Dennis Jay A.

Paras
Remedial Law Review 2
Judge Emmanuel Pasal

PEOPLE vs. MENDEZ

G.R. No. 147671 Nov 21, 2002
Doctrine: Accused-appellants Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong are acquitted
of the crime of rape with homicide due to lack of credible testimonies and procedural
lapses, highlighting the importance of establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt
and respecting the rights of the accused during the investigation and arrest process.

Facts:
Herein accused-appellants Renante Mendez and Baby Cabagtong were charged
with the crime of Rape with Homicide against Candy Dolim, which happened on
December 8, 1996, in Brgy. Burabud, Gamay, Northern Samar. Several witnesses
were presented by the prosecution, which included Ronnie Cabagtong, who testified
that he saw Mendez while on the act of having sexual intercourse with Dolim, while
Baby was holding the victim’s hands in order to keep her from fighting back. Candy
was then repeatedly stabbed by the accused, which wounds caused her
instantaneous death. One of the witnesses, Aurea Cabagtong, who is Ronnie’s
mother had testified that she saw the two accused at the evening of the aforesaid
date, while washing their clothes to remove the bloodstains, which is an act of
concealing the fact that a crime has been committed.

Issue:

Whether or not prosecution witnesses Ronnie and Aurea Cabugtong are

credible.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court found that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of
accused-appellants beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of Ronnie and Aurea
Cabugtong were deemed not credible and did not meet the standards of being
reasonable and in accord with human experience. The Court noted inconsistencies
in Ronnie's testimony and the testimony of another witness, as well as Ronnie's
behavior after allegedly witnessing the incident. The Court also considered the
ulterior motive that Ronnie and his mother had in pointing to accused-appellants as
the culprits. Therefore, the Court acquitted accused-appellants of the crime of rape
with homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
Remedial Law Review 2
Judge Emmanuel Pasal

People vs. Cubcubin Jr.

G.R. No. 136267 Jul 10, 2001
Doctrine: In the case of People v. Cubcubin, Jr., the Supreme Court ruled that the
arrest and search conducted on the accused-appellant were illegal due to lack of
personal knowledge and absence of incriminating items within his immediate control,
rendering the seized evidence inadmissible in court.

Facts:
On 3:30am of August 26, 1997, the Cavite Police Station received a phone call about
a person who was shot near the cemetery along Julian Felipe Boulevard in San
Antonio, Cavite City. Because of the said report, police officers were dispatched to
the crime scene, where they found the corpse of a man named Henry Piamonte,
slumped at his tricycle with bullet wounds on the head. On the same day, herein
respondent Fidel Cubcubin Jr. was arrested at Cavite for the killing of Piamonte with
the use of an unlicensed homemade (paltik) Smith & Wesson caliber .38 revolver. At
the time of the arrest, the police found a bloodied shirt along with spent gun
ammunition. As a result, thereof, Cubcubin was arrested and was charged with
Murder. The prosecution witness testified that he saw Piamonte with Cubcubin while
inside Sting Café, a local café, right before the incident took place.

Issue:
Whether or not the arrest and search conducted on accused-appellant were legal.

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that the arrest and search conducted on accused-
appellant were illegal. The arresting officers did not have personal knowledge of
facts indicating that accused-appellant had committed the crime. The search cannot
be justified as incidental to a valid arrest because the items seized were not within
the area of accused-appellant's immediate control. The search also cannot be
justified under the "plain view" doctrine as the items were not incriminating in nature.
Therefore, the items seized are inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
Remedial Law Review 2
Judge Emmanuel Pasal

People vs. Montilla y Gatdula

G.R. No. 123872 Jan 30, 1998
Doctrine: A man's conviction for transporting marijuana is affirmed despite an illegal
warrantless search and arrest, as he waived his right to object by voluntarily
consenting to the search and participating in the trial.

Facts:
On 4:00am of June 20, 1994, herein respondent Montilla was apprehended by two
police officers near a waiting shed located at Barangay Salitran, Dasmarinas, Cavite.
After searching the belongings of the accused, 28 bricks of dried Marijuana leaves
were found in his person which was contained in a travelling bag and a carton box,
which had an aggregate weight of 28 kilograms. While on trial, the two arresting
officers testified that they were aided by an informer in the arrest of the accused.
Montilla averred that he came to Dasmarinas from Baguio to look for his cousin who
had offered him a job at a garment factory, and that he had no luggage with him. The
trial court found Montilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt and imposed the penalty of
death.

Issue:
Whether the warrantless search conducted on Montilla was valid as a search
incidental to a lawful arrest.

Ruling:
The warrantless search conducted on Montilla was not valid as there was no lawful
arrest preceding it. Montilla waived his right to object to the illegality of the search
and arrest by voluntarily submitting to the search and participating in the trial.
Voluntary consent is a valid waiver of one's right against unreasonable searches.
The conviction of Montilla for transporting marijuana was affirmed, but the penalty
was modified to reclusion perpetua.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
Remedial Law Review 2
Judge Emmanuel Pasal

People vs. Mengote y Tejas

G.R. No. 87059 Jun 22, 1992
Doctrine: In the case of People v. Mengote y Tejas, the court ruled in favor of the
accused-appellant and acquitted him of illegal possession of firearms due to an
unlawful search and seizure, emphasizing the inadmissibility of evidence obtained
through an illegal search or seizure.

Facts:
During noon of August 8, 1987, the Western Police District received a phone call
from an informer about three suspicious-looking persons in Tondo, Manila. Police
officers were dispatched to the said location, all of which saw herein respondent
Mengote and his cohorts. They were then approached by the police officers and
identified themselves. They then attempted to arrest Mengote’s group and a they
were searched, in which a .38 caliber revolver was recovered from his person.
Because of this, Mengote was charged with Illegal Possession of Firearms.

Issue:
Whether the revolver found on Mengote's person is admissible as evidence against
him, considering that it was obtained through an illegal search and seizure.

Ruling:
No. The court ruled in favor of the accused-appellant and acquitted him of illegal
possession of firearms, as the revolver should not have been admitted as evidence
because it was obtained through an unlawful arrest and seizure. The court explained
that the arrest of Mengote was unlawful because it was conducted without a warrant
and did not meet the requirements for a lawful warrantless arrest.
The court found that there was no offense being committed or attempted in the
presence of the arresting officers, and there was no personal knowledge of facts
indicating that Mengote had committed an offense. The court also rejected the
argument that Mengote's suspicious behavior justified the arrest, as there was no
reasonable suspicion of any specific offense. Therefore, the court concluded that the
seizure of the revolver was illegal, and as a result, it could not be admitted as
evidence against Mengote.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
Remedial Law Review 2
Judge Emmanuel Pasal

De Joya vs. Marquez

G.R. No. 162416 Jan 31, 2006
Doctrine: A petitioner seeks to nullify a warrant of arrest issued against him, but the
Philippine Court upholds the warrant due to sufficient probable cause and the
petitioner's refusal to submit to the court's jurisdiction.

Facts:
The warrant of arrest was issued in Criminal Case No. 03-219952 for violation of
Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner Chester De Joya filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition which sought to nullify and set aside the warrant
of arrest issued against him by respondent Judge Placido C. Marquez. The Supreme
Court finds that the existence of probable cause was sufficiently established by the
documents offered in evidence, as required under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. The foregoing documents found in the records and
examined by respondent judge tend to show that therein private complainant was
enticed to invest a large sum of money in State Resources Development
Management Corporation; that he issued several checks amounting
to P114,286,086.14 in favor of the corporation; that the corporation, in turn, issued
several checks to private complainant, purportedly representing the return of his
investments; that said checks were later dishonored for insufficient funds and closed
account; that petitioner and his co-accused, being incorporators and directors of the
corporation, had knowledge of its activities and transactions. These are all that need
to be shown to establish probable cause for the purpose of issuing a warrant of
arrest.

Issue:
Whether there was sufficient probable cause to justify the issuance of the warrant of
arrest.

Ruling:
The documents presented by the prosecution, including the report of the National
Bureau of Investigation, the affidavit-complaint of the private complainant, copies of
the checks issued, demand letter, supplemental affidavit, counter-affidavits,
resolution of the State Prosecutor, and the Articles of Incorporation of State
Resources Development Management Corporation, established sufficient probable
cause for the issuance of the warrant. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired
through voluntary appearance or submission to the court or by coercive process
issued by the court, such as the service of summons.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
Remedial Law Review 2
Judge Emmanuel Pasal

Estrada vs. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. No. 212140-41 Jan 21, 2015
Doctrine: Senator Jinggoy Estrada's request for counter-affidavits in a Plunder case
was denied by the Ombudsman, leading to a Supreme Court ruling that the denial
did not violate his right to due process as a preliminary investigation is only for
determining probable cause and not a stage where an accused can demand full
exercise of their rights.

Facts:
Senator Jinggoy Estrada was served with a copy of a complaint filed by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Atty. Levito Baligod, praying for criminal
proceedings for Plunder. Another complaint was filed by the Field Investigation Office
(FIO) of the Ombudsman, also praying for criminal proceedings for Plunder. Eighteen
of Sen. Estrada's co-respondents filed their counter-affidavits. Sen. Estrada filed a
request to be furnished with copies of the counter-affidavits of the other respondents
and other filings. The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada's request, stating that the
accused in a preliminary investigation has no right to be furnished with all the filings
of the other parties. The Ombudsman issued a joint resolution finding probable
cause to indict Sen. Estrada and his co-respondents. Sen. Estrada filed a petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court, claiming a violation of his right to due process.

Issue:
Whether the denial of Sen. Estrada's request for counter-affidavits violated his right
to due process.

Ruling:
The denial of Sen. Estrada's request did not violate his right to due process. The
accused in a preliminary investigation has limited rights, and the right to be furnished
with all the filings of the other parties is not one of those rights. The provisions of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman support the ruling. A preliminary investigation is only for the
determination of probable cause and is not a part of the trial where an accused can
demand the full exercise of his rights.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
Remedial Law Review 2
Judge Emmanuel Pasal

CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO R. ZUÑO vs. JUDGE ALEJADRINO C. CABEBE

A.M. OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ Nov 26, 2004

Doctrine: The judge must determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong before
granting or denying bail.

Facts:
Criminal Case No. 3950-18 for illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs
was filed against several individuals, including police officers, in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18. Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño filed an administrative
complaint against Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
18, Batac, Ilocos Norte, alleging that Judge Cabebe knowingly rendered an unjust
judgment, displayed gross ignorance of the law, and showed partiality.
The accused pleaded not guilty to the charges. On November 5, 2002, Judge
Cabebe granted bail to the accused without conducting a hearing and without the
accused filing an application or motion for bail. The prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration, but instead of acting on it, Judge Cabebe inhibited himself from the
case. Judge Cabebe retired on March 26, 2003.

Issue:
Did Judge Cabebe commit gross ignorance of the law by granting bail without
conducting a hearing and without the accused filing an application or motion for bail?

Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the Deputy Court Administrator
that Judge Cabebe committed gross ignorance of the law. The Court emphasized
that a hearing is mandatory in granting bail, whether it is a matter of right or
discretion. The judge must determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong before
granting or denying bail. In this case, Judge Cabebe failed to conduct a hearing and
did not require the prosecution to submit its recommendation on bail. The absence of
objection from the prosecution does not dispense with the requirement of a bail
hearing. The Court did not find him guilty of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
or showing partiality, as there was no evidence of bad faith, malice, or corruption in
his actions.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
Remedial Law Review 2
Judge Emmanuel Pasal

ROMULO SJ TOLENTINO vs. JUDGE POLICARPIO S. CAMANO, JR.

A.M. No. RTJ-00-1522 Jan 20, 2000

Doctrine: A judge is found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and abuse of
authority for granting bail without a hearing in a child abuse case, despite the
prosecution's failure to present evidence to oppose the petition.

Facts:
An information was filed against Roderick Odiaman for allegedly engaging in sexual
intercourse with a child in violation of the Child Abuse Act and was filed at the RTC of
Tigaon, Camarines Sur, which was assigned to herein respondent Judge Camano.
The defense moved to quash the information on the ground that no preliminary
investigation had been conducted before the case was filed, whereupon respondent
judge on November 15, 1995 ordered complainant state prosecutor to conduct a
preliminary investigation. As a result, Prosecutor Romulo filed a complaint against
herein respondent judge, alleging that the latter had granted bail in the amount of
PHP 100,000.00 without hearing in a child abuse case, which is in violation of
procedural due process.

Issue:
Can a petition for bail be entertained by the court at the preliminary investigation
stage of the proceedings?

Ruling:
Yes, a petition for bail can be entertained by the court at the preliminary investigation
stage of the proceedings. Section 17(c) of Rule 114 allows any person in custody
who is not yet charged in court to apply for bail. A hearing is not necessary for bail at
the preliminary investigation stage if ordered by the court. Bail is a matter of right
before conviction in the Regional Trial Court. A hearing should be conducted to
determine the strength of evidence of guilt and whether bail should be granted for
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
Remedial Law Review 2
Judge Emmanuel Pasal

Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 213847 Aug 18, 2015
Doctrine: A senator challenges the denial of his motion for bail in a plunder case,
arguing for his release on humanitarian grounds due to his age, physical condition,
and weak evidence, leading to a Supreme Court ruling in his favor.

Facts:
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others
with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the
diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF). On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively filed his
Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Opposition, praying, among others, that he be
allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him, Enrile argued that
he should be allowed to post bail due to weak evidence, a lesser penalty, and his
age and physical condition.
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion,
particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that
Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of
the law.

Issue:
Whether Enrile should be granted bail in the plunder case.

Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Enrile and granted him bail on humanitarian
grounds. The court held that bail is a matter of right unless the offense is punishable
by reclusion perpetua and evidence of guilt is strong. The court found that Enrile's
age, physical condition, and social standing indicated that he was not a flight risk.
The court held that bail should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge
if the continued incarceration of the accused is injurious to his health or endangers
his life.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
Remedial Law Review 2
Judge Emmanuel Pasal

Jose Antonio Leviste vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 189122 Mar 17, 2010

Doctrine: Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for
his release to guarantee his appearance before any court as may be required, is the
answer of the criminal justice system to a vexing question: what is to be done with
the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the "dubious interval," often
years long, between arrest and final adjudication? Bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in pretrial liberty and
society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.

Facts:

Herein petitioner Leviste was charged and convicted with the crime of homicide for
killing Rafael De Las Alas by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. He appealed
his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application
for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition,
and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part. The Court of
Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. Citing well-established jurisprudence,
it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner
needing medical care outside the prison facility. It found that petitioner failed to show
that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during
trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger.

Issue:

In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court
to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of
the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted
absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court?

Ruling:
The grant of bail pending appeal is a matter of discretion for the appellate court. The
court must consider all relevant circumstances, including the demands of equity and
justice, in determining whether to grant or deny bail. The court must also determine
whether the appeal raises a substantial question of law or fact. The denial of bail
pending appeal by the Court of Appeals was not a grave abuse of discretion. The
court exercised caution and followed established jurisprudence in denying Leviste's
application.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
Remedial Law Review 2
Judge Emmanuel Pasal

Genuino vs. De Lima

G.R. No. 197930, 199034 & 199046 Apr 17, 2018

Doctrine: The Supreme Court declares Department of Justice (DOJ)

Circular No. 41 unconstitutional, emphasizing the importance of due
process and clear legal standards in restricting the right to travel, and
stating that the power to issue Hold-Departure Orders (HDO) and Watchlist
Orders (WLO) belongs to the courts, not the DOJ Secretary.

Facts:
Three consolidated petitions were filed against the Secretary of Justice and other
government officials regarding the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 41, which
allows the Department of Justice to issue Hold-Departure Orders (HDO) and
Watchlist Orders to restrict the right to travel of individuals under investigation or
facing criminal charges. Herein petitioners themselves were issued hold-departure
orders and watchlist orders. The petitioners argue that the restrictions on movement
imposed by the said DOJ Circular is unconstitutional, as such restrictions should be
based on clear legal standards and due process.

Issue:
Whether or not DOJ Circular No. 41 constitutional.

Ruling:
No. The right to travel is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution and can
only be restricted in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as
provided by law. In this case, DOJ Circular No. 41 does not have a legal basis and
exceeds the powers of the DOJ, as it is vague and lacks clear standards for the
issuance of HDOs and WLOs. The DOJ Secretary does not have the authority to
issue HDOs and WLOs without a specific law granting such power. The exercise of
police power must be reasonable and not violate the Constitution. Due process and
clear legal standards are important in restricting the right to travel.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
Remedial Law Review 2
Judge Emmanuel Pasal

Libuit vs. People

G.R. No. 154363 Sep 13, 2005
Doctrine: Joel P. Libuit, operator of Paeng Motorworks, is convicted for estafa after
failing to return a customer's car and selling its parts, with the Supreme Court ruling
that there was sufficient evidence and no deprivation of his right to counsel.

Facts:
Sometime in May 1993, Domingo del Mundo delivered and brought his car to the
Paeng Motor Works, a motor shop owned and operated by herein petitioner Libuit
located on Brgy. Sico, Lipa City. Jose Baustita, one of Libuit’s mechanic, had
received the car in the latter’s presence, with the assurance that the car would be
taken cared of in the shop. Sometime later, Del Mundo found his car on the roadside
with its engine removed, which was inside the shop at the time. Libuit and Bautista
promised to finish the necessary repairs and to deliver the car to Del Mundo’s
residence in two weeks. However, herein accused failed to deliver the car, and
eventually sold its differential and cylinder head. Upon knowing of such act, Del
Mundo reported the matter to the police, which lead to the conviction of Libuit for
committing the crime of Estafa.
Issue:
1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain Libuit's conviction.
2. Whether Libuit was deprived of his right to counsel.

Ruling:
1. Yes. There was sufficient evidence to support Libuit's conviction for Estafa.
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence were present in the case.
Libuit operated the motor shop and was responsible for the repair and return
of the car. Even if it was Bautista who personally received the car, Libuit was
present and assured del Mundo that the car would be safe in his shop.
Demand was properly made when del Mundo returned to the shop after giving
Libuit a two-week extension to complete the repairs.

2. Libuit was not deprived of his right to counsel. The trial court was not duty-
bound to appoint a counsel de oficio for Libuit during the continuation of his
cross-examination. The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for the
accused who has no counsel of choice and desires to employ the services of
Dennis Jay A. Paras
Remedial Law Review 2
Judge Emmanuel Pasal

one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment. No such duty exists where
the accused has proceeded to arraignment and then trial with a counsel of his
own choice. Worth noting, when the time for the presentation of evidence for
the defense arrived, and the defendant appeared by himself alone, the
absence of his counsel was inexcusable.
People vs. Tomaquin
G.R. No. 133188 Jul 23, 2004
Doctrine: In the murder case of People v. Tomaquin, the court declares the
appellant's extrajudicial confession inadmissible due to the violation of his right to be
assisted by an independent counsel, resulting in his acquittal based on insufficient
circumstantial evidence.

Facts:
On or about 2:30am of December 15, 1996 in Cebu City, herein accused Elizar
Tomaquin stabbed and killed Jacquelyn Tatoy using a bladed weapon (tres cantos)
which inflicted fatal blows to the vital parts of her body. On arraignment, appellant
pleaded not guilty to the charge. There were no eyewitnesses to the incident, and
the prosecution’s evidence, aside from appellant’s extrajudicial confession, was
mainly circumstantial. Tomaquin averred that it was his companion Magdasal who
committed the crime, as Jacquelyn saw them while they were stealing the television
set from the Tatoy Family’s residence. He also added that he was made to admit to
committing the crime because Magdasal has a family while he is single. Appellant
also repudiated his extrajudicial confession, saying that Atty. Parawan merely asked
him to sign a blank sheet of paper and in exchange, Atty. Parawan promised to
assist and help him with his expenses.

Issue:
1. Is the appellant's extrajudicial confession admissible in court?
2. Did the appellant's appointed counsel violate his right to choose his own
counsel?

Ruling:
The appellant's right to be assisted by an independent counsel was violated. The
extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in court. The appellant is acquitted and
ordered to be released, unless held for another cause. The court emphasized the
importance of the accused's freedom to choose his own counsel for a fair and
meaningful defense. Atty. Fortunato Parawan, the appellant's appointed counsel,
was also the barangay captain, which made him not an independent counsel. The
role of a peacekeeping officer conflicted with providing competent legal assistance to
Dennis Jay A. Paras
Remedial Law Review 2
Judge Emmanuel Pasal

the appellant. Atty. Parawan did not meet the standards of an effective and vigilant
counsel as he did not advise or explain the questions during the investigation.
Without the extrajudicial confession, the prosecution's case relied solely on
circumstantial evidence.

People vs. Mamarion

G.R. No. 137554 Oct 1, 2003
Doctrine: A group of individuals are found guilty of kidnapping for ransom and
subsequent murder of a businesswoman, with the court ruling that the testimony of a
key witness was credible and sufficient evidence proved the existence of a
conspiracy among the appellants.

Facts:
On July 15, 1995, Roberta Cokin, a Filipino-Chinese businesswoman, abducted by a
group of armed men which consisted of herein respondent John Mamarion, Charlito
Domingo, Rolando Maclang, and Juliet Harisco in Bacolod City. The kidnappers
demanded a ransom of PHP 2 million from Roberta’s family in exchange for her
release. The family members complied with the kidnappers’ request and delivered
the ransom money on July 20, 1995. However, Roberta was found dead in a shallow
grave in Iloilo City on August 7, 1995. Herein petitioners were charged with found
guilty of the crime of kidnapping for ransom by the trial court. During the trial, other
accused were acquitted due to lack of evidence.

Issue:
Whether the trial court erred in allowing Gale to plead guilty to a lesser offense in
consideration of testifying as a prosecution witness.

Ruling:
No. The trial court did not err in allowing Gale to plead guilty to a lesser offense in
consideration of testifying as a prosecution witness. The acceptance of Gale's plea is
within the discretion of the trial court, and his testimony was crucial to the
prosecution's case. Gale’s testimony was crucial to the prosecution as there was no
other direct evidence linking appellants to the commission of the crime. In the case
at bar, the private respondent (accused) moved to plead guilty to a lesser offense
after the prosecution had already rested its case. In such situation, jurisprudence has
provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with a yardstick within which
their discretion may be properly exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan, we held that
Dennis Jay A. Paras
Remedial Law Review 2
Judge Emmanuel Pasal

the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient
evidence to establish the guilt of the crime charged. Hence, the trial court did not err
in allowing Gale to plead guilty to a lesser offense.

People vs. Ernas

G.R. No. 137256-58 Aug 6, 2003
Doctrine: Defendant charged with three counts of rape pleads guilty, but Supreme
Court rules that the trial court failed to ensure he fully understood the consequences
of his plea and violated his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses, resulting
in the case being remanded for re-arraignment.

Facts:
Defendant Rufino Ernas was charged with three counts of rape for sexually abusing
his two daughters. Ernas initially pleaded not guilty to each of the charges, but he
later withdrew his plea and voluntarily pleaded guilty to all three counts of rape. The
trial court granted his motion to withdraw his former plea and ordered his re-
arraignment. The prosecution opted to dispense with the direct testimony of the
complaining witnesses. The trial court rendered a joint judgment, finding Ernas guilty
of three counts of rape and sentencing him to death for each case.

Issue:
Did the trial court conduct a proper "searching inquiry" to ensure that Ernas fully
understood the consequences of his plea?

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled that Ernas made an improvident plea of guilty. The trial
court failed to conduct a proper "searching inquiry" to ensure that Ernas fully
understood the consequences of his plea. First, there was no effort on the part of the
presiding judge to comply with the guidelines enumerated above. While Atty. Capuno
manifested to the trial court that appellant intimated to her the latter’s intention to
withdraw his former plea of not guilty, the trial court did not inquire from Atty. Capuno
whether she had conferred and explained to appellant the meaning and
consequences of the latter’s plea of guilt. Further, the records do not show the age,
socio-economic status as well as the educational attainment of the appellant to
Dennis Jay A. Paras
Remedial Law Review 2
Judge Emmanuel Pasal

assist the court a quo as well as this Court in determining if appellant has full
understanding and capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.

Sasot vs. People

G.R. No. 143193 Jun 29, 2005
Doctrine: The Supreme Court affirms the denial of the motion to quash in the case
of Sasot v. People, ruling that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper
remedy to challenge the denial and that the complainant's capacity to sue is
immaterial in a public crime like unfair competition, remanding the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.
Facts:
Sometime in May 1997, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted an
investigation pursuant to a complaint by the NBA Properties, Inc., against petitioners
for possible violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code on unfair competition.
During the investigation, it was discovered that petitioners are engaged in the
manufacture, printing, sale, and distribution of counterfeit "NBA" garment products.
Hence, it recommended petitioners’ prosecution for unfair competition under Article
189 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint was filed by NBA Properties, Inc.,
which was was executed by Welts before a notary public in the State of New York. A
Special Power of Attorney was executed by Rick Welts, the President of NBA
Properties, Inc., authorizing the law firm of Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio,
Calma & Carbonell to act on behalf of the company.

Issue:
Whether the facts charged constitute an offense and whether the court has
jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused.

Ruling:
The trial court denied the motion to quash. The Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the
petition for certiorari filed by the petitioners. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA's
decision and denied the petition for review on certiorari. The Court held that a special
civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to challenge the denial of a motion
to quash. The Court found no justification for the quashal of the information filed
Dennis Jay A. Paras
Remedial Law Review 2
Judge Emmanuel Pasal

against the petitioners. The Court emphasized that the complaint filed before the
fiscal, despite some defects, was supported by other documents and satisfied the
requirements of the law. The Court ruled that the complainant's capacity to sue is
immaterial in a public crime like unfair competition. The Court stated that the issues
raised by the petitioners regarding the complainant's entitlement to protection under
Philippine patent laws and their own defenses should be resolved during trial on the
merits.

Torres, Jr. vs. Spouses Torres-Aguinaldo

G.R. No. 164268 Jun 28, 2005
Doctrine: A complaint for falsification of public document is filed against petitioner
Artemio T. Torres, Jr. by respondent-spouses Edgardo and Nelia Aguinaldo, leading
to a legal battle over the transfer of property titles and allegations of forgery.

Facts:
Spouses Aguinaldo, herein respondents, filed a case against Artemio Torres, Jr. for
falsification of public documents for the transfer of their properties covered by
various transfer certificate of titles which was done by herein petitioner without their
knowledge and consent through the use of a forged deed of sale. Torres denies the
allegations and claims that the properties were sold to him through a valid Deed of
Absolute Sale. Motion for reconsideration filed by Torres was denied. Secretary of
Justice reversed the findings of the investigating prosecutor and ordered the
withdrawal of the information. Motion to withdraw information was filed and granted
by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC). Aguinaldo filed a petition for certiorari before
the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals reversed the Secretary of Justice's decision
and reinstated the resolution of the OCP finding probable cause against Torres.
Motion for reconsideration filed by Torres was denied. Petition for review on certiorari
filed before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
Whether the Secretary of Justice gravely abused his discretion in reinstating the
resolution of the OCP finding probable cause against Torres.

Ruling:
The order granting the withdrawal of the information did not render moot the petition
for certiorari. Aguinaldo did not commit forum shopping. The Secretary of Justice did
not gravely abuse his discretion in reinstating the resolution of the OCP.
Dennis Jay A. Paras
Remedial Law Review 2
Judge Emmanuel Pasal