THE 13TH GIL NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION 2023

Before,

THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF EUREKATIA

WRIT PETITION

UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE EURAKATIAN CONSTITUTION

IN THE MATTER OF

True Democratic Society and Ors…(Petitioner) V. Union of Eurekatia…(Respondent)

Clubbed with

A.Y. Bisht ………….. (Petitioner) v. Union of Eurekatia…………..(Respondent)

Clubbed with

George Sebastian. …………..(Petitioner) v. Union of Eurekatia…………..(Respondent)

Clubbed with

Lal Mahesh Diwan. …………..(Petitioner) v. Union of Eurekatia…………..(Respondent)

1
WHETHER THE MULTIPLE FIRS FILED AGAINST CHANCHAL SHARMA IN
DIFFERENT JURISDICTIONS SHOULD BE CLUBBED AT ONE JURISDICTION OF
HER CHOICE OR NOT?
It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that the multiple FIRs filed against Chanchal
Sharma in different jurisdictions should not be clubbed at one jurisdiction of her choice because
of the following reasons:

1) Clubbing Issues together at one jurisdiction is not in accordance with the law.
2) An investigation cannot run at the behest of an accused.
3) SC doesn’t have the jurisdiction to club the FIRs on its own.
4) There are rival versions in respect of the same incident that may take different shapes and
hence need to be tried differently.
5) It would lead to a Lack of impartiality.
6) It would override the jurisdiction of the local police.

Therefore, the multiple FIRs against Chanchal Sharma in different jurisdictions should not be
clubbed together in one jurisdiction of her choice.

[1.1.] AN INVESTIGATION CAN NOT RUN AT THE BEHEST OF AN ACCUSED

It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that the Republic of Akhand Bharat is a
democratic country and treats everyone equally in the eyes of law. Article 14 of the constitution
of India enshrines the concept of equality in the eyes of law and therefore no one can be given
special treatment in the trial. The petitioner is demanding the clubbing of FIRs in the jurisdiction
of her choice. If this is allowed then that would amount to discrimination between the parties and
hence the clubbing of the FIRs should not be allowed. This has been held in various SC and HC
judgments and hence in this case also this should be followed.

It is humbly submitted that in the case of Romila Thapar V. Union of India, it was held that

“We must, at this juncture note that it is trite law of criminal jurisprudence that an investigation
cannot run at the behest of the accused. An accused cannot be permitted to take control of the
investigation by choosing from where should he be investigated.”

Therefore, it is requested by the respondent that the same should be followed in this case and the
petitioner Chanchal Sharma should not be allowed to club her petitions together at one

2
jurisdiction that too at the jurisdiction of her choice because this would defeat the very nature of
the justice in India and hence it the court should decide in favor of the respondents.

It is also humbly submitted that the in another landmark judgment of Narender G Goel v. State
of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court went up to the extent of holding that it is well settled that the
accused has no right to be heard at the stage of the investigation. Transfer of investigation from
other jurisdictions to one jurisdiction at the behest of the accused will overturn the entire
criminal jurisprudence and will open up Pandora’s box.

Therefore, following the ratio decedendi of the above case, the court in this case too should
follow the same decision and hold that the clubbing of cases is not allowed at her own choice of
jurisdiction as it has the responsibility of maintaining the predictability in the judicial system.
Therefore, the clubbing of issues at one jurisdiction of her choice is not allowed.

[1.2.] CLUBBING ISSUES TOGETHER IN ONE JURISDICTION IS NOT IN

ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW.

It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that the clubbing of the issues together at one
jurisdiction of the choice of an accused is against the spirit of the law followed in the Republic of
Akhanda Bharat. It defies the fundamental principle of equality as well as defeats the
fundamental process of justice mentioned in Article 22 of the constitution of Akhanda Bharat
and therefore this should not be allowed.

Also, it is humbly submitted that there is no provision in the criminal procedure code on
clubbing of the FIR which is available in the CPC that means there must be some reason behind
it why legislatures didn’t include it in the CrPC and we should not interfere with the basic
structure of legislation and hence the clubbing of issues at one jurisdiction should not be allowed
as it is against the very spirit of the law followed by the Republic of Akhand Bharat.

It is humbly submitted that SC has given many decisions on the above lines of arguments which
should be taken into consideration by this court while deciding the present issues to come on a
similar decision and make the justice system predictable and efficient.

It is humbly submitted that in the landmark case of the State of Punjab V. Rajesh Singh Sayal,
proceedings were initiated in different courts, but the High Court in its jurisdiction u/s 482 CrPC,

3
while relying on the decision in VKSharma, transferred all pending cases in the state of Punjab to
a Special Judicial Magistrate.

Against this order, the State of Punjab approached the Supreme Court. A 3-judge bench of the
Supreme Court observed that the High Court had mechanically followed the decision in VK
Sharma and observed that the said order is not in accordance with the law and should not be
treated as a precedent.

It further observed that although the Supreme Court has ample powers under Article 142(1) of
the Constitution, the same cannot be exercised contrary to law. It concluded that the decision
in VK Sharma, not under Article 142, the order to direct the applicant to file applications for
consolidation of cases pending in different courts to be tried in a single court was not in
accordance with the law. VK Sharma was thus expressly overruled.

Therefore, apart from a direct order against consolidation/clubbing of FIRs by the Supreme
Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, there is a 3-judge bench decision that holds that a
direction in the form of liberty to the accused to approach respective High Courts for
consolidation of FIRs to be tried in one single court within such states in its jurisdiction is also
not in accordance with the law.

It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that the clubbing of issues together in this case
too is out of the jurisdiction of the SC since the petitioner has approached the court under Article
32 of the constitution and therefore the SC cannot exercise its power to consolidate the FIRs in
one jurisdiction and hence the clubbing of the issues should be denied by the court on the merits
of the case.

[1.3.] SC DOESN’T HAVE THE JURISDICTION TO CLUB THE FIRs ON ITS OWN.

It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that SC doesn’t have the jurisdiction to club the
FIRs on it own and the petitioner has to go to the HC of appropriate jurisdiction to get them
clubbed which in this case is not followed hence the SC can’t club the FIRs and defeat the
justice.

It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that in the case of State of West Bengal v
Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal, Justice DK Jain observed: “…

4
despite wide powers conferred by Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution while passing any
order, the Courts must bear in mind certain self-imposed limitations on the exercise of these
constitutional powers. The very plenitude of the power under the said articles requires great
caution in its exercise.” Therefore, the court should work within it’s jurisdiction that is it cannot
club the FIRs.

It is also humbly submitted that in the case of V.K. Sharma v. Union of India, a two-judge bench
of the apex court had a similar issue before them; a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the
Constitution in order to amalgamate all the pending cases in different jurisdictions across the
country into one. The Court provisioned for the petitioner to approach the concerned High
Courts to bring in all the related cases within its territorial jurisdictions into one. The Supreme
Court rejected or refused to consolidate them on its own. Therefore, the Supreme Court does not
have the jurisdiction of clubbing the FIRs and hence the FIRs cannot be clubbed in one
jurisdiction of her own choice.

It is also humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that in the State of Punjab v. Rajesh Syal,
the V.K. Sharma judgment was essentially overruled by the three-judge bench of the apex court.
Initially, relying on the precedent set in VK Sharma, Punjab, and Haryana High Court
consolidated all the cases under Section 482 of the CrPC and transferred it to a Special District
Magistrate in Punjab. This verdict was challenged in the Supreme Court which subsequently held
that the judgment was in contravention to the established law and was not within the ambit
of Article 142 of the Constitution which grants ample powers to the Supreme Court.

Therefore, it can be observed that there exists a direct order against the filing of a writ petition
under Article 32 of the Constitution for the clubbing of multiple FIRs into one. In fact, as held in
the judgment, an accused does not even have the freedom to approach a particular High Court in
order to request for the amalgamation of various FIRs into one court within a state falling in its
territorial jurisdiction.

Hence, the petitioner in this case too can’t even go to the High court for the amalgamation of the
issues and hence the clubbing of FIRs cannot take place.

[1.4.] SEPARATE FIR MAY HAVE SEPARATE MATTERS IN THE ISSUE

5
It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that separate FIRs filed against Chanchal Sharma
may have different Matters in issue and hence different FIRs may be filed in a different
jurisdiction since the matter in issue and the parties to the case are different the case can be tried
differently in a different jurisdiction.

It is humbly submitted that in the case of Narinderjit Singh Sahni and Anr v. Union Of India, the
Supreme Court held that each individual transaction that has been brought about by the
allurement of the financial companies must be treated as a separate transaction. This is for the
reason that the investors/depositors are different; the amount of deposit is different, and; the
period when which the deposit was affected is also different.

It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that the analogously similar decision should be
followed in this case too. It is safe to assume that different communities may have filed different
FIRs for different reasons and hence the matter in issue is distinct in every FIR and also the
parties are also different in all the FIRs and hence such FIRs cannot be clubbed since it would be
an injustice to those who filed their FIRs in other jurisdictions. Therefore, clubbing of FIRs
should not be allowed by SC after trying the merits of the case.

It is also humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that the petitioner must have quoted the
Nupur Sharma case but it should be noted by the court that initially the clubbing of FIRs was
declined by the court on trying the merits of the case however later it was granted only keeping
in mind the security of the accused because she was receiving death threats but it was not on the
merits of the case however, in this case, there is no such threat to the security of the accused and
hence the clubbing of FIRs should be decided solely on the merits of the case which are against
the clubbing of the FIRs and therefore the FIRs should not be clubbed in this case.

It is also humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that in the case of Babubhai v. State of
Gujarat, (2010) 12 SCC 254 – The general rule is that with respect to the same cause of action
or same facts, subsequent/successive/second FIR is impermissible; however, in cases,
where “there are rival versions in respect of the same episode, the investigating agency would
take the same on two different FIRs and investigation can be carried under both of them by the
same investigating agency and thus, filing an FIR pertaining to a counterclaim in respect of the
same incident having a different version of events, is permissible.

6
Also in the case of Surender Kaushik v. State of U.P., (2013) 5 SCC 148, it was held that where
there is a counter-FIR or there are rival versions in respect of the same incident that may take
different shapes, lodgement of two FIRs is permissible.

It is also humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that in the case of P. Sreekumar v. State of
Kerala, (2018) 4 SCC 579 it was held that when the Second FIR relates to the same incident for
which the first FIR was filed but if the second FIR is in the nature of a counter-complaint, then
the same is legally maintainable and could be entertained for being tried on its merits.

Similarly in the case of Varshaben Kantilal Purani v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 11 SCC 774, it
was held that “Second FIR/subsequent FIR is permissible where the conspiracy discovered later
is found to cover a much larger canvas with broader ramifications and it cannot be equated with
the earlier conspiracy which covered a smaller field of narrower dimensions.”1

Therefore, the second FIRs are allowed in the case where there are different matters in issue or
the other FIR has some additional information that might be missing from the first FIR and hence
if multiple FIRs are allowed to file then the multiple suits could also be tried for such FIRs in a
different jurisdiction and therefore the Clubbing of FIRs is not required.

[1.5.] THE PETITIONER IS IMPEDING THE PROCESS OF TRIAL

It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that the petitioner by asking for the clubbing of
issues at one jurisdiction of her choice is trying to impede the process of trial and hence should
not be allowed by the court by clubbing the FIRs.

It is also humbly submitted that if the FIRs are clubbed at one jurisdiction of the petitioner's
choice, it may give the impression of a lack of impartiality on the part of the investigating
authorities. Given that the party ‘X’, of which the petitioner is a spokesperson, has a majority at

1
Upkar Singh v Ved Prakash20 (“Upkar Singh”). Justice N Santosh Hegde, speaking for this Court adverted to the
earlier decisions of this Court in Ram Lal Narang v State (Delhi Administration) 21 (“Ram Lal Narang”), Kari
Choudhary v Mst. Sita Devi22 (“Kari Choudhary”) and State of Bihar v JAC Saldanha23 (“Saldanha”). The Court
noted that in Kari Choudhary, this Court held that: “11…Of course, the legal position is that there cannot be two
FIRs against the same accused in respect of the same case. But when there are rival versions in respect of the same
episode, they would normally take the shape of two different FIRs and investigation can be carried on under both of
them by the same investigating agency.” Chirra Shivraj v State of Andhra Pradesh25 and Chirag M Pathak v
Dollyben Kantilal Patel

7
the center, this could further fuel allegations of bias and raise questions about the integrity of the
legal process.

[1.6.] ACTUS CURIAE NEMINEM GRAVABIT

It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that the maxim Actus curiae neminem gravabit,
means no party should suffer due to the act of the court. This principle also necessitates that if in
the course of adjudicating a case, through an act of the court, any party has gained an unfair
advantage and the other party has been disadvantaged and is bound to suffer, the outcome has to
be neutralized and rectified. Clubbing of Issues at one jurisdiction would be unfair advantage
gained by the petitioner and hence it should be rectified as per the essence of this maxim that is
by not allowing the clubbing of the FIRs at one jurisdiction of the choice of the petitioner.

It is humbly submitted that in a case titled BK Office Needs Private Limited vs Divya Shakthi
Granites Limited, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh made significant points in this regard. It
stated in its judgment: “The principle underlying the maxim ‘actus curiae neminem gravity is
that the act of court should harm no one. The said maxim is founded upon the principle of justice
and good conscience.” Hence the court should do no harm to the defendant by allowing one
party to take unfair advantage by allowing to club the FIRs.

It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that the clubbing of multiple FIRs filed against
Chanchal Sharma in different jurisdictions at one jurisdiction of her choice would be contrary to
the principles of federalism, impartiality, territorial jurisdiction, and access to justice, and could
have serious implications for public safety and the administration of justice in the Republic of
Akhand Bharat.

8
WHETHER SECTION 295A OF AKHAND BHARAT PENAL CODE IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID OR NOT? IF YES, WHETHER THE ENHANCEMENT
OF THE PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION 295A BY THE STATE OF RANJI IS
REASONABLE OR NOT?

It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that the section 295A of Akhand Bharat Penal
code is constitutionally valid because of the following reasons:

1. It is within the scope of reasonable restriction mentioned under Article 19(2) of the
Constitution of the Republic of Akhand Bharat.
2. It is for public policy and safety.

It is also humbly submitted that the enhancement of the punishment under section 295A by the
state of Ranji is also reasonable because it is in the interst of the public and maintains a safe
environment in the country. Therefore, the enhancement of the punishment under section 295A
is reasonable.

Hence, section 295 A is constitutional and the enhancement of punishment by the state of Ranji
is reasonable too.

[2.1.] REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS

It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble SC of the republic of Akhanda Bharat that the citizens
of India are given certain freedoms under Article 19 of the constitution one of which is freedom
of speech and expression but they are not absolute rights. They are subject to some reasonable
restrictions mentioned under Article 19(2) of the Indian constitution and it is submitted by the
respondent that section 295 A of Akhand Bharat Penal code also comes under the purview of this
is Article 19(2) as it restricts the freedom of speech and expression.

It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code
(IPC) aims at restraining acts of outraging religious sentiments. The Section talks about
deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage the religious feelings of any class by insulting
its religion or religious beliefs. Acts spoken, written, by signs, or by any visible representations,
insulting or attempting to insult the religion or religious beliefs fall under the category of an
offense under IPC.

9
It is humbly submitted that Article 19(1) (a) talks about freedom of speech and expression, but
the subsequent clauses of the article enumerate ‘reasonable restriction’. When we look at the
constitutional aspect of Section 295A we see that it falls under the ‘reasonable restriction’ of the
said article, which states that no person should use this fundamental right of freedom of speech
and expression to insult or hurt the religious sentiments of any class. This is a punishable
offense.

It is humbly submitted that the test for reasonability has evolved continuously. In the case of
State of Madras v. V.G. Row, Sastri CJ had laid down the test of reasonableness that is generally
accepted today, saying that: “it is important… to bear in mind that the test of reasonableness,
wherever prescribed should be applied to each individual statute impugned, and no abstract
standard or general pattern of reasonableness, can be laid down as applicable to all cases”.
Following this test of reasonability, it can be seen that the restriction imposed by section 295A of
the code are reasonable as they are for maintaining the peace in the country and hence are
constitutional.

It is humbly submitted that the blasphemy laws or Section 295A have been imbibed under the
reasonable restrictions of Article 19 of the Constitution of India. Thus, it can be interpreted by
stating that the section acts as a violation of the freedom of speech and expression. But the main
fundamental principle of the constitution is to maintain peace and security and also to respect the
principle of secularism. Therefore, the constitutional validity of Section 295A was challenged in
the case of Ramji Lal Modi v State of Uttar Pradesh, 1957 on the ground that the section
infringes the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression that has been guaranteed
under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India.

Hence, the Supreme Court while upholding the constitutionality of Section 295A of the Indian
Penal Code stated that the section has been introduced and enacted in the interest of public order
and welfare and that it only penalizes the aggravated form of insult to any kind of religion when
it is perpetrated with the deliberate and malicious intention of outraging and defaming the
religious feelings and sentiments of the citizens. The court further stated that the section which
penalizes such activities of blasphemy that is within the protection of Article 19(2) of the
Constitution of India is a law imposing a reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right to
freedom of speech and expression as guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a).

10
It is also humbly submitted that the constitutional guarantee of the right to freedom of religion
under Article 25 and Article 26 is subjected to public order, morality, and health. In the case
of Sant Das Maheshwari v Babu Ram Jodoun, 1969 it was held that Section 295A of the Indian
Penal Code has no intention of prohibiting or punishing anything which acts as a mere
profession, practice, or propagation of religion or any of the things that have been specified
under Article 26 of the Constitution of India. Thus, it was interpreted through the verdict of the
court that Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code does not come into conflict with Article 25 and
Article 26 of the Constitution of India. Hence the constitutionality of Section 295A was upheld
in this case and this decision should be followed in this case to maintain certainty in the judicial
system.

It is also humbly submitted that in the case of Rajpal v Emperor,1927, the accused had published
a pamphlet entitled Rangila Rasul in which he described the sexual incontinence of the Prophet
Mohammed. The Lahore High Court held that Section 153A of the code was intended to prevent
persons from making attacks or defaming any particular community as it exists in the present
times and was not meant to stop polemics against a deceased religious leader. Therefore, all
over-the-top platforms have been facing a prospect of great scrutiny, as they have been told to
always comply with Section 295A of the Indian penal code. Therefore, the constitutionality of
section 295A has always been upheld and it should be upheld in this case too.

It is also humbly submitted that Sri Baragur Ramachandrappa & Ors v State of Karnataka, the
court dealt with the issue of banning an award-winning Kannada novel, dealing with the life of a
revered Saint, on the grounds of violating Section 295A. The court said:
‘No person has a right to impinge on the feelings of others on the premise that his right to
freedom of speech remains unrestricted and unfettered. It cannot be ignored that India is [a]
country with vast disparities in language, culture and religion and unwarranted and malicious
criticism or interference in the faith of others cannot be accepted.’ Therefore, it can’t be held
that this section 295A is unconstitutional.
It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that the reasonable restrictions under Article 19
use the term ‘in the interest of, as opposed to the term ‘for the maintenance of, the test for the
constitutionality of the implementation of the law takes on a broader scope. Therefore if Section
295A restricts free speech and expression in the interest of public order, it need not be the

11
primary objective of the law but will remain a valid restriction on free speech so far as it
penalizes actions that are disruptive to public order. Therefore, it is constitutional in nature.

[2.1.1.] REASONABLITY CHECK

It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that the section cannot be merely held
unconstitutional because the government is misusing the section in its favor and abusing the
citizens. However, some tests could be laid down by the court to follow while placing such
restrictions. In the case of Rangarajan v Jagjivan Ram verdict of the Supreme Court provided
for the impugned act of speech to be akin to a “spark in a powder keg”. This development further
bolsters the proximity test laid down by the Central Prison Fatehgarh v Ram Manohar
Lohia verdict, by necessitating a “proximate and direct nexus” between the act of speech and
public order.

It is also humbly submitted that the holding of Arup Bhuyan v State of Assam also seems counter
intuitive to the impugned judgment. Reaffirming the Supreme Court of the United States of
America devised Brandenburg Test, our Supreme Court held that criminalization of speech is
only permitted if it incites “imminent lawless action”. Hence some tests could be laid down to
check whether this section is not misused however it cannot be held unconstitutional merely
because of some incidents of misuse.

It is also humbly submitted that the ratios of the aforementioned cases, when read in addition to
the seminal observations in the Shreya Singhal v Union of India case, further bolster the case
against the constitutionality of Section 295A. Apart from necessitating a narrow interpretation of
the restrictions enlisted under Article 19(2) to be classified as reasonable, it further draws a
distinction between “advocacy” and “incitement”, with only the latter inviting legal sanction, in
addition to establishing that “overbroad laws” that affect legal and legitimate speech will have to
be to declare as unconstitutional as they have the potential to inflict a chilling effect upon speech
rights. Hence until the limitations are reasonable the law is constitutional.

It is humbly submitted that the analysis of the grounds under Article 19(2) which avail Section
295A the garb of “reasonability” present in the Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia vs State of
Bihar judicial pronouncement of a five-judge constitutional bench. It was held that:

12
“One has to imagine three concentric circles, the largest representing “law and order”, the next
representing “public order” and the smallest representing “security of State”. An act may affect
“law and order” but not “public order”. This section 295A is in favor of the public order and
hence is constitutional.

It is humbly submitted that even a speech containing a true statement could be banned if it
outrages religious feelings, as held in Khalil Ahmad v State. Similarly, in this case, the element
of ‘malicious intention’ has been diluted so much so that the presence of malice can be presumed
even if there is no lawful justification. Hence the constitutionality of this section cannot be
challenged.

[2.2.] PUBLIC SAFTEY AND TRANQUILLITY

It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that the aim and the scope for introducing these
laws were to maintain social peace and the method was for enhancing equality between the
religious groups. Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code was introduced in the code by Section 2
of the Criminal Law of Amendment Act of 1927 with the aim of punishing deliberate and
malicious acts that intend to outrage or defame the religious feelings of any class by insulting the
religions or the crimes of blasphemy. The provisions that are contained in the section are similar
to those of the common law crimes of blasphemy. Blasphemous words are punishable because
they tend to endanger peace, deprave public morals, and shake the fabric of society for being a
cause of civil strife. The primary element of the section is to insult or attempt to insult the
religion or the religious beliefs of any class of citizens of India. Therefore, it is bona fide in
nature and is constitutional since the state is maintaining the state peace and tranquility in the
state.

It is also humbly submitted that the preservation of public order, as laid down by the Supreme
Court in The Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v. Ram Manohar Lohia, would mean
the preservation of public peace, safety, and tranquillity. This must be the yardstick for
determining the extent to which the objectives of the restriction in cases where IPC 295A have
been implemented. Further, the reasonability of the restriction should also be determined based
on an objective view of the same, i.e., from the standpoint of the general public and not from that

13
of the accused or from any vague, unspecified principles. Hence, following the ratio of this case
it could be inferred that the section 295A is constitutional and should be treated in that way only.

It is preempted by the respondent that the petitioner would argue that the law has been misused
by the government quite several times and therefore should be quashed. However, the respondent
argues that even if the law has been misused by the state in various cases, the constitutionality of
the law in and of itself does not change, the constitutionality of the action of the state is what
comes under challenge. While examining the constitutionality of the implementation of IPC
295A, would help courts to follow principles that the Supreme Court has established through
various rulings. Therefore, Section 295A is constitutional in nature.

[2.3.] ENHANCEMENT OF PUNISHMENT IS REASONABLE

It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that the enhancement of the punishment under
section 295A by the state of Ranji can be seen as reasonable from the following arguments:

[2.3.1.] Protection of Religious Sentiments

It is humbly submitted that the enhancement of the punishment under section 295A aims to
provide better protection to the religious sentiments of people, which is crucial in a diverse
country like India where different communities hold different religious beliefs. The increased
punishment will help prevent acts of blasphemy and acts that can hurt the religious sentiments of
people, and maintain social harmony.

[2.3.2.] Stronger Deterrent

It is humbly submitted that the increased punishment can act as a stronger deterrent for
individuals who might be considering similar acts, and therefore prevent them from doing so.
This can help reduce the number of incidents of blasphemy and minimize the harm caused to
religious sentiments.

[2.3.3.] Maintaining Social Order

It is humbly submitted that the enhancement of the punishment under section 295A helps
maintain social order by preventing acts that can lead to communal tensions and unrest. This is
important for the stability and security of the country and its people.

14
[2.3.4.] Consistency with Other Laws

It is humbly submitted that the enhancement of the punishment under section 295A aligns with
the punishments provided for similar offenses under other laws, such as hate speech and
incitement to violence. This can help ensure consistency in the application of the law and prevent
any loopholes or ambiguities.

It is humbly submitted that section 295A is constitutional in nature and the enhancement of the
punishment under section 295A by the state of Punjab can be seen as a reasonable measure to
better protect religious sentiments, prevent acts of blasphemy, maintain social order, and provide
consistency in the application of the law.

15
[ISSUE 3] WHETHER THE BAN IMPOSED BY STATE OF RANJI ON
ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY VIDE NOTIFICATION NO. 42/2023 IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID OR NOT?

It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that the ban imposed by the state of Ranji on
entertainment industry vide Notification no. 42/2023 which banned the glorification of gun
culture in movies and songs of the state of Ranji is constitutionally valid because of the
following reasons:

1) The films and songs are subject to censorship.

2) The films are covered under the scope of reasonable restrictions mentioned under Article
19(2) of the Constitution of Akhanda Bharat.
3) Cinematography Act, 19 allows such restrictions.
4) To maintain the public peace and tranquillity.

Therefore, the ban imposed by state of ranji on entertainment industry wide notification no.
42/2023 is constitutionally valid.

[3.1.] REASONABLE RESTRICTIONS UNDER ARTICLE 19(2)

It is humbly submitted by the respondent before the hon’ble SC of the Republic of Akhnada
Baharat that Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution guarantees freedom of speech and expression
which brings in to its contours the freedom of the press. Films as a medium of expression also
are put in the same footing and accordingly granted the equal status. Both the press and films are
considered as strong mediums of communication. Both the mediums cater to the needs of a vast
number of people. Thus, the films and the press enjoy the same status and right so far as
constitutional freedom relating to expression of ideas and spreading messages are concerned.
However, the media or the films are subject to censorship laws in the country and hence are
subjected to reasonable restrictions mentioned under Article 19(2) of the Constitution.

It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that the film is a medium that touches the minds
of millions of people by spreading its base both in rural and urban areas. The contribution of
Ranji cinema to the growth and development of the state of Ranji’s society is outstanding and

16
unparallel. It is an established fact that the Constitution of Akhanda Bharat guarantees a bunch of
rights to the citizens. These rights also include certain fundamental freedoms. So far as films are
concerned, any individual is at liberty to make a film and exhibit it anywhere in India. But like
other freedoms, this freedom is also not absolute. 'Reasonable restriction' can be imposed on the
enjoyment of this freedom by the State under clause 2 of Article 19 on certain grounds, i.e., the
interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with
foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation
or incitement to an offense.

It is humbly submitted that the case of K.A. Abbas v. Union of India, is the first case where the
question relating to the censorship of films arises. In this case, the Supreme Court considered
important question relating to pre-censorship of cinematograph films in relation to the
fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression conferred by Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution. Taking into consideration all these, Hidayatullah, C.J. made it clear that censorship
of films including pre-censorship was constitutionally valid in India as it was a reasonable
restriction within the ambit of Article 19(2).

It is also humbly submitted that Hidayatullah, C.J. went on to observe that "it had been almost
universally recognized that motion pictures must be treated differently from other forms of art
and expression because a motion picture's instant appeal both to the sight and to , and because a
motion picture had become truer to life than even the theatre or any other form of artistic
representation. Its effect, particularly on children and immature adolescents was great."

The Supreme Court also held the view that "censorship of films, their classification according to
the age groups and their suitability for unrestricted exhibition with or without excisions is
regarded as a valid exercise of power in the interest of public morality, decency etc. This is not
to be construed as necessarily offending the freedom of speech and expression.”

It is humbly submitted that the above rationale must also be followed in this case too. As the
movies have a great impact on the minds of the people the banning of the gun culture is a
constitutionally valid step in the interest of the public. Therefore, the notification issued by the
state of Ranji banning the showcase of guns in songs and movies is a reasonable and
constitutionally valid step.

17
It is humbly submitted that recently a singer who used to showcase a lot of gun culture in his
songs was murdered by the assassinator via more than 30 bullets. Therefore, considering the
volatile situation in the state of Ranji it is humbly requested by the state of Ranji to allow such
notification to maintain peace and public tranquility in the state.

The constitutionality of censorship was also held in S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram. The case
came to the Supreme Court in an appeal relating to the revocation of the `U' certificate for a
Tamil film. In this case, the Madras High Court revoked the 'U' certificate issued to a film
entitled "Ore Oru Gramathile" ("In Just One Village"), and also banned the exhibition of the film
as there was some public protest against the film. The film was critical of the reservation policy
of the Government of Tamil Nadu. During the pendency of the case, the film received the
National Award by the Directorate of Film Festival of the Government of India. After the
decision of the Madras High Court, the matter went to the Supreme Court on an appeal and the
court reiterated the importance of the freedom of speech and expression and the role of films as a
legitimate media for its exercise. Reversing the judgment of the Madras High Court, the Supreme
Court opined that:

"Though movie enjoys the guarantee under Article 19(1)(a) but there is one significant
difference between the movies and the other modes of communication. Movie motivates thought
and action and assures a high degree of attention and retention. In view of the scientific
improvements in photography and production the present movie is a powerful means of
communication. It has a unique capacity to disturb and arouse feelings. It has as much potential
for evil as it has for good. It has an equal potential to instill or cultivate violent or good
behaviour. With these qualities and since it caters for mass audience who are generally not
selective about what they watch, the movie cannot be equated with other modes of
communication. It cannot be allowed to function in a free market place just as does the
newspapers and magazines. Censorship by prior restraint is, therefore, not only desirable but
also necessary."

The gun culture shown in movies has a tendency to disturb and arouse feelings. It has much
potential for evil and for cultivating a violent behaviour. As the songs and movies are watched
by masses in state of Ranji it has the capacity to aggravate violent behaviour in the youth and

18
others and hence the state ordered to ban such glorification. Therefore, the censorhip of gun
culture in this case is desirable as well as necessary and therefore it is constitutionally valid.

It is humbly submitted in the court of law that the Censorship in Ranji (and pre-censorship is not
different in quality) has full justification in the field of the exhibition in cinema films. There is no
need to generalize about other forms of speech and expression here for each such fundamental
right has a different content and importance. The censorship imposed on the making and
exhibition of films is in the interest of society. If the regulations venture into something which
goes beyond this legitimate opening of the restrictions, they can be questioned on the ground that
legitimate power is being abused. However in this case no such power has been abused and
therefore, the censorship of films including prior restraint is justified under the Constitution.

It is humbly submitted that the States are also empowered to make laws on cinemas under Entry
33 of the State List (or List II). Hence the notification issued by state of Ranji is within its
constitutional power and hence it is constitutional in nature.

It is humbly submitted that in the case of Sivashankari vs The Superintendent Of Police, a

seventeen-year-old girl had gone missing from the village of Nagapattinam. In this case, it was
claimed that her stalker had sexually exploited her. Later, as the stalking continued, the girl
married the stalker and reasoned that she was influenced by Tamil movies that had normalized
the same.
Based on the case, it was pleaded that a film ‘NEW’, which had a similar storyline and got
certified by the censor board, should be proscribed owing to its vulgarity. The Madras court
hearing the matter held:

“Though guidelines have been issued for the Board of Film Certification to follow, a lot of films
which are put for public exhibition nowadays obviously do not satisfy this guideline”.

Therefore, the court continued:

“..we deem it appropriate to issue a direction to the authorities under the Cinematograph Act to
strictly enforce the provisions of the Act and the guidelines issued therein.”

19
Therefore drawing the analogy from the above case the youth can get inspired from the gun
culture shown in movies and the songs and hence has the tendency to involve in violent acts
which is not in public interest. Therefore, the appropriate direction of banning such culture in the
movies and the songs were necessary and constitutional.

It is humbly submitted that the censorship of films, their classification according to the age
groups and their suitability for unrestricted exhibition with or without excisions is regarded as a
valid exercise of power in the interest of public morality, decency etc. This is not to be construed
as necessarily offending the freedom of speech and expression. Censorship in India (and pre-
censorship is not different in quality) has full justification in the field of the exhibition in cinema
films. There is no need to generalise about other forms of speech and expression here for each
such fundamental right has a different content and importance. The censorship imposed on the
making and exhibition of films is in the interest of society. If the regulations venture into
something which goes beyond this legitimate opening the restrictions, they can be questioned on
the ground that a legitimate power is being abused. Therefore, the censorship of films including
prior restraint is justified under our Constitution. Hence the notification vide 42/2023 issued by
state of Ranji is constitutional in nature.

20