Kato IslamNusantaraMovement 2021
Kato IslamNusantaraMovement 2021
Kato IslamNusantaraMovement 2021
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Islamic Sects and Movements
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Chapter 5
1 Introduction
1 This research was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant number 16K02004. An earlier version
of this chapter was published as Hisanori Kato, 2018, “Religion and Locality: The Case of the
Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia,” Fieldwork in Religion 13:2, 151–168.
2 The Indonesian government officially recognises six religions, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism,
Catholicism, Protestantism, and Confucianism.
that Indonesian Islam is “multi-voiced” and takes “multi-forms” and “not all of
them Koranic, and whatever it brought to the sprawling archipelago it was not
uniformity” (Geertz 1968: 12).3
Islam has been a primary socio-political force in Indonesia, the country with
the largest Muslim population in the world. When drafting a new constitution
in the post-World War II era, there was a serious debate in Indonesia over the
enforcement of sharīʿa or syariah,4 or Islamic law (Ricklefs 1993: 209–211). The
country eventually opted for republicanism with the leadership of Sukarno,
the first President of the Republic of Indonesia. However, that political choice
has created a division among the umma or umat,5 (the Islamic community)
between those wishing to realise a more religiously rigid society with the imple-
mentation of syariah and those upholding secular nationalism wherein faith is
an individual matter. The latter group, nonetheless, has never abandoned the
commitment to Islam and has emphasised its piousness. This religious stratum
tends to be supportive of integrating indigenous Indonesian culture and local
tradition into Islam. Nahdlatul Ulama,6 the largest Islamic organisation in the
country (popularly known as NU), best represents this religious orientation and
promotes this way of thinking as ‘Islam Nusantara’. While NU is branded as ‘tra-
ditionalist’ and is less hesitant to adopt local religious practices of Indonesia,
Muhammadiyah—the second largest Islamic organisation, established by
Ahmad Dahlan in 1912—is regarded as ‘modernist’. Muhammadiyah is more
religiously rigid, and intends to bring about a more ‘authentic’ version of Islam
than the syncretic form which has traditionally proliferated in Indonesia.
The establishment of NU was initiated by several Muslim scholars called
kiai, such as Hasyim Asy’ari. It is a common practice for kiai to own Islamic
boarding schools or pesantren, which has contributed to the organisational
expansion of NU since its establishment. NU has exerted much political and
cultural influence in Indonesian society. For example, Partai Nahdlatul Ulama,
a political wing of NU, secured its second position in the parliamentary elec-
tion in 1971 after President Suharto’s powerful Golkar group. We should also
remember that the members of NU played a significant role in the annihilation
of the communist party of Indonesia (PKI) after the 1965 aborted coup d’etat.
Then chairperson of NU in the 1990s, Abdurrahaman Wahid, popularly
known as Gus Dur, was a crucial figure in the process of transforming politically
3 However, there is also an argument that some Javanese cultures such as selametan, which
Geertz regarded as animistic, are also linked with authentic Islamic teachings (Woodward
2011: Chapter 3).
4 In Indonesia, sharīʿa is usually spelled as syariah.
5 In Indonesia, umma is usually spelled as umat.
6 NU was established by some religious scholars, ʿulamāʾ, in 1926.
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112 Kato
oppressed Indonesia into a more democratic society after the fall of Suharto in
1998. Gus Dur was elected as the fourth president of the Republic in 1999 and
implemented policies that promoted cultural diversity in the nation. He lifted
the prohibition against public displays of Chinese culture such as the dragon
dance and Chinese characters after he took office. Religious as well as cultural
diversity was promoted by Gus Dur, and he was termed guru bangsa or the
‘teacher of the country’. NU also has been regarded as a safeguard of kebin-
nekaan (diversity) in Indonesia.
The NU drew widespread attention in August 2015 when it hosted its
national congress in the Eastern Javanese town of Jombang with the theme
of Islam Nusantara for Indonesia and the World (International Summit of
the Moderate Islamic Leaders n.d.). NU intended to clarify Islam Nusantara’s
uniqueness by linking it with the locality found in the archipelago, which dif-
ferentiates it from Arab-Islamic culture, and to promote tolerant and moderate
attitudes for Muslims along with a nationalist message (International Summit
of the Moderate Islamic Leaders n.d.).
This chapter will explore the nature and characteristics of the Islam
Nusantara movement. This work contributes to deepening understanding of
how the ideas of authenticity in Islam and local culture mutually interact. An
attempt to answer these questions can bring about a better comprehension of
the role of religion in Indonesian society.
2 Religion as Organism
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The Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia 113
non-identical with the original form of the religion. However, this is not merely
relevant to Islam in Indonesia but is also pertinent to any other religion that
spans a significant time period.
For example, Japanese Buddhism, which has flourished with various schools
since it was introduced in the sixth century, created its unique syncretic notion
with Shinto (Eisenstadt 1996: 224). Shusaku Endo also points out that the long-
standing tradition of Japanese ancestor worship contributed to the preserva-
tion of the faith of Japanese Christians in the time of the Edo Period when
Christianity was forbidden (Endo 2016: 135). These facts suggest that the fol-
lowers of the same religion recurrently exhibit contending attitudes and prac-
tices depending on where and when they exist.
In fact, the homogenisation of indigenous traditional cultures and original
religion is ubiquitous, and the locality becomes a part of the religion. Islam in
Indonesia is no stranger to this phenomenon. Although egalitarianism is cher-
ished in Islam, the approbation of Muslims towards venerated religious schol-
ars (ʿulamāʾ or kiai) is habitually observed in Indonesia. This specific attitude
of Muslims can be found in Islamic boarding schools called pesantren, which
are operated by kiai and ʿulamāʾ who belong to NU. Orthodox Muslim (santri)
students at pesantren pay much respect to their teachers and treat them as
touched by the divine. This attitude undoubtedly is derived from the appre-
ciation of seniority in Indonesian society that has existed for a long period
of time.
Indonesian Muslims commonly pay a visit to the family grave (ziarah,
Arab. ziyārāt), to recite the Qurʾān jointly (tahlilan, Arab. tahlīl), and to prac-
tice homecoming (mudik) in the time of Idul Fitri (Arab. ʿĪd al-Fiṭr) following
Ramadan. The veneration of saints is another popular religious routine among
Indonesian Muslims. The grave of Mbk Priok, which is one of the most famous
and popular sites for saint worship in Indonesia, is located in the northern part
of Jakarta. Habib Ali, the caretaker of the site and the self-claimed descen-
dant of Mbk Priok, is popular with visitors and attracts respect from pilgrims.
The followers of Habib Ali even believe that he possesses supernatural power
to bring about miracles. When Habib Ali recites the Qurʾān, the pilgrims put
bottled water in front of him, believing that the water will become holy and be
able to cure diseases (Kato 2012: 37–49).
None of these religious practices, in the eyes of Salafist-oriented fundamen-
talist Muslims, are in accordance with the authentic teachings of Islam. This
discrepancy creates a wide division between those who are less hesitant to
accept the locally influenced version of Islam and those who are firmly deter-
mined to maintain the theological authenticity of Islam, disregarding any non-
Islamic element in their behaviours.
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114 Kato
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The Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia 115
they are religiously authentic enough to be called devout Muslims and never
dream that they are being unorthodox Muslims. Jeremy Menchik (2016: 72)
points out this complexity in Muslims:
Godly nationalists feel that belief in God is a civic virtue that accrues
both individual and social benefits. For individuals, belief in God brings
an enlightened understanding of the world that is preferable to premod-
ern beliefs such as animism, heterodox beliefs, or secular worldviews.
This suggests that the components of religion or Islam are rather complex,
and Muslims, especially the people of Muslim society, are by no means single-
minded. The object of our study in this chapter, the Islam Nusantara move-
ment, can be categorised as one of the examples of the religiosity of Islam in
that the residents of Muslim society adopt local traditions in order to affirm
their ‘piousness’ and commitment to their own faith. At the same time, the
Islam Nusantara movement will be rejected by those who value the realisation
of a religiously conservative and ‘purely’ Islamic society.
The substance of religion will be also explored. A.R. Radcliffe-Brown sug-
gested that an efficient means to understand religion is to examine the “social
function of religions” (Radcliffe-Brown 1965: 154). With this idea in mind, the
substance of the Islam Nusantara movement and the complex mind of the fol-
lowers of Islam Nusantara will be explored in the following part of the chapter.
‘Nusantara’ is the combination of two ancient Javanese words, nusa and antara,
which mean ‘islands’ and ‘opposite’ or ‘across from’ respectively (Baso 2017:
2). Nusantara in fact includes Sumatra, Java, the Sunda Islands, Kalimantan,
Sulawesi, the Maluku, and West Papua (Irian Jaya) of current Indonesian
territory, as well as other parts of Southeast Asian regions, such as Malaysia,
Singapore, and the southern Philippines (Baso 2017: 2–3). The defining charac-
teristic of Islam Nusantara is its appreciation of the diversity of local cultures
with regional languages and varying customs in these areas.
However, the initiator of Islam Nusantara, NU, obviously emphasises the
linkage between Islam and Indonesian native cultures. Azis Anwar Fachrudin
explains that NU’s traditions are deeply connected with religious rituals, such
as joint prayer (tahlilan) and communal meals (selametan) (Fachrudin 2015). In
addition to the preservation of the local religious rituals, the unity of Indonesia
is another key ideological pillar in the movement. The leader of NU, Aqil Siradj,
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116 Kato
explicitly stated that “we start from Islam Nusantara and maintain the unity
of Republic of Indonesia, the local culture, and the richness of nature” (Islam
Nusantara n.d.).
This also does not mean that Islam Nusantara is a newly-born Indonesian
version of Islamic teachings (Hasyim 2018: 8). The authenticity of Islam is never
abandoned by the advocates of the Islam Nusantara movement. Some believe
that Indonesian tradition never excluded the orthodoxy of Islam. Azyumardi
Azra, for example, lists three major influences in Islam Nusantara: the ortho-
dox Sunnī theology of al-Ashʿarī or Asy’ariyah; the judicature of al-Shāfiʿī, and
other judicial schools of the Sunnī tradition; and the Ṣūfism of the Persian
mystic al-Ghazālī (Azra 2015: 170).
Some also argue that the Islam that spread over the archipelago of
Indonesia has a profound relation with the Prophet Muḥammad. Ahmad Baso
states that the descendants of the Prophet, called sayyids or asyrafs, directly
contributed to the spread of Islam over the Southeast Asian region, includ-
ing the Indonesian islands (Baso 2017: 10). It is a common understanding that
the nine saints known as wali songo (sanga) played an important role for the
Islamisation of Java (Laffan 2011: 8). According to Baso, these wali songo, who
were the descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad, constructed the founda-
tion of Islam Nusantara (Baso 2017: 27–30). He cited the words of one of the
wali songo to explain the dialectical development of Islam as “borrowing ele-
ments from the old culture to empower and enrich the new; let the old cus-
toms become the container and the elements of faith the contents” (Baso
2017: 30). Such statements clearly work to validate Islam Nusantara. This reso-
nates with the view presented by Abudurrahman Wahid, a former leader of
NU, who has said that Islam in Indonesia is experiencing an “encounter” with
history and “manifests” Islam uniquely, but never forsaking its core teachings
(Wahid 2015: 35).
NU hosted an international conference called the International Summit of
the Moderate Islamic Leaders (ISOMIL) to promote Islam Nusantara in May
2016. As the outcome of ISOMIL, NU issued a declaration on Islam Nusantara.
In addition to the advocacy of patriotism that was expressed by its leader Aquil
Siradj in February 2016, there are several points that should be heeded from the
declaration: the affinity with the core teachings of Islam; peaceful coexistence
with other religions without overpowering them; the rejection of extrem-
ism; and the affirmation of being Sunnī Muslim (Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaʿah)
(International Summit of the Moderate Islamic Leaders n.d.: 51–52).
With regard to the first, the declaration clearly states that the inher-
ited nature of Islam Nusantara never conflicts with Islamic teachings, such
as “tawassuth [Arab. tawassul, following the middle path, i.e., the path of
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The Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia 117
4 Political Support
Not only does the Islam Nusantara movement have religious meaning, but it
also has political significance. President Joko Widodo, who was seeking re-
election for another term in 2019, ardently joined the campaign of the Islam
Nusantara movement in the hope that he would obtain support from the mod-
erate Muslim constituency, especially from a vast number of NU followers.8 He
has received criticism from more hard-line Muslims, alleging that he and his
family are affiliated with communism.9 It seems that Joko Widodo was eager
to maintain his image as a devout and moderate Muslim by supporting NU’s
Islam Nusantara.
President Joko Widodo attended the religious gathering held in the Istiqlal
Mosque in Jakarta, which is the largest of its kind in Southeast Asia, at the time
of Islamic fasting month of Ramadan in June 2015. He reiterated the validity
of Islam Nusantara in his speech in front of approximately 10,000 attendants,
saying that “Thank God, we are Islam Nusantara that is filled with santun (well-
mannered people), tata karma (ordered people), and full toleransi (tolerance)”
(NU Online 2015). On another occasion, President Joko Widodo praised NU’s
effort to promote a peaceful and tolerant Islam in culturally and ethnically
diverse Indonesia at the 92nd commemoration ceremony of NU’s establish-
ment in February 2018.
President Joko Widodo also showed his commitment to safeguarding reli-
gious tolerance characterised by Islam Nusantara by building a monument
in the Sumatran town of Barus, where bearers of Islam from the Middle East
arrived at the dawn of Islamic history in Indonesia. In addition, he issued a
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118 Kato
presidential decree that instituted the day of Hari Santri Nasional or the
National Day of Devout Muslims.10 The Islam Nusantara Movement has gained
momentum by the political stratagems of President Joko Widodo, who intends
to emphasise his devout but moderate leadership to eliminate the Islamic reli-
gious fanaticism that potentially threatens the stability of the country.
While Islam Nusantara has been endorsed by the government of the Republic
of Indonesia, some criticism has been directed towards this NU-led Islamic
movement. H.A. Fallah, who is active in campaigning for the implementation
of syariah and was once imprisoned in relation to his involvement in a ter-
rorist scheme, has questioned the legitimacy of Islam Nusantara, saying that
Islam Nusantara promotes radicalism as it creates a sectarian sentiment.11 He
points out that the substance of the Islam Nusantara movement is merely
anti-Wahhābist, and this binary religious setting would widen the division that
has already existed in the umat in Indonesia.12
He in fact has no hesitation to adopt cultural elements in Islamic life, such as
wearing Indonesian traditional clothes called batik; however, he never accepts
any metamorphosis relating to akidah [ʿaqīdah], or Islamic faith. For example,
he believes the rituals in the time of ḥajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) should remain
as they have been, referring to some Indonesians who (illegitimately, he thinks)
chanted Pancasila (the five principles of the Republic of Indonesia) at the time
of ḥajj.13 By the same token, Fallah believes that selametan, which has the aura
of the existence of a deity other than Allāh, should never be allowed.
Another high-profile Muslim leader, Abdul Rohim, who serves as one of the
executives of the hard-line Islamic organisation Jammah Ansharusy Shariah
(JAS), also accuses ‘moderate Muslims’ who advocate Islam Nusantara as
forcing fellow Muslims to deviate from the correct path of Islam.14 Rohim
emphasises that the one of the essentials of the Islamic faith is to respect all
10 22 October is set as Hari Santri, as NU once declared jihād on 22 October 1945 against
the Dutch who intended to recolonise Indonesia after World War II. Presidential Decree
no. 22/2015 enacted Hari Santri, at https://ketemulagi.com/sejarah-hari-santri-nasional
-22-oktober/, accessed 27/05/2018.
11 Interview with the author, Jakarta, 6 March 2018.
12 Interview with the author, Jakarta, 6 March 2018.
13 See their deeds on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lpWH_AfKWhc. Accessed 27/03/
2018.
14 Interview with the author, Solo, 18 March 2018.
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The Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia 119
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120 Kato
6 NU and Modernity
20 This comment was made by Muhammadiyah’s young intellectual Najib Burhani (cited in
Sahal and Aziz 2015: 26).
21 Interview with the author, Yogyakarta, 16 March 2018.
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The Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia 121
7 Conventional Approach
While NU has adopted modern digital technology for their propagation strat-
egy, a more conventional approach has never been dismissed. NU is consis-
tently active in their missionary work with the conventional verbal method.
For example, a local branch of NU in Yogyakarta offers community based
religious classes to rural workers every fortnight. On 15 March 2018, Fatya, a
women’s organisation of NU in Yogyakarta, organised a class for female agricul-
tural workers in the evening. The venue was one of the participants’ primitive
house, and twenty middle-aged women attended the class.
Khotimatul Husna, a leader of Fatya in Yogyakarta, presided over the class
which was about the Islamic faith, emphasising the need of reverence to Allāh
and obedience to the Qurʾān and ḥadīth. After the class, they conducted tahlīl
and had a meal together. According to the participants, the major objective in
attending the class was to obtain ‘knowledge’. They also explained that there
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122 Kato
was one non-Muslim family in the village, and that their communication and
socialisation with non-Muslim families remain firmly amicable. They state
that the non-Muslim family commonly joins the funerals of fellow villagers,
and mutual help takes place without exception in times of natural disaster.25
Khotimatul believes that this type of conventional and direct method is vital in
order for the villagers to learn the essentials of Islam, as they hesitate to access
modern cyber technology.
NU’s conventional approach to their followers is employed not only in rural
areas but also in urban areas. The propagation division of NU offers a special
course to potential community leaders who convey the religious ideas upheld
by NU, including Islam Nusantara to the members of their community. The
course is called Pelatian Kadar Dakwa’h (PKD) or Practice for the Followers of
the Faith, and it runs twice a week for six months at the headquarters in Jakarta.
On 20 March 2018, a PKD session was held and was attended by twenty-two
male and eight female members of NU. Their occupation and their stage of life
varied: there were university and high school students, teachers, food sellers,
community leaders, and mosque staff. The class was led by a religious expert,
and he provided the participants with rather practical advice for efficient pub-
lic speaking and choice of topics. The participants were required to prepare
for their speech and conduct their session in front of all the participants and
the teacher.
Four participants had a chance to present their own speech during the one-
and-a-half-hour session. The theme of their speeches included the issue of
self-achievement through religion, the importance of tolerance, polygamy, and
general ideas on Islam in life. The atmosphere of the class was amicable, and
the participants seemed to be enthusiastic about their activities. The young-
est participant was a seventeen-year-old high school male student, and he
expressed his impressions on the course as follows.
I was encouraged by my parents who had joined the class before to attend
the course. I have no non-Muslim friends and am not sure if I am willing
to say ‘Merry Christmas’ to non-Muslims.26
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The Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia 123
I wanted to get the knowledge. Now I know that mutual respect (between
Muslim and non-Muslim) is important. We (Muslims) should let non-
Muslims be alone. I myself am not really close to non-Muslims. We should
not disturb one another. I do not utter ‘Merry Christmas’ to non-Muslims.
I like to say, ‘Selamat’ (Happy).27
These comments from the participants of PKD suggest that the essential idea
of a harmonious relationship with non-Muslims, for them at least, does not
necessarily mean to mingle with non-Muslims; rather, it is to maintain their
own community, independent and undisturbed. This attitude echoes with the
ideas of Rohim who is regarded as a hard-line, Muslim who vehemently rejects
the Islam Nusantara movement. For Rohim, Islam offers no ideology to reject
kuffār (unbelievers), as long as they do not disturb Muslims, while maintaining
the absolute superiority of Islam to other faiths.28
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124 Kato
Ishomuddin insists that the essential concepts of Islam Nusantara and the
authentic teachings of Islam mutually correspond, and he mentions typical
characteristics of the common values of both as follows: tasaamuh (tolerance);
itidaal (justice), tawaazun (balance), tawassuth (moderateness); and tasyawur
(valuing discussion).32 Ishomuddin emphasises the core idea of Islam, that
is, Islam rahmatan lil alamin or ‘Islam as a blessing for all’. Yet, one of the NU
executives in fact objected to a view of Ishomuddin’s at a meeting with the
author, saying that the burial site of Muslims should be separated from that of
non-Muslims, which suggests that Islam Nusantara has not yet offered a unani-
mous view on ‘tolerance’.
Nonetheless, it is true that the concept of tolerance is recurrently empha-
sised in the movement of Islam Nusantara, while hard-line Muslims, includ-
ing Rohim, clearly elaborate the Islamic tenet on the concept of tolerance.
However, the advocates of the Islam Nusantara movement themselves seem to
have exhibited a rather abstract attitude towards tolerance compared to fun-
damentalists, especially on the issues relating to minorities, including the his-
torically persecuted Aḥmadiyya (or Ahmadiyah)33 movement, and lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people. With regard to the religious minor-
ity of Shīʿa, NU is invariably clear that Sunnī Islam is their tenet, and Islam
Nusantara is for the Sunnī community (Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaʿah) worldwide;
however, Islam Nusantara proponents almost unanimously agreed that Sunnī
and Shīʿa Muslims should coexist in a harmonious manner. Nonetheless, the
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The Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia 125
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126 Kato
9 Conclusion
The ambivalence found in the Islam Nusantara movement seems to have con-
tributed to the avoidance of intricate religious discussions. Almost all advo-
cates of Islam Nusantara vaguely admit the supremacy of Islam over other
religions; however, they never explicitly emphasise the ascendancy of Islam.
Zastrouw, a lecturer at NU University in Jakarta, states using a clever metaphor
that “I would say that my wife is best, when I am asked about the supremacy of
Islam over other faiths.”38
This ‘pacifist’ attitude shows clear contrast with that of more ‘liberal’-
minded Muslims who state that all religions are equal. The liberal Islam move-
ment, such as Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), was branded as too extreme with
overwhelming secularism and was criticised severely in the early 2000s. The
Islam Nusantara movement tactfully avoids theological controversies, and
this leads us to understand that the movement contains ambivalence on sensi-
tive issues.
The Islam Nusantara movement obviously accepts several metamorphoses
in religious practices and rituals. However, the need to retain the authenticity
of Islam at the same time seems to have never been abandoned in the move-
ment. For instance, they emphasise the linkage between Nusantara and the
Prophet Muḥammad. The residents of ‘Muslim society’ seem to be unwill-
ing to be branded as impious; thus, they emphasise the rightfulness of Islam
Nusantara. In this sense, the attitudes of the advocates of Islam Nusantara and
fundamentalists occasionally overlap. This is a time when we have difficulties
in drawing a clear line between ‘Islamic society’ and ‘Muslim society’.
In other words, the Islam Nusantara movement, which has emerged from
Muslim society, necessitates ‘authentic’ Islam as a basic tenet of an Islamic
society. These two major components of Islam mutually complement each
other: so-called fundamentalists accept cultural elements in their social behav-
iour including wearing traditional clothes, while Islam Nusantara advocates
emphasise their linkage with the Prophet. This suggests that there exist some
similarities between these two distinctive elements in Islam. Yet, it is the Islam
Nusantara movement’s ambivalence that differentiates it from Salafist-type
Islam and the residents of Islamic society.
Importantly, the Islam Nusantara movement is evidently reactive to the
emergence of extremism as the official declaration acknowledges. It could
be effective in promoting the peaceable aspects of Islam. However, it should
be noted that Islam Nusantara contains potential for promoting the idea that
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The Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia 127
any version of Islam other than Islam Nusantara is belligerent and thus wrong,
which could create psychological antagonism among umat in Indonesia.
The Islam Nusantara Movement seemingly contributes to a more moderate
type of Islam and a less tense relationship with other religions in Indonesia;
however, it is yet to truly confront the stricter form of Islam. This relationship
will bring about either an organic development of Islam with serious yet pro-
ductive discussions or a deeper mutual distrust and conflicts. We should also
remember that Islam Nusantara has been a useful political tool for President
Joko Widodo. In this respect, Islam Nusantara has the potential to bring
about changes in a society, including stability, peaceful coexistence with the
members of society, or threats to these. As its political potential is ongoing,
scholars must consistently engage with the movement to witness how Islam
Nusantara, Indonesian society, and the religion of Islam more broadly, influ-
ence one another.
References
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128 Kato
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