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Brill

Chapter Title: The Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia


Chapter Author(s): Hisanori Kato

Book Title: Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements


Book Editor(s): Muhammad Afzal Upal, Carole M. Cusack
Published by: Brill. (2021)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1163/j.ctv1v7zbv8.10

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Chapter 5

The Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia


Hisanori Kato

1 Introduction

Indonesia is known as a country of socio-cultural diversity with approximately


300 ethnic groups (Kewarganegaraan n.d.).1 The spiritual life of Indonesians is
also rather heterogeneous, as various religious traditions are deeply rooted in
the fourth most populous nation in the world today (World Population Review
2020).2 Despite the fact that 87.2 per cent of the total population embraces the
faith of Islam (Badan Pusat Statistik 2010), chronology shows that non-Islamic
traditions were dominant in the Indonesian archipelago prior to the advent
of Islam. The kings of a maritime empire called Srivijaya which flourished in
southern Sumatra between the seventh and thirteenth centuries (Legge 1964:
5–6), for instance, adopted Buddhism and contributed to cultural interchanges
among Southeast Asia, South Asia, and East Asia (Laffan 2011: 4). We also know
that Borobudur, which is one of the oldest and largest single Buddhist monu-
ments in the world, was built by the Sailendra Kingdom, which was dominant
in Central Java in the eighth century (Laffan 2011: 28). Prambanan temples in
Central Java were built by an ancient Hindu kingdom called Old Mataram in
the tenth century, and the eastern island of Bali, a famous tourist destination
today, is also known as the homeland of the Indonesian version of Hinduism.
Apart from the organised religions, such as Hinduism and Buddhism, the
local traditions and cultures have also profoundly exerted their influence over
the spiritual life of Indonesians. This tendency is most noticeable in Java,
which is the most populated island in the country. The customary traditions of
Javanese cultures, including communal religious meals, traditional medicine,
and the performance of aristocratic rituals in the residence of Sultan, are co-
related with Islam (Woodward 2011: 5). Some argue that Islam in Indonesia is
syncretic and is by no means monolithic. Clifford Geertz, for example, stated

1 This research was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant number 16K02004. An earlier version
of this chapter was published as Hisanori Kato, 2018, “Religion and Locality: The Case of the
Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia,” Fieldwork in Religion 13:2, 151–168.
2 The Indonesian government officially recognises six religions, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism,
Catholicism, Protestantism, and Confucianism.

© Hisanori Kato, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004435544_008


This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
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The Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia 111

that Indonesian Islam is “multi-voiced” and takes “multi-forms” and “not all of
them Koranic, and whatever it brought to the sprawling archipelago it was not
uniformity” (Geertz 1968: 12).3
Islam has been a primary socio-political force in Indonesia, the country with
the largest Muslim population in the world. When drafting a new constitution
in the post-World War II era, there was a serious debate in Indonesia over the
enforcement of sharīʿa or syariah,4 or Islamic law (Ricklefs 1993: 209–211). The
country eventually opted for republicanism with the leadership of Sukarno,
the first President of the Republic of Indonesia. However, that political choice
has created a division among the umma or umat,5 (the Islamic community)
between those wishing to realise a more religiously rigid society with the imple-
mentation of syariah and those upholding secular nationalism wherein faith is
an individual matter. The latter group, nonetheless, has never abandoned the
commitment to Islam and has emphasised its piousness. This religious stratum
tends to be supportive of integrating indigenous Indonesian culture and local
tradition into Islam. Nahdlatul Ulama,6 the largest Islamic organisation in the
country (popularly known as NU), best represents this religious orientation and
promotes this way of thinking as ‘Islam Nusantara’. While NU is branded as ‘tra-
ditionalist’ and is less hesitant to adopt local religious practices of Indonesia,
Muhammadiyah—the second largest Islamic organisation, established by
Ahmad Dahlan in 1912—is regarded as ‘modernist’. Muhammadiyah is more
religiously rigid, and intends to bring about a more ‘authentic’ version of Islam
than the syncretic form which has traditionally proliferated in Indonesia.
The establishment of NU was initiated by several Muslim scholars called
kiai, such as Hasyim Asy’ari. It is a common practice for kiai to own Islamic
boarding schools or pesantren, which has contributed to the organisational
expansion of NU since its establishment. NU has exerted much political and
cultural influence in Indonesian society. For example, Partai Nahdlatul Ulama,
a political wing of NU, secured its second position in the parliamentary elec-
tion in 1971 after President Suharto’s powerful Golkar group. We should also
remember that the members of NU played a significant role in the annihilation
of the communist party of Indonesia (PKI) after the 1965 aborted coup d’etat.
Then chairperson of NU in the 1990s, Abdurrahaman Wahid, popularly
known as Gus Dur, was a crucial figure in the process of transforming politically

3 However, there is also an argument that some Javanese cultures such as selametan, which
Geertz regarded as animistic, are also linked with authentic Islamic teachings (Woodward
2011: Chapter 3).
4 In Indonesia, sharīʿa is usually spelled as syariah.
5 In Indonesia, umma is usually spelled as umat.
6 NU was established by some religious scholars, ʿulamāʾ, in 1926.

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112 Kato

oppressed Indonesia into a more democratic society after the fall of Suharto in
1998. Gus Dur was elected as the fourth president of the Republic in 1999 and
implemented policies that promoted cultural diversity in the nation. He lifted
the prohibition against public displays of Chinese culture such as the dragon
dance and Chinese characters after he took office. Religious as well as cultural
diversity was promoted by Gus Dur, and he was termed guru bangsa or the
‘teacher of the country’. NU also has been regarded as a safeguard of kebin-
nekaan (diversity) in Indonesia.
The NU drew widespread attention in August 2015 when it hosted its
national congress in the Eastern Javanese town of Jombang with the theme
of Islam Nusantara for Indonesia and the World (International Summit of
the Moderate Islamic Leaders n.d.). NU intended to clarify Islam Nusantara’s
uniqueness by linking it with the locality found in the archipelago, which dif-
ferentiates it from Arab-Islamic culture, and to promote tolerant and moderate
attitudes for Muslims along with a nationalist message (International Summit
of the Moderate Islamic Leaders n.d.).
This chapter will explore the nature and characteristics of the Islam
Nusantara movement. This work contributes to deepening understanding of
how the ideas of authenticity in Islam and local culture mutually interact. An
attempt to answer these questions can bring about a better comprehension of
the role of religion in Indonesian society.

2 Religion as Organism

As to whether the authenticity of religion remains unchanged regardless of


the alteration of the social environment where a religion exists remains a
pertinent question; does a religion itself adjust to the newfangled social, eco-
nomic, political, and historical situation? In relation to this query, we could ask
whether the Buddhism taught by Siddhartha Gautama about 2,500 years ago
in India can be the same Buddhism in Japan of the present day or whether the
Christianity practiced clandestinely by Japanese peasants in the early 1600s
can be the same religion as Jesus Christ conveyed to the people of Galilee
(Endo 2016)?
By the same token, we are inquisitive about the authenticity of Islam in
Indonesia, namely, as to whether it shares the same bearings with Islam in the
Middle East. As Clifford Geertz has pointed out, Islam in Indonesia seems to
exhibit its noticeable character as a result of socio-cultural encounters with
local traditions (Geertz 1971: 12). At minimum, this suggests that Islam has been
influenced by its surroundings and has manifested a unique outlook, which is

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The Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia 113

non-identical with the original form of the religion. However, this is not merely
relevant to Islam in Indonesia but is also pertinent to any other religion that
spans a significant time period.
For example, Japanese Buddhism, which has flourished with various schools
since it was introduced in the sixth century, created its unique syncretic notion
with Shinto (Eisenstadt 1996: 224). Shusaku Endo also points out that the long-
standing tradition of Japanese ancestor worship contributed to the preserva-
tion of the faith of Japanese Christians in the time of the Edo Period when
Christianity was forbidden (Endo 2016: 135). These facts suggest that the fol-
lowers of the same religion recurrently exhibit contending attitudes and prac-
tices depending on where and when they exist.
In fact, the homogenisation of indigenous traditional cultures and original
religion is ubiquitous, and the locality becomes a part of the religion. Islam in
Indonesia is no stranger to this phenomenon. Although egalitarianism is cher-
ished in Islam, the approbation of Muslims towards venerated religious schol-
ars (ʿulamāʾ or kiai) is habitually observed in Indonesia. This specific attitude
of Muslims can be found in Islamic boarding schools called pesantren, which
are operated by kiai and ʿulamāʾ who belong to NU. Orthodox Muslim (santri)
students at pesantren pay much respect to their teachers and treat them as
touched by the divine. This attitude undoubtedly is derived from the appre-
ciation of seniority in Indonesian society that has existed for a long period
of time.
Indonesian Muslims commonly pay a visit to the family grave (ziarah,
Arab. ziyārāt), to recite the Qurʾān jointly (tahlilan, Arab. tahlīl), and to prac-
tice homecoming (mudik) in the time of Idul Fitri (Arab. ʿĪd al-Fiṭr) following
Ramadan. The veneration of saints is another popular religious routine among
Indonesian Muslims. The grave of Mbk Priok, which is one of the most famous
and popular sites for saint worship in Indonesia, is located in the northern part
of Jakarta. Habib Ali, the caretaker of the site and the self-claimed descen-
dant of Mbk Priok, is popular with visitors and attracts respect from pilgrims.
The followers of Habib Ali even believe that he possesses supernatural power
to bring about miracles. When Habib Ali recites the Qurʾān, the pilgrims put
bottled water in front of him, believing that the water will become holy and be
able to cure diseases (Kato 2012: 37–49).
None of these religious practices, in the eyes of Salafist-oriented fundamen-
talist Muslims, are in accordance with the authentic teachings of Islam. This
discrepancy creates a wide division between those who are less hesitant to
accept the locally influenced version of Islam and those who are firmly deter-
mined to maintain the theological authenticity of Islam, disregarding any non-
Islamic element in their behaviours.

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114 Kato

There appears to be two dominant approaches within the Islamic commu-


nity or umat in Indonesia, that is, theologically rigid Muslims and theologically
moderate Muslims. The primary purpose of the former would be to implement
syariah and to follow the Qurʾān and ḥadīth, the collection of the words and
deeds of the Prophet Muḥammad. In other words, their absolute objective is
to bring about a precise similitude between their modern lives and that which
was the case in the time of the Prophet Muḥammad, struggling to create a so-
called ‘Islamic society’ which has not yet been realised. The latter, on the other
hand, are more heedful to the changes of the socio-cultural situation; thus,
they are more able to adjust to local peculiarities. It is possible to say that they
reside in a so-called ‘Muslim society’, where the adjustability of local traditions
with human reasoning is more appreciated (Katakura 1991; Kato 2017a).
The essence of Islamic society is theological genuineness or what we can
simply call ‘religion’, while the substance of Muslim society is anything char-
acterised as religious or ‘religiosity’. This classification is useful to understand
the substance of Pancasila, or the five ideological principles of the Republic
of Indonesia as stated in the constitution, which all citizens should follow.
Pancasila is stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia as fol-
lows: Belief in One and Only God; just and civilised humanity; the unity of
Indonesia; democratic life led by wisdom of thoughts in deliberation amongst
representatives of the people; and achieving social justice for all the people
of Indonesia.
In the time of the establishment of the Republic, the national leaders set
Yang Maha Esa, or the One and Only God, as the first principle without allud-
ing to Allāh explicitly on the grounds that Indonesia is a multi-religious nation.
At the time of the drafting of the Constitution in 1945, the national leaders
decided to take a secular nationalist political formation on religiosity through
the principle of Yang Maha Esa. Obviously, this rather politically compro-
mised state ideology clashes with the basic principle of Islamic teachings that
enforces syariah and upholds tauhid (Arab. tawḥīd), the singularity of Allāh. It
was therefore understandable that those who struggle for realising an ‘Islamic
society’ reject Pancasila.
Presumably, Islam qua religion itself consists of Islamic society or reli-
gion and Muslim society or religiosity. As the latter presents new-fashioned
religious practices, influenced by social, historical, geographical, economic,
political, and cultural locality, religion itself would alter its shape as an organ-
ism (Kato 2012). However, this does not necessarily mean that the residents of
Islamic society and Muslim society unequivocally cling to their own domains;
rather, they occasionally cross the boundary of each sphere and show complex
religious attitudes. The residents of Muslim society, for example, believe that

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The Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia 115

they are religiously authentic enough to be called devout Muslims and never
dream that they are being unorthodox Muslims. Jeremy Menchik (2016: 72)
points out this complexity in Muslims:

Godly nationalists feel that belief in God is a civic virtue that accrues
both individual and social benefits. For individuals, belief in God brings
an enlightened understanding of the world that is preferable to premod-
ern beliefs such as animism, heterodox beliefs, or secular worldviews.

This suggests that the components of religion or Islam are rather complex,
and Muslims, especially the people of Muslim society, are by no means single-
minded. The object of our study in this chapter, the Islam Nusantara move-
ment, can be categorised as one of the examples of the religiosity of Islam in
that the residents of Muslim society adopt local traditions in order to affirm
their ‘piousness’ and commitment to their own faith. At the same time, the
Islam Nusantara movement will be rejected by those who value the realisation
of a religiously conservative and ‘purely’ Islamic society.
The substance of religion will be also explored. A.R. Radcliffe-Brown sug-
gested that an efficient means to understand religion is to examine the “social
function of religions” (Radcliffe-Brown 1965: 154). With this idea in mind, the
substance of the Islam Nusantara movement and the complex mind of the fol-
lowers of Islam Nusantara will be explored in the following part of the chapter.

3 Overview of Islam Nusantara

‘Nusantara’ is the combination of two ancient Javanese words, nusa and antara,
which mean ‘islands’ and ‘opposite’ or ‘across from’ respectively (Baso 2017:
2). Nusantara in fact includes Sumatra, Java, the Sunda Islands, Kalimantan,
Sulawesi, the Maluku, and West Papua (Irian Jaya) of current Indonesian
territory, as well as other parts of Southeast Asian regions, such as Malaysia,
Singapore, and the southern Philippines (Baso 2017: 2–3). The defining charac-
teristic of Islam Nusantara is its appreciation of the diversity of local cultures
with regional languages and varying customs in these areas.
However, the initiator of Islam Nusantara, NU, obviously emphasises the
linkage between Islam and Indonesian native cultures. Azis Anwar Fachrudin
explains that NU’s traditions are deeply connected with religious rituals, such
as joint prayer (tahlilan) and communal meals (selametan) (Fachrudin 2015). In
addition to the preservation of the local religious rituals, the unity of Indonesia
is another key ideological pillar in the movement. The leader of NU, Aqil Siradj,

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116 Kato

explicitly stated that “we start from Islam Nusantara and maintain the unity
of Republic of Indonesia, the local culture, and the richness of nature” (Islam
Nusantara n.d.).
This also does not mean that Islam Nusantara is a newly-born Indonesian
version of Islamic teachings (Hasyim 2018: 8). The authenticity of Islam is never
abandoned by the advocates of the Islam Nusantara movement. Some believe
that Indonesian tradition never excluded the orthodoxy of Islam. Azyumardi
Azra, for example, lists three major influences in Islam Nusantara: the ortho-
dox Sunnī theology of al-Ashʿarī or Asy’ariyah; the judicature of al-Shāfiʿī, and
other judicial schools of the Sunnī tradition; and the Ṣūfism of the Persian
mystic al-Ghazālī (Azra 2015: 170).
Some also argue that the Islam that spread over the archipelago of
Indonesia has a profound relation with the Prophet Muḥammad. Ahmad Baso
states that the descendants of the Prophet, called sayyids or asyrafs, directly
contributed to the spread of Islam over the Southeast Asian region, includ-
ing the Indonesian islands (Baso 2017: 10). It is a common understanding that
the nine saints known as wali songo (sanga) played an important role for the
Islamisation of Java (Laffan 2011: 8). According to Baso, these wali songo, who
were the descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad, constructed the founda-
tion of Islam Nusantara (Baso 2017: 27–30). He cited the words of one of the
wali songo to explain the dialectical development of Islam as “borrowing ele-
ments from the old culture to empower and enrich the new; let the old cus-
toms become the container and the elements of faith the contents” (Baso
2017: 30). Such statements clearly work to validate Islam Nusantara. This reso-
nates with the view presented by Abudurrahman Wahid, a former leader of
NU, who has said that Islam in Indonesia is experiencing an “encounter” with
history and “manifests” Islam uniquely, but never forsaking its core teachings
(Wahid 2015: 35).
NU hosted an international conference called the International Summit of
the Moderate Islamic Leaders (ISOMIL) to promote Islam Nusantara in May
2016. As the outcome of ISOMIL, NU issued a declaration on Islam Nusantara.
In addition to the advocacy of patriotism that was expressed by its leader Aquil
Siradj in February 2016, there are several points that should be heeded from the
declaration: the affinity with the core teachings of Islam; peaceful coexistence
with other religions without overpowering them; the rejection of extrem-
ism; and the affirmation of being Sunnī Muslim (Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaʿah)
(International Summit of the Moderate Islamic Leaders n.d.: 51–52).
With regard to the first, the declaration clearly states that the inher-
ited nature of Islam Nusantara never conflicts with Islamic teachings, such
as “tawassuth [Arab. tawassul, following the middle path, i.e., the path of

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The Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia 117

moderation], tawaazun [tawāzun, balance; harmony], tasaamuh [tasāmuḥ,


gentle and loving rather than harsh and violent behaviour, i.e., tolerance rather
than compulsion], and itidaal [iʿtidāl, justice]” (International Summit of the
Moderate Islamic Leaders n.d.: 51), which also corresponds with Indonesian,
especially Javanese, cultural tradition. The declaration also vehemently warns
against the emergence of extremism, which would potentially bring about ter-
rorist acts. Some even believe that Islam Nusantara is a reaction to the rise of
radicalism in Indonesia.7

4 Political Support

Not only does the Islam Nusantara movement have religious meaning, but it
also has political significance. President Joko Widodo, who was seeking re-
election for another term in 2019, ardently joined the campaign of the Islam
Nusantara movement in the hope that he would obtain support from the mod-
erate Muslim constituency, especially from a vast number of NU followers.8 He
has received criticism from more hard-line Muslims, alleging that he and his
family are affiliated with communism.9 It seems that Joko Widodo was eager
to maintain his image as a devout and moderate Muslim by supporting NU’s
Islam Nusantara.
President Joko Widodo attended the religious gathering held in the Istiqlal
Mosque in Jakarta, which is the largest of its kind in Southeast Asia, at the time
of Islamic fasting month of Ramadan in June 2015. He reiterated the validity
of Islam Nusantara in his speech in front of approximately 10,000 attendants,
saying that “Thank God, we are Islam Nusantara that is filled with santun (well-
mannered people), tata karma (ordered people), and full toleransi (tolerance)”
(NU Online 2015). On another occasion, President Joko Widodo praised NU’s
effort to promote a peaceful and tolerant Islam in culturally and ethnically
diverse Indonesia at the 92nd commemoration ceremony of NU’s establish-
ment in February 2018.
President Joko Widodo also showed his commitment to safeguarding reli-
gious tolerance characterised by Islam Nusantara by building a monument
in the Sumatran town of Barus, where bearers of Islam from the Middle East
arrived at the dawn of Islamic history in Indonesia. In addition, he issued a

7 Interview with the author, Jakarta, 22 March 2018.


8 NU itself declares that their membership is 91,200,000, that is, 36.5% of the total population
in Indonesia, citing the survey conducted by LSI in 2013.
9 Interview with the author, Jakarta, 9 March 2018.

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118 Kato

presidential decree that instituted the day of Hari Santri Nasional or the
National Day of Devout Muslims.10 The Islam Nusantara Movement has gained
momentum by the political stratagems of President Joko Widodo, who intends
to emphasise his devout but moderate leadership to eliminate the Islamic reli-
gious fanaticism that potentially threatens the stability of the country.

5 Rejection of Islam Nusantara

While Islam Nusantara has been endorsed by the government of the Republic
of Indonesia, some criticism has been directed towards this NU-led Islamic
movement. H.A. Fallah, who is active in campaigning for the implementation
of syariah and was once imprisoned in relation to his involvement in a ter-
rorist scheme, has questioned the legitimacy of Islam Nusantara, saying that
Islam Nusantara promotes radicalism as it creates a sectarian sentiment.11 He
points out that the substance of the Islam Nusantara movement is merely
anti-Wahhābist, and this binary religious setting would widen the division that
has already existed in the umat in Indonesia.12
He in fact has no hesitation to adopt cultural elements in Islamic life, such as
wearing Indonesian traditional clothes called batik; however, he never accepts
any metamorphosis relating to akidah [ʿaqīdah], or Islamic faith. For example,
he believes the rituals in the time of ḥajj (pilgrimage to Mecca) should remain
as they have been, referring to some Indonesians who (illegitimately, he thinks)
chanted Pancasila (the five principles of the Republic of Indonesia) at the time
of ḥajj.13 By the same token, Fallah believes that selametan, which has the aura
of the existence of a deity other than Allāh, should never be allowed.
Another high-profile Muslim leader, Abdul Rohim, who serves as one of the
executives of the hard-line Islamic organisation Jammah Ansharusy Shariah
(JAS), also accuses ‘moderate Muslims’ who advocate Islam Nusantara as
forcing fellow Muslims to deviate from the correct path of Islam.14 Rohim
emphasises that the one of the essentials of the Islamic faith is to respect all

10 22 October is set as Hari Santri, as NU once declared jihād on 22 October 1945 against
the Dutch who intended to recolonise Indonesia after World War II. Presidential Decree
no. 22/2015 enacted Hari Santri, at https://ketemulagi.com/sejarah-hari-santri-nasional
-22-oktober/, accessed 27/05/2018.
11 Interview with the author, Jakarta, 6 March 2018.
12 Interview with the author, Jakarta, 6 March 2018.
13 See their deeds on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lpWH_AfKWhc. Accessed 27/03/
2018.
14 Interview with the author, Solo, 18 March 2018.

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The Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia 119

creatures including non-Muslims, citing the verse 21 of al-Anbya in the Qurʾān,


which reads “We have sent you forth but as a blessing to mankind.” However,
the concept of being tolerant to other faiths, for Rohim, is different from that
of moderate Muslims who advocate Islam Nusantara. He believes Muslims
should never lose the essentials of Islamic faith, such as tauhid (the oneness
of Allāh), while he firmly maintains they should respect the followers of other
faiths. Therefore, he never forces the Islamic faith on non-believers but refuses
to utter, for example, ‘Merry Christmas’ to Christians.15
Rohim explains that the position of Islam is invariably higher than culture,
although cultural expressions in the attitude of Muslims are permissible.16
Muslim women in Indonesia are still allowed to wear Indonesian jilbab rather
than Middle Eastern niqāb.17 Nonetheless, any practice relating to rituals and
belief, for Rohim, should be based on the orthodoxy of Islam. Thus, tahlīl, for
example, cannot be accepted by Rohim, as it was ‘created’ by NU followers
in Indonesia.18
Ismail Yusanto, who is a leader of the banned Islamic organisation Hizb
ut-Tahrir Indonesia, also shares similar views with both Fallah and Rohim on
Islam Nusantara. According to Yusanto, there should be no “Islam Nusantara”
but “Islam in Nusantara,” as Islam should be only one.19 Yusanto also believes
that no reconciliation between so-called moderate Muslims and fundamen-
talist Muslims under the leadership of Joko Widodo is possible, as the social
division in the country has been widened by him after the controversial Jakarta
gubernatorial election in 2017 (Kato 2017b).
The official approval of Islam Nusantara by President Joko Widodo might
have created the notion that there exists different Islams: the ‘right’ Islam,
that is, Islam Nusantara, and the ‘wrong’ Islam, whatever Islam exists outside
of Islam Nusantara. Needless to say, no terrorist acts encouraged by fanatical
ideology should be justified; however, this does not necessarily mean that all
Muslims who reject Islam Nusantara are the perpetrators or advocates of terror-
ism. While the Islam Nusantara movement has the potential to be an efficient
political tool for Joko Widodo, there is the possibility that it will contribute to
the creation of more serious ideological conflicts in umat in Indonesia in the
times to come.

15 Interview with the author, Solo, 18 March 2018.


16 Interview with the author, Solo, 18 March 2018.
17 Both jilbab and niqāb are headscarfs for Muslim women. Jilbab merely covers the head,
and niqāb covers the head and face.
18 Interview with the author, Solo, 18 March 2018.
19 Interview with the author, Jakarta, 9 March 2018.

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120 Kato

6 NU and Modernity

As has been mentioned, NU is an Islamic organisation that is concilia-


tory to indigenous culture, and it was established “to defend the interests of
Traditionalism” (Ricklefs 1993: 19). On the other hand, there was an Islamic
reform movement in the early twentieth century in Indonesia, which resulted
in the establishment of the modernist organisation Muhammadiyah in 1912
(Ricklefs 1993: 19). The aim of this modernist Muhammadiyah is to bring back
the authenticity of Islam, which corresponds with the Qurʾān and ḥadīth along
with the encouragement of utilising ijtihād, or human reasoning (Ricklefs 1993:
19). Both NU and Muhammadiyah have played an important role not only in
Islamic life but also in political and social life in Indonesia throughout its mod-
ern history. In the time of the fall of President Suharto in 1998, the leaders
of both organisations, that is, Abdurrahman Wahid of NU and Amien Rais of
Muhammadiyah, exercised a tremendous amount of influence over the one
of the greatest social changes in Indonesia that took place after the end of
Suharto’s era, called reformasi or reformation (Aspinall 2005).
These two organisations in some respect have had a rivalry, if not mutual
hatred, since their establishment. When NU started to campaign for Islam
Nusantara publicly in 2015, Muhammadiyah also launched a similar Islamic
movement called ‘Islam Berkumajuan’, which means ‘Progressive Islam’. The
substance of Islam Berkemajuan is explained by its leader as “Islam that is
adaptive and accommodative to reconcile with [the] dynamic era” (Sahal and
Aziz 2015: 26). Some note that the difference between Islam Nusantara and
Islam Berkemajuan is that the former emphasises locality with Islam, as if
the outfit is Indonesia but the body is Islam, while the latter focuses more on
globalisation.20
However, A. Abdullah, a respected Muslim scholar, finds few differences in
the motivation of these movements, as he believes that they merely ‘re-brand’
each organisation.21 In Abudullah’s reckoning, as social change proceeds, NU is
required to be more responsive to modernity, and Muhammadiyah becomes
more attentive to local culture. In this regard, the origin of NU’s Islam Nusantara
movement could be traced in its vying with Muhammadiyah.
We in fact find NU’s effort to bring more modern approaches into their
activities, including the campaign of Islam Nusantara. NU introduced an
online information technology (IT) called NU-Online for the first time in 2004.

20 This comment was made by Muhammadiyah’s young intellectual Najib Burhani (cited in
Sahal and Aziz 2015: 26).
21 Interview with the author, Yogyakarta, 16 March 2018.

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The Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia 121

IT-related jargon was so unknown to NU members in rural areas in the early


2000s; even the word ‘Internet’ was mistaken as internit, which means ‘plaster-
board’ in Indonesian.22 However, NU has rapidly developed its cyber system for
the last twenty years with the creation of NU-Online, an official website for the
propagation division of NU, and Islam Nusantara.com in order to accomplish
their religious mission.
Syaifullah Amin, the head of NU’s propagation division, explains that NU
needs to reach out to members of every social stratum nationwide. Although
the major component of NU’s constituency reside in rural areas, NU also
intends to extend its religious message to urban young people, who, unlike the
lower-educated people in rural areas, do not hesitate or face obstacles when
employing modern IT for communication.23 This strategy has become more
urgent since 2010 when ultra-religious conservatism has become more appar-
ent in Indonesian society.24 In fact, ideas of extremism that can potentially
bring about acts of terrorism have been circulated through the internet glob-
ally. In response to this, NU, for example, has created an application for smart
phones called NUTIZEN, which the users can access not only for watching
commercial television or shopping but also for the lectures on Islam Nusantara
and moderate Islam delivered by members of the NU ʿulamāʾ.

7 Conventional Approach

While NU has adopted modern digital technology for their propagation strat-
egy, a more conventional approach has never been dismissed. NU is consis-
tently active in their missionary work with the conventional verbal method.
For example, a local branch of NU in Yogyakarta offers community based
religious classes to rural workers every fortnight. On 15 March 2018, Fatya, a
women’s organisation of NU in Yogyakarta, organised a class for female agricul-
tural workers in the evening. The venue was one of the participants’ primitive
house, and twenty middle-aged women attended the class.
Khotimatul Husna, a leader of Fatya in Yogyakarta, presided over the class
which was about the Islamic faith, emphasising the need of reverence to Allāh
and obedience to the Qurʾān and ḥadīth. After the class, they conducted tahlīl
and had a meal together. According to the participants, the major objective in
attending the class was to obtain ‘knowledge’. They also explained that there

22 Interview with the author, Jakarta, 8 March 2018.


23 Interview with the author, Jakarta, 8 March 2018.
24 Interview with the author, Jakarta, 8 March 2018.

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122 Kato

was one non-Muslim family in the village, and that their communication and
socialisation with non-Muslim families remain firmly amicable. They state
that the non-Muslim family commonly joins the funerals of fellow villagers,
and mutual help takes place without exception in times of natural disaster.25
Khotimatul believes that this type of conventional and direct method is vital in
order for the villagers to learn the essentials of Islam, as they hesitate to access
modern cyber technology.
NU’s conventional approach to their followers is employed not only in rural
areas but also in urban areas. The propagation division of NU offers a special
course to potential community leaders who convey the religious ideas upheld
by NU, including Islam Nusantara to the members of their community. The
course is called Pelatian Kadar Dakwa’h (PKD) or Practice for the Followers of
the Faith, and it runs twice a week for six months at the headquarters in Jakarta.
On 20 March 2018, a PKD session was held and was attended by twenty-two
male and eight female members of NU. Their occupation and their stage of life
varied: there were university and high school students, teachers, food sellers,
community leaders, and mosque staff. The class was led by a religious expert,
and he provided the participants with rather practical advice for efficient pub-
lic speaking and choice of topics. The participants were required to prepare
for their speech and conduct their session in front of all the participants and
the teacher.
Four participants had a chance to present their own speech during the one-
and-a-half-hour session. The theme of their speeches included the issue of
self-achievement through religion, the importance of tolerance, polygamy, and
general ideas on Islam in life. The atmosphere of the class was amicable, and
the participants seemed to be enthusiastic about their activities. The young-
est participant was a seventeen-year-old high school male student, and he
expressed his impressions on the course as follows.

I was encouraged by my parents who had joined the class before to attend
the course. I have no non-Muslim friends and am not sure if I am willing
to say ‘Merry Christmas’ to non-Muslims.26

Another participant, a forty-seven-year old community leader also explained


his motivation to join the course.

25 Discussion with the participants in Bantul, 15 March 2018.


26 Interview with the author, Jakarta, 10 March 2018.

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The Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia 123

I wanted to get the knowledge. Now I know that mutual respect (between
Muslim and non-Muslim) is important. We (Muslims) should let non-
Muslims be alone. I myself am not really close to non-Muslims. We should
not disturb one another. I do not utter ‘Merry Christmas’ to non-Muslims.
I like to say, ‘Selamat’ (Happy).27

These comments from the participants of PKD suggest that the essential idea
of a harmonious relationship with non-Muslims, for them at least, does not
necessarily mean to mingle with non-Muslims; rather, it is to maintain their
own community, independent and undisturbed. This attitude echoes with the
ideas of Rohim who is regarded as a hard-line, Muslim who vehemently rejects
the Islam Nusantara movement. For Rohim, Islam offers no ideology to reject
kuffār (unbelievers), as long as they do not disturb Muslims, while maintaining
the absolute superiority of Islam to other faiths.28

8 Ambivalence in Islam Nusantara

Generally speaking, the word ‘tolerance’ pertains to manifold concepts.


However, as far as Islam Nusantara is concerned, there seems to be two major
domains of the concept of tolerance: tolerance towards local culture in terms of
religious rituals; and tolerance towards minority groups. In relation to the for-
mer tolerance, we find clear statements from the advocates of Islam Nusantara.
Muhammadun, one of the executives of the NU branch in Yogyakarta, decid-
edly asserts that the religious rituals in Java should be accepted as Islam in
order to complete Islam in Indonesia, which they call Islam Nusantara.29 He
mentioned several rituals as examples, including kenduren or tahlil (joint
prayer), sekaten (the procession of the day of Muḥammad’s birthday), sedekah
bumi (offering food to the deity in land and sea), and the tradition in Kudus in
Java, where they use buffalo as a sacrifice to Allāh rather than a goat.30
Ahmad Ishomuddin, a high-profile NU leader, also explains that there should
be tolerance in relation to adat, or custom. For example, he finds no obstacle
for shaking hands with women where that specific custom is accepted, and it
is also permissible for a Muslim to conduct ziarah, or visit a grave, and make

27 Interview with the author, Jakarta, 10 March 2018.


28 Interviews with the author, Solo, 30 December 2017 and 18 March 2018.
29 Interview with the author, Bantul, 15 March 2018.
30 Interview with the author, Bantul, 15 March 2018.

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124 Kato

prayers to Allāh through a mediator. He presents more concrete examples of


the relationship between Islam and local adat in the following:

Islam should accommodate with local culture and custom [adat] as we


have the concept that Islam should be in accordance with the place and
the time [shalihun li kulli zamanin wa makanin]. For example, the share
of women’s inheritance can be greater in a matrilineal society, though
Islamic syariah acknowledges the greater share for men. It is also fine that
Muslims and non-Muslims are buried in the same complex.31

Ishomuddin insists that the essential concepts of Islam Nusantara and the
authentic teachings of Islam mutually correspond, and he mentions typical
characteristics of the common values of both as follows: tasaamuh (tolerance);
itidaal (justice), tawaazun (balance), tawassuth (moderateness); and tasyawur
(valuing discussion).32 Ishomuddin emphasises the core idea of Islam, that
is, Islam rahmatan lil alamin or ‘Islam as a blessing for all’. Yet, one of the NU
executives in fact objected to a view of Ishomuddin’s at a meeting with the
author, saying that the burial site of Muslims should be separated from that of
non-Muslims, which suggests that Islam Nusantara has not yet offered a unani-
mous view on ‘tolerance’.
Nonetheless, it is true that the concept of tolerance is recurrently empha-
sised in the movement of Islam Nusantara, while hard-line Muslims, includ-
ing Rohim, clearly elaborate the Islamic tenet on the concept of tolerance.
However, the advocates of the Islam Nusantara movement themselves seem to
have exhibited a rather abstract attitude towards tolerance compared to fun-
damentalists, especially on the issues relating to minorities, including the his-
torically persecuted Aḥmadiyya (or Ahmadiyah)33 movement, and lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people. With regard to the religious minor-
ity of Shīʿa, NU is invariably clear that Sunnī Islam is their tenet, and Islam
Nusantara is for the Sunnī community (Ahlus Sunnah wal Jamaʿah) worldwide;
however, Islam Nusantara proponents almost unanimously agreed that Sunnī
and Shīʿa Muslims should coexist in a harmonious manner. Nonetheless, the

31 Interview with the author, Jakarta,7 March 2018.


32 Interview with the author, Jakarta,7 March 2018. This is also mentioned in International
Summit of the Moderate Islamic Leaders (ISOMIL) & Deklarasi Nahdlatul Ulama, 51.
33 Ahmadiyah was established by Punjabi Mirzā Ghulām Aḥmad in northern India at the
end of nineteenth century. There are two major schools: Lahore, which regards Aḥmad
as a “renewer” of Islam; and Qadian, which takes Aḥmad as the last Prophet (Ricklefs
2012: 48).

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The Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia 125

degree and extent of tolerance in Islam Nusantara varies depending on indi-


vidual understandings rather than an institutional definition.
For example, some young NU activists who actively campaign on behalf of
Islam Nusantara do believe that the existence of Aḥmadiyya can be accepted,
and the followers of Aḥmadiyya can be regarded as Muslims, although their
concept of Muḥammad is deemed wrong.34 On the other hand, some NU
executives state that Aḥmadiyya is theologically wrong, and their false beliefs
about Aḥmad should be corrected, adding that Aḥmadiyya or its members
should not be the target of attack.35 We find that the difference of attitudes
between the two towards Aḥmadiyya is that the former has no intention to
alter Aḥmadiyya, while the latter intends to bring them back to the ‘right path’
of Islam. Nonetheless, one of the advisory board members of NU, Ma’ruf Amin,
clearly stated that Aḥmadiyya was unacceptable on the official website of NU
in 2005 (NU Online 2005).
The Islam Nusantara movement has also failed to set a clear position on
another minority group, LGBT Indonesians. While there is no mention in the
official declaration of Islam Nusantara, different opinions on sexual minorities
exist among advocates of Islam Nusantara. Khotimatul, a leader of the wom-
en’s association of NU in Yogyakarta, shows her humane attitude towards the
LGBT community by supporting the identities of transgender people, without
judging whether they are right or wrong.36 On the other hand, S. Amin, one of
the executives of NU, believes that LGBT people are wrong, and they should
be taken back to the right path of Islam, though there is no need to abuse or
persecute them.37
This discrepancy also suggests that Islam Nusantara has failed to present
a solution for the discrimination against the minorities. Islam Nusantara in
fact remains ambivalent on certain social issues, such as Aḥmadiyya and LGBT
people, while it has taken a clear position on the adaptation of local culture in
Islamic practice. Azis Fachrudin, a young Muslim intellectual, is right to point
out that the urgent need for Islam Nusantara to present its stance on minority
groups, lest it be “a new name for old content” (Fachrudin 2015).

34 Anonymous interview with the author.


35 Anonymous interview with the author.
36 Interview with the author, Bantul, 15 March 2018.
37 Interview with the author, Jakarta, 8 March 2018.

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126 Kato

9 Conclusion

The ambivalence found in the Islam Nusantara movement seems to have con-
tributed to the avoidance of intricate religious discussions. Almost all advo-
cates of Islam Nusantara vaguely admit the supremacy of Islam over other
religions; however, they never explicitly emphasise the ascendancy of Islam.
Zastrouw, a lecturer at NU University in Jakarta, states using a clever metaphor
that “I would say that my wife is best, when I am asked about the supremacy of
Islam over other faiths.”38
This ‘pacifist’ attitude shows clear contrast with that of more ‘liberal’-
minded Muslims who state that all religions are equal. The liberal Islam move-
ment, such as Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL), was branded as too extreme with
overwhelming secularism and was criticised severely in the early 2000s. The
Islam Nusantara movement tactfully avoids theological controversies, and
this leads us to understand that the movement contains ambivalence on sensi-
tive issues.
The Islam Nusantara movement obviously accepts several metamorphoses
in religious practices and rituals. However, the need to retain the authenticity
of Islam at the same time seems to have never been abandoned in the move-
ment. For instance, they emphasise the linkage between Nusantara and the
Prophet Muḥammad. The residents of ‘Muslim society’ seem to be unwill-
ing to be branded as impious; thus, they emphasise the rightfulness of Islam
Nusantara. In this sense, the attitudes of the advocates of Islam Nusantara and
fundamentalists occasionally overlap. This is a time when we have difficulties
in drawing a clear line between ‘Islamic society’ and ‘Muslim society’.
In other words, the Islam Nusantara movement, which has emerged from
Muslim society, necessitates ‘authentic’ Islam as a basic tenet of an Islamic
society. These two major components of Islam mutually complement each
other: so-called fundamentalists accept cultural elements in their social behav-
iour including wearing traditional clothes, while Islam Nusantara advocates
emphasise their linkage with the Prophet. This suggests that there exist some
similarities between these two distinctive elements in Islam. Yet, it is the Islam
Nusantara movement’s ambivalence that differentiates it from Salafist-type
Islam and the residents of Islamic society.
Importantly, the Islam Nusantara movement is evidently reactive to the
emergence of extremism as the official declaration acknowledges. It could
be effective in promoting the peaceable aspects of Islam. However, it should
be noted that Islam Nusantara contains potential for promoting the idea that

38 Interview with the author, Jakarta, 10 March 2018.

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The Islam Nusantara Movement in Indonesia 127

any version of Islam other than Islam Nusantara is belligerent and thus wrong,
which could create psychological antagonism among umat in Indonesia.
The Islam Nusantara Movement seemingly contributes to a more moderate
type of Islam and a less tense relationship with other religions in Indonesia;
however, it is yet to truly confront the stricter form of Islam. This relationship
will bring about either an organic development of Islam with serious yet pro-
ductive discussions or a deeper mutual distrust and conflicts. We should also
remember that Islam Nusantara has been a useful political tool for President
Joko Widodo. In this respect, Islam Nusantara has the potential to bring
about changes in a society, including stability, peaceful coexistence with the
members of society, or threats to these. As its political potential is ongoing,
scholars must consistently engage with the movement to witness how Islam
Nusantara, Indonesian society, and the religion of Islam more broadly, influ-
ence one another.

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