Export Prospects and Economic Growth - India - Surendra J. Patel (1959)
Export Prospects and Economic Growth - India - Surendra J. Patel (1959)
Export Prospects and Economic Growth - India - Surendra J. Patel (1959)
I. LONG-TERM
TRENDS
Stagnationin Exports
The developments that have taken place in the foreign trade of India
over the last quarter of a century are shown in Tables I, II and III. These
TABLE I
in theForeignTradeof India
Developments
Index numbers,1953 = 100
The quantum of world exports has increased by more than two-thirdsin the
course of the last two decades, but the combined volume of exports from
Burma, Ceylon, India and Pakistanis now actually lower by a tenth.' Thus,
the vast expansion in world trade over the last three decades has simply
by-passed the Indian sub-continent.
(b) These developments were reflected in strains on balance of payments
in recent years. Instead of the export surpluses, common in the pre-war
period, there are now continuous import surpluses. The long-term de-
velopments have thus created a basic imbalance ,between exports and im-
ports, a situation which efforts at export promotion and continued import
restrictionsin post-war years have failed to alter significantly.
(c) In the development of this imbalance, the changes in terms of trade
do not seem to have played a major role (except during the 'thirties). The
favourable change in the terms of trade in the early post-war years has
disappeared,with the terms of trade now falling to the 1937-38 level.
Directionof Exports
The historical trend in the decline of the volume of exports assumesgreat
significancewhen the data on the direction of foreign trade are related to it
(see Tables II and III). In general, the changes in the direction of India's
foreign trade have remained minor over the last few decades. It is true that
the proportionof exportsgoing to the United Kingdom has increasedslightly;
in contrast, there was a sharp decline in exportsgoing to continental western
Europe, particularly Germany. Trade with the dollar area is now some-
what higher, whereas the share of Japan remains far below that in 1928.
Broadly speaking, the private-enterpriseindustrialised countries have
continued to account for over 70% of India's exports. This, when read with
the changes in the volume of trade pointed out in (a) above, suggests that
the industrialised countries have increased the volume of their exports to
India but have reduced the volume of their imports from India.
The share of the other pre-industrial countries in India's exports rose
very sharplyin the early post-war years when the exportsfrom the European
countrieshad not fully recovered. Since then, the proportionhas continued
to decline, it now being a little higher than in the late 'twenties.
So far, the centrally planned economies do not account for a significant
proportion of exports from India, although their share has increased very
rapidly in the last two to three years.
As can be seen from Table III, the value of imports from all primary-
producing countriesinto western Europe, the United States and Canada has
nearly trebled between 1928 and 1956. Their imports from India, Pakistan,
Burma and Ceylon, however, have increased very slightly. Since prices
1 The decline would be obviously much greater if trade among these four countries and exports
of cotton textiles to other countries (which were previously used within the sub-continent) are
excluded.
during this period have risen considerably, it is obvious that the volume of
imports from these countries into the industrialisedcountries, India's tradi-
tional trade partners, has fallen markedly. The stagnation of India's ex-
ports is thus not due to the fact that India was dealing with trade partners
whose imports were stationary or declining. Indian exports have simply
failed to share in an otherwise expanding market.
TABLE II
TheDirectionof Exportsfrom India*
Destination. 1928* 1938* 1950 1956
Sources: League of Nations, Networkof World Trade (1942); United Nations, Directionof Inter-
national Trade (1953, 1955 and June 1957).
* Pre-war data refer to India, Pakistan and Burma for 1928, and to India and Pakistan for 1938.
t Whole of Germany.
TABLE III
from India,Pakistan,BurmaandCeylon
ImportsintoIndustrialCountries
Imports from Imports from India,
etc., as a share of
Destination. imports from all
All primary India, Pakistan, primary producers,
producers. Burma and Ceylon.
Source: United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, EconomicSurveyof Europein 1957,
Chapter IV, p. 18, and Appendix Table IX. The figures are based on the statistics of the import-
ing countries and are therefore not strictly comparable with those in Table I.
and Argentine in Latin America in 1956 was about the same as in 1928,
although the current value of world as well as primary producers' exports
increased two and a half times during this period. In 1928 these areas
constituted nearly half the population of primary producing countries and
accounted for slightly less than half the exports of the primary producers.
As a result of the sharp structural shift in the import demand of the in-
dustrial countries, however, the share of these primary producers has now
shrunk to only a sixth of the total exports from the primary producers.
vegetable oils, spices, tobacco, fruits and vegetables, gums and resins, and
hides, skins and leather. Non-metallic minerals and metal ores (mainly
mica, iron ore and manganese) account for only 3-5%. The factors in-
fluencing the exports of some of the major items are examined below.
Jute andManufactures.The data on changes in world demand and output
over the last half a century are summarisedin the table below:
In thousand tons (annual averages)
1900-9. 1910-19. 1920-29. 1930-39. 1940-49. 1950-54.
World consumption . . . 1,300 1,527 1,681 1,711 1,469 1,789
of which: United States. . 266 314 383 323 293 302
Others . . . 1,034 1,213 1,298 1,388 1,176 1,487
Output (India plus Pakistan) . 1,312 1,556 1,522 1,499 1,420 1,684
Source: FAO, 7ute, CommoditySeriesNo. 28, pp. 52-3, 63-4.
On the whole, the world consumptionofjute has expanded but little over
the last five decades; while weather may have played some part in restricting
the output of raw jute in certain years, it is clear that the major reason for
this stagnationis the limited world demand rather than the ability to expand
output. The peak output in the years 1912-14 (First World War), 1939 and
1940 (Second World War) and 1951 and 1952 (Korean conflict) was nearly
equal in all these instances-illustrating that a rise in demand could induce
sizeable increases in output. In the more recent period, the output in the
two years 1951 and 1952 was some 40% above that in the preceding as well
as the following three years.
Tea. Next in importance is tea. As the data in the table below show,
world supplies have increased faster than world imports, and output in
India has again increased considerably faster than exports. The increase
in world imports has lagged behind growth in population.
Annual averages
1934-38. 1949-51. 1952-54. 1949-51. 1952-54.
Million lb. Index No.
1934-38 = 100
World supplies* . . 981 1,166 1,233 119 126
World imports . . . . 871 913 996 105 114
Consumption in producing countries t 110 253 237 230 215
India: + supplies . . . . (390) 610 625 156 160
Domestic absorption t . . . (70) 170 190 243 271
Exports . . . . . (320) 440 435 138 136
Source: International Tea Committee, Report1954-55, pp. 28-9.
* Defined as output in the main tea-producing countries and exports from China and Japan.
f Derived by subtraction.
+ Pre-war data adjusted to refer to present-day Indian territories.
Thus, output has gone up by nearly 45%, but exports have fallen by a
third from the peak levels in the early post-war years.
Groundnut Oil. The developmentsin the output and exports of ground-
nuts and oil (the most important item in the group nuts and vegetable oils),
as may be seen from the table below, run again on similar lines.
1934-38. 1948-52. 1953-55. 1948-52. 1953-55.
Thousand tons in Index numbers
nuts-in-shell equivalent * pre-war = 100
Groundnuts Annual averages
World output. . . . . 9,100 9,900 10,930 109 120
World exports. . . . . 3,240 1,810 2,070 56 64
Consumption in producing countries t 5,860 8,090 8,860 138 151
India: output. . . . . 3,196 3,197 3,836 100 120
Exports . . . . . 1,050 240 240 23 23
Domestic availability t . . 2,146 2,957 3,596 138 168
Source: FAO, rearbookson Productionand Trade,and MonthlyBulletins.
* Conversion factors used are: oil equivalent = 30% of unshelled and 43% of shelled weight
of groundnuts.
t Derived by subtraction.
World output in recent years is a fifth higher than in pre-war years,
whereas world exports are a third below: exports have declined from 36%
of total output to only 19%. In India, output has increased by 20% (as a
result of partition and natural increase, the population supplied from
domestic output is now somewhat lower than in pre-war years), whereas
exportshave fallen to only a fourth of the pre-war level.
The brief review of the four major commodities that figure in India's
exportsindicates that in all cases domestic supply has increased and can be
increased even more over a period of time if there was an adequate demand.
As far as the exports of minerals and ores (mica, manganese and iron ores)
are concerned, export demand rather than ability to expand is again the de-
cisivefactor. The stagnationin the overallvolume of exports (the increasein
the volume of tea being offset by the decline in others) has continued despite
strenuousefforts at export promotion and a preparednessto export even if it
meant restrictions on, or very limited increases in, domestic supplies, thus
underlining stagnant export demand as the main cause in keeping the
export level stable.
Against this background, it is not surprising at all that the export ex-
pectations of the First Five-year Plan were not fulfilled. The Planning
Commissionhad estimated that the volume of exports at the end of the Plan
period would rise by 30% compared with that in 1948-49, and by 10%
compared with the boom year 1950-51. In practice, the average volume
of exports for the Plan period was only 10% higher as compared with
1948-49, and about 10% lower as compared with 1950-51. The increases
expected in the exports of the major commodities were also not realised.
The reason for the stagnation in India's export trade may be simply
expressed: India has been trying to sell more of the wrong things to the
wrong places. The efforts at export promotion can no doubt be increased,
and high-pressuresalesmanship in export markets may increase somewhat
the exports to some destinations. The main fact, nevertheless,remains that
offering more of the same things to the same people, who no longer want
more of them, lies at the basis of a remarkably poor performance in the
export trade over the last three decades.
TABLE IV
EstimatedExportsDuringtheSecondFive-yearPlan, 1956-60
Annual Last Change between Crude *
1954 average year of 1954 and indica-
current 2nd Plan 1960-61. tions for
Items. prices, plan. 1960-61. 1975,
Rs. -____-____ Rs. crorest
crores;t Rs. crores t in 1955 prices. % rn1955
prices.
1. Itemsshowinglittle change
Tea . . . . . 131 127 133 2 2 150
Jute yarns and manufactures . 122 122 118 -4 -3 110
Cotton yarn and manufactures 72 75 84 12 18 60
Hides, skins and leather. . 29 28 28 -1 -3 30
Cotton, raw and waste 19 22 22 3 17 20
Coal and coke . 6 5 3 -3 -50 5
Chemicals, drugs and medicines 5 5 5 _ 10
"Others "-(miscellaneous) 130 145 150 20 15 175*
2. Itemsshowingmarkedrise:
Vegetable oils . . . 11 22 24 13 118 40
Tobacco . . . . 12 15 17 5 42 30
Metallic ores, scrap iron, steel. 23 23 27 4 17
Cutlery, hardware, vehicles, 180-280*
electricalgoods and appara-
tus and machinery . . 3 4 4 1 33
Source: Planning Commission, SecondFive rear Plan (New Delhi, 1956), pp. 97, 99.
* These are only illustrative figures for emphasising that an expansion by a third to a half in
total proceeds would require very big increases in the exports of " items showing marked rise,"
particularly ores, etc., and the new products such as " cutlery, hardware, etc."
t Equals ten million.
was worried that rising home demand would encroach upon export avail-
abilities. The experience of the cotton textile trade over the last half-
century, and of India in the seven to eight years, however, suggeststhat this
is a narrowing market in general. A more likely probability, clearly borne
out by the data for late 1957 and early 1958, is that the volume of cotton
textile exports will be lower than in 1954. The actual value of textile
exports may show even a greater fall owing to the decline in the unit price
of exports. Instead of a rise in earnings by Rs. 12 crores,there will probably
be a fall of some Rs. 10 crores or more from the earnings in 1954.
The additional proceeds of Rs. 20 crores expected from the " other"
miscellaneous items are " assumed to bring in the same level of earnings as
at present (1955)." 1 The level in 1955, however, was higher by Rs. 20
1 Planning Commission, SecondFive rear Plan (New Dehli, 1956), p. 98. One crore = ten
million.
over the last few decades. No real increases can thereforebe expected from
this group over the next two decades.
When all the items described above are added up, 90% of the exports
from India are already accounted for. The only commodities that remain
are some agriculturalproducts (tobacco and vegetable oils), ores, metals and
scrap, and products of the new industries, such as chemicals, drugs and
medicines, and cutlery, hardware, vehicles, electrical goods and appliances,
and machinery. Of these, the agricultural products, such as tobacco and
vegetable oils, account for half of this group or 5% of the total exports and
may be expected to increase at the most by around 50% by 1975.
As far as 95% of the exports from India are concerned, there is thus little
likelihood of any marked increase even over the next two decades. In the
past three decades the volume of exports of these items has fallen, and the
trend may continue.
The prospects of growth in the other items may be considered bright in
that they form the core of the dynamic or the most rapidly expanding items
in world trade. The actual level of the exports, however, will largely
depend on the advantages, in terms of prices, quality and terms that Indian
products will offer in the world markets, which can only be expected to
become more and more intensely competitive.
How hard is going to be the task of export expansion in India may be
arithmetically illustrated. In order to obtain an increment of one-third in
total export proceeds, it will be necessary to expand the exports of the
dynamic commodities, now accounting for 5 % of the total, by nearly seven
times. An expansion of the total by half would require more than a tenfold
increase in the dynamic sector. These are large magnitudesindeed! They
will require a basic change in the commodity composition of the export
trade. The dynamic items will have to rise from 5% to between a fourth
and a third of the total exports to attain an increment of a third to a half in
India's export earnings over the next twenty years.
The difficult but very essential task of expanding foreign trade may
also be examined from the angle of the direction of the trade. The basic
feature of India's trade relations with its traditional trade partners, the
private-enterpriseeconomies of the western world, has been stagnation or
decline. This was also true of the centrally planned economies, but for
different reasons (see Table II). The stagnation resulted from the absence
of trade and other contacts, so that these markets cannot be considered
saturated for India's traditional export items. In the last two or three years
India's exports to these areas have expanded two to three times, although
their share is still only 6% of the total.
Here the possibilities of expansion, it would seem, are not closed in the
economic sense, that is, simply not needing more of the products that India
usually offers. The expansion of these economies over the last few decades
has proceeded without recourseto the materials that India usually exported
to the western economies, and it may well be that these materials, so far not
available on the marketsof the centrally planned economies, will command a
marked cost advantage over the substitutesnow in use there. The barriers
against increasedtrade are thus non-economic in character. If they can be
overcome,this will open up the prospectsof expanding the exportsof the non-
dynamic commodities. In that case, India's exports can grow immediately
without waiting for a thorough diversificationof the commodity structureof
exports. In view of the low share of the centrally planned economies in
India's exports, it should be emphasised that the expansion would have to
be in terms not of a few per cent but of a few times over the present magni-
tudes of the total exports to them.
This rather long discussion may be briefly summarised thus: even a
modest increase of a third to a half in the export proceeds over the next
two decades would require a big change both in the direction and in the
commodity structureof exports. Without such changes, Indian exports can
only be expected to drift along, as they have done in the past, a downward
curve, despite the increasingnumber of expert bodies and export promotion
councils that may be appointed to reverseit. It is better part of wisdom to
accept this unwelcome and brutal fact and to prepare to live with it.
widening gap in the levels of living between the industrial and the pre-
industrial countries. Reversing this process has now been accepted as an
essential ingredient in the work of all the international organisations. The
gap, however, has continued to widen in recent years,1 suggesting that,
despite the widespread recognition given to the need for narrowing inter-
national disparities in living, the analytical tools used to approach this
problem perhaps need much refashioning.
Simply stated, to initiate the process of narrowing the gap requires that
the rate of growth of real product in the pre-industrial countries has to be
higher than in the industrial countries and the rate of growth of investment
and, therefore, of capital-goods supplies has to be substantially higher still.
Since, under the present international division of labour, capital-goods are
almost exclusively imported from the industrial countries, expanding the
supplies of these goods means that import capacity (i.e., export proceeds) has
to increase correspondingly. The growth of import capacity, however, is
dependent not upon the need for enlarging the supplies of capital-goods for
development but upon the import demand of the industrial countries, which
has in general tended to grow at a rate lower than that of the real product in
industrial countries. Thus the needs of capital-goods imports outrun by
far the supply potential of capital-goods as a result of the much slower
growth of import capacity.
Consequently, whenever a pre-industrial country embarks upon a de-
termined drive to expand investments,it is soon faced with a seriousbalance-
of-payments crisis. The pace falters, the drive slackens and the will
evaporatesin a frustratingstagnation. The reality of the trade relationship
between the industrial and the pre-industrial countries and the present
international division of labour which it reflects, thus act as a built-in
depressorleading to a continuous widening rather than a narrowing of the
gap. Admittedly, the analysis of the trade flows here is a very simplified,
and an incomplete, version of the causal mechanism which lies at the root
of the widening gap; problems such as domestic mobilisation of resources
and capital exports from the industrial countries are kept out of considera-
tion. Even in its bare essentials, however, it would seem to have more to
commend itself as a much closer approximation to reality than the postulates
of the more sophisticated theory of international trade.2 In the quest for
unravelling the complex, the simple and obvious is too often forgotten.
The basic argument of the preceding paragraphs may be understood
1 See United Nations, WorldEconomicSurvey1955, p. 5 and EconomicSurveyof Europein 1958,
Chap. V, p. 5.
2 Folke Hilgerdt, well known for his contributions to the present ideas about the " network of
international trade," noted this in a recent paper. " The fact," he wrote, " that many under-
developed countries do not derive the advantages from modern transportation and commerce
that theory seems to demand is one of the most pertinent facts in the present international situation
and cannot be easily dismissed." Paper at the WorldPopulationConference, Rome, 1954. Cited by
Gunnar Myrdal in EconomicTheoryand Underdeveloped Regions(Bombay, 1958), p. 159.
TABLE V
IllustrativeExampleof theImplications
of ExportProspects
for India
Actual. Plan. Percentage change
between 1955-56
1955-56. 1975-76. and 1975-76.
Note. The figures are rounded to the nearest five or ten. The estimates of national income and
net investment in 1975-76 are taken from the Planning Commission, SecondFive YearPlan (New
Delhi, 1956), p. 11.
* Net investment in 1955-56 broken down into the following rough proportions: wages and
salaries about two-fifths, domestic capital-goods one-fourth and imported capital equipment one-
third. 1975-76 estimates based on maintaining the ratio of wage costs at two-fifths of total in-
vestments.
t 40% of total imports in 1955-56 and assumed to be at the most 60% of imports in 1975-76.
,: Assuming an increase of 60% during each plan period.
national income will be in inverse directions; export earnings will fall from
6% of national income in 1955-56 to only 3-4% in 1975-76, whereas
investment will rise during this period from about 7 to 17% of a much larger
volume of national income.
1 In the 'sixties, the burden of repayment of loans and interest alone may be expected to be as
high as a fifth of the export proceeds. Imports will in fact have to be correspondingly lower.