Aranult VS Nazareno

9/13/22, 9:10 AM PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 087
[No. L-3820. July 18, 1950]
JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner, vs.

LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-
Arms, Philippine Senate, and
EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, Director of
Prisons, respondents.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW;
POWER OF ElTHER HOUSE OF
CONGRESS TO CONDUCT AN
INQUIRY.—The power of inquiry,
with process to enforce it, is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary
to the legislative function.
2. ID.; RANGE OF LEGISLATIVE

INQUIRY.—The Congress of the
Philippines has a wider range of
legislative field than either the
Congress of the United States or a
State Legislature, and the field of
inquiry into which it may enter is
also wider. It is difficult to define
any limits by which the subject
https://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000183346697f115963229000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/105
matter of its inquiry can be

bounded. Suffice it to say that it
must be coextensive with the range
of legislative power.
3. ID.; POWER OF ElTHER HOUSE

OF CONGRESS TO PUNISH A
WlTNESS FOR CONTEMPT.—No
person can be punished for
contumacy as a witness before
either House unless his testimony
is required in a matter into which
that House has jurisdiction to
inquire.
4. ID. ; ID.—Once an inquiry is

admitted or established to be
within the jurisdiction of a
legislative body to make, the
investi
30
30 PHILIPPINE REPORTS
ANNOTATED
Arnault vs. Nazareno
gating committee has the power to

require a witness to answer any
question pertinent to the subject of
the inquiry, subject of course to his

constitutional privilege against
selfincrimination.
5. ID.; ID.; MATERIALITY OF THE

QUESTION.—The materiality of a
question that may be propounded
to a witness is determined by its
direct relation to the subject of the
inquiry and not by its indirect
relation to any proposed or possible
legislation.
6. ID.; ID.; POWER OF THE COURT

TO PASS UPON MATERIALITY.
—Where the immateriality of the
information sought by the
legislative body from a witness is
relied upon to contest its
jurisdiction, the Court is in duty
bound to pass upon the contention.
Although the legislative body has
the power to make the inquiry, the
Court is empowered to correct a
clear abuse of discretion in the
exercise of that power.
7. ID.; LACK OF POWER OF THE

COURT TO INTERFERE WITH
LEGISLATIVE ACTION.—Since
the Court has no power to
determine what legislation to
approve or not to approve, it

cannot say that the information
sought from a witness which. is
material to the subject of the
legislative inquiry is immaterial to
any proposed or possible
legislation. It is not within the
province of the Court to determine
or imagine what legislative
measures Congress may take after
the completion of the legislative
investigation.
8. ID.; AUTHORITY OF EITHER

HOUSE OF CONGRESS TO
COMMIT A WlTNESS FOR
CONTEMPT BEYOND PERIOD
OF LEGISLATIVE SESSION.—
There is no sound reason to limit
the power of the legislative body to
punish. for contempt to the end of
every session and not to the end of
the last session terminating the
existence of that body. While the
existence of the House of
Representatives is limited to four
years, that of the Senate is not so
limited. The Senate is a continuing
body which does not cease to exist
upon the periodical dissolution of
the Congress or of the House of
Representatives. There is no limit
as to time to the Senate's power to

punish for contempt in cases where
that power may constitutionally be
exerted.
9. ID.; PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-

INCRIMINATION; REFUSAL OF
WITNESS TO ANSWER.—
Testimony which is obviously false
or evasive is equivalent to a refusal
to testify and is punishable as
contempt, assuming that a refusal
to testify would be so punishable.
31
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 31
10. ID.; ID.; POWER OF COURT TO

DETERMINE WHETHER
QUESTION is INCRIMINATORY.
—It is not enough for the witness
to say that the answer will
incriminate him, as he is not the
sole judge of his liability. The
danger of self-incrimination must
appear reasonable and real to the
court, from all the circumstances,
and from the whole case, as well as
from his general 'Conception of the

relations of the witness. Upon the
facts thus developed, it is the
province of the court to determine
whether a direct answer to a
question may criminate or not. The
witness cannot assert his privilege
by reason of some fanciful excuse,
for protection against an.
imaginary danger, or to secure
immunity to a third person.
11. ID.; RIGHT AND OBLIGATION

OF A CITIZEN.—It is the duty of
every citizen to give frank, sincere,
and truthful testimony before a
competent authority. His
constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination, unless clearly
established, must yield to that
duty. When a specific right and a
specific obligation conflict with
each other, and one is doubtful or
uncertain while the other is clear
and imperative, the former must
yield to the latter. The right to live
is one of the most sacred that the
citizen may claim, and yet the
state may deprive him of it if he
violates his corresponding
obligation to respect the life of
others.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme

Court. Habeas corpus.
The facts are stated in the opinion of
the Court.
J. C. Orendain, Augusto Revilla,
and Eduardo Arboleda for petitioner.
Solicitor General Felix Bautista,
Angelo, Lorenzo Sumulong, Lorenzo
Tañada, and Vicente J. Francisco for
respondents.
OZAETA, J:
This is an original petition for habeas

corpus to relieve the petitioner from
his confinement in the New Bilibid
Prison to which he has been
committed by virtue of a resolution
adopted by the Senate on May 15,
1950, which reads as follows:
"Whereas, Jean L. Arnault refused to

reveal the name of the person to whom he
gave the P440,000, as well as answer other
32
ANNOTATED
pertinent questions related to the said

amount; Now, therefore, be it
"Resolved, That for his refusal to reveal
the name of the person to whom he gave
the P440,000 Jean L. Arnault be
committed to the custody of the Sergeant-
at-Arms and imprisoned in the New
Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, until
discharged by further order of the Senate
or by the special committee created by
Senate Resolution No. 8, such discharge to
be ordered when he shall have purged the
contempt by revealing to the Senate or to
the said special committee the name of the
person to whom he gave the P440,000, as
well as answer other pertinent questions
in connection therewith."
The facts that gave rise to the

adoption of said resolution, insofar as
pertinent here, may be briefly stated
as f ollows:
In the latter part of October, 1949,
the Philippine Government, through
the Rural Progress Administration,
bought two estates known as
Buenavista and Tambobong for the
sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000,
respectively. Of the first sum,
P1,000,000 was paid to Ernest H.
Burt, a nonresident American, thru
his attorney-in-fact in the Philippines,
the Associated Estates, Inc.,

represented by Jean L. Arnault, for
alleged interest of the said Burt in the
Buenavista Estate. The second sum of
P500,000 was all paid to the same
Ernest H. Burt through his other
attorney-in-fact, the North Manila
Development Co., Inc., also
represented by Jean L. Arnault, for
the alleged interest of the said Burt in
the Tambobong Estate.
The original owner of the
Buenavista Estate was the San Juan
de Dios Hospital. The Philippine
Government held a 25-year lease
contract on said estate, with an option
to purchase it for P3,000,000 within
the same period of 25 years counted
from January 1, 1939. The occupation
republic of the Philippines purported
to exercise that option by tendering to
the owner the sum of P3,000,000 and,
upon its rejection, by depositing it in
court on June 21, 1944, together with
the accrued rentals amounting to
P324,000. Since 1939 the Government
has remained in possession of the
estate.
33
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 33

On June 29, 1946, the San Juan de

Dios Hospital sold the Buenavista
Estate for P5,000,000 to Ernest H.
Burt, who made a down payment of
P10,000 only and agreed to pay
P500,000 within one year and the
remainder in annual installments of
P500,000 each, with the stipulation
that failure on his part to make any of
said payments would cause the
forfeiture of his down payment of
P10,000 and would entitle the
Hospital to rescind the sale to him.
Aside from the down payment of
P10,000, Burt has made no other
payment on account of the purchase
price of said estate.
The original owner of the
Tambobong Estate was the Philippine
Trust Company. On May 14, 1946, the
Philippine Trust Company sold said
estate for the sum of P1,200,000 to
Ernest H. Burt, who paid P10,000
down and promised to pay P90,000
within nine months and the balance of
P1,100,000 in ten sucessive annual
instalments of P110,000 each. The
nine-month period within which to
pay the first intalment of P90,000
expired on February 14, 1947, without
Burt's having paid the said or any

other amount then or afterwards. On
September 4, 1947, the Philippine
Trust Company sold, conveyed, and
delivered the Tambobong Estate to the
Rural Progress Administration by an
abolute deed of sale in consideration of
the sum of P750,000. On February 5,
1948, the Rural Progress
Administration made, under article
1504 of the Civil Code, a notarial
demand upon Burt for the resolution
and cancellation of his contract of
purchase with the Philippine Trust
Company due to his failure to pay the
installment of P90,000 within the
period of nine months. Subsequently
the Court of First Instance of Rizal
ordered the cancellation of Burt's
certificate of title and the issuance of a
new one in the name of the Rural
Progress Administration, from which
order he appealed to the Supreme
1
Court.
It was in the face of the
antecedents sketched in the last three
preceding paragraphs that the
Philippine Government, through the
Secretary of Justice as Chairman
_______________
1 The appeal was withdrawn on November 9,

1949.
34
ANNOTATED
of the Board of Directors of the Rural

Progress Administration and as
Chairman of the Board of Directors of
the Philippine National Bank, from
which the money was borrowed,
accomplished the purchase of the two
estates in the latter part of October,
1949, as stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate
adopted its Resolution No. 8, which
reads as follows:
"RESOLUTION CREATING A
SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO
INVESTIGATE THE
BUENAVISTA AND THE
TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL.
"WHEREAS, it is reported that the

Philippine Government, through the Rural
Progress Administration, has bought the
Buenavista and the Tambobong Estates
for the aggregate sum of five million pesos;
"WHEREAS, it is reported that under

the decision of the Supreme Court dated
October 31, 1949, the Buenavista Estate
could have been bought for three million
pesos by virtue of a contract entered into
between the San Juan de Dios Hospital
and Philippine Government in 1939;
"WHEREAS, it is even alleged that the
Philippine Government did not have to
purchase the Buenavista Estate because
the occupation government had made
tender of payment in the amount of three
million pesos, Japanese currency, which
fact is believed sufficient to vest title of
ownership in the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to decisions of the
Supreme Court sustaining the validity of
payments made in Japanese military notes
during the occupation;
"WHEREAS, it is reported that the
Philippine Government did not have to
pay a single centavo for the Tambobong
Estate as it was already practically owned
by the Philippine Government by virtue of
a deed of sale from the Philippine Trust
Company dated September 3, 1947, for
seven hundred and fifty thousand pesos,
and by virtue of the recission of the
contract through which Ernest H. Burt
had an interest in the estate; Now,
therefore, be it
"RESOLVED, That a Special

Committee, be, as it hereby is, created,
composed of five members to be appointed
by the President of the Senate to
investigate the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estate deals. It shall be the
duty of the said Committee to determine
whether the said purchase was honest,
valid, and proper and whether the price
35
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 35

involved in the deal was fair and just, the

parties responsible therefor, and any other
facts the Committee may deem proper in
the premises. Said Committee shall have
the power to conduct public hearings; issue
subpoena or subpoena duces tecum to
compel the attendance of witnesses or the
production of documents before it; and
may require any official or employee of any
bureau, office, branch, subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality of the Government to
assist or otherwise cooperate with the
Special Committee in the performance of
its functions and duties. Said Committee
shall submit its report of findings and
recommendations within two weeks from

the adoption of this Resolution."
The special committee created by the

above resolution called and examined
various witnesses, among the most
important of whom was the herein
petitioner, Jean L. Arnault. An
intriguing question which. the
committee sought to resolve was that
involved in the apparent
unnecessariness and irregularity of
the Government's paying to Burt the
total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged
interest of only P20,000 in the two
estates, which he seemed to have
forfeited anyway long before October,
1949. The committee sought to
determine who were responsible for
and who benefited from the
transaction at the expense of the
Government.
Arnault testified that two checks
payable to Burt aggregating
P1,500,000 were delivered to him on
the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that
on the same date he opened a new
account in the name of Ernest H. Burt
with the Philippine National Bank in
which he deposited the two checks
aggregating P1,500,000; and that on
the same occasion he drew on said
account two checks; one for P500,000,

which he transferred to the account of
the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the
Philippine National Bank, and
another for P440,000 payable to cash,
which he himself cashed. It was the
desire of the committee to determine
the ultimate recipient of this sum of
P440,000 that gave rise to the present
case.
At first the petitioner claimed
before the Committee:
"Mr. ARNAULT (reading from a note). Mr.

Chairman, for questions involving the
disposition of funds, I take the position
that
36
ANNOTATED
the transactions were legal, that no laws

were being violated, and that all requisites
had been complied with. Here also I acted
in a purely functional capacity of
representative. I beg to be excused from
making answer which might later be used
against me. I have been assured that it is
my constitutional right to refuse to
incriminate myself, and I am certain that

the Honorable Members of this
Committee, who, I understand, are
lawyers, will see the justness of my
position."
At a subsequent session of the

committee (March 16) Senator De
Vera, a member of the committee,
interrogated him as follows:
"Senator DE VERA. Now these

transactions, according to your own
typewritten statement, were legal?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.
"Senator DE VERA. And the disposition
of that fund involved, according to your
own statement, did not violate any law?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.
* * * * * * *
"Senator DE VERA. So that if the funds
were disposed of in such a manner that no
laws were violated, how is it that when
you were asked by the Committee to tell
what steps you took to have this money
delivered to Burt, you refused to answer
the questions, saying that it would
incriminate you?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Because it violates the
rights of a citizen to privacy in his dealings
with other people.
* * * * * * *
"Senator DE VERA. Are you afraid to

state how the money was disposed of
because you would be incriminated, or you
would be incriminating somebody?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I am not afraid; I
simply stand on my privilege to dispose of
the money that has been paid to me as a
result of a legal transaction without
having to account for any use of it."
But when in the same session the

chairman of the committee, Senator
Sumulong, interrogated the petitioner,
the latter testified as follows:
"The CHAIRMAN. The other check of

P440,000 which you also made on October
29, 1949, is payable to cash; and upon
cashing this P440,000 on October 29, 1949,
what did you do with that amount?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I turned it over to a
certain person.
"The CHAIRMAN. The whole amount -
of P440,000?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
37
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 37

"The CHAIRMAN. Who was that

certain person to whom you
delivered these P440,000 which you
cashed on October 29, 1949?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I don't remember the
name; he was a representative of
Burt.
"The CHAIRMAN. That
representative of Burt to whom you
delivered the P440,000 was a
Filipino?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I don't know.
"The CHAIRMAN. You do not
remember the name of that
representative of Burt to whom you
delivered this big amount of
P440,000?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I do
not remember the name.
"The CHAIRMAN. That certain
person who represented Burt to
whom you delivered this big
amount on October 29, 1949, gave
you a receipt for the amount?
"Mr. ARNAULT. No.
"The CHAIRMAN. Neither did you
ask for a receipt?
"Mr, ARNAULT. I didn't ask.
"The CHAIRMAN. And why did you
give that certain person,
representative of Burt, this big
amount of P440,000 which forms
part of the P1-1/2 million paid to

Burt?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Because I have
instructions to that effect.
"The CHAIRMAN. Who gave you the
instruction?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Burt.
"The CHAIRMAN. Where is the
instruction; was that in writing?
"Mr.. ARNAULT. No.
"The CHAIRMAN. By cable?
"Mr. ARNAULT. No.
"The CHAIRMAN. In what form did
you receive that instruction?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Verbal instruction.
"The CHAIRMAN. When did you
receive this verbal instruction from
Burt to deliver these P440,000 to a
certain person whose name you do
not like to reveal?
"Mr. ARNAULT. 1 have instruction to
comply with the request of that
person.
"The CHAIRMAN. Now, you said that
instruction to you by Burt was
verbal?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
"The CHAIRMAN. When was that
instruction given to you by Burt?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Long time ago.
"The CHAIRMAN. In what year did
Burt give you that verbal
instruction; when Burt was still

here in the Philippines'
"Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
"The CHAIRMAN. But at that time
Burt already knew that he would
receive the money?
"Mr. ARNAULT. No.
38
ANNOTATED
"The CHAIRMAN. In what year was

that when Burt while he was here
in the Philippines gave you the
verbal instruction?
"Mr. ARNAULT. In 1946.
"The CHAIRMAN. And what has that
certain person done for Burt to
merit receiving these P440,000?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I absolutely do not
know.
"The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.
"The CHAIRMAN. Burt did not tell
you when he gave you the verbal
instruction why that certain person
should receive these P440,000?
"Mr. ARNAULT. He did not tell me.
"The CHAIRMAN. And Burt also

authorized you to give this big
amount to that certain person
without receipt?
"Mr. ARNAULT. He told me that a
certain person would represent him
and where I could meet him.
"The CHAIRMAN. Did Burt know
already that certain person as early
as 1946?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I presume much
before that.
"The CHAIRMAN. Did that certain
person have any intervention in the
prosecution of the two cases
involving the Buenavista and
Tambobong estates?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Not that I know of.
"The CHAIRMAN. Did that certain
person have anything to do with
the negotiation for the settlement
of the two cases?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Not that I know of.
"The CHAIRMAN. Is that certain
person related to any high
government official?
"Mr. ARNAULT. No, I do not know.
"The CHAIRMAN. Why can you not
tell us the name of that certain
person?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Because I am not
sure of his name; I cannot
remember the name.

"The CHAIRMAN. When you gave
that certain person that P440,000
on October 29, 1949, you knew
already that person?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Yes, I have seen him
several times.
"The CHAIRMAN. And the name of
that certain person is a Filipino
name?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I would say Spanish
name.
"The CHAIRMAN. And how about his
Christian name; is it also a Spanish
name?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I
think the initial is J.
"The CHAIRMAN. Did he have a
middle name?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I never knew it.
39
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 39

"The CHAIRMAN. And how about his

family name which according to
your recollection is Spanish; can
you remember the first letter with
which that family name begins?
Mr. ARNAULT. S, D or F.
"The CHAIRMAN. And what was the
last letter of the family name?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.
"The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen that
person again after you have
delivered this P440,000?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
"The CHAIRMAN. Several times?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Two or three times.
"The CHAIRMAN. When was the last
time that you saw that certain
person?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Sometime in
December.
"The CHAIRMAN. Here in Manila?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
"The CHAIRMAN. And in spite of the
fact that you met that person two
or three times, you never were able
to find out what was his name?
"Mr. ARNAULT. If I knew, I would
[have] taken it down. Mr. Peralta
knows my name; of course, we have
not done business. Lots of people in
Manila know me, but they don't
know my name, and I don't know
them. They say I am 'chiflado'
because I don't know their names.
"The CHAIRMAN. That certain
person is a male or a female?
"Mr. ARNAULT. He is a male.
"The CHAIRMAN. You are sure that

he is a male at least?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
"The CHAIRMAN. How old was he?
"Mr. ARNAULT. Let us say 38 to 40
years, more or less.
"The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us,
more or less, a description of that
certain person? What is his
complexion: light, dark or light
brown?
"Mr. ARNAULT. He is like the
gentleman there (pointing to Sen.
abili), smaller- He walks very
straight, with military bearing
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the
residence of that certain person to
whom you gave the P440.000?
"Mr. ARNAULT. No.
"The CHAIRMAN. During these
frequent times that you met that
certain person, you never came to
know his residence?
Mr. ARNAULT. No, because he was
coming to the office
The CHAIRMAN. How tall is that
certain person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Between 5-2 and 5-6."
40
ANNOTATED
On May 15, 1950, the petitioner was

haled before the bar of the Senate,
which approved and read to him the
following resolution:
"Be it resolved by the Senate of the

Philippines in Session assembled:
"That Jean L. Arnault, now at the bar of

the Senate, be arraigned for contempt
consisting of contumacious acts committed
by him during the investigation conducted
by the Special Committee created by
Senate Resolution No. 8 to probe the
Tambobong and Buenavista estates deal of
October 21, 1949, and that the President of
the Senate propounded to him the
following interrogatories:
"1. What excuse have you for
persistently refusing to reveal the name of
the person to whom you gave the P440,000
on October 29, 1949, a person whose name
it is impossible for you not to remember
not only because of the big amount of
money you gave to him without receipt,
but also because by your own statements
you knew him as early as 1946 when
General Ernest H. Burt was still in the
Philippines, you made two other deliveries
of money to him without receipt, and the

last time you saw him was in December
1949?"
Thereupon petitioner's attorney, Mr.

Orendain, submitted for him a written
answer alleging that the questions
were incriminatory in nature and
begging leave to be allowed to stand
on his constitutional right not to be
compelled to be a witness against
himself. Not satisfied with that
written answer Senator Sumulong,
over the objection of counsel for the
petitioner, propounded to the latter
the following question:
"Sen. SUMULONG. During the

investigation, when the Committee asked
you for the name of that person to whom
you gave the P440,000, you said that you
can [could] not remember his name. That
was your reason then for refusing to reveal
the name of the person. Now, in the
answer that you have just cited, you are
refusing to reveal the name of that person
to whom you gave the P440,000 on the
ground that your answer will be self-
incriminating. Now, do I understand from
you that you are abandoning your former
claim that you cannot remember the name
of that person, and that your reason now
for your refusal to reveal the name of that
person is that your answer might be self-

incriminating? In other words, the
question is this: What is your real reason
for refusing to reveal the name of that
person to whom you gave the
41
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 41

P440,000: that you do not remember his

name or that your answer would be self-
incriminating?
* * * * * * *
"Mr. ORENDAIN. Mr. President, we
are begging for the rules of procedure that
the accused should not be required to
testify unless he so desires.
"The PRESIDENT. It is the duty of the
respondent to answer the question. The
question is very clear. It does not
incriminate him.
* * * * * * *
"Mr. ARNAULT. I stand by every
statement that I have made before the
Senate Committee on the first, second, and
third hearings to which I was made to
testify. I stand by the statements that I
have made in my letter to this Senate of
May 2, 1950, in which I gave all the
reasons that were in my powers to give, as

requested. I cannot change anything in
those statements that I made because they
represent the best that I can do, to the
best of my ability.
"The PRESIDENT. You are not
answering the question. The answer has
nothing to do with the question.
"Sen. SUMULONG. I would like to
remind you, Mr. Arnault, that the reason
that you gave during the investigation for
not revealing the name of the person to
whom you gave the P440,000 is not the
same reason that you are now alleging
because during the investigation you told
us: 'I do not remember his name.' But,
now, you are now saying: 'My answer
might incriminate me.' What is your real
position?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I have just stated that
I stand by my statements that I made at
the first, second, and third hearings. I said
that I wanted to be excused from
answering the question. I beg to be
excused from making any answer that
might be incriminating in nature.
However, in this answer, if the detail of
not remembering the name of the person
has not been included, it is an oversight.
"Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. Arnault, will
you kindly answer a simple question: Do
you remember or not the name of the

person to whom you gave the P440,000?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember.
"Sen. SUMULONG. Now, if you do not
remember the name of that person, how
can you say that your answer might be
incriminating? If you do not remember his
name, you cannot answer the question; so
how could your answer be self-
incriminating? What do you say to that?
"Mr. ARNAULT. This is too complicated
for me to explain. Please, I do not see how
to answer those questions. That is why I
asked
42
ANNOTATED
for a lawyer, so he can help me. I have no

means of knowing what the situation is
about. I have been in jail 13 days without
communication with the outside. How
could I answer the question? I have no
knowledge of legal procedure or rule, of
which I am completely ignorant.
* * * * * * *
"Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. President, I
ask that the question be answered.
"The PRESIDENT. The witness is

ordered to answer the question. It is very
clear. It does not incriminate the witness.
* * * * * * *
"Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember. I
stand on my constitutional rights. I beg to
be excused from making further answer,
please.
* * * * * * *
"Sen. SUMULONG. In that
mimeographed letter that you sent
addressed to the President of the Senate,
dated May 2, 1950, you stated there that
you cannot reveal the name of the person
to whom you gave the P440,000 because if
he is a public official you might render
yourself liable for prosecution for bribery,
and that if he is a private individual you
might render yourself liable for
prosecution for slander. Why did you make
those statements when you cannot even
tell us whether that person to whom you
gave the P440,000 is a public official or a
private individual? We are giving you this
chance to convince the Senate that all
these allegations of yours that your
answers might incriminate you are given
by you honestly or you are just trying to
make a pretext for not revealing the
information desired by the Senate.
"The PRESIDENT. You are ordered to
answer the question.
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not even

understand the question.
(The question is restated and
explained.)
"Mr. ARNAULT. That letter of May 2
was prepared by a lawyer for me and I
signed it. That is all I can say how I stand
about this letter. I have no knowledge
myself enough to write such a letter, so I
had to secure the help of a lawyer to help
me in my period of distress'."
In that same session of the Senate

before which the petitioner was called
to show cause why he should not be
adjudged guilty of contempt of the
Senate, Senator Sumulong
propounded to the petitioner questions
tending to elicit information from him
as to the identity of the person to
whom he delivered the P440,000; but
the petitioner ref used
43
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 43

to reveal it by saying that he did not

remember. The President of the
Senate then propounded to him
various questions concerning his past
activities dating as far back as when

witness was seven years of age and
ending as recently as the
postliberation period, all of which
questions the witness answered
satisfactorily. In view thereof, the
President of the Senate also made an
attempt to elicit the desired
information from the witness, as
follows:
'The PRESIDENT. Now I am

convinced that you have a good
memory. Answer: Did you deliver
the P440,000 as a gift, or for any
consideration?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I have said that I
had instructions to deliver it to that
person, that is all.
"The PRESIDENT. Was it the first
time you saw that person?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I saw him various
times, I have already said.
"The PRESIDENT. In spite of that,
you do not have the least
remembrance of the name of that
person?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot remember.
"The PRESIDENT. How is it that you
do not remember events that
happened a short time ago and, on
the other hand, you remember
events that occurred during your

childhood?
"Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot explain."
The Senate then deliberated and

adopted the resolution of May 15
hereinabove quoted whereby the
petitioner was committed to the
custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and
imprisoned until "he shall have
purged the contempt by revealing to
the Senate or to the aforesaid Special
Committee the name of the person to
whom he gave the P440,000, as well
as answer other pertinent questions in
connection therewith."
The Senate also adopted on the
same date another resolution (No. 16),
to wit:
"That the Special Committee created by

Senate Resolution No. 8 be empowered
and directed to continue its investigation
of the Tambobong and Buenavista Estates
deal of October 21, 1949, more particularly
to continue its examination of Jean L.
Arnault regarding the name of the person
to whom he gave the P440,000 and other
matters related therewith."
44
ANNOTATED
The first session of the Second

Congress was adjourned at midnight
on May 18, 1950.
The case was argued twice before
us. We have given it earnest and
prolonged consideration because it is
the first of its kind to arise since the
Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines was adopted. For the first
time this Court is called upon to
define the power of either House of
Congress to punish a person not a
member for contempt; and we are fully
conscious that our pronouncements
here will set an important precedent
for the future guidance of all
concerned.
Bef ore discussing the specific
issues raised by the parties, we deem
it necessary to lay down the general
principles of law which form the
background of those issues.
Patterned after the American
system, our Constitution vests the
powers of the Government in three
independent but coordinate
Departments—Legislative, Executive,
and Judicial. The legislative power is
vested in the Congress, which consists

of the Senate and the House of
Representatives. (Section 1, Article
VI.) Each House may determine the
rules of its proceedings, punish its
Members for disorderly behaviour,
and, with the concurrence of twothirds
of all its Members, expel a Members
(Section 10, Article VI.) The judicial
power is vested in the Supreme Court
and in such inferior courts as may be
established by law. (Section 1, Article
VIII.) Like the Constitution of the
United States, ours does not contain
an express provision empowering
either of the two Houses of Congress
to punish nonmembers for contempt.
It may also be noted that whereas in
the United States the legislative
power is shared by and between the
Congress of the United States, on the
one hand, and the respective
legislatures of the different States, on
the other—the powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution
nor prohibited by it to States being
reserved to the States, respectively, or
to the people—in the Philippines, the
legislative power is vested in the
Congress of the Philippines alone. It
may therefore
45
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 45

be said that the Congress of the

Philippines has a wider range of
legislative field than the Congress of
the United States or any State
Legislature.
Our f form of government being
patterned after the American system
—the framers of our Constitution
having drawn largely from American
institutions and practices—we can, in
this case, properly draw also from
American precedents in interpreting
analogous provisions of our
Constitution, as we have done in other
cases in the past.
Although there is no provision in
the Constitution expressly investing
either House of Congress with power
to make investigations and exact
testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions
advisedly and effectively? such power
is so f ar incidental to the legislative f
unction as to be implied. In other
words, the power of inquiry—with
process to enforce it—is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the

legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in
the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change; and
where the legislative body does not
itself possess the requisite information
—which is not infrequently true—
recourse must be had to others who do
possess it. Experience has shown that
mere requests for such information
are often unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is
not always accurate or complete; so
some means of compulsion is essential
to obtain what is needed. (McGrain vs.
Daugherty, 273 U. S., 135; 71 L. ed.,
580; 50 A. L. R., 1.) The fact that the
Constitution expressly gives to
Congress the power to punish its
Members f or disorderly behaviour,
does not by necessary implication
exclude the power to punish for
contempt any other person. (Anderson
vs. Dunn, 6 Wheaton, 204; 5 L. ed.,
242.)
But no person can be punished for
contumacy as a witness before either
House, unless his testimony is
required in a matter into which that
House has jurisdiction to inquire.
(Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed.,

377.)
46
ANNOTATED
Since, as we have noted, the Congress

of the Philippines has a wider range of
legislative field than either the
Congress of the United States or a
State Legislature, we think it is
correct to say that the field of inquiry
into which it may enter is also wider.
It would be difficult to define any
limits by which the subject matter of
its inquiry can be bounded. It is not
necessary for us to do so in this case.
Suffice it to say that it must be
coextensive with the range of the
legislative power.
In the present case the jurisdiction
of the Senate, thru the Special
Committee created by it, to
investigate the Buenavista and
Tambobong estates deal is not
challenged by the petitioner; and we
entertain no doubt as to the Senate's
authority to do so and as to the
validity of Resolution No. 8
hereinabove quoted. The transaction

involved a questionable and allegedly
unnecessary and irregular
expenditure of no less than P5,000,000
of public funds, of which Congress is
the constitutional guardian. It also
involved government agencies created
by Congress and officers whose
positions it is within the power of
Congress to regulate or even abolish.
As a result of the yet uncompleted
investigation, the investigating
committee has recommended and the
Senate has approved three bills (1)
prohibiting the Secretary of Justice or
any other department head from
discharging functions and exercising
powers other than those attached to
his own office, without previous
congressional authorization; (2)
prohibiting brothers and near
relatives of any President of the
Philippines from intervening directly
or indirectly and in whatever capacity
in transactions in which the
Government is a party, more
particularly where the decision lies in
the hands of executive or
administrative officers who are
appointees of the President; and (3)
providing that purchases of the Rural
Progress Administration of big landed
estates at a price of P100,000 or more,

and loans guaranteed by the
Government involving P100,000 or
more, shall not
47
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 47

become effective without previous

1
congressional confirmation.
We shall now consider and pass
upon each of the questions raised by
the petitioner in support of his
contention that his commitment is
unlawful.
First. He contends that the Senate
has no power to punish him for
contempt for refusing to reveal the
name of the person to whom he gave
the P440,000, because such
information is immaterial to, and will
not serve, any intended or purported
legislation and his refusal to answer
the question has not embarrassed,
obstructed, or impeded the legislative
process. It is argued that since the
investigating committee has already
rendered its report and has made all
its recommendations as to what
legislative measures should be taken

pursuant to its findings, there is no
necessity to force the petitioner to give
the information desired other than
that mentioned in its report, to wit:
"In justice to Judge Quirino and to
Secretary Nepomuceno, this
atmosphere of suspicion that now
pervades the public mind must be
dissipated, and it can only be done if
appropriate steps are taken by the
Senate to compel Arnault to stop
pretending that he cannot remember
the name of the person to whom he
gave the P440,000 and answer
questions which will definitely
establish the identity of that person *
* *." Senator Sumulong, Chairman of
the Committee, who appeared and
argued the case for the respondents,
denied that that was the only purpose
of the Senate in seeking the
information from the witness. He said
that the investigation had not been
completed, because, due to the
contumacy of the witness, his
committee had not yet determined the
parties responsible for the anomalous
transaction as required by Resolution
No. 8; that, by Resolution No. 16. his
committee was empowered and
directed to continue its investigation,

more particularly to continue
______________
1 These bills, however, have not yet been

acted upon by the House of Representatives.
48
ANNOTATED
its examination of the witness

regarding the name of the person to
whom he gave the P440,000 and other
matters related therewith; that the
bills recommended by his committee
had not been approved by the House
and might not be approved pending
the completion of the investigation;
and that those bills were not
necessarily all the measures that
Congress might deem it necessary to
pass after the investigation is
finished.
Once an inquiry is admitted or
established to be within the
jurisdiction of a legislative body to
make, we think the investigating
committee has the power to require a
witness to answer any question

pertinent to that inquiry, subject of
course to his constitutional right
against self-incrimination. The
inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of
the legislative body to make, must be
material or necessary to the exercise
of a power in it vested by the
Constitution, such as to legislate, or to
expel a Member; and every question
which the investigator is empowered
to coerce a witness to answer must be
material or pertinent to the subject of
the inquiry or investigation. So a
witness may not be coerced to answer
a question that obviously has no
relation to the subject of the inquiry.
But from this it does not follow that
every question that may be
propounded to a witness must be
material to any proposed or possible
legislation. In other words, the
materiality of the question must be
determined by its direct relation to the
subject of the inquiry and not by its
indirect relation to any proposed or
possible legislation. The reason is,
that the necessity or lack of necessity
for legislative action and the form and
character of the action itself are
determined by the sum total of the
information to be gathered as a result
of the investigation, and not by a

fraction of such information elicited
from a single question.
In this connection, it is suggested
by counsel for the respondents that
the power of the Court is limited to
determining whether the legislative
body has jurisdiction to institute the
inquiry or investigation; that once
that
49
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 49

jurisdiction is conceded, this Court

cannot control the exercise of that
jurisdiction or the use of
Congressional discretion; and, it is
insinuated, that the ruling of the
Senate on the materiality of the
question propounded to the witness is
not subject to review by this Court
under the principle of the separation
of powers. We have to qualify this
proposition. As was said by the Court
of Appeals of New York: "We are
bound to presume that the action of
the legislative body was with a
legitimate object if it is capable of
being so construed, and we have no

right to assume that the contrary was
intended." (People ex rel. McDonald vs.
Keeler, 99 N. Y., 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49;
2 N. E., 615, quoted with approval by
the Supreme Court of the United
States in McGrain vs. Daugherty,
supra.) Applying this principle to the
question at hand, we may concede
that the ruling of the Senate on the
materiality of the information sought
from the witness is presumed to be
correct. But, as noted by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the said
case of McGrain vs. Daugherty, it is a
necessary deduction from the decision
in Re Chapman, 41 L. ed., 1154, that
where the questions are not pertinent
to the matter under inquiry a witness
rightfully may refuse to answer. So we
are of the opinion that where the
alleged immateriality of the
information sought by the legislative
body from a witness is relied upon to
contest its jurisdiction, the court is in
duty bound to pass upon the
contention. The fact that the
legislative body has jurisdiction or the
power to make the inquiry would not
preclude judicial intervention to
correct a clear abuse of discretion in
the exercise of that power.
Applying the criterion laid down in

the last two preceding paragraphs to
the resolution of the issue under
consideration, we find that the
question for the refusal to answer
which the petitioner was held in
contempt by the Senate is pertinent to
the matter under inquiry. In fact, this
is not and cannot be disputed. Senate
Resolution No. 8, the validity of which
is not challenged by the peti-
50
ANNOTATED
tioner, requires the Special

Committee, among other things, to
determine the parties responsible for
the Buenavista and Tambobong
estates deal, and it is obvious that the
name of the person to whom the
witness gave the P440,000 involved in
said deal is pertinent to that
determination—it is in fact the very
thing sought to be determined. The
contention is not that the qeustion is
impertinent to the subject of the
inquiry but that it has no relation or
materiality to any proposed
legislation. We have already indicated

that it is not necessary for the
legislative body to show that every
question propounded to a witness is
material to any proposed or possible
legislation; what is required is that it
be pertinent to the matter under
inquiry.
The Court cannot determine, any
more than it can direct Congress,
what legislation to approve or not to
approve; that would be an invasion of
the legislative prerogative. The Court,
therefore, may not say that the
information sought from the witness
which is material to the subject of the
legislative inquiry is immaterial to
any proposed or possible legislation.
It is said that the Senate has
already approved the three bills
recommended by the Committee as a
result of the uncompleted
investigation and that there is no need
for it to know the name of the person
to whom the witness gave the
P440,000. But aside from the fact that
those bills have not yet been approved
by the lower house and by the
President and that they may be
withdrawn or modified if after the
inquiry is completed they should be
found unnecessary or inadequate,
there is nothing to prevent the

Congress from approving other
measures it may deem necessary after
completing the investigation. We are
not called upon, nor is it within our
province, to determine or imagine
what those measures may be. And our
inability to do so is no reason for
overruling the question propounded by
the Senate to the witness.
The case of Re Chapman, 166 U. S.,
661; 41 L. ed., 1154, is in point here.
The inquiry there in question was con-
51
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 51

ducted under a resolution of the

Senate and related to charges,
published in the press, that senators
were yielding to corrupt influences in
considering a tariff bill then before the
Senate and were speculating in stocks
the value of which would be affected
by pending amendments to the bill.
Chapman, a member of a firm of stock
brokers dealing in the stock of the
American Sugar Refining Company,
appeared before the committee in
response to a subpoena and was

asked, among others, the following
questions:
"Had the firm, during the month of March,

1894, bought or sold any stock or
securities, known as sugar stocks, for or in
the interest, directly or indirectly, of any
United States senator? "Was the said firm
at that time carrying any sugar stock for
the benefit of, or in the interest, directly or
indirectly, of any United Senate senator?"
He refused to answer those questions

and was prosecuted under an Act of
Congress for contempt of the Senate.
Upon being convicted and sent to jail
he petitioned the Supreme Court of
the United States for a writ of habeas
corpus. One of the questions decided
by the Supreme Court of the United
States in that case was whether the
committee had the right to compel the
witness to answer said questions, and
the Court held that the committee did
have such right, saying:
"The questions were undoubtedly pertinent

to the subject-matter of the inquiry. The
resolution directed the committee to
inquire 'whether any senator has been, or
is, speculating in what are known as sugar
stocks during the consideration of the
tariff bill now bef ore the Senate.' What the

Senate might or might not do upon the
facts when ascertained, we cannot say, nor
are we called upon to inquire whether such
ventures might be defensible, as contended
in argument, but it is plain that negative
answers would have cleared that body of
what the Senate regarded as offensive
imputations, while affirmative answers
might have led to further action on the
part of the Senate within its constitutional
powers." (Italics ours.)
It may be contended that the

determination of the parties
responsible for the deal is incumbent
upon the judicial rather than upon the
legislative branch. But
52
ANNOTATED
we think there is no basis in fact or in

law for such assumption. The
petitioner has not challenged the
validity of Senate Resolution No. 8,
and that resolution expressly requires
the committee to determine the
parties responsible for the deal. We
are bound to presume that the Senate

has acted in the due performance of
its constitutional function in
instituting the inquiry, if the act is
capable of being so construed. On the
other hand, there is no suggestion
that the judiciary has instituted an
inquiry to determine the parties
responsible for the deal. Under the
circumstances of the case, it appearing
that the questioned transaction was
affected by the head of the
Department of Justice himself, it is
not reasonable to expect that the
Fiscal or the Court of First Instance of
Manila will take the initiative to
investigate and prosecute the parties
responsible for the deal until and
unless the Senate shall have
determined who those parties are and
shall have taken such measures as
may be within its competence to take
to redress the wrong that may have
been committed against the people as
a result of the transaction. As we have
said, the transaction involved no less
than P5,000,000 of public funds. That
certainly is a matter of public concern
which it is the duty of the
constitutional guardian of the
treasury to investigate.
If the subject of investigation before

the committee is within the range of
legitimate legislative inquiry and the
proposed testimony of the witness
called relates to that subject, obedience
to its process may be enforced by the
committee by imprisonment. (Sullivan
vs. Hill, 73 W. Va., 49; 79 S. E., 670;
40 Ann. Cas. [1916 B.], 1115.)
The decision in the case of Kilbourn
vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377, relied
upon by the petitioner, is not
applicable here. In that case the
inquiry instituted by the House of
Representatives of the United States
related to a private real-estate pool or
partnership in the District of
Columbia. Jay Cook & Company had
had an interest in the pool but had
become bankrupts, and their estate
was
53
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 53

in course of administration in a
federal bankruptcy court in
Pennsylvania. The United States was
one of their creditors. The trustee in
the bankruptcy proceeding had

effected a settlement of the bankrupts'
interest in the pool, and of course his
action was subject to examination and
approval or disapproval by the
bankruptcy court. Some of the
creditors, including the United States,
were dissatisfied with the settlement.
The resolution of the House directed
the Committee "to inquire into the
nature and history of said real-estate
pool and the character of said
settlement, with the amount of
property involved, in which Jay Cooke
& Co. were interested, and the
amount paid or to be paid in said
settlement, with power to send for
persons and papers, and report to this
House." The Supreme Court of the
United States, speaking thru Mr.
Justice Miller, pointed out that the
resolution contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation; that the
matter was one in respect of which no
valid legislation could be had; that the
bankrupts' estate and the trustee's
settlement were still pending in the
bankruptcy court; and that the United
States and other creditors were free to
press their claims in that proceeding.
And on these grounds the court held
that in undertaking the investigation
"the House of Representatives not

only exceeded the limit of its own
authority, but assumed a power which
could only be properly exercised by
another branch of the government,
because the power was in its nature
clearly judicial." The principles
announced and applied in that case
are: that neither House of Congress
possesses a "general power of making
inquiry into the private affairs of the
citizen"; that the power actually
possessed is limited to inquiries
relating to matters of which the
particular House has jurisdiction, and
in respect of which it rightfully may
take other action; that if the inquiry
relates to a matter wherein relief or
redress could be had only by judicial
proceeding, it is not within the range
of
54
ANNOTATED
this power, but must be left to the

courts, conformably to the
constitutional separation of
governmental powers.
That case diff ers from the present

case in two important respects: (1)
There the court found that the subject
of the inquiry, which related to a
private real-estate pool or
partnership, was not within the
jurisdiction of either House of
Congress; while here it is not disputed
that the subject of the inquiry, which
relates to a transaction involving a
questionable expenditure by the
Government of P5,000,000 of public
funds, is within the jurisdiction of the
Senate. (2) There the claim of the
Government as a creditor of Jay Cooke
& Company, which had had an
interest in the pool, was pending
adjudication by the court; while here
the interposition of the judicial power
on the subject of the inquiry cannot be
expected, as we have pointed out
above, until after the Senate shall
have determined who the parties
responsible are and shall have taken
such measures as may be within its
competence to take to redress the
wrong that may have been committed
against the people as a result of the
transaction.
It is interesting to note that the
decision in the case of Kilbourn vs.
Thompson has evoked strong
criticisms from legal scholars. (See

Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to
Punish for Contempt [1926], 74 U. Pa.
L. Rev., 692-699; James M. Landis,
Constitutional Limitations on the
Congressional Power of Investigation
[1926], 40 Harvard L. Rev., 153, 214-
220.) We quote the following from
Professor Landis' criticism: "Mr.
Justice Miller saw the case purely as
an attempt by the House to secure to
the Government certain priority rights
as creditor of the bankrupt concern.
To him it assumed the character of a
lawsuit between the Government and
Jay Cooke & Co., with the
Government, acting through the
House, attempting to override the
orderliness of established procedure
and thereby prefer a creditors' bill not
before the courts but before Congress.
That bankruptcy proceedings had.
already been instituted against Jay
Cooke & Co. in a f ederal
55
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 55

court gave added impetus to such a

conception. The House was seeking to
oust a court of prior acquired
jurisdiction by an extraordinary and
unwarranted assumption of 'judicial
power'! The broader aspect of the
investigation had not been disclosed to
the Court. That Jay Cooke & Co.'s
indebtedness and the particular funds
in question were only part of the great
administrative problem connected
with the use and disposition of public
monies, that the particular failure was
of consequence mainly in relation to
the security demanded for all
government deposits, that the facts
connected with one such default
revealed the possibility of other and
greater maladministration, such
considerations had not been put before
the Court. Nor had it been acquainted
with the every-day nature of the
particular investigation and the
powers there exerted by the House,
powers whose exercise was customary
and familiar in legislative practice.
Instead of assuming the character of
an extraordinary judicial proceeding,
the inquiry, placed in its proper
background, should have been
regarded as a normal and customary
part of the legislative process.
Detailed definiteness of legislative

purpose was thus made the demand of
the Court in Kilbourn. vs. Thompson.
But investigators cannot foretell the
results that may be achieved. The
power of Congress to exercise control
over a real-estate pool is not a matter
for abstract speculation but one to be
determined only after an exhaustive
examination of the problem.
Relationship, and not their
possibilities, determine the extent of
congressional power. Constitutionality
depends upon such disclosures. Their
presence, whether determinative of
legislative or judicial power, cannot be
relegated to guesswork. Neither
Congress nor the Court can predict,
prior to the event, the result of
investigation."
The other case relied upon by the
petitioner is Marshall vs. Gordon, 243
U. S., 521; 61 L. ed., 881. The question
there was whether the House of
Representatives exceeded its power in
punishing, as for contempt of its
authority,
56
ANNOTATED
the District Attorney of the Southern

District of New York, who had
written, published, and sent to the
chairman of one of its committees an
ill-tempered and irritating letter
respecting the action and purposes of
the committee in interfering with the
investigation by the grand jury of
alleged illegal activities of a member
of the House of Representatives.
Power to make inquiries and obtain
evidence by compulsory process was
not involved. The court recognized
distinctly that the House of
Representatives had implied power to
punish a person not a member f or
contempt, but held that its action in
this instance was without
constitutional justification. The
decision was put on the ground that
the letter, while offensive and
vexatious, was not calculated or likely
to affect the House in any of its
proceedings or in the exercise of any of
its f unctions. This brief statement of
the facts and the issues decided in
that case is sufficient to show the
inapplicability thereof to the present
case. There the contempt involved
consisted in the district attorney's
writing to the chairman of the

committee an offensive and vexatious
letter, while here the contempt
involved consists in the refusal of the
witness to answer questions pertinent
to the subject of an inquiry which the
Senate has the power and jurisdiction
to make. But in that case it was
recognized that the House of
Representatives has implied power to
punish a person not a member for
contempt. In that respect the case is
applicable here in favor of the Senate's
(and not of the petitioner's)
contention.
Second. It is next contended for the
petitioner that the Senate lacks
authority to commit him for contempt
for a term beyond its period of
legislative session, which ended on
May 18, 1950. This contention is
based on the opinion of Mr. Justice
Malcolm, concurred in by Justices
Street and Villa-Real, in the case of
Lopez vs. De los Reyes (1930), 55 Phil.,
170. In that case it appears that on
October 23, 1929, Candido Lopez
assaulted a member of
57
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 57

the House of Representatives while

the latter was going to the hall of the
House of Representatives to attend
the session which was then about to
begin, as a result of which assault said
representative was unable to attend
the sessions on that day and those of
the two days next following by reason
of the threats which Candido Lopez
made against him. By resolution of
the House adopted November 6, 1929,
Lopez was declared guilty of contempt
of the House of Representatives and
ordered punished by confinement in
Bilibid Prison for a period of twentyf
our hours, That resolution was not
complied with because the session of
the House of Representatives
adjourned at midnight on November 8,
1929, and was reiterated at the next
session on September 16, 1930. Lopez
was subsequently arrested,
whereupon he applied for the writ of
habeas corpus in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, which denied the
application. Upon appeal to the
Supreme Court, six justices voted to
grant the writ: Justices Malcolm,
Street, and Villa-Real, on the ground
that the term of imprisonment meted
out to the petitioner could not legally

be extended beyond the session of the
body in which the contempt occurred;
and Justices Johns, Villamor, and
Ostrand, on the ground that the
Philippine Legislature had no power
to punish for contempt because it was
a creature merely of an Act of the
Congress of the United States and not
of a Constitution adopted by the
people. Chief Justice Avanceña,
Justice Johnson, and Justice
Romualdez wrote separate opinions,
concurring with Justices Malcolm,
Street, and Villa-Real, that the
Legislature had inherent power to
punish for contempt but dissenting
from the opinion that the order of
commitment could only be executed
during the particular session in which
the act of contempt was committed.
Thus, on the question under
consideration, the Court was equally
divided and no decisive
pronouncement was made. The
opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm is
based mainly
58
ANNOTATED
on the following passage in the case of

Anderson vs. Dunn, supra:
"And although the legislative power

continues perpetual, the legislative body
ceases to exist on the moment of its
adjournment or periodical dissolution. It
follows that imprisonment must terminate
with that adjournment."
as well as on the following quotation

from Marshall vs. Gordon, supra:
"And the essential nature of the power also

makes clear the cogency and application of
the two limitations which were expressly
pointed out in Anderson vs. Dunn, supra,
that is, that the power even when applied
to subjects which justified its exercise is
limited to imprisonment and such
imprisonment may not be extended beyond
the session of the body in which the
contempt occurred."
Interpreting the above quotations,

Chief Justice Avanceña held:
"From this doctrine it follows, in. my

judgment, that the imposition of the
penalty is limited to the existence of the
legislative body, which ceases to function
upon its final periodical dissolution. The

doctrine refers to its existence and not to
any particular session thereof. This must
be so, inasmuch as the basis of the power
to impose such penalty is the right which
the Legislature has to self-preservation,
and which right is enforceable during the
existence of the legislative body. Many
causes might be conceived to constitute
contempt to the Legislature, which would
continue to be a menace to its preservation
during the existence of the legislative body
against which contempt was committed.
"If the basis of the power of the
legislature to punish for contempt exists
while the legislative body exercising it is
in session, then that power and the
exercise thereof must perforce continue
until its final adjournment and the
election of its successor." Mr. Justice
Johnson's more elaborate opinion,
supported
by quotations from Cooley's

Constitutional Limitations and from
Jefferson's Manual, is to the same
effect. Mr. Justice Romualdez said: "In
my opinion, where, as in the case
'before us, the members composing the
legislative body against which the
contempt was committed have not yet
completed their three-year term, the
House may take action against the

petitioner herein."
59
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 59

We note that the quotations from

Anderson vs. Dunn and Marshall vs.
Gordon relied upon by Justice
Malcolm are obiter dicta. Anderson vs.
Dunn was an action of trespass
against the Sergeant-at-Arms of the
House of Representatives of the
United States for assault and battery
and false imprisonment. The plaintiff
had been arrested for contempt of the
House, brought before the bar of the
House, and reprimanded by the
Speaker, and then discharged from
custody. The question as to the
duration of the penalty was not
involved in that case. The question
there presented was "whether the
House of Representatives can take
cognizance of contempts committed
against themselves, under any
circumstances." The court there held
that the House of Representatives had
the power to punish for contempt, and
affirmed the judgment of the lower

court in favor of the defendant. In
Marshall vs. Gordon, the question
presented was whether the House had
the power under the Constitution to
deal with the conduct of the district
attorney in writing a vexatious letter
as a contempt of its authority, and to
inflict punishment upon the writer for
such contempt as a matter of
legislative power. The court held that
the House had no such power because
the writing of the letter did not
obstruct the performance of legislative
duty and did not endanger the
preservation of the power of the House
to carry out its legislative authority.
Upon that ground alone, and not
because the House had adjourned, the
court ordered the discharge of the
petitioner from custody.
The case where the question was
squarely decided is McGrain vs.
Daugherty, supra. There it appears
that the Senate had adopted a
resolution authorizing and directing a
select committee of five senators to
investigate various charges of
misfeasance and nonfeasance in the
Department of Justice after Attorney
General Harry M. Daugherty became
its supervising head. In the course of
the investigation the committte

caused to be served on Mally S.
Daugherty, brother of Harry M.
Daugherty and president of the
60
ANNOTATED
Midland National Bank of

Washington Court House, Ohio, a
subpœna commanding him to appear
before it for the purpose of giving
testimony relating to the subject
under consideration. The witness
failed to appear without offering any
excuse for his failure. The committee
reported the matter to the Senate and
the latter adopted a resolution, "That
the President of the Senate pro
tempore issue his warrant
commanding the Sergeant-at-Arms or
his deputy to take into custody the
body of the said M. S. Daugherty
wherever found, and to bring the said
M. S. Daugherty before the bar of the
Senate, then and there to answer such
questions pertinent to the matter
under inquiry as the Senate may
order the President of the Senate pro
tempore to propound; and to keep the

said M. S. Daugherty in custody to
await the further order of the Senate."
Upon being arrested, the witness
petitioned the federal court in
Cincinnati for a writ of habeas corpus.
The f ederal court granted the writ
and discharged the witness on the
ground that the Senate, in directing
the investigation and in ordering the
arrest, exceeded its power under the
Constitution. Upon appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States,
one of the contentions of the witness
was that the case had become moot
because the investigation was ordered
and the committee was appointed
during the Sixty-eighth Congress,
which expired on March 4, 1926. In
overruling the contention, the court
said:
"* * * The resolution ordering the

investigation in terms limited the
committee's authority to the period of the
Sixty-eight Congress; but this apparently
was changed by a later and amendatory
resolution authorizing the committee to sit
at such times and places as it might deem
advisable or necessary. It is said in
Jefferson's Manual: 'Neither House can
continue any portion of itself in any
parliamentary function beyond the end of

the session without the consent of the
other two branches. When done, it is by a
bill constituting them commissioners for
the particular purpose.' But the context
shows that the reference is to the two
houses of Parliament when adjourned by
prorogation or dissolution by the King.
61
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 61

The rule may be the same with the House

of Representatives whose members are all
elected for the period of a single Congress;
but it cannot well be the same with the
Senate, which is a continuing body whose
members are all elected for a term of six
years and so divided into classes that the
seats of one third only become vacant at
the end of each Congress, two thirds
always continuing into the next Congress,
save as vacancies may occur through death
or resignation. "Mr. Hinds in his collection
of precedents, says: 'The Senate, as a
continuing body, may continue its
committees through the recess following
the expiration of a Congress;' and, after
quoting the above statement from
Jefferson's Manual, he says: 'The Senate,

however, being a continuing body, gives
authority to its committees during the
recess after the expiration of a Congress.'
So far as we are advised the select
committee having this investigation in
charge has neither made a final report nor
been discharged; nor has it been continued
by an affirmative order. Apparently its
activities have been suspended pending
the decision of this case. But, be this as it
may, it is certain that the committee may
be continued or revived now by motion to
that effect, and, if continued or revived,
will have all its orginal powers. This being
so, and the Senate being a continuing
body, the case cannot be said to have
become moot in the ordinary sense. The
situation is measurably like that in
Southern P. Terminal Co. vs. Interstate
Commerce Commission, 219 U. S., 498,
514-516; 55 L. ed., 310, 315, 316; 31 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 279, where it was held that a suit
to enjoin the enforcement of an order of
the Interstate Commerce Commission did
not become moot through the expiration of
the order where it was capable of
repetition by the Commission and was a
matter of public interest. Our judgment
may yet be carried into effect and the
investigation proceeded with from the
point at which it apparently was
interrupted by reason of the habeas corpus

proceedings. In these circumstances we
think a judgment should be rendered as
was done in the case cited.
"What has been said requires that the
final order in the District Court
discharging the witness from custody be
reversed."
Like the Senate of the United States,

the Senate of the Philippines is a
continuing body whose members are
elected for a term of six years and so
divided that the seats of only one-
third become vacant every two years,
two-thirds always continuing into the
next Congress save as vacancies may
occur thru death or resignation.
Members of the House of
Representatives are all elected for a
term of four years;
62
ANNOTATED
so that the term of every Congress is

four years. The Second Congress of
the Philippines was constituted on
December 30, 1949, and will expire on

December 30, 1953. The resolution of
the Senate committing the petitioner
was adopted during the first session of
the Second Congress, which began on
the fourth Monday of January and
ended on May 18, 1950.
Had said resolution of commitment
been adopted by the House of
Representatives, we think it could be
enforced until the final adjournment
of the last session of the Second
Congress in 1953. We find no sound
reason to limit the power of a
legislative body to punish for
contempt to the end of every session
and not to the end of the last session
terminating the existence of that body.
The very reason f or the exercise of the
power to punish for contempt is to
enable the legislative body to perform
its constitutional function without
impediment or obstruction. Legislative
functions may be and in practice are
performed during recess by duly
constituted committees charged with
the duty of performing investigations
or conducting hearing relative to any
proposed legislation. To deny to such
committees the power of inquiry with
process to enforce it would be to defeat
the very purpose for which that power
is recognized in the legislative body as

an essential and appropriate auxiliary
to its legislative function. It is but
logical to say that the power of self-
preservation is coexistent with the life
to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment
here in question was adopted by the
Senate, which is a continuing body
and which does not cease to exist upon
the periodical dissolution of the
Congress or of the House of
Representatives. There is no limit as
to time to the Senate's power to
punish for contempt in cases where
that power may constitutionally be
exerted as in the present case.
Mere reflection upon the situation
at hand convinces us of the soundness
of this proposition. The Senate has
ordered an investigation of the
Buenavista and Tambobong estates
63
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 63

deal, which we have found it is within

its competence to make. That
investigation has not been completed
because of the ref usal of the

petitioner as a witness to answer
certain questions pertinent to the
subject of the inquiry. The Senate has
empowered the committee to continue
the investigation during the recess. By
ref using to answer the questions, the
witness has obstructed the
performance by the Senate of its
legislative function, and the Senate
has the power to remove the
obstruction by compelling the witness
to answer the questions thru restraint
of his liberty until he shall have
answered them. That power subsists
as long as the Senate, which is a
continuing body, persists in
performing the particular legislative
function involved. To hold that it may
punish the witness for contempt only
during the session in which
investigation was begun, would be to
recognize the right of the Senate to
perform its function but at the same
time to deny to it an essential and
appropriate means for its
performance. Aside from this, if we
should hold that the power to punish
for contempt terminates upon the
adjournment of the session, the
Senate would have to resume the
investigation at the next and
succeeding sessions and repeat the

contempt proceedings against the
witness until the investigation is
completed—an absurd, unnecessary,
and vexatious procedure, which
should be avoided.
As against the foregoing conclusion
it is argued for the petitioner that the
power may be abusively and
oppressively exerted by the Senate
which might keep the witness in
prison for life. But we must assume
that the Senate will not be disposed to
exert the power beyond its proper
bounds. And if, contrary to this
assumption, proper limitations are
disregarded, the portals of this Court
are always open to those whose rights
might thus be transgressed.
Third. Lastly, the petitioner
invokes the privilege against self-
incrimination. He contends that he
would incriminate himself if he should
reveal the name of the person to
whom he gave the P440,000 because if
that person be a public
64
ANNOTATED
official he (witness) might be accused

of bribery, and if that person be a
private individual the latter might
accuse him of oral defamation.
The ground upon which the
witness' claim is based is too shaky,
infirm, and slippery to afford him
safety. At first he told the Committee
that the transactions were legal, that
no laws were violated, and that all
requisites had been complied with; but
at the same time he begged to be
excused from making answers "which
might later be used against me." A
little later he explained that although
the transactions were legal he ref used
to answer questions concerning them
"because it violates the rights of a
citizen to privacy in his dealings with
other people. * * * I simply stand on
my privilege to dispose of the money
that has been paid to me as a result of
a legal transaction without having to
account for any use of it." But after
being apparently convinced by the
Committee that his position was
untenable, the witness testified that,
without securing any receipt, he
turned over the P440,000 to a certain
person, a representative of Burt, in
compliance with Burt's verbal
instruction made in 1946; that, as far

as he know, that certain person had
nothing to do with the negotiations for
the settlement of the Buenavista and
Tambobong cases; that he had seen
that person several times before he
gave him the ?440,000 on October 29,
1949, and that since then he had seen
him again two or three times, the last
time being in December, 1949, in
Manila; that the person was a male,
39 to 40 years of age, between 5 feet, 2
inches and 5 feet, 6 inches in height.
But the witness would not reveal the
name of that person on these pretexts:
"I don't remember the name; he was a
representative of Burt." "I am not
sure; I don't remember the name."
We are satisfied that those answers
of the witness to the important
question, What is the name of that
person to whom you gave the
P440,000? were obviously false. His
65
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 65

insistent claim bef ore the bar of the

Senate that if he should reveal the
name he would incriminate himself,

necessarily implied that he knew the
name. Moreover, it is unbelievable
that he gave P440,000 to a person to
him unknown.
"Testimony which is obviously false
or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to
testify and is punishable as contempt,
assuming. that a refusal to testify
would be so punishable." (12 Am. Jur.,
sec. 15, Contempt, pp. 399-400.) In the
case of Mason vs. U. S., 61 L. ed.,
1198, it appears that Mason was
called to testify before a grand jury
engaged in investigating a charge of
gambling against six other men, After
stating that he was sitting at a table
with said men when they were
arrested, he refused to answer two
questions, claiming so to do might
tend to incriminate him: (1) "Was
there a game of cards being played on
this particular evening at the table at
which you were sitting?" (2) "Was
there a game of cards being played at
another table at this time?" The
foreman of the grand jury reported the
matter to the judge, who ruled "that
each and all of said questions are
proper and that the answers thereto
would not tend to incriminate the
witnesses." Mason was again called
and he ref used to answer the first

question propounded to him, but, half
yielding to frustration, he said in
response to the second question: "I
don't know." In affirming the
conviction for contempt, the Supreme
Court of the United States among
other things said:
"In the present case the witnesses

certainly were not relieved from answering
merely because they declared that so to do
might incriminate them. The wisdom of
the rule in this regard is well illustrated
by the enforced answer, 'I don't know,'
given by Mason to the second question,
after he had refused to reply under a claim
of constitutional privilege."
Since according to the witness himself

the transaction was legal, and that he
gave the P440,000 to a representative
of Burt in compliance with the latter's
verbal instruction, we find no basis
upon which to sustain his claim that
to reveal the name of that person
might incriminate him. There is no
conflict of authorities on the
applicable rule, to wit:
66
ANNOTATED
"Generally, the question whether

testimony is privileged is for the
determination of the Court. At least, it is
not enough for the witness to say that the
answer will incriminate him, as he is not
the sole judge of his liability. The danger
of self-incrimmation must appear
reasonable and real to the court, from all
the circumstances, and from the whole
case, as well as from his general
conception of the relations of the witness.
Upon the facts thus developed, it is the
province of the court to determine whether
a direct answer to a question may
criminate or not. * * * The fact that the
testimony of a witness may tend to show
that he has violated the law is not
sufficient to entitle him to claim the
protection of the constitutional provision
against self-incrimination, unless he is at
the same time liable to prosecution and
punishment for such violation. The
witness cannot assert his privilege by
reason of some fanciful excuse, for
protection against an imaginary danger, or
to secure immunity to a third person." (3
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th ed.,
secs. 1135, 1136.)
"It is the province of the trial judge to

determine from all the facts and
circumstances of the case whether the
witness is justified in refusing to answer.
(People vs. Gonzo, 23 N. E. [2d], 210 [111.
App., 1939].) A witness is not relieved from
answering merely on his own declaration
that an answer might incriminate him, but
rather it is for the trial judge to decide
that question." (Mason vs. U. S., 244 U. S.,
362; 61 L. ed., 1193, 1200.)
As against witness's inconsistent and

unjustified claim to a constitutional
right, is his clear duty as a citizen to
give frank, sincere, and truthful
testimony before a competent
authority. The state has the right to
exact fulfilment of a citizen's
obligation, consistent of course with
his right under the Constitution. The
witness in this case has been
vociferous and militant in claiming
constitutional rights and privileges
but patently recreant to his duties and
obligations to the Government which
protects those rights under the law.
When a specific right and a specific
obligation conflict with each .other,
and one is doubtful or uncertain while
the other is clear and imperative, the
former must give way to the latter.
The right to life is one of the most

sacred that the citizen may claim, and
yet the state may deprive him of it if
he violates his corresponding
obligation to respect the life of others.
As Mr.
67
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 67

Justice Johnson said in Anderson vs.

Dunn: "The wretch beneath the
gallows may repine at the fate which
awaits him, and yet it is not less
certain that the laws under which he
suffers were made for the security;"
Paraphrasing and applying that
pronouncement here, the petitioner
may not relish the restraint of his
liberty pending the f ulfilment by him
of his duty, but it is no less certain
that the laws under which his liberty
is restrained were made for his
welfare.
From all the foregoing, it follows
that the petition must be denied, and
it is so ordered, with costs.
Parás, Pablo, Bengzon,

Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
TUASON, J., dissenting:
The estates deal which gave rise to

petitioner's examination by a
committee of the Senate was one that
aroused popular indignation as few
cases of graft and corruption have.
The investigation was greeted with
spontaneous outburst of applause by
an outraged citizenry, and the Senate
was rightly commended for making
the lead in getting at the bottom of an
infamous transaction.
All the more necessary it is that we
should approach the consideration of
this case with circumspection, lest the
influence of strong public passions
should get the better of our judgment.
It is trite to say that public sentiment
fades into insignificance before a
proper observance of constitutional
processes, the maintenance of the
constitutional structure, and the
protection of individual rights. Only
thus can a government of laws, the
foundation stone of human liberty, be
strengthened and made secure for
that very public.
It is with these thoughts in mind
that, with sincere regret, I am
constrained to dissent.
The power of legislative bodies

under the American system of
government to punish for contempt
was at the
68
ANNOTATED
beginning totally denied by some

courts and students of constitutional
law, on the ground that this power is
judicial in nature and belongs to the
judiciary branch of the government
under the constitutional scheme. The
point however is now settled in favor
of the existence of the power. This rule
is based on the necessity for the
attainment of the ends for which
legislative body is created. Nor can the
legitimacy of the purpose of the
investigation which the Senate
ordered in this case be disputed. As a
corollary, it was likewise legitimate
and necessary for the committee to
summon the petitioner with a
command to produce his books and
documents, and to commit him to
prison for his refusal or failure to obey
the subpoena. And, finally, there is no
question that the arresting officers

were fully justified in using necessary
bodily force to bring him before the
bar of the Senate when he feigned
illness and stalled for time in the
mistaken belief that after the closing
of the then current session of
Congress he could go scot-free.
At the same time, there is also
universal agreement that the power is
not absolute. The disagreement lies in
the extent of the power, and such
disagreement is to be f ound even
between decisions of the same court.
Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheat., No. 204,
may be said to have taken the most
liberal view of the legislature's
authority, and Kilbourn vs.
Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, which
partly overruled and qualified the
former, the strictest. By the most
liberal standard the power is
restricted "by considerations as to the
nature of the inquiry, occasion, or
action in connection with which the
contemptuous conduct has occurred."
Punishment must be resorted to for
the efficient exercise of the legislative
function. Even Anderson vs. Dunn
speaks of the power as "the least
possible power adequate to the end
proposed."
Judged by any test, the question

propounded to the witness does not, in
my opinion, meet the constitutional
69
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 69

requirement. It is obvious, I think,

that the query has nothing to do with
any matter within the cognizance of
the Congress. There is, on the
contrary, positive suggestion that the
question has no relation ,to the
contemplated legislation. The
statement of the committee in its
report that the information sought to
be obtained would clear the names of
the persons suspected of having
received the money, is, on the surface,
the most or only plausible reason that
can be advanced. Assuming this to be
the motive behind the question, yet
little reflection will show that the
same is beyond the scope of legislative
authority and prerogatives. It is
outside the concern of the Congress to
protect the honor of particular citizens
except that of its own members' as a
means of preserving respect and
confidence in that body. Moreover, the

purported good intention must
assume, if it is to materialize, that the
persons under suspicion are really
innocent; for if they are not and the
witness will tell the truth, the result
will be to augment their disgrace
rather than vindicate their honor.
This is all the more likely to happen
because one of those persons, is judged
from the committee's findings, the
most likely one, to say the least, who
got the money.
If the process of deduction is
pressed further, the reasonable
conclusion seems to be that the object
of the question is, to mention only one,
to prepare the way for a court action.
The majority decision indirectly
admits or insinuates this to be the
case. It says, "It appearing that the
questioned transaction was effected by
the head of the Department of Justice
himself, it is not reasonable to expect
the fiscal or the Court of First
Instance of Manila will take the
initiative to investigate and prosecute
the parties responsible f or the deal
until and unless the Senate shall have
determined who those parties are and
shall have taken such measures as
may be within its competence to take,
to redress the wrong that may have

been committed against the people as
a result of the transaction." So
70
ANNOTATED
here is an admission, implied if not

express, that the Senate wants the
witness to give names because the
fiscal or the courts will not initiate an
action against parties who should be
prosecuted. It is needless to say that
the institution of a criminal or civil
suit is a matter that devolves upon
other departments of the government,
alien to the duties of the Congress to
look after.
The Congress is at full liberty, of
course, to make any investigation for
the purpose of aiding the fiscal or the
courts, and ask any question which a
witness may please to answer, but this
liberty does not carry with it the
authority to imprison persons who
refuse to testify.
In the intricacy and complexity of
an investigation it is often impossible
to foretell before its close what
relation certain facts may bear on the

final results, and experience has
shown that investigators and courts
would do well to veer on the liberal
side in the resolution of doubtful
questions. But the Senate is not now
in the midst of an inquiry with the
situation still in a fluid or tentative
state. Now the facts are no longer
confused. The committee has finished
its investigation and submitted its
final report and the Senate has
appproved a bill on the bases of the
facts found. All the pertinent facts
having been gathered, as is to be
inferred from that report and the
nature of the Senate's action, every
question, every fact, every bit of
testimony has taken a distinct
meaning susceptible of concrete and
definite evaluation; the task has been
reduced to the simple process of
sifting the grain from the chaffs.
In the light of the committee's
report and of the bill introduced and
appproved in the Senate, it seems
quite plain that the express naming of
the recipient or recipients of the
money is entirely unessential to
anything the Senate has a right or
duty to do in the premises. Names
may be necessary f or the purpose of

criminal prosecution, impeach-
71
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 71

ment or civil suit. In such proceedings,

identities are essential. In some
legislative investigations it is
important to know the names of public
officials involved. But the particular
disclosure sought of the petitioner
here is immaterial to the proposed
law. It is enough for the Senate, for its
own legitimate object, to learn how the
Department of Justice was being run,
to know the part the Secretary of
Justice had in the purchase, and to
have a moral conviction as to the
identity of the person who benefited
thereby. The need for such legislation
as was envisaged in the resolution and
translated into the bill approved by
the Senate is met by an insight into a
broad outline of the deal. To
paraphrase the U. S. Supreme Court
in Anderson vs. Dunn, although the
passage was used in another
connection, legislation is a science of
experiment and the relation between

the legislator and the end does not
have to be so direct as to strike the eye
of the former.
One of the proposed laws prohibits
brothers and near relatives of any
president of the Philippines from
intervening directly or indirectly in
transactions in which the Government
is a party. It is stated that this is
subject to change depending on the
answer Arnault may give. This
statement is wide open to challenge.
If Arnault should name Antonio
Quirino it must be admitted that the
bill would not be altered. But let us
suppose that the witness will point to
another man. Will the result be any
different? Will the Senate recall the
bill? I can not perceive the slightest
possibility of such eventuality. The
pending bill was framed on the
assumption that Antonio Quirino was
a party to the deal in question. As has
been said, the committee entertains a
moral conviction that this brother of
the President was the recipient of a
share of the proceeds of sale. No
amount of assurance by Arnault to the
contrary would be believed by the
committee in the face of his absolute
unreliability for truth. And, I repeat,
the proposed legislation does not need

for its justification
72
ANNOTATED
legal evidence of Antonio Quirino's

intervention in the transaction.
All this in the first place. In the
second place, it is not to be assumed
that the present bill is aimed solely
against Antonio Quirino whose
relation to the Administration is but
temporary. It is more reasonable to
presume that the proposed enactment
is intended for all time and for all
brothers of future presidents, for in
reality it is no more than an extension
or enlargement of laws already found
in the statute book which guard
against temptations to exploit official
positions or influence to the prejudice
of public interests.
The disputed question is, in fact,
not only irrelevant but moot. This is
decisive of the irrelevancy of this
question. As has been noticed, the
committee has submitted its final
report and recommendation, and a bill
has been approved by the Senate

calculated to prevent recurrence of the
anomalies exposed. For the purpose
for which it was instituted the inquiry
is over and the committee's mission
accomplished.
It is true that the committee
continues to sit during the recess of
Congress, but it is obvious from all the
circumstances that the sole and real
object of the extension of the
committee's sittings is to receive the
witness' answer in the event he
capitulates. I am unable to see any
new phase of the deal which the
Senate could legitimately wish to
know, and the respondents and this
Court have not pointed out any. That
the committee has not sat and nothing
has been done so far except to wait for
Arnault's answer is a convincing
manifestation of the above conclusion.
The order "to continue its
investigation" contained in Senate
Resolution No, 16 cannot disguise the
realities revealed by the Senate's
actions already referred to and by the
emphasis given to the instruction "to
continue its (committee's) examination
of Jean L. Arnault regarding the name
73
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 73

of the person to whom he gave the

P440,000." The instruction 'to
continue the investigation' is not
entitled to the blind presumption that
it embraces matters other than the
revelation by the witness of the name
of the person who got the money.
Jurisdiction to deprive a citizen of
liberty outside the usual process is not
acquired by innuendos or vague
assertions of the facts on which
jurisdiction is made to depend. If the
judgment of a court of law of limited
jurisdiction does not enjoy the
presumption of legality, much less can
the presumption of regularity be
invoked for a resolution of a
deliberative body whose power to
inflict punishment upon private
citizens is wholly derived by
implication and vehemently contested
by some judges. At any rate, "the
stronger presumption of innocence
attends accused at the trial", and "it is
incumbent" upon the respondents "to
show that the question pertains to
some matter under investigation."
(Sinclair vs. U. S., 73 L. ed., 693.) This
rule stems from the fact that the
power is in derogation of the

constitutional guarantee that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property without due process of
law, which presupposes "a trial in
which the rights of the parties shall be
decided by a tribunal appointed by
law, which tribunal is to be governed
by rules of law previously
established." Powers so dangerous to
the liberty of a citizen can not be
allowed except where the pertinency is
clear. A Judge who abuses such power
may be impeached and he acts at all
times under the sense of this
accountability and responsibility. His
victims may be reached by the
pardoning power. But if the Congress
be allowed this unbounded jurisdiction
of discretion, there is no redress. The
Congress may dispoil of a citizen's life,
liberty or property and there is no
power on earth to stop its hand. There
is, there can be, no such unlimited
power in any department of the
government of the Republic. (Loan
Association vs. Topeka, 20 Wall, Nos.
662, 663; Taylor vs. Porter, 4 Hill No.
N. Y. 140.)
74
ANNOTATED
The above rule and discussion apply

with equal f force to the instruction to
the committee in the original
resolution, "to determine the parties
responsible for the deal." It goes
without saying that the Congress
cannot authorize a committee to do
what it itself cannot do. In other
words, the Senate could not insist on
the disclosure of Arnault's accomplice
in the present state of the
investigation if the Senate were
conducting the inquiry itself instead of
through a committee.
Our attention is called to the fact
that "in the Philippines, the legislative
power is vested in the Congress of the
Philippines alone, and therefore that
the Congress of the Philippines has a
wider range of legislative field than
the Congress of the United States or
any state legislature." From this
premise the inference is drawn that
"the field of inquiry into which it
(Philippine Congress) may enter is
also wider."
This argument overlooks the
important fact that congressional or
legislative committees both here and

in the United States, do not embark
upon fishing expeditions in search of
information which by chance may be
useful to legislation. Inquiries
entrusted to congressional committee,
whether here or in the United States,
are necessarily for specific objects
within the competence of the Congress
to look into. I do not believe any
reason, rule or principle could be
found which would sustain the theory
that just because the United States
Congress or a state legislature could
legislate on, say, only ten subjects and
the Philippine Congress on twenty,
the latter's power to commit to prison
for contempt is proportionately as
great as that of the former, In the
consideration of the legality of an
imprisonment f or contempt by each
House, the power is gauged not by the
greater or lesser number of subject
matters that fall within its sphere of
action, but by the answer to the
question, has it jurisdiction over the
matter under investigation? Bearing
this distinction in mind, it is apparent
that the power of a legislature to
punish for contempt can
75
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 75

be no greater nor less than that of any

other. Were it possible for the
Philippine Senate and the United
States Senate to undertake an
investigation of exactly identical
anomalies in their respective
departments of justice, could it be
asserted with any support of logic that
one Senate has a wider authority to
imprison for contempt in such
investigation simply because it has a
"wider range of legislative field?"
It is said that the Senate bill has
not been acted upon by the lower
house and that even if it should pass
in that chamber it would still have the
President's veto to hurdle. It has been
expressly stated at the oral argument,
and there is insinuation in this
Court's decision, that the revelation of
the name or names of the person or
persons who received the money may
help in convincing the House of
Representatives or the President of
the wisdom of the pending measure.
Entirely apart from the discussion in
the preceding paragraphs, it is enough
answer to this that the House of
Representatives and the Chief
Executive have their own idea of what

they need to guide them in the
discharge of their respective duties,
and they have the f acilities of their
own f or obtaining the requisite data.
There is another objection, more
fundamental, to the Senate invoking
the interest or convenience of the
other House or the President as
ground of jurisdiction. The House of
Representatives and the President are
absolutely independent of the Senate
in the conduct of legislative and
administrative inquiries, and the
power of each House to imprison for
contempt does not go beyond the
necessity for its own self-preservation
or for making its express powers
effective. Each House exercises this
power to protect or accomplish its own
authority and not that of the other
House or the President. Each House
and the President are supposed to
take care of their respective affairs.
The two Houses and the Chief
Executive act separately although the
concurrence of the three is required in
the passage of legislation and of both
Houses in the approval
76
ANNOTATED
of resolutions. As the United States

Supreme Court in Kilbourn vs.
Thompson, said, "No general power of
inflicting punishment by the Congress
(as distinct from a House is found in
the Constitution." "An act of Congress
—it said—which proposed to adjudge
a man guilty of a crime and inflict the
punishment, will be considered by all
thinking men to be unauthorized by
the Constitution."
Kilbourn vs. Thompson, supra, it is
said, can not be relied on in this case
as a precedent because, so it is also
said, "the subject of the inquiry, which
related to a private real-estate pool or
partnership, was not within the
jurisdiction of either House of
Congress; while here it is not disputed
that the subject of the inquiry, which
relates to a transaction involving a
questionable expenditure by the
Government of P5,000,000 of public
funds, is within the jurisdiction of the
Senate." Yet the remarks of Judge
Landis which are quoted in the
majority decision point out that the
inquiry "was a normal and customary
part of the legislative process."

Moreover, Kilbourn vs. Thompson is
important, not for the matter it
treated but for the principles it
enunciated.
It is also said that Kilbourn vs.
Thompson did not meet with universal
approval as Judge Landis' article
above mentioned shows. The jurist
who delivered the opinion in that case,
Mr. Justice Miller, was one of the
"giants" who have ever sat on the
Supreme Federal Bench, venerated
and eminent for the width and depth
of his learning. Subsequent decisions,
as far as I have been able to ascertain,
have not rejected or criticized but
have followed it, and it, still stands as
a landmark in this branch of
constitutional law.
If we can lean on private opinions
and magazine articles for comfort, the
petitioner can cite one by a legal
scholar and author no less renown and
respected than Judge Landis. I refer
to Judge Wigmore who, referring to an
investigation of the U. S. Department
of Justice said in an article published
in 19 (1925) Illinois Law Review, 452:
77
VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 77

"The senatorial debauch of investigations

—poking into political garbage cans and
dragging the sewers of political intrigue—
filled the winter of 1923-24 with a stench
which has not yet passed away. Instead of
employing the constitutional, manly, fair
procedure of impeachment, the Senate
flung self-respect and fairness to the
winds. As a prosecutor, the Senate
presented a spectacle which cannot even
be dignified by a comparison with the
persecutive scoldings of Coke and Scroggs
and Jeffreys, but fell rather in popular
estimate to the level of professional
searchers of the municipal dunghills.'
It is far from my thought to subscribe

to this vitupiration as applied to our
Senate. Certainly, this august body
did not only do the right thing but is
entitled to the lasting gratitude of the
people for taking the courageous stand
it did in probing into an anomaly that
robbed a depleted treasury of a huge
amount. I have tried to make it clear
that my disagreement with the
majority lies not in the propriety or
constitutionality of the investigation
but in the pertinency to that
investigation of a single question. The

investigation, as has been said, was
legal and commendable. My objection
is that the Senate having started
within the bounds of its authority,
has, in entire good faith, overstepped
those bounds and trespassed on a
territory reserved to other branches of
the government, when it imprisoned a
witness for contumacy on a point that
is unimportant, useless, impertinent
and irrelevant, let alone moot.
Thus understood, this humble
opinion does not conflict with the
views of Judge Landis and all other
advocates of wide latitude for
congressional investigations. All are
agreed, and the majority accept the
proposition, that there is a limit to the
legislative power to punish for
contempt. The limit is set in Anderson
vs. Dunn which Judge Landis
approved—"the least possible power
adequate to the end proposed."
Petition denied.
78
ANNOTATED
Bas vs. Vda. de Bas
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Aranult VS Nazareno

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9/13/22, 9:10 AM PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 087

[No. L-3820. July 18, 1950]

JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner, vs.

2. ID.; RANGE OF LEGISLATIVE

matter of its inquiry can be

3. ID.; POWER OF ElTHER HOUSE

4. ID. ; ID.—Once an inquiry is

Arnault vs. Nazareno

gating committee has the power to

the inquiry, subject of course to his

5. ID.; ID.; MATERIALITY OF THE

6. ID.; ID.; POWER OF THE COURT

7. ID.; LACK OF POWER OF THE

approve or not to approve, it

8. ID.; AUTHORITY OF EITHER

as to time to the Senate's power to

9. ID.; PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-

VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 31

Arnault vs. Nazareno

10. ID.; ID.; POWER OF COURT TO

from his general 'Conception of the

11. ID.; RIGHT AND OBLIGATION

ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme

This is an original petition for habeas

"Whereas, Jean L. Arnault refused to

pertinent questions related to the said

The facts that gave rise to the

the Associated Estates, Inc.,

VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 33

Arnault vs. Nazareno

On June 29, 1946, the San Juan de

Burt's having paid the said or any

1 The appeal was withdrawn on November 9,

of the Board of Directors of the Rural

"WHEREAS, it is reported that the

"WHEREAS, it is reported that under

"RESOLVED, That a Special

VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 35

involved in the deal was fair and just, the

recommendations within two weeks from

The special committee created by the

account two checks; one for P500,000,

"Mr. ARNAULT (reading from a note). Mr.

the transactions were legal, that no laws

incriminate myself, and I am certain that

At a subsequent session of the

"Senator DE VERA. Now these

"Senator DE VERA. Are you afraid to

But when in the same session the

"The CHAIRMAN. The other check of

VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 37

"The CHAIRMAN. Who was that

part of the P1-1/2 million paid to

instruction; when Burt was still

"The CHAIRMAN. In what year was

"The CHAIRMAN. And Burt also

remember the name.

VOL. 87, JULY 18, 1950 39