the sake of appearances. As Value, and Ecology (Athens, G A: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1988), pp.
a matter of policy, however, it would be much better to 88-91.
References
An earlier and somewhat different version of this paper was read at the
conference Moral Philosophy in the Public Domain under the title, "The
Big Lie: Human Restoration of Nature," at the University of British
Columbia, Vancouver, Canada, June 8, 1990. That version of the paper
will appear in Research in Philosophy and Technology 12 (1992). The
author wishes to thank Edwin Hettinger, Eric Higgs, Holmes Rolston,
and Bill Jordan for important comments that helped in the revision of this
paper.
12 Losonsky, p. 84.
Andrew Brennan, "The Moral Standing of Natural Objects," Environ-
mental Ethics 6 (1984): 41-44. The only way one could say that natural
entities were designed for a purpose would be to accept a cosmic or divine
principle of design in the universe. I hesitate to make such metaphysical
claims.