Hindawi Publishing Corporation

International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

Volume 2012, Article ID 751784, 11 pages
doi:10.1155/2012/751784

Research Article
Energy-Efficient Secure Path Algorithm for
Wireless Sensor Networks

Imanishimwe Jean de Dieu, Nyirabahizi Assouma,

Maniraguha Muhamad, Wang Jin, and Sungyoung Lee
Department of Computer Engineering, Kyung Hee University, Seoul 130-701, Republic of Korea

Correspondence should be addressed to Imanishimwe Jean de Dieu, [email protected]

Received 19 June 2011; Accepted 16 January 2012

Academic Editor: Rajgopal Kannan

Copyright © 2012 Imanishimwe Jean de Dieu et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons
Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is
properly cited.

To collect the data and transmit them on the base station is the main task of the sensor nodes in wireless sensor networks (WSNs).
This transmission requires a specific routing algorithm. To prolong the network lifetime, sensor nodes need a secure load-balancing
route. In this paper, we investigate the facts of ensuring secure sensed data in a balanced energy network backbone, and propose
energy-efficient secure path algorithm (ESPA) for WSNs. It is a process of ensuring sensed data authenticity and integrity under
a well-structured energy-efficient routing. To overcome the limitation caused by the symmetric key cryptography algorithms for
securing data in WSNs, we proposed a mechanism for checking data integrity in a balanced energy network backbone. On this
basis, we use the combined version of distance energy aware routing and a checking data integrity method for WSNs. ESPA provides
a better performance in maximizing the network lifetime.

1. Introduction Our paper is mainly inspired by the work in [7] where

the symmetric key (shared key) was used to ensure the pro-
Wireless sensor wireless sensor networks (WSNs) [1–3] are tection of actual sensed data in WSNs. Their work was well
the most important technologies which are used in variety analyzed in different challenges. However, symmetric key can
of applications. To impact these applications in real-world be extracted by an attacker through a compromised node and
environments we need more efficient strategies to guarantee without checking integrity on the receiver side; this may re-
security on the sensor readings as well as to prolong or max- sult on delivering a modified data to a base station (BS).
imize the network lifetime. WSNs use tiny and inexpensive In this paper, we present an energy-efficient secure path
sensor node devices; these multifunctional miniature devices algorithm (ESPA) for wireless sensor networks which aims to
perform limited and also specific monitoring and sensing achieve authenticity and integrity on the actual sensed data
functions [4]. They permit very low energy consumption and within an energy-efficient network infrastructure. Due to
have very low processing power as well as low radio ranges inherent deployment nature and energy limitation constraint
[1]. The sensor nodes will sense, process and then transmit of the sensors, ensuring energy efficiency together with the
the data to a certain remote sink node (base station) in an security of the sensed data becomes a foremost task [8]. Our
autonomous and unattended manner [4]. scheme ensures the secure transmission of data from the
Secure sensor readings are important when confidential source sensors to the base station in a way that it can consume
data are involved in WSNs applications [1, 5, 6]. WSNs pose the available amount of energy in a balanced manner after
unique challenges in terms of designing security mecha- selecting an optimal path within the whole network. We use
nisms, specifically due to power, computation, and com- one-way hash function and shared secret keys for ensuring
munication constraints of individual sensors. As WSNs are security service on the sensed data. In ESPA, a routing archi-
used in everyday life, the secure energy, efficient routing of tecture is created as the topology of the network. The key
monitored sensitive data becomes an important issue. contribution in this paper is to ensure secure transmission
2 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

which results prolonging network lifetime via a suboptimal they proved that, in a linear network, energy consumption is
energy-efficient and balancing routing algorithm. Below a list minimal when nodes are equally spaced. However, the load
of achievement is shown. is not equally to all the nodes therefore energy distribution
should take into account the traffic load from the source to
(1) In multipath routing, we first select the shortest path destination.
based on an ant-colony optimization method adopt- Energy-efficient secure pattern based data aggregation
ed in WSNs. for wireless sensor networks ESPDA is presented in [12]
(2) Based on the selected path, the traffic load will be which focused on the issue of energy-efficient data aggrega-
balanced from a source node to base station based on tion with secure data transmission. ESPDA keeps the data
the optimal distance of each node to base station. transmission and aggregation more secure by limiting the
This will increase the lifetime of the whole network. cluster heads to decrypt or encrypt the data received from
the sensor.
(3) The privacy of the sensor readings will be achieved In [8], secure energy-efficient routing protocol for
through a service of anonymity which results hiding densely deployed wireless sensor networks SERP is presented
the source node identity along the transmission path which aims to achieve robust security for transmitted sensor
and only the base station will identify the sender. readings with an energy-efficient backbone. They proposed a
(4) On the packet delivery along the path from source, network routing model which aims at minimizing the waste-
node to base station node symmetric key and hash ful energy consumption by energy-efficient structuring of the
function will defend an attack vector, and more network and then security on the sensed data transmissions
strong verification will be done on the receiver side from the sensors to the base station using one-way hash chain
(base station) to guaranty the authenticity and in- and shared secret keys. Their routing model selects a mini-
tegrity of the actual sensed data. mum number of forwarding nodes in the network through
energy- and distance-based efficient structuring of the net-
(5) Simulation results and comparisons are provided work which helps for maximizing the lifetime of the network.
with a scenario application for healthcare. However, these exchange control messages will introduce
more control overheads as well as require more energy con-
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
sumption and for security defense mechanism the identity
introduces some related work of energy efficient and secure
of the source node is publicly known, therefore, brute-force
routing algorithms. In Section 3 we present the motivation search and eavesdropping attacks are free to gain access on
of our work. In Sections 4 and 5, the details of our ESPA the system.
are described based on the theoretical and numerical analysis The energy efficient ant based routing algorithm for
under different models. Performance evaluation and com- WSNs (EEABR) [13], based on an ACO metaheuristic, is a
parison are given in Sections 6 and 7 concludes this paper. proposed ant-based algorithm to maximize the lifetime of
WSNs. The algorithm uses a good strategy considering ener-
2. Related Work gy levels of the nodes and the lengths of the routed paths
Even though the above-mentioned energy-efficient and
Transmission between the end nodes can occur in a single secure routing protocols or algorithms can improve prolong
hop, or up to N hops [6]. Many existing researchers indicate network lifetime to some degree, they cannot effectively over-
that on multihop routing more short hops are preferable to come the burden overhead in communication known as
fewer long hops, because the minimum signal-to noise ratio hotspot problem which is tightly related with energy and
(SNR) along the route is larger for multihop. But as indicated traffic models. In this paper, we propose a load balanced
in [9] this consideration does not take into account the distance-based energy aware routing algorithm which can
important practical issues of resource allocation, end-to-end effectively alleviate the hotspot problem based on the theo-
delay, error propagation, and interference induced by extra retical deduction and analysis of relevant models. Under
transmissions. Therefore, a new routing method should be this well-designed route, the packet will be delivered to the
adapted to prevent routing over many short hops. In [10], destination in a secure manner with help of a keyed hash
a hierarchical structured energy efficient routing protocol function.
called LEACH is presented, it is a smart solution where
clusters are formed to merge data before transmitting to the 3. Problem Statement
base station. By using the cluster heads chosen to transmit to
the base station, LEACH achieves a factor of 8 improvement WSNs are one of the most important technologies which are
compared to direct transmissions and the energy consump- used in a variety of applications. To impact these applica-
tion is balanced via the rotation of 5% cluster heads and it is tions in a real-world environment, we need more efficient
greatly reduced by data aggregation inside each cluster head. strategies to guarantee secure communication on the sensor
However, clustering will require more energy during rotation readings as well as to maximize the whole network lifetime.
of cluster heads. Since the sensor nodes are equipped with limited energy bat-
In [11], an energy-efficient routing schemes for wireless teries, the energy conservation is the primary challenge for
sensor networks is proposed where after making a study on WSNs.
energy-optimal network configurations for manual and ran- On this basis, the energy efficient information processing
dom placement of nodes under a natural coverage criterion; is of critical importance to balance the available residual
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 3

Opt search process

Source Base
node station

ACO F ACO B

Initialization
Path
info DPP verification Packet drop
process

DEAR
DPP Packet
accept

Figure 1: General backbone model.

amount of energy and to operate the deployed networks as path from the source node to the base station. The reason of
long as possible. The objective of prolonging the network choosing ACO is due to its distributed nature and quick
lifetime is not only to reduce energy consumption during the reaction to changes in the network.
sensing, processing, or control processes, but also to balance There are a number of reasons that ACO algorithms are a
energy consumption among the sensor nodes. If some good fit for WSN routing. ACO algorithms are decentralized
sensor nodes die early, the whole network will quickly get just as WSNs are similarly decentralized. In WSNs nodes can
partitioned and out of function, for example in the case of break, run out of energy and have the radio propagation
hotspot problems. Wherein, under a multipath routing, characteristics change. ACO algorithms have been shown to
nodes closer to the base station (BS) die early, while in a react quickly to changes in the network [14].
direct transmission routing, nodes far from the BS die early. There are two types of packets in our approach: data
Many schemes have been proposed using a symmetric packets and ant (or control) packets. Data packets are the
key cryptography algorithm for securing data in WSNs. data carried in the sensor network. The routing algorithm
However, a current limitation of these schemes is that the routes these packets from the source to the destination, but
symmetric key cryptography algorithms are vulnerable to has no interest in the contents of these packets. Forward and
node compromise attacks. To overcome this limitation, we backward ants named ACO F and ACO B, respectively, are
propose a scheme for ensuring secure sensed data in a balanc- represented by control packets. These packets are used to
ed energy network backbone from the source node to base update the routing table.
station. Therefore, this motivated our work in this paper. We Information or results from control packets will be stored
deal with the issue of balancing the available residual energy in a Path info repository. Path info repository is required to
of the whole network infrastructure and guarantee that the maintain or store all available optimal selected results and
packet data is delivered under a well secured route. send them to DEAR (distance energy aware routing) on the
event based for load balancing. When the event boost the
4. Proposed Approach initialization has to be sent on ACO to initiate the already ob-
tained optimal path. The actual sensed data will be sent un-
4.1. Network Model. The proposed approach for ensuring der the control of DPP (data privacy protection) for pro-
data privacy protection in WSNs through an energy-efficient tecting the sensory data readings from malicious.
network backbone is comprised of two phases. At the first Sensor will then send the obfuscated collected data via a
phase, we proposed a distance based energy aware routing well-selected path to a command center known as the base
(DEAR) algorithm on selected optimal path through Ant station or sink. The DPP verification process will be per-
colony optimization (ACO). The objective of this phase is to formed for ensuring the authenticity and integrity on the
balance the available amount of energy in the whole WSNs as actual sensed data. Therefore, the packets will be accepted or
well as to maximize the network lifetime. At the second phase dropped according to a verification process.
in the proposed network routing we ensured confidentiality, In wireless sensor network, there are so many challenges.
authenticity, and integrity security services on the sensed The main challenges are how to provide maximum lifetime
data. Figure 1 shows the complete architecture of the pro- to the network and how to provide secure communication
posed model. ACO will be adopted for searching an optimal to the network. As sensor networks totally rely on battery
4 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

power, the main aim for maximizing the lifetime of the BS

network is to conserve battery power or energy with some S4
security considerations. Our algorithm is suitable to the S3
model as follows
(i) The bidirection link is used in networks. That is to
say, if sensor A can communicate with sensor B, then S2
sensor B can communicate with sensor A.
(ii) The initial energy in sensors is equal. During the early
period of the network’s life, there is enough energy in
sensors to communicate with border sensors. S1

(iii) The sensor has an all-direction antenna.

4.2. Sub optimal Selection Phase. In our scheme, the first Figure 2: Distance based network model.
phase is to build a suboptimal path among available multi-
path routes through an ACO, based technique. On this basis,
each ant tries to find a path in the network by providing pheromone intensity; whereby the nodes with more energy
minimum cost. Ants are initiated from a source node s, move should be chosen with high probability and if on connection
through neighbor nodes ri, and reach a final destination (r, s) there has been a lot of traffic then it is highly desirable
node (base station). As shown in (1), the choice of the next to use that connection.
node r is made according to a probabilistic decision rule pro- Once a forward ant reaches the destination node, it is
posed in the ACO metaheuristic [14]: transformed in a backward ant with the aim of updating the
⎧ pheromone trail of the path it used to reach the destination
 β
⎪
⎪ [τ(r, s)]α × η(r, s) and that is stored in its memory. This update will be com-
⎨
  β if r ∈
/ MemK , puted by the destination node through this formula
pk (r, s) = ⎪ r Rs [τ(r, s)]α × η(r, s)
⎪
⎩
0 otherwise, 1
(1) Δτ = , (3)
N − Fdk
where τ is the routing table at each node that stores the where N is the number of nodes stored in the ant’s memory
amount of pheromone trail on connection (r, s) · η is the and Fdk is the distance travelled by the forward ant k. When
visibility function. RS is the receiver nodes and MemK , is the the backward ant reaches the node where it was created, its
list of identities of every visited node, which is carried by ant mission is finished, and the ant is eliminated. The path with
k. more pheromone intensity will indicate the shortest route
During ant’s exploration, forward ant (ACO F) will col- and then, a suboptimal path will be obtained.
lect all the information of the paths passed by, while back-
ward ant (ACO B) recoiling back from a destination node 4.3. Energy-Balancing Phase. From Figure 2, our scenario
(base station) to a source node s. During its moving back, shows that when an event occurs in WSNs, the source node
ACO B will update the routing tables of all the nodes along will transfer the data to the base station (BS) in two phases:
the path according to the information collected by the cor- Direct transmission routing “single hop” when the sensor
responding ACO F. Each ant has the memory which contains node is located near the base station and multihop routing
the already visited nodes, by exploiting this ant’s memory; an when the source node is located far away from the sink node.
ant k can build feasible solutions. On this, no node can be As proposed in our previous work [4], for direct transmis-
visited more than once, which is shown by the Figure 2. At sion routing, the nodes far away from sink node will drain
each node r, a forward ant selects the next hop node using the out of energy very quickly due to the characteristics of wire-
same probabilistic rule proposed in the ACO metaheuristic less channel. For multihop routing, the nodes close to sink
[14]. The visibility function is given by node will have more traffic load to forward under most rout-
1 ing mechanisms and also drain out of energy quickly.
η= , (2) Table 1 shows the energy distribution along the network
ei − es
from the source node to base station by considering 4 nodes
where ei is the initial energy level of the nodes and es is the to reach the sink. On the event based scenario refer to Table 1,
current energy level of the node s. This enables decision mak- each node will require one round of an amount of energy to
ing according to neighbor node’s energy levels, meaning that transmit ETx its own message and the round time for for-
if a node has a lower energy source then it has lower prob- warding the message from previous nodes, it will increase
ability to be chosen. Nodes inform their neighbors about one round per hop on the path towards the base station and
their energy levels when they sense any change in their energy this will results on more energy forwarding EFx consumption
levels. Here, α and β are parameters that control the relative for the nodes closer to the sink (base station). Distance based
importance of trail versus visibility. In this case, probability energy balancing scheme is proposed to deal with this prob-
selection is based on two important factors: the energy and lem as well as maximizing the network lifetime.
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 5

Table 1: Round traffics. Therefore, E(n) is finally equal to

Sensors Transmit Forward E(n) = (2n − 1) · Eelec + εamp · n1−α · dα . (6)
S1 1 0
S2 1 1 As the (5) has a minimal value when d1 = d2 = · · · = dn =
S3 1 2 d/n. Then, our minimum point can be obtained through the
S4 1 3 first derivative of (6). In this case we can get
α
d
2Eelec + εamp · (1 − α) · =0 (7)
n
Algorithm 1 clearly shows the basic steps for distance-
based energy aware routing: “this algorithm is used for bal- Therefore, we can get E1 ≈ E2 = E3 · · · = En .
ancing the energy in a whole network as well as maximizing In this case, all involved sensors will consume their ener-
the network lifetime.” gy at similar rate, which can effectively alleviate the hotspot
Where ∝ is the energy attenuation power parameter re- problem and prolong the network lifetime.
lated to a specific field, d is the distance between the sender We are also considering the second case where on the
and receiver. However, the distribution is not far from uni- whole network, the packet or traffic length is not the same,
form, as manifested by the small variance of di . For Eelec = in this scenario a certain node which is the furthest from the
10, and ∝= 2, the variance is about 0.14. For ∝= 3; 4, the base station only needs to transmit its data once while other
variances are 0 : 058, 0 : 029, the gain in total energy con- node n which is closest to base station has to transmit its own
sumption varies between 22% (∝= 4) and 28% (∝= 2). The data once and help forward the data (n − 1) times along the
gain in lifetime is considerably higher and ranges between a line. On this basis, the node n will become a hotspot node as
factor of 2.3 (∝= 4) and 2.5 (∝= 2). it has a lot of burden to forward and then die quickly.
Iteratively other nodes also repeat the same process. Un- Let us consider that a node i will transmit its own data
der one dimensional linear network, sensor nodes are usually and help to forward other traffics for (i − 1) times. Here, the
placed in a line from source node to a base station node. energy consumption for node i is
⎧
⎨l.Eelec + l · εfs .d 2 , if d < d 0 , Ei = l · Eelec + εamp · diα + l · (i − 1) 2Eelec + εamp · diα
ETx (l, d) = ⎩
l.Eelec + l · εmp · d4 , if d ≥ d 0 , = l · (2i − 1)Eelec + l · i · εamp · diα .
(4) (8)
ERx (l) = l.Eelec ,
Since our objective is to let each node consume the energy at
EFx (l, d) = ETx (l, d) + ERx (l), similar rate, then Ei = Ei+1 , we can get
where ETx The amount of energy to transmit l-bits messages l · (2i − 1)Eelec + iεamp diα
over a distance d, ERx amount of energy to receive the mes- (9)
α
sage and EFx amount of energy to forward the message. For = l · (2i + 1)Eelec + (i + 1)εamp di+1 ,
other parameters, Eelec is the Energy dissipation to run the α
radio device, ε f s free space model of transmitter amplifier, (i + 1)εamp di+1 = (2i − 1)Eelec + iεamp diα − (2i + 1)Eelec ,
εmp multipath model of transmitter amplifier, and d0 the dis- α
(i + 1)εamp di+1 = −2Eelec + iεamp diα ,
tance threshold.
−2Eelec + iεamp diα
In this section, we present our improved version of en- α
di+1 = ,
suring the least energy consumption through a load balanced εamp (i + 1)

routing based on an obtained suboptimal path from the pre- −2Eelec + iεamp diα
vious section. Here, our objective is to balance the load along di+1 = α .
εamp (i + 1)
the path from the source node to the base station node. An (10)
individual distance from one node to next hop node is com-
puted and the energy will be consumed at the similar rate. From (10), we can deduce
Basically, we are targeting to find the optimal multihop
number and each individual distance di so that each node −2Eelec + (i − 1)εamp diα−1
diα = . (11)
consumes the least energy at similar rate. Based on (4), the iεamp
total energy consumption to transmit one bit data (l = 1)
over n-hop route will be Here, we can notify that

n
iεamp diα = −2Eelec + (i − 1)εamp diα−1 . (12)
E(n) = Eelec + εamp · d1α + 2Eelec + εamp · d1α
i=2
We substitute this in (11), then
(5) 

n  −2(2)Eelec + (i − 1)εamp diα−1
= (2n − 1)Eelec + εamp · diα . di+1 = 
α
. (13)
i=1
εamp (i + 1)
6 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

Load Balancing
Input: sensor nodes, distance form each sensor node to base station, base
station address and sistance to neighbor nodes
Output: Maximizing network lifetime through bes routing
∗
/
1. /∗ calculate optimal distance value, where
α[2, 4] εamp = εfs when α = 2 and
∗
εamp = εmp when
 α = 4. /
2 · Eelec
di = dopt = α
εamp (α − 1)
2. /∗ neighbors selection ∗ /
Si =: select (neighbors)
3. /∗ calculate disyance from source neighbors ∗ /
d j =: d(S, N)
4. /∗ compare optimal distance di with d j ∗ /
dtemp =: near (di ,d(s,n), energy ≥ engTH
5. Finally;
6. End

Algorithm 1: Distance-based network model.

From (13), we can get Therefore, from the above analysis, we can conclude that:
Given the source to base station node distance d and the
−2Eelec + (i − 2)εamp diα−2 suboptimal route among available routes, the optimal multi-
diα−1 = ,
(i − 1)εamp (14) hop number n as well as each individual distance di , i ∈ [1, n]
can be determined so that all the sensor nodes consume their
(i − 1)εamp diα−1 = −2Eelec + (i − 2)εamp diα−2 . energy at similar rate.
Below pseudocodes for suboptimal balanced route are
By substituting this in (13), then shown, in each searching period, an ant ak chooses a path
 randomly according to a predetermined path selection pos-

 −2(3)Eelec + (i − 2)εamp diα−2 sibility. An optimal path searching period ends up in the
di+1 = 
α
. (15)
εamp (i + 1) algorithm when all the n ants finish the path seeking res-
pectively.
Iteratively, then we can get
 Load Balancing under an Optimal Path. See Algorithm 2.

 −2iEelec + εamp d1α After obtaining di as a selected suboptimal path and then
di+1 = 
α
. (16) the sensed data will be directly sent or forwarded through
εamp (i + 1)
this path under an individual optimal distance to reach the
Since the individual distance dn is always positive then: next forwarded node and so on till the base station.
(−2(n − 1)Eelec + εamp d1α )/εamp (n) > 0, then from this
equation we can deduce: 5. Control Point Checking Phase
−2nEelec > −εamp d1α − 2Eelec , Our proposed secure path solution ensures authenticity and
(17) integrity of the actual sensed privacy in WSNs by providing a
2nEelec < εamp d1α + 2Eelec , checking mechanism on the receiver side (base station). This
will provide the evidence that the packet has reached the
thus it proves that: n < (εamp d1α /2Eelec ) + 1, and from here, destination without being modified along the path. Here, our
we can also deduce the corresponding lower bound distance first stage is to claim the weak point of symmetric key, which
when hop number n is known: is usually known as a single point failure based on a single
shared key. On this basis, the symmetric key may be captured
2(n − 1)Eelec by en-route attack. Therefore, data integrity checking on the
d1α > . (18)
εamp receiver side is needed through a hashing operation by en-
suring that the packet received was un-altered during its
On the other hand, given the minimal distance from the transmission from a source to destination by any intermedi-
source node to base station d, there might be several multi- ate sensor or malicious node. Below Figure 3 is the proposed
hop routes with different hop number n. On this basis, we secure model.
first select the suboptimal route path by using ant-colony
optimization technique and then on that chosen route, we 5.1. Sender Side
select the highest hop number above with the minimal ener-
gy consumption for each sensor node and this is the optimal 5.1.1. E(IDx || Rn , Kbs ). Here, we apply concatenation be-
multihop number we need. tween the source sensor ID and random number Rn (with
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 7

Inputs: Sensor nodes address, distance from each sensor node to base station,
base station address, distance to neighbor nodes
Output: Shortest path
1. Intialize the phermone value on the sensor nodes
Perm node = Random Initialization
2. Place the ants for searching optimal path
ants = till the tour complete
3. Intialize the Constants
α  [2, 4]
εamp = fs when α = 2 and εamp = εmp when α = 4
4. Searching an optimal path
if (ri ! = BS)
whilep = 1 to pmax
If (ri = visited node)
ri = 0
⎧ Endif
⎪
⎨ [τ(r, s)]α × [η(r, s)]β
pk (r, s) = ⎪  [τ(r, s)]α × [η(r, s)]β if r ∈/ MemK
⎩ r R
0 otherwise
Endwhile
di = Active (backward)
Thenelse
di = Active (backward)
return di
Endif
5. Calculate optimal
 distance value
2Eelec
di = dopt = α
εamp (α − 1)
6. Neighbors selection
Si = select (neighbors)
7. Calculate distance from source to neighbors
di = d(S, N)
8. Compare optimal distance di with d j
dtemp = near(di · d(S, N) · energ y ≥ ength
9. Reture the optimal path
Return dtemp

Algorithm 2

the same size as the sensor identity) in order to provide 5.2.2. Integrity and Authentication Verification. After separat-
protection against brute-force search attacks and then we ing the cipher text data E(Data) and the cipher text message
encrypt them with Kbs (public Key of the base station (re- digest E(H(Data)) both will be decrypted by using shared
ceiver) to provide anonymity of the source node against some secret key between the source node and the base station.
attacks from attack vector. Next, we save the plain-text message digest and then one-way
hash function will be applied on the plain-text data obtained
5.1.2. E((Data), Kx,BS ). Secondly, we encrypt the sensed data and finally we compare the result. Thus, the overall process
with Kx,BS symmetric key shared between sender and base results on checking data integrity to ensure that during the
station (receiver), as secrecy of actual sensed data for pro- transmission from the source node to destination (base sta-
viding confidentiality. tion) the packet has not been modified and authenticate that
the packet has been sent by legitimate user.
In this paper, our security scheme is built based on the
5.1.3. E(H(Data), Kx,BS ). Next, we apply one-way hash func- assumption that the gateway or base station is a central
tion on the sensed data and to enhance data security we also command authority. It has no resource constraint problem,
encrypt the message digest by the symmetric key (shared and furthermore it cannot be compromised by an attacker.
secret key between the source node and the base station). To In order to provide protection against en-route attacks from
reach our goal of ensuring authenticity and integrity on traffic analysis or fabrication during transfer from one node
the sensor readings from the source to destination; we con- to another, we propose a secure communication model,
catenate the cipher-text obtained in the previous step with which can be established with the help of hybrid key (asym-
the later result that becomes E(data, Kx , bs) || E(H(Data), metric key and symmetric keyed hash function) scheme. On
Kx , bs). this basis, asymmetric key (between the sensor node and the
base station) is used only for hiding the sensor node identity
5.2. Receiver Side (anonymity), which results on identity privacy. while the
symmetric keyed hash function is used to protect the whole
5.2.1. D(IDx || Rn , K ∗ BS ). Decryption to get source node actual sensed data.
identity (ID) by using the private key of the base station. If an adversary compromises a sensor node, he can-
not successfully deceive the base station to perform insider
8 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

Source node Base station

A = E(IDX ∥Rn , KBS ) A = D(IDX ∥Rn , KBS )

P(A, B)

B = E((data)∥E(H(data)), KX,BS ) B = {Verification

process}

E((data), KX,BS )
D((data),
Data E(data)∥ E(data) H(data)
KX,BS )
E(H(data))
E(H(data))

Compare

D(H(data), KX,BS )
H(data) E(H(data), KX,BS )

BS
1 2 3 4 5

Figure 3: Secure en-route attack model.

attacks, due to the infeasible computational properties of 6. Performance Evaluation

keyed hash functions. This makes it extremely difficult for
an adversary to retrieve the necessary keys to decrypt or gain 6.1. Security Analysis. We analyze the security of our scheme
access to the original message. This also provides a simple with respect to two goals: the ability of the base station to
resistance in the case of nodes compromising, as the key detect an altered message and the ability of the source node
established between non compromised nodes remains con- to mask its identity (id) for data privacy issue.
fidential. In this scheme, the data packet is transmitted under the
Our scheme is also resilient to the second type of node keyed hash function covered by the shared key Kx,BS between
compromised, where an attacker injects the nodes in the the sensor node and the base station. Hence, the shared key
network with the false identities. In this case, the base station Kx,BS is never disclosed during transmission. The shared key
will be able to detect this attack through a failure verification Kx,BS is only known by the related peers, that is, the sensor
of our anonymity mechanism. node and the base station.
If an insider attack (from a compromised node) gets the An eavesdropper at the edge of the sensor node fails to
packet from that compromised one, it could use the last monitor or capture the random number Rn as well as the
shared key to access the data, and then, the false packet could identity of the sensor node based on hiding features from
be sent successfully to the base station. In this case, the false the asymmetric key Kbs . On this basis, without a proper
packet will be composed by two concatenated contents: fake matching of those dual keys (public key of the base station
data and genuine message digest. Therefore, the base station and private key of legitimate sensor node), any malicious
verification will indicate the attacker failure point through an node will not gain access to the context information or being
authentication failure. able to forward the packets to next nodes. Therefore, this
International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks 9

attribute could prevent camouflage and traffic attacks and be 120

useful to protect sensor node privacy.
100
The data packets from the sensor node to the base station

Number of alive nodes

are authenticated by a keyed hash function. Before accepting 80
the inward packet data and making further processing,
the receiver must verify the authentication. Based on the 60
infeasible computational properties of a hash algorithm, the
base station and sensor node could avoid the attacks of denial 40
of service. According to the above analysis, this proposed 20
scheme, which is simple and easy to implement, can provide
relatively strong protection for sensor node networks. 0
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
Time (S)
6.1.1. Base Station Verification Theoretical Analysis. An at-
tacker can utilize devices with the same capabilities as the Without BS verification (5 attackers)
sensor nodes in the network, either by introducing sensor Without BS verification (3 attackers)
nodes to the networks deployment area or by destroying With BS verification (5 attackers)
some of the nodes in the network under attack. Figure 4: Number of alive nodes per time.
Assume that an adversary j has known the secret key
(shared) between source node and base station. j will have
access to the concatenated data between message digest and Table 2: Simulation parameters.
actual sensed data. As only base station has the knowledge of Parameter Value
the size of the cipher text (E[h(data), Kx,BS ]), therefore, j will
Network size 300 × 300 m2
not be able to separate the concatenated payload. If so, then
Node number 70–300
the data will be stolen or only modified according to what
kind of attacker, but as one-way hash function has following Radius 150 m
properties Data length 2,000 bits
Initial energy 2 Joule
(a) H(x) = h; where h equals to the result of one-way Eelec 50 nJ/bit
hash function of the message x. So given h, it is in- εamp 0.001 pJ/bit/m4
feasible to find x (one-way property), Δ [20, 50] m
(b) H(x1) = H(x2) given x1 is infeasible to find x2 (weak BS Inside or outside
collision resistance), Sleep mode energy 0
(c) H(x1) = H(x2), it is infeasible to find any x1 and x2 Multipath model of transmitter amplifier (εmp ) 0.0013 pJ/bit/m4
(strong collision resistance). Free space model of transmitter amplifier (εfs ) 10 pJ/bit/m2
εamp = εmp α=4
Therefore, the infeasible computational properties of a
one-way hash function will help our scheme to identify any
change that has occurred on the actual sensed data during the that, if BS verification method is absent, the nodes lose the
transmission from the source node to the base station. Thus energy rapidly, which results in a shorter network lifetime.
integrity and authenticity will be achieved. To the best of If an insider attack (from a compromised node) gets the
our knowledge, ESPA can be able to defend against an out- packet from that compromised one, it could use the last
sider and insider attackers by adopting the knowledge of car- shared key to access the data, and then, the false packet could
rying out both cryptography and signature verification. With be sent successfully to the base station. In this case, the false
an outsider attack, an attacker does not become part of the packet will be composed by two concatenated contents: fake
network. An outsider attacker can choose to passively eaves- data and genuine message digest. Therefore, the base station
drop on the network communication, which is very difficult verification will indicate the attacker failure point through an
to detect. However, using a sufficiently strong cipher from authentication failure.
hybrid key cryptography (asymmetric and symmetric) to
preserve confidentiality is generally the only defense needed 6.2. Comparison Analysis. We compared our results with
against this type of attack. some existing schemes EEABR, SERP, and ESPDA based on
evaluating the energy efficiency and security analysis issues.
6.1.2. Base Station Verification Simulation Analysis. In our For performance evaluation, we use MATLAB software. As
simulation, 5 to 16 packets per second (pps) were generated is shown in Table 2, there are 300 sensor nodes randomly
by the attackers to drainout energy of the nodes. When the deployed in a 300 × 300 m2 area WSN with BS placed in
packet authentication method is employed, the base station the middle of the area. The maximal transmission radius is
can detect false packets. In Figure 4, we show the number of 150 meters. Each node takes turns to transmit a 2,000 bits
alive nodes versus simulation time by considering our pro- message to BS using either direct transmission or multihop
posed authenticity checking mechanism. The graph shows transmission based on different routing algorithms.
10 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks

1 100

Checking capability (%)

90
0.9 80
Average remaining Energy

70
60
0.8 50
40
0.7 30
20
10
0.6 0
2 4 6 8 10
0.5 In-action nodes

0.4 ESPA
0.4 64 128 192 256 320 384 448 512 576 640 SERP
Number of packet received ESPDA

EEABR Figure 6: En-route detection.

ESPA
SERP

Figure 5: Average remaining Energy. better checking results than SERP and ESPDA schemes, ex-
ceeding over 84% of dropping misbehavior packet.

Figure 5 shows the average remaining energy under our 7. Conclusions

infrastructure after dividing the number of nodes by the
total area to get the network densities. In the simulation, the To extend the network lifetime, we proposed an energy-
nodes close to the phenomenon send the actual sensed data efficient secure path algorithm for WSNs. The algorithm
through the neighbor nodes to the base station by consuming used distance-based energy-aware routing and data privacy
energy. The average remaining energy of the nodes decreases protection techniques in WSNs. Using both techniques
based on the incremental of the packets number received helped to improve the performance analysis of the system
by the base station, Figure 5 gives the whole picture of the while achieving at the same time a good level of security in
scenario. In the simulations, the proposed approach gives terms of authenticity and integrity of the sensed data, as well
better results, by allowing each node to consume the least as maximizing the network lifetime. During the routing pro-
energy at similar rate. cess, we tried to let each node to consume the least energy at
In the simulation, the nodes close to the phenomenon similar rate under a suboptimal path.
send the actual sensed data through the neighbor nodes to In our future work, we plan to extend our work based on
the base station by consuming energy. The average remaining the implications of adopting a hybrid security scheme to
energy of the nodes decreases based on the incremental of the handle storage and communication security, in order to im-
packets number received by the base station, in below Figure plement the full confidential data privacy and how the algo-
5 gives the whole picture of the scenario. In the simulations, rithm can be used to achieve better performance.
the proposed approach gives better results, by allowing each
node to consume the least energy at similar rate.
We also analyze and evaluate the proposed secure model
Acknowledgment
capability, with respect to three defense parameters: ano- This research was supported by the MKE (The Ministry of
nymity, confidentiality, and integrity, to determine the per- Knowledge Economy), Republic os Korea, under the ITRC
formance of our scheme. The possibility of defending an (Information Technology Research Center) support program
attack, Da , depends on three factors: number of in-action supervised by the NIPA (National Industry Promotion
nodes, failure verification, and our malicious counter thresh- Agency) (NIPA-2010-(C1090-1021-0003)).
old v:
⎛ ⎞
n n v
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