PACIFICO B. ARCEO, JR.

, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the April 28, 1999 decision1 and March 27, 2000
resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19601 affirming the trial court’s judgment
finding petitioner Pacifico B. Arceo, Jr. liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 22, otherwise
known as the "Bouncing Checks Law."

The facts of the case as found by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals follow.

On March 14, 1991, [petitioner], obtained a loan from private complainant Josefino Cenizal []
in the amount of P100,000.00. Several weeks thereafter, [petitioner] obtained an additional
loan of P50,000.00 from [Cenizal]. [Petitioner] then issued in favor of Cenizal, Bank of the
Philippine Islands [(BPI)] Check No. 163255, postdated August 4, 1991, for P150,000.00, at
Cenizal’s house located at 70 Panay Avenue, Quezon City. When August 4, 1991 came,
[Cenizal] did not deposit the check immediately because [petitioner] promised [] that he
would replace the check with cash. Such promise was made verbally seven (7) times. When
his patience ran out, [Cenizal] brought the check to the bank for encashment. The head
office of the Bank of the Philippine Islands through a letter dated December 5, 1991,
informed [Cenizal] that the check bounced because of insufficient funds.

Thereafter, [Cenizal] went to the house of [petitioner] to inform him of the dishonor of the
check but [Cenizal] found out that [petitioner] had left the place. So, [Cenizal] referred the
matter to a lawyer who wrote a letter giving [petitioner] three days from receipt thereof to pay
the amount of the check. [Petitioner] still failed to make good the amount of the check. As a
consequence, [Cenizal] executed on January 20, 1992 before the office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City his affidavit and submitted documents in support of his complaint
for [e]stafa and [v]iolation of [BP 22] against [petitioner]. After due investigation, this case for
[v]iolation of [BP 22] was filed against [petitioner] on March 27, 1992. The check in question
and the return slip were however lost by [Cenizal] as a result of a fire that occurred near his
residence on September 16, 1992. [Cenizal] executed an Affidavit of Loss regarding the loss
of the check in question and the return slip.3

After trial, petitioner was found guilty as charged. Aggrieved, he appealed to the Court of Appeals.
However, on April 28, 1999, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision in toto. Petitioner
sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner claims that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him despite the failure of the
prosecution to present the dishonored check during the trial. He also contends that he should not be
held liable for the dishonor of the check because it was presented beyond the 90-day period
provided under the law. Petitioner further questions his conviction since the notice requirement was
not complied with and he was given only three days to pay, not five banking days as required by law.
Finally, petitioner asserts that he had already paid his obligation to Cenizal.

Petitioner’s contentions have no merit.

Petitioner asserts that there was no violation of BP 22 because the check was presented to the
drawee bank only on December 5, 1991 or 120 days from the date thereof (August 4, 1991). He
argues that this was beyond the 90-day period provided under the law in connection with the
presentment of the check. We disagree.

Section 1 of BP 22 provides:

SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds Any person who makes or draws and issues
any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full
upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished
by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not
less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion
of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep
sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented
within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is
dishonored by the drawee bank.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who
actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

In Wong v. Court of Appeals,4 the Court ruled that the 90-day period provided in the law is not an
element of the offense. Neither does it discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds
in the account within a reasonable time from the date indicated in the check. According to current
banking practice, the reasonable period within which to present a check to the drawee bank is six
months. Thereafter, the check becomes stale and the drawer is discharged from liability thereon to
the extent of the loss caused by the delay.

Thus, Cenizal’s presentment of the check to the drawee bank 120 days (four months) after its issue
was still within the allowable period. Petitioner was freed neither from the obligation to keep sufficient
funds in his account nor from liability resulting from the dishonor of the check.

Applicability of the
Best Evidence Rule

Petitioner’s insistence on the presentation of the check in evidence as a condition sine qua non for
conviction under BP 22 is wrong. Petitioner anchors his argument on Rule 130, Section 3, of the
Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule. However, the rule applies only where the
content of the document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is the execution or existence
of the document or the circumstances surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not
apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.5
The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a worthless check.6 Hence, the
subject of the inquiry is the fact of issuance or execution of the check, not its content.

Here, the due execution and existence of the check were sufficiently established. Cenizal testified
that he presented the originals of the check, the return slip and other pertinent documents before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City when he executed his complaint-affidavit during the
preliminary investigation. The City Prosecutor found a prima facie case against petitioner for
violation of BP 22 and filed the corresponding information based on the documents. Although the
check and the return slip were among the documents lost by Cenizal in a fire that occurred near his
residence on September 16, 1992, he was nevertheless able to adequately establish the due
execution, existence and loss of the check and the return slip in an affidavit of loss as well as in his
testimony during the trial of the case.

Moreover, petitioner himself admited that he issued the check. He never denied that the check was
presented for payment to the drawee bank and was dishonored for having been drawn against
insufficient funds.

Presence of the
Elements of the Offense

Based on the allegations in the information,7 petitioner was charged for violating the first paragraph
of BP 22. The elements of the offense are:

1. the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value;

2. knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and

3. subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit,
or dishonor of the check for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause,
ordered the bank to stop payment.8

All these elements are present in this case.

Both the trial and appellate courts found that petitioner issued BPI check no. 163255 postdated
August 4, 1991 in the amount of P150,000 in consideration of a loan which he obtained from
Cenizal. When the check was deposited, it was dishonored by the drawee bank for having been
drawn against insufficient funds. There was sufficient evidence on record that petitioner knew of the
insufficiency of his funds in the drawee bank at the time of the issuance of the check. In fact, this
was why, on maturity date, he requested the payee not to encash it with the promise that he would
replace it with cash. He made this request and assurance seven times but repeatedly failed to make
good on his promises despite the repeated accommodation granted him by the payee, Cenizal.

Notice of Dishonor to Petitioner

The trial court found that, contrary to petitioner’s claim, Cenizal’s counsel had informed petitioner in
writing of the check’s dishonor and demanded payment of the value of the check. Despite receipt of
the notice of dishonor and demand for payment, petitioner still failed to pay the amount of the check.
Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the period of five banking days from receipt of notice
of dishonor within which to pay the amount of the check.9 While petitioner may have been given only
three days to pay the value of the check, the trial court found that the amount due thereon remained
unpaid even after five banking days from his receipt of the notice of dishonor. This negated his claim
that he had already paid Cenizal and should therefore be relieved of any liability.

Moreover, petitioner’s claim of payment was nothing more than a mere allegation. He presented no
proof to support it. If indeed there was payment, petitioner should have redeemed or taken the check
back in the ordinary course of business.10 Instead, the check remained in the possession of the
payee who demanded the satisfaction of petitioner’s obligation when the check became due as well
as when the check was dishonored by the drawee bank.

These findings (due notice to petitioner and nonpayment of the obligation) were confirmed by the
appellate court. This Court has no reason to rule otherwise. Well-settled is the rule that the factual
findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are not to be disturbed.11

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The April 28, 1999 decision and March 27, 2000
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 19601 are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Garcia, J.J., concur.