Charles Johann

PHIL 3481

02/18/24

Dr. Justin P. McBrayer

In Defence of Hard Incompatibilism

Introduction:

The problem of free will has been pondered for as long as philosophers have been

pondering. The problem goes something like this: (1) If an action is determined, then that action

is not free. (2) If an action is indeterminate, then that action is not free. (3) All actions are either

determined or undetermined. (4) Therefore all actions are not free. There are many responses to

this argument from Libertarians who reject premise 2, compatibilists (or soft determinists) who

reject premise 1, hard determinists who approve the argument, and hard incompatibilists who

approve the argument but are agnostic on determinism at large.

First, I will define all of the relevant terms used throughout this paper so that there is a clear

understanding of what is being said and the relevant arguments. Next, I will argue against the

existence of free will from biology and psychology and, in the process, dismantle the libertarian

argument. Next, I will examine why compatibility is not the correct position to hold either and,

in doing so, disprove the view of determinism by dissolving the notion of the determined

universe.
 Definitions:

Libertarianism asserts that free will and determinism are incompatible. It holds that

humans possess free will and that this free will entails the ability to make choices that are not

causally determined by preceding events. Libertarianism denies determinism, suggesting that

some events, particularly human choices, are not determined by prior causes. In this context, free

will is closely linked to the absence of deterministic constraints and the ability to exercise

genuine agency over one's actions.

Compatibilism holds that free will and determinism are compatible concepts. It argues

that even if determinism is true (i.e., all events are causally determined by preceding events),

humans can still possess free will. Free will can be understood as the ability to act according to

one's desires, motivations, or rational deliberations, even if prior factors causally determine those

desires and motivations. In this context, free will emphasizes the absence of external constraints

or coercion and the presence of internal factors that enable individuals to act autonomously.

Hard determinism asserts that every event, including human actions and decisions, is the

inevitable result of prior causes. According to this view, the universe operates according to strict

causal laws, leaving no room for genuine free will or choice. Because antecedent causes

determine every action, humans cannot be morally responsible for their actions because they

cannot choose differently. In this context, free will is denied altogether, as individuals are seen as

passive participants in a predetermined chain of events, lacking genuine agency or autonomy.

Hard incompatibilism asserts that free will and determinism cannot coexist. It argues that

even if determinism is false (as libertarians claim) and there is indeterminacy or randomness in

the universe, free will still cannot exist. Hard incompatibilism contends that even if prior events
did not causally determine human actions, they would still not be genuinely free since

randomness or indeterminacy would not provide a sufficient basis for free will. After all, random

actions are not under the control of the individual and, thus, are not made freely. In this context,

free will is seen as an illusory concept.

Freewill is a term that, depending on which view of freewill you have, will have a

different definition. Throughout this paper, I will use free will to refer to the ability to do

otherwise than what was done. An example of this is an ice cream shop where Jones chooses

vanilla ice cream; however, to be free, Jones had to be able to choose a different flavor. This

closely aligns with the principle of alternate possibility (PAP), which states that "A person is

morally responsible for what s/he has done only if s/he could have done otherwise." (Frankfurt,

1969). It should be noted that PAP differs in that it deals strictly with moral responsibility,

whereas my definition is concerned with the causes and reasons for an action.

External constraints refer to factors outside the individual that limit or influence their

freedom and choices. Contrast that with internal constraints, which refer to factors within the

individual that limits or influences their freedom and choices.

Sufficient causes are conditions that alone are adequate to produce a certain effect or

outcome. That is, a sufficient cause is a condition that, without any other conditions, is enough to

lead to a particular action. In the case of the ice cream shop the sufficient cause of Jones

purchasing vanilla is Jones’ taste preference for vanilla ice cream.

Arguments from the Sciences Against Free Will:

shaping our behavior, preferences, and abilities. Genetic predispositions, neurochemical

imbalances, evolutionary pressures, and physiological factors can influence our actions and

decision-making processes. When all of these factors come together, they create what we can call

dispositions. These dispositions affect how we examine, and reason about actions made long

before the action occurs. One example is the evolutionary pressures that created a desire for

sugary, salty, and fatty foods (Breslin, 2013). Because of the advantage that wanting these foods

gave our ancestors, that trait was selected for and passed along to humans today.

Further, because this constraint comes from outside of the individual (i.e., natural

selection), it is an external constraint and limits the freedom of the individual. Another example

of biological external constraints is religiousness, which is influenced by genetics (D'Onofrio et

al., 1999). That is to say; how willing one is to participate in religion or believe in religious

thought is influenced by genetics.

Similarly, psychology, including cognitive processes, emotions, and past experiences,

significantly influences our behavior and decision-making. Our beliefs, attitudes, and past

traumas can shape how we perceive the world, make choices, and which choices are available to

us. For example, someone who fears public speaking may avoid opportunities for public

speaking, not because they freely choose to do so, but because their past experiences and

psychological makeup influence their behavior.

Lastly, Neuroscience research suggests that much of our decision-making occurs

subconsciously, with conscious awareness often lagging. Many studies have been conducted that

can decode brain waves before a voluntary decision. In one such study, Researchers "decoded

imagery content as far as 11 seconds before the voluntary decision". (Koenig-Robert, & Pearson,
2019) These studies imply that our sense of conscious agency is illusory since decisions are

made before we are consciously aware of them.

To these arguments, the compatibilist will respond, 'So what?' Even if they are disposed to desire

certain foods or their brain has made a decision long before, as long as wants align with actions,

they are free. The response to this is to say that that is not what it means to be free, but this is

unlikely to sway the compatibilist, so I will grant the compatibilist this and acknowledge that this

argument will not sway them. Instead, I will refer to the compatibilist in my later arguments

against compatibilism.

The libertarian will respond that none of these factors are sufficient causes of action and

are merely incentives. To this, I will push the libertarian to pinpoint the exact cause of the action.

If it is a want, then where does that want come from? At some point, a sufficient cause will stem

from one of the abovementioned factors that is not under the agent's control. Suppose the

libertarian avoids this and says that there is no sufficient cause. In that case, the libertarian falls

back into premise 3, that if an action is indeterminate, then that action is not free. This pressure

from the sciences seems to put libertarians out of play as a viable view of free will.

For those libertarians who still deny science, I would like to make one final point. Our wants

from our actions, but what forms our wants? A libertarian might argue that it is second-order

wants, but where do those come from? This chain of questioning could continue indefinitely

until a sufficient condition is identified, and the libertarian position fails on its premise that

preceding events do not causally determine choices.

Argument Against Compatibilism From Moral Responsibility:

determined, and difficulties within moral responsibility come with that belief. Namely, Peter van

Inwagen's consequence argument goes like this: (1) No one has power over the facts of the past

and the laws of nature. (2) No one has power over the fact that the facts of the past and the laws

of nature entail every fact of the future (i.e., determinism is true) (3) Therefore, no one has power

over the facts of the future. Simplified, this argument says that if determinism is true, our actions

are not up to us because they result from past events and the laws of nature, which we have no

control over and, thus, no responsibility. This argument offers a significant hurdle for the

compatibilist since it is widely agreed that moral responsibility requires the agent to be free in

doing their action. An example of this is if someone's family is being held hostage and they rob a

bank, we would not hold them morally responsible since they did not do so freely. Suppose we

expand this to a deterministic world, which an agent could not have done otherwise. In that case,

we cannot hold them morally responsible in the same way we do not hold the bank robber

morally responsible because they did not have free will in their choice.

The compatibilist response is that as long as they can deliberate and make choices

according to our desires and reasons, we can still be considered free agents. Thus, the moral

responsibility will still fall on the agent. The compatibilist response fails to account for the fact

that if the compatibilist is committed to determinism, then genuine deliberation is not possible

since genuine deliberation would require that both outcomes are plausible. The outcome is

dependent on how well-reasoned one point is over another. However, in determinism, it would

not be the case that both possibilities are viable outcomes; this genuine deliberation is not

possible, and, once again, a lack of moral responsibility is something the compatibilist is faced

with and, for many compatibilists, will be what falters their belief in compatibilism, however for
those compatibilists who are not convinced my following argument will examine what the

sciences have to say about compatibilism by examining determinism.

Argument Against Compatibilism From Sciences:

Quantum indeterminacy is a foundational concept in quantum mechanics, a branch of

physics that deals with the behavior of particles at the most minor scales of existence, such as

atoms and subatomic particles. At this level, deterministic laws break down, and a probabilistic

framework emerges to describe the behavior of particles. In quantum indeterminacy, the

Heisenberg uncertainty principle states that the position and momentum of a particle cannot be

precisely determined simultaneously, i.e., we can know the position or the momentum, but not

both. Another piece of quantum indeterminacy is quantum superposition, which states that

particles such as electrons can exist in a state of superposition, where they simultaneously

occupy multiple states or positions until they are observed. Only upon observation or

measurement does the particle "collapse" into a definite state. This indeterminacy in the outcome

of measurements is not due to a lack of knowledge but is an inherent feature of quantum systems.

While quantum indeterminacy operates at the microscopic level and may not directly translate to

macroscopic phenomena like human decision-making, it eliminates a fully deterministic

universe. Put differently, the subatomic world does not operate deterministically, and despite

being at a microscopic scale, this indeterminacy makes it so the universe is not determined. Over

the 13.7 billion years the universe has existed, these indeterminacies inevitably compound to
make it possible that the universe could have been a different place than it is, and as such, it is

possible that an agent could have acted differently in another universe.

The compatibilist reply to this will be that the minor scales in which quantum

indeterminacy takes place operate at a level far removed from human decision-making, and this

can not and does not affect the free will of an agent. For quantum indeterminacy to make

relevant differences in the freedom of an agent, the scale on which these events take place would

have to change causal chains that shape human behavior. However, quantum indeterminacy does

just that, firstly, in highly proven events of radioactive decay, the behavior of subatomic particles

in particle accelerators has been affected by quantum indeterminacy. Additionally, as stated

before, the universe is so old that it is nearly impossible that quantum indeterminacy has not

changed the fabric of our universe. The reason for this is the butterfly effect, which states that

small changes in initial conditions can lead to vastly different outcomes in complex systems. The

universe is undoubtedly a complex system, and quantum indeterminacy undoubtedly changed the

initial conditions of the universe during the early days of formation after the Big Bang and is

even suggested as the reason for the Big Bang (Vilenkin, 1983). Given this, it is possible that the

universe could have been entirely different had initial conditions differed. If the universe was

different in whatever way that it could have been, then human decision-making would have been

different, and thus, the scale of quantum indeterminacy is one that does affect human

decision-making.

Conclusion:
 In summary, the arguments we've explored support the concept of hard incompatibilism.

This viewpoint suggests that free will and determinism can not coexist—they're like oil and

water, fundamentally unable to mix. This leads us to the rather stark conclusion that free will,

thought of as being able to do otherwise than we did, simply does not exist. By digging into the

philosophical, and scientific aspects of this debate, we've peeled back the layers to reveal a

challenging reality: our sense of personal choice and control is a comforting illusion in a

universe governed by our biology, psychology, and environment. While deterministic influences

shape human behavior there is no evidence that we exist in a deterministic universe. The

compatibilist response fails to address the moral responsibility of their deterministic world and

libertarians fail to account for deterministic influences on agents. Furthermore, quantum

mechanics introduces unpredictability at the fundamental level, eliminating the notion of an

entirely determined universe. Hard incompatibilism offers a nuanced understanding of the

complexities surrounding the problem of free will and successfully answers the problem by

concluding that no actions are free.

References
Breslin, P. A. (2013). An evolutionary perspective on food and human taste. Current Biology,

23(9), R409-R418.

D’Onofrio, B. M., Eaves, L. J., Murrelle, L., Maes, H. H., & Spilka, B. (1999). Understanding

biological and social influences on religious affiliation, attitudes, and behaviors: A

behavior genetic perspective. Journal of personality, 67(6), 953-984.

Frankfurt, H. G (1969): Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. The Journal of

Philosophy, 66(23), 829-39.

Koenig-Robert, R., & Pearson, J. (2019). Decoding the contents and strength of imagery before

volitional engagement. Scientific reports, 9(1), 3504.

Vilenkin, A. (1983). Quantum fluctuations in the new inflationary universe. Nuclear Physics B,

226(2), 527-546.