Secure Tamper Resistant

Authentication for Anti-Counterfeit

Applications
Balaji Badam
Security Architect
Anti-Counterfeit Products

May 2019 | AMF-CIT-T3539

Company Public – NXP, the NXP logo, and NXP secure connections for a smarter world are trademarks of NXP
B.V. All other product or service names are the property of their respective owners. © 2018 NXP B.V.
Agenda
• Brief Introduction to NXP Security Offerings
• Anti-Counterfeit Applications and Use Cases
• What to look for in an anti-counterfeit solution
• A1006 Secure Authenticator
• A1007 Preview
• Development Tools and Provisioning Utility

COMPANY PUBLIC 1
Brief Introduction to NXP Security
Offerings

COMPANY PUBLIC 2
 NXP #1 Market Position in Security ICs
2017 Security IC Market Share ($3.3B)
40.0%
35.0%
30.0%
Markets include:
25.0%
• Authentication & Anti-counterfeiting
20.0%
15.0% • Enterprise ID & Access Management
10.0%
5.0% • Government and Healthcare ID
0.0%
NXP Competitor A Competitor B Competitor C Competitor D Others • NFC Embedded Secure Element
All Security Ics Non-SIM Security Ics
• Payment and Banking
Security IC Revenues $M (TAM) • Pay TV / Conditional Access
4000
• Retail and Loyalty
3500

3000 • SIM card ICs

2500
• Telecom / Payphone card ICs
2000

1500 • Transportation
1000
• Other (includes TPM)
500

0
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Sources: ABI Research, Q4 2018

COMPANY PUBLIC 3
NXP Offers a Full Range of Authentication Solutions

The level and type of security depends Tamper Resistant Certified

Secure Element
on the nature of the product, the Secure Tamper
Tamper Resistant Secure
Resistant
logistics channel and possible threats Authenticator

+ Communication Security

Cryptography
+ Mutual (Tag-initiator)
authentication

+Cryptography (with memory)

Tag Authentication

NXP products address a whole range of Enhanced ID

+ Customer Specific
Originality Signature

security requirements: from base level +NXP Originality Signature

and NXP Specific Commands
identification to physically secure tamper
resistant cryptographic authentication +Memory Protection
Base
through to independently certified Secure Identification + User memory

Elements for applications such as payment Unique UID/TID

and e-government identification (optionally customized)

COMPANY PUBLIC 4
Applications and Use Case
Examples

COMPANY PUBLIC 5
Anti-counterfeit Protection and Proof of Origin
Anti-Counterfeit
Physically secure authentication
ICs
Electronic High value High Value
accessories components Consumables
Complete security solution: IC,
Electronic • Router • Printer cartridges software, key/certificate insertion
Accessories • Switches • Batteries and secure production flow
• Charger • Blade server • Medical probes,
• Keyboard • Memory sensors
• Cables boards • Phone/Tablet Multiple solutions in development
• Transceiver Cases. offer range of flexibility, size, and
Game consoles • Electronic Cig. cost
• Docking cartridges
Stations
• Head Set
• Controllers

COMPANY PUBLIC 6
Counterfeited Batteries and Chargers – Serious Problem
• Counterfeit batteries and chargers are
very common and difficult to identify
• Significant risk to consumers
• Significant risk to revenue, brand and
product liability
• Replaceable batteries, power banks,
and all chargers are susceptible to
counterfeit
• Xiaomi CEO Lei Jun assessing MI
power bank sales
− “If
there were no counterfeits, our sales would be
double or triple”
− Estimated loss of $115 M

COMPANY PUBLIC 7
Rise of Counterfeits
• Border agents seize $700K in counterfeits at Ranier, The
containers held 50 amplifiers, 662 cartons of earbuds and cables,
and 57 cartons of sandwich boards and touch lamina.” – Duluth
News Tribune, April 16, 2019
• “More than 99% of fake iPhone chargers failed critical safety test –
faulty chargers have caused electrical shocks and even fires.” –
Underwriters Laboratories study, 2016
• Manufacturing and 3D printing has made it very hard to tell the
difference between a super fake and a legitimate product – Steve
Shapiro, FBI Intellectual Property Rights
• The US Government accountability Office found that over 2 out of
every 5 of supposedly brand name products it purchased were
counterfeit” - 2018

COMPANY PUBLIC 8
Impact of Counterfeit Power Accessories
Mobile Phones
• “At the end of 2016, Apple claimed that of 100 Apple-branded charging accessories it bought on Amazon, 90 were
counterfeits” – ECN, February 2017
• “Britain’s Chartered Trading Standards Institute reported that of 400 counterfeit chargers it bought from a range of online
retailers, 397 failed a basic safety test. ” ECN, February 2017

Electronic cigarettes
• “A tale of two Juul pods: China’s counterfeits pose a threat to US” – New York Post April 10, 2019
• “Philadelphia customs agents intercept cases of counterfeit Juul products.” – April 17, 2019
• “Illicit trade in electronic cigarettes is on the rise across the developed world … include bogus batteries that fail to recharge
and liquids containing dangerously high levels of nicotine.” – Wall St. Journal Feb 20, 2015

Medical Supplies
• “According to the World Health Organization (WHO), more than 8% of the medical devices in circulation are counterfeit …
pose a significant liability to the manufacturers and a health risk to both the patients and healthcare providers that could result
in injury, permanent disability, or even death.” – News Medical April 6, 2016

Hoverboards
• “Thousands of fake hoverboards, worth $1.2 million, seized in Southern California” – Mercury News September 19th, 2017
• “CBP Seizes Record Amount of Counterfeit Hoverboards … over 16-thousand counterfeit hoverboards with an estimated MSRP
of over $6 million … contain batteries that are deemed unauthorized and therefore counterfeit as well as fake trademark logos.”
- January 27, 2016 – US Customs and Boarder Protection

Power Tools
• “counterfeit battery … presents significant safety hazards, including an explosion risk … Black & Decker employees and
customers have purchased similar counterfeit batteries on the websites eBay and Amazon.” STANLEY BLACK & DECKER, INC. V.
D&L ELITE INVS., LLC (US District Court for the Northern District of California (July 19, 2013)

COMPANY PUBLIC 9
Battery & Charger Auth Applications
Fitness
Watches

Handheld Portable
Medical Doppler
Imaging
Medical
DVs Tablets Blood Glucose
Cameras
Monitoring
Wireless Barcode
Power Scanners

Hoverboards
Smartphones Medical Surgical Systems
Consumer
Industrial
Power Tools
Power Banks Drone
s
Portable Industrial
Notebooks/ Portable PCs
Portable
Tablets Industrial Uninterruptable
Audio Ultrabooks
PDAs Power Supply
Speakers
(UPS)

All replaceable batteries and high powered chargers (including wireless chargers)
should be authenticated for safety, and revenue & brand protection
COMPANY PUBLIC 10
USB Trust Challenges
USB Type-C PD chargers can deliver up to 5 amps at 20 volts “Faulty USB phone
• Is the charger one that came with the system? charger blamed for
• Counterfeit chargers are widespread death” – Sydney
Morning Herald 2014
• Will it damage my system or even possibly cause a fire?

USB charging ports are everywhere – rental car, taxis, airports, …

• Is it safe to charge at high power?
• Is it only charging, or doing something else?
• “Bad USB” accessories can present as a network device or
keyboard and steal data or worse

Malicious USB devices can even take down other networked

systems
• Stuxnet delivered via infected USB storage drives – destroyed a
large number of Iranian nuclear centrifuges and was also
targeted at their power plant steam turbines
COMPANY PUBLIC 11
NXP USB Type-C Interface & Smart Charging Solutions
Type-C
Cable

AC-DC Adapter • NXP USB Type C PD Adapter

Solution
TEA1993
SR Controller

TEA1936 TEA1905

• Includes:
QR Controller
USB PD QC2.0/3.0
controller for SMPS

Authentication

Authentication − Primary Controller

− Secondary Controller
− PD controller
− Authentication
Authentication as part of complete
end to end USB Type-C Solution

COMPANY PUBLIC 12
Authenticating Electronic Accessories
• Ecosystem Quality & User
Experience
− Authenticatedevices before enabling them
− Prevent access from rogue devices

• Create licensable ecosystem

− Embedded secure element is requirement to
be a “Made for [OEM]” accessory
− Accessory makers must agree to OEMs
T&C’s and purchase authentication IC from
partners
Mandatory − Enforces & protects OEM licensing revenue
Authentication IC
as well as user experience
COMPANY PUBLIC 13
Anti-Counterfeit – Printer Cartridges
Commonly used in both inkjet and laser printers
• Protect revenue source (make money on ink/toner, not printer)

Cartridge Authentication Options

• Only genuine printer cartridges work
• Warn user that cartridge is not genuine
• Allow refills and clones, but potentially reduced functionality

Same business model applies to e-cigarettes, medical consumables, …

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What to Look For in Anti-
Counterfeit Solutions
Crypto, tamper resistance, secure manufacturing, personalization
(Trust Provisioning)

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Authentication Options

Authentication Option Description Advantages Disadvantages

Silicon Identifier (unique Unique code in ROM/OTP per Simple to implement Easily cloned
device or per application
ID)
Cryptographic Identifier Cryptographic challenge- Requires slightly more skill to Easily cloned by motivated
response clone than Silicon Identifier counterfeiters

Secure Symmetric Tamper-resistant symmetric Simple authentication algorithm Protecting shared keys (can
authentication (typically SHA or require two security ICs), break
Crypto Authenticator AES) one-break all risk

Secure Asymmetric Tamper-resistant asymmetric Secure key storage only Challenge-response validation
authentication required on one device, limited can be more compute intensive
Crypto Authenticator (typically RSA or ECC) attack scalability reduces
incentive to counterfeiters

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Symmetric Encryption

Key Key

Plaintext Ciphertext Plaintext

Encryption Decryption
DES DES-1
TDEA TDEA-1
AES AES-1

• Efficient algorithms, good for bulk data encryption

• Both parties have a shared secret key
• Challenge 1: How do we get a key securely from A to B?
• Challenge 2: If one device is hacked, then all are hacked (since key is shared)
• Challenge 3: Both sides need secure key storage
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Asymmetric Cryptography
• Based on hard and long-studied mathematical problems
• Each participating party owns a key pair
− A public key (can be known to everybody)
− A private key (must stay under the sole control of the owner)
• Only the private key can decrypt something encrypted with the public key
− Example – encrypted email – sender uses public key of intended receiver, only the person with the corresponding
private key can read message
• Only the public key can decrypt something encrypted with the private key
− Ensures that the message came from the original sender who had the private key

Bob‘s Bob‘s Alice‘s Alice‘s

Public Private Private Public
Key Key Key Key

Plaintext Ciphertext Plaintext Plaintext Signature Verified?

Encryption Decryption Signing Verification

COMPANY PUBLIC 18
Key Value: Asymmetric Crypto-based Authentication
Host
Accessory
MCU

I2C or OWI A1006

Alternative
Benefits: Implementation
• Unique key pair per accessory BLE, Wifi, NFC, USB
MCU
− Minimized hack scalability
I2C
− Can blacklist/revoke cloned devices without impacting existing infrastructure
A1006
• Tamper-resistant IC protects secret key
• One anti-counterfeit IC per accessory
• No need for secure element in the main unit, lower cost of ownership
− No host secrets, just a single public key needed for validation
• Interface options include I2C, One-wire interfaces
COMPANY PUBLIC 19
Elliptic Curve Crypto (ECC) Based Authentication
(NXP) Certificate
Authority
HOST (Host-MCU or Cloud) CLIENT Public Key

Private Key
Request (HSM)
certificate
Send Client Certificate
Body
CRL certificate …
Public Key
NOK Validate …
Signed HASH
certificate [Success]
[Success]
check Cert
challenge Public Key
OK (SE)
Send Random Private Key
Challenge (SE)
Sign
challenge
Send
response
NOK Validate
response
[Success]
OK auth_verify

Continue HSM: Hardware Security Module

SE: Secure Element
stop service CRL: Certificate Revocation List

COMPANY PUBLIC 20
But is Cryptography Enough?
• Crypto does not equal security
• Even if door lock is impenetrable, if you can find the key it is easy
to get in
• If an attacker can get the keys, they don’t need to break the crypto
• Most “secure” micros can be easily hacked if an attacker can get
physical access
• NXP combines tamper resistant secure ICs with cryptographic
authentication for secure authentication
• Multilayered security extends beyond the IC to Software, Product
Design and Manufacturing
COMPANY PUBLIC 21
Cracking a Crypto Authentication Device
Combined Attacks

Semi-invasive Attacks: Fault Attacks

Reverse

Non invasive Attacks: Leakage

Photo emission
Engineering
Analysis
Delayering
Invasive Attacks

Micro-probing
Global And Local Light EMA
Forcing
Attacks Analysis
Manipulation

Electron Microscopy
Timing
Atomic Force Spike/Glitch injection
Analysis
Microscopy (AFM)

Contrast Etching Alpha Particle SPA/DPA

Decoration Penetration Analysis

Attacker’s goal is to steal the secret key(s)

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Fault Attacks with Lasers

COMPANY PUBLIC 23
Simple Fault Attacks: Code Execution

attack critical jumps…

NO
PIN correct?

YES
throw error
pay money

COMPANY PUBLIC 24
Simple Fault Attacks: Code Execution

attack I/O loop…

(copy from buffer) configure loop

Hello world! end loop

Memory dump: FB AE 04 23 82 F3 D1 …

COMPANY PUBLIC 25
Timing Attack
input

Process A

YES bit = 1?
Process X

NO
Process B

Process C

measure difference & get value of bit output

COMPANY PUBLIC 26
Timing / SPA Attack: Example RSA

Modular exponentiation: x  mk mod N

xm
for i  n  2 down to 0
x  x2
if (ki  1) then execution time depends
x  xm on value of secret bit ki!
endfor
V(t)
return x

square & multiply algorithm

0 1

COMPANY PUBLIC 27
Key Value: NXP Attack Countermeasures
• Glue Logic
− Function blocks are chopped up and randomly mixed
• Memory encryption, Memory scrambling
− For unique placement of data for each IC
• Security routing on all metal layers
• Voltage sensors on the IC

EEPROM
EEPROM
Logi

Secure
• Active and passive shielding Glue Logic

• Protected true random number generator

• Secured Cores
− Secured booting/secured mode control
− Protection against pertinent fault attacks (robustness)
• Leakage attack countermeasures
− Protection against timing analysis
− Protection against Single Power Analysis (SPA), Differential
Power Analysis (DPA), Electromagnetic Analysis (EMA)
− Protection against Differential Fault Analysis (DFA)

COMPANY PUBLIC 28
A1006 Secure Authenticator
Product Introduction

COMPANY PUBLIC 29
A1006 Secure Authenticator – Key Customer Benefits
Targeted for Anti- … Providing strong asymmetric cryptographic solution coupled
counterfeit with industry leading NXP security technology and services
applications…

Highly Secure … … Industry leading tamper resilience and countermeasures

against SPA, DPA and other invasive and non-invasive attacks.
Die specific key injection preventing scalable attacks.

Fast, Small and low … Providing very small package(1x1 mm), very fast
power… authentication (~ 50 ms) and supporting a deep sleep mode
consuming very low power(~ 1 uA)

No secure element … PKI based asymmetric cryptography with private keys never
in the host… leaving the secure element. No Secure IC needed in the host

Complete Solution … Host reference library, developer kit, certificate provisioning

tool, trust provisioning options

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Tamper Resistant Authentication - A1006
• No security IC needed on host side because of PKI
(Public Key Infrastructure) authentication
− Asymmetric/public key based ECDH (Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman)
explicit authentication protocol with NIST-b163 curve
− Digitally signed X509v3 certificates using ECDSA signatures with
NIST-p224 curve and SHA-224 digest hash
• Industry leading advanced security features include:
TRNG, active shielding, security sensors, many more
• 4 kbit EEPROM supports 2 certificates, system
memory, and 1kbit for user needs
• Industry’s lowest power (550uA max)
− Deep sleep power < 1 uA at 1.8V Vdd
• Industry’s smallest footprint – as small as 1 mm2 in
WLCSP
− Also available in HXSON6 2 x 2 mm package
• Flexible Interfaces: 400 kbps I2C or one wired
interface
− OWI bus powered (no external Vdd needed)
− OWI interface rated 8kV IEC61000-4-2 ESD protection
COMPANY PUBLIC 31
A1006 EEPROM Details

4kbit EEPROM split into 4 regions x 1kbit:

1st Certificate area 2nd Certificate area User memory System memory

NXP Generic Certificate User-defined certificate Always accessible System memory

Once this leaves NXP injected at the customer (RW) (not accessible by
factory, it is read-only. manufacturing flow. customer ever)
In “User-mode”: this
area is locked, and
becomes read only.

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NXP Value Proposition for A1006 Secure Authenticator
• Best in class anti-counterfeiting/anti-hacking technology
− Strongestlevels of market-proven and certified security
− End to end security includes common criteria certified design environment, production facilities
and secure personalization/key insertion per chip
• Lowest power, smallest footprint, high performance
− Solutions as small as 1mm2
− Power consumption as low as 550 uA full-on, < 1 uA deep sleep
− Full certificate validation plus ECC challenge-response in ~50 ms

• Ease of system integration

• Bus-powered one wire interface
− 8kV IEC61000-4-2 contact ESD protection
− Demo board and host demo software available
− Applications support team includes security experts

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A1007 Preview

COMPANY PUBLIC 34
A1007 for Consumables – Launching Soon
• No security IC needed on host side because of public key authentication (PKI)
− Asymmetric public/private key Diffie-Hollman authentication protocol based on NIST ECC
B-163 curve
− Digitally signed certificates using ECDSA and NIST ECC P-224 curve
− PRESENT cipher for locking user memory
• Features for consumables:
− Two one-way counters
− 24 non-resettable flags
− Lockable user space
− Kill-chip command
• Industry leading advanced security features include: TRNG, active shielding, security
sensors, DPA/SPA, many more
• 8kbit EEPROM supports 2 certificates, system memory, and 4kbit for user needs
• Industry’s lowest power (550uA max)
− Deep sleep power < 1 uA at 1.8V Vdd
• Small footprint – available in HXSON6 2 x 2 mm package
− CSP package - 1.3 x 0.94 mm WLCSP4
• Flexible Interfaces: 400 kbps I2C or one wired interface
− OWI bus powered (no external Vdd needed)
− OWI interface rated 8kV IEC61000-4-2 ESD protection
COMPANY PUBLIC 35
A1007 Secure Authenticator – Key Customer Benefits
Targeted for … Providing strong asymmetric cryptographic solution coupled
Consumables markets… with industry leading NXP security technology and services

Highly Secure … … Industry leading tamper resilience and countermeasures

against SPA, DPA and other invasive and non-invasive attacks.
Die specific key injection preventing scalable attacks.

Fast, Small and low … Providing very small package(1.3 x 0.94 mm), very fast
power… authentication (~ 50 ms) and supporting a deep sleep mode
consuming very low power(~ 1.5 uA)

No secure element … PKI based asymmetric cryptography with private keys never
required in the host… leaving the secure element. No Secure IC needed in the host

Authenticated User … Anti tearing counters; Lightweight symmetric present80

Memory and Counters cipher for authenticated reads of user memory and counters

Kill Command … Secure End of Life

Complete Solution … Host reference library, developer kit, certificate provisioning

tool, trust provisioning options

COMPANY PUBLIC 36
A1007 EEPROM Details
8kbit EEPROM split into 8 regions x 1kbit:
1st Certificate area 1k 2nd Certificate area Four 1K User memory Counters and User Flags System memory

NXP Generic Certificate User-defined certificate Accessible after unlock Always accessible System memory
Once this leaves NXP injected at the customer (Authenticated Reads (Authenticated Reads (not accessible by
factory, it is read-only. manufacturing flow. and Writes) Increment Counters) customer ever)
In “User-mode”: this
area is locked, and
becomes read only.

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Comparing A1006 vs A1007
Feature A1006 A1007 Comment

Cryptographic Auth ECC NIST-B163 ECDH ECC NIST-B163 ECDH + PRESENT80 cipher Symmetric cipher MAC added
MAC for authenticated data
Authenticated Read/Write No Yes Per flow diagram

Certificate Validation X509v3 DER certificate signed with X509v3 DER certificate signed with ECDSA using No change
ECDSA using ECC NIST-P224 and ECC NIST-P224 and SHA-224
SHA-224

Authentication Protocol Explicit using ECDH challenge-response Implicit using per ECDH challenge for key See flow diagram
validation agreement, followed by MAC response validation
Interfaces I2C, OWI I2C, OWI No change

Package HXSON6, WLCSP4 HXSON6, WLCSP4 No change

Memory Size 4 kbit (1 kbit user memory + 2 certificate) 8 kbit (4 kbit user memory + 2 certificates) Increase user data storage

24-bit one-way counter x 2 No Yes Eg. measure ink/page

consumption
Non-resettable operation flag No 16-bit individually settable, cannot be cleared Track different usage states

ESD Level 2kV HBM (8kV IEC on OWI) 4 kV HBM (8kV IEC on OWI) Improved robustness in high-
touch environments

CRC Checksum No Yes Improved data reliability

Kill Chip command No Yes Permanent shut down prevents

refills and other illegitimate uses

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Development Tools and
Provisioning Utility

COMPANY PUBLIC 39
A1006/A1007 “Whole Product”
Development Tools

Host Software
Reference
Library Trust Provisioning Options
Demo Kit
Standard NXP
Cert (customer Secure IC Options (secure IC, secure manufacturing)
Developer Kit provides own cert
in their facility)

Custom NXP
Technical signed Certificate
Collateral HXSON6 WLCSP
Customer signed
Certificate certificate
Configuration inserted by NXP
Tool

Supplemented by:
- Sales Tools (Demo boards, Collateral, Presentations, White Papers)
- Deep Security Expertise
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NXP Secure Product Delivery
• Secure product manufacturing
− Certified procedures for ROM code and FabKey data submission
− All
sites involved in manufacturing are regularly re-audited according to Common
Criteria
• Security maintenance
− Dedicated security managers
− Continuous Improvement process installed including regular process reviews
• Trustful external partnerships
− Customer Screening Procedure
− Long lasting trustworthy partnerships with suppliers and vendors
• Regularly assessed by security audits
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A1006 / A1007 Life Cycle stages – Standard Product
PRE- CUSTOMER SIDE
PERSONALIZATIO PERSONALIZATION USER MODE
N STATE (OPTIONAL)

NXP Signed certificate and A User certificate is injected at the The Authentication operation mode.
optional User signed certificate customer site before locking the Both certificate regions are locked,
injected as a part of the Trust device for Authentication operation user memory region still RW.
provisioning flow.

Customer side personalization:

• NXP delivers the standard part with a generic NXP digital certificate
• Customers 1) read the public key from the NXP Cert.; 2) create their own Cert. using the
same public key and adding customer data; 3) insert the Custom Cert. into the chip in the 2nd
Cert. area.
• NXP Smart Card-based Tool to Assist is Now Available
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NXP Trust Provisioning Services – Flexible Options

Flexible options available for certificate injection

using NXP’s Secure Trust Provisioning flow

Standard Product: NXP signed generic Digital Certificate

• NXP acts as “Certificate Authority” and signs a generic NXP certificate. The A1006 IC is
supplied in “Customer side personalization” mode to allow additional customer-specific
certificate to be inserted.

Customer signed Digital Certificate with customer-specific information

• The A1006 IC ships with a user certificate, containing user-specific information, which
NXP signs using the customer signing key within NXP HSM.
• IC can be delivered in either customer provisioning mode (to allow additional data to be
locked in 2nd slot) or user mode.

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A1006 / A1007 Customer Certificate Provisioning Utility

Use Cases Specify customer-specific data and signing key for NXP-injected User Certificates

Provision user-signed certificates in user’s factory

Securely control (limit) certificate provisioning at 3rd party manufacturing sites

Key Smart-Card for secure storage of signing key and issuance of certificates
Features:
Cross-Platform Web GUI based User Interface

Capabilities: Create or Import User Certificate Signing Key

Clone Signing Key to Additional Cards
Securely provision individual A1006/A1007 with user-signed certificates
Restrict # of devices that can be provisioned

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NXP Trust Provisioning Overview
Creation of secret keys, certificates &
personalization data in HSM
• Only HSM’s (Hardware Security Modules) with
CC EAL5+ certification have access to Master
secrets and unencrypted cryptographic objects

Insertion of key data into NXP chips during

production
• Security sealed Wafer Tester allocates
cryptographic objects into chips

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NXP Trust Provisioning: Key Benefits

Value
Customer Benefit
Proposition
- Higher supply chain security
Reliable Secure - Reduces the security risks and complexity
Certified Process involved in injecting keys and ceriticates at
customer site.

- No investment needed for secure equipment,

and certified manufacturing facility
Cost savings and
faster TTM
- Reduced test time in the customer system
manufacturing line without the need for
key/certificate injection per die
- Cost savings and shorter lead times/faster time-
$
to-market

- Customized Service – Optional User

Flexible customization
certificate with User parameters can be
options injected per die in our Secure manufacturing
facilities

COMPANY PUBLIC 46
Supporting Materials
Accessing These are security documents
Datasheet and
other Support Encypted secure distribution protects customer and NXP
Materials Register in DocStore for documents:
https://www.docstore.nxp.com/flex/DocStoreApp.html

Tools Demo boards, samples, developer kits are Available through sample store, but need PL
available now approval

Certificate configuration tool (beta) Contact product line

available now
Additional Info Product Brief , White papers, Demo Video
Available on NXP A1007 Launching Soon: 2019
Authentication
Web page www.nxp.com/authentication

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 www.nxp.com
NXP, the NXP logo, and NXP secure connections for a smarter world are trademarks of NXP B.V. All other product or service names are the property of their respective owners. © 2018 NXP B.V.