REPORT

INTERNATIONAL
CONSENSUS:
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
OF DEMOCRACY

1
Michael Meyer-Resende of Democracy Reporting International (DRI) wrote this
report. The author wishes to thank Kate McGuinness for her contribution to this text.
It follows on from two previous reports by the author about the notion of democracy:

Discussing International Standards for Democratic Governance (2007), funded by the

OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and available at:
http://www.democracy-reporting.org/files/standards_go.pdf

Democracy Revisited (2009), commissioned by the Office for the Promotion of

Parliamentary Democracy of the European Parliament and available at:
http://www.democracy-reporting.org/files/oppd-defining_democracy.pdf

For a French-language version of Democracy Revisited, see:

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/pdf/oppd/Page_1/OPPD-La_democratie_revisitee.pdf

© Democracy Reporting International (DRI), October 2011. All rights reserved.

Distribution for all non-commercial purposes is encouraged, provided DRI is
acknowledged as the source and sent copies of any translation. DRI will provide an
Arabic translation.
 INTERNATIONAL
CONSENSUS:
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
OF DEMOCRACY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 05

POLITICAL BACKGROUND 06

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF DEMOCRACY 08

01. THE SEPARATION AND BALANCE OF POWER 08

02. INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY 10
03. A PLURALIST SYSTEM OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND ORGANISATIONS 11
04. THE RULE OF LAW 12
05. ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY 13
06. FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA 14
07. RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS 15
INTERNATIONAL
CONSENSUS:
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
OF DEMOCRACY

Democracy is not an anything goes form of Yet, democracy is not an anything goes form of government.
government. Various internationally agreed Various internationally agreed documents include an outline
documents include an outline of the core of the core components of what democracy means. A range
components of what democracy means. A range of them are ‘hard’ legally binding international law. Others may
of them are ‘hard’ legally binding international be considered soft law. While these documents do not give
law. Others may be considered soft law. While an exhaustive definition of democracy, they include basic key
these documents do not give an exhaustive elements, each of which is a necessary condition for a
definition of democracy, they include basic key democratic form of governance.
elements, each of which is a necessary condition
for a democratic form of governance. In 2004, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution that
lays out seven ‘essential elements’ of democracy, including:

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY •• Separation and balance of power

•• Independence of the judiciary
The demonstrators of the Arab Spring demand democracy in •• A pluralistic system of political parties and organisations
a region that has been ruled by authoritarian regimes for •• Respect for the rule of law
decades. While the demand is clear, it may be less clear what •• Accountability and transparency
kind of democracy the people demand. Everybody is in favour •• Free, independent and pluralistic media
of transparent, competitive elections. But at the same time •• Respect for human and political rights; e.g., freedoms of
many are concerned about tyrannical majorities imposing their association and expression; the right to vote and to stand
view of the state and society on those who are not represented in elections
in government.
This report explores the implications of these seven
Questions about the extent and the limits of majority rule elements in the hope of offering support to the debate in Egypt,
are as old as the very concept of democracy itself and there are Tunisia and other countries in the region, about what, exactly,
no hard and fast answers. Indeed, there is no generally accepted a democratic state should look like. It is noteworthy that all Arab
concept of what makes a democracy. Academic definitions range states endorsed the UN General Assembly resolution, except
from the minimalist (‘competitive struggle for votes’) to the far- Libya and the United Arab Emirates, which abstained from the
reaching (including a degree of economic equality or well-being). vote. Democracy activists in the region therefore should not
Looking at states that are considered to be democratic may not hesitate to invoke these essential elements. They have been
be helpful either, because there is a large variety of political accepted in numerous internationally agreed documents, some
systems and practices in them. of which represent international law.

05
 representatives, to vote and to be elected at genuine
POLITICAL BACKGROUND periodic free elections by universal and equal suffrage and
by secret ballot guaranteeing the free expression of the
Recent events throughout the Arab states, especially the will of the people, as well as a pluralistic system of political
popular uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, provide the impetus for parties and organizations, respect for the rule of law, the
this report. From Morocco to Bahrain protesters are demanding separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary,
democratic reforms. In some countries, these developments transparency and accountability in public administration,
have moved the debate to questions about what democracy and free, independent and pluralistic media.
really means. What should the priorities for constitution writers
in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya be as they try to establish democratic By referring to essential elements, UN member states
regimes? What should civil society contribute to the democracy outline the core components of democracy. At the same time,
building process and how? What reforms are necessary to they leave open the possibility of exploring whether there are
better ensure, for example, genuinely democratic elections? other elements not included here that also make a democracy.
As such, this definition does not strive to be exhaustive. Rather
There are many definitions of what democracy means, its goal is to define the basic minimal requirements necessary
especially in academic circles. These range from Schumpeter’s for a state to be considered democratic.
minimalist ‘competitive struggle for votes’ 1 to more extensive
definitions that include reference to political freedoms and The 2004 UN General Assembly resolution builds on a
specific institutional arrangements; e.g., parliament, an inde- similarly worded UN Human Rights Commission resolution
pendent judiciary and so on. The most wide-reaching definitions from 2003 5 and other legally binding international treaties that
of democracy even incorporate a notion of economic rights.2 include many aspects of the essential elements resolution from
2004, namely the International Covenant for Civil and Political
Looking beyond academic debates about how to define Rights (ICCPR).6 The 2004 UN General Assembly resolution, along
democracy, it is important to acknowledge that this term with the ICCPR, provide the primary frame of reference for this
has also been elaborated in numerous internationally paper, which analyses the various components of this definition
agreed documents, such as international and regional inter- of democracy in more detail. Occasional reference is also made
governmental organisations like the United Nations, the African to regional agreements that represent a codification of good
Union or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in practice around the world.
Europe (OSCE). Some of these may be characterised as soft law
while others are legally binding treaty obligations. Altogether At the outset, it is worth noting that the UN resolution
they represent a growing international consensus about the addresses two distinct aspects of democracy. The first is
essential elements that make a democracy. sometimes referred to as ‘vertical accountability’ and relates
to how a state interacts with its people. This is the realm of
In 2004, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution human rights, which is codified in binding treaties reflecting
(A/RES/59/201) that lays out these ‘essential elements of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 7 The promotion
a democracy’.3 The resolution was endorsed by 172 states, with and protection of all human rights is a prerequisite for a
15 abstentions (including Libya and the United Arab Emirates); democratic society, which is also stressed by the UN resolution.
no state voted against the resolution.4 It therefore both This area of democracy has already been well explored in
represents and consolidates an international consensus on many publications and extensively documented. Hence it is
what democracy means and how it should function. not closely examined here.

According to paragraph 1 of this resolution, these essential The second aspect of democracy identified in the 2004
elements include: UN resolution is sometimes called ‘horizontal accountability’.
It relates to how state institutions interact and, ultimately, how
…respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, inter they are constructed and organised. How are the three branches
alia, freedom of association and peaceful assembly and of government structured as organisational entities and how
of expression and opinion, and the right to take part in the do they function? How does the executive branch of government
conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen relate to the legislative branch? What types of relationships
operate between the judiciary and the executive? How do

1 J. A. Schumpeter (1943), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy.

2 International IDEA (July 2009), Democracy in Development, Global Consulta-

5 UN Human Rights Commission Resolution 2003/36, UN Doc E/CN. 4/2003/59.
tion on the EU’s role in democracy building. See: http://www.idea.int/ publications/
See: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G03/ 105/74/PDF/G0310574.
democracy_in_development/index.cfm.
pdf?OpenElement.
3 Adopted 20 December 2004, the resolution was officially published in 2005.
6 See: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm. All subsequent references
See: http://www.undemocracy.com/A-RES-59-201.pdf. All subsequent references in
in the text to the ICCPR are from this source (with the exception of extracts from
the text to this UN General Assembly resolution are from this source.
General Comment 25 of the UN Human Rights Committee; see footnote 17 below).
Arab League states that are not state parties to the ICCPR include: Comoros,
4 For documentation on the vote results, including abstentions, see: http://un-
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. For information about the
bisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?session=13167S8448CT7.132415&menu=searc
current status of ICCPR state parties, see: http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.
h&aspect=power&npp=50&ipp=20&spp=20&profile=voting&ri=&index=.VM&term
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec.
=A%2FRES%2F59%2F201&matchopt=0%7C0&oper=AND&x=10&y=9&aspect=pow
er&index=.VW&term=&matchopt=0%7C0&oper=AND&index=.AD&term=&matchop
7 See: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/. All subsequent references in the
t=0%7C0&oper=AND&index=BIB&term=&matchopt=0%7C0&limitbox_1=VI01+%3
text to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are from this source.
D+vi_a&ultype=&uloper=%3D&ullimit=&ultype=&uloper=%3D&ullimit=&sort=.

06
independent state institutions, such as human rights commissions,
election management bodies or fiscal oversight agencies,
relate to all three branches of government power? As it remains
critically under explored, this aspect of democracy is the
primary focus of this report.

Existing democracies entertain a wide range of institutional

arrangements—presidential or parliamentary systems (or
a mix of both), republics, constitutional monarchies, executive
and non-executive heads of state, unicameral and bicameral
legislatures, centralised or decentralised government, federal
and non-federal states, written and unwritten constitutions and
the like. Consequently, it is often assumed that it is impossible
to speak of the term ‘democracy’ as a unified concept commanding
consent about how it is defined. Certainly there is not one model
of democracy, but many diverse forms spread over a spectrum
of possible political systems. At the same time, however, this
does not suggest that democracy is an anything goes form of
government. It is not.

Nothing reflects this better than the political realities

of Arab autocracies over the last several decades. Not only
have these governments violated their own constitutions,
for instance, by rigging elections or gerrymandering election
boundaries. On paper their constitutional arrangements have
been undemocratic. In Syria, for example, the constitution
merges the three branches of government in the presidency and
thus allows for no separation and balance of power. In Egypt,
there has been no equal right to stand for presidential elections.
In Jordan, the king could dissolve parliament at will. And Libya
had no constitution or rule of law to begin with.

Arab states have generally lacked institutional democracy

at three levels:

•• Many governmental institutions have not been accountable

through elections: most obviously, various Arab monarchs
enjoy genuine political power, but are not elected. Further-
more, key institutions, such as militaries, are not held
accountable by elected institutions. Militaries in the Arab
states generally do not report to parliament, nor do they
offer parliament an opportunity to review military budgets
and expenditure.
•• There are elected institutions, parliaments in particular,
but they do not enjoy genuine powers. More often than
not, parliaments in Arab states have been rubberstamping
bodies that follow the lead of the executive branch of
power, rather than the will of the electorate.
•• Electoral accountability has been undermined by electoral
fraud and the absence of genuinely competitive elections.

Democratic state-building is now the central challenge

in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and beyond. This paper strives to make
a contribution to this process by highlighting the essential
elements that define democracy according to international
consensus, and which need to be addressed across the region.

07
 Executive-legislative relations
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS
OF DEMOCRACY While the idea of an independent judiciary is generally accepted,
if not always respected, the relationship between the executive
and legislative branches of power is less uniform. The separation
01. THE SEPARATION AND BALANCE OF POWER or balance of power between these two branches of government
depends on the given political system that is in place.
The terms ‘separation of power’ and ‘balance of power’ mean
that the power of the three branches of democratic government Presidential systems, like the United States, have a clearer
– the legislative, executive and judiciary – should not be separation of legislative-executive powers than other political
concentrated in one branch, but should be distributed such that systems: directly elected presidents do not depend on the
each branch can independently carry out its own respective confidence of the legislature; their term in office is independent
functions. The separation and balance of power rests on two of that of the legislature; and they can appoint and instruct
main principles. First, the competencies of the three branches their cabinet. In semi-presidential systems, like France and
of governmental power must be clearly delimited and defined. Portugal, the government is answerable both to a directly
Second, all branches of government are bound by the rule of elected president and to the legislature.
law (also see section 4 below).
In parliamentary systems, in contrast, the separation of
The idea of a separation and balance of powers emerged power is less marked because the government, including
in an historical context as a protection against tyranny.8 This is the executive, is appointed from a parliamentary majority.
also reflected in contemporary human rights instruments, such Consequently, the executive depends on parliamentary approval:
as the ICCPR, and other sources such as the Latimer House a prime minister requires the support of parliament to govern
Principles.9 The separation of power is most clearly defined and, without this, can be dismissed by a vote of no confidence.10
with respect to the judiciary, which must be independent from
the other branches (see Section 2 below). In contrast, the
separation of power is more complex in terms of the distinction
between the executive and legislative branches of power.

Parliamentary System Presidential System

Electorate Electorate

Parliament / Legislature Legislature / Parliament President / Executive

Government / Executive

8 For example, see: Baron de Montesquieu (1750, first English translation),

The Spirit of the Laws and James Madison, Alexander Hamilton and John Jay (1788),
The Federalist Papers.

9 Officially known as the Principles on the Accountability of and the Relationship

between the three Branches of Government, the Latimer House Principles offer a
detailed description of the separation and balance of power that was endorsed by
the Commonwealth heads of government at a 2003 meeting in Abuja, Nigeria. See:
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/shared_asp_files/uploadedfiles/%7BACC9270A-
E929-4AE0-AEF9-4AAFEC68479C%7D_Latimer%20House%20Booklet%20130504. 10 For an overview, see: M.S. Shugart (2008), “Comparative Executive-Legislative
pdf. All subsequent references in the text to the Latimer House Principles are from Relations” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions (Eds. R. A. W. Rhodes,
this source. Sarah A. Binder, and Bert A. Rockman).

08
 From the perspective of international consensus on the head of state should not promulgate legislation that s/he
essential elements of democracy, then, the key issue is not considers deficient; e.g., anti-constitutional.14
the type of political system or government regime. Presidential
and parliamentary systems are equally acceptable.11 Rather, •• Civilian control of the security sector15
the salient issue is whether elected legislators have sufficient The armed forces, police, intelligence services, and so on
powers. Do elected representatives actually have the competencies enjoy considerable potential de facto power in any state.
they need to exercise power? Are they able to hold government International consensus on democratic governance indicates
accountable? Can parliament fulfil its legislative role? that it is imperative for the security sector to be fully controlled
by civilian authorities with democratic legitimacy. The Human
It is in this sense that the separation or balance of power Rights Commission resolution on democracy and the rule of law,
should be understood within the context of executive-legislative Human Rights Resolution 2005/32, Paragraph 14 (b)(vii), states,
relations. That is, it defines a standard that requires each branch “The military remains accountable to democratically elected
of government to have the capacity to play a meaningful and civilian Government.”16 Emphasis on the particular importance
sufficiently independent role in governance – whatever the of democratic standards in relation to control of the security
political system. sector, namely legitimacy, accountability and transparency,
suggests that parliament has a crucial oversight role.
In Arab states, most legislatures have been dominated
by the executive branch of power, diminishing the relevance
of parliaments and parliamentary elections. The need for The role of the legislature
parliaments to play a meaningful role logically follows from
the right to vote and to stand in elections, which is enshrined A properly functioning and directly elected legislature is
in article 25 of the ICCPR. As paragraph 7 of General Comment key to democratic governance. The rule of law requires that
25 of the UN Human Rights Committee notes, “Where citizens all important legislation be adopted by the legislature. A
participate in the conduct of public affairs through freely pluralistic system of political parties is based on competition
chosen representatives, it is implicit in Article 25 that those over legislative interests. And transparency results from
representatives do in fact exercise governmental power and genuine, widespread and inclusive public consultation on draft
that they are accountable through the electoral process for legislation and debates on public affairs in the legislature.
the exercise of that power.”12 Thus, the legislative branch of government is the lynchpin of
democratic institutions.
The UN Human Rights Committee emphasises that
parliaments with little de jure or de facto power do not satisfy The three main functions of the legislative branch – passing
the requirements of article 25 of the ICCPR, and it has clarified laws, maintaining oversight of the executive and serving as
in various concluding observations on states’ reports this a forum for public debate and deliberation of citizens’ interests –
aspect in three concrete ways.13 have been acknowledged in a number of international documents.17
The essential role of legislatures for democratic governance
•• No over-concentration of power in the executive branch has also been translated into a range of concrete prescriptions
of government about the structure of legislatures and their working modes,
The over-concentration of power in the executive is one of the as follows.
most significant concerns of democratic governance in many
states. Even if there is a direct election for the head of state,
this should not serve as a justification for sidelining a directly
elected legislature.

•• The right of heads of state to refer bills back to 14 There are different models for this type of veto. In most cases, for example,
parliament must reconsider the bill in case of referral; but if they adopt it again,
the legislature the head of state must promulgate it. In a few cases, it is required that parliament
Independent of the political system (presidential or adopts the bill with a higher majority after referral. There are also cases where
the head of state can submit a draft bill to the constitutional court for review
parliamentary), some states give their head of state (usually before promulgation.
presidents) the right to refer legislation back to parliament for
15 The Geneva-based organisation DCAF (Democratic Control of Armed Forces)
reconsideration. The rationale for this approach is that has a range of relevant publications on civilian control of armed forces. For more
information, see: http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Series/Detail?lng=en&id=18411.

16 For Human Rights Resolution 2005/32, see: http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/

E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN_4-RES-2005-32.doc. OSCE participating states have also
committed themselves to a number of standards in this field; for example see:
Points 21-25 of the Concluding Document of Budapest, 6 December 1994; http://
www.osce.org/mc/39554.
11 This has been made explicit in the UN Human Rights Commission's resolution
'Promotion of the Right to Democracy' (1999): 'The Commission on Human Rights... 17 For example, see publications by the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU): http://
affirms... the right of citizens to choose their governmental systems through www.ipu.org/english/home.htm and the National Democratic Institute, in particular
constitutional or other democratic means’. For UN Doc E/CN.4/Res/1999/57, see: Towards the Development of International Standards for Democratic Legislatures
http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/alldocs.aspx?doc_id=4660. (2007); see: http://www.ndi.org/node/13674. Of further interest: the Commonwealth
Parliamentary Association (December 2006), Recommended Benchmarks for Demo-
12 The provisions in article 25 of the ICCPR are elaborated in General Comment cratic Parliaments; see: http://www.cpahq.org/cpahq/Mem/Document%20Library/
25. See: http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/ 0/d0b7f023e8d6d9898025651e004b- Benchmarks_for_Democratic_Legislatures/Recommended%20Benchmarks%20
c0eb. All subsequent references in the text to General Comment 25 are from for%20Democratic%20Legislatures.aspx and the Southern African Development
this source. Community Parliamentary Forum (2001), SADC Parliamentary Forum: norms and
standards for elections in the SADC region; see: http://www.sadc.int/amlibweb/we-
13 For detailed references, see Democracy Reporting International (2007), bquery.html?v1=pbMarc&v4=0&v5=5A&v8=84830&v9=0&v10 =N&v13=4A&v20=4&
Discussing International Standards for Democratic Governance: http://www.democracy- v23=0&v25=PARLIAMENTARY%20and%20%20STANDARDS&v27=6989&v29=5A&v3
reporting.org/files/standards_go.pdf. 5={]0[}{]0[}{]0[}{]0[}&v40=84828&v46=84830.

09
The set up and rules of the legislature activities and have the right to determine how much time
is required to draft, review or amend proposed legislation.
Legislatures have either one chamber or house (unicameral) or In many Arab states, the autonomy of legislatures has
two (bi-cameral). There are two important principles for been greatly circumscribed and their role has been one
bi-cameral legislatures: of rubberstamping.

•• All seats in at least one legislative chamber or house

should be freely contested Legislative power
To ensure that the democratic accountability of a legislature is
not diluted, at least one chamber should be entirely composed The power of legislation is the most essential of a legislature’s
of representatives freely chosen in direct elections.18 In prerogatives and it should have the competence and authority
many Arab states, however, the head of state has the power to undertake this role. Although the executive branch of
to appoint a number of members of parliament, often to both government has the right to adopt legally binding acts (e.g.,
houses or chambers, thus undermining the principle of freely regulations, decrees), it must be entitled to do so by the
elected representatives. constitution or through law adopted by the legislature. Transfer
of legislative power to the executive may be permissible for
•• A second legislative chamber or house should either be brief periods, for example when the legislature is not in session.
accountable through elections, or not be able to impact However this transfer of power should only be very limited
significantly on the powers of the directly-elected chamber in scope and have strictly defined conditions. As the Venice
or house Commission asserts, a general shift of competencies from the
The question of democratic legitimacy becomes important legislative to the executive ‘is not acceptable in a democratic
in the context of a bicameral legislature. When a non-elected constitutional state’.21
upper chamber or house (e.g., based on hereditary principles or
appointed by the head of state) has powers that are similar to
those of a directly elected lower chamber or house, the principle 02. INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
of democratic accountability is weakened.19
Article 14 of the ICCPR states that ‘in the determinations of
In federal systems, such as the US, the Russian Federation any criminal charges against him [or her], or of his rights and
and Germany, the upper chamber or house represents the obligations in a suit of law, everybody shall be entitled to a fair
interests of the constituent parts of the federation (i.e., the and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial
50 states in the US; ‘Subjects of the Federation’ in the Russian court established by law’. There is, then, a ‘hard’ international
Federation; Länder in Germany). This should not be cause for obligation to establish an independent judiciary. Moreover, the
concern so long as the representatives of federal states have UN Human Rights Committee has made it clear that the ICCPR
their own democratic mandates (e.g., based on direct or indirect stipulates judicial independence beyond the realm of criminal
elections),20 or if the powers of these upper chambers or houses law such that it also comes to bear on administrative law and
are limited. The Council of Europe’s Venice Commission has the organisation of the state.
drawn attention to the fact that a second chamber or house
should follow a constitutional logic, in other words its mandate In particular, this pertains to both the legal and de facto
and role should have an objective justification. separation of the judicial and executive branches of government.
That is, the courts can play a vital role in ensuring government
accountability by adjudicating conflicts, for instance, in the
Legislative autonomy areas of administrative or constitutional law. The independence
of the judiciary can also be relevant within the context of
Given that legislatures represent the people, they must be election-related disputes.
free to autonomously organise their work. This is generally
understood in two ways. First, the legislature should be The principles and practices of an independent judiciary
free to adopt and amend its own rules of procedure on an are delineated in a number of international documents. For
independent basis. Second, the legislature should be free example, the UN’s Basic Principles on the Independence of the
to schedule its sessions, set the pace for organising its own Judiciary provides operational guidance on how to secure the
independence and tenure of judges, addressing issues like
recruitment, remuneration, promotion, immunity and removal.22

18 This is a clear standard, for example, in the OSCE's Copenhagen 1990

commitments. See: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304. All subsequent
references in the text to the Copenhagen 1990 commitments are from this source.

19 The discussion in the United Kingdom on reforming the House of Lords offers
a relevant example. While the House of Lords can return draft laws to the House of
Commons, the House of Lords accepts the possibility that it can be over-ruled by the
House of Commons. As such, there is an additional level of scrutiny and consultation,
but this does not veto or over-rule the directly elected chamber (i.e., the House
of Commons).
21 Point 21, Venice Commission Opinion of the draft amendments to the
20 In the US, senators are directly elected by each state. In Germany, Länder constitution of Kyrgyzstan, 13-14 December 2002.
(federal states) governments are represented in the upper house of parliament
(Bundesrat), which reflects the fact that the federal states in Germany are based on 22 Endorsed by UN General Assembly resolutions 40/32 (29 November 1985) and
parliamentary systems. 40/146 (3 December 1985). See: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/indjudiciary.htm.

10
03. A PLURALIST SYSTEM OF POLITICAL PARTIES In terms of fostering a system defined by political pluralism,
AND ORGANISATIONS states are bound by a number of concrete obligations, including:

•• A legal framework for the operation of political parties

Political parties should be in place
The UN Human Rights Committee indicates that the absence of
Arguably, the need for a pluralistic system of political parties regulation or legislation governing the creation and registration
follows logically from the protection of freedom of association, of political parties ‘runs counter to the provisions of Article 22
including participation in political parties, as this is enshrined of the ICCPR, as it may adversely affect the rights of citizens to
in article 22 of the ICCPR (also see section 7 below). While a participate in the conduct of public affairs through freely chosen
controversial issue some decades ago, there is now international representatives’.28
consensus that the existence of a one-party state or the
prohibition of political parties is not consistent with freedom of •• Restrictions to the right to register a political party should
association and related freedoms.23 As paragraph 17 of General be narrowly constructed
Comment 25 states, “The right of persons to stand for elections In the context of international human rights instruments, it is
should not be limited unreasonably by requiring candidates to a generally recognised rule to adopt a narrow interpretation of
be members of parties or specific parties.” And paragraph 26 of restrictions. Article 22(2) of the ICCPR takes a similar approach
General Comment 25 states, “Political parties and membership to interpreting possible limitations to the right to freedom
in parties plays a significant role in the conduct of public of association, stating that if restrictions are necessary in a
affairs and the election process.” democratic state, these should be ‘in the interests of national
security, or public safety, public order (ordre public), the
A pluralistic system of political parties implies that states protection of public health or morals or the protection of the
should not hinder the development of political parties, but rights and freedoms of others’.29
instead have an obligation to favour political pluralism based
on parties. Pluralism indicates that a party system should not •• Political party membership should not be mandatory
only consist of a multitude of parties, but it should also include While international consensus is supportive of the role of
parties that represent genuinely alternative policy choices. political parties, at the same time it is clear that membership
Political systems with a mere façade of a multi-party system, in a political party should not be made a pre-condition for
which disguises a pattern of state-sponsored domination of one participating in the political life of a country. This bears on
or several parties, fall short of this core element of democracy. such issues as eligibility criteria for the right to vote and to
stand for elections; e.g., see General Comment 25, particularly
Effective opposition both inside and outside parliament is paragraphs 10, 17 and 26. Although list-based proportional
a key condition of a functioning democracy, providing an element representation election systems tend to favour political parties,
of checks and balances. The rights of opposition or ‘electoral they should also accommodate lists of independent candidates.
minorities’ in parliament should be codified in parliamentary rules
of procedures and, partly, in constitutions. In many democracies
such rights include a guarantee of participation, rights to supervise Civil society organisations
and scrutinise government, the right to delay or, in some cases,
to block majority decision24 and sometimes the right to demand Civil society organisations (CSOs) serve to organise and mediate
the constitutional review of laws.25 In the European context, political, economic, social and other interests vis-à-vis the
such opposition rights have been recognised at the international state and government. Civil society is a broad concept, which
level.26 The Inter-Parliamentary Union adopted similar standards is reflected in the wide and varied range of organisations and
at working level.27 groups that constitute it. For example, civil society organisations
may include trade unions, professional associations, religion-
based groups, women’s associations and networks, sports clubs,
business associations and chambers of commerce, philanthropic
organisations, human rights NGOs and other types of advocacy
and watchdog organisations, student associations, and so
on. They should enjoy freedom of association as enshrined in
article 22 of the ICCPR.

23 During the Cold War, for example, it was a matter of controversy as to whether
freedom of association could be exercised in one-party systems.

24 An example would be the need for ‘super-majorities’ for constitutional

amendments.

25 For an in-depth study on these issues, see the Venice Commission’s “Report 28 Point 25, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee,
on the Role of the Opposition in a Democratic Parliament” (2010). See: http://www. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, UN Doc. CCPR/CO/72/PRK (2001). See: http://
venice.coe.int/docs/2010/CDL-AD(2010)025-e.pdf. www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/%28Symbol%29/CCPR.CO.72.PRK.En?OpenDocument.

26 Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1601 (2008), Procedural 29 For further elaboration of international standards related to political par-
guidelines on the rights and responsibilities of the opposition in a democratic parlia- ties, also see: Venice Commission (2004), "Guidelines and Explanatory Report on
ment, see: http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta08/ Legislation on Political Parties: Some Specific Issues", Study no. 247/2004; http://
eres1601.htm. www.venice.coe.int/docs/2004/CDL-AD%282004%29007-e.pdf; and OSCE ODIHR
(2003), Existing Commitments for Democratic Elections in OSCE Participating States,
27 See: http://www.ipu.org/dem-e/opposition.pdf. especially page 64; http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/13957.

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International consensus about the value of civil society for State of emergency
democracy, in particular as this bears on fostering both political
and social pluralism, is reflected in numerous international The rule of law is organically linked to the other essential
instruments. For example, paragraph 8 of the 2004 UN General elements of democracy, including the separation and balance
Assembly resolution invites (among others) ‘non-governmental of power, especially an independent judiciary, and transparency
organizations to engage actively in work at the local, national, and accountability. The convergence of these elements, as
sub-regional and regional levels for the constant promotion well as the necessity to uphold and preserve them, can be made
and consolidation of democracy’. Paragraph 12 of the resolution no clearer than in a state of emergency. In such situations, the
also encourages ‘non-governmental organizations to initiate rule of law is of paramount importance. This issue is highly
networks and partnerships with a view to assisting the relevant in the Arab region, where many states imposed a state
Governments and civil society in their respective regions in of emergency for decades (e.g., Syria, Egypt and Algeria).
disseminating knowledge and information about the role of During a state of emergency, democratic governance tends
democratic institutions and mechanisms in meeting the to be diminished. The executive branch of government is
political, economic, social and cultural challenges in their temporarily empowered at the expense of the legislative branch,
respective societies’. and possibly the judiciary. Human rights, including political
rights, may also be suspended or severely restricted. While
human rights instruments acknowledge that declaring a state
04. THE RULE OF LAW of emergency may be necessary, at the same time they recognise
that this does not give a free hand to the executive branch of
There are few definitions of the rule of law in the context of power to adopt whatever measures it deems necessary.
international instruments related to ensuring democratic
practices within states.30 Nonetheless, its core meaning is clear. International and regional instruments, notably the ICCPR,
That is, the rule of law commits all public authorities to comply the Arab Charter on Human Rights, along with the European
with independently and impartially administered legal and Convention of Human Rights and OSCE commitments, provide a
justice systems, such that states make continuous efforts number of detailed procedural and substantive guidelines on how
‘[g]uaranteeing that no individual or public or private institution to deal with such situations.32 As follows, a state of emergency:
is above the law’.31
•• must be declared by a constitutionally lawful body; usually
Sometimes the rule of law is narrowly construed as an this is the head of state or government
efficient and effective system of justice and law enforcement. •• should be declared officially, publicly and within the law
Beyond that, it is also interpreted to imply certain standards for •• should be approved by the legislature, which should
the legislative process, namely that this should be an open and continue to function
transparent process that reflects the will of the people and the •• should be temporally and geographically limited
outcomes of which are public and freely available. Increasingly, •• should be managed transparently
the rule of law is seen through a broader conceptual framework •• should require that legal guarantees remain in place and
that links it to human rights and democratic order; e.g., UN derogations from fundamental rights should be as limited
Human Rights Commission resolution on democracy and the as possible33
rule of law (resolution 2005/32), the OSCE Copenhagen 1990
commitments and the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. Although protection in ‘exceptional situations of emergency
which threaten the life of a nation’ (article 4, paragraph 1, Arab
As an inherent element of democracy, the rule of law Charter on Human Rights) is the primary intent for declaring
therefore indicates that the will of the majority has clear and a state of emergency, such actions by many Arab states have
certain limits, not only in the form of universal human rights, played and still play a major role in curtailing human rights. For
but also in relation to the constitutional framework of a state. example, Egypt has been ruled under a state of emergency
Consequently, for example, public referenda should not be since1967 (except for an 18-month break in 1980–1981), which
used to overrule constitutional provisions. extended police powers, suspended constitutional rights,
legalised censor-ship and sharply curtailed political activity
by civil society organisations, including formal bans on street
demonstrations and political organisations without government
approval. While the state of emergency was lifted in the context
of Mubarak’s overthrow, controversially it was re-introduced in
September 2011.

30 See paragraph 14(b) of the UN Human Rights Commission’s resolution

(Resolution 2005/32, 19 April 2005) on ‘democracy and the rule of law’: http://ap.
ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN_4-RES-2005-32.doc. However, the
clearest explanation of rule of law can be found in OSCE commitments, notably
Point 2 of Copenhagen 1990, which asserts participating states ‘consider that
the rule of law does not mean merely a formal legality which assures regularity 32 For a more detailed elaboration of these restrictions to declaring a state of
and consistency in the achievement and enforcement of democratic order, but emergency, see DRI’s Discussing International Standards for Democratic Governance
justice based on the recognition and full acceptance of the supreme value of the (2007) and Democracy Revisited (2009), as referenced in footnote 2 above.
human personality and guaranteed by institutions providing a framework for its
fullest expression’. 33 Where the ICCPR references seven specific protections that cannot be dero-
gated in a state of emergency, the Arab Charter on Human Rights identifies twice as
31 See point 5.3 Copenhagen 1990. many, with 14 specific protections that cannot be violated in any circumstance.

12
05. ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY ministers, schedule sessions and hearings, adopt resolutions
and so on.
As stated in both the 2005 UN General Assembly resolution
and the 2003 declaration by the UN Human Rights Commission, The right of sanction depends on the political system
‘transparency and accountability in public administration’ are that is in place. In presidential systems, the electorate has the
essential to democracy. Without exception, this applies to all primary right of sanction – by voting a president out of office
those with governmental and public authority (whether elected when the next scheduled election is held, while the legislature
or not) and to all bodies of government and public authority. usually has only the narrowly-defined right of impeachment.
Elaborating this, the Inter-Parliamentary Union’s Universal In contrast, legislatures in parliamentary systems can punish
Declaration on Democracy explains, “Accountability [and the government by passing a no-confidence vote, forcing the
transparency] entails a public right of access to information about resignation of the government.
the activities of government, the right to petition government
and to seek redress through impartial administrative and •• The executive is accountable to the judiciary
judicial mechanisms.”34 As with any other public position of power and authority, the
executive is bound by the rule of law. Consequently, actions
undertaken by the executive can be reviewed by the judiciary;
Accountability e.g., if aggrieved citizens appeal to administrative courts. In
some systems the legislature, or parts of the legislature (e.g.,
Accountability thus implies both answerability (i.e., the a parliamentary fraction), can appeal to a court (e.g., a supreme
obligation to provide information and explanation; the right to court or constitutional court) if it deems that the executive
ask questions and expect reasonable answers) and enforcement overstepped its powers.
(i.e., a capacity to hold those who are responsible to account
for their actions, including punishment).35 Public authority It is important to note that there is no minimum standard
can be held accountable through elections and legislative about the degree to which the legislature is accountable to the
bodies, as well as through the courts or other independent judiciary for all of its actions. While in most states, constitutional
oversight institutions. As an essential element of democracy, courts have the right to review whether legislation is in line with
accountability is therefore closely linked to the principles the constitution, this is not the case in every democratic state.
related to elections and the rule of law.

In addition to the public accountability of government, Transparency

another crucial dimension of accountability is that pertaining
between public institutions.36 In this case, the separation and Without some level of transparency, there can be no account-
balance of power is a necessary condition for accountability ability. The concept of transparency is underpinned by freedom
to function properly. The question is, then, who is accountable of expression, which is likewise closely related to freedom of
to whom? information. As article 19(2) of the ICCPR states everyone ‘shall
have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
While the exact answer depends on each individual political freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of
system, international consensus points to some minimum all kinds’. Although the precise limits of the right to information
requirements, both of which focus on the executive branch: remain controversial, an accepted minimum standard relies
on the assumption that a state should inform the public on an
•• The executive is accountable to the legislature equal basis.
This means the legislature has the right to ask questions that
the executive must answer, which is a principle that applies The UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression
equally across political systems. This translates into concrete provides further guidance that reflects a degree of international
rights that a legislature has: for example, to summon government consensus, emphasising that:

…everyone has the right to seek, receive and impart

information and that this imposes a positive obligation on
States to ensure access to information, particularly with
regard to information held by Government in all types of
34 See: http://www.ipu.org/cnl-e/161-dem.htm. For additional principles dealing
with the issue of accountability, also see the Latimer House Principles. storage and retrieval systems – including film, microfiche,
electronic capacities, video and photographs – subject only
35 Enforcement implies that the body held accountable may be punished
if it does not respond or if answers are considered unsatisfactory. Punishment to such restrictions as referred to in article 19, paragraph 3,
can have many meanings: a human rights institution can usually only ‘punish’ of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.37
violators by public reporting or referring the case to appropriate state institutions.
In the realm of vertical accountability, media usually have the political power
to ask questions and expect answers and they can punish by reporting facts or
publishing negative opinions. The electorate can also ask questions (e.g., lodge
petitions) and can punish the executive branch by voting a government and/or
president out of office. Where individuals feel their rights have been violated, they
can appeal to the judiciary against actions by the state.

36 Whereas the public accountability of government relates to ‘vertical’ 37 See: UN Special Rapporteur on the protection and promotion of the right to
relationships within a democratic system (i.e., the relationships between citizens freedom of opinion and expression, 1999 Report to the Human Rights Commission,
and state institutions), this dimension of accountability refers to ‘horizontal’ E/CN.4/1996/64; http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/%28Symbol%
relationships (i.e., the relationships between the three branches of government). In 29/E.CN.4.1999.64.En?Opendocument. This view was also welcomed by the
line with international consensus, both aspects of accountability are considered UN Human Rights Commission, as is reflected in Resolution 1999/36, paragraph 2;
to be equally important elements of democracy. ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/resolutions/E-CN_4-RES-1999-36.doc.

13
 A study on freedom of information notes, “It is perhaps as or ombudsman offices), anti-corruption bodies, state auditing
an underpinning of democracy that freedom of information is offices, civil service commissions or judicial commissions.
most important. Information held by public authorities is not
acquired for the benefit of officials or politicians but for the Increasingly, the management of elections is also entrusted
public as a whole. Unless there are good reasons for withholding to bodies that are not part of the executive. These can be
such information, everyone should be able to access it.”38 multi-party election commissions, independent expert
election commissions or a mix of both. Paragraph 20 of General
Indeed, without sufficient information and wide public Comment 25 underlines the preference for independent election
access to official documents, there is no basis for holding management bodies: “An independent electoral authority should
state authorities accountable. The right to vote, for example, be established to supervise the electoral process and to ensure
becomes less meaningful in the absence of sufficient public that it is conduced fairly, impartially and in accordance with
information that allows voters to judge and evaluate government established laws which are compatible with the Covenant [i.e.,
performance. The capacity to make informed judgments is the ICCPR].”
likewise impaired by lack of access to or availability of reliable
statistical information concerning matters of public interest;
e.g., census, population and demographic data; economic 06. FREEDOM OF THE MEDIA
and labour force statistics; environmental data; government
expenditures and so on. Media freedom is vitally important for democracy. 41 It contributes
to creating plural, open societies and accountable, transparent
Transparency is often mentioned in documents related systems of government, as well as safeguards human rights
to good governance, particularly as this bears on the issues of and fundamental freedoms. In particular, a free media sector plays
corruption and actions by the executive. However, transparency an essential role in guaranteeing the freedom of expression
is also a key principle for the legislature. Specifically, new and freedom of information, both of which are necessary for
legislation and amendments to existing legislation should facilitating the effective participation of citizens in democratic
be adopted only at the end of a public procedure, with processes. International consensus on media freedom is
these regulations published in and for the public interest as reflected in article 19 of the ICCPR, which is spelled out in
part of a public record, which should be the condition for paragraph 40 of General Comment 34 of the UN Human Rights
their application. Committee:

Along similar lines, the Commonwealth Latimer House The Committee reiterates its observation in General
principles provide detailed guidance related to the transparency Comment 10 that ‘because of the development of modern
of legislative processes. These principles stress the need for mass media, effective measures are necessary to prevent
public exposure of draft legislation, consultation, time lines such control of the media as would interfere with the right
between introducing legislation and debate in parliament, the of everyone to freedom of expression’. The State should not
establishment of select committees to allow detailed exami- have monopoly control over the media and should promote
nation of major legislation and so on.39 plurality of the media.42

Freedom of expression therefore includes an obligation

Independent institutions on states to prevent excessive media concentration and
control. As special representatives on media freedom from four
Independent institutions play an important role in relation to international organisations note, “In recognition of the particular
governmental accountability and transparency. In particular, importance of media diversity to democracy, special measures,
they provide oversight for specific areas of executive and including anti-monopoly rules, should be put in place to prevent
judiciary branch activity, or they have responsibility for making undue concentration of media or cross-media ownership.”43
policy recommendations to the government, which requires This is especially important with respect to fostering independent
a degree of distance from the parliamentary majorities of the media, which should not be discriminated against in terms of
day (such as judicial commissions, civil service commissions access to information, material and facilities.
or media boards). As such, they serve as a guarantor for the
rule of law upon which any democracy is founded. Typical Article 13(3) of the American Convention on Human Rights
independent institutions or bodies include national human specifies the protection of media freedom in greater detail
rights institutions40 (e.g., national human rights commissions

41 Although article 19(3) of the ICCPR permits restrictions to media freedom,

38 Toby Mendel, “Freedom of Information as an Internationally Protected as with other aspects of this covenant, these must be narrowly construed.
Human Right”, briefing paper for Article 19, page 1. See: http://www.article19.org/
data/files/pdfs/publications/foi-as-an-international-right.pdf. 42 General Comment 34 on article 19 of the ICCPR from July 2011 replaces the
earlier General Comment 10 (adopted in July 1983). See: http://www2.ohchr.org /
39 For in-depth analysis of legislative reform processes in the context of english/bodies/hrc/docs/GC34.pdf.
electoral law, see DRI’s Electoral Law Reform Processes: Key Elements for Success,
briefing paper 12 (May 2011); http://www.democracy-reporting.org/files/dri_brief- 43 Joint Declaration on Diversity in Broadcasting, 12 December 2007, agreed
ing_paper_12_-_good_practices.pdf. by: UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Opinion, The OSCE
Representative on Freedom of the Media, the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom
40 The UN's 'Paris Principles' provide detailed guidance on the composition of Expression, and the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression and Access to
and guarantees for the independence of such institutions. See: http://www2.ohchr. Information of the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights. See: http://
org/english/law/parisprinciples.htm. www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/igo-documents/mandates-broadcasting.pdf.

14
in its far-reaching provision in favour of media pluralism: “The Recognised in the 2005 General Assembly resolution,
right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods these rights of participation are also enshrined in article 25
or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls of the ICCPR and in article 21 of the Universal Declaration
over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment of Human Rights. Article 25 of the ICCPR further stipulates
used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means that these rights should be granted to citizens ‘without any
tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas of the distinctions mentioned in article 2’, which prohibits
and opinions.”44 discrimination of ‘any kind such as race, color, sex, language
and political or other opinion’.48 In Arab countries, often only
Muslims are eligible to run for presidential office– a violation on
07. RESPECT FOR POLITICAL RIGHTS religious grounds. Participation on a non-discriminatory basis
is reinforced by a range of other specific conventions that
prohibit discrimination, as well as call for specific measures to
Freedoms of assembly and expression overcome existing inequalities.

The freedom of political debate, along with freedom of For example, the Convention on the Elimination of all
association and assembly, are at the centre of the concept of Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) calls on
democracy. These essential political rights are well defined states to take measures to eliminate discrimination against
in legally binding treaties, such as the ICCPR. They are also women in the political, public and private spheres. Article 4 of
identified in a number of declarations about democracy by the CEDAW states, “Adoption by States Parties of temporary special
UN General Assembly. For example, article 19 of the Universal measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality between
Declaration of Human Rights defines freedom of expression men and women shall not be considered discrimination as
as including ‘freedom to hold opinions without interference defined in the present Convention.”49 As such, CEDAW allows
and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through prescribing quotas for female candidates in elections.
any media and regardless of frontiers’. Paragraph 1 of the 2004
UN General Assembly resolution declares that ‘the essential Other conventions and commitments in favour of specific
elements of democracy include… fundamental freedoms, inter groups also reiterate the need for participation without
alia, freedom of association and peaceful assembly and of discrimination; e.g., the UN Convention on the Elimination of
expression and opinion’. All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); the UN Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CPRD); and the
The right to freedom of expression has wide-ranging General Assembly resolution on the Rights of Persons belonging
implications on the access of opposition parties to state to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities.50
controlled media, for election campaign regulations, media
legislation and citizens’ rights to access to information. Freedom
of assembly protects ‘intentional, temporary gatherings of
several persons for a specific purpose’ and has a ‘clear democratic
function in the process of forming, expressing and implementing
political opinions’.45 Freedom of association is ‘indispensable
for a democracy, because political interests can be effectively
championed only in community with others (as a political party,
professional interest group, organisation or other association
for pursuing particular public interests)’.46

Participation in public affairs, the right to stand and

vote in elections

A core element of democracy is the right to participate in the

conduct of public affairs, and to stand for and vote in elections.47
Participation in public affairs can take place directly, for instance,
by referenda. It can be indirect; e.g., by voting for elected
representatives. More generally, participation can refer to being
politically active.

44 See: http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas3con.htm.
48 Article 25 of the ICCPR further elaborates these rights by asserting that
45 Manfred Nowak (2005), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: states must also provide their citizens with the ‘opportunity’ to participate. This
CCPR Commentary, second edition, pages 482 and 481 (respectively). means, for example, that states should adopt positive measures to allow detainees
or physically disabled people to vote.
46 Ibid, 496.
49 See: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm.
47 Standards for good practice in democratic elections, including equality,
secrecy, universal suffrage and periodic elections, have been well defined; e.g., 50 Respectively, see: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm; http://www.
see: General Comment 25 of the ICCPR. The Carter Center also offers a detailed, un.org/disabilities/convention/conventionfull.shtml; and http://www2.ohchr.org/
searchable guide on democratic election standards, see: http://www.cartercenter. english/law/minorities.htm.
org/peace/democracy/des.html.

15
Democracy Reporting International is an independent, non-
partisan and not-for-profit organisation which operates on
the conviction that democratic, participatory governance is a
human right and that governments need to be accountable
to their citizens.

Through careful assessment of the institutional aspects of the

democratic process such as elections, the role of parliaments
and constitutional arrangements Democracy Reporting
International seeks to provide citizens, legislators, the media,
and the international community with specialist analysis.
Democracy Reporting International also offers policy advice
and recommendations on how improvements can be made in
line with international standards and engages political actors
to advocate for these reforms.

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