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Real Madrid football club: A new model of business organization for sports clubs
in Spain

Article in Global Business and Organizational Excellence · November 2006

DOI: 10.1002/joe.20121

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Real Madrid Football Club: A New
Model of Business Organization for MIGUEL BLANCO CALLEJO
AND FRANCISCO
Sports Clubs in Spain J AV I E R F O R C A D E L L

World soccer clubs, constrained by their inability to America. The key aspect of this conception resides
increase their income from their traditional busi- in the idea that sports clubs can behave as brands,
nesses, have begun to adopt strategies to transform and the essential principle is to exploit the spon-
themselves into modern sports and media compa- sorship plan and sale of products, together with
nies. Under the recent presidency of Florentino the commercialization and sale of audio-visual and
Pérez, the Spanish football club Real Madrid pres- television rights of sporting events. In soccer,
ents a good example of the application of this Manchester United in the United Kingdom was the
expanded vision. One of the fundamental pillars of pioneer in commercially exploiting its brand on an
this model has involved designing and implement- international level, and this strategy was highly
ing a new marketing strategy aimed at strengthen- successful in the 1990s. During the early years of
ing the value of the club's brand. The adoption of the 21st century, however, Real Madrid has gained
this model has resulted in a significant increase in the position of “commercial leadership” within the
income from marketing. Undeniably, in this area, world soccer market.
Real Madrid has become the leader in world soccer.
© 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Thus, during the 1990s, the soccer industry has
been transformed into a new business reality that
Real Madrid F.C. is a sports club with more than 100 has transformed the sport, converting it into one of
years of history. During the 2000-2001 season, the most profitable entertainment and leisure busi-
FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football nesses around the world. Szymanski, an economist
Association) named it the “best soccer team of the specialized in the football industry, estimated that
20th century.” This distinction converts this globally the soccer industry generates $170 billion
Spanish club into a reference point in world soccer, per year. Indeed, this industry is growing in impor-
and in sport generally. However, in recent years, tance for the economies of developed European
attention to this entity has not been limited to the countries. For example, the total impact of the pro-
sporting domain. Its new management model, as fessional soccer sector on the Spanish economy
well as the strategy it has deployed in economic exceeds $9.6 billion, which represents approximate-
aspects, has caught the attention of other teams, ly 1.7 percent of general GDP and 2.5 percent of the
the economic press, and researchers in business GDP of the services sector, according to the Spanish
management. Professional Soccer League.

With regards to this aspect, perhaps the most note- The adoption of a new business model in soccer
worthy point has been the club’s implementation clubs is linked to the existence of an evident crisis
of a management model that has transformed a in the generation and growth of income. The soc-
traditional soccer club into a modern sports and cer industry has traditionally been based on the
media company. This model derives from the exploitation of the sporting event. Currently, the
sports entertainment market developed in North generation of income from this source is very

© 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Published online in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com)
Global Business and Organizational Excellence • DOI: 10.1002/joe.20121 • November/December 2006 51
 restricted, since on the one hand, the stadium earlier been sold to other firms, resulting in a
capacities are limited in terms of the number of more coherent, planned, and rational manage-
spectators and the VIP boxes, and on the other, ment and exploitation. This has increased the
the market for audio-visual and TV rights is in value of these resources in recent seasons.
decline internationally. Given this situation, sports • Development of new lines of business, allowing
clubs have been forced to think up new ways to the club to diversify its sources of income.
exploit this business. Real Madrid, along with • Transformation of followers and supporters into
other sports clubs, has responded by acting at two effective customers, who because of their senti-
levels. First, the club has tried to rationalize and mental attachment to the club, increasingly and
improve the exploitation of its traditional busi- constantly demand products that associate and
nesses; and second, it has attempted to increase identify them with “their team.” For this reason,
the value of its brand in order to generate new the club has launched a number of products with
income from its exploitation. the “Real Madrid” brand onto the market. These
have proved much more successful than was first
expected. For sports brands, the customer’s link
with the brand is not purely commercial; it goes
The club has recovered the management of a large
beyond that, so that the level of identification and
number of assets that had earlier been sold to loyalty produced is much stronger than for other
other firms, resulting in a more coherent, planned, types of commercial product.
and rational management and exploitation.
After implementing this strategy, Real Madrid has
seen its income rise from $165.48 million in the
2000-2001 season, to $331 million in the 2004-
In the case of Real Madrid, the strategic transforma- 2005 season (see Exhibit 1).1
tion of the club is linked to the arrival of Florentino
Pérez at the presidency in the year 2000. His main
aim was to make the club the “top sports firm in Transformation of the Club from 2000-2006 under
Europe,” giving it economic stability, and turning it the Presidency of Florentino Pérez
into a debt-free, profitable institution. The club’s Real Madrid is a professional football club owned
new management strategy has been defined on the and run by its members. A sports club is a nonprof-
basis of the following pillars: it organization oriented to sport competition.2
Members have the opportunity to vote in, and stand
• Restructure of the club’s internal organization. Doing for, elections to determine the club president.
this has meant implementing a professionalized Florentino Pérez became President of Real Madrid
management structured into three broad areas: in the year 2000, after winning the election celebrat-
sporting, marketing, and corporate-economic. The ed in July of that year. After becoming president of
club has also created an Office of the Presidency, the club, he declared, “I want to make Real Madrid
with an Executive Director in charge. a perfect machine, not only for winning competi-
• Promotion of the “Real Madrid” brand image. To tions, but also in the organizational sphere.” In spite
do this, the club has tried to provide the brand of the sporting triumphs of the previous presidency
with a worldwide renown, allowing it to be posi- (UEFA Champions League Cups in 1998 and 2000),
tioned in strategic markets. various obscure issues had appeared in the manage-
• Recovery of assets. The club has recovered the ment of the club. On the one hand, the debt was
management of a large number of assets that had ballooning spectacularly (Florentino Pérez candidly

52 November/December 2006 DOI: 10.1002/joe Global Business and Organizational Excellence

Exhibit 1. Evolution of Real Madrid Revenues

300
275.7

124.0
250 236.0 45%

85.3
192.6 36%
200
68.2
36%
151.7
150 137.9 46.2
88.1 88.0
38.6 30% 32%
38%
28% 66.2
100 58.6 34%
57.9 39%
42%

50 58.2 62.6 63.7

46.9 30% 26% 23%
41.4
31%
30%
0 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05
2000/01

Matchday Broadcasting Commercial

Source: Deloitte Analysis

put the debt at around $288.5 million), and on the a proposal to sell land from the club’s sports com-
other, instability reigned in the Board of Directors. plex (the so-called “Sport City”), and the restructur-
The sports/corporate project was consequently ing and professionalization of the organization in
undefined, gravely threatening the club’s future. the three management areas—sporting, marketing,
and corporate-economic-financial. After a full term
In September 2000, Florentino Pérez presented his of office in charge of the club (2000-2004),
project for the club’s future. It was founded on the Florentino Pérez has fulfilled two of the fundamen-
following pillars: the formulation of a feasibility tal objectives he set himself when becoming presi-
plan to wipe out the club’s debt, in conjunction with dent of Real Madrid. First, he has managed to clear

Global Business and Organizational Excellence DOI: 10.1002/joe November/December 2006 53

 the historic debt that had been weighing so heavily With regard to Real Madrid’s social strategy, this
on the club’s accounts. Second, the club’s expansive consists of three aspects: managing the club’s mem-
marketing policy has managed to diversify the bers; the public image policy, articulated through its
income, giving increasing weight to revenues com- foundation; and promoting a model of peaceful
ing from the marketing area. The club’s specific behavior among its spectators, eliminating all vio-
commercial revenue totaled $149 million during the lence.3 First, the club has a policy of information
2004-2005 season, representing 45 percent of total transparency with respect to its members, and of
revenue. The club’s aim is for the income from mar- careful respect and protection of their rights. The
keting to continue to grow and to reach around 50 members have responded by giving the institution
percent of the club’s total income. an excellent evaluation. (The club reported that
from a base of 82,000 members, 97 percent feel that
they are well treated by their club.) Second, Real
Description of the Club’s Strategy Madrid tries to transmit a friendly public image of
Real Madrid’s strategy is founded fundamentally solidarity and commitment to society fundamental-
on three broad pillars (see Exhibit 2): the sport- ly through its foundation. Currently, the club is
ing, marketing, and social strategy. In any case, UNICEF ambassador, and it programs and carries
the club’s entire strategic vision is focused on the out activities of social integration and of an educa-
basis of a two-fold objective: economic success tional nature, and cooperates in a great variety of
and sporting success. However, within this model, programs all around the world to raise funds to help
the club considers it impossible to achieve sport- alleviate natural disasters and other such tragedies.
ing success without obtaining a good economic Finally, its conception of confrontation in soccer
performance. entertainment is limited purely to the field of play.
This has led the club to establish a program of re-
education and relocation of spectators that has dra-
The club’s entire strategic vision is focused on the matically reduced the number of violent acts
occurring within the stadium.
basis of a two-fold objective: economic success
and sporting success.
Finally, with regard to the club’s marketing strategy,
Real Madrid’s priority is to promote the exploita-
tion of its brand, transforming its supporters into
Firstly, it is important to note that the club’s sport- customers of its products and services. The club
ing strategy subordinated to the club’s global considers that the brand is “its best asset, and so it
strategic decisions. The sporting strategy is found- has become [the club’s] best guarantee for the
ed on two main courses of action: signing up soc- future.” Exploitation of the brand is carried out as
cer players with a significant media impact, and part of a commercial strategy that has been careful-
promoting the club’s “nursery,” that is, its young- ly designed and developed, in which the following
players program. In signing up the world’s best aspects stand out:
soccer players, apart from sporting quality the club
obtains an important media impact, which can be • Signing of strategic alliances to collaborate with
exploited in the advertising market, enhancing leading firms in different sectors. This allows
their trade mark value. At the same time, Real value and synergies to be transferred between the
Madrid aims to promote access to its “first team” associated brands.
for players coming up from its youth teams—play- • Exploitation of the brand in emerging soccer
ers who conserve the club’s values and identity. markets. The main emerging soccer markets are

54 November/December 2006 DOI: 10.1002/joe Global Business and Organizational Excellence

Exhibit 2. Real Madrid’s Strategic Pillars and Objectives

REAL MADRID
OBJECTIVES
STRATEGY

SPORTING SPORTING
SUCCESS

MARKETING

ECONOMIC
SOCIAL
SUCCESS

regarded as south-east Asia (China, Japan, and • Licensing and franchising program to sell prod-
South Korea), the Arab world, and India. ucts with the “Real Madrid” brand.
These markets are still practically unexplored,
so capturing supporters in these areas will con-
ceivably translate into high loyalty levels. In Evolution of the Club’s Businesses
order to get this objective, Real Madrid has As we mentioned earlier, in soccer there is a clear dis-
developed preseason International Tours, par- tinction between two broad business lines: traditional
ticularly in Asia. businesses and brand-related businesses. Traditional
• Use of a multichannel strategy to exploit the businesses refers to the exploitation of the live sport-
brand. Real Madrid uses various channels, and it ing event, fundamentally managing the attendance at
employs new technologies to help it carry out the the stadium—spectators and VIP boxes—as well as
exploitation of its brand. the negotiation and sale of the television rights to the
• Exploitation of soccer players’ image rights in the matches. On the other hand, a second group of busi-
advertising market. This trend is expected to nesses is associated with the exploitation of the brand,
strengthen in coming seasons. and largely involves an attempt to generate new
• Loyalty scheme through the “Real Madrid Fan sources of income by the institution. It is in this sec-
Card” (Carnet Madridista). The club sees this ond aspect that Real Madrid has introduced new
medium as a means to maintain contact with its ways of operating that have increased and diversified
supporters, both nationally and internationally. the club’s revenue sources.

Global Business and Organizational Excellence DOI: 10.1002/joe November/December 2006 55

 Exhibit 3. Real Madrid’s Traditional Businesses

Improving Management of Traditional Businesses taking place or not. Income is generated during
In the exploitation of the traditional business—that live sporting events by the sale of tickets through
is, the sporting competitions in which the team par- various channels, services inside the stadium—
ticipates—we can distinguish between two broad bars, sale and hire of cushions, and of other con-
categories (see Exhibit 3): the exploitation of the sumable products—as well as the management of
installations where the matches take place, and the the commercialization and sale of the advertising
transmission of these matches via television. mediums within the stadium—advertising hoard-
ings, advertising on the video scoreboards, seats
In the year 2000, the club agreed to a plan to or press conference/interview displays. In this
fully exploit the stadium. This plan has allowed it respect, Real Madrid’s policy has been to buy
to noticeably increase its income from this back these assets, whose management had previ-
source: revenues have risen from $51 million in ously been sold to other companies, and to put a
the 2000-2001 season to a forecast $79.5 million specialized and professionalized management in
for 2004-2005. This increasing income has not place for all of them. Moreover, the club has cre-
been funded by raising membership fees, but fun- ated all-inclusive tourist packages for VIP specta-
damentally from increases in revenues due to tors that include, apart from the ticket to the
improved management of VIP areas. Naturally, match, other additional services (luxury accom-
exploitation of the stadium installations includes modation, limousine service, and catering).
its use when sporting competitions are taking Finally, Real Madrid tries to enable supporters
place. But the club also aims to extend commer- without season tickets to attend matches, so it
cial exploitation of the installations all year has limited the number of season tickets to
round, regardless of whether a competition is 60,000, allowing approximately 20,000 occa-

56 November/December 2006 DOI: 10.1002/joe Global Business and Organizational Excellence

sional visitors to attend each match. The reason- Apart from the diverse revenues from spectators
ing behind this is that these spectators spend attending the stadium to watch live matches, the
more on products and services carrying the “Real transmission of matches on television means that
Madrid” brand. competitions can reach a greater number of spec-
tators, allowing the club to earn a return on the
With regard to the commercial exploitation of the TV rights. Spanish soccer clubs sold the television
installations outside of live sporting events, we rights of competitions to communications media
can classify the club’s businesses as a function of companies; Real Madrid’s current deal with
the type of customer targeted. Thus, we can dis- Sogecable is worth a reported $65 million per sea-
tinguish between businesses targeted at support- son. Going further in this area, Real Madrid has
ers, at firms, and at the public in general. In the launched a thematic television channel—“Real
businesses targeted at fans, the club organizes two Madrid TV”—to exploit sporting contents. This
types of tourist visits to its installations: the visit channel is regarded as a strategic tool for content
to the trophy room and the controlled tour of the management within the club’s business model. In
stadium. During the 2002-2003 season, more this respect, Real Madrid regained complete con-
than 400,000 people visited the trophy room at trol of this channel in June 2003, and intends to
the stadium and more than 25,000 toured the sta- make it the central platform for producing, pack-
dium. An innovative service directed at season- aging, and distributing content in the future, both
ticket holders is to allow them to relinquish their nationally and internationally, as well as an
“ticket” if they cannot attend a particular match. important source of income generation. (Real
The club can then sell the season-ticket holder’s Madrid estimated income from this source in
tickets in the ticket office, and the season-ticket 2004 was $7.2 million, including subscriptions,
holder benefits with a discount of 35 percent of advertising, international agreements and one-off
the sum earned from the tickets sold when renew- sale of contents.)
ing his or her season ticket for the following sea-
son. The total profit from this service has
amounted to more than $180,000.
With regard to the commercial exploitation of the
installations outside of live sporting events, we
With regard to the services directed at firms, Real
Madrid hires out its VIP boxes on match days and can classify the club’s businesses as a function of
on any other day of the year, to facilitate all types of the type of customer targeted.
meeting and company events. With this objective,
the club bought back the exploitation of the VIP
boxes in the stadium, foreseeing that it would be New Brand-exploitation-related Businesses
able to raise the income from this source to levels The businesses related to the exploitation of the
seen in other large European soccer clubs. (The club brand have involved the exploitation of the mer-
estimated that net profits from exploiting these VIP chandising rights, the rights to the image of the club
boxes from the 2001-2002 season to the year 2009 and its players, and the rights to distribute content
could reach $86.5 million.) As for those services tar- through the Internet and cell phones, both national-
geting the general public, the club started building ly and internationally. This strategy has allowed the
two restaurants inside the stadium during the 2002- club to increase its marketing income four-fold
2003 season, one of them thematic and the other a between 2000 and 2004, and the club made earn-
high-class restaurant targeted essentially at busi- ings of $149 million in the 2004-2005 season. It has
nesspeople. been Real Madrid’s ability to generate revenue from

Global Business and Organizational Excellence DOI: 10.1002/joe November/December 2006 57

 Exhibit 4. Brand-Exploitation Businesses

commercial sources that set it apart from its com- Exploitation of the “Real Madrid” brand is not lim-
petitor’s club. Real Madrid has designed new busi- ited to Spain, where everyone is familiar with it: the
nesses that have become new sources of income, as club also aims to give the brand an international
we can see in Exhibit 4. dimension. The club has an internal international
business development team solely responsible for
First, as we mentioned above, the club’s sports strat- building international partnerships. With this objec-
egy involves signing up major soccer stars with a tive, the club has designed a system of brand devel-
huge media impact. Real Madrid has been a pioneer opment agreements, through which the club
in exploiting the advertising dimension of the image negotiates exclusive contracts with local partners for
of its most emblematic players, by negotiating a particular country or geographical area. The brand
advertising contracts with commercial firms.4 The development agreement includes the signal for the
club receives a stipulated percentage of the total Real Madrid TV channel, the local version of the
amount of these agreements, allowing it to finance Web page, Real Madrid’s stores, and the exclusive
the purchase and transfer of these players. sale of products licensed by the club. During the
(According to specialized press, Real Madrid could presidency of Pérez, Real Madrid signed agreements
recover David Beckham’s transfer fee of $42 million with Pegaso (2002) to exploit the brand in Mexico
in just two or three years, and this only from the for $7.2 million, with Asia Sport Development
income of exploiting his image.) (ASD) (2003) for its exploitation in Asia with a value

58 November/December 2006 DOI: 10.1002/joe Global Business and Organizational Excellence

of $26–$48 million, with Platia (2004) to exploit the out any type of barrier or limitation. For this pur-
brand in Japan for $24 million, and with Citic pose, it will use a multichannel strategy to exploit
Conglomerate (2005) for its exploitation in China. its brand. The club is putting particular emphasis
on the use of the new Internet-based technologies,
With regard to the sponsorship agreements, Real for which it aims to promote its Web page as a
Madrid has evolved from the concept of sponsor- channel to provide information and encourage the
ship—partners that act as sponsors—to a system online sale of products. (The Real Madrid Web
based on partnership—partners that add comple- page was the sector leader, both in terms of page
mentary values to the brand by generating synergies views [250 million] and number of unique visitors
between the institutions that allow them both to [18 million], during the 2003-2004 season. The
conquer strategic markets. In this line, Real Madrid gross sales from the club’s online store reached
has signed sponsorship agreements with firms that $720,000 during the 2002-2003 season). On the
are leaders in their markets at the national and other hand, transmitting content to cell phones is
international level. The team’s main sponsor is the the other key aspect with regard to the new tech-
German company Siemens IC Mobile. This agree- nologies. To achieve this objective, Real Madrid
ment involves the sponsorship of the soccer team, has signed an agreement with the telecom firm
which carries the firm’s advertising on the kit the Telefónica, which provides the technology, com-
players wear during matches, plus the development munications, know-how, and resources to package
of joint businesses together, with Siemens providing content through various channels that can then be
the technological know-how and Real Madrid the transmitted to the fans.
contents. The Siemens shirt sponsorship is worth an
estimated $17 million. Real Madrid has recently
negotiated an improved shirt sponsorship deal with
Using new technologies is an important way of
telecommunications company BenQ, worth a
reported $24–$30 million a season for four seasons exploiting the brand. Real Madrid aims to design
from 2006-2007 onward. Apart from this main a model allowing it to relate to its supporters
sponsorship agreement, Real Madrid has designed without any type of barrier or limitation.
secondary packages consisting of sets of rights
involving all the club’s advertising vehicles. These
provide huge exposure to brands associated with Real Madrid has designed a mechanism to
Real Madrid. (During the 2000-2001 season, Real strengthen fans’ loyalty: the “Real Madrid Fan
Madrid signed contracts with other firms, such as Card.” The aim of this card, launched in September
Mahou, Sanitas, Pepsico, and Altadis. In 2002- 2001, is to be a medium for managing the club’s
2003, Audi became the club’s official sponsor for supporters in Spain and around the world. The club
three years. The club’s estimate of its revenues from estimates that it has 15 million supporters in Spain,
the whole sponsorship program is $11 million.) The and around the world the figure is approximately
current operation of these sponsorship agreements 70 million, thereby creating value from their feeling
represents an important source of income for the of being Real Madrid fans. Cardholders enjoy the
club, which is estimated to be approximately $24 position of being “official Real Madrid fans,” with
million per year. a free subscription to the magazine Hala Madrid
(roughly, “Come on Madrid!”), discounts in stores,
Using new technologies is an important way of and club products, as well as priority when acquir-
exploiting the brand. Real Madrid aims to design ing match tickets. According to club sources, the
a model allowing it to relate to its supporters with- card currently generates income of approximately

Global Business and Organizational Excellence DOI: 10.1002/joe November/December 2006 59

 $7.2 million. The club has carried out studies that official stores selling its products within the
estimate the number of potential cardholders at 1 Region of Madrid. Likewise, the club has designed
million individuals, which would generate market a project to operate franchises, which began in
revenues of around $36 million. During the 2003- 2002 with the setting up of a master franchise in
2004 season, the club attained 300,000 signed-up Madrid. This project has two phases. In the first,
cardholders. the focus is on expanding at the national level, and
in the second, the club hopes to take the business
One of the businesses that has been most heavily to countries all around the world. The club has
promoted within the new marketing area has been received more than 1,500 requests to open stores,
the direct sales of products, as well as a product- both in Spain and abroad. We should mention that
licensing program. First, sales of the soccer team’s the commercialization strategy is multichannel,
shirts—copies of the one used by the first team trying to push sales through various distribution
during matches—have grown exponentially dur- channels—mail-order, telesales, Internet. This new
ing recent seasons. The sales figure from the offi- strategy has helped Real Madrid’s income from
cial Real Madrid store during 2000-2001 rose by distribution, merchandise, and licenses of the
35 percent. The club sold 500,000 shirts with the brand to increase from $27 million on the balance
names of Figo, Raúl, and Roberto Carlos alone, sheet of the 2000-2001 season, to a projected $77
for an estimated figure, according to the special- million for 2004-2005.
ized press, of $39.7 million. On the day when
Beckham was officially presented as a Real
Madrid player, the club sold 8,000 shirts, earning One of the businesses that has been most heavily
it $750,000. This privileged situation has allowed promoted within the new marketing area has been
Real Madrid to renegotiate and increase the value
the direct sales of products, as well as a product-
of its contracts with sports brands. Second, with
regard to the product licensing program, the club
licensing program.
follows a strategy of customer segmentation. It
has developed the separate brand Hala Madrid, to
reach other markets apart from those of the offi- As a result of this strategy, Commercial revenues
cial match-wear, with three fundamental differ- have increased by $102.5 million between 2000–
ences: price, quality, and alternative distribution 2001 and 2004-2005, a compound annual growth
channels. Finally, the club has established a licens- rate of 34 percent. In the 2004-2005 season, mer-
ing program at the national and international chandising and licensing contributed the largest pro-
level for licensed products. The club earns a mini- portion (44 percent) of the club’s commercial
mum guaranteed amount plus royalties in func- revenues at $65 million. The remainder is derived
tion of sales. Real Madrid has more than 75 from sponsorship and advertising ($55 million), sta-
official licensees manufacturing more than 700 dium tours and conferencing ($8.6 million), and
products of all types under the “Real Madrid” other marketing sources ($20 million).
brand.

The distribution and commercialization of Real Conclusions: Managerial Implications of the Real
Madrid products is the final category of new busi- Madrid Experience
nesses concerns. The club uses two types of estab- There has been an important crisis in recent years
lishment to sell its products: official club stores in the soccer industry, leading many clubs to
and franchises. At present, Real Madrid has three transform themselves into companies dedicated to

60 November/December 2006 DOI: 10.1002/joe Global Business and Organizational Excellence

sports entertainment. The ensuing adjustments ential position compared with the rest of the
required economic and sporting success to be European clubs,5 giving it an important competi-
compatible. In this sense, eight of the nine richest tive advantage. Thus, one of the fundamental pil-
clubs in Europe played against each other in the lars upon which the club’s management is based is
quarterfinals of the UEFA Champions League in its marketing strategy, whose objective is to exploit
the 2003-2004 seasons. Real Madrid is becoming the “Real Madrid” brand and its strategic sport
a clear reference point for this new business assets in all possible markets, attempting to gener-
model. The club has shown that there are several ate loyal supporters/customers all around the
ways to establish a relation between both types of world. Having identified the brand as a key asset,
success, and the brand has become a key element the club has built the “content” in order to devel-
for this. Indeed, the club’s entire strategy is subor- op a product that people from around the world
dinated to achieving the objective of creating a can identify with and ultimately buy. Real Madrid
debt-free, profitable firm. Even the sporting strat- has set for itself the aim of enhancing its value, so
egy of the team could conceivably take second that the brand has real market value, with the
place to this basic objective. objective of converting it into one of the most
powerful brands in world sports.6
The Real Madrid F.C. case is a good example of an
organization that has been successful in developing
a valuable resource, its brand. This resource has The Real Madrid F.C. case is a good example of an
been the key for developing a new strategy that has
organization that has been successful in develop-
been able to promote and exploit it. The trade name
of the club is the result of the whole compilation of
ing a valuable resource, its brand.
the club’s resources: past and current players, corpo-
rate culture, and the tradition of success that Real
Madrid has developed throughout its history. Real Players can be considered as a specific sort of
Madrid’s brand was valuable in the past, but resource in a sports club. They must be considered
Florentino Pérez’s main contributions in 2000-2006 as strategic assets (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993;
have been both to confirm the Real Madrid brand Barney, 1991). In this category, it is possible to dif-
value, providing it with increasing value, and to find ferentiate two kinds of football players: firstly, play-
new and profitable ways to exploit it. This strategy ers like Raul or Casillas (developed in Real Madrid’s
has allowed Real Madrid to attain a competitive nursery) that are long-term resources, whereas play-
advantage over other European clubs, making the ers such as Beckham, Ronaldo, or Zinedine Zidane
growth and diversification of the club possible (signed up when they were already famous world
around the sports event. football players) that are short-term resources.
Although both kinds of resources are scarce in the
Although the results of Real Madrid’s last seasons market and fulfill the consumer demand, the former
have not been as good as expected, this club has can be considered as specific to the Real, whereas
been very successful in the development of its com- the latter are not specific. The specificity refers to
mercial/marketing strategy, enabling it to reach a the value of a resource in alternative uses (in this
leading position among the richest clubs in case, sports clubs) and determines the distribution
Europe, doubling its income in a four-year period. of profits among players and clubs. The wages and
Real Madrid’s incredible capacity for marketing incentives are affected by these specific characteris-
income generation from sponsorship, licensing, tics. Nevertheless, in the last instance, the brand
and merchandising programs has put it in a differ- name depends on the value of these strategic sport

Global Business and Organizational Excellence DOI: 10.1002/joe November/December 2006 61

 resources and their performance. In this respect, degree of uncertainty is clearly present in the
sport results determine, in the long run, brand name activity, as there exists a factor as critical and
success.7 unmanageable as the result of the match, which
can, however, decisively condition the firm’s eco-
nomic performance. The club’s executives and
managers cannot possibly control the chance fac-
One of the objectives of this brand exploitation
tor. However, one of the objectives of this brand
model is to reduce the level of uncertainty, exploitation model is to reduce the level of uncer-
although that may appear paradoxical. tainty, although that may appear paradoxical.
José Ángel Sánchez, marketing area director of
Real Madrid, explains this with a graphic exam-
We should not, however, forget that the club’s ple: “Ferrari went twenty-one years without win-
capacity to generate revenues is determined by the ning the World Championship and yet the public
team’s success on the soccer field. This decisive continued to regard the Italian company as the
aspect is associated with the club’s capacity to world’s greatest automobile brand.” Thus, Real
acquire, sign up, and keep the best players on its Madrid’s strategy has been to continue consoli-
books, as these players are resources that are the dating its brand as a symbol of prestige, excel-
basis for building capabilities. Furthermore, soccer lence, and leadership, allowing it to generate a
stars are a scarce resource; they are professionals solid source of revenues to finance the team with
that have all the ingredients to allow them to be some independence from the sporting results that
considered as strategic assets. Consequently, the team might obtain.
acquiring these soccer resources—a highly quali-
fied professional staff—can only be done at Nevertheless, recent events in Real Madrid, espe-
extremely high costs and relying on the club’s cially Mr. Pérez’s resignation in February 2006,
healthy finances. To accomplish this objective, it is seem to suggest some limits on model validity and
fundamental for the club to achieve an adequate the existence of a possible gap between sports
financial balance, forcing the institution to con- entertainment and brand management. Real
stantly explore new income sources, something Madrid’s strategy is therefore conditioned by its
which the club can achieve through diverse and nonprofit character and members’ capacity to elect
various means, with the enhancement in value of the president. These members have shown major
the “Real Madrid” brand proving to be the most concern about the last season’s sports results, and
effective. Its high market value has enabled the could deny their support to the club’s management
club to generate substantial revenues, allowing it if performance is not according to their expecta-
to position itself appropriately in the market, while tions. This discussion suggests that in this kind of
competing successfully at an international level in organization, equilibrium between sports and eco-
the struggle among clubs to sign up the world’s nomic results is a key issue that should be careful-
best soccer players. ly managed.

The relation between sports results and econom- Finally, we believe that this work opens important
ic performance is another aspect that we should future research lines in order to analyze organiza-
mention, due to its high correlation and impor- tional excellence comparing Real Madrid with
tance. We must accept that the soccer industry is other important European football clubs
based on a game, and consequently a substantial (Manchester United, Juventus, Bayern Munchen)
random component is inherent to it. A high or sports organizations with brand strategy

62 November/December 2006 DOI: 10.1002/joe Global Business and Organizational Excellence

(Roland Garros and ATP, and U.S. franchises NBA, contracts with media companies (Italy and France) and
MLB, NFL, and NHL). We think that these future increasing stadium capacity (England).
development lines could involve interesting discus- 6. According to the brand consultants Landor Associates,
sions for managers and perhaps researchers in man- Florentino Pérez has created the most powerful global brand
agement and marketing.8 among sports teams. In the words of Manuel Redondo, the
Presidency Manager: “…With regards to sports brands, only
Nike is more economically valuable than the “Real Madrid”
brand. But that brand is more localized in the North
American market.”
Notes
1. Matchday income is largely derived from gate receipts 7. We are grateful to this comment from an anonymous
(including season tickets and memberships). Broadcast reviewer.
income includes revenue from television and radio and 8. We are grateful to this comment from an anonymous
from both domestic and international competitions. reviewer.
Commercial income includes sponsorship (mainly derived
from brand-name placement on team shirts and around the
stadium), conference, catering, and merchandising References
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 Real Madrid. Annual Reports 2000-2004. Madrid.
Miguel Blanco Callejo is assistant professor of strategic
Redondo, M. Presidency Manager of Real Madrid F.C. management in the department of management at the Rey
Interview Santiago Bernabéu Stadium, 26 January 2004. Juan Carlos University, Madrid, Spain. His research interests
Rosaaen, K., & Amis, J. (2004). From the Busby Babes to the include corporate restructuring, brand management, and
Theatre of Dreams: Image, reputation and the rise of teaching devices in management. He received a BA from the
Complutense University, Spain. He can be contacted at
Manchester United. In D. Andrews (Ed.), Manchester United:
[email protected]. Francisco Javier Forcadell is profes-
An interdisciplinary study (pp. 43–62). Oxford: Berg.
sor of strategic management in the department of manage-
Srivastava, R.J., Fahey, L., Christensen, H.K. (2001). The ment at the Rey Juan Carlos University, Madrid, Spain. His
resource-based view and marketing: The role of market- areas of investigation are related to corporate strategy,
based assets in gaining competitive advantage. Journal of knowledge management and cooperativism. He received a
Management, 27, 777–802. BA from the La Rioja University, Spain, and a Ph.D. from
the Rey Juan Carlos University, Spain. He can be contacted
Szymanski, S. (1998). Why is Manchester United so success-
at [email protected].
ful? Business Strategy Review, 9(4), 47–54.

64 November/December 2006 DOI: 10.1002/joe Global Business and Organizational Excellence

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