14 Escra - Heirs of Falame VS Baguio

9/15/22, 8:53 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 548
CASES REPORTED
SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
____________________
Adm. Case No. 6876. March 7, 2008.*
HEIRS OF LYDIO “JERRY”

FALAME, namely: MELBA FALAME,
LEO FALAME and JERRY FALAME,
complainants, vs. ATTY. EDGAR J.
BAGUIO, respondent.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Court

holds that the instant administrative
action is not barred by prescription; Rule
VII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of
the CBD-IBP which provides for a
prescriptive period for the filing of
administrative complaints against lawyers
https://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001833ea393e65fff9f08000d00d40059004a/t/?o=False 1/32
should be struck down as void and of the

legal effect for being ultra vires.—The
Court holds that the instant
administrative action is not barred by
prescription. As early as 1947, the Court
held in Calo, Jr. v. Degamo, 20 SCRA 447
(1967), to wit: The ordinary statutes of
limitation have no application to
disbarment proceedings, nor does the
circumstance that the facts set up as a
ground for disbarment constitute a crime,
prosecution for which in a criminal procee-
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED
Heirs of Lydio "Jerry" Falame vs. Baguio
ding is barred by limitation, affect the

disbarment proceeding x x x (5 Am. Jur.
434) This doctrine was reaffirmed in the
relatively recent case of Frias v. Bautista-
Lozada, 489 SCRA 345 (2006) where the
Court held that Rule VII, Section 1 of the
Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP, which
provides for a prescriptive period for the
filing of administrative complaints against

lawyers, should be struck down as void
and of no legal effect for being ultra vires.
Same; Administrative Cases; Due
Process; In administrative cases, the
requirement of notice and hearing does not
connote full adversarial proceedings; Due
process is fulfilled when the parties were
given reasonable opportunity to be heard
and to submit evidence in support of their
arguments.—There is, however, sufficient
basis to hold respondent accountable for
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. While this
charge was not raised in the initiatory
pleading, it was put forward in
complainants’ position paper filed with the
IBP and in the petition filed with the
Court. In fact, respondent proffered his
defenses to the charge in his position
paper before the IBP and likewise in his
comment before the Court. In his very first
pleading before the IBP, the answer with
motion to dismiss, he denied having Lydio
as his client. Such absence of attorney-
client relationship is the essential element
of his defense to the charge of conflict of
interest, as articulated in his subsequent
submissions. The Court, therefore, rules
and so holds that respondent has been
adequately apprised of and heard on the
issue. In administrative cases, the
requirement of notice and hearing does not

connote full adversarial proceedings.
Actual adversarial proceedings only
become necessary for clarification when
there is a need to propound searching
questions to witnesses who give vague
testimonies. Due process is fulfilled when
the parties were given reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit
evidence in support of their arguments.
Same; Same; A lawyer may not, without
being guilty of professional misconduct, act
as counsel for a person whose interest
conflicts with that of his present or former
client; The rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have
been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be
used.—A lawyer may not, without being
guilty of professional misconduct, act as
counsel for a person whose interest
conflicts with that of his present or former
client. The test is whether, on behalf of one
client, it is the lawyer’s duty to contest for
that which his duty to
VOL. 548, MARCH 7, 2008 3
another client requires him to oppose or

when the possibility of such situation will
develop. The rule covers not only cases in
which confidential communications have
been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be
used. In addition, the rule holds even if the
inconsistency is remote or merely probable
or the lawyer has acted in good faith and
with no intention to represent conflicting
interests.
Same; Same; The rule concerning
conflict of interest prohibits a lawyer from
representing a client if that representation
will be directly adverse to any of his
present or former clients; Rule is grounded
in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.—The
rule concerning conflict of interest
prohibits a lawyer from representing a
client if that representation will be directly
adverse to any of his present or former
clients. In the same way, a lawyer may
only be allowed to represent a client
involving the same or a substantially
related matter that is materially adverse
to the former client only if the former
client consents to it after consultation. The
rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation
of loyalty. In the course of a lawyer-client
relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts
connected with the client’s case, including
the weak and strong points of the case.

The nature of that relationship is,
therefore, one of trust and confidence of
the highest degree.
Same; Same; The termination of
attorney-client relation provides no
justification for a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that
of the former client.—The termination of
attorney-client relation provides no
justification for a lawyer to represent an
interest adverse to or in conflict with that
of the former client. The client’s confidence
once reposed should not be divested by
mere expiration of professional
employment. Even after the severance of
the relation, a lawyer should not do
anything which will injuriously affect his
former client in any matter in which he
previously represented him nor should he
disclose or use any of the client’s
confidences acquired in the previous
relation.
PETITION for review on certiorari of

a resolution of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.
The facts are stated in the resolution
of the Court.
Lazaro, Tuazon, Santos Associates
for complainants.

ANNOTATED
Heirs of Lydio "Jerry" Falame vs.
Baguio
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
On Petition for Review1 is the

Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Board of Governors
dismissing the disbarment complaint
filed by the Heirs of Lydio “Jerry”
Falame (complainants) against Atty.
Edgar J. Baguio (respondent),
docketed as CBD Case No. 04-1191.
In their Complaint2 against
respondent, complainants alleged that
on 15 July 1991, their father, the late
Lydio “Jerry” Falame (Lydio), engaged
the services of respondent to represent
him in an action for forcible entry
docketed as Civil Case No. A-2694 (the
first civil case) and entitled “Heirs of
Emilio T. Sy, represented by Anastacia
Velayo Vda. de Sy and Belen V. Sy vs.
Lydio ‘Jerry’ Falame, Raleigh Falame
and Four (4) John Does,” in which
Lydio was one of the defendants.3
Complainants recounted that

respondent, as counsel for the
defendants, filed the answer to the
complaint in the first civil case.
Subsequently, when the parties to the
first civil case were required to file
their respective position papers,
respondent used and submitted in
evidence the following: (1) a special
power of attorney dated 1 July 1988
executed by Lydio in favor of his
brother, Raleigh Falame, appointing
the latter to be his attorney-in-fact;
and (2) the affidavit of Raleigh Falame
dated 23 July 1988, executed before
respondent, in which Raleigh stated
that Lydio owned the property subject
of the first civil case.4
Complainants claimed that even
after the Municipal Trial Court of
Dipolog City had ruled in favor of the
defendants in the first civil case, Lydio
retained the services of respondent
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 691-718.

2 Id., at pp. 1-6; dated 7 January 2004.
3 Id., at p. 2.
4 Id., at pp. 2-3.
5 Id., at p. 3.
5
VOL. 548, MARCH 7, 2008 5

Baguio
as his legal adviser and counsel for his

businesses until Lydio’s death on 8
September 1996.5
However, on 23 October 2000, in
representation of spouses Raleigh and
Noemi Falame, respondent filed a case
against complainants allegedly
involving the property subject of the
first civil case, entitled “Spouses Rally
F. Falame and Noemi F. Falame v.
Melba A. Falame, Leo A. Falame,
Jerry A. Falame, Jr., Sugni Realty
Holdings and Development
Corporations, their representatives,
agents and persons acting in their
behalf” and docketed as Civil Case No.
5568 (the second civil case) before the
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City,
Branch 6. The complaint sought the
declaration of nullity of the deed of
sale, its registration in the registry of
deeds, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
20241 issued as a consequence of the
registration of the deed of sale, and
the real estate mortgage on the said
property. Alternatively, it prayed for
specific performance and

reconveyance or legal redemption and
damages with preliminary injunction
and restraining order.6
Firstly, complainants maintained
that by acting as counsel for the
spouses Falame in the second civil
case wherein they were impleaded as
defendants, respondent violated his
oath of office and duty as an attorney.
Plainly, they contended that the
spouses Falame’s interests are
adverse to those of his former client,
Lydio.7
Secondly, complainants claimed
that respondent knowingly made false
statements of fact in the complaint in
the second civil case to mislead the
trial court. In so doing, respondent
violated paragraph (d), Section 208 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of
_______________
6 Id., at p. 33.
7 Id., at p. 3.
8 It reads as follows:
SEC. 20. Duties of attorneys.—It is
the duty of an attorney:
(d) To employ, for the purpose of
maintaining the causes confided to him,
such means only as are consistent with

truth and

ANNOTATED
Baguio
Court,9 complainants asserted further.

Lastly, complainants alleged that
the second civil case is a baseless and
fabricated suit which respondent filed
as counsel for complainants’ uncle
against the heirs of respondent’s
deceased client. Specifically, they
averred that respondent filed the case
for the sole purpose of retaining,
maintaining and/or withholding the
possession of the subject property
from complainants who are its true
owners. Complainants concluded that
respondent violated paragraph (g),
Section 2010 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.11
In his Answer with Motion to
Dismiss,12 respondent controverted
complainants’ allegations. He
emphasizes that it was only Raleigh
Falame who personally engaged his
legal services for him and on Lydio’s

behalf and that, in fact, it was Raleigh
who paid him the attorney’s fees. He
also stated that he signed the jurat in
Raleigh’s affidavit, which was
submitted as evidence in the first civil
case, believing to the best of his
knowledge that there is good ground
to support it. Insisting that he did not
betray the confidence reposed in him
by Lydio as the latter’s counsel in the
first civil case, respondent maintained
that he did not reveal or use any fact
he acquired knowledge of during the
existence of the attorney-client
relation in the first civil case as he
had never even conferred with nor
talked to Lydio in the first place.
Respondent likewise contended that
he did not knowingly make any
misleading or untruthful statement of
fact in the complaint in the second
_______________
honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or

any judicial officer by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law;
9 Rollo, pp. 4-5.

10 Duties of attorneys.
(g) Not to encourage either the
commencement or the continuance of an
action or proceeding, or delay any man’s

cause, from any corrupt motive or
interest;
11 Rollo, p. 5.
12 Id., at pp. 145-170.
VOL. 548, MARCH 7, 2008 7

Baguio
civil case and neither did he employ

any means inconsistent with truth
and honor in the hearing of the case.13
Respondent vigorously averred that
Lydio had not retained him as counsel
in any case or transaction. Stressing
the long interval of twelve years
separating the termination of the first
civil case and his acceptance of the
second civil case, respondent pointed
out that the first civil case was not
between Lydio and Raleigh but rather
between the heirs of Emilio T. Sy on
one hand and Lydio and Raleigh on
the other where physical possession of
property was at stake. Respondent
further averred that in contrast the
second civil case is one involving the
spouses Raleigh and Noemi Falame as
plaintiffs, and Melba, Leo and Jerry

Jr., all surnamed Falame, and Sugni
Realty Holdings and Development
Corporation, as defendants—a case
which arose from the wrongful acts
committed by Melba, Leo and Jerry
Jr. after Lydio’s death.14
Respondent maintained that since
the second civil case was still pending
before the trial court, the IBP had no
jurisdiction over the instant
administrative case. He added that
complainants filed this administrative
case when Raleigh could no longer
testify in his own favor as he had died
a year earlier.15
In their Position Paper16 dated 7
September 2004, in addition to their
previous charges against respondent,
complainants claimed that respondent
violated Rule 15.0317 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility when he
represented the cause of the spouses
Falame against that of his former
client, Lydio.18
_______________
13 Id., at pp. 147-154.

14 Id., at pp. 152-154.
15 Id., at p. 671.
16 Id., at pp. 445-466.
17 It reads:
17 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent
conflicting interests.
18 Rollo, pp. 455-456.

ANNOTATED
Baguio
On 25 June 2005, the IBP Board of

Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-
2005-167 adopting and approving
Investigating Commissioner Winston
D. Abuyuan’s report and
recommendation for the dismissal of
this administrative case, thus:19
“x x x The charge lacks specification as to

what part of the lawyer’s oath was violated
by the respondent and what confidence
was disclosed. The complainants may have
in mind the prohibition against disclosure
of secret information learned in
confidence, but there is no specification in
the complaint what secret or information
learned in confidence under Civil Case No.
A-2694 was disclosed or will be disclosed
by respondent in Civil Case No. 5568. In
administrative complaints for disbarment
or suspension against lawyers, the

complainant must specify in the affidavit-
complaint the alleged secrets or
confidential information disclosed or will
be disclosed in the professional
employment (Uy v. Gonzalez, 426 SCRA
422; 431). In the absence of such
specification, the complaint must fail.
In the complaint, there is no specific
charge against respondent for violation of
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility about the
prohibition against representation of
conflicting interest. So, the allegation in
paragraph 1, page 8 and 9 of complainants’
position paper stating: With all due
respect, it is submitted that respondent
violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility” cannot be
countenanced. The reason being that it is
an elementary principle of due process to
which the respondent is entitled that only
those charged in the complaint can be
proved by the complainants. A charge not
specified in the complaint cannot be
proved (Uy v. Gonzalez, id.)
x x x But still this charge will not
proper for lack of sufficient bases.
xxx
Civil Case No. 5568, which was
commenced on 03 October 2000, or three
years since the complainants became
owners of Lydio Falame’s properties, is a

suit against the complainants, not as
representatives of Lydio Falame, but as
owners of their respective aliquot interests
in the property in question (Gayon v.
Gayon, 36 SCRA 104;
_______________
19 Id., at p. 666.
VOL. 548, MARCH 7, 2008 9

107-108). The complainants are sued not

on the basis of the acts, rights, obligations
and interest of Lydio Falame on the
material possession of the improvements
found on Lot 345 litigated in Civil Case
No. A-2694 nor even on such land itself,
but rather on the facts alleged in the
second amended and supplemental
complaint which give rise to their cause of
action against them.
While the complainants could not
specify under what circumstances the
respondent committed [the] alleged breach
of confidence, breach of secrecy or
revelation of secret or confidential
information[,] the respondent has shown
that he did not commit any violation of

such duties or obligations of an attorney.
It is clear that only Raleigh Falame
engaged the legal services of the
respondent for his and Lydio Falame’s
defense in Civil Case No. A-2694.
xxx
The other allegations of the
complainants that the respondent violated
paragraph (d), Section 20 of Rule 139,
Rules of Court, and his lawyer’s oath when
he allegedly betrayed the trust and
confidence of his former client by denying
knowledge of the fact that the land was
owned by Lydio Falame and when he did
not disclose to the Court that at one time
his present clients categorically declared
and unconditionally recognized the full
ownership of the late Lydio Falame and
complainant Melba Falame over subject
matter of both cases equally lacks
evidentiary basis.
xxx
It is beyond the competence of the
complainants to conclude and is outside
the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Commission to rule as to whether or nor
(sic) the complaint in Civil Case No. 5568
is baseless or fabricated. It is only the
Honorable Court which has the exclusive
jurisdiction to determine the same and
cannot be the subject of an administrative

complaint against the respondent.
xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it
is respectfully recommended that this
complaint be dismissed on grounds of
prescription, the same having been filed
four (4) years after the alleged misconduct
took place and for lack of merit.
10

ANNOTATED
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.20
Dissatisfied, complainants filed the

instant petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court reiterating
their allegations in the complaint and
their position paper.21 They likewise
assert that the IBP erred in holding
that the instant administrative
complaint had been filed out of time
since it was filed on 16 January 2004,
or three (3) years, four (4) months and
sixteen (16) days after the second civil
case was filed on 23 October 2000.22 In
addition, in their Consolidated
Comment (should be Consolidated
Reply),23 complainants invoke the

Court’s ruling in Frias v. Bautista-
Lozada24 to support their contention
that administrative complaints
against members of the bar do not
prescribe.25
In his Comment,26 respondent
principally maintains that the charges
imputed to him have never been
proven by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence which is the
quantum of proof required in
administrative cases against lawyers,
and that complainants have the
burden to prove their accusations as
he enjoys the presumption of
innocence.27 Respondent likewise
asserts that in accusing him of
Professional Responsibility only in
their position paper and in the instant
petition, complainants infringed his
right to due process and to be
informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him.28
There is merit in the petition.
_______________
20 Id., at pp. 680-689.

21 Supra note 1; dated 5 September 2005.
22 Id., at p. 716.
23 Id., at pp. 1129-1132; dated 29 November

2006.
24 A.C. No. 6656, 4 May 2006, 489 SCRA
345.
25 Rollo, pp. 1129-1130.
26 Id., at pp. 989-1071; dated 7 July 2006.
27 Id., at pp. 1067-1068.
28 Id., at p. 1031.
11
VOL. 548, MARCH 7, 2008 11

Baguio
At the outset, the Court holds that

the instant administrative action is
not barred by prescription. As early as
1947, the Court held in Calo, Jr. v.
Degamo,29 to wit:
“The ordinary statutes of limitation

have no application to disbarment
proceedings, nor does the circumstance
that the facts set up as a ground for
disbarment constitute a crime, prosecution
for which in a criminal proceeding is
barred by limitation, affect the disbarment
proceeding x x x (5 Am. Jur. 434)”30
This doctrine was reaffirmed in the

relatively recent case of Frias v.
Bautista-Lozada31 where the Court

held that Rule VII, Section 1 of the
Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP,
which provides for a prescriptive
period for the filing of administrative
complaints against lawyers, should be
struck down as void and of no legal
effect for being ultra vires.32
Prescinding from the unavailability
of the defense of prescription, the
Court concurs with the Investigating
Commissioner’s opinion that some of
the charges raised by complainants in
their complaint are unsubstantiated.
There is, however, sufficient basis
to hold respondent accountable for
Professional Responsibility. While this
charge was not raised in the initiatory
pleading, it was put forward in
complainants’ position paper filed
with the IBP and in the petition filed
with the Court. In fact, respondent
proffered his defenses to the charge in
his position paper before the IBP and
likewise in his comment before the
Court. In his very first pleading before
the IBP, the answer with motion to
dismiss, he denied having Lydio as his
client. Such absence of attorney-client
relationship is the essential element of
his defense to the charge of
_______________
29 126 Phil. 802; 20 SCRA 447 (1967).

30 Id., at p. 806; p. 450.
31 Supra note 24.
32 Id., at p. 348.
12

ANNOTATED
Baguio
conflict of interest, as articulated in

his subsequent submissions.
The Court, therefore, rules and so
holds that respondent has been
adequately apprised of and heard on
the issue. In administrative cases, the
requirement of notice and hearing
does not connote full adversarial
proceedings. Actual adversarial
proceedings only become necessary for
clarification when there is a need to
propound searching questions to
witnesses who give vague testimonies.
Due process is fulfilled when the
parties were given reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit
evidence in support of their
arguments.33
Rule 15.03 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility provides:
“A lawyer shall not represent conflicting

interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of
the facts.”
A lawyer may not, without being

guilty of professional misconduct, act
as counsel for a person whose interest
conflicts with that of his present or
former client.34 The test is whether, on
behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s
duty to contest for that which his duty
to another client requires him to
oppose or when the possibility of such
situation will develop.35 The rule
covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have
been confided, but also those in which
no confidence has been bestowed or
will be used.36 In addition, the rule
holds even if the inconsistency is
remote or merely prob-
_______________
33 Artezuela v. Maderazo, 431 Phil. 135, 141;

381 SCRA 419, 424 (2002).
34 Frias v. Lozada, A.C. No. 6656, 13
December 2005, 477 SCRA 393, 400.
35 Agpalo, The Code of Professional

Responsibility for Lawyers, 1st Edition,
Copyright 1991, p. 166, citing Canon 6, Canons
of Professional Ethics and U.S. v. Laranja, 21
Phil. 500 (1912).
36 Hornilla v. Salunat, 453 Phil. 108, 111;
405 SCRA 220, 223 (2003).
13
VOL. 548, MARCH 7, 2008 13

Baguio
able or the lawyer has acted in good

faith and with no intention to
represent conflicting interests.37
The rule concerning conflict of
interest prohibits a lawyer from
representing a client if that
representation will be directly adverse
to any of his present or former clients.
In the same way, a lawyer may only
be allowed to represent a client
involving the same or a substantially
related matter that is materially
adverse to the former client only if the
former client consents to it after
consultation. The rule is grounded in
the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.38 In
the course of a lawyer-client
relationship, the lawyer learns all the

facts connected with the client’s case,
including the weak and strong points
of the case. The nature of that
relationship is, therefore, one of trust
and confidence of the highest degree.
39
The termination of attorney-client
relation provides no justification for a
lawyer to represent an interest
adverse to or in conflict with that of
the former client. The client’s
confidence once reposed should not be
divested by mere expiration of
professional employment. Even after
the severance of the relation, a lawyer
should not do anything which will
injuriously affect his former client in
any matter in which he previously
represented him nor should he
disclose or use any of the client’s
confidences acquired in the previous
relation.40
_______________

Copyright 1991, p. 166, citing Nombrado v.
Hernandez, 26 SCRA 13 (1968) and Natam v.
Capule, 91 Phil. 640 (1952).
38 kauffman, kent d., legal ethics, Delmar
Learning, Copyright 2004, pp. 174-175, 207.
39 Perez v. De la Torre, A.C. No. 6160, 30

March 2006, 485 SCRA 551.
Copyright 1991, p. 167, citing Nombrado v.
Hernandez, 26 SCRA 13 (1968), Natam v.
Capule, 91 Phil. 640 (1952), San Jose v. Cruz,
57 Phil. 79 (1933) and Hilado v. David, 84 Phil.
569 (1949).
14

ANNOTATED
Baguio
In relation to this, Canon 17 of the

Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to
the cause of his client and shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed on him. His highest and most
unquestioned duty is to protect the
client at all hazards and costs even to
himself.41 The protection given to the
client is perpetual and does not cease
with the termination of the litigation,
nor is it affected by the party’s ceasing
to employ the attorney and retaining
another, or by any other change of
relation between them. It even

survives the death of the client.42
In the case at bar, respondent
admitted having jointly represented
Lydio and Raleigh as defendants in
the first civil case. Evidently, the
attorney-client relation between Lydio
and respondent was established
despite the fact that it was only
Raleigh who paid him. The case of
Hilado v. David43 tells us that it is
immaterial whether such employment
was paid, promised or charged for.44
As defense counsel in the first civil
case, respondent advocated the stance
that Lydio solely owned the property
subject of the case. In the second civil
case involving the same property,
respondent, as counsel for Raleigh and
his spouse, has pursued the
inconsistent position that Raleigh
owned the same property in common
with Lydio, with complainants, who
inherited the property, committing
acts which debase respondent’s rights
as a co-owner.
The fact that the attorney-client
relation had ceased by reason of
Lydio’s death or through the
completion of the specific task for
which respondent was employed is not
reason for
_______________
41 Id., at p. 199, citing Watkins v. Sedberry,

261 U.S. 571, 67 L. ed. 802 (1923).
42 Bun Siong Yao v. Aurelio, A.C. No. 7023,
30 March 2006, 485 SCRA 553, 560.
43 84 Phil. 569 (1949).
44 Id., at p. 576.
15
VOL. 548, MARCH 7, 2008 15

Baguio
respondent to advocate a position

opposed to that of Lydio.45 Precedents
tell us that even after the termination
of his employment, an attorney may
not act as counsel against his client in
the same general matter, even though,
while acting for his former client, he
acquired no knowledge which could
operate to his client’s disadvantage in
the subsequent adverse employment.46
And while complainants have never
been respondent’s clients, they derive
their rights to the property from
Lydio’s ownership of it which
respondent maintained in the first
civil case.
For representing Raleigh’s cause

which is adverse to that of his former
client—Raleigh’s supposed co-
ownership of the subject property—
respondent is guilty of representing
conflicting interests. Having
previously undertaken joint
representation of Lydio and Raleigh,
respondent should have diligently
studied and anticipated the potential
conflict of interest. Accordingly,
disciplinary action is warranted.47
Heretofore, respondent is enjoined to
look at any representation situation
from “the point of view that there are
possible conflicts”; and further, “to
think in terms of impaired loyalty”
that is to evaluate if his
representation in any way will impair
loyalty to a client.48 Considering,
however, that this is respondent’s first
offense, the Court resolves to
reprimand respon-
_______________
45 Gonzaga v. Atty. Villanueva, Jr., 478 Phil.

859; 435 SCRA 1 (2004).
46 Hilado v. David, supra note 43 at pp. 569,
577, citing Brown v. Miller, 52 App. D.C. 330;
286, F. 994 and Pierce v. Palmer (1910), 31 R. I.
432; 77 Atl., Ann Cas., 1912 S, 181.
47 See Florida Bar v. Mastrilli, 614 So. 2d

1081 (Fla. 1993), cited in kauffman, kent d.,
legal ethics, Copyright 2004, p. 164.
48 Zitrin, richard a. and langford carol m.,
legal ethics in the practice of law, Matthew
Bender and Company, Inc., Second Edition, p.
181.
16

ANNOTATED
Baguio
dent, with admonition to observe a

higher degree of fidelity in the
practice of his profession.49
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty.
Edgar J. Baguio is found GUILTY of
representing conflicting interests and
meted out the penalty of
REPRIMAND. He is further
admonished to observe a higher
degree of fidelity in the practice of his
profession and to bear in mind that a
repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Acting Chairperson),

Carpio-Morales, Azcuna** and Velasco,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Atty. Edgar J. Baguio reprimanded.
Note.—There is conflict of interest

when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing
parties and the test is “whether or not
in behalf of one client, it is the
lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or
claim but it is his duty to oppose it for
the other client. (Santos, Sr. vs.
Beltran, 418 SCRA 17 [2003])
——o0o——
_______________
49 See Hornilla v. Salunat, 453 Phil. 108,

114; 405 SCRA 220, 226 (2003).
** As replacement of Justice Leonardo A.
Quisumbing who is on official leave per
Administrative Circular No. 84-2007.
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9/15/22, 8:53 AM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 548

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Adm. Case No. 6876. March 7, 2008.*

HEIRS OF LYDIO “JERRY”

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Court

should be struck down as void and of the

2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Heirs of Lydio "Jerry" Falame vs. Baguio

ding is barred by limitation, affect the

filing of administrative complaints against

requirement of notice and hearing does not

VOL. 548, MARCH 7, 2008 3

Heirs of Lydio "Jerry" Falame vs. Baguio

another client requires him to oppose or

the weak and strong points of the case.

PETITION for review on certiorari of

4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

On Petition for Review1 is the

Complainants recounted that

1 Rollo, pp. 691-718.

VOL. 548, MARCH 7, 2008 5

as his legal adviser and counsel for his

specific performance and

such means only as are consistent with

6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Court,9 complainants asserted further.

legal services for him and on Lydio’s

honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or

9 Rollo, pp. 4-5.

action or proceeding, or delay any man’s

VOL. 548, MARCH 7, 2008 7

civil case and neither did he employ

plaintiffs, and Melba, Leo and Jerry

13 Id., at pp. 147-154.

8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

On 25 June 2005, the IBP Board of

“x x x The charge lacks specification as to

or suspension against lawyers, the

owners of Lydio Falame’s properties, is a

VOL. 548, MARCH 7, 2008 9

107-108). The complainants are sued not

that he did not commit any violation of

cannot be the subject of an administrative

10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Dissatisfied, complainants filed the

Reply),23 complainants invoke the

20 Id., at pp. 680-689.

23 Id., at pp. 1129-1132; dated 29 November

VOL. 548, MARCH 7, 2008 11

At the outset, the Court holds that

“The ordinary statutes of limitation

This doctrine was reaffirmed in the

Bautista-Lozada31 where the Court

29 126 Phil. 802; 20 SCRA 447 (1967).

12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

conflict of interest, as articulated in

Rule 15.03 of the Code of

“A lawyer shall not represent conflicting