FEBRUARY 2024

Evolution Not Revolution

Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

Stacie Pettyjohn
About the Author About the Defense Program
Stacie Pettyjohn is a Senior Fellow and Over the past 15 years, CNAS has defined the future of U.S.
Director of the Defense Program at the defense strategy. Building on this legacy, the CNAS Defense
Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Program team continues to develop high-level concepts
Her areas of expertise include defense and concrete recommendations to ensure U.S. military
strategy, posture, force planning, the preeminence into the future and to reverse the erosion of
defense budget, and wargaming. Prior to U.S. military advantages vis-à-vis China and, to a lesser
joining CNAS, Pettyjohn spent over 10 years at the RAND extent, Russia. Specific areas of study include concentrating
Corporation as a political scientist. From 2019–2021, she on great-power competition, developing a force structure
was director of the strategy and doctrine program at RAND and innovative operational concepts adapted for this
Project AIR FORCE. From 2014–2020, she served as RAND’s more challenging era, and making hard choices to effect
co-director of the Center for Gaming. In 2020, she was a necessary change.
volunteer on the Biden administration’s defense transition
team. She has designed and led strategic and operational Acknowledgments
games that have assessed new operational concepts, tested
the impacts of new technology, examined nuclear escalation This report would not have been possible without the
and warfighting, and explored unclear phenomena, such feedback and support of many individuals. I owe a debt of
as gray zone tactics and information warfare. Previously, gratitude to the experts who agreed to be interviewed in the
she was a research fellow at the Brookings Institution, a course of this research. I want to thank Meaghan Burnes and
peace scholar at the United States Institute of Peace, and a Molly Campbell for their invaluable research support and
Transatlantic Post-Doc Fellowship for International Relations Maura McCarthy, Melody Cook, and Rin Rothback for their
and Security (TAPIR) fellow at the RAND Corporation. She assistance with editing and design. Hannah Dennis deserves
has a PhD and an MA in foreign affairs from the University special thanks for her research support, meticulous editing,
of Virginia and a BA in history and political science from The and thoughtful feedback on multiple drafts of the report. I
Ohio State University. am deeply indebted to Becca Wasser, Paul Scharre, Michael
Kofman, and Sam Bendett for their detailed reviews of the
report and helpful suggestions on how to improve it. I would
also like to thank Edgesource and Konrad Muzyka of Rochan
Consulting for sharing with me their data on commercial
drones detections and Shahed and missile intercepts,
respectively. All mistakes and errors remain mine. This report
was made possible with the generous support of the Smith
Richardson Foundation.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

01 Executive Summary

03 Introduction

05 Types of Drones Used in the Ukraine War

07 Survey of the War’s Different Phases

08 Coup de Main Decapitation Strike
February 24–28, 2022

09 Regrouping and Reattacking

March 2022

10 Refocusing on the Donbas

April–August 2022

11 Ukraine’s Fall 2022 Offensive

September–November 2022

13 Russia’s Winter 2023 Offensive

January–May 2023

13 Ukraine’s Summer Counteroffensive

June 2023–September 2023

14 The Deep Fight: Strategic Strikes

February 24, 2022–September 2023

16 Types of Drones
16 Military Drones

23 Commercial Drones

28 Kamikaze Drones

36 Drone Boats

37 Tactical Battle Networks and Communications

38 Conclusion
 DEFENSE | FEBRUARY 2024
Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

Executive Summary ¡ Volunteer networks have performed an unprece-

dented role in acquiring, modifying, and building

T his report concludes that drones have transformed commercial and DIY drones for both Ukrainian
the battlefield in the war in Ukraine, but in an and Russian troops. Because of a heavy reliance on
evolutionary rather than revolutionary fashion.1 commercial or dual-use technologies, patriotic civil-
While tactical innovation abounds and drones offer ians have been able to bolster drone production. They
some new capabilities, their impact falls short of the have also led broader efforts to professionalize the use
truly disruptive change that constitutes a so-called of drones by identifying best practices and establishing
revolution in military affairs. For the most part, Russian training courses.
and Ukrainian drones remain piloted by humans, are
not broadly networked together, and are small, which ¡ Russia has an edge in military drones, which enables
means their effects tend to be localized. In part, drones its forces to see and strike farther behind the front
have not offered Ukrainians or Russians a decisive edge lines, while Ukrainian forces have gaps in this area.
on the battlefield because both parties are engaged in Russia entered the war with a reasonable inventory
a fast-paced two-sided cycle of innovation and emula- and bolstered production of its most effective military
tion. Because many drone technologies are commercial drones to meet the current demand. Russia now has
or dual use, they can be easily acquired, meaning that enough Orlan-10 and ZALA surveillance drones that
innovations quickly diffuse to the enemy. Russian Ukrainian forces sometimes do not bother trying to
forces have been fast followers in adopting commercial shoot them down because the Ukrainians know that
and do-it-yourself (DIY) kamikaze drones. Similarly, the drones will be replaced. In contrast, Ukraine has
Ukrainian forces have tried to match the quantity and smaller inventories of military drones—both intel-
quality of Russia’s military drones, but given the mili- ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and
tary-specific technologies involved, the Ukrainians have kamikaze variants—which limits its forces’ visibility
been unable to fully close this gap. and reach behind the front lines. This gap may eventu-
This report is part of a larger project exploring how ally close as Ukraine’s government is investing heavily
drones are affecting great-power competition and a in its indigenous drone industry.
potential future war between the United States and
¡ In the Ukraine war, drones have operated in stacks
China. It focuses on lessons learned from drone opera-
rather than swarms. Drones are more effective when
tions in Ukraine. It offers a novel typology for the widely
operated as a part of larger team of uncrewed systems.
varied drones available today—military, commercial,
Swarms typically consist of a greater number of units
and kamikaze—to enable more precise discussion of
that autonomously coordinate their behavior. The
their impact; it provides an overview of the Ukraine
drone stacks used by both sides in the war in Ukraine
conflict to date; and it includes an in-depth analysis
have been coordinated through multiple drone opera-
of major developments seen for each drone type
tors using software-based battle networks, traditional
in this war.
means of communication, or commercial communica-
Beyond this general assessment about whether a
tions platforms. Both parties claim to be using artificial
revolution in military affairs has occurred, this analysis
intelligence to improve the drone’s ability to hit its
yielded a number of insights about the war in Ukraine
target, but likely its use is limited.
and drone warfare more broadly.
¡ Russian and Ukrainian forces are using long-range
In the Ukraine war: kamikaze drones for penetrating strategic strikes.
Ukrainian forces would not have a capability to strike
¡ Ukraine has consistently out-innovated Russia
deep targets inside Russia and Crimea without these
with commercial technologies and software, but
drones. Russian forces use kamikaze drones to com-
Russian forces have quickly adapted and emulated
plement their more expensive long-range cruise
Ukrainian successes. In a key example, Ukraine
and ballistic missiles by soaking up Ukrainian sur-
pioneered the use of first-person view (FPV) racing
face-to-air missile (SAM) interceptors, identifying the
drones in kamikaze attacks and began creating DIY
location of air defenses, and creating complex hetero-
cheap kamikaze drones. Russia was a fast follower and
geneous attacks. It is not clear that strategic strikes
employed FPV kamikaze drones to contest Ukraine’s
weaken public support for the war, but they may be
summer 2023 counteroffensive.
diverting scarce air defense assets from the front lines.

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¡ In the Ukraine war, both sides are experimenting ¡ Kamikaze FPV drones offer cheap precision strike
with counterdrone capabilities. Electronic warfare capabilities but are tactical beyond-line-of-sight
(EW) is the most effective way to stop drones, but weapons that primarily extend the reach of ground
Ukrainian and Russian forces are trying counters forces. FPV drones are essentially very cheap antitank
that range from simple barriers such as wire nets to weapons, but their range is roughly six times that of
drone dogfighting. A key part of the drone-counter- the most advanced antitank weapon. Their biggest
drone competition has been finding and attacking drawbacks are their small payload capacity, which
drone operators using drone tracking software such limits their destructive power, and the fact that FPV
as AeroScope and WindtalkerX. Because commercial drones, unlike modern antitank weapons, are not
and FPV kamikaze drone operators must remain near automated fire-and-forget systems. Instead, FPV
the drone’s operating area, they are vulnerable to drone pilots require training and must be very skilled
discovery and attack. to effectively steer the fast drones and crash them into
vulnerable parts of an armored target. Even though
More general lessons about drone warfare include: experienced or lucky FPV operators might destroy a
tank, more often FPV attacks at best will disable large
¡ The accessibility and affordability of drones is vehicles, which can then be destroyed by follow-on
creating new capabilities at a scale that previously artillery or air strikes.
did not exist and transforming the battlefield. The
three primary examples of this are the ubiquity of ¡ Even large numbers of small drones cannot match
commercial drones on the front lines, FPV kamikaze the potency of artillery fire. Collectively, drone strikes
drones for beyond-line-of-sight antipersonnel and supplement indirect fire weapons, but they are not sub-
antivehicle attacks, and long-range kamikaze drones stitutes for howitzers. Common artillery shells pack a
for strategic strikes. All of these missions could be bigger explosive punch and can be fired rapidly in large
completed by more expensive military systems, such salvos. Thus, artillery barrages far outstrip the fire-
as military drones, traditional manned air forces, and power that many small drones can collectively deliver.
antitank weapons or artillery. The biggest difference
is that because the commercially derived versions ¡ Drones provide affordable airpower, but they have
employed in Ukraine are cheap and plentiful, there not replaced traditional air forces or been able to
are deeper stockpiles of uncrewed aircraft than have obtain air superiority. A core mission of most air
previously been available, enabling drones’ wide- forces is obtaining and maintaining air superiority—
spread use. that is, the freedom to conduct operations in the air,
which include protecting against enemy aerial attacks
¡ Surveillance and targeting missions remain more and conducting offensive air-to-ground operations.
important than drone strikes. Despite the preva- Obtaining air superiority typically entails destroying
lence of videos on social media showing commercial an opponent’s air force through air-to-air engage-
quadcopters dropping grenades on soldiers or ments or attacks against air bases and suppressing or
crashing into tanks, the most consequential mission destroying ground-based air defenses. There have been
for drones has been collecting intelligence and a few instances of drone dogfighting and kamikaze
obtaining targeting information. Ground forces at drone strikes against Russian bomber air bases, but
all echelons are employing different types of drones these missions have been few and far between. Russian
to improve their situational awareness, planning, forces have conducted effective suppression of enemy
and operations. air defense (SEAD) operations involving drones near
the front lines but have not disabled Ukraine’s long-
¡ Commercial drones are making it more difficult to range air defenses. Because neither side has obtained
concentrate forces, achieve surprise, and conduct air superiority, they have both relied on standoff
offensive operations. By providing greater visi- attacks instead of direct attacks against deep targets.
bility into enemy troop movements beyond the front
lines, drones have made it difficult for the Ukrainian ¡ Drones are not more survivable than crewed
and Russian militaries to mass forces. Offensive aircraft, but instead enable greater risk acceptance.
operations are difficult but not impossible in this envi- Drones are vulnerable to many countermeasures,
ronment. If strong defenses are in place, prolonged especially electronic warfare, guns, and SAMs. Like
periods of bombardment can weaken the enemy and countries discovered the hard way with bomber
gradually enable territorial gains.
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 DEFENSE | FEBRUARY 2024
Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

aircraft in World War II, the drone “will not always get of the “first full-scale drone war.”2 In the early days of the
through.” Because drones are cheap and do not have war, high-flying Ukrainian TB2 drones dropped guided
humans aboard, both sides have been willing to send bombs on advancing Russian forces, arresting their
them on risky missions that may have a low probability march toward Kyiv. In recent months, Russian ZALA
of succeeding. surveillance drones and Lancet-3 loitering munitions
¡ Drones do not have to be survivable if they are have worked together to find and destroy Ukrainian how-
cheap and plentiful because one can have resiliency itzers. While military drones have played an important
through reconstitution. Because they are vulnerable, role, over the front lines commercial off-the-shelf drones
drones must be cheap enough and easy enough to are omnipresent. Ground forces at all echelons use small
manufacture that they can be readily replaced. Instead commercial quadcopters to monitor their environs
of hardening commercial drones against electronic and to direct artillery fire. Over time, both Russian and
attacks, which would notably raise the costs, both Ukrainian forces have also employed different types of
parties have opted to instead buy more cheap drones. kamikaze drones—those that crash into their target—for
The logic of resiliency through reconstitution also strategic attacks against cities and deep targets.
applies to military drones. The prevalence of drones in Ukraine and other recent
conflicts has led some observers to conclude that drones
are revolutionizing warfare.3 Others maintain that drones
In the Ukraine war, drones have become an increasingly are incremental improvements to existing technolo-
important weapon, but they have not revolutionized gies. According to this view, drones perform the same
warfare. Nonetheless, Ukrainian forces have extensively roles and missions as traditional weapons systems but
employed drones to gain an asymmetric edge over a remove the human from the platform. Critics also point
superior Russian force. Russian forces have been fast fol- out that drones are not superweapons but remain quite
lowers and emulated Ukraine’s use of commercial drones vulnerable to electronic warfare (EW) and air defenses,
to a surprising degree given the reluctance of the Russian while typical defensive measures such as dispersion and
Ministry of Defense (MOD) to officially embrace pri- concealment continue to dilute drones’ lethality. Thus,
vate-sector technologies. Russian forces have employed according to the skeptics, drones are not fundamentally
their military-grade and kamikaze drones as a part of the shifting the character of war.4
reconnaissance fires complex, allowing them to increas- This report concludes that drones have transformed
ingly leverage their greater firepower. Throughout the the battlefield in Ukraine, but in an evolutionary rather
war, there have been rapid cycles of adaptation as both than revolutionary fashion.5 While tactical innovation
sides have learned from each other, adopting tactics and abounds and drones offer some new capabilities, this
technologies that have been used successfully and devel- falls short of the truly disruptive change that constitutes
oping counters to improve defenses. This pattern is likely a revolution. For the most part, Russian and Ukrainian
to continue as the war drags on. It is clear that drones drones remain piloted by humans, are not broadly
alone will not determine who prevails in this conflict, but networked together, and are small, which means that
they will certainly play a prominent role in the ongoing their effects tend to be localized. In part, drones have
war in Ukraine and in other battlefields in the future. not offered Ukrainians or Russians a decisive edge on
the battlefield because both parties are engaged in a
Introduction fast-paced two-sided cycle of innovation and emula-
tion. Because many drone technologies are commercial

R ussia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine initiated a con-

ventional war of a scale and intensity that had not
been seen in Europe since World War II. In many
or dual use, they can be easily acquired, meaning that
innovations quickly diffuse to the enemy. Russian
forces have been fast followers in adopting commercial
ways, the fighting in Ukraine seems anachronistic, with and do-it-yourself (DIY) kamikaze drones. Similarly,
large-scale artillery barrages and the heavily defended Ukrainian forces have tried to match the quantity and
front lines that resemble the trench warfare of World quality of Russia’s military drones, but given the mil-
War I. In other respects, however, the war in Ukraine itary-specific technologies involved, they have been
gives a glimpse at how future battlefields may look. One unable to fully close this gap.
of the most notable differences between Ukraine and The most important roles for drones in the Ukraine
past wars is the extensive use of drones or uncrewed war have been as intelligence platforms and artillery
systems by both parties, earning this conflict the moniker spotters. The proliferation of drones over the front lines

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has made it hard to concentrate forces and launch of these studies, however, focus on one side or one
surprise attacks. Yet while offensive operations are moment in time and do not systematically compare
difficult, they are not impossible. Moreover, mass artil- Ukrainian and Russian troops’ use of drones, and how
lery fires still dominate battlefield outcomes. Drones this unfolded in different phases of the war. This report
enhance artillery firepower by making it more accurate aims to fill these gaps and to offer an initial analysis
but, as noted analyst Michael Kofman has observed, that can be built on and revised by future researchers.
by themselves drones are not a “substitute for mass.”6 To explore these issues, the author drew heavily
Because small drones can only carry meager payloads, on secondary sources, including think tank reports,
even large drone swarms cannot rival the potency of newspaper and magazine articles, and videos and
artillery salvos. Similarly, small drones cannot match photos posted on social media. The videos and pictures
the volume of fires that bombers could provide if posted by Ukrainian and Russian sources are a part of
either side had air superiority. Drones are clearly an a larger information and propaganda war that is trying
important military innovation and are increasing the to shape public opinion. Thus, they are certainly biased
effectiveness of Russian and Ukrainian artillery and and must be treated with caution. The author has used
ground operations.7 Over time, as drones become these as evidence that different types of drones have
more autonomous and are more broadly connected been employed against specific targets or have been
with other weapons, they may fundamentally reshape involved in different phases of the war. Unsurprisingly,
military doctrine and organizations and truly revolu- almost all the videos show successful drone strikes,
tionize warfare. But thus far in Ukraine, drone warfare but they are clearly not a representative sample.
has been an evolution, not a revolution. Because observers cannot know the percentage of
This report is part of a larger project that is attempted strikes represented by these videos, the
exploring how drones are affecting great-power videos do not shed much light on the overall efficacy
competition and a potential future war between the of these weapons.8 Additionally, the author conducted
United States and China. A forthcoming report by the interviews with U.S. government and NATO offi-
Center for a New American Security (CNAS) examines cials and with experts on the Russian and Ukrainian
this broader issue. A first step in answering this militaries but did not undertake field research in
question involved analyzing three recent conflicts that Ukraine. All interviews were conducted in confiden-
employed drones, including the war in Ukraine, and tiality, and the names of interviewees are withheld by
determining what lessons they provide. The Ukraine mutual agreement.
case study merited its own report because the volume The remainder of this report is divided into four
of pertinent information on this war could not be sections. The first section offers a typology of drones
incorporated into that have been used
the broader com- Over time, as drones become more by Ukrainian and
parative historical Russian forces. The
analysis. This report autonomous and are more broadly second provides a brief
also serves a broader connected with other weapons, they overview of the major
audience that is fol- may fundamentally reshape military phases of the war
lowing and trying to
understand develop-
doctrine and organizations and truly between February 2022
and September 2023 and
ments in the ongoing revolutionize warfare. notes major develop-
war between ments related to drone
Ukraine and Russia. warfare. The third section is a functional discussion
A few caveats are in order. This report is not a full focused on the different types of drones, with each
political or military history of the war in Ukraine. section describing the most significant drones for both
Instead, it synthesizes information on how both Russia and Ukraine, how they have been employed,
Ukrainian and Russian forces have employed drones and what has been used to counter them. The func-
across time and attempts to identify key insights tional discussion concludes with an overview of the
from this analysis. It builds on foundational studies battle networks that have linked drones to other forces.
from organizations such as the Royal United Services The final section offers conclusions about how drones
Institute (RUSI) and CNA that document and analyze have been used in the Ukraine war and explains why
the conflict and the impact of drones in it. Many this does not constitute a revolution.

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 DEFENSE | FEBRUARY 2024
Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

Types of Drones Used weapons, dumb bombs, or jammers. They also may be
in the Ukraine War unarmed but have sensors to help them accurately cal-
culate the range to a target or to illuminate targets that

D
rones have played a prominent role throughout can then be engaged by other weapons. Military drones
the war, although the drone types and their roles require specialized training to operate and include
have evolved over time. In the war in Ukraine, additional features that prepare them to deal with adver-
drones can be differentiated by two major attributes: saries that are trying to interfere with their operations
whether they are built for commercial or military use or hide from them. For example, they may be resistant to
and whether they are intended to be single-use or jamming and cyberattacks and, in addition to cameras,
reusable systems. These two variables and examples of have sensors that can pick up signals or electronic intel-
different drones that fit into each category are presented ligence. Russia’s most common military drones are the
in Figure 1. Orlan-10 and ZALA 421 variants, while the Ukrainians
The first factor matters because commercially avail- have the Leleka-100, Furia, and PD-1s. Additionally, both
able or DIY drones made from commercial or dual-use parties have a smaller number of larger medium-altitude
subcomponents are widely available and quite affordable. long endurance (MALE) drones, including the Russian
These drones have GPS and high-definition cameras, and Forpost-R and Orion and the Ukrainian TB2.
are remotely operated with smartphones or controllers The other key attribute is whether a drone is intended
that stream real-time video feeds.9 Most commercial to fly multiple missions or is a single-use weapon more
drones are quadcopters used by the agricultural industry, akin to a munition. The former is often a more expensive
by photographers, or for recreational racing. Because system because it is expected to return after completing
they are marketed to amateur users, they tend to be rel- a sortie and to fly again. Additionally, reusable drones
atively easy to operate, although first-person view (FPV) tend to be configured for multiple different missions,
racing drones require additional skill. The downside of most notably intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
these systems is they tend to be small, with low endur- sance (ISR) and sometimes strike. In contrast, single-use
ance and small payloads, and must be modified to be drones tend to be cheaper systems primarily used for
armed or hardened against electronic attack. Common strikes. These drones are also called loitering muni-
examples of reusable commercial drones used by Russian tions because they can search for targets after they have
and Ukrainian troops include DJI Mavic 3, DJI Matrice, been launched. They are in many respects similar to
and Autel EVO II quadcopters. cruise missiles, especially if they fly to preprogrammed
In contrast, military drones are built specifically coordinates. Many kamikaze drones are controlled by
for use by professional military personnel in a combat humans or may have autonomous systems that identify
setting. This means the systems tend to have additional and engage targets even if the connection to the human
features that harden them against attacks and equip them operator is broken. Both Russia and Ukraine have made
for offensive operations by either carrying weapons or extensive use of kamikaze drones, including military
being integrated into a broader battle network. Military grade systems and commercial FPV drones. Only Ukraine
drones may carry sophisticated precision-guided has developed and employed kamikaze drone boats.

In the war in Ukraine, drones can be differentiated by two

major attributes: whether they are built for commercial or
military use and whether they are intended to be single-
use or reusable systems.

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FIGURE 1: EXAMPLES OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF DRONES IN THE UKRAINE WAR

*Drones featured in this graphic are not to scale

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 DEFENSE | FEBRUARY 2024
Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

Survey of the War’s Different Phases The deep fight has occurred across all of these periods,
but it was largely one-sided in 2022. Russia had a large

T he war in Ukraine has evolved over time and so

has the use of drones. First, it is important to note
that there are two battles being waged concur-
inventory of long-range cruise and ballistic missiles
that it fired at Ukraine, while Ukraine had few long-
range strike capabilities. After depleting its stockpiles
rently: the close fight and the deep fight.10 The close of missiles, Russia began to employ Iranian kamikaze
fight occurs between troops in contact or near the front drones for standoff attacks in fall 2022, and Ukraine
lines, while the deep fight consists of long-range attacks developed its own long-range kamikaze drone aircraft
against strategic targets. There have been six major and drone boats to attack Crimea and Russia. The deep
phases of the close fight: the initial failed decapitation fight, therefore, became more symmetrical in 2023 as
attack (February 24–28, 2022), the Russian regrouping Ukrainian kamikaze drone attacks into Russia signifi-
and reattacking (March 2022), the Russian attack on cantly increased. This section of the report provides an
Donbas (April–August 2022), the autumn 2022 Ukrainian overview of the six phases of close combat in the Russia-
offensive (September–November 2022), the winter 2023 Ukraine war and deep strikes through September 2023,
Russian offensive (January–May 2023), and the summer including a high-level description of major developments
2023 Ukrainian offensive (June 2023–September 2023).11 in the war and major trends in drone warfare.

FIGURE 2: OVERVIEW OF THE CLOSE AND DEEP FIGHTS DURING KEY PHASES OF THE UKRAINE WAR
(WINTER 2022–SEPTEMBER 2023)

Major Trends in Drone and Counterdrone Strategic Strikes

Time Phase Ground Offensives Warfare (Close Fight) (Deep Fight)

February Coup de ¡ Russian main attack on ¡ Little Russian use of drones except decoys, ¡ Russian cruise and ballistic
24– Main Attack Kyiv from Belarus and despite having many military drones missile strikes focused on
28, 2022 Russia ¡ Restrictive Russian rules of engagement Ukrainian military targets
¡ Russian attack on limited use of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)
Kharkiv, fixing operation ¡ Ukrainian forces used commercial and
in Donbas, and attack in military drones to find Russian forces, direct
south from Crimea artillery fire, and directly attack
¡ Ukrainian TB2 interdiction strikes against
Russian troops

March 2022 Regrouping ¡ Russian forces ¡ Russia began to employ ground-based air ¡ Russian cruise and ballistic
and transitioned to defenses and electronic warfare (EW) missile strikes focused
Reattacking deliberate combat ¡ Ukrainian forces made extensive use on Ukrainian military
operations of commercial and military drones targets, defense industry,
¡ Russian forces for intelligence, surveillance, and and communications
continued to focus on reconnaissance (ISR); artillery targeting; infrastructure
Kyiv and strike
¡ Large medium-altitude long endurance
(MALE) drones (e.g., TB2s and Orion)
experienced many losses and largely
disappeared from the battlefield
¡ Russia began to use military ISR drones
(e.g., Orlan-10 and ZALA) to target ground-
based fires and KUB kamikaze drones for
attack

April– Refocusing ¡ Russian forces attacked ¡ Ukrainian forces retained an advantage in ¡ Russian cruise and ballistic
August on Donbas from multiple axes but commercial drones, while Russian forces missile strikes focused
2022 northern attack stalled had an advantage in military drones on economic targets,
¡ Russian forces made ¡ Ukraine began its “army of drones” project such as oil refineries,
slow gains from east in and transportation
¡ Extensive electromagnetic interference
province of Luhansk infrastructure
due to the dense network of Russian EW
systems and growing number of man- ¡ Ukrainian kamikaze drone
portable Ukrainian jammers attack on Russian oil
refinery
¡ Many losses of all kinds of Russian and
Ukrainian drones ¡ Ukrainian kamikaze drone
attacks on Crimea
¡ Russia ran low on Orlan-10s

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Coup de Main Decapitation Strike of the war. After the missile strikes, Russia’s unreal-
istic strategy had shorthanded, unprepared battalion
FEBRUARY 24–28, 2022 tactical groups racing into Ukraine along multiple axes of
advance, leaving them vulnerable to Ukrainian counter-
On February 24, 2022, Russia began an unprovoked attacks.14 Russian forces invaded southern Ukraine from
war of aggression against Ukraine. Moscow believed Crimea, advanced toward Kharkiv from the east, and con-
Ukrainian resistance would be minimal and that through ducted a fixing operation in Donbas, but the main Russian
a large show of force and rapid assault, Russia could attack was focused on Kyiv.15 In an effort to depose the
achieve a coup de main in several days. Russia’s attack Ukrainian government, Russian mechanized forces in
began with a large-scale campaign of air and missile Belarus and Russia approached Kyiv from both sides of
strikes focused on military targets, including Ukrainian the Dnieper River, while helicopters transported Russian
air bases, command and control infrastructure, muni- airborne forces (VDV) to Hostomel Airport, just 12 miles
tions stores, and air defenses.12 To bait Ukrainian from the capital.16
air defense radars into exposing themselves, Russia Ukrainian military forces and volunteers used a
deployed E95M target drones as decoys.13 This was one wide array of drones in their defensive operations.
of the few uses of Russian drones in the opening phase The Ukrainian air force flew the Turkish-made TB2, a

Time Major Trends in Drone and Counterdrone Strategic Strikes

continued Phase Ground Offensives Warfare (Close Fight) (Deep Fight)

September– Ukraine’s ¡ Ukrainian attack ¡ Russian and Ukrainian drones’ most ¡ Russia fired Shahed
November Fall 2022 overwhelmed weak common missions were intelligence and kamikaze drones at Odesa
2022 Offensive Russian defenses near spotting for artillery units ¡ Russian Shahed drone and
Kharkiv ¡ Increasing Russian use of Lancet kamikaze missile attacks on critical
¡ Ukrainian forces drones infrastructure (e.g., electric
eventually attritted ¡ Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) began grid) began
Russian defenses in to encourage soldiers to bring commercial ¡ Ukrainian drone boats and
Kherson drones, and large numbers of volunteer- aircraft attacked Black
supplied commercial drones reached Sea Fleet headquarters in
Russian troops Sevastopol

January– Russia’s ¡ Russian forces ¡ Commercial drones had become ubiquitous ¡ Ukrainian defenses
May 2023 Winter 2023 counterattacked on ¡ Russia achieved near parity in commercial intercepted most Shahed
Offensive multiple fronts in drones with Ukraine drone and missile attacks
Donbas but made few ¡ Increasing Ukrainian
¡ Russian and Ukrainian troops increasingly
gains kamikaze drone attacks in
used more advanced commercial drones
¡ Russia finally secured with thermal cameras Russia against oil fields,
Bakhmut in May air bases, transportation
¡ Ukraine began to employ first-person view
infrastructure, and the
(FPV) kamikaze drones to attack moving
Kremlin
Russian forces

June– Ukraine’s ¡ Ukrainian forces ¡ Front lines saturated with all types of ¡ Ukrainian kamikaze drone
September Summer attacked along three drones hit skyscraper in Moscow
2023 2023 axes: Orikhiv, Velika ¡ Ukrainian forces often refrained from firing ¡ Ukraine launched
Offensive Novosilka, and Bakhmut SAMs at common Russian military drones to simultaneous drone
conserve interceptors attacks on multiple sites
¡ Russia mimicked Ukraine FPV drones. FPV in Russia
kamikazes proliferate on battlefield for ¡ Increased Ukrainian drone
antipersonnel and antivehicle attacks boat attacks
¡ Extensive Russian use of ZALA Lancet-3 for
counterbattery fire

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 DEFENSE | FEBRUARY 2024
Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

medium-altitude long endurance military drone, to hunt their original objectives.20 As Russia continued its
for and interdict Russian forces.17 Similarly, Ukrainian offensive, the fighting became more contested, and there
ground forces employed smaller military drones, such as was a real chance the much larger invading force might
the Punisher and Leleka-100, and commercially adapted overwhelm defenses around Kyiv. Ukrainians contested
drones, such as the R18 and DJI Mavic, to find and track all Russian axes of attack but focused their resources,
Russian troops.18 Sometimes armed drones, such as the including special forces and reserves, on defending the
R18, dropped bombs on unsuspecting Russian forces, but capital, leaving other areas with shortfalls.21 Russian
more often the drones provided vital intelligence that forces had the most success in their southern offensive,
directed Ukrainian artillery fire or hidden Ukrainian in part because of insufficient Ukrainian artillery in the
ground teams to ambush them. Ukrainian drones had region and also because they had previously destroyed
free rein because Russia’s air defenses were operating Ukrainian air defenses in the south with cruise missile
under strict rules of engagement (ROE) that limited the strikes.22 In contrast, the attack on Kyiv encountered
use of surface-to-air missiles (SAM) to avoid friendly fierce resistance and was quickly bogged down, and
fire incidents.19 Russian troops suffered heavy casualties. By the end
of March, the Russian attack on the capital had com-
Regrouping and Reattacking pletely stalled. On March 25, the Russian Ministry of
Defense (MOD) proclaimed that, having met its initial
MARCH 2022 goals, Russia’s main objective would now be conquering
and annexing the remainder of the Donbas region
Over the next month, Russian forces regrouped from of eastern Ukraine.23
their shambolic initial attack and gradually transitioned Drones became more prominent during this period
to deliberate combat operations while trying to advance because they continued to play an important role in

FIGURE 3: THE RUSSIAN INVASION PLAN

This map shows the initial axes from which Russian forces advanced in Ukraine in February 2022. While there were multiple avenues of attack,
the focus was on Kyiv, the Ukrainian capital.

Map adapted from “Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” The New York Times, June 9, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/world/europe/
ukraine-maps.html.

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 @CNASDC

Ukrainian forces’ operations and Russian troops began drones. Russia briefly conducted Orion and Forpost
to employ them in the surveillance and target acquisition strikes against Ukrainian forces, but several were shot
roles outlined by Russian military doctrine.24 Russian down, after which such strikes were rarely employed.27
forces used their military drones, such as the ZALA, Similarly, Russian SAMs shot down most of Ukraine’s
Orlan-10, Orlan-30, and Eleron-3, for situational aware- TB2s during this period, and the much-hyped Turkish
ness and to direct artillery strikes, while Ukrainian forces drone largely disappeared from the battlefield.28
bolstered their smaller fleet of military drones with
commercial off-the-shelf or homemade drones for the Refocusing on the Donbas
same missions.25 Russian troops were slower to adopt
commercial drones for tactical reconnaissance than APRIL–AUGUST 2022
were Ukrainian forces, which included many civilians
who volunteered to fight and had little choice but to rely After battered and demoralized Russian forces
on commercial technology and improvised weapons. retreated from Kyiv in April, the front lines shifted to
Around the same time, the airspace in Ukraine became the eastern regions of Luhansk and Donetsk.29 As the
more contested as Russian forces began operating their battlefield contracted, the character of the war shifted
ground-based air defenses and EW systems.26 With each from being a war of maneuver to being one of attrition
side actively searching for its opponent’s drones and dominated by artillery duels. At this time, Russia had a
employing man-portable air defenses (MANPADs), anti- 12-to-1 advantage in ground-based firepower in Donbas,
aircraft guns, jammers, and SAMs, drone losses began to which enabled its forces to slowly grind forward after
pile up. The widespread use of SAMs, which prevented devastating an area with tube and rocket artillery.30
either side from obtaining complete air superiority over To conquer the remainder of Donbas, Russia sought
Ukraine, made it far too dangerous for MALE military to squeeze Ukrainian defenders simultaneously from
the north, south, and west,
including the key cities of
FIGURE 4: RUSSIA’S 2022 OFFENSIVE IN DONBAS
Russian forces withdrew from Kyiv and refocused their operations on Donbas, seeking to attack from
Kramatorsk and Slovyansk.
the north and south. Russian forces relocated
from Kyiv and massed near
Izium to drive south toward
Slovyansk, while troops
near the city of Donetsk
tried to move north toward
Kramatorsk. Russia already
controlled most of the
territory in Luhansk, and
its troops there attacked
from the west. By late May,
due to slow progress on
the Izium and Donetsk
axes, Russia reinforced
its attack from the west
with troops from Mariupol
and focused its efforts on
encircling Sievierodonetsk
and Lysychansk, the
remaining two cities
under Ukrainian control
in Luhansk.31 At the end of
June, Russian forces finally
seized Sievierodonetsk, and
shortly after, in early July,
Lysychansk fell.32

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Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

For both sides, drones became the principal reconnais- military and train drone operators.45 In its first seven
sance and target acquisition platform for artillery units months, the program purchased several thousand
and were used at most echelons of the ground forces. drones and trained 10,000 drone pilots.46 Similarly,
Instead of being used as a strike platform, military and the Russian government sought to bolster its military
commercial drones were primarily used as spotters or drone production, which the Russian Ministry of
forward observers, sent to find time-sensitive targets Defense had admitted was not meeting the needs of the
for engagement by artillery units.33 At the tactical war in Ukraine.47
levels, Ukrainian and, increasingly, Russian troops By midsummer 2022, Russia’s offensive in Donbas
used commercial or improvised drones.34 Typically, had stalled.48 Around the same time, Ukrainian forces
only brigade- and higher-level echelons had fixed- were assimilating one of their first big batches of
wing military drones, such as the ZALA, Orlan, Furia, Western military equipment, including American-made
or Leleka-100, and they were used primarily for target High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS)
acquisition.35 Russian forces also used their superior and long-range precision rockets.49 This set up the
military drone fleet for suppression and destruction of next phase of the conflict, when the Ukrainians would
enemy air defense (SEAD/DEAD) missions and con- launch their first counteroffensive.
sequently gained a degree of air superiority.36 Because
of their scarcity and greater cost, MALE drones were Ukraine’s Fall 2022 Offensive
only committed in lower-threat environments and were
seldom seen on the battlefield.37 Ukrainian TB2s’ last SEPTEMBER–NOVEMBER 2022
major employment was the battle to recapture Snake
Island in May and June 2022.38 Ukraine launched a successful attack to liberate
In general, the airspace near the front lines became Kharkiv and the west bank of Kherson in fall 2022.
more inhospitable, resulting in high losses of all types Russia’s grinding prior offensive in Donbas enabled
of drones. In addition to both parties more effectively Ukraine’s counterattack by consuming Russian
operating their ground-based air defenses, Russia manpower, artillery shells, and drones.50 Russia
deployed a very dense network of EW systems in Donbas, did not have enough forces to defend everywhere,
which resulted in pervasive jamming of navigation and and Ukraine’s buildup of forces in Kherson and
communications.39 Ukraine also used man-portable EW Zaporizhzhia forced Russian officials to decide
guns to attrit Russian drones, including the Orlan-10.40 whether to prioritize Kharkiv or Kherson.51 They
A RUSI report estimates that 90 percent of Ukrainian elected to reinforce Kherson, leaving Kharkiv
drones used up to this point were destroyed during this inadequately defended by a motley collection of
period.41 On average, Ukrainian quadcopters tended understrength and demoralized forces.52 Ukraine
preceded both offensives with HIMARS attacks.
In general, the airspace near Western nations provided targeting information on
Russian logistics nodes, which were hit by Ukraine’s
the front lines became more
precision long-range rockets.53 The HIMARS strikes
inhospitable, resulting in high against ammunition depots reduced the number of
losses of all types of drones. shells available to Russian forces, but the Russians
quickly adapted and moved their depots farther back,
to survive for just three flights, while military drones which decreased the impact of the rocket strikes.
survived for an average of six.42 Yet Russian EW forces More than these precision strikes, prior attrition
might have been their drones’ own worst enemy. Russian suffered by Russian forces drove Ukraine’s successful
EW tactics did not emphasize deconfliction or discrim- counteroffensives.54
ination, so while they effectively countered Ukrainian Ukrainian forces quickly penetrated the weakly
drones, Russian drones also suffered from considerable defended Russian front lines in Kharkiv and out-
fratricide.43 To replace drone losses, in July Ukrainian flanked exhausted Russian defenders, who could not
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy launched Ukraine’s effectively respond. Consequently, Ukrainian troops
“army of drones” initiative, which aimed to crowdsource regained 2,300 square miles of territory in 10 days.55
funding for military drones and to spur donations of Ukraine did not replicate the success of its blitzkrieg
commercial drones.44 The Ukrainian initiative aims in Kharkiv in the Kherson province, where prepared
to raise $100 million to buy drones for the Ukrainian defensive lines were manned by higher-quality Russian

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 @CNASDC

forces augmented by reservists and new FIGURE 5: UKRAINE’S FALL 2022 OFFENSIVE
recruits.56 Fierce Russian resistance made Russian forces anticipated Ukrainian counterattacks in Kherson and Kharkiv
but elected to send reinforcements to Kherson, leaving Kharkiv with thin defenses.
this a grinding offensive where only after
extended artillery, rocket, and drone
strikes could Ukrainian forces slowly
advance village by village.57 The Ukrainian
offensive in northern Kherson acceler-
ated in early October, and on November
9, Russia announced that its forces were
withdrawing to the eastern side of the
Dnieper River.58 This deliberate retreat
represented a humiliating loss, but unlike
in Kharkiv, Russian forces had inflicted
significant losses on the Ukrainians and
withdrew in an orderly fashion, which
enabled the Russian forces to consolidate
in a more defensible position behind
the river.59 With the partial mobilization
that Russian President Vladimir Putin
ordered in September, Russia reinforced
its front lines.
During this period, the most important
roles for drones remained intelligence
and targeting for artillery units. In
preparation for the attack in the Kharkiv
region, Ukrainian drone teams—called
“ochi,” meaning eyes—surveilled the Map adapted from "Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” The New York Times, June 9,
area and compiled a list of Russian 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/world/europe/ukraine-maps.html.

high-value targets, including ammu-

nition stores, artillery guns, command
posts, and EW systems that Ukrainian artillery units Russia’s Winter 2023 Offensive
later engaged.60 Commercial drones redirected artillery
fire that missed its mark and verified that targets were JANUARY–MAY 2023
destroyed. Because of a shortage of Orlan-10s, which
could not quickly be replaced, Russian forces in Kharkiv After Ukraine’s fall offensive, the conflict settled into a
increasingly relied on other models of military drones period of fixed front lines and attrition warfare punc-
and commercial drones for intelligence and target tuated by efforts by both parties to break out of the
acquisition.61 By September, the Russian MOD, which stalemate. Russia attempted to seize the initiative in
had previously impeded efforts of Russian soldiers to January 2023 by launching a much anticipated offen-
obtain and employ commercial drones, finally began to sive in Donbas that sought to envelop and capture
encourage its troops’ acquisition of these useful off-the- Bakhmut.66 Russian Wagner units attacked Soledar and
shelf quadcopters and to offer training on how to operate seized the small mining town just north of Bakhmut.67
them.62 During the battle for Kherson, artillery again Soledar was the first city Russia had taken since July
dominated and Russian and Ukrainian drones located 2022, but conquering the city required committing
enemy targets and directed fires.63 Because this was the significant manpower and accepting high casualty
priority theater, Russian forces in Kherson still had many numbers.68 Soledar ended up being one of few suc-
military drones for ISR and increasingly employed KUB cesses as Russian attacks faltered elsewhere due to a
and Lancet-3 kamikaze drones to conduct precision lack of quality forces, experienced leaders, and artillery
counterbattery attacks.64 The Ukrainian troops also used ammunition.69 By April 2023, the Russian counteroffen-
their drones for direct attack, often dropping weapons on sive had petered out with paltry territorial gains, with
camouflaged Russian infantry vehicles or tanks.65 the exception of Bakhmut, which was secured in May.70

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 DEFENSE | FEBRUARY 2024
Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

Both sides sustained significant losses during this period. During the Ukrainian
Russia’s leadership seemed willing to continue the costly
offensive mainly to prolong the war in the belief that counteroffensive, drones of all
Russia would outlast Kyiv and its Western supporters in a types saturated the airspace,
protracted attritional war.71 limiting maneuver near the front.
By early 2023, small commercial quadcopters had
become ubiquitous, erasing Ukraine’s initial 3-to-1 advan- achieve a rapid breakthrough, but this proved too costly.
tage in tactical drones.72 While the Russian Ministry of Ukrainian vehicles quickly drew Russian artillery and
Defense was slow to catch up, Russian troops had quickly antitank fires, often cued by drones. Many other Ukrainian
realized the utility of commercial quadcopters and vol- vehicles ran into mines and then were picked off by artil-
unteer groups had emerged to provide frontline soldiers lery.79 After suffering notable losses with few territorial
with drones and the necessary training.73 Moreover, the gains, the Ukrainians adjusted their tactics and fell back
type of commercial drones preferred began to change as onto a more practiced and deliberate approach: seeking to
troops on both sides increasingly sought out advanced significantly attrit Russian forces with artillery and long-
models with thermal cameras that could be used on night range strikes before slowly and incrementally advancing
missions.74 As other weapons were depleted, combatants in platoon- and company-sized units.80 At the time of this
increasingly relied on kamikaze drones for precision writing, the Ukrainian offensive continued but had not
strikes. Russia had an advantage in military kamikaze made major territorial gains.81 The fighting was producing
drones, but Ukrainian forces developed creative new significant attrition on both sides, but it was unclear
ways to use commercial racing or FPV drones in which side was taking more losses.82
kamikaze strikes. During the Ukrainian counteroffensive, drones of all
types saturated the airspace, limiting maneuver near the
Ukraine’s Summer 2023 Counteroffensive front. Because drone-directed artillery fire has been so
lethal, each side sought various ways to defeat the other’s
JUNE 2023–SEPTEMBER 2023 drones and to use drones to find their opponent’s coun-
terbattery radars, howitzers, and rocket launchers. The
Russian forces used the winter and spring to heavily drone-counterdrone competition was fast-paced with
fortify their front lines, especially in the south. The dense quick adaptations, but given the sheer number of drones,
network of layered Russian defenses included over- it was also increasingly driven by cost considerations.83
lapping minefields, concealed and hardened machine Ukrainian forces continued to rely on drones as spotters
gun and antitank positions in the tree lines, concrete for ground-based fires but had to adapt their tactics, only
reinforced trenches, antitank trenches, and rows of flying drones when they found EW gaps and frequently
concrete barriers known as dragon’s teeth.75 Russia’s changing radio frequencies to evade Russia’s layered EW
heavily entrenched defenses ensured that any Ukrainian systems.84 They also increasingly experimented with
effort to breach the lines and reclaim territory would drones made from foam or plastic that are less likely to be
be challenging and costly. In preparation for this effort, seen by Russian radars and, if detected and lost, are cheap
Western nations rushed additional arms to Ukraine and enough to be easily replaced.85
trained Ukrainian forces in combined arms operations— The other cheap drone that proliferated was the FPV
which entails simultaneously employing different types kamikaze because it offers an extremely inexpensive pre-
of capabilities to produce a greater effect. In addition to cision strike capability when operated by skilled pilots.86
howitzers and artillery shells, the West provided new Because FPV drones are very fast and highly maneu-
heavy weapons, including Leopard and Challenger tanks verable, they can run down and accurately hit mobile
and Bradley fighting vehicles.76 targets, but piloting these drones requires more skill and
Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive began on June 4 training than does a traditional quadcopter.87 By June,
and had three major axes: the main focus was attacking Russian forces had emulated the Ukrainians and regu-
Orikhiv, the second was Velika Novosilka, and the third larly were employing commercial or DIY racing drones
was counterattacking in Bakhmut.77 Despite securing a to run down Ukrainian vehicles and troops.88 Ukrainian
number of towns near Velika Novosilka in the second and Russian volunteers produced tens of thousands of
week and making gains around Bakhmut, progress cheap FPV drones a month as these one-way drones were
quickly stalled.78 Early on, the Ukrainians conducted a rapidly being expended. FPV drones provide an afford-
mechanized assault on the Orikhiv axis in the attempt to able way of attacking mobile targets, especially people

13
 @CNASDC

and fast-moving vehicles.89 But the FPV drones miss more troops have effectively coordinated ISR drones, kamikaze
often than not. Even if they find their mark, they might drones, and artillery fire to engage Ukrainian vehicles that
not critically damage, let alone destroy, a hardened vehicle approach the front.93
because they carry relatively small payloads. Nevertheless,
they are another plentiful weapon that makes the battle- The Deep Fight: Strategic Strikes
field in Ukraine extremely lethal.
The omnipresent Russian military and commercial FEBRUARY 24, 2022–SEPTEMBER 2023
drones made it difficult for Ukraine to mass forces, break
through defense lines, and exploit advances. Russia’s In parallel to the close fight on the front lines, there was a
defense industry had responded to the increased demand largely separate ongoing battle of strategic strikes between
and increased production of ISR drones, such as the Moscow and Kyiv. Strategic attacks are those that, inde-
Orlan-10 and ZALA, as well as Lancet-3 kamikaze.90 pendent of what is happening at the operational level,
Ukraine did not have enough air defenses to defend every- weaken an adversary’s will or ability to fight and therefore
where and sought to preserve these critical weapons by may achieve overarching political goals.94 Historically,
keeping them in safer locations in their rear areas. Even strategic target sets include deep military bases, the
when Ukrainian SAMs could have shot down an Orlan- defense industry, enemy leadership, and critical economic
10, they often did not, preferring not to expend a scarce targets, such as oil or energy. In the first few phases of the
and expensive interceptor on a much cheaper drone that war, Russia had a monopoly on strategic attacks because
Russia could easily replace.91 Consequently, largely uncon- of its large stockpile of missiles. Over time, Ukraine
tested Russian drones provided intelligence on Ukrainian eroded but did not eliminate Russia’s advantage in this
force positions behind the front lines.92 Moreover, Russian space. Drones became the weapon of choice for deep
strikes because of the lack of alternatives.
Russia has launched long-range air
FIGURE 6:
THE THREE AXES OF ATTACK IN UKRAINE’S SUMMER 2023 OFFENSIVE and missile attacks since the first day of
Ukrainian forces counterattacked in Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Bakhmut but made the invasion. Strikes initially focused on
few gains in the first few months. Ukrainian military targets, then empha-
sized defense industry and communications
infrastructure target sets, and by spring 2022
were aimed primarily at rail infrastructure
and fuel storage and production.95 By that
point, Russia’s stockpiles of preferred long-
range munitions were reportedly running
low, leading it to repurpose surface-to-air
and antiship missiles for land attacks.96
These strikes became increasingly indis-
criminate and resulted in a growing number
of Ukrainian civilian casualties.97
In response, Ukraine began an effort to
develop an indigenous capability to strike
targets within Russia with long-range
drones.98 This initiative was shrouded in
mystery, and typically, Kyiv denied responsi-
bility for the attacks in Russia. Consequently,
it was often difficult to determine whether an
explosion in Russia was executed by long-
range drones or Ukrainian special forces
or was simply an accident. Yet over time, it
has become clear that adapted commercial
or homemade kamikaze drones played an
Map adapted from "Maps: Tracking the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” The New York Times, June 9, increasingly important role and enabled
2023, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/world/europe/ukraine-maps.html.
Ukraine to hit targets deep inside Russia.

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 DEFENSE | FEBRUARY 2024
Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

The first evidence that Ukraine was using long-range infrastructure in more than 10 Ukrainian cities, including
kamikaze drones appeared in the summer of 2022. In those deep in western Ukraine.109 The attack consisted of
June, two Ukrainian drones struck a Russian oil refinery 95 missiles and at least 21 Shahed drones and marked a
in Novoshakhtinsk in the Rostov region adjacent to the new concerted effort to make ordinary Ukrainians suffer
border. One analysis suggested that Ukrainians used a by depriving them of electricity and heat during the cold
Chinese Skyeye 5000, a commercially available drone winter months.110
that costs $5,000 to $10,000 on Alibaba, and modified Putin claimed the attack was solely in retaliation for
it for a kamikaze mission.99 By August, the focus of the destruction of the Kerch bridge, but evidence shows
Ukraine’s long-range attacks shifted from nearby targets that Russia had planned to inflict pain on Ukrainian
across the Russian border to Crimea, which Russia citizens by turning out the lights and turning off the
had illegally annexed in 2014.100 As a spokesperson heat in Ukraine before the bridge explosion.111 Over the
for Ukraine’s southern command, Natalia Gumenyuk, next several months, Russia regularly launched complex
explained, “Ukraine’s armed forces are carrying out attacks that included cruise and ballistic missiles and
activities to liberate our occupied territories.” She said kamikaze drones against Ukraine’s energy grid.112 Despite
they exclusively struck military targets, but not “on the Russia’s damaging or destroying nearly 40 percent of
territory of the Russian Federation,” and she empha- Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and causing rolling
sized that “Crimea is Ukraine.”101 Russia claimed that blackouts, the Ukrainian electrical grid did not collapse,
a Ukrainian drone attack against its Black Sea Fleet nor did the Ukrainian public's will to fight decline.113
headquarters in Sevastopol forced it to cancel its Navy The West provided additional air defenses to shoot
Day celebration on August 1. On August 9, unexplained
102
down incoming drones and missiles.114 Additionally,
explosions at Russia’s Saki air base on the Crimean Ukrainian forces refined their tactics and developed
Peninsula significantly damaged or destroyed at least innovative solutions for defeating the long-range strikes.
10 aircraft.103 Later in August, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet For instance, Ukraine developed a crowd-sourced
headquarters was again targeted, this time by another smart phone application for early detection of incoming
weaponized Chinese- missiles and drones, pro-
made drone, which This quickly became an attritional viding defenders time to get
crashed into the roof in position to shoot down
of the headquarters battle as Russia sought to exhaust the drone or missile before
building.104 Ukrainian air defense interceptors it reached its target.115
While Ukraine before it ran out of its long-range This quickly became an
experimented with attritional battle as Russia
long-range kamikaze
strike weapons. sought to exhaust Ukrainian
drone attacks, Russia air defense interceptors
purchased Iranian Shahed-136 drones to augment before it ran out of its long-range strike weapons. Over
its dwindling stockpiles of long-range missiles and time, the salvo size and frequency of Russian strategic
uncrewed systems. Russia’s first reported Shahed-
105
attacks declined as its weapons inventory ran low.116
136 strategic strike was in September 2022, when it Concomitantly, the Ukrainian air force’s rate of inter-
fired the kamikaze drones at Odesa for three con- cepting the smaller attacks of incoming missiles and
secutive days, killing several civilians and hitting an drones improved, but its interceptor stockpiles ran low.117
administrative building. 106
Neither side was completely exhausted, and this stra-
The deep-strike war escalated in October 2022. On tegic battle was still underway at the time this report was
October 7, Ukraine launched a kamikaze drone attack written.
140 miles north of the Ukrainian border at Shaykovka As Russian strikes on Ukraine’s cities continued,
air base and damaged two Russian Tu-22M Backfire Ukraine conducted novel drone attacks against deep
bombers.107 On October 8, a large explosion damaged the targets in Russia and Crimea. On October 29, 2022,
Kerch bridge linking Crimea to Russia. The Ukrainian Ukraine launched a coordinated air and maritime attack
domestic intelligence agency later claimed responsibility against the naval base at Sevastopol. Nine aerial drones
for the truck bomb attack that destroyed the bridge.108 and seven improvised kamikaze drone boats participated
Russia began an extended air campaign aimed at in the attack against the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship
Ukrainian’s power grid on October 10. Moscow launched the Admiral Makarov.118 Another drone boat damaged the
a massive missile and drone barrage against critical oil terminal in Russia at Novorossiysk in November.119 In

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 @CNASDC

December, Ukrainian drone operators turned their Types of Drones

sights on the Russian bombers that had been con-
ducting missile strikes against many Ukrainian cities.
Ukraine armed several Tu-141 Strizh 1970s-era Soviet
reconnaissance drones and sent them on kamikaze
T his section provides more detail on the types
of drones and the tactics and countermea-
sures used by Ukrainian and Russian forces. It
strike missions against two Russian bomber air provides an overview of the major military, commer-
bases.120 Two Russian bombers were reported slightly cial, and kamikaze drones used by each party, as well as
damaged at Engels airfield, 300 miles inside of Russia, Ukrainian maritime drones. It also covers the tactical
while three military personnel were killed and four battle networks and communications systems used to
wounded in the strike on Dyagilevo air base.121 control the drones.
By mid-2023, Ukraine’s commitment to building
long-range kamikaze drones began to bear fruit, and Military Drones
there has been a significant uptick in drone attacks Both the Ukrainians and Russians have used military
against Russia. The BBC tabulated 190 attacks in drones extensively, but not the military drones that many
Russia and Crimea from January through September might expect. The image that often springs to mind for
2, 2023.122 The New York Times reported that the military drones is large, high-flying, armed drones, such
number of kamikaze drone strikes into Russia from as the Bayraktar TB2 or the Russian Orion, but MALE
May through July alone was double the total for all of drones have played a relatively small role in this war.
2022.123 These attacks used a diverse array of drones The most common and important Russian and Ukrainian
against a range of targets, including oil fields, air military drones have been smaller, recoverable fixed-
bases, and transportation infrastructure. A growing wing systems that are integrated with ground units
number of Ukrainian drone strikes targeted Moscow, and used primarily for surveillance, target acquisition,
including two drones that hit the Kremlin in May and battle damage assessment (BDA). Like all drones,
and strikes against skyscrapers in central Moscow in military drones have also been used for information
July.124 Some were launched within Russia, such as warfare and propaganda purposes.
the quadcopters that damaged bombers at Soltsy-2 air
base near Novgorod in August 2023.125 UKRAINIAN MILITARY DRONES
Ukraine has also made extensive use of its Ukraine has a diverse fleet of indigenously developed
expanding number of long-range drones. The UJ-22, and internationally procured military drones. Far more
the Bober (“Beaver”), the Morok (“dark spirit”), and important has been Ukraine’s mixed fleet of smaller
the Mugin-5 drone were identified in these attacks.126 drones that have provided vital intelligence to ground
Russia claimed to have defeated a large Ukrainian forces and directed artillery, rocket, and mortar fire.
drone salvo at Crimea in August, shooting down 14 Figure 7 lists the major Ukrainian military drones.131
of the incoming kamikazes and using jammers to As is evident from this list, most Ukrainian military
disable the other four.127 The largest Ukrainian drone drones cannot fly more than 50 miles or stay aloft over 10
attack, as of the writing of this report, was on August hours. They, therefore, are tactical systems that provide
30, when Ukrainian drones struck at least six loca- Ukrainian ground forces with previously unavailable
tions in Russia and Crimea.128 One of these strikes was levels of local situational awareness and improve the
against Pskov air base, 370 miles from Ukraine, and accuracy of indirect fires.
reportedly damaged at least four Russian military At the beginning of the war, the Ukrainian drone that
cargo aircraft.129 captured headlines and the public imagination was the
Drones enabled Ukraine to take the war home to Turkish-built TB2.133 The TB2 was one of the few armed
Russia and impose costs on Moscow. The intended military drones that Ukraine had at the war’s start, and
impact, however, was likely psychological, bolstering the only one that carried precise laser-guided bombs.
Ukrainian morale and convincing the Russians that Ukraine had 24 TB2s when the war began.134 During the
the “special operation,” as Putin dubbed the war first days of the war, social media sites were littered with
in Ukraine, was not worth the cost. As Zelenskyy viral videos of TB2 attacks on Russian forces, including
noted: “Gradually, the war is returning to the terri- columns of Russian vehicles, air defenses (likely nonop-
tory of Russia — to its symbolic centers and military erating), trains transporting fuel, and infantry fighting
bases,” which “is an inevitable, natural and absolutely vehicles.135 Because of the strict ROE that prohibited
fair process.”130 Russian forces from launching SAM interceptors for fear

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FIGURE 7: UKRAINIAN MILITARY DRONES 132

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of hitting Russian planes, TB2s patrolled the skies unmo- for further Russian attempts to supply the outpost, and
lested, enabling them to effectively interdict invading then interdict any attempted reinforcements, which
Russian forces.136 included a Russian transport helicopter and a Serna-
TB2s offered the Ukrainians an important capability in class landing craft.144 Despite these interdiction strikes,
the early weeks of the war. These drones supplemented Russia eventually landed reinforcements on the island.
manned Ukrainian jets and provided a limited precision But the Ukrainian harassment of the small island con-
ground-attack capability, but their success was entirely tinued unabated. At this point in the battle, for unknown
contingent on Russia’s decision not to operate its air reasons, Ukrainian manned aircraft strikes assumed
defenses. Oryx, an open-source intelligence website, center stage, while TB2s filmed the attacks. Finally, on
tallied all the successful TB2 strikes, which included June 30, Russia withdrew.145
five Russian tanks, eight armored fighting vehicles, nine In contrast to the TB2s, Ukrainian smaller military
pieces of artillery, 15 SAMs, two antiaircraft guns, 10 heli- drones, such as the Leleka-100, the Furia, and the PD-1,
copters, seven ships, two fuel trains, 29 other vehicles, have been used continuously throughout the war in the
four command and communications posts, and six close fight. Although Ukrainian military drones are fewer
other targets.137 Given the hype and Turkish propaganda than Ukrainian quadcopters, they offer more capability
surrounding this drone, these kill numbers are likely than most commercially available models because they
inflated, but they still indicate that the TB2s offered the are often hardened against electronic attack and have
Ukrainian air force a ground strike capability that did not extended ranges, more endurance, and better sensors.
endanger its pilots and helped to attrit Russian forces in Their most important missions are finding enemy targets,
those critical first few days and weeks. providing accurate target data to artillery units, adjusting
About 10 days into the war, when Russia began to fires, and assessing whether the target is destroyed. Very
activate its air defense and EW systems, TB2 losses began few of Ukraine’s military drones are armed.
to appear.138 The aircraft has large electromagnetic and This has been a war in which ground-based firepower
radar signatures and is vulnerable to Russian short- and working in concert with drones often drives battlefield
medium-range air defenses, especially those now attuned outcomes. By directing artillery fire, drones increase
to the drone threat. Over this period, Ukrainian forces the accuracy of strikes and enable Ukrainian forces to
became more careful about when they employed TB2s fire fewer shells to destroy a target. One example of
and increasingly committed them only in favorable cir- the deadly effects of drones and howitzers comes from
cumstances.139 The TB2s were too expensive to put at risk early in the war, in March 2022, when a large column of
and clearly not survivable in the heavily contested front Russian forces approached Kyiv.146 As Russia’s offensive
lines. Although Ukrainian air force TB2 pilots adjusted slowed due to harassing attacks from Ukrainian special
their tactics and began flying at lower altitudes and then forces armed with small drones, larger Ukrainian units
popping up for strikes to reduce the chances of detection, screened the flanks of the advancing Russians, pinning
most of the drones were shot them down with artillery
down in March 2022.140 About 10 days into the war, fire.147 Ukrainians dubbed
One of the last high-pro-
when Russia began to activate this stretch of road the
file TB2 missions occurred “highway to hell” because so
in the spring and summer its air defense and EW systems, many Russian vehicles were
of 2022 over Snake Island TB2 losses began to appear. destroyed. Leleka-100 drones
in the Black Sea. The TB2s searched for the enemy
could contribute to the Ukrainian counterattack on and passed target coordinates via Starlink terminals to
Snake Island because in April Ukrainian antiship cruise Ukrainian artillery units armed with 152mm guns.148 The
missiles sank the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s flagship, the Russian troops could not recover from the drone-di-
Moskva. Consequently, the threat of Ukrainian cruise
141
rected artillery strikes and eventually retreated.
missiles pushed Russian ships farther from the shore, In another famous battle, in May 2022, Flyeye drones
thinning the air defenses over the island and opening a participated in an attack against a Russian unit crossing
window for the TB2s to operate.142 The TB2s picked off the Seversky Donets river on a pontoon bridge.149 The
Russian Raptor boats carrying supplies and destroyed Flyeyes watched the Russian troops traverse the bridge
the short-range SAM protecting the island.143 With the and then directed artillery to destroy the bridge, trapping
SAM threat eliminated, the long-endurance TB2s could the Russian forces on the Ukrainian side of the river,
conduct lengthy patrols around the island, watching where they were eliminated.

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Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

Compared with commercial drones, military drones where Russian forces had a comparative advantage over
such as the Furia and Flyeye offer additional capabili- Ukraine’s less numerous and capable military drone fleet.
ties.150 Both the Furia and Flyeye have thermal cameras By early March 2022, Russian forces were flying their
and could be used to find and target Russian forces at drones and suffering notable losses from Ukrainian air
night when they are more likely to move around. These defenses.154 Russia had long-endurance armed drones
drones also have better battery life and can patrol larger such as Forpost-R and Orion, which flew some combat
areas for hours instead of minutes. These systems are operations.155 There is a video of an Orion MALE drone
usually remote controlled, but some military drones, dropping Kornet-D antitank weapons on a Ukrainian
including the Furia, have the ability to fly autonomously T-72 tank in April 2022.156 According to Oryx, Orion
on preprogrammed routes.151 Despite Ukraine’s pub- drones damaged at least three Ukrainian tanks and seven
lic-private “army of drones” initiative, which has tried to other vehicles, while Forpost-R drones damaged seven
acquire additional military drones for Ukrainian forces, Ukrainian vehicles.157 Yet because of the small size of
this is an area where Russia retains an edge. the fleets of long-range armed drones and their vulner-
ability to Ukrainian air defenses, Russia appears to have
RUSSIAN MILITARY DRONES employed them sparingly.158
Russia has a robust fleet of military drones that includes Instead, most Russian military drones are short-
a few armed MALE drones and a larger number of er-range, smaller ISR systems that supported the Russian
smaller, mainly unarmed, drones that are controlled by army’s reconnaissance strike complex by collecting
ground forces. In the first few days of the war as Russian intelligence, rapidly acquiring targeting data, and
forces raced forward, they did not employ many military passing that information to artillery units that then
drones, even though the Russian military had prioritized engaged the target.159 Russian operational concepts aim
investment in uncrewed and autonomous systems.152 to achieve battlefield information dominance and use
That quickly changed over the next month. Russia’s this information superiority to close kill chains faster
military drones proved an enduring strength and area than their enemy. Military drones are the critical sensors

FIGURE 8: COMMON UKRAINIAN AND RUSSIAN MILITARY DRONES USED BY GROUND FORCES 163

In general, Russian military drones have longer ranges than the military drones embedded with Ukrainian ground forces. This chart excludes
MALE and HALE drones that are operated by air forces.

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 @CNASDC

and communications nodes that gather and distribute and then passing that information to artillery units.169
information across ground forces using Russia’s Strelets Additionally, an Orlan-10 variant armed with EW
tactical command and control system.160 The Strelets payloads, called the Leer-3, has been used in jamming
system integrates feeds from multiple drones and other and SEAD missions.170 For SEAD missions, Leer-3s
sensors into a computer that helps to accurately direct would fly at high altitudes to bait Ukrainian SAMs
fires.161 Russian forces have a wide variety of military to shoot, revealing their positions. The Leer-3 might
drones with greater range and endurance than those of survive because of its ability to jam air defense inter-
Ukraine. This means Russian drones can cover larger ceptor proximity fuses. A lower-flying Orlan-10
areas and fly much longer missions, providing Russian equipped with an electronic intelligence payload
forces with broader and more persistent surveillance. would gain targeting coordinates on the SAM that
While Russian forces struggled to execute the idealized fired, while another Orlan-10 with an electro-optical
version of the reconnaissance strike complex in Ukraine, sensor would designate the launcher as a target and
they improved over time and military drones did enable pass this information to an artillery battery.171 This
responsive, dynamic targeting of enemy forces by artil- was not a swarm in the sense that the drones were
lery units. With an organic drone, Russian units could autonomously collaborating or even controlled by
accurately fire on a newly detected enemy target in three one operator, but the combination of a Leer-3, several
to five minutes.162 Orlan-10s, and artillery was effective. To preserve their
The Orlan-10 is the most common Russian military short- and medium-ranged SAMs in the face of the
drone employed in Ukraine and plays a critical role in the drone and artillery threat, the Ukrainians moved them
reconnaissance strike complex. At $87,000 to $120,000 away from the front lines, opening up the airspace for
per system, the Orlan-10 is a relatively inexpensive largely uncontested Orlan-10s to provide the Russians
but capable military drone that flies above the reach with real-time intelligence on the disposition of
of MANPADs on missions out to 75 miles and carries Ukrainian forces and their activities.172
several different payloads.164 While it can be equipped The Orlan-30 can fly farther than the Orlan-10 and is
with weapons, this is not common and most Orlan-10s equipped with a laser designator rangefinder, enabling
in Ukraine are unarmed.165 Often, multiple Orlan-10s it to illuminate targets for precision strikes.173 In fall
fly over an area at once, because each Russian regional 2022, for example, Russian Orlan-30s illuminated
commander has an orbit and each artillery brigade Ukrainian howitzers that were then hit with Krasnopol
commander has several Orlan-10 orbits.166 For example, precision-guided 152mm round shells.174 To ration
during an attack, Russia ideally would have multiple artillery shells, some Russian forces have worked to
Orlan-10 drones, with each monitoring a different part lessen their traditional reliance on mass fires in favor of
of the battlespace, providing real-time information more precise salvos aided by drones, which makes the
about the situation back to headquarters, facilitating Orlan-30s particularly valuable.175 Given their longer
maneuver and enabling responsive fires on emergent range, Orlan-30s also have been observed conducting
enemy targets.167 battle damage assessment for Iskander missile strikes
Russia’s many different ZALA 421-E variants tend to and providing long-endurance overwatch to help cue
be slightly smaller than the Orlan-10 but provide another other drones, such as the cheaper and shorter-range
sophisticated ISR capability that can reach out 16 to over ZALA 421-16E5.176 In this situation, the Orlan-30 would
60 miles and fly missions that last several hours. When first detect a possible target, then send the ZALA to
combined, the Orlan-10 and ZALA 421-E variant fleets validate the target and obtain precise coordinates,
provide Russian forces with a dense layered network of which would then be passed to an FPV drone operator
surveillance drones that can watch over the depth of the who would crash a kamikaze drone into a target.177
battlespace and help coordinate artillery and kamikaze Throughout the war, Russian forces have generally
drone strikes on Ukrainian targets.168 maintained more persistent coverage and visibility
In addition to general reconnaissance and targeting, above and beyond Ukraine’s front lines because of their
Russian drones played an important role in SEAD large fleet of military drones.178 While both Ukraine
and DEAD operations. Although some Orlan-10s and and Russia have made extensive use of military drones
Orlan-30s (another variant) were lost while hunting throughout this war, in many respects they have been
Ukrainian air defenses, they played a vital role in overshadowed by the cheaper and more plentiful
destroying many Ukrainian SAMs by finding the air commercial or DIY drones that have proliferated
defense radars and launchers, marking them for strike, at all echelons.

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Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

FIGURE 9: RUSSIAN MILITARY DRONES 153

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Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

Commercial Drones made it difficult for either side to concentrate its forces,
The widespread use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) break through the defensive lines, or achieve surprise.181
drones by both parties has differentiated this war from While the Ukrainians were ahead of the Russians at the
others.179 Commercial drones are less capable than many beginning of the war and initially better at harnessing
larger military systems, but they have provided Russian commercial technology, the Russians have emulated
and Ukrainian forces with an affordable and easy to their adversary and largely caught up.
use tactical ISR capability that did not previously exist. Because this is an attritional war dominated by
Commercial drones have become indispensable for artillery, the most important role of commercial drones
ground force operations and saturate the front lines.180 (and military drones) is serving as spotters for artil-
They are essentially performing roles a person could lery units and dramatically improving the accuracy of
fill as a reconnaissance scout or an artillery spotter, but indirect fires. It is not simply that drones can see enemy
they reduce the danger to the operator and can be easily forces, but that because the drones are connected to
replaced. Equally importantly, they complete these artillery units, they can call significant firepower onto
missions better than a person could. Drones can cover troops that are discovered. Although in Ukraine it has
more ground faster than a human scout on foot who become inconceivable to conduct ground operations
would have to move slowly to try to remain concealed. without commercial drone scouts, these drones have
Drones can also reconnoiter exposed areas such as long not fundamentally changed the nature of the fight,
stretches of roads, where a person on foot or a car would which still resembles a classic artillery duel. In this duel,
be at risk. Also, because drones are operating at a higher commercial drones perform the roles of tactical aerial
altitude, their view is not impeded by many ground reconnaissance and fire support. Even with these eyes in
obstacles. Because of all these factors, more enemy the sky, the battlefield is not entirely transparent; small,
targets of opportunity are likely to be found with com- dismounted units can use natural features for cover
mercial drones than without, even though their sensors and make use of camouflage to complicate targeting.183
have a relatively narrow soda straw view of the world. If Moreover, the short range and limited endurance of
a commander has access to information from multiple commercial drones combined with limited connectivity
drones (even if the data are not truly fused), her situa- means their effects are localized.184
tional awareness is further enhanced. As analyst Michael In addition to using drones for their direct effect on
Kofman observed, the presence of so many drones has the battlefield, Russian and Ukrainian forces have used
commercial drones for psycholog-
FIGURE 10: DJI MAVIC 3 ical effect and to influence public
DJI Mavic 3 drones have been the most common commercial quadcopter used by perceptions of the war. Because
Ukrainian and Russian forces.185
drones can directly attack targets
or call in additional fires, their
presence overhead keeps soldiers on
edge and could degrade morale.186 A
tertiary impact, therefore, of some
drone flights is simply to harass
enemies and keep them flustered. It
is hard to measure this or to deter-
mine what actual effect it has had on
the course of different battles, but
there are many anecdotal reports
of the psychological dimension.
Moscow and Kyiv have also used the
videos from drone feeds to fuel their
ongoing information war and to try
to shape international and domestic
opinion.187 It is not surprising that
commercial drones often marketed
Drawing is approximate and based on DJI Mavic 3 Pro (DJI RC), DJI Store, https://store.dji.com/ for photography play a prominent
product/dji-mavic-3-pro?site=brandsite&vid=137691.
role in this space.

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FIGURE 11: COMMON COMMERCIAL DRONES USED BY RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN FORCES 182

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Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

UKRAINIAN COMMERCIAL DRONES

The Ukraine war is notable because of the significant role
Over time, more Ukrainian
that volunteer organizations have played in acquiring troops have received training
and modifying commercial drones for combat and in on commercial quadcopters,
training troops to effectively use these platforms. After although there remains a
the 2014 Russian invasion of Donbas, a group of Ukrainian
volunteers created Aerorozvidka, a civilian organization
disparity between specialized
focused on using drones for aerial reconnaissance in drone units and general-
defense of Ukraine.188 By February 2022, Aerorozvidka purpose forces.
could modify commercial drones for combat and had
designed and produced its own homemade drones from Ukrainian drone operations and tactics have also evolved
commercial parts, including the R18 octocopter, which over time. In the first few phases of the war, Ukrainian
can carry up to four grenades.189 Equally importantly, drone teams typically drove to the front lines, found a
Ukrainian volunteers formed a cadre of highly skilled location to hide, launched their drone, and searched for
and experienced drone operators who joined forces targets. They usually left when they found Russian forces
with the Ukrainian military and brought their drones to or exhausted their drone’s battery life.201 As the conflict
the fight to resist the latest Russian invasion.190 While progressed and the front lines stabilized, Ukrainian forces
many reports and videos show R18s and other modified have increasingly operated quadcopters in pairs or groups,
quadcopters dropping grenades on Russian forces, their which provides redundancy and the ability to execute
primary missions and roles were, again, reconnaissance different tasks simultaneously, and have been closely
and targeting.191 linked to nearby fires units. For instance, the BBC shows
Early in the war, the bulk of commercial drones were two Ukrainian drone operators searching for targets and
operated by specialized Ukrainian units, soldiers who correcting artillery fire, a mission they can complete even
were able to procure quadcopters, and ad hoc volunteer though one drone is lost.202 At other times, an unarmed
teams.192 Territorial defense units, such as the Karlson quadcopter has looked for targets while an armed quad-
aerial surveillance team, also used commercial drones.193 copter has loitered nearby, prepared to engage any enemy
Some individual Ukrainian soldiers acquired quadcop- forces that are found.203 In December 2022, analyst Sam
ters, often by purchasing them with their own money, but Bendett noted that Russian soldiers on Telegram were
general-purpose forces tended to have less training and reporting that Ukrainian drone operators had adopted a
experience than dedicated drone units and were often new tactic to expose Russian targets at night. One drone
less proficient at operating the drones.194 While volunteer with a light shining would fly overhead to attract Russian
drone teams were often more skilled, in the early phases fire, while another drone that was dark and hovering at a
of the war, they would just show up in an area and append different altitude recorded the location of the firing unit.204
themselves to nearby military formations.195 Because they
roamed where they pleased and were not formally under RUSSIAN COMMERCIAL DRONES
military command, these independent drone operators Russian forces have also used commercial drones since the
were known as “feral” or “wild” teams.196 As a result, there war’s beginning, although initially they had fewer quadcop-
was significant variability among commercial drone oper- ters and their troops were less skilled than the Ukrainians
ators in terms of their organization, tactics, equipment, at employing them.205 In the early days of the war, artillery
and aptitude.197 Of the nongovernmental groups that even- units controlled most of the military drones, leaving regular
tually joined the military, Aerorozvidka has had the most infantry units with only quadcopters for aerial recon-
capable drone pilots.198 In summer 2022, Aerorozvidka naissance. Yet there were not enough commercial drones
reportedly had 50 drone teams carrying out approxi- available to equip all the Russian units because the Russian
mately 300 drone flights a day.199 Other high-end drone Ministry of Defense was slow to embrace the use of com-
operators included Ukrainian special operations forces mercial technology.206 The MOD even discouraged and
units and intelligence organizations such as the Security hindered the efforts of troops to obtain quadcopters inde-
Service of Ukraine and Main Intelligence Directorate.200 pendently, which stands in stark contrast to the Ukrainian
Over time, more Ukrainian troops have received training government’s policy.207 The official Russian policy failed
on commercial quadcopters, although there remains a to deter Russian troops and volunteers from obtaining
disparity between specialized drone units and gener- quadcopters and sending them to the Ukrainian front lines,
al-purpose forces. where they have been employed extensively.

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Crowdfunded civilian organizations have pur- FIGURE 12: DJI DRONE DETECTIONS IN UKRAINE,
chased drones for Russian soldiers, 3D printed the JUNE–DECEMBER 2022

parts to arm commercial drones, and taught soldiers Because of their larger inventory of commercial drones,
Ukrainian DJI drones were much more active during this period
drone piloting tactics.208 One Russian volunteer than Russian DJI drones. The Mavic 3 was the most common
organization, Dronnitsa, formed in September 2022 drone for both parties. This graphic shows how many times
the 2,624 unique Ukrainian DJI quadcopters and 284 Russian
and sought to create a training pipeline for Russian DJI drones were detected by the WindtalkerX. The number
quadcopter pilots with a train-the-trainer program.209 of detections gives a sense of how many sorties or flights the
drones flew.
By the end of the month, the Russian MOD relented
and announced that newly mobilized soldiers could
bring their own quadcopters when they deployed.
Although the Russian government has gotten out
of the way of the volunteers, it has not enabled or
supported them like the Ukrainian government has.210
More recently, the Russian MOD finally began offering
quadcopter training, which ranges from several days
to two weeks.211
Tactically, the Russians employ the quadcopters like
the Ukrainians, mainly for surveillance and spot-
ting.212 They often fly in pairs, with one drone tasked
with finding the targets, monitoring the attack, and
conducting BDA, while the other drone drops the
weapon.213 This approach offers better situational This information is drawn from the briefing Edgesource, “Commercial
awareness and ability to correct for aiming errors. To Drones in War a C-UAS Perspective,” unpublished, undated.

flush Ukrainian forces out of their defensive posi-

tions, Russian drones have dropped tear gas grenades
followed by additional strikes.214 Russian fighters
FIGURE 13: DJI DRONE DETECTIONS IN UKRAINE,
conducting an urban assault often use more quad-
OCTOBER 2022–MARCH 2023
copters—at least three—with two scouting ahead
Although more Ukrainian DJI drones were detected during this
and looking for enemy forces and ambushes, while period, Russian DJI drone activity had increased significantly.
one stays above the troops, tracking their progress.215 The DJI Mavic 3 remained the most common commercial drone.
This graphic shows how many times the 3,901 unique Ukrainian
Frequently, commercial Russian drones also coordi- DJI quadcopters and 3,817 Russian DJI drones were detected
nate with military drones. Small commercial drones by the WindtalkerX. The number of detections gives a sense of
how many sorties or flights the drones flew.
often find Ukrainian forces and cue an Orlan-10, which
precisely locates the enemy forces and passes the
information to the gunline. 216 At other times, Russia
has used microdrones, such as the DJI Mini or Mavic
Air 2 or Air 3, to gauge the extent of electronic inter-
ference before committing larger quadcopters.217 In
this case, these microdrones act as canaries in the
coal mine—early warning systems that indicate that
whether enemy jamming is present.
Data provided by the American company
Edgesource, which produces the WindtalkerX sensor
that detects and tracks the location of commercial
drones and their pilots, suggest that by early 2023
Russia had caught up to Ukrainian commercial drone
use.218 While these data are drawn from a limited slice
of the battlespace and the time periods have some This information is drawn from the briefing Edgesource, “Commercial
overlap, it does support other anecdotal observations Drones in War a C-UAS Perspective,” unpublished, undated.

about commercial drone use in Ukraine. 219 From

June through December 2022, the four WindtalkerX

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Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

systems in Ukraine detected 2,624 unique Ukrainian DJI Russian forces used layered handheld jammers and
quadcopters and only 284 Russian DJI drones. Thus, larger EW systems in Bakhmut and frequently moved
during 2022 Ukraine had a 9-to-1 advantage in commer- them around.228 As a result, Ukrainian troops often
cial drones. From October 2022 through March 2023, refrain from sending commercial drones on missions if
Ukraine’s lead in commercial drones had essentially Russian EW systems are operating.229
disappeared, with WindtalkerX observing 3,901 unique Yet, Russia cannot jam everywhere all the time.230
Ukrainian DJI drones and 3,817 Russian DJI drones. It does not have enough EW systems to blanket the
The overall number of commercial drone flights also front lines and protect strategic sites within Russia and
increased dramatically between the two periods, and the Crimea. Moreover, as EW also disrupts Russian military
composition of the DJI drones in the air changed. While systems and has resulted in considerable fratricide,
the most ubiquitous commercial drone in this conflict Russian forces must turn off their jammers to conduct
remains the Chinese-made DJI Mavic 3 quadcopter, offensive operations.231 Thus, electronic interference
there was a notable uptick in Mavic 3 Enterprise E/T and is common, but not continuous, giving Ukrainian
Matrice 30T drones, which have thermal cameras and forces windows of opportunity to operate commercial
can conduct night operations.220 drones.232 Because of its effects on drones, Ukraine has
prioritized targeting Russia’s larger EW systems, which
COUNTERING THE QUADCOPTERS have large electronic signatures and are easily identi-
Because quadcopters play a critical role in enabling fied by American signals intelligence.233 For instance,
precise artillery fire, both parties have prioritized a Ukrainian special forces team operating in Russian-
defeating them. Operators treat these relatively cheap controlled territory disabled a Russian EW system by
drones as expendable and often send them on missions remotely flying a Styrofoam kamikaze drone into its
where they are likely to be lost. Moreover, commercial
drones have a very high utilization rate, with many quad- In this ‘aerial game of spy vs.
copters flying 10 to 15 missions a day.221 For these reasons,
loss numbers for commercial drones are incredibly high.
spy,’ drone operators spend
According to a RUSI report, Ukraine lost approximately much of their time searching
10,000 drones a month, and most of those were commer- for their enemy counterparts.
cial or DIY drones.222 On average, a Ukrainian quadcopter
only survived for three flights, although there is one antennas. This paved the way for a rocket strike fired by
instance of a single quadcopter completing more than Ukrainian HIMARS, which was guided precisely into the
700 sorties.223 While this is certainly an anomaly, it does tower in the absence of GPS jamming.234
indicate the most competent drone pilots can extend Instead of hardening commercial drones against elec-
the life of a drone. tronic attack, which is expensive and does not guarantee
There are a variety of ways to protect against commer- survival, Ukraine and Russia have simply bought more
cial drones. The most effective way to disable or destroy cheap drones.235 Realizing the high loss rate, in July 2022,
commercial drones is electronic warfare, and Russia the Ukrainian government launched its “army of drones”
has long invested heavily in this.224 A senior Ukrainian project. As a part of this effort, Ukraine has sought to
official estimated that Russia’s electronic attacks have bolster its indigenous drone industry. To expedite and
caused half of Ukraine’s drone losses.225 Russia has larger encourage drone production, Ukraine has removed taxes
truck-based EW systems that can jam drone communica- and relaxed import restrictions on key drone compo-
tions, resulting in the pilot’s loss of control, or disrupt the nents, such as GPS systems and cameras.236 In contrast,
drone’s navigational system, causing it to go off course. the Russian government does not officially support the
Additionally, Russian forces employ more tactical EW volunteer-run crowdfunding efforts to buy drones. Still,
systems that include mobile directional jammers and reports show that additional DJI quadcopter shipments
systems that can hijack the controls of a quadcopter, from China have reached Russia, despite DJI’s claims of
enabling the attacker to commandeer the system and not selling to either belligerent.237
exploit its data.226 In spring 2023 in Bakhmut, electronic Because Russian and Ukrainian forces use many of the
interference was so extensive that Ukrainian soldiers same commercial drones, it is often hard to discriminate
reported that their quadcopters could only fly 500 meters between one’s own drones and the enemy’s. Commercial
before losing control, leading them to fear that commer- drones are easily countered and frequently downed
cial drones were no longer effective on the battlefield.227 by electronic attacks, but neither party has developed

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 @CNASDC

a way of countering the enemy’s commercial drones real-time feeds on drone flight paths, with an added
and obtaining tactical air superiority while allowing capability that filters out spoofed drone tracks from real
one’s own drones to continue to operate. Electronic ones. WindtalkerX, thus, is a secure system that has
interference is quite effective but often indiscrimi- helped Ukrainian forces find and target Russian drone
nate. One alternate approach is drone-on-drone aerial operators and interdict or evade approaching Russian
combat, where one quadcopter collides with another commercial drones, but there are only four of these
and attempts to knock it out of the sky or deploys a net systems, so they can provide coverage of a relatively
that downs the enemy drone.238 Ukrainian drone pilots small area.245
have refined their tactics by attacking other quadcop- Commercial drones have played an unexpectedly
ters from above, typically a blind spot, and aiming for important role in this war.246 Combatants have used them
the enemy’s fragile rotors. This type of diving attack can for direct strikes, surveillance, propaganda, and psycho-
fatally damage the targeted drone but leave the other logical attacks. But their most important role has been
unscathed.239 Given the number of quadcopters in the sky as spotters improving the accuracy of unguided artil-
over the front lines, drone dogfighting is becoming more lery fire.247 Despite being incorporated in an ad hoc way
common, but it is still a relatively nascent tactic. into the Ukrainian and Russian militaries, commercial
Most of the counters discussed thus far focus on dis- drones have provided a “surprising amount of tactical
abling or destroying the drone itself. The other approach clarity and coordination.”248 Although Ukraine initially
is to find and target the drone operators. Most quadcop- dominated commercial drone warfare, Russian forces
ters are remotely piloted and therefore not autonomous. quickly adapted and copied their enemy. Thus, commer-
There usually are two or more operators, one flying the cial drones have not decisively advantaged either party.
drone and one acting as a spotter, helping with targeting As the conflict continues to trudge on, these cycles of
by correlating the drone’s video feed with a map.240 In adaptation and counters continue, with the latest devel-
this “aerial game of spy vs. spy,” drone operators spend opments occurring around DIY kamikaze drones.
much of their time searching for their enemy counter-
parts.241 Since commercial quadcopters and DIY drones Kamikaze Drones
have limited ranges, the operators need to be relatively The final drone type that has proliferated in the Ukraine
proximate to the drone, which makes them vulnerable war is the kamikaze drone or loitering munition, which
to attack. If one’s adversary can determine the location has been used for strategic and tactical strikes. Kamikaze
of operators by, for example, hijacking the drone’s radio drones range from military-grade medium-range loi-
controls, they can then send an armed drone to attack tering munitions, to long-range Ukrainian drones and
them or fire mortars or shells at them. 242 Iranian-built Shahed-136s, to very short-range modified
As part of this competition, both sides have exten- commercial FPV drones. Despite the differences among
sively used a DJI system called AeroScope that tracks them, they are all one-use uncrewed weapons that crash
the positions of drones and operators more than 20 miles into targets like a kamikaze. Kamikaze drones, therefore,
away. There were two AeroScope systems offered by are primarily used as strike weapons and often paired
DJI: a small portable one with shorter range and larger with surveillance drones in hunter-killer teams or larger
stationary system with more capability. AeroScopes, drone groups.249 While the use of kamikaze drones
thus, could be used to track all DJI drone users within in Ukraine far outstrips any prior war, most of these
their range and compile longitudinal information on weapons are not fully autonomous, as a human operator
each drone, including the flight paths each had taken, at still selects the target and when to engage it. There are
what altitude and speed it had operated, and where its reports that some of these systems have autonomous
pilot had been located.243 This could help track patterns capabilities, but this is hard to verify.250 Instead, it is
in enemy drone units’ operations and identify trends likely that most of the kamikaze drones used thus far in
in commercial drone activity around specific locations. Ukraine are controlled by a human operator or hit pre-
Ukraine eventually developed software that could be programmed coordinates.
uploaded onto DJI drones to disable the tracking, and
DJI stopped selling the commercial AeroScope system.244 BATTLEFIELD KAMIKAZE DRONES
Edgesource donated five WindtalkerX systems, which USED IN THE CLOSE FIGHT
perform a similar function to AeroScope, to Ukraine In general, Russia has had more kamikaze drones than
to detect and track Russian commercial drones. The Ukraine. In particular, Russia has maintained an advan-
WindtalkerX is a cyber-hardened system that provides tage in military-grade loitering munitions, which are

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Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

FIGURE 14: COMMON KAMIKAZE DRONES USED BY RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN FORCES 256

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 @CNASDC

capable of damaging high-priority mobile targets such heavier five-kilogram warhead, have enhanced its per-
as howitzers and SAMs. Ukraine has acquired kamikaze formance.262 Although Russian loitering munitions can
military drones from various international supporters be deadly, the Ukrainians have developed many counters,
but has not used them to the same effect because it either including using small-arms fire and shoulder-fired
does not have enough of the one-way drones or they MANPADs to shoot down the slow-moving drone.263 One
are less capable systems. As a result of this disparity, of the most prevalent counters has been a simple metal
Ukrainian forces began employing commercial or DIY screen or mesh net that stops the drone short of the
FPV kamikaze drones to hit mobile targets. Russian target and forces it to detonate prematurely.264 Decoys
forces quickly copied this innovation and have largely have also effectively fooled loitering munitions.265
matched the Ukrainians’ use of these homemade drones. By comparison, Ukraine has not employed military
Russia entered the war with two military-grade kamikaze drones to significant effect on the battle-
loitering munitions in its inventory—the KUB-BLA and field. In general, Ukrainian kamikazes, such as the
the Lancet-3. Although these Russian kamikaze drones Switchblade 300, Warmate, D40, or RAM II, are smaller
appear similar with two- to six-pound warheads and a than the Russian drones and optimized for attacks on
range of 25 miles, they have performed very differently personnel or tanks.266 For instance, the tube-launched
on the battlefield. Several weeks into the invasion
251
Switchblade 300 is a small drone with a 15-minute loiter
there was evidence the Russians were using KUB drones time that Ukrainian special forces have used primarily
around Kyiv.252 By October 2022, Russia reported that it against exposed Russian troops.267Although American
had employed several hundred KUBs and Lancets against special forces found the Switchblades effective against
air defenses, radars, and personnel. Overall, the KUB’s
253
insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan, they are not user
performance was disappointing. Videos and pictures friendly and have performed poorly in the heavily dis-
showed KUBs missing their targets and the remnants of rupted communications and navigation environment in
ones that had been shot down by small-arms fire.254 The Ukraine.268 If a Switchblade 300 does not find its target
KUB’s warhead also frequently malfunctioned. Not sur- within 15 minutes, the warhead disarms and the drone
prisingly, by the second half of 2022, KUB use declined, crashes into the ground. Russian jamming has reportedly
and the Russians began employing the Lancet-3s, which frequently triggered the Switchblades’ disarmament
proved more effec- protocol.269 Near the
tive and tended to be By comparison, Ukraine has not end of 2022, the first of
operated by experi- employed military kamikaze drones the larger Switchblade
enced drone pilots.255
Unlike the KUB,
to significant effect on the battlefield. 600 was delivered to
Ukraine, although there
the Lancet-3 was are few reports on how
advertised as having autonomous target identification these antitank drones have performed. 270 The United
and engagement, although these claims are unveri- States also gave Ukraine 1,800 Phoenix Ghost drones,
fied and reportedly the Lancets are flown by the most which supposedly require significant training, which has
skilled Russian drone operators. Typically, Lancet-3s
257
probably limited their use.271 There is little evidence on
have been reserved for priority missions, such as coun- social media that they have been employed at all.272
terbattery fire and SEAD. As of March 2023, Oryx had The Ukrainians do not have large numbers of loitering
confirmed 54 Lancet-3 hits on howitzers and multiple munitions for SEAD or counterbattery missions.273 In
rocket launchers, and two short-range, one medi- the fall of 2022, Ukraine used money from its “army of
um-range, and two long-range air defense systems.258 In drones” campaign to purchase around 40 Polish-made
the subsequent months, Russia has become increasingly Warmate kamikaze drones.274 The larger Warmate has a
reliant on battlefield kamikazes, and they have reportedly longer time of flight than many other Ukrainian loi-
become the preferred weapon for attacking Ukrainian tering munitions and has a variety of warheads that can
artillery.259 Typically, an unarmed military drone, such be used against different target sets. Ukrainian defense
as an Orlan-10 or ZALA 421-16E, finds a target, and then intelligence units have used the Warmate effectively
operators launch a Lancet-3 to perform the strike.260 against radars, EW systems, and air defenses, but
Hunter-killer teams of ZALAs and Lancets have also the inventory of these kamikaze drones is limited.275
been used to immobilize armored vehicles that are While exact stockpile numbers are unknown, Ukraine
then destroyed by artillery fire.261 Improvements to the likely has not acquired large numbers of any of these
latest variant of the Lancet-3, including arming it with a systems, in contrast with Russia, which has ramped

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Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

up production of Lancet-3s. Because kamikaze drones nearby and wearing augmented reality goggles, steer the
can only be used once, one needs many to appreciably kamikaze racer on its short journey and try to crash it
affect the battlefield. into the most vulnerable point on a target. For instance,
Ukrainian and Russian forces have increasingly relied FPV pilots have flown drones through the open doors of
on cheap commercial or DIY FPV kamikaze drones, armored vehicles where they then detonate.283 Therefore,
which can be quickly manufactured by volunteers and skilled FPV drone pilots can disable or destroy even
purchased in large numbers.276 FPV kamikaze drones armored vehicles, such as tanks, by aiming for their
present a cost-effective way of attacking exposed and weak points. Becoming a proficient FPV drone pilot
moving targets beyond visual range.277 FPV drones requires more training than is needed for typical com-
are fast enough to catch moving vehicles but can only mercial drones, which limits who can effectively operate
fly about six miles.278 Most of these racing drones are these drones. Ukrainians put their FPV pilots through a
assembled by volunteers and cost between $400 and monthlong training program, and only 60 percent to 70
$700.279 Compared with the price tag for Switchblade percent of students pass.284 The Russians have shortened
300s—at least $6,000 each—or for Lancet-3s—$35,000 their FPV drone training to two weeks to more quickly
apiece—FPVs are a bargain.280 They also are a fraction qualify additional operators.285
of the cost of the Javelin, an American antitank weapon July 2022 saw the first recorded instance of a
that costs $368,778 per missile.281 Because FPV drones Ukrainian FPV racing drone flying through the doorway
have powerful engines, they can carry slightly larger of a house to reach its target.286 Since then, Ukrainian
payloads than typical commercial drones, up to three to FPV production has ramped up to thousands of drones
five pounds of explosives.282 Pilots of FPV drones, located a month, enabling troops to use these weapons against
self-propelled mortar
trucks, tanks, transport
FIGURE 15: COMPARISON OF COMMON RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN KAMIKAZE DRONES
Russia has boosted production of its Lancet-3 kamikaze drone and is increasingly using these weapons for
trucks, and infantry
precise counterbattery fire. Ukrainian forces have a variety of kamikaze drones, including the American- fighting vehicles.287
made Switchblade 600, but these have not been as effective on the battlefield as the Russian drones.
They reportedly
played an important
role in the Ukrainian
defense of Bakhmut.288
Ukrainian drone
operators admit that
the kamikaze drones
do not have as high a
success rate as more
expensive antitank
weapons, but they
argue that because the
drones are inexpen-
sive and still hit their
target half of the time,
mass could compen-
sate for FPVs’ inferior
performance.289
Although there are
many videos of FPV
drones seemingly
successfully striking
targets, it is unclear
whether these systems
do enough damage
Drawing is approximate and based on Alistair MacDonald and James Marson, “This Russian Suicide Drone Is Blunting to seriously harm or
Ukraine’s Advance,” The Wall Street Journal, November 3, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/world/this-russian-suicide-drone-is-
blunting-ukraines-advance-8241a0e4.
disable them. This is

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 @CNASDC

FIGURE 16: DO-IT-YOURSELF FIRST-PERSON VIEW KAMIKAZE DRONES FPV kamikaze drone is launched
Ukrainian and Russian forces are using modified or do-it-yourself first-person view racing and catches up to and overtakes
drones with bombs strapped to them to hit moving targets.
the target. Ideally, the drone com-
manders are also linked up with
nearby artillery units that might then
be called on to finish off a target that
has been disabled but not destroyed
by a kamikaze drone.294
Compared with other drones, DIY
kamikaze racing drones are difficult
to counter. Because of their speed
and size, gunfire is not particularly
effective against them. Moreover,
they do not rely on GPS, so they
are not affected by navigational
jamming.295 FPV drones do need
radio communications to enable the
pilot to fly the drone, and if those
signals are jammed, the drone will
fall to the ground.296 Because Russia
Drawing is approximate and replicated from Jarrod Fankhauser’s illustration in Annika Burgess,
makes extensive use of jamming,
“Why Ukraine’s Kamikaze Racing Drones Are Causing a Buzz on and off the Battlefield,” Australian Ukraine is developing software
Broadcasting Corporation News, March 31, 2023, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-04-01/fpv-
racing-drone-kamikaze-attacks-ukraine-russia-war/102155702. that locks the FPV drone on to a
predesignated target, such that if
an especially important question because FPV drones the communications link breaks, the drone can auton-
carry relatively small payloads compared with artillery omously reach its target.297 The widespread use of FPV
and antitank missiles. kamikazes has increased the lethality of the close fight.
Seeing Ukrainian success, Russia once again played Maneuver is dangerous because if an enemy ISR drone
the role of the fast follower and adopted FPV kamikaze spots a target, the enemy can deploy a fast-moving FPV
drones. Russian volunteers set up their own facto- kamikaze that can run down even a moving vehicle. But
ries to build FPV drones and have produced tens of these systems have not fundamentally shifted the balance
thousands a month that have made an impact on the on the battlefield because both Russian and Ukrainian
battlefield.290 Russia relied heavily on FPV kamikazes to troops are making widespread use of them.
blunt Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive, striking
Ukrainian moving vehicles. Videos show Russian FPVs KAMIKAZE DRONES FOR DEEP STRIKES
ramming into Leopard tanks, Mine-Resistant Ambush Beyond the battlefield, Ukraine and Russia have used
Protected Vehicles (MRAP), Humvees, armored per- kamikaze drones for strategic strikes against deep
sonnel carriers, and Bradleys.291 targets. These kamikaze drones are more akin to
Both Russian and Ukrainian forces often operate FPVs long-range cruise missiles than autonomous loitering
in groups. In a recent attack, four Ukrainian FPV drones munitions. For instance, most of Russia’s Shaheds have
flew together to hit a Russian self-propelled mortar preprogrammed fixed targets that they transit to and
truck.292 More often, FPV drones are employed with then perform a diving attack on instead of searching a
a mix of other types of uncrewed systems in a “drone wide area and selecting a target. As discussed previously,
stack.” A drone stack includes multiple drones oper- Ukraine began launching drone attacks into Russia in
ating in the same vicinity but at different altitudes.293 summer 2022 but dramatically increased these attacks
Unarmed drones—either commercial or military— in spring 2023.298 Ukraine developed at least four long-
with better endurance hover over the battlespace and range drones—the Bober, UJ-22, the Mugin-5, and the
watch for enemy targets to appear. A more persistent Morok—for these kamikaze attacks.299 Little is known
higher altitude drone may cue another surveillance about where the drones are launched from, the tactics
drone to verify that something is a valid target and to used, or how these drones have penetrated deep into
obtain precise targeting coordinates for it. Then, an heavily defended Russian airspace.

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Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

FIGURE 17: COMMON DEEP-STRIKE KAMIKAZE DRONES USED BY RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN FORCES 300

33
 @CNASDC

There is more information available about Russia’s Shahed kamikazes are similar to decoys that distract
Shahed kamikaze drone strikes on Ukraine. Russia’s defensive fires from the primary weapons. Shaheds are
strategic kamikaze drone attacks should not be examined easy to manufacture, rely heavily on commercial and
alone, but in the context of its ongoing missile campaign. dual-use technologies and components, and are cheap,
While Ukraine has limited long-range strike options, costing between $20,000 and $30,000.306 Because they fly
Russia has an array of different cruise and ballistic slowly and have a loud acoustic signature, they are easy
missiles that it has fired in addition to the Shaheds.301 to intercept, which is part of the point. Russia uses them
It acquired Shaheds to supplement decreasing stocks of to bait Ukrainian air defenders into firing much more
precision-guided missiles and has employed them as an expensive and scarcer SAMs to shoot down the cheap
integral part of air and missile attacks. Konrad Muzyka, and abundant Shaheds.307 Conserving Ukraine’s SAMs for
an independent defense analyst and founder of Rochan more advanced Russian missiles and aircraft has become
Consulting, compiled Ukrainian government reports on increasingly important over time as Ukraine’s ground-
Shahed drone intercepts, Russian missiles fired, and the based air defenses are the primary weapon stopping
number of missiles intercepted, displayed in Figure 19.302 the Russian air force from gaining air superiority over
These reports show that over time, the Russian missile the entire country.308 Between September 11, 2022, and
and Shahed attacks have become increasingly sophisti- August 30, 2023, Russia fired 144 salvos into Ukraine,
cated as Russia has experimented with different tactics including more than 1,600 Shahed drones and 1,651
and learned.303 It has packaged its missile attacks in missiles. The Ukrainian government has not consistently
different ways and launched Shaheds alone and as a part relayed the number of Shaheds fired, but it has reported
of more complex missile packages.304 the number shot down, which as of August 30, 2023,
Shaheds have played three primary roles in Russia’s was 1,570. Ukrainian air defenders have attempted to
strategic strikes: interceptor sponges, pathfinders, and conserve SAMs for Russia’s precision munitions and use
complements. These roles are not mutually exclusive as the antiaircraft guns such as Gepard 2 against the kamikaze
Shaheds may perform multiple functions simultaneously. drones, but some number of Shaheds have been shot
Russians have used the Shaheds to provide mass long- down by SAMs.309
range fires to saturate and exhaust Ukrainian air defense Russia has also used the Shaheds as enablers for
interceptors.305 In this role as interceptor sponges, the missile strikes by testing Ukraine’s air defenses and
looking for weaker points. In this
FIGURE 18: UKRAINE’S BOBER LONG-RANGE KAMIKAZE DRONE
Ukraine has launched long-range strategic strikes into Russia with kamikaze drones
pathfinder role, a group of Shaheds
such as the Bober. are fired at targets, but Russia does
not necessarily expect them to
complete the strike mission. The
main purpose instead is to reveal
important information on the posture
of Ukrainian SAMs and to help
identify air corridors for follow-on
missile salvos.310 Sixty-four percent
of the attacks during this period
were Shahed-only strikes, and many
of these were likely used to keep
pressure on Ukraine and soak up air
defense missiles but also to identify
avenues for missile strikes. Often, a
missile-only or complex (i.e., Shahed
and missile) attack followed several
days of Shahed-only strikes. Missile-
only attacks are relatively rare and
constitute only 15 percent of the 144
Drawing is approximate and replicated from Adrienne Tong’s illustration in Stephen Kalin, “Behind Ukraine’s reported strikes.
Deadly Drones: Putin’s Invasion and Biden’s Limits,” The Wall Street Journal, August 2, 2023, https://www.
wsj.com/articles/behind-ukraines-deadly-drones-putins-invasion-and-bidens-limits-5f2f2cf. Finally, the Shahed drones have
complemented the missiles in

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 DEFENSE | FEBRUARY 2024
Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

complex massed missile and drone attacks that are are supplementing Ukraine’s early warning with their
harder to defeat than a homogenous salvo. There have own intelligence assets, which may be having a signifi-
been 29 such attacks. As complements, the Shaheds cant impact.313 Ukrainian forces have gotten better at how
serve as penetration aids that increase the chance that they allocate their air defense weapons, preserving the
the missiles reach their targets by confusing and dis- more expensive SAMs for cruise and ballistic missiles
tracting defenders. These diverse strikes could stress and relying more heavily on guns and MANPADs to
and overwhelm Ukrainian defenders or take advantage destroy less sophisticated threats. EW systems that jam
of defenders’ focus on one type of threat, leaving their the Shaheds’ communications or navigation systems
radars and SAMs ill-positioned to stop other inbound would seem to offer a cost-effective way of disabling
weapons. More recently, Russia has deployed its these kamikaze attacks. Yet, because many Shaheds have
Supercam commercial drones with its long-range attacks preprogrammed targets, they are not as reliant on commu-
to improve BDA for these strikes.311 nications as most drones in this war. They do use Russia’s
As Figure 19 shows, the Ukrainians have gotten better satellite navigation system, GLONASS, to navigate to their
at intercepting Shaheds and missiles. One key innovation targets but also have a backup inertial navigation system,
that has enabled this improvement is a crowdsourced making navigational jamming less effective.314 Moreover,
smartphone application that allows users to geotag because many Shaheds fly into civilian areas, they can still
incoming air threats, providing early warning for drone cause significant damage even if they miss their intended
and missile strikes.312 It is also likely that Western nations target and crash into something else.

FIGURE 19: SHAHEDS INTERCEPTED AND RUSSIAN MISSILES FIRED AND INTERCEPTED
Ukraine reports the number of Shahed kamikaze drones that have been intercepted and Russian missiles fired and intercepted. Over time the
size of the missile salvos has declined, and they have been supplemented with Shahed-only strikes. Ukraine has not consistently reported the
number of Shaheds fired.

Rochan Consulting, “Datasets of Russian Missile Strikes and Shahed Strikes,” provided September 22, 2023.

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 @CNASDC

FIGURE 20: RUSSIA’S SHAHED-136 KAMIKAZE DRONE maritime kamikaze drone attacks
Russia has fired thousands of Shahed-136 drones against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. escalated and enabled Kyiv to
contest Russian control over
the Black Sea.316
The world first got a hint
that Ukraine was developing
maritime drones in early October
2022 when an unusual looking,
sleek, small black boat washed
up on the shores in Crimea. The
boat, which was a custom altered
jet ski, was small and low to the
water.317 Additional modifica-
tions, including a camera, a radio
control link, and explosives,
turned the recreational craft into
a weapon.318 Later in the month,
Ukraine launched an air and
maritime attack on the Russian
naval base at Sevastopol.319 At
least seven drone boats pen-
Drawing is approximate and replicated from William Neff’s illustration for Annabelle Timsit, Isabelle
etrated the inner harbor and
Khurshudyan, Adam Taylor, and William Neff, “What Are kamikaze Drones? Here’s How Russia and attacked docked Russian ships,
Ukraine Are Using Them,” The Washington Post, October 18, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/2022/10/17/kamizake-drones-russia-ukraine/. including its flagship, the Admiral
Makarov, and a minesweeper. It
As the war has progressed, both Ukraine and is unclear how much damage this attack inflicted on the
Russia have increasingly utilized kamikaze drones as Russian warships, but it did prompt Russia to enhance
important tactical weapons to destroy mobile military defenses around the base and camouflage the bow and
forces and conduct strategic strikes against fixed stern of its ships by painting them dark colors.320
deep targets. Tactically, loitering munitions or DIY Ukraine has now developed several variants of
FPV drones are best employed with other uncrewed kamikaze drone boats and announced the creation
systems that provide intelligence and targeting data on of the 385th Separate Brigade, which operates these
moving enemy forces to the kamikaze strike platform. systems.321 The drone boats tend to be around 16 feet
Russian long-range kamikazes, such as the Shahed, long and weigh several thousand pounds. Because
have been most effective when fired with cruise and of their larger size, they can typically sail about 500
ballistic missiles. They should be seen as a part of the miles and carry a 600- to 700-pound payload, much
larger missile campaign that Russia has waged against more than most of Ukraine’s aerial drones. 322 Because
Ukraine. In all cases, since these weapons are one-way maritime drones can travel at up to 50 miles per hour
systems, large quantities are needed. and are low to the water, they can sneak up on larger
ships undetected. Moreover, drone boats, which attack
Drone Boats a ship at the waterline instead of from above, have the
While aerial drones are the most prevalent uncrewed potential to cause more damage to a ship than aerial
weapon in Ukraine, the Ukrainians have also used attacks because their explosive charge is aimed at
maritime kamikaze drone boats to attack Russian ships the hull instead of the ship’s superstructure.323 Each
in the Black Sea. Because Ukraine does not have a maritime drone costs about $250,000 and is funded by
large navy, its efforts to counter Russia in the maritime Ukraine’s “army of drones” project.324
domain have been asymmetric. Ukraine has relied on In summer 2023, Ukrainian maritime drones sup-
antiship missiles, such as the Neptune or Harpoon, ported attacks on the Kerch bridge, a Russian oil tanker,
manned and unmanned aircraft attacks, and unmanned and a Russian landing ship in Novorossiysk.325 These
surface vehicles also known as drone boats or maritime attacks are part of Ukrainian’s maritime denial strategy,
drones.315 In spring and summer 2023, Ukraine’s which has sought to push Russia’s naval forces away

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 DEFENSE | FEBRUARY 2024
Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

from Ukraine’s shoreline to bolster the security of its port disconnects between higher headquarters and tactical
cities. Maritime drones have been one of the few areas echelons and between different tactical units, which
where Russia has not tried to copy Ukraine’s ingenious is why each Ukrainian command insisted on having its
use of uncrewed and commercial technology. Drone boat own drones.333 Higher headquarters had more access
attacks have remained a niche part of the overall war to commercial satellite data and analytic tools, such as
effort but have offered Ukraine another means for taking Palantir’s AI target identification application, which was
the fight to Russia, potentially damaging its economy and not shared with subordinate units. Meanwhile, tactical
forcing Moscow to divert more of resources to defensive formations did not share data from their drones up the
operations instead of offensive ones.326 chain of command.334 In February 2023, the Ukrainian
Ministry of Defence formally adopted the Delta appli-
Tactical Battle Networks cation. There have been efforts to develop regional ISR
and Communications centers to improve information sharing, but it is unclear
how successful these have been. 335

T
he war in Ukraine is unique in the level of integra- Additionally, Ukrainian soldiers use Kropyva, more
tion between drones and ground-based fires units, commonly known as “Uber for artillery,” to coordinate
although these connections are not as automated ground-based fires.336 Kropyva is another map-based
as many assume. Although both Ukrainian and Russian application available on tablets and smartphones.
troops have tactical battle networks, Ukrainian forces Ukrainian soldiers upload data on their location and
have excelled at developing open-sourced map-based the location of Russian forces, which is displayed as a
software to fuse information from different sources and composite picture on a map.337 Commanders can use
share it.327 Russia has developed similar propriety MOD Kropyva to help them match weapons to targets based
systems that are not quite as user friendly. Additionally, on their availability and suitability.338 This helps optimize
Russia’s more skilled forces use the military-developed Ukrainian fires and conserve ammunition. When using
Strelets tactical battle network.328 Virtual command Kropyva, Ukrainian troops have been able to attack a
and control networks that connect sensors—mainly on Russian target in as little as 30 seconds after receiving
drones—with shooters have dramatically decreased the
time required to engage dynamic targets. Russia has many command
While both sides use networks and software to connect and control networks, but
drones with ground-based fires units, these systems are
the one that has received the
primarily at the tactical level and do not compile and
provide real-time information from multiple sources. most attention in Ukraine is a
The most well-known mapping programs are Delta and tactical battle control network
Kropyva, which were developed after the 2014 invasion called Strelets.
of Ukraine.329 Aerorozvidka developed Delta, a mapping
software for sharing information and tracking enemy coordinates obtained by drone.339 Using Kropyva not
force movements. Ukrainian troops manually upload only increases the responsiveness of Ukrainian fires, but
information on Russian force locations from drones, sat- also helps Ukraine to coordinate attacks from multiple
ellites, social media, and human intelligence into Delta, directions to ensure a target is destroyed. Finally, by
which then displays this composite information as dif- networking units together, Kropyva enables Ukrainian
ferent layers on a map.330 Because information including artillery batteries to “shoot and scoot”—fire and then
drone footage is uploaded daily to Delta and is not given quickly move to another location—which increases
in real time, the information is not immediately action- their survivability.
able.331 Still, Delta greatly enhances Ukrainian forces’ Russia has prioritized infiltrating Ukraine’s tactical
situational awareness, enables them to more effectively battle networks because of their centrality to Ukrainian
and efficiently task drones to confirm targets, improves operations. Reportedly, a Russian hacker group associated
the routing of drone flights to avoid Russian EW systems with Russian military intelligence moved to the front lines
and air defenses, and allows the sharing of BDA.332 to attempt a close-in infiltration of one of the Ukrainian
Delta is widely employed by Ukrainian troops, systems.340 Russian hackers have also sent phishing emails
but information is often segregated and not shared to Delta users to access the system. Ukraine has attempted
between different echelons and across units at the same to bolster the cybersecurity of its networks and has taken
echelon. For example, in fall 2022, there were significant steps to limit the information available to different users.

37
 @CNASDC

The backbone for all of Ukraine’s military commu- would try to maneuver or launch an assault without at
nications and networks has been SpaceX’s Starlink least one small commercial drone to scout for the unit
satellite communications, which enable high bandwidth and enhance its situational awareness. Because quad-
exchanges.341 In the first 15 months of the war, Ukraine copters are readily available, Ukrainian and Russian
received over 30,000 Starlink terminals, which have troops at every echelon employ them, blanketing the
been used by all frontline Ukrainian troops.342 Starlink front lines with eyes in the sky. Equally importantly,
terminals enable applications such as Delta and Kropyva drones dramatically improve the accuracy of artillery
to function and transmit drone video feeds to command fires, which are the dominant weapon in this war. Drone
posts. Although Starlink has proved quite resilient to spotters enable imprecise indirect fire weapons to have
enemy interference, SpaceX’s president, Elon Musk, precision effects. When drone operators use command
reportedly geofenced Starlink signals so that they would and control networks to share information with artil-
not work in Crimea. Due to Musk’s earlier decision to lery units, they can significantly accelerate targeting
limit Starlink’s reach, a planned Ukrainian attack on cycles, enabling responsive, precise fires. Small FPV
Sevastopol failed when Ukrainian operators lost control kamikaze drones cost a fraction of other weapons and
over their drone boats.343 allow soldiers to attack moving targets beyond their line
Russia has many command and control networks, but of sight, while Ukrainian and Russian forces employ
the one that has received the most attention in Ukraine is long-range kamikaze drones as cheap cruise missiles to
a tactical battle control network called Strelets. Strelets conduct strategic attacks. Individually these are notable
has been a critical system tying together Russian military advancements, but even cumulatively they do not add up
drones and artillery units in its reconnaissance strike to a revolution.
complex. Early in the war, Russian forces either did not According to Andrew Krepinevich, revolutions in
have or did not use Strelets, but over time, more elite military affairs must “fundamentally alte[r] the character
units—such as the airborne or Wagner troops—increas- and conduct of a conflict” by “producing a dramatic
ingly employed this system.344 Strelets not only connects increase—often an order of magnitude or greater—in the
drones and other sensors to fires units, but also connects combat potential and military effectiveness of armed
these lower echelon fires with a command post that can forces.”350 Revolutions in military affairs are so disrup-
assign targets among the different batteries.345 Drone tive that they render old weapons, ways of fighting, and
feeds simultaneously flow to lower level commanders, organizational constructs obsolete. Thus, revolutions
and the command posts and leaders at either echelon can require more than widespread adoption of new tech-
authorize strikes.346 While Strelets helps Russian forces nologies. Additionally, militaries must develop new
share information up and down a chain of command, operational concepts, integrate new capabilities into
they do not often share information across units, an area broader military systems, and adapt their organizational
where Ukraine also struggles.347 Still, Russian artillery culture and structure.351 Not surprisingly, this whole-
fires have become more responsive as its troops have sale sort of change does not often happen during a war
made more widespread use of Strelets.348 Outside of because the combatants are focused on fighting and
Strelets, Russians have more heavily relied on radios and immediate tactical adaptations, not overhauling their
unencrypted analog military systems for communica- doctrine and organization. In the Ukraine war, there have
tions, which are vulnerable to interception.349 been rapid cycles of tactical innovation, emulation, and
the development of new counters. Over time, these cycles
Conclusion could lead to more profound changes in operational
concepts and how Russian and Ukrainian forces are

I
n the ongoing war between Ukraine and Russia, organized, which could truly revolutionize warfare. By
both sides have employed drones to an extent never this standard, Ukraine represents, at best, the early stages
seen before. Because of the ubiquity of drones on the of a revolution, as the effects of drones thus far have been
battlefield and the multiplicity of types, some observers more evolutionary.
conclude that drones are revolutionizing warfare. The Drones have had the most significant impact at the
findings of this report suggest the contrary. Drones have tactical level of warfare. They have provided cheap
not fundamentally altered the character of war and will precision strikes either by directly attacking an enemy or,
not determine who wins or loses this conflict. far more often, directing artillery shells to their intended
Yet drones are transforming how Ukrainian and aim point. Drones have been most impactful when
Russian troops fight. No Ukrainian or Russian unit networked together and connected to ground-based

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Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

fires units. While this type of battle network exists ¡ Volunteer networks have performed an unprece-
at tactical echelons, examples are rudimentary and dented role in acquiring, modifying, and building
still rely on soldiers manually inputting the data commercial and DIY drones for both Ukrainian
and making decisions that are often communicated and Russian troops. Because of a heavy reliance on
through commercial channels, such as WhatsApp commercial or dual-use technologies, patriotic civil-
and Google Meet. Moreover, in both the Ukrainian ians have been able to bolster drone production. They
and Russian militaries there are disconnects between have also led broader efforts to professionalize the use
units and up the chain of command that limit the of drones by identifying best practices and establishing
operational effects of drones. Ultimately, most of training courses. Some of the most skilled drone opera-
the drones being used and lost today are relatively tors on the Ukrainian side first emerged as volunteers,
inexpensive military or commercial drones that have although they have subsequently been incorporated
limited endurance, range, and payload and are suscep- into the military.
tible to countermeasures, especially EW. Instead of
investing in hardening these systems, both sides are ¡ Russia has an edge in military drones, which enables
simply buying or producing more of them. Moreover, its forces to see and strike farther behind the front
the majority of drones are remotely piloted and not lines, while Ukrainian forces have gaps in this area.
fully autonomous. Autonomy may be used in some Russia entered the war with a reasonable inventory
systems, and it could become more prevalent, but cur- of Orlan-10 and ZALA ISR drones and Lancet-3 and
rently, drones are tethered to human operators. KUB-BLA kamikaze drones. These systems have
Beyond this general assessment about whether considerably longer ranges and more endurance than
a revolution in military affairs has occurred, this commercial drones. Russia’s military drone stockpiles
analysis has yielded a number of insights about the proved to be insufficient given the number of Orlan-10s
war in Ukraine and drone warfare more generally: it lost early in the war and the quantity of loitering
munitions it expended, but Russian industry has
In the Ukraine war: bolstered production of its most effective drones and
seems to be meeting the current demand. Russia now
¡ Ukraine has consistently out-innovated Russia has enough Orlan-10 and ZALA surveillance drones
with commercial technologies and software, that Ukrainian forces sometimes do not bother trying
but Russian forces have quickly adapted and to shoot them down because the Ukrainians know that
emulated Ukrainian successes. Ukraine’s volun- the drones will be replaced. In contrast, Ukraine has
teers and its private sector have been an engine for smaller inventories of military drones—both ISR and
innovation and consistently led Ukrainian forces kamikaze variants—which limits its forces’ visibility
to be the first ones to adopt new drone technolo- and reach behind the front lines. This gap may even-
gies and tactics. Ukraine’s ingenuity after the 2014 tually close as Ukraine’s government is investing
Russian invasion resulted in the creation of civilian heavily in its indigenous drone industry. For now, Kyiv
organizations, such as Aerorozvidka, that developed is encouraging thousands of flowers—or drones—to
homemade drones and software. This left Ukraine bloom. Eventually, the government will need to pick
well positioned to immediately use commercial winners and losers so production can be scaled.
drones to defend against Russia’s 2022 attack.
Initially, Ukraine had an overwhelming advantage ¡ In the Ukraine war, drones have operated in stacks
in commercial drones, but by the end of the year rather than swarms. Drones are more effective
Russia had essentially caught up. At the same time, when operated as a part of larger team of unmanned
Ukrainian forces experimented with FPV racing systems. In Ukraine, hunter-kill tactics—where one
drones for kamikaze attacks. They pioneered drone collects intelligence and targeting data and the
this new approach and began creating DIY cheap other armed drone strikes the target—have been used
kamikaze drones. Once again, Russia was a fast extensively by both sides. Beyond tandem tactics,
follower and employed FPV kamikaze drones to stacks of drones, not that dissimilar from stacks of
contest Ukraine’s summer 2023 counteroffensive. manned aircraft, have become common. In a stack,
It is notable that a more centralized and top-down drones are layered in the same vicinity but at different
Russian military and society has been able to altitudes to prevent collision. Longer-range and endur-
rapidly incorporate commercial technologies into ance drones with better sensors are at the top of the
its operations. stack providing persistent coverage of the battlespace

39
 @CNASDC

and cueing other drones if a potential target is spotted. completed by more expensive military systems, such
Below them, there is another intelligence drone that as military drones, traditional manned air forces, and
obtains precise targeting information. A separate drone antitank weapons or artillery. The biggest difference
will often pass that information to ground-based fires is that because the commercially derived versions
units or to kamikaze drone operators, which will then employed in Ukraine are cheap and plentiful, there
strike the target. Drones provide intelligence, including are deeper stockpiles of uncrewed aircraft than have
battle damage assessment, and determine if the target previously been available, enabling drones’ wide-
needs to be reengaged. In contrast, swarms typically spread use. In the Ukraine war, every ground unit can
consist of a greater number of units that autono- be equipped with multiple commercial drones, which
mously coordinate their behavior. The drone stacks dramatically improves the units’ tactical battlefield
in the war in Ukraine have been coordinated through awareness. FPV kamikaze drones do not have the
multiple drone operators using software-based battle firepower of artillery or antitank weapons, but ground
networks or traditional means of communication. forces have a cheap capability to hold at risk moving
Both parties claim to be using artificial intelligence to targets from miles away. Long-range kamikaze drones
improve the drone’s ability to hit its target, but likely its are cheap enough to be used like decoys, yet also have
use is limited. the capability to damage a target, so the enemy must
honor the threat they pose.
¡ Russian and Ukrainian forces are using long-range
kamikaze drones for penetrating strategic strikes. ¡ Surveillance and targeting missions remain more
Ukrainian forces would not have a capability to strike important than drone strikes. Despite the preva-
deep targets inside Russia and Crimea without these lence of videos on social media showing commercial
drones. Russian forces use kamikaze drones to com- quadcopters dropping rocket-propelled grenades on
plement their more expensive long-range cruise and soldiers or crashing into tanks, the most consequen-
ballistic missiles by soaking up Ukrainian SAM inter- tial mission for drones remains collecting intelligence
ceptors, identifying the location of air defenses, and and obtaining targeting information. Ground forces at
creating complex heterogeneous attacks. It is not clear all echelons are employing different types of drones
that strategic strikes weaken public support for the to improve their situational awareness, planning,
war, but they may be diverting scarce air defense assets and operations. When drones are attached to artil-
from the front lines. lery units, they replace human spotters and help to
acquire targets, find their precise locations, track
¡ In the Ukraine war, both sides are experimenting them, and then conduct battle damage assessment.
with counterdrone capabilities. EW is the most effec- Since howitzers provide most of the firepower on
tive way to stop drones, but Ukrainian and Russian the battlefield and the biggest single constraint on
forces are trying counters that range from simple artillery fires is the availability of ammunition, drones
barriers such as wire nets to drone dogfighting. A key are helping conserve shells by making strikes more
part of the drone-counterdrone competition has been precise and thus effective.
finding and attacking drone operators using drone
tracking software such as AeroScope and WindtalkerX. ¡ Commercial drones are making it more difficult to
Because commercial and FPV kamikaze drone opera- concentrate forces, achieve surprise, and conduct
tors must remain near the drone’s operating area, they offensive operations. By providing greater visi-
are vulnerable to attack. bility into enemy troop movements beyond the front
lines, drones have made it difficult for the Ukrainian
More general lessons about drone warfare include:
and Russian militaries to mass forces. Drones may
¡ The accessibility and affordability of drones is launch harassing attacks on troops that are gathering
creating new capabilities at a scale that previously or, more often, feed targeting information to tube
did not exist and transforming the battlefield. The artillery or long-range rockets to engage massed
three primary examples of this are the ubiquity of troops. Dispersion and concealment mitigate this
commercial drones on the front lines, FPV kamikaze vulnerability, but it is challenging for dispersed forces
drones for beyond-line-of-sight antipersonnel and to launch large-scale offensive operations and break
antivehicle attacks, and long-range kamikaze drones through heavily defended front lines. Intelligence col-
for strategic strikes. All of these missions could be lected from satellites also increases the transparency

40
 DEFENSE | FEBRUARY 2024
Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

of the battlefield, but drones enable a more rapid opponent’s air force through air-to-air engagements or
tactical response. Offensive operations are difficult attacks against air bases and suppressing or destroying
but not impossible in this environment. If there are ground-based air defenses. There have been a few
strong defenses in place, prolonged periods of bom- instances of drone dogfighting and kamikaze drone
bardment can weaken the enemy and gradually enable strikes against Russian bomber air bases, but these
territorial gains. missions have been few and far between. Russian troops
have effectively used hunter-killer teams of ISR and
¡ Kamikaze FPV drones offer cheap precision strike kamikaze drones for SEAD operations near the front
capabilities but are tactical beyond-line-of-sight lines. But Russian forces have not been able to destroy
weapons that primarily extend the reach of ground Ukraine’s air defenses, especially its longer-range
forces. Ukrainian forces first experimented with using systems that are in rear areas. Early in the war, Ukraine
FPV drones in kamikaze attacks, but because these used TB2s for interdiction strikes, but since Russian
drones proved effective at hitting exposed and mobile forces activated their air defenses, MALE drone air-
targets, the Russians quickly also adopted them. FPV to-ground strikes have largely ceased. Because neither
drones are essentially very cheap antitank weapons, side has obtained air superiority, they have both relied
but their range is roughly six times that of the most on standoff attacks instead of direct attacks against
advanced antitank weapon. Nevertheless, they are still deep targets.
tactical weapons. Their biggest drawbacks are their
small payload capacity, which limits their destructive ¡ Drones are not more survivable than crewed aircraft,
power, and the fact that FPV drones, unlike modern but instead enable greater risker acceptance. Drones
antitank weapons, are not automated fire and forget are vulnerable to many countermeasures, especially EW,
systems. Instead, FPV drone pilots require training and guns, and SAMs. Like countries discovered the hard way
must be very skilled to effectively steer the fast drones with bomber aircraft in World War II, the drone “will
and crash them into vulnerable parts of an armored not always get through.” But air defenses are not perfect
target. Even though experienced or lucky FPV oper- and there are often seams that can be exploited if one
ators might destroy a tank, more often FPV attacks is willing to undertake dangerous missions. Because
will at most disable large vehicles, which can then be drones are cheap and do not have humans onboard, both
destroyed by follow-on artillery or air strikes. sides have been willing to send them on risky missions
that may have a low probability of succeeding.
¡ Even large numbers of small drones cannot match
the potency of artillery fire. Reusable military and ¡ Drones do not have to be survivable if they are cheap
commercial drones may be armed for ground attack, and plentiful because one can have resiliency through
and kamikaze drones’ primary mission is to conduct reconstitution. Because they are vulnerable, drones
surface strikes. Collectively, drone strikes supplement must be cheap enough and easy enough to manufacture
indirect fire weapons, but they are not substitutes that they can be readily replaced. Thousands of com-
for howitzers. Common artillery shells pack a bigger mercial and DIY drones are lost each month to EW and
explosive punch and can be fired rapidly in large small-arms fire. Despite China’s ban on drone sales to
salvos. Thus, artillery barrages far outstrip the fire- both sides, commercial drones intended for hobbyists
power that even many small drones can collectively that are built by Chinese companies are readily available
deliver. Moreover, drones must be individually piloted to both Russian and Ukrainian forces. These have been
and their actions manually coordinated, which cur- supplemented by DIY drones that rely on commercially
rently limits the size of offensive drone group attacks. available dual-use technology, such as FPV kamikazes,
which are easy to manufacture. Instead of hardening
¡ Drones provide affordable airpower, but they have commercial drones against electronic attacks, which
not replaced traditional air forces or been able to would notably raise the costs, both parties have opted to
obtain air superiority. A core mission of most air instead buy more cheap drones. The logic of resiliency
forces is obtaining and maintaining air superiority— through reconstitution also applies to military drones.
that is, the freedom to conduct operations in the air, Russia, for example, has significantly bolstered produc-
which include protecting against enemy aerial attacks tion of its Orlan-10 and Lancet-3 drones, replenishing
and conducting offensive air-to-ground operations. the systems that had been lost or expended throughout
Obtaining air superiority typically entails destroying an the conflict.

41
 @CNASDC

In the Ukraine war, drones have become an

increasingly important weapon, but they have not revo-
lutionized warfare. Nonetheless, Ukrainian forces have
extensively employed drones to gain an asymmetric edge
over a superior Russian force. Russian forces have been
fast followers and emulated Ukraine’s use of commercial
drones to a surprising degree given the Russian MOD’s
reluctance to officially embrace private-sector technolo-
gies. Russian forces have employed their military-grade
and kamikaze drones as a part of the reconnaissance fires
complex, allowing them to increasingly leverage their
greater firepower. Throughout the war, there have been
rapid cycles of adaptation as both sides have learned
from each other, adopting tactics and technologies that
have been used successfully and developing counters to
improve their defenses. This pattern is likely to continue
as the war drags on. It is clear that drones alone will not
determine who prevails in this conflict, but they will
certainly play a prominent role in the ongoing war in
Ukraine and in other battlefields in the future.

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 DEFENSE | FEBRUARY 2024
Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

1. This is similar to the conclusion that Shashank Joshi 9. Kelley Sayler, A World of Proliferated Drones: A Technology
reached in his special report. Shashank Joshi, “Ypres with Primer (Center for a New American Security, June 2015),
AI,” The Economist, July 8, 2023, https://www.economist. 11, https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/
com/special-report/2023/07/03/the-war-in-ukraine- hero/documents/CNAS-World-of-Drones_052115.pdf?m-
shows-how-technology-is-changing-the-battlefield. time=20160906082154&focal=none.

2. Isabelle Khurshudyan, Mary Ilyushina, and Kostian- 10. The author uses the terms “close fight” and “deep fight” to
tyn Khudov, “Russia and Ukraine Are Fighting the describe how drones were employed in different parts of
First Full-Scale Drone War,” The Washington Post, the battlespace. This terminology comports with how the
December 2, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ U.S. Air Force approaches counterland operations, which
world/2022/12/02/drones-russia-ukraine-air-war/; John is delineated by the fire support coordination line (FSCL).
Hudson and Kostiantyn Khudov, “The War in Ukraine Is Targets within the FSCL are considered close air support
Spurring a Revolution in Drone Warfare Using AI,” The and require integration with ground forces, while targets
Washington Post, July 26, 2023, https://www.washington- beyond the FSCL are considered air interdiction or stra-
post.com/world/2023/07/26/drones-ai-ukraine-war-in- tegic strikes and do not require coordination with ground
novation/. forces. This is not dissimilar to how the U.S. Army thinks
about deep operations, although the U.S. Air Force’s
3. Eric Schmidt, “The Future of War Has Come in Ukraine: conception is broader than the Army’s. The Russians also
Drone Swarms,” The Wall Street Journal, July 7, 2023, have a concept of deep attack. For more, see Air Force
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-future-of-war-has- Doctrine Publication (AFDP) 3-03 Counterland Operations
come-in-ukraine-drone-swarms-kamikaze-kyiv-31dd19d7; (U.S. Air Force, October 21, 2020), 9, https://www.doc-
Hudson and Khudov, “The War in Ukraine Is Spurring trine.af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-03/3-03-AF-
a Revolution in Drone Warfare Using AI”; and Stephen DP-COUNTERLAND.pdf; Army Techniques Publication
Witt, “The Turkish Drone That Changed the Nature of ATP 3-94.2 Deep Operations (Headquarters Department
Warfare,” The New Yorker, May 9, 2022, https://www. of the Army, September 2016), 1-2, https://armypubs.army.
newyorker.com/magazine/2022/05/16/the-turkish- mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ATP%203-94x2%20
drone-that-changed-the-nature-of-warfare. FINAL%20WEB.pdf; and Jack D. Kem, ed., Deep Opera-
tions: Theoretical Approaches to Fighting Deep (Fort Leav-
4. Stephen Biddle, “Back in the Trenches: Why New Tech- enworth, KS: Army University Press, 2021), https://www.
nology Hasn’t Revolutionized Warfare in Ukraine,” For- armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/
eign Affairs, August 10, 2023, https://www.foreignaffairs. images/LSCO%20DeepOps%20book%20interactive%20
com/ukraine/back-trenches-technology-warfare; Antonio with%20cover%20spread%2012Nov21.pdf.
Calcara et al., “Why Drones Have Not Revolutionized
War: The Enduring Hider-Finder Competition in Air War- 11. The author has named the phases of the close fight by the
fare,” International Security 46, no. 4 (Spring 2022): 130- starting date of the initial attack. At times, an offensive
171, https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/46/4/130/111172/ extends beyond the season in which it began.
Why-Drones-Have-Not-Revolutionized-War-The.
12. Ian Williams, Putin’s Missile War: Russia’s Strike Cam-
5. This is similar to the conclusion that Shashank Joshi paign in Ukraine (Center for Strategic and International
reached in his special report. Joshi, “Ypres with AI.” Studies, May 2023), 5, https://www.csis.org/analysis/
putins-missile-war; Justin Bronk, Nick Reynolds, and Jack
6. Joshi, “Ypres with AI.” Watling, The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements
for Air Defence (Royal United Services Institute, Novem-
7. Military innovation is defined as a “change in operational
ber 7, 2022), 7-8, https://static.rusi.org/SR-Russian-Air-
praxis that produces a significant increase in military ef-
War-Ukraine-web-final.pdf; and Mykhaylo Zabrodskyi et
fectiveness,” and therefore is a lower bar than a revolution
al., Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from
in military affairs. Adam R. Grissom, Caitlin Lee, and Karl
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February-July 2022 (Royal
Mueller, Innovation in the United States Air Force: Evi-
United Services Institute, November 30, 2022), 24, https://
dence from Six Cases (RAND Corporation, 2016), 1, https://
static.rusi.org/359-SR-Ukraine-Preliminary-Lessons-Feb-
www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1207.html.
July-2022-web-final.pdf.
8. Samuel Bendett (@sambendett) and Michael Kofman (@
13. Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, Operation Z: The Death
KofmanMichael), “Drones in Ukraine – swarms, groups
Throes of an Imperial Delusion (Royal United Services
and volunteer-driven tech,” Twitter Spaces, August 2,
Institute, April 22, 2022), 2, https://static.rusi.org/spe-
2023, https://twitter.com/i/spaces/1mnxeRpLMAAKX-
cial-report-202204-operation-z-web.pdf.
?s=20; Dmitri Alperovitch, “How Drones Are Changing
the Nature of Warfare in Ukraine,” July 24, 2023, in Geo- 14. Rob Lee, “The Tank Is Not Obsolete, and Other Obser-
politics Decanted, produced by Silverado, podcast, MP3 vations about the Future of Combat,” War on the Rocks,
audio, 56:28, https://podcast.silverado.org/episodes/how- September 6, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/09/
drones-are-changing-the-nature-of-warfare-in-ukraine. the-tank-is-not-obsolete-and-other-observations-about-
the-future-of-combat/; Michael Kofman and Rob Lee,

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 @CNASDC

“Not Built for Purpose: The Russian Military’s Ill-Fated 20. Zabrodskyi et al., Preliminary Lessons in Conventional
Force Design,” War on the Rocks, June 2, 2022, https:// Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Febru-
warontherocks.com/2022/06/not-built-for-purpose-the- ary-July 2022, 28-29.
russian-militarys-ill-fated-force-design/; Zabrodskyi et
al., Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from 21. Bronk, Watling, and Reynolds, The Russian Air War and
Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February-July 2022, 26-28; Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence, 4.
and Bronk, Watling, and Reynolds, The Russian Air War
and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence, 3. 22. Zabrodskyi et al., Preliminary Lessons in Conventional
Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Febru-
15. Zabrodskyi et al., Preliminary Lessons in Conventional ary-July 2022, 33-34; Bronk, Watling, and Reynolds, The
Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Febru- Russian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air
ary-July 2022, 26-28; Mason Clark, George Barros, and Defence, 7.
Katya Stepanenko, Russian Offensive Campaign Assess-
ment, February 26, 2022 (Institute for the Study of War, 23. Andrew S. Bowen, Russia’s War in Ukraine: Military and
February 26, 2022), https://www.understandingwar.org/ Intelligence Aspects (Congressional Research Service,
backgrounder/russia-ukraine-warning-update-russian-of- September 14, 2023), 7, https://crsreports.congress.gov/
fensive-campaign-assessment-february-26. product/pdf/R/R47068.

16. Liam Collins, Michael Kofman, and John Spencer, “The 24. Jeffrey A. Edmonds and Samuel Bendett, Russia’s Use of
Battle of Hostomel Airport: A Key Moment in Russia’s De- Uncrewed Systems in Ukraine (CNA, March 2023), 3-9,
feat in Kyiv,” War on the Rocks, August 10, 2023, https:// https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/03/Russian-Un-
warontherocks.com/2023/08/the-battle-of-hostomel-air- crewed-Systems-Ukraine.pdf.
port-a-key-moment-in-russias-defeat-in-kyiv/.
25. Edmonds and Bendett, Russia’s Use of Uncrewed Sys-
17. Rob Lee (@RALee85), “Video of a Ukrainian TB2 strike tems in Ukraine; Samuel Bendett (@sambendett), “26/
on a Russian Buk-M1-2 9A310M1-2 TELAR in Zhytomyr Another Russian Orlan-10 loss,” X (formerly Twit-
Oblast,” X (formerly Twitter), February 28, 2022, https:// ter), April 2, 2022, https://twitter.com/sambendett/
twitter.com/RALee85/status/1498328073950973957; status/1510230041547968516; Rob Lee (@RALee85),
Rob Lee (@RALee85), “Another video of a Ukrainian “The Russian MoD published a video likely taken by an
TB2 UCAV strike, presumably with a MAM muni- Orlan-10 UAV reportedly showing Krasnopol laser-guid-
tion, on a Russian Buk system,” X (formerly Twitter), ed artillery strikes in Kyiv Oblast,” X (formerly Twitter),
February 27, 2022, https://twitter.com/RALee85/ March 12, 2022, https://twitter.com/RALee85/sta-
status/1498155219657674756; Ministry of Defence of tus/1502698032038559753; Rob Lee (@RALee85), “The
Ukraine, “Повітряні Сили ЗС України самовіддано і Russian MoD published another video from an Orlan-10
майстерно захищають Україну з неба – Валерій Залужний UAV allegedly showing a Krasnopol laser-guided artillery
[The Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine selflessly strike on a Ukrainian command post,” X (formerly Twit-
and skillfully defends Ukraine from the sky - Valery Zalu- ter), March 13, 2022, https://twitter.com/RALee85/sta-
zhnyi],” press release, March 1, 2022, https://www.mil.gov. tus/1502897934874165253; Rob Lee (@RALee85), “Video
ua/news/2022/03/01/povitryani-sili-zs-ukraini-samov- from an Orlan-10 UAV of a Russian strike on a Ukrainian
iddano-i-majsterno-zahishhayut-ukrainu-z-ne- position,” X (formerly Twitter), March 13, 2022, https://
ba-%E2%80%93-valerij-zaluzhnij/; and Billy Perrigo, twitter.com/RALee85/status/1503226808778604547;
“Ukraine’s Secret Weapon Against Russia: Turkish Rob Lee (@RALee85), “Russian MoD video from an
Drones,” Time, March 1, 2022, https://time.com/6153197/ Orlan-10 UAV showing a strike on what they claim are
ukraine-russia-turkish-drones-bayraktar/. two Ukrainian military vehicles,” X (formerly Twitter),
March 15, 2022, https://twitter.com/RALee85/sta-
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com/world/2022/mar/28/the-drone-operators-who- oryxspioenkop), “#Ukraine: Newly added Ukrainian
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November 5, 2023.

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 DEFENSE | FEBRUARY 2024
Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

sance drone (destroyed) 1x Leleka-100 reconnaissance netsk-to-avoid-encirclement-11656056814; Johnathan

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 @CNASDC

43. “How Ukraine Is Winning the Drone-Jamming War,” The The Washington Post, December 29, 2022, https://www.
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teroffensive That Shocked Putin and Reshaped the War,” of the footage of strikes is old.” X (formerly Twitter),

46
 DEFENSE | FEBRUARY 2024
Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

October 27, 2022, https://twitter.com/RALee85/sta- 75. Tatarigami_UA (@Tatarigami_UA), “Impressive thread

tus/1585810592543043584; Rob Lee (@RALee85), was done by the @Black_BirdGroup about defenses
“Video of Russian Lancet loitering munition strikes in the south. In relation to this subject, I’d like to add
on a Ukrainian Gyurza gunboat, two M109 howitzers additional insights and context. My intention is not
in Kherson, and a 36D6 radar.” X (formerly Twitter), to critique their presented report, but to emphasize
November 4, 2022, https://twitter.com/RALee85/ crucial details that need to be added. Thread,” X (for-
status/1588514816888475648; Rob Lee (@RALee85), merly Twitter), August 29, 2023, https://twitter.com/
“Video of a Russian Lancet loitering munition strike on a Tatarigami_UA/status/1696564228331655559; Thomas
Ukrainian M777 howitzer in Kherson Oblast.” X (for- Gibbons-Neff, Josh Holder, and Marco Hernandez, “21
merly Twitter), November 5, 2022, https://twitter.com/ Miles of Obstacles,” The New York Times, June 28, 2023,
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world/europe/ukraine-counteroffensive-obstacles.
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ping munitions on a concealed Russian BMD-2 in Kherson Brinson, and Emma Brown, “Russia’s Vast Fortifications
Oblast.” X (formerly Twitter), October 27, 2022, https:// in Ukraine, Visualized,” The Wall Street Journal, Sep-
twitter.com/RALee85/status/1585620198102556676; Rob tember 2, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/
Lee (@RALee85), “SBU Alpha Group servicemen employ- russia-defense-ukraine-trenches-dragon-teeth-visual-
ing a loitering munition and a quad copter UAV to drop ized-614a4910?mod=hp_lead_pos7; Pasi Paroinen (@
munitions on a Russian tank in the Kherson direction.” X Inkvisiit) “We have decided to release a series of full
(formerly Twitter), September 28, 2022, https://twitter. satellite images used to construct this thread, since at
com/RALee85/status/1575239152521871360. this point they are nearly five months old (13MAR23)
and could be useful for geolocation as well as providing
66. “Russia’s Vaunted Second Offensive Is a Damp Squib,” The some transparency on the methods used in the original
Economist, February 23, 2023, https://www.economist. analysis.” X (formerly Twitter), July 31, 2023, https://
com/europe/2023/02/23/russias-vaunted-second-offen- twitter.com/Inkvisiit/status/1686076915952599044;
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68. Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 9 January
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– 15 January 2023 (Weekly update),” Rochan Consulting
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tion-ukraines-counteroffensive-at-three-months/.
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ten correspondence with the author, November 5, 2023.

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 @CNASDC

2023), 56, https://rochan-consulting.com/wp-content/ 87. Bendett and Kofman, “Drones in Ukraine.”

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the Technological Revolution on Ukraine Battlefields Trofimov, “Drones Everywhere: How the Technological
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22, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/22/world/ mikaze-drones-2023-05-26/; Sakshi Tiwari, “Delivery
europe/ukraine-budget-drones-russia.html; Jack Watling of Russia’s Deadly Orlan-10 & Orlan-30 UAVs Have
and Nick Reynolds, Stormbreak: Fighting through Russian Increased by a Whopping 53 Times Since SMO: RuMoD,”
Defences in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive, 8, https://static.rusi. The EurAsian Times, July 12, 2023, https://www.eurasian-
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30-drones/.
85. Kramer, “Budget Drones Prove Their Value in a Bil-
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- 15 July – 21 July 2023 (Weekly update).”
86. Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 15 July –
21 July 2023 (Weekly update),” Rochan Consulting on 92. Muzyka (@rochanconsulting), “Ukraine Conflict Monitor
Substack, 21, 2023, https://rochanconsulting.substack. - 15 July – 21 July 2023 (Weekly update).”
com/p/ukraine-conflict-monitor-15-july; Rob Lee (@
RALee85), “Videos of Ukrainian FPV loitering muni- 93. Muzyka (@rochanconsulting), “Ukraine Conflict Monitor
tion strikes on two Russian T-80BV tanks, a BMP-3, - 15 July – 21 July 2023 (Weekly update).”
and a 2S3 Akatsiya near Robotyne and Zherebyanky,
94. Air Force Doctrine Publication 3-70, Strategic Attack (U.S.
Zaporizhzhia Oblast and possibly Donetsk.” X (formerly
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Twitter), June 19, 2023, https://twitter.com/RALee85/
af.mil/Portals/61/documents/AFDP_3-70/3-70-AF-
status/1670862308233412608; Rob Lee (@RALee85),
DP-STRATEGIC-ATTACK.pdf.
“Ukrainian FPV loitering munition strikes on a Russian
BTR-82 and soldier in a trench.” X (formerly Twit- 95. Williams, Putin’s Missile War, 6-7; Bronk, Watling, and
ter), June 19, 2023, https://twitter.com/RALee85/sta- Reynolds, The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Require-
tus/1670843181678706718; Rob Lee (@RALee85), “Rybar ments for Air Defence, 34.
claimed that Ukraine’s 46th Airmobile Brigade has been
fighting near Robotyne, and Ukraine’s 82nd Air Assault 96. Williams, Putin’s Missile War, 9; Bronk, Watling, and
Brigade also posted a video of an FPV strike yesterday.” Reynolds, The Russian Air War and Ukrainian Require-
X (formerly Twitter), August 12, 2023, https://twitter. ments for Air Defence, 31.
com/RALee85/status/1690450489941389312; Rob Lee
(@RALee85), “Footage of another FPV loitering muni- 97. Williams, Putin’s Missile War, 9.
tion strike on a Russian UMZ minelayer.” X (formerly
Twitter), June 16, 2023, https://twitter.com/RALee85/ 98. “Ukraine Is Betting on Drones to Strike Deep into Russia,”
status/1669789955218874369; Konrad Muzyka (@ro- The Economist, March 20, 2023, https://www.economist.
chanconsulting), “Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 19 August com/europe/2023/03/20/ukraine-is-betting-on-drones-
– 25 August 2023(Weekly update),” Rochan Consulting to-strike-deep-into-russia; Mary Ilyushina, “Ukraine
on Substack, August 25, 2023, https://rochanconsulting. Strikes Another Russian Air Base, Showing Vulnerability
substack.com/p/ukraine-conflict-monitor-19-august; of Defenses,” The Washington Post, December 6, 2022,
Rob Lee (@RALee85), “Russian FPV loitering munition https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/06/
strikes, possibly on abandoned vehicles.” X (formerly ukraine-drones-russian-airfield-attacks/.
Twitter), June 17, 2023, https://twitter.com/RALee85/
status/1670124976710533123; and Rob Lee (@RALee85), 99. Thomas Newdick, “‘Kamikaze’ Drones Strike Russian
“A Russian FPV loitering munition strike on a Ukrainian Oil Refinery, Looks Like Model Sold on Alibaba,” The
T-72H tank in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The first attempt is a War Zone, June 22, 2022, https://www.thedrive.com/
miss.” X (formerly Twitter), June 11, 2023, https://twitter. the-war-zone/kamikaze-drones-strike-russian-oil-refin-
com/RALee85/status/1667970471025934336. ery-looks-like-model-sold-on-alibaba.

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Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

100. Howard Altman, “Russia Increasingly Feeling Sting of 2022, https://www.cnn.com/2022/10/08/europe/crimea-

War behind the Lines,” The War Zone, August 18, 2022, bridge-explosion-intl-hnk/index.html.
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/russia-increas-
ingly-feeling-sting-of-war-behind-the-lines. 109. Ian Lovett, Isabel Coles, and Mauro Orru, “Russia Un-
leashes Its Biggest Barrage of Strikes on Ukraine Since
101. Andrew Roth, Isobel Koshiw, and Pjotr Sauer, “Russia Invasion,” The Wall Street Journal, October 10, 2022,
Claims Five Injured in Ukraine Drone Attack on Black https://www.wsj.com/articles/explosions-rock-kyiv-in-
Sea Fleet HQ,” The Guardian, July 31, 2022, https://www. first-attack-on-ukraines-capital-in-months-11665384662.
theguardian.com/world/2022/jul/31/russia-claims-
ukraine-drone-attack-black-sea-fleet-headquarters. 110. Konrad Muzyka, “Ukraine Conflict Monitor - 26 August
– 1 September 2023,” Rochan Consulting on Substack,
102. Thomas Newdick, “Drone Strike on Black Sea Fleet Head- September 1, 2023, https://rochanconsulting.substack.
quarters Likely a Sign of What’s to Come,” The War Zone, com/p/ukraine-conflict-monitor-26-august.
August 1, 2022, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/
drone-strike-on-black-sea-fleet-headquarters-likely-a- 111. Bronk, Watling, and Reynolds, The Russian Air War and
sign-of-whats-to-come. Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence, 33.

103. Samuel Oakford and Joyce Sohyun Lee, “At Least Six 112. Joshua Yaffa, “The Impact of Russian Missile Strikes on
Explosions Hit Crimea Air Base in Nearly an Hour,” Ukraine’s Power Grid,” The New Yorker, February 20,
The Washington Post, August 14, 2022, https://www. 2023, https://www.newyorker.com/culture/photo-booth/
washingtonpost.com/investigations/2022/08/14/ the-impact-of-russian-missile-strikes-on-ukraines-pow-
crimea-airbase-attack/; Julian Hayda, “Who Was Be- er-grid; Bronk, Watling, and Reynolds, The Russian Air
hind the Explosions in Crimea? Ukraine and Russia War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence, 34; and
Aren’t Saying,” NPR, August 13, 2022, https://www.npr. Megan Specia and Andrew E. Kramer, “Russian Barrage
org/2022/08/12/1116994504/russia-ukraine-crimea-air- Targets Power, Water and Heat for Ukraine’s Civilians,”
base-explosions. The New York Times, October 18, 2022, https://www.
nytimes.com/2022/10/18/world/europe/ukraine-rus-
104. Hyder Abbasi, “Drone Hits Russia’s Black Sea Fleet sia-blackout-water.html.
Headquarters in Crimea,” NBC News, August 21, 2022,
https://www.cnbc.com/2022/08/21/drone-hits-russias- 113. Yaffa, “The Impact of Russian Missile Strikes on
black-sea-fleet-headquarters-in-crimea.html; Tyler Ro- Ukraine’s Power Grid”; Marc Santora, “How Ukraine’s
goway, “Ukraine Situation Report: Shadowy Long-Range Power Grid Survived So Many Russian Bombings,” The
Kamikaze Drone Strikes Again,” The War Zone, August New York Times, April 11, 2023, https://www.nytimes.
20, 2022, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/ com/2023/04/11/world/europe/ukraine-war-infrastruc-
ukraine-situation-report-shadowy-long-range-kamakaze- ture.html.
drone-strikes-again; Interview with B, in written corre-
spondence with the author, October 5, 2023. 114. Paul Sandle, “Britain to Donate Air Defence Missiles
to Ukraine,” Reuters, October 12, 2022, https://www.
105. Edmonds and Bendett, Russia’s Use of Uncrewed Systems reuters.com/world/uk/britain-donate-air-defence-
in Ukraine, 31. missiles-ukraine-2022-10-12/; Becky Sullivan and Tom
Bowman, “The U.S. Will Send a Patriot Air Defense
106. Marc Santora, “Ukraine Warns of Growing Attacks by System to Ukraine. How Will It Help?” NPR, December
Drones Iran Has Supplied to Russia,” The New York 21, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/12/21/1144662505/
Times, September 25, 2022, https://www.nytimes. us-ukraine-patriot-missile-system.
com/2022/09/25/world/europe/ukraine-drones-iran-
russia.html; Bronk, Watling, and Reynolds, The Russian 115. Interview D, in discussion with the author, March 9, 2023.
Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence, 32. For attack size and number reported intercepted, see
Muzyka (@rochanconsulting), “Ukraine Conflict Monitor
107. Howard Altman and Tyler Rogoway, “Ukrainian Kamikaze - 26 August – 1 September 2023.”
Drone Attacks Bomber Base Deep in Russia (Updated),”
The War Zone, October 7, 2022, https://www.thedrive. 116. Muzyka (@rochanconsulting), “Ukraine Conflict Monitor
com/the-war-zone/ukrainian-kamikaze-drone-attacks- - 26 August – 1 September 2023”; Williams, Putin’s Missile
bomber-base-deep-in-russia. War, 15.

108. Olena Harmash, “Ukraine’s SBU Claims Responsibility 117. Muzyka (@rochanconsulting), “Ukraine Conflict Monitor
for Last Year’s Crimea Bridge Blast,” Reuters, July 26, - 26 August – 1 September 2023”; Henry Foy et al., “Mili-
2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraines- tary Briefing: Ukraine Pleads for Missiles as Air Defence
sbu-claims-responsibility-last-years-crimea-bridge- Stocks Run Low,” Financial Times, April 19, 2023, https://
blast-2023-07-26/; Hannah Ritchie, Tim Lister, and Josh www.ft.com/content/9e68f9d6-0c0e-4d71-adc0-9a95f-
Pennington, “Massive Blast Cripples Parts of Crimea-Rus- c57ad4d.
sia Bridge, in Blow to Putin’s War Effort,” CNN, October 8,
118. John C.K. Daly, “Ukraine Launches Unprecedented

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Drone Attack on Russian Black Sea Fleet’s Sevas- 128. Yaroslav Trofimov and Ann M. Simmons, “Ukrainian
topol Headquarters,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, No- Drones Strike Deep inside Russia, Hitting Military Air-
vember 8, 2022, https://jamestown.org/program/ field, Other Targets,” The Wall Street Journal, August 30,
ukraine-launches-unprecedented-drone-attack-on-rus- 2023, https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/ukrainian-
sian-black-sea-fleets-sevastopol-headquarters/. drones-strike-deep-inside-russia-hitting-military-air-
field-other-targets-e42ca54; Polina Ivanova, Courtney
119. H I Sutton, “Ukraine’s Maritime Drone Strikes Weaver, and John Paul Rathbone, “Ukraine Launches
Again: Reports Indicate Attack on Novorossiysk,” Biggest Drone Attack Yet inside Russian Territory,”
Naval News, November 18, 2022, https://www.na- Financial Times, August 20, 2023, https://www.ft.com/
valnews.com/naval-news/2022/11/ukraine-mari- content/3cf2c4cb-804d-4e2f-891d-c200ca988cdd.
time-drone-strikes-again-reports-indicate-attack-on-no-
vorossiysk/. 129 . “New Footage Shows Moment of Drone Strike on Pskov
Airport, Launched from Inside Russia, Says Ukraine,”
120. Ilyushina, “Ukraine Strikes Another Russian Air Base, Sky News, September 1, 2023, https://news.sky.com/
Showing Vulnerability of Defenses.” video/new-footage-shows-moment-of-drone-strike-
on-pskov-airport-launched-from-inside-russia-says-
121. Andrew E. Kramer, Michael Schwirtz, and Marc Santora, ukraine-12952539.
“Ukraine Targets Bases Deep in Russia, Showing Ex-
panded Reach,” The New York Times, December 5, 2022, 130. Marc Santora and Ivan Nechepurenko, “Ukraine’s At-
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/05/world/europe/ tacks in Russia Aimed at Degrading Moscow’s Ability to
ukraine-russia-military-bases.html. Wage War,” The New York Times, July 31, 2023, https://
www.nytimes.com/2023/07/31/world/europe/ukraine-
122. Jake Horton, Olga Robinson, and Daniele Palumbo, russia-drone-strikes.html.
“What Do We Know About Drone Attacks in Russia?”
BBC, September 1, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/news/ 131. Given the rapid pace of innovation on the ground in
world-europe-65475333#. Ukraine and the main different types of indigenously
produced drones, this list is certainly incomplete.
123. Christiaan Triebert et al., “Ukraine’s Other Coun-
teroffensive: Drone Attacks on Russian Soil,” The 132. “Bayraktar TB2,” Baykar, https://baykartech.com/en/
New York Times, July 31, 2023, https://www.nytimes. uav/bayraktar-tb2/; “FLYEYE,” WEB Group America,
com/2023/07/31/world/europe/ukraine-drone-strikes- https://wbgroupamerica.com/product/flyeye/; “Fly
russia.html. Eye Uncrewed Aerial System (UAS), Poland,” Army
Technology, https://www.army-technology.com/
124. Michael Schwirtz, “Kremlin Blasts Were Real. The Rest projects/fly-eye-unmanned-aerial-vehicle/?cf-view;
Is Hazy, Maybe Intentionally,” The New York Times, May David Hambling, “Every. Single. Drone. Fighting in
4, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/04/world/ Russia’s War against Ukraine,” Popular Mechanics,
europe/kremlin-drone-explosions-analysis.html; Julian June 23, 2022, https://www.popularmechanics.com/
E. Barnes et al., “Ukrainians Were Likely Behind Kremlin military/a40298287/drone-fighting-ukraine-war-
Drone Attack, U.S. Officials Say,” The New York Times, russia/; “PD-1 Unmanned Aerial System,” UKRSPEC
May 24, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/24/ Systems, https://ukrspecsystems.com/drones/pd-1-
us/politics/ukraine-kremlin-drone-attack.html; and vtol; “Punisher,” UA Dynamics, https://uadynamics.
Veronika Melkozerova, “Drones Hit Moscow City Center com/; “Puma AE RQ-20B,” AeroVironment datasheet,
in Latest Attack on Russian Territory,” Politico, July 30, https://www.avinc.com/images/uploads/product_docs/
2023, https://www.politico.eu/article/drone-attack-mos- PumaAE_Datasheet_2017_Web_v1.1.pdf; “Design and
cow-city-center-kremlin-ukraine-war/. Production of Unmanned Aviation Vehicles (UAV),”
DeViRo, 4-6, https://res2.weblium.site/res/5d-
125. Sebastien Roblin, “Hobby Drones Had a Little Fun and
fe007809892000216e9925/5e3c78888cf2ee0021b310a1;
Drove Russian Bombers Out of Their Base,” Popular Me-
“A1-CM Furia,” LLC SPC Athlon Avia, https://ath-
chanics, August 24, 2023, https://www.popularmechan-
lonavia.com/en/furia/; “ScanEagle,” Insitu, https://
ics.com/military/aviation/a44881505/hobby-drones-
www.insitu.com/products/scaneagle; “From Dolphins
drive-russian-bombers-out-of-base/.
to Destroyers: The ScanEagle UAV,” Defense Industry
126. Triebert et al., “Ukraine’s Other Counteroffensive: Drone Daily, December 30, 2022, https://www.defenseindus-
Attacks on Russian Soil”; “Inside Ukraine’s Drone War trydaily.com/from-dolphins-to-destroyers-the-scanea-
against Putin.” gle-uav-04933/#:~:text=ScanEagle%20carries%20a%20
stabilized%20electro,endurance%20of%20over%20
127. Susie Blann, “Russia Downs 20 Drones over Crimea 20%20hours; “Vector: Mid-range eVTOL Fixed-Wing
following a Spate of Attacks on Moscow,” The Associat- sUAS,” Quantum Systems, https://quantum-systems.
ed Press, August 12, 2023, https://apnews.com/article/ com/vector/; Anton Mikhnenko, “Spectator-M1: Mission
crimea-drones-russia-ukraine-war-de83d603e64ab85e- Successful,” Defense Express, September 9, 2019, https://
48ae37be27997caf. en.defence-ua.com/weapon_and_tech/spectator_m1_
mission_successful-1644.html; “Raven,” AeroVironment,

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Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

https://www.avinc.com/uas/raven; “Bayraktar Mini UAV,” TB2 UCAV strike, presumably with a MAM munition, on
Baykar, https://baykartech.com/en/uav/bayraktar-mini- a Russian Buk system.”; and Zabrodskyi et al., Preliminary
iha/; and Hambling, “Every. Single. Drone. Fighting in Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Inva-
Russia’s War against Ukraine.” sion of Ukraine: February-July 2022, 29.

133. Ayla Jean Yackley, “Ukraine Army Hails Turkish Drones 137. Samuel Bendett and Jeffrey Edmonds, Russian Military
but Ankara Plays Down Weapons Sales,” Financial Times, Autonomy in a Ukraine Conflict (CNA, February 2022),
March 12, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/7529a862- 1, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/Russian-Mili-
7928-4b4e-a4c5-b2f50747d1f6. tary-Autonomy-in-a-Ukraine-Conflict.pdf.

134. Burak Ege Bekdil, “Ukraine Is Set to Buy 24 Turkish 138. Zabrodskyi et al., Preliminary Lessons in Conventional
Drones. So Why Hasn’t Russia Pushed Back?” Defense Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Febru-
News, September 29, 2021, https://www.defensenews. ary-July 2022, 30; Bronk, Watling, and Reynolds, The Rus-
com/unmanned/2021/09/29/ukraine-is-set-to-buy- sian Air War and Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence,
24-turkish-drones-so-why-hasnt-russia-pushed-back/; 16; and Oryx (@oryxspioenkop), “#Ukraine:Newly added
Interview A, in written correspondence with the author, Ukrainian equipment losses: 1x Bayraktar TB2 UCAV (de-
November 5, 2023. stroyed) 1x T-64B1M MBT (abandoned) 1x 9P148 Konkurs
ATGM carrier (destroyed) 1x BTR-4 IFV (captured) 1x
135. Rob Lee (@RALee85), “Another video of a Ukrainian TB2 BTR-70 APC (destroyed) Full list:” X (formerly Twitter),
UCAV strike, presumably with a MAM munition, on a March 17, 2022, accessed September 30, 2023, account
Russian Buk system. Looks like the strike is on a Buk-M2 deleted October 2023.
9A316 TEL/transloader with a 9A317 TELAR next to it,”
X (formerly Twitter), February 27, 2022, https://twitter. 139. Zabrodskyi et al., Preliminary Lessons in Conventional
com/RALee85/status/1498155219657674756; Stijn Mitzer Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Febru-
et al., “A Monument of Victory: The Bayraktar TB2 Kill ary-July 2022, 37.
List,” Oryx, February 23, 2022, https://www.oryxspioen-
kop.com/2021/12/a-monument-of-victory-bayraktar-tb2. 140. Derek Gatopoulos and Suzan Fraser, “Cheap but Lethal
html. Turkish Drones Bolster Ukraine’s Defenses,” The Associ-
ated Press, March 17, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/
136. Interview E, in discussion with the author, March 3, 2022; russia-ukraine-middle-east-africa-libya-europe-ec-
Rob Lee (@RALee85) “This looks like a legitimate video b9e820ea4bddb4464d7e8cb40e82fc.
of a Ukrainian TB2 UCAV strike on a Russian military
column.” X (formerly Twitter), February 27, 2022, https:// 141. Rob Lee (@RALee85), “I think the sinking of the
twitter.com/RALee85/status/1497861256975249411; Rob Moskva may have caused the Russian Navy to keep
Lee (@RALee85) “Another video of the TB2 UCAV strike its ships farther away from Snake Island because of
on a Russian column in Kherson.” X (formerly Twit- the threat from Neptun missiles.” X (formerly Twit-
ter), February 27, 2022, https://twitter.com/RALee85/ ter), May 3, 2022, https://twitter.com/RALee85/sta-
status/1497871439176871937; Brett Forrest and Jared tus/1521632444377702401.
Malsin, “Ukraine Says It Used Turkish-Made Drones to
Hit Russian Targets,” The Wall Street Journal, February 142. Rob Lee (@RALee85), “The Clash Report channel (likely
27, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia- linked to the Turkish government) posted a longer video
ukraine-latest-news-2022-02-26/card/ukraine-says-it- of the TB2 strikes on the two Raptor fast-attack craft
uses-turkish-made-drones-to-hit-russian-targets-Drig- near Snake Island this morning.” X (formerly Twit-
GO7vkGfDzbBuncnA; Witt, “The Turkish Drone That ter), May 2, 2022, https://twitter.com/RALee85/sta-
Changed the Nature of Warfare”; Oryx (@oryxspioenkop), tus/1521068198287880193.
“#UkraineWar: Another #BayraktarTB2 strike on a Rus-
143. Rob Lee (@RALee85), “Another Ukrainian TB2 UCAV
sian Tor-M1 SAM system. This is the second Tor known to
video reportedly showing strikes on Russian positions on
have been struck by a TB2.” X (formerly Twitter), March
Snake Island.” X (formerly Twitter), May 3, 2022, https://
14, 2022, accessed September 30, 2023, account deleted
twitter.com/RALee85/status/1521631421412036608; Sut-
October 2023; Oryx (@oryxspioenkop), “A Ukrainian
ton, “Incredible Success of Ukraine’s Bayraktar TB2: The
Bayraktar TB2 struck a Russian military train carrying
Ghost of Snake Island.”
fuel to the front in Ukraine… This is utter, utter humilia-
tion.” X (formerly Twitter), February 28, 2022, accessed 144. Rob Lee (@RALee85), “This might be the first TB2
September 30, 2023, account deleted October 2023; UCAV aviation kill. It looks like a Russian Mi-8 helicop-
Oryx (@oryxspioenkop), “A new video has been released ter was struck while dismounting soldiers onto Snake
showing three #BayraktarTB2 drone strikes on Russian Island.” X (formerly Twitter), May 8, 2022, https://
BMD-2s and BTR-80s on the 25th of February, and the twitter.com/RALee85/status/1523193649151897601;
use of the TB2 to direct artillery fire at Kherson air base Rob Lee (@RALee85), “Another video of TB2 UCAV
and a Russian armoured column.” X (formerly Twitter), strikes on Snake Island, including what looks like a
March 18, 2022, accessed September 30, 2023, account Project 11770 Serna-class landing craft.” X (formerly
deleted October 2023; Lee, “Another video of a Ukrainian

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Twitter), May 7, 2022, https://twitter.com/RALee85/ 153. Janes, “Russian Federation—Air Force,” World Air Forces,
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Landing Craft at Snake Island,” The War Zone, May 7, Creates SIGINT Payloads for Granat-4 UAV,” Defence
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situation-report-tb2s-strike-russian-sam-carrying- com/2016/02/18/russia_creates_sigint_payloads_for_
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stroyed a Russian Pantsir-S1. It doesn’t appear to be from Its Unmanned Aerial Capabilities,” Defence Weekly, July
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Russian Forces from Snake Island, a Setback for Moscow,” defence-news/news-detail/zala-aero-unveils-hybrid-en-
The New York Times, June 30, 2022, https://www.nytimes. gine-uav-and-gps-independent-uas-navigation-system;
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Russian Equipment Losses during the Russian Invasion of on-10,” https://enics.aero/en/products-2/928-2/; Dylan
Ukraine,” Oryx, February 24, 2022, https://www.oryxs- Malyasov, “Ukrainian Troops Capture Secret Russia’s
pioenkop.com/2022/02/attack-on-europe-document- Drone,” Defence Blog, July 21, 2022, https://defence-blog.
ing-equipment.html; Stijn Mitzer et al., “A Monument of com/ukrainian-troops-capture-secret-russias-drone/;
Victory: The Bayraktar TB2 Kill List,” Oryx, February 23, United States Institute of Peace, “Roster of Iran’s Drones,”
2022, https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2021/12/a-monu- The Iran Primer, August 25, 2023, https://iranprimer.usip.
ment-of-victory-bayraktar-tb2.html. org/blog/2023/mar/02/roster-iran%E2%80%99s-drones;
ZALA Aero Group, “Unmanned Systems,” https://www.
146. Borger, “The Drone Operators Who Halted Russian Con- grenadier.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/UAV_page.
voy Headed for Kyiv.” pdf; and TRADOC, ODIN, “Orion Russian Medium-Alti-
tude Long Endurance (MALE) Unmanned Aerial Vehi-
147. Zabrodskyi et al., Preliminary Lessons in Conventional
cle (UAV),” https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/
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Orion_Russian_Medium-Altitude_Long_Endurance_
ary-July 2022, 32.
(MALE)_Unmanned_Aerial_Vehicle_(UAV)#:~:text=It%20
148. James Marson, “The Ragtag Army That Won the Battle of weighs%205%2Dtonne%20(11%2C000,at%20the%20Kro-
Kyiv and Saved Ukraine,” The Wall Street Journal, Septem- nstadt%20pilot%20plant; and Hambling, “Every. Single.
ber 20, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-inva- Drone. Fighting in Russia’s War against Ukraine.”
sion-ukraine-battle-of-kyiv-ragtag-army-11663683336.
154. Oryx (@oryxspioenkop), “Definite list of Russian Air
149. Sebastien Roblin, “Voices from the Front: UAS Pilot from Force losses over #Ukraine in the past 26 hours: - 1x Su-
Ukraine’s Spy Agency Shares Lessons from Battle,” Inside 30SM multirole aircraft (pictured) - 2 Su-34 strike aircraft
Unmanned Systems, June 28, 2023, https://insideun- - 2 Su-25 close air support aircraft - 2 Mi-24/35 attack he-
mannedsystems.com/voices-from-the-front-uas-pilot- licopters - 2 Mi-8 transport helicopter - 1 Orlan-10 UAV,”
from-ukraines-spy-agency-shares-lessons-from-battle/; X (formerly Twitter), March 5, 2022, accessed September
William McGee, “Ukraine Shares Video of Devasted Rus- 30, 2023, account deleted October 2023; Oryx (@oryxs-
sian Unit That Failed to Cross River,” Newsweek, May 19, pioenkop), “#UkraineRussianWar: New Newly added
2022, https://www.newsweek.com/ukraine-shares-video- Russian equipment losses: 1x Eleron-3 UAV (captured) 2x
devastated-russian-unit-that-failed-cross-river-1708320. MT-LB AFV (1x abandoned, 1x captured) 1x BMP-2 IFV
(destroyed) 1x BMD-2 IFV (destroyed) 1x BTR-82A IFV
150. Borys Sachalko and Will Tizard, “Sleek Ukrainian Drone (destroyed) 1x 152mm 2A65 Msta-B howitzer (aban-
Provides Critical Data for Bakhmut Area Troops,” Radio doned) Full list,” X (formerly Twitter), March 10, 2022,
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 18, 2023, https://www. accessed September 30, 2023, account deleted October
rferl.org/a/ukraine-russia-bakhmut-drone-furia-artil- 2023; Oryx (@oryxspioenkop), #UkraineRussianWar:
lery-reconnaissance/32417494.html; Roblin, “Voices from Newly added Russian equipment losses: 1x Forpost UAV
the Front.” (destroyed) 1x T-72B MBT (destroyed) 1x Unknown tank
(damaged) 1x BMD-4M IFV (destroyed) 1x 152mm 2S3
151. “A1-CM Furia.” Akatsiya SPG (destroyed) 1x 9T217 loader (for 9K33 Osa)
(captured) Full list:” X (formerly Twitter), March 11, 2022,
152. Bendett and Edmonds, Russian Military Autonomy in a accessed September 30, 2023, account deleted October
Ukraine Conflict, 1. 2023; Oryx (@oryxspioenkop), “#UkraineRussianWar:
Newly added Russian equipment losses: 1x Eleron-3 re-

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Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

connaissance UAV (captured) 1x T-90A MBT (destroyed) November 5, 2023.

1x MT-LB AFV (abandoned) 1x BMD-4M IFV (destroyed)
1x BTR-82A IFV (destroyed) Full list:” X (formerly Twit- 170. Edmonds and Bendett, Russia’s Use of Uncrewed Systems
ter), March 12, 2022, accessed September 30, 2023, ac- in Ukraine,16; Byrne et al., The Orlan Complex: Tracking
count deleted October 2023; and Oryx (@oryxspioenkop), the Supply Chains of Russia’s Most Successful UAV, 8.
“The Orlan-10 can easily be jammed, resulting in instances
like these.” X (formerly Twitter), March 14, 2022, accessed 171. Byrne et al., The Orlan Complex: Tracking the Supply
September 30, 2023, account deleted October 2023. Chains of Russia’s Most Successful UAV, 8.

155. Bendett and Edmonds, Russian Military Autonomy in 172. Bronk, Watling, and Reynolds, The Russian Air War and
Ukraine: Four Months In, 3; Rob Lee (@RALee85), “It Ukrainian Requirements for Air Defence, 16.
appears a Russian Forpost UAV crashed In Zhytomyr
173. Edmonds and Bendett, Russia’s Use of Uncrewed Systems
Oblast.” X (formerly Twitter), March 11, 2022, https://
in Ukraine, 11; Watling and Reynolds, Meatgrinder: Russian
twitter.com/RALee85/status/1502301684969656330.
Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine, 12.
156. BabakTaghvaee, “This footage shows destruction of a
174. Rob Lee (@RALee85), “Reportedly footage of a Russian
T-72AMT main battle tank of #UkrainianARmy by a Kor-
Krasnopol artillery strike on a Ukrainian position with
net-D anti-tank missile of a #Russian Orion armed drone
guidance from an Orlan-30 UAV.” X (formerly Twit-
near #Kharkiv.”
ter), November 3, 2022, https://twitter.com/RALee85/
157. Janovsky et al., “Nascent Capabilities: Russian Armed status/1588182862250930176; Rob Lee (@RALee85),
Drones Over Ukraine.” “Videos reportedly of Russian Krasnopol precision-guided
artillery strikes on Ukrainian forces guided by Orlan-30
158. Bendett and Edmonds, Russian Military Autonomy in UAVs.” X (formerly Twitter), November 7, 2022, https://
Ukraine: Four Months In, 3-4; Zabrodskyi et al., Prelim- twitter.com/RALee85/status/1589664740976254976.
inary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s
Invasion of Ukraine: February-July 2022, 37. 175. Watling and Reynolds, Stormbreak: Fighting through Rus-
sian Defences in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive, 19.
159. Edmonds and Bendett, Russia’s Use of Uncrewed Systems
in Ukraine, 3. 176. Rob Lee (@RALee85), “Footage from Orlan-30 UAVs of
two Iskander strikes from from Feb 25 in Termakhivka,
160. Edmonds and Bendett, Russia’s Use of Uncrewed Systems Kyiv Oblast on Ukrainian armor.” X (formerly Twitter),
in Ukraine, 5-6; Watling and Reynolds, Meatgrinder: Rus- January 9, 2023, https://twitter.com/RALee85/sta-
sian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine, tus/1612549534952857602.
13.
177. Samuel Bendett (@sambendett) “Russian Telegram chan-
161. Watling and Reynolds, Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the nels are commenting on the growing drone aerial density
Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine, 13. in combat: same target (a Ukrainian tank) was attacked
by an FPV drone while it was observed by a ZALA drone
162. Zabrodskyi et al., Preliminary Lessons in Conventional and separately, an Orlan-30 UAV that was also selecting
Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Febru- targets.” X (formerly Twitter), September 7, 2023, https://
ary-July 2022, 38. twitter.com/sambendett/status/1699746479223480717;
Bendett and Kofman, “Drones in Ukraine.”
163. See sources in endnotes 132 and 153.
178. Interview C, in discussion with the author, May 24, 2023;
164. James Byrne et al., The Orlan Complex: Tracking the Sup- Interview A, in discussion with the author, August 3, 2023.
ply Chains of Russia’s Most Successful UAV (Royal United
Services Institute, December 2022), 7-8, https://static.rusi. 179. For data on COTS, see Faine Greenwood, Ukraine War
org/SR-Orlan-complex-web-final.pdf. Drone Incidents (self-published, 2023), https://docs.
google.com/spreadsheets/d/1oItrQ7RceC8w1eR2ttpo-
165. Edmonds and Bendett, Russia’s Use of Uncrewed Systems qSz3zHhW1-tZkrU7yfZTqAU/edit#gid=0.
in Ukraine, 13.
180. In total, there were often 25 to 50 drones operating over
166. Watling and Reynolds, Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the every 12 miles of front lines. Watling and Reynolds, Meat-
Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine, 13. grinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion
of Ukraine, 7.
167. Watling and Reynolds, Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the
Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine, 14. 181. Bendett and Kofman, “Drones in Ukraine.”
168. Interview B, in discussion with the author, July 27, 2023. 182. DJI, “Phantom 4 Pro V2,” https://www.dji.com/phan-
tom-4-pro-v2/specs; DJI, “DJI Mavic 3,” https://www.
169. Interview A, in written correspondence with the author, dji.com/mavic-3/specs; Supercam Unmanned Systems

53
 @CNASDC

Group, “Supercam S350/S350F,” https://en.supercam.aero/ 193. Jason Beaubien, “In the Russia-Ukraine War, Drones Are
catalog/supercam-s350; Supercam Unmanned Systems One of the Most Powerful Weapons,” NPR, July 30, 2022,
group, “Supercam S150,” https://en.supercam.aero/catalog/ https://www.npr.org/2022/07/30/1114024870/russia-
supercams150; DJI, “DJI Mini 3 Pro,” https://www.dji. ukraine-war-drones.
com/mini-3-pro/specs; DJI, “Mavic 2,” https://www.dji.
com/mavic-2/info; DJI, “Matrice 30 Series,” https://enter- 194. Alperovitch, “How Drones Are Changing the Nature
prise.dji.com/matrice-30/specs; DJI, “Mavic 3 Enterprise,” of Warfare in Ukraine”; Schweiger and Platt, ISTAR
https://enterprise.dji.com/mavic-3-enterprise/specs; Autel Program: Progress Report, 10; and Yaroslav Trofimov,
Robotics, “EVO Max 4T,” https://shop.autelrobotics.com/ “Ukraine’s Drone Spotters on Front Lines Wage New
products/evo-max-4t; Autel Robotics, “EVO II Pro Enter- Kind of War,” The Wall Street Journal, August 7, 2022,
prise V2,” https://shop.autelrobotics.com/collections/autel- https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-drone-spotters-
evo-ii-series/products/evo-ii-pro-6k-enterprise-bundle-v3; on-front-lines-wage-new-kind-of-war-11659870805;
and Oleg Danylov, “R18 Octocopter from Aerorozvidka— Interview A, discussion; Interview E, discussion; Inter-
Ukrainian Drone Destroying the Enemy,” Mezha, April 26, view C, discussion; and Bendett and Kofman, “Drones in
2022, https://mezha.media/en/2022/04/26/r18-octocop- Ukraine.”
ter-from-aerorozvidka-ukrainian-drone-destroying-the-en-
emy/. 195. Schweiger and Platt, ISTAR Program: Progress Report,
10.
183. Kofman and Lee, “Perseverance and Adaptation: Ukraine’s
Counteroffensive at Three Months.” 196. Schweiger and Platt, ISTAR Program: Progress Report,
10.
184. Schweiger and Platt, ISTAR Program: Progress Report.
197. Interview A, discussion; Interview E, discussion; and
185. Greenwood, “The Drone War in Ukraine is Cheap, Deadly, Schweiger and Platt, ISTAR Program: Progress Report,
and Made in China.” 10.

186. Interview B, discussion; Interview E, discussion. 198. Interview E, discussion.

187. Kelsey D. Atherton, “How Drones Are Helping Fuel Propa- 199. Sebastien Roblin, “Russia’s War in Ukraine,” Inside
ganda in Ukraine,” Popular Science, March 26, 2022, https:// Unmanned Systems, June 30, 2022, https://insideun-
www.popsci.com/technology/russia-ukraine-drone-propa- mannedsystems.com/russias-war-in-ukraine/.
ganda-war/.
200. Interview E, discussion.
188. Patrick Tucker, “In Ukraine, Tomorrow’s Drone War Is Alive
Today,” Defense One, March 9, 2015, https://www.defense- 201. Trofimov, “Ukraine’s Drone Spotters on Front Lines
one.com/technology/2015/03/ukraine-tomorrows-drone- Wage New Kind of War”; Schweiger and Platt, ISTAR
war-alive-today/107085/. Program: Progress Report, 11.

189. John Wendle, “The Fighting Drones of Ukraine,” Smith- 202. “Ukraine’s Drone Pilots Under Fire as They Locate
sonian Air and Space Magazine, February 2018, https:// Russia Targets,” BBC, August 18, 2022, https://www.bbc.
www.smithsonianmag.com/air-space-magazine/ukraines- com/news/av/world-europe-62583499.
drones-180967708/; Nolan Peterson, “The Drone War over
203. Rob Lee (@RALee85), “Photos of a captured Ukrainian
Ukraine’s Trenches Foretells the Future of Air Combat,”
DJI UAV near Lyman. The Russian source says that
Coffee or Die Magazine, October 27, 2020, https://coffeeord-
Ukraine typically uses multiple UAVs at once to target
ie.com/drone-war-ukraine.
Russian positions with VOG-17 grenades. One UAV is
190. Borger, “The Drone Operators Who Halted Russian Convoy used for locating targets and another will conduct the
Headed For Kyiv.” strike.” X (formerly Twitter), July 25, 2022, https://twit-
ter.com/RALee85/status/1551736923470823427.
191. Bendett and Kofman, “Drones in Ukraine”; Alperovitch,
“How Drones Are Changing the Nature of Warfare in 204. Samuel Bendett (@sambendett), “1/2 Russian Telegram
Ukraine”; Schweiger and Platt, ISTAR Program: Progress Re- channels are reporting a new Ukrainian drone tactic: a
port, 10-11; Interview E, discussion; Interview B, in discus- group of drones fly at different heights during the night,
sion with the author, July 27, 2023; Edmonds and Bendett, but only one of them has a light. It attracts attention,
Russia’s Use of Uncrewed Systems in Ukraine, 3; and David provokes shelling from ground positions, while “dark”
Hambling, “How Ukraine Perfected the Small Anti-Tank drones record the data.” X (formerly Twitter), De-
Drone,” Forbes, June 1, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/ cember 19, 2022, https://twitter.com/SamBendett/sta-
davidhambling/2022/06/01/how-ukraine-perfected-the- tus/1604935894896615424.
small-anti-tank-drone/?sh=3be72bb73171.
205. Interview E, discussion.
192. Schweiger and Platt, ISTAR Program: Progress Report, 10.
206. Rob Lee and Philip Wasielewski, Russia’s War in

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Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

Ukraine: Critical Vulnerabilities to Russia’s Military Op- ary-July 2022, 37. This figure is probably driven by the
erations and Systems (Foreign Policy Research Institute, incorporation of drones within most Ukrainian infantry
June 30, 2023), https://www.fpri.org/article/2023/06/ formations where there are less experienced drone opera-
russias-war-in-ukraine-critical-vulnerabilities-to-rus- tors. Highly skilled operators can significantly extend the
sias-military-operations-and-systems/. life span of a drone, using the same platform for hundreds
of flights. Interview F, in conversation with the author,
207. Russian proxy forces in Donbas were ahead of the regular April 26, 2023.
Russian army in adopting commercial drones. Edmonds
and Bendett, Russia’s Use of Uncrewed Systems in Ukraine, 224. Zabrodskyi et al., Preliminary Lessons in Conventional
26. Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Febru-
ary-July 2022, 59; Watling and Reynolds, Meatgrinder:
208. Bendett and Kofman, “Drones in Ukraine.” Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of
Ukraine, 18; Bendett and Kofman, “Drones in Ukraine”;
209. Edmonds and Bendett, Russia’s Use of Uncrewed Systems and Interview C, discussion.
in Ukraine, 24-25.
225. “The Latest in the Battle of Jamming with Electronic
210. Interview B, discussion. Beams,” The Economist, July 3, 2023, https://www.econ-
omist.com/special-report/2023/07/03/the-latest-in-the-
211. Interview B, discussion.
battle-of-jamming-with-electronic-beams.
212. Interview A, discussion.
226. Watling and Reynolds, Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in
213. Edmonds and Bendett, Russia’s Use of Uncrewed Systems the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine, 18-19; Abdujalil
in Ukraine, 27. Abdurasulov, “Ukraine’s Invisible Battle to Jam Russian
Weapons,” BBC, August 3, 2023, https://www.bbc.com/
214. Edmonds and Bendett, Russia’s Use of Uncrewed Systems news/world-europe-66279650; and Beaubien, “In the
in Ukraine, 28. Russia-Ukraine War, Drones Are One of the Most Power-
ful Weapons.”
215. Edmonds and Bendett, Russia’s Use of Uncrewed Systems
in Ukraine, 28. 227. Dan Sabbagh and Artem Mazhulin, “‘They’re Starting
to Die’: Fears Ukraine’s Drone Supremacy May Soon
216. Interview E, discussion; Interview C, discussion. Be Over,” The Guardian, April 10, 2023, https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/10/in-war-there-are-
217. Edmonds and Bendett, Russia’s Use of Uncrewed Systems no-emotions-ukraine-drone-squads-bakhmut.
in Ukraine, 28.
228. Valerii Zaluzhnyi, “Modern Positional Warfare and
218. This information is drawn from the briefing Edgesource, How to Win in It,” UDC 355 shared with The Econo-
“Commercial Drones in War: A C-UAS Perspective,” un- mist, November 1, 2023, https://infographics.economist.
published, undated. com/2023/ExternalContent/ZALUZHNYI_FULL_VER-
SION.pdf.
219. Windtalker can track DJI drones within 35km of it. There
were four Windtalker systems in Ukraine at the time: 229. Watling and Reynolds, Stormbreak: Fighting through
three in the Donetsk Oblast and one in the Chernihiv Russian Defences in Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive, 8; Fredrick
Oblast. Kunkle and Serhii Korolchuk, “Ukraine Pushes to Reclaim
Bakhmut, Fighting on Fallen City’s Flanks,” The Washing-
220. From June through December 2022, four Edgesource ton Post, July 9, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
WindtalkerX systems located in Donetsk and Chernihiv world/2023/07/09/bakhmut-flanks-ukraine-russia-war/.
Oblasts detected 2,908 unique commercial drones in
Ukraine that completed 62,743 flights. Over 80 percent of 230. “The Latest in the Battle of Jamming with Electronic
those flights were by DJI Mavic 3s. “Commercial Drones Beams.”
in War: A C-UAS Perspective,” 6. The Mavic 3 Enterprise
T variant and Matrice 30T have thermal cameras, while 231. Zabrodskyi et al., Preliminary Lessons in Conventional
the Mavic 3 Enterprise E model does not. Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Febru-
ary-July 2022, 38.
221. Interview F, in conversation with the author, April 26,
2023. 232. Given the rather thin force-to-space ratios across the
front lines, there are always EW gaps that are being ex-
222. Watling and Reynolds, Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the ploited by both sides. Interview C, discussion; Interview
Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine, 18; Interview A, A, discussion.
discussion.
233. “The Latest in the Battle of Jamming with Electronic
223. Zabrodskyi et al., Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Beams.”
Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Febru-

55
 @CNASDC

234. Isabelle Khurshudyan, Sasha Maslov, and Kamila Eastern Battle,” CNN, January 30, 2023, https://www.cnn.
Hrabchuk, “Ukraine’s Elite Forces Rely on Technology com/2023/01/30/europe/ukraine-drone-operators-for-
to Strike behind Enemy Lines,” The Washington Post, est-kreminna-intl-cmd/index.html.
August 6, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/2023/08/06/ukraine-special-forces-alpha-coun- 242. Beaubien, “In the Russia-Ukraine War, Drones Are One of
teroffensive/. the Most Powerful Weapons.”

235. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Dumb and Cheap: When 243. Sean Hollister, “DJI Drones, Ukraine, and Russia — What
Facing Electronic Warfare in Ukraine, Small Drones’ We Know about AeroScope,” The Verge, March 23, 2022,
Quantity Is Quality,” Breaking Defense, June 13, 2023, https://www.theverge.com/22985101/dji-aeroscope-
https://breakingdefense.com/2023/06/dumb-and- ukraine-russia-drone-tracking.
cheap-when-facing-electronic-warfare-in-ukraine-
small-drones-quantity-is-quality/. 244. Sam Skove, “How Ukraine Learned to Cloak Its Drones
from Russian Surveillance,” C4ISRNet, October 17, 2022,
236. Joe Tidy, “Ukraine Rapidly Expanding Its ‘Army of https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/2022/10/17/
Drones’ for Front Line,” BBC, April 25, 2023, https:// how-ukraine-learned-to-cloak-its-drones-from-russian-
www.bbc.com/news/technology-65389215. surveillance/.

237. Ian Talley and Anthony DeBarros, “China Aids Rus- 245. Interview F, in conversation with the author, April 26,
sia’s War in Ukraine, Trade Data Shows,” The Wall 2023.
Street Journal, February 4, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/
articles/china-aids-russias-war-in-ukraine-trade-da- 246. Interview E, discussion.
ta-shows-11675466360?mod=e2tw; Greenwood, “The
247. Interview A, discussion.
Drone War in Ukraine Is Cheap, Deadly, and Made in
China”; and Paul Mozur, Aaron Krolik, and Keith Brad- 248. Schweiger and Platt, ISTAR Program: Progress Report, 10.
sher, “As War in Ukraine Grinds On, China Helps Refill
Russian Drone Supplies,” The New York Times, March 249. Edmonds and Bendett, Russia’s Use of Uncrewed Systems
21, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/03/21/ in Ukraine, 15.
business/russia-china-drones-ukraine-war.htm-
l?smid=tw-nytimes&smtyp=cur. 250. Bendett and Edmonds, Russian Military Autonomy in
Ukraine: Four Months In, 5.
238. Zaluzhnyi, “Modern Positional Warfare and How
to Win in It”; Edmonds and Bendett, Russia’s Use of 251. Edmonds and Bendett, Russia’s Use of Uncrewed Sys-
Uncrewed Systems in Ukraine, 29; and Brendan Cole, tems in Ukraine, 10; Defense Technology Review, Issue 92,
“Ukraine Beats Russia in War’s First Drone Dogfight, November 2022, 40; and David Hambling, “Russia Boosts
Video Shows,” Newsweek, October 13, 2022, https:// Production and Displays New ‘Swarming’ Version of
www.newsweek.com/drone-video-ukraine-russia-dog- Lancet-3 Kamikaze Drone,” Forbes, July 18, 2023, https://
fight-serhiy-prytula-1751628. www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2023/07/18/rus-
sia-boosts-production-and-displays-new-swarming-ver-
239. “How Drones Dogfight above Ukraine,” The Econo- sion-of-lancet-3-kamikaze-drone/?sh=5c9907a8aa20.
mist, February 7, 2023, https://www.economist.com/
the-economist-explains/2023/02/07/how-drones-dog- 252. Rob Lee (@RALee85), “The first evidence Russia is using
fight-above-ukraine. loitering munitions in Ukraine. This looks like a Ka-
lashnikov ZALA Aero KUB-BLA loitering munition.” X
240. Bendett and Kofman, “Drones in Ukraine; Schweiger (formerly Twitter), March 12, 2022, https://twitter.com/
and Platt, ISTAR Program: Progress Report, 11; and RALee85/status/1502550038731497474.
Veronika Melkozerova, “Ukraine’s Drone Academy Is
in Session,” Politico, February 26, 2023, https://www. 253. Edmonds and Bendett, Russia’s Use of Uncrewed Systems
politico.eu/article/ukraine-drone-academy-war-russia- in Ukraine, 15.
kyiv-pilot/.
254. Rob Lee (@RALee85), “Video of a Russian KUB-BLA
241. Beaubien, “In the Russia-Ukraine War, Drones Are loitering munition narrowly missing Ukrainian M777
One of the Most Powerful Weapons”; Nick Schifrin howitzers (could have wounded the crew).” X (formerly
and Eric O’Connor, “How Ukrainian Drone Pilots Are Twitter), May 18, 2022, https://twitter.com/RALee85/
Changing the Course of the War against Russia,” PBS status/1526845570551357440; Rob Lee (@RALee85),
News Hour, February 20, 2023, https://www.pbs.org/ “The wreckage of another KUB-BLA loitering munition
newshour/show/how-ukrainian-drone-pilots-are- likely employed by Russian SSO. The source claims it was
changing-the-course-of-the-war-against-russia; and shot down by small arms fire, but it is hard to know.” X
Tim Lister, Frederik Pleitgen, and Konstantin Hak, (formerly Twitter), April 19, 2022, https://twitter.com/
“‘The Enemy Is Always Looking for Us’: Hidden in the RALee85/status/1516557417781334017.
Forest, Ukraine’s Drone Operators Are Crucial to the

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Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

255. Bendett and Edmonds, Russian Military Autonomy in lancet-drones-russia-invasion-counteroffensive-kamika-

Ukraine: Four Months In, 4; Jakub Janovsky et al., “Hit ze/32493513.html; Rob Lee (@RALee85), “Counter-Lan-
or Miss: The Russian Loitering Munition Kill List,” cet loitering munition screens used by a Ukrainian M777
Oryx, November 25, 2022, https://www.oryxspioenkop. howitzer crew. (h/t @AbraxasSpa) 145/.” X (formerly
com/2022/11/hit-or-miss-russian-loitering-munition. Twitter), August 9, 2023, https://twitter.com/RALee85/
html; and Muzyka (@rochanconsulting), “Ukraine Con- status/1689352468751073280.
flict Monitor - 15 July – 21 July 2023 (Weekly update).”
265. Rob Lee (@RALee85), “A Russian Lancet loitering
256. DJI, “DJI FPV,” https://www.dji.com/dji-fpv/specs; munition destroyed a wooden dummy.” X (formerly
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Switchblade_600_Datasheet_07192021.pdf; AeroVi-
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blade_300_Block20_Datasheet_03_230320.pdf; WB wp-content/uploads/D40_V10_Product_DataSheet.pdf;
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wbgroup.pl/en/produkt/warmate-loitering-munnitions/; https://ramuav.com/#about; “ST-35 Silent Thunder,”
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en/production/bvs/zala-lancet-3/; ZALA Aero Group, lonavia.com/en/st-35-silent-thunder/; AeroVironment,
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257. Bendett and Edmonds, Russian Military Autonomy in
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Switchblade loitering munition strike on Russian troops
258. Janovsky et al., “Hit or Miss: The Russian Loitering Muni- by Ukraine’s 53rd Mechanized Brigade.” X (formerly
tion Kill List.” Twitter), May 6, 2022, https://twitter.com/RALee85/
status/1522573394855743488; Rob Lee (@RALee85),
259. Bendett and Edmonds, Russian Military Autonomy “Video of a Ukrainian Switchblade 300 loitering mu-
in Ukraine: Four Months In, 10; Watling and Reyn- nition strike on a Russian border checkpoint in Tro-
olds, Stormbreak: Fighting through Russian Defences in ebortnoe, Bryansk Oblast from today.” X (formerly
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260. Edmonds and Bendett, Russia’s Use of Uncrewed Systems
in Ukraine, 15; Janovsky et al., “Hit or Miss: The Russian 268. Interview E, discussion; Rob Lee (@RALee85), “‘In some
Loitering Munition Kill List”; and Watling and Reyn- cases...Ukraine is simply opting not to use the unfamiliar
olds, Stormbreak: Fighting through Russian Defences in Western systems. For example, despite receiving hundreds
Ukraine’s 2023 Offensive, 19. of Switchblade drones, some units prefer to use commer-
cial drones rigged with explosives that are more us-
261. Muzyka (@rochanconsulting), “Ukraine Conflict Monitor er-friendly.’” X (formerly Twitter), June 15, 2022, https://
- 15 July – 21 July 2023 (Weekly update).” twitter.com/RALee85/status/1536944902323458049;
and Rob Lee (@RALee85), “Video of a Switchblade 300
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reportedly shooting down a Lancet loitering munition.”
269. David Hambling, “Failure or Savior? Busting Myths
X (formerly Twitter), May 31, 2023, https://twitter.
about SwitchBlade Loitering Munitions in Ukraine,”
com/RALee85/status/1663989217607786500; Rob Lee
Forbes, June 8, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/
(@RALee85), “Video of soldiers from Ukraine’s 28th
davidhambling/2022/06/08/failure-or-savior-bust-
Mechanized Brigade shooting down a Lancet loitering
ing-myths-about-switchblade-loitering-munitions-in-
munition with small arms and a ZU-23-2.” X (formerly
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Twitter), January 15, 2023, https://twitter.com/RALee85/
status/1614645851783151618. 270. Sebastien Roblin, “Watch the First Confirmed Use of
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264. “Lancet: The Russian Kamikaze Drone Blunting Ukraine’s
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first-confirmed-use-tank-busting-switchblade-600-

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 @CNASDC

drone-in-ukraine-video/; Rob Lee (@RALee85), “Video the-frontline-with-one-of-ukraines-deadliest-drone-pi-

of a loitering munition strike by Ukraine’s 28th Mecha- lots.
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biden-admin-armed-drones-jamming-gear-surface-air-
271. Interview H, in conversation with the author, February 27, missile-rcna20197. Switchblade 300 all-up rounds, which
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a US-made Phoenix Ghost loitering munition.”; Roblin, army.mil/Portals/72/Documents/BudgetMaterial/2024/
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273. Zabrodskyi et al., Preliminary Lessons in Conventional 281. This is the fiscal year (FY) 2024 estimated cost. Simi-
Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Febru- larly, the FPV drones are much cheaper than American
ary-July 2022, 58-59. antitank guided missiles, such as the Javelin, which in
prior years had cost $166,516 per unit and in FY 2023 cost
274. Lithuania also donated a few Warmates to Kyiv. Oleksandr $763,986 per unit. U.S. Army, “Javelin (Line Item Number
Shumilin, “Another 20 Warmate Drones Sent to Ukrainian 0648CC0007)” in Department of Defense Fiscal Year (FY)
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275. “Polish-Made Drones Destroy Rare Russian Kasta-2E2, 283. Andrew E. Kramer, “Homemade, Cheap and Lethal,
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278. Stephen Kalin, “Ukraine’s Drone Army Takes Bites Out 286. “A video from the 93rd Brigade shows a drone carry-
of Bigger Opponent,” The Wall Street Journal, September ing out an impressive precision strike through an open
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world/2023/aug/07/like-playing-a-computer-game-on- loitering munitions and UAV-dropped munitions

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Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

from Ukraine’s 72nd Mechanized Brigade.” X (for- 294. Alperovitch, “How Drones Are Changing the Nature of
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297. Hudson and Khudov, “The War in Ukraine Is Spurring a
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air-launched long-range Storm Shadow/SCALP cruise
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304. Sine Ozkarasahin, “Iranian Drones Are Changing the

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Battlefields of Eurasia,” Terrorism Monitor, November 4, https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/10/irans-shahed-136-ka-

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com/DefenceHQ/status/1660161473455218688. Black Sea.”

312. Interview D, discussion. Unclear but this may be Kropyva 323. Scott Savitz, “The Age of Uncrewed Surface Vessels,”
app used also to coordinate ground-based fires. David Axe, The RAND Blog (blog) on RAND.org, November 15, 2022,
“There’s a Good Reason the Russian Air Force Is Falter- https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/11/the-age-of-uncrewed-
ing. Ukrainian Air-Defense Crews Have Better Apps,” surface-vessels.html.
Forbes, October 18, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/
davidaxe/2022/10/18/theres-a-good-reason-the-russian- 324. Zafra and McClure, “Sea Drones and the Counteroffensive in
air-force-is-faltering-ukrainian-air-defense-crews-have- Crimea.”
better-apps/?sh=452014a7960d. Others have suggested
325. Nick Paton Walsh, Victoria Butenko, and Florence Dav-
that this application is not effective. Interview A, in written
ey-Attlee, “The Moment Ukraine Used an Experimental
correspondence with the author, November 5, 2023.
Drone to Attack a Russian Bridge,” CNN, August 15, 2023,
313. Interview A, in written correspondence with the author, https://www.cnn.com/2023/08/15/europe/ukraine-crimea-
November 5, 2023. bridge-drone-strike-video-intl/index.html; Christopher
Miller, “Ukrainian Naval Drone Hits Russian Oil Tanker
314. Rubin, “Russia’s Iranian-Made UAVs: A Technical Profile”; near Crimea,” Financial Times, August 5, 2023, https://www.
Sebastien Roblin, “Iran’s Shahed-136 Kamikaze Drone: ft.com/content/efaaf7aa-bf22-412c-9f82-48d8fb1c5f4b; and
Everything You Need to Know,” 1945, October 21, 2022, Jared Malsin, “Ukraine’s Sea Drones Alter Balance of Power

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 DEFENSE | FEBRUARY 2024
Evolution Not Revolution: Drone Warfare in Russia’s 2022 Invasion of Ukraine

in Black Sea,” The Wall Street Journal, August 11, 2023, 337. Mark Bruno, ““Uber for Artillery” – What Is Ukraine’s
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ukraines-sea-drones-alter- GIS Arta System?” The Moloch, August 24, 2022, https://
balance-of-power-in-black-sea-391cebee. themoloch.com/conflict/uber-for-artillery-what-is-
ukraines-gis-arta-system/.
326. Malsin, “Ukraine’s Sea Drones Alter Balance of Power in
Black Sea.” 338. Zikusoka, “How Ukraine’s ‘Uber for Artillery’ Is Leading
the Software War against Russia.”
327. Sam Schechner and Daniel Michaels, “Ukraine Has Digi-
tized Its Fighting Forces on a Shoestring,” The Wall Street 339. Zikusoka, “How Ukraine’s ‘Uber for Artillery’ Is Leading
Journal, January 3, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/ the Software War against Russia”; Bruno, “‘Uber For Artil-
ukraine-has-digitized-its-fighting-forces-on-a-shoe- lery’ – What is Ukraine’s GIS Arta System?”
string-11672741405.
340 . Jenna McLaughlin, “Inside Russia’s Attempts to Hack
328. Interview A, in written correspondence with the author, Ukrainian Military Operations,” NPR, August 10, 2023,
November 5, 2023. https://www.npr.org/2023/08/10/1193167328/rus-
sia-hack-ukraine-military.
329. Some Ukrainians are also using the American-developed
civilian Android Team Awareness Kit (ATAK-CIV), which 341. “How Elon Musk’s Satellites Have Saved Ukraine and
is a mapping application that shares geospatial infor- Changed Warfare,” The Economist, January 5, 2023,
mation and enables precision targeting. Schweiger and https://www.economist.com/briefing/2023/01/05/how-
Platt, ISTAR Program: Progress Report, 12; Julian Borger, elon-musks-satellites-have-saved-ukraine-and-changed-
“‘Our Weapons Are Computers’: Ukrainian Coders Aim to warfare.
Gain Battlefield Edge,” The Guardian, December 18, 2022,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/dec/18/our- 342. Ulrike Franke and Jenny Soderstrom, Star Tech Enter-
weapons-are-computers-ukrainian-coders-aim-to-gain- prise: Emerging Technology in Russia’s War on Ukraine,
battlefield-edge; and Lara Jakes, “For Western Weapons, policy brief (European Council on Foreign Relations,
the Ukraine War Is a Beta Test,” The New York Times, No- September 5, 2023), https://ecfr.eu/publication/star-tech-
vember 15, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/15/ enterprise-emerging-technologies-in-russias-war-on-
world/europe/ukraine-weapons.html. ukraine/; Josh Pennington and Sean Lyngaas, “Starlink
In Use on ‘All Front Lines,’ Ukraine Spy Chief Says, but
330. Interview A, in written correspondence with the author, Wasn’t Active ‘for Time’ over Crimea,” CNN, September
November 5, 2023. 10, 2023, https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/10/europe/
ukraine-starlink-not-active-crimea-intl-hnk/index.html.
331. Borger, “‘Our Weapons Are Computers’: Ukrainian Coders
Aim to Gain Battlefield Edge”; Schweiger and Platt, IS- 343. Victoria Kim, “Elon Musk Acknowledges Withholding
TAR Program: Progress Report, 17. Satellite Service to Thwart Ukrainian Attack,” The New
York Times, September 8, 2023, https://www.nytimes.
332. Schweiger and Platt, ISTAR Program: Progress Report, 18. com/2023/09/08/world/europe/elon-musk-star-
link-ukraine.html; Paul Farhi, “Elon Musk Biographer
333. Schweiger and Platt, ISTAR Program: Progress Report, 8-9, Concedes Flaw in Account of War in Ukraine,” The
11. Washington Post, September 12, 2023, https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/style/2023/09/12/elon-musk-walter-isaa-
334. Schweiger and Platt, ISTAR Program: Progress Report, 9;
cson-ukraine/.
David Ignatius, “How the Algorithm Tipped the Balance
in Ukraine,” The Washington Post, December 19, 2022, 344. Watling and Reynolds, Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/12/19/ the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine, 13. For more on
palantir-algorithm-data-ukraine-war/. Russian reconnaissance strike complex, see Edmonds and
Bendett, Russia’s Use of Uncrewed Systems in Ukraine, 3-9.
335. “Ukraine to Introduce Delta Situational Awareness
System for Military,” The Kyiv Independent, February 4, 345. Watling and Reynolds, Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the
2023, https://kyivindependent.com/government-intro- Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine, 13.
duces-nato-standard-delta-management-defense-sys-
tem/; Borger, “‘Our Weapons Are Computers’: Ukrainian 346. Watling and Reynolds, Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the
Coders Aim to Gain Battlefield Edge.” Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine, 14.

336. David Zikusoka, “How Ukraine’s ‘Uber for Artillery’ Is 347. Watling and Reynolds, Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the
Leading the Software War against Russia,” Future Front- Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine, 24.
line (blog) on NewAmerica.org, May 25, 2023, https://
www.newamerica.org/future-frontlines/blogs/how- 348. Watling and Reynolds, Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the
ukraines-uber-for-artillery-is-leading-the-software-war- Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine; Lee and Wasi-
against-russia/. elewski, Russia’s War in Ukraine: Critical Vulnerabilities to
Russia’s Military Operations and Systems.

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 @CNASDC

349. Watling and Reynolds, Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the

Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine, 24.

350. Andrew F. Krepinevich, “Cavalry to Computer: The Pat-

tern of Military Revolutions,” The National Interest, Sep-
tember 1, 1994, https://nationalinterest.org/article/caval-
ry-to-computer-the-pattern-of-military-revolutions-848.

351. James R. Fitzsimonds and Jan M. Van Tol, “Revolutions in

Military Affairs,” Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1994, 25-26,
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA360252.pdf.

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