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Game Theory Mid Term

The document describes three game theory scenarios involving choices between attending a party with or without a clown, a professor choosing weapons and a student choosing to study or not, and a similar scenario to the second one with different payoffs. It asks to identify dominated strategies, find Nash equilibriums, and compare equilibrium outcomes between similar games with different payoffs.

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gedhi toaka
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78 views2 pages

Game Theory Mid Term

The document describes three game theory scenarios involving choices between attending a party with or without a clown, a professor choosing weapons and a student choosing to study or not, and a similar scenario to the second one with different payoffs. It asks to identify dominated strategies, find Nash equilibriums, and compare equilibrium outcomes between similar games with different payoffs.

Uploaded by

gedhi toaka
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Game Theory Mid Term

NITIE Mumbai

1) Roger has invited Caleb to his party. Roger must choose whether or not to
hire a clown. Simultaneously, Caleb must decide whether or not to go the
party. Caleb likes Roger but he hates clowns {he even hates other people
seeing clowns! Caleb's payoff from going to the party is 4 if there is no clown,
but 0 if there is a clown there. Caleb's payoff from not going to the party is 3 if
there is no clown at the party, but 1 if there is a clown at the party. Roger likes
clowns {he especially likes Caleb's reaction to them -but does not like paying
for them. Roger's payoff if Caleb comes to the party is 4 if there is no clown,
but 8-x if there is a clown (x is the cost of a clown). Roger's payoff if Caleb
does not come to the party is 2 if there is no clown, but 3-x if there is a clown
there.

(a) Write down the payoff matrix of this game.

(b) Suppose x = 0. Identify any dominated strategies. Explain. Find the Nash equilibrium.
What are the equilibrium payoffs?

(c) Suppose x = 2. Identify any dominated strategies. Explain. Find the Nash equilibrium.
What are the equilibrium payoffs?

(d) Suppose x = 3. Identify any dominated strategies. Explain. Find the Nash equilibrium.
What are the equilibrium payoffs?

(e) Suppose x = 5. Identify any dominated strategies. Explain. Find the Nash equilibrium.
What are the equilibrium payoffs?

2) Consider the following game

Professor M
Revolver Knife Wrench
Student S Study 1,3 2,-2 6,6
Not Study 3,1 1,4 5,6

a) Graph the expected payoffs from each of the professor M strategies as a function
of Student S p –mix.
b) Over what range of P mix does Revolver yields higher expected payoff for
Professor M than Knife?
c) Over what range of P mix does Revolver yields higher expected payoff for
Professor M than Wrench
d) Which Pure Strategies will professor M use in his equilibrium mixture and why?
e) What is the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium of the Game ?

3) Consider the following game

Professor M
Revolver Knife Wrench
Student S Study 1,3 2,-2 6,6
Not Study 3,2 1,4 5,6

a) Which strategies will professor M use in his equilibrium outcome and why?
b) What is the mixed strategy NE of the game?
c) Note that this game is slightly different from the above Game. How are the two
Games different. Explain why you think the equilibrium outcome has changed?

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