UMak BarOps Pre-Week Notes - Civil Law
UMak BarOps Pre-Week Notes - Civil Law
UMak BarOps Pre-Week Notes - Civil Law
The Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the This is a conflict of law principle that comes
Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign into play when there are substantive issues
judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises relating to a contract that is celebrated
personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and elsewhere than the place of citizenship of its
legal capacity of such citizen. parties.
(Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013; Ambrose v. Seque-Amrbose, G.R. No. 206761, June 23, 2021)
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8. AAA and BBB got married in Mandaue City on June 5, 2000. Sometime in November 2000, BBB left
without any information of where he was going. She inquired from their friends if they saw or heard
BBB, but they were also clueless. Based on AAA’s knowledge, BBB had a cyst in his right jaw which
was getting bigger. AAA sought to declare BBB presumptively dead considering that more than 6
years have lapsed without any information on his whereabouts. Is BBB presumptively dead which
would allow AAA to remarry?
No. Jurisprudence sets out four requisites for a grant of a petition for declaration of presumptive death under
Article 41 of the Family Code: first, the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid
down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; second, the present spouse wishes to remarry;third, the present spouse
has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and fourth, the present spouse files for a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee. The well-founded belief in the
absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and
reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes
that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. AAA in this case only successfully
established that the whereabouts of BBB are indeterminable. As circumstances that definitely suggest BBB's
death remain to be seen, the Court cannot consider AAA's civil status as that of a widow. (Republic vs.
Ponce-Pilapil, G.R. No. 219185, November 25, 2020, J. Hernando)
10. Is marriage entered into for the sole purpose of acquiring foreign citizenship in exchange of sum of
money void on the ground of lack of consent?
No. There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered for purposes other than what the Constitution
or law declares, such as acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites are present, and it is not void or voidable under ground provided by law, it shall be declared valid.
(Republic v. Albios, G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013)
11. Distinguish the effect between absence of any of the essential or formal requisites and
defect/irregularity in any of the essential requisites of marriage.
Absence Irregularity
The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall An irregularity in the formal requisites will
render the marriage void ab initio, except those solemnized by not affect the validity of the marriage but
any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless the party responsible for the irregularity
such marriages were contracted with either or both parties shall, however, be civilly, criminally, and
believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the administratively liable.
legal authority to do so.
(Articles 4 & 35 (2) Family Code)
12. Does it matter who among the parties obtained the divorce decree as regards to the capacity to
remarry?
No. As long as a valid divorce decree is obtained capacitating an alien to remarry, it is immaterial who
between the parties obtained divorce decree. (Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 220129, April 24, 2018)
13. After obtaining a foreign divorce decree, is the Filipino spouse capacitated to remarry?
When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse
and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in a
likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the right to
remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the
marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses
change as both of them are freed from the marital bond. (Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 220129, April 24, 2018)
14. AAA filed before the trial court a Petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce of his marriage
with BBB. She submitted before the court a photocopy of the English translation of the Civil Code of
Japan, published by Eibun-Horei-Sha, Inc. and stamped with "LIBRARY, Japan Information and
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Culture Center, Embassy of Japan, 2627 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City". Is the document sufficient
proof of the law of Japan on divorce?
No. The Court noted that the translations by Eibun-Horei-Sha, Inc. (the publisher of the document submitted
by AAA) are not advertised as a source of official translations of Japanese laws. Not being an official
translation, the document submitted by AAA does not prove the existing law on divorce in Japan.
Unfortunately, without such evidence, there is nothing on record to establish that the divorce between AAA
and BBB was validly obtained and is consistent with the Japanese law on divorce. (Republic vs. Kikuchi, G.R. No.
243646, June 22, 2022, J. Hernando)
15. What are the grounds for the declaration of nullity of marriage?
1. Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;
2. Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were
contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal
authority to do so;
3. Those solemnized without license, except those marriages that are exempt from the license requirement;
4. Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41;
5. Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other;
6. Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53
7. Those subsequent marriages that are void because the judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the
previous marriage, the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the
children’s presumptive legitimes were not recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of
property (Article 35(6), in relation to Article 52 and 53, Family Code)
8. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
9. Incestuous Marriages:
a. Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
b. Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
10. Marriages declared void for reasons of public policy:
a. Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
b. Between step-parents and step-children;
c. Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
d. Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
e. Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and the adopted child
f. Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the adopter;
g. Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the adopter
h. Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
i. Between parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed that other person's spouse, or
his or her own spouse. (Article 35, 36, 37, 38, Family Code)
16. Does the action for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage prescribe?
No. The action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity does not prescribe, except in case of
marriages celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code and falling under Article 36. In such cases, the
action shall prescribe in ten (10) years after the effectivity of the Code (Article 39, Family Code)
17. Who may file a petition for declaration of nullity of a subsequent bigamous marriage?
A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife" of
the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the
beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The
husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. (Fujiki v. Marinay,
G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013)
19. AAA was charged with bigamy after he had an affair and married a certain BBB during the course of
his marriage with CCC. AAA, in his defense, contends that he cannot be held criminally liable for
bigamy because both his marriages are null and void: lack of a valid marriage license with CCC and
lack of a marriage ceremony with BBB. May AAA raise the defense that his marriages in cases for
bigamy?
Yes, AAA may raise as a defense the nullity of both his marriages in bigamy. To summarize and for future
guidance, the parties are not required to obtain a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of a void ab initio first
and subsequent marriages in order to raise it as a defense in a bigamy case. The same rule now applies to all
marriages celebrated under the Civil Code and the Family Code. Article 40 of the Family Code, which states
that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely
of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void, did not amend Article 349 of the RPC, and thus,
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did not deny the accused the right to collaterally attack the validity of a void ab initio marriage in the criminal
prosecution for bigamy. (Pulido vs. People, G.R. No. 220149. July 27, 2021.)
20. Does the requirement of a judicial decree of nullity of a void marriage before contracting a
subsequent one apply to marriages celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code?
No. The requirement does not apply to marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family
Code, particularly if the children of the parties were born while the Civil Code was in force. (Castillo v. De
Leon-Castillo, G.R. No. 189607, April 18, 2016 citing Apiag v. Cantero and Ty v. Court of Appeals)
22. Discuss the requisite of “incurability” with regard to the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
The psychological incapacity contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code is incurable, not in the medical,
but in the legal sense; hence, the third Molina guideline is amended accordingly. This means that the
incapacity is so enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation where
the couple's respective personality structures are so incompatible and antagonistic that the only result of the
union would be the inevitable and irreparable breakdown of the marriage. An undeniable pattern of such
persisting failure [to be a present, loving, faithful, respectful, and supportive spouse] must be established so
as to demonstrate that there is indeed a psychological anomaly or incongruity in the spouse relative to the
other." (Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No, 196359, May 11, 2021)
23. Discuss the requisite of “juridical antecedence” with regard to the declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto. (Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No, 196359, May 11, 2021 citing Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina, G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997)
24. Discuss the requisite of “gravity” with regard to the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional
outbursts"cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability,
not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. (Tan-Andal v.
Andal, G.R. No, 196359, May 11, 2021 citing Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997)
25. AAA sought to nullify her marriage with BBB on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since it was
clinically found that: (1) BBB is a sexual deviant/sadist type, as manifested by his preference for anal
and oral sex; and (2) that said personality disorder of BBB is characterized by seriousness or gravity
and incurability, AAA alleged that BBB is not capable of adhering to a normal sex life. AAA asserts
that one who unconsciously inflicts sexual violence on his wife, such as BBB, is incapable of
complying with the essential marital obligations of observing mutual love and respect. Do these
irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities of the spouses amount to psychological
incapacity as ground for nullity of marriage?
No. The mere showing of 'irreconcilable differences' and 'conflicting personalities' [as in the present case,] in
no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates downright incapacity
or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. It is not enough to prove that a
spouse failed to meet his responsibilities and duties as a married person; incapacity must be so enduring and
persistent with respect to a specific partner, that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and
irreparable breakdown of the marriage. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and
abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.
It must be stressed that an unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. (Carullo-Padua vs. Padua, G.R.
No. 208258. April 27, 2022, J. Hernando)
26. Under present jurisprudence, is psychological incapacity a mental incapacity that must be proven by
expert opinion?
No. Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that must be proven
through expert opinion. There must be proof, however, of the durable or enduring aspects of a person's
personality, called "personality structure," which manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that
undermines the family. The spouse's personality structure must make it impossible for him or her to
understand and to comply with his or her essential marital obligations. Proof of these aspects of personality
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need not be given by an expert. Ordinary witnesses who have been present in the life of the spouses before
the latter contracted marriage may testify on behaviors that they have consistently observed from the
supposedly incapacitated spouse. From there, the judge will decide if these behaviors are indicative of a true
and serious incapacity to assume the essential marital obligations. (Carullo-Padua vs. Padua, G.R. No. 208258. April 27,
2022, J. Hernando)
27. What is the quantum of evidence needed in nullity cases based on psychological incapacity
To prove psychological incapacity, a party must present clear and convincing evidence of its existence.
(Tan-Andal v. Andal, G.R. No, 196359, May 11, 2021)
29. AAA sought to nullify her marriage with BBB on the ground of psychological incapacity. The following
are AAA’s testimony: (1) she was the breadwinner of BBB's family, while BBB never worked and only
spent his time in gambling and cockfighting; (2) their relationship turned sour after she got pregnant;
(3) BBB's parents were no longer fond of her for being an additional mouth to feed; (4) that BBB
asked her to leave with her mother and child after being instructed by his parents; and (5) even after
their forced departure, BBB did not bother to go after her and their child. Are these allegations
sufficient to prove that BBB is psychologically incapable to comply with the essential marital
obligations?
No. These allegations do not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity. Irreconcilable differences, sexual
infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves prove the
existence of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The totality of evidence must still
be sufficient to prove that the incapacity was grave, incurable, and existing prior to the time of the marriage.
(Pugoy-Solidum vs. Republic, G.R. No. 213954. April 20, 2022, J. Hernando)
30. AAA and BBB started dating when they were working in Taiwan. After months of courtship, AAA got
pregnant. After the termination of their employment contract, they returned to the Philippines and got
married. AAA later on became the breadwinner of the family and they would often argue about BBB’s
unemployment. In 2000, BBB worked as an entertainer in Japan and in his passport, he indicated
“single” as his status. BBB proceeded with his work but in 2002, he failed to send money to AAA and
lost communication with each other. Is BBB psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligation?
No. The Tan-Andal case retains the fifth Molina guideline that requires that "such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage", but further
provides that there must be a clear and convincing evidence showing that such incapacity is caused by a
genuinely serious psychic cause. The Court, in the Molina case, further elaborates: Thus, 'mild
characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts' cannot be accepted as root
causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. For failure to show by clear and convincing
evidence that BBB is incapable of fulfilling his essential marital obligations due to a genuinely serious and
incurable psychic cause which exists prior to or at the time of celebration of the marriage of the parties, the
Court is compelled to deny the petition. (Santos-Macabata vs. Macabata, Jr., G.R. No. 237524. April 6, 2022, J. Hernando)
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death of the parties. (Article 39, Family Code)
Susceptible The action or defense for declaration of nullity The cause of action to annul a
to never prescribes. (Article 39, Family Code) marriage is subject to prescription
prescription depending on the causes for
annulment present. (Article 47)
(Castillo v. Castillo, G.R. No. 189607, April 18, 2016)
33. What is the legal status of a marriage contracted by an 18-year-old illegitimate child who secured the
parental consent only from his/her putative father?
It is voidable due to lack of parental consent. In the case of illegitimate children, their mother holds exclusive
parental authority, making the consent of the mother a crucial prerequisite. (Article 176, Family Code)
34. Distinguish STD (sexually transmitted disease) as ground for annulment under Article 45 versus
Article 46 of the Family Code.
Article 45, Family Code Article 46, Family Code
Ground for annulment Affliction Concealment, as it constitutes fraud
Presence of concealment Not necessary Necessary
Nature of the disease Must be serious and appears Does not need to be serious and
to be incurable incurable
(Articles 45 and 46, Family Code)
35. What is the rule on marriages between Filipinos solemnized abroad in accordance with the law in
force in said country?
GR: Marriages between Filipinos solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the law of the foreign
country where it is celebrated, if valid there, shall be valid here as such.
XPNs: Exceptions: It shall be void, even if it is valid in the foreign country where the marriage was celebrated,
if any of the following circumstances are present:
1. Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;
2. Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under Article 41 (on terminable bigamous
marriages);
3. Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other;
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4. Those subsequent marriages contracted following the annulment or declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage but before the partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of the
children's presumptive legitimes
5. Void marriages due to psychological incapacity;
6. Incestuous marriages; and
7. Void marriages by reason of ublic policy. (Article 26, Family Code)
35. After obtaining a foreign divorce decree, is the Filipino spouse capacitated to remarry?
Yes. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino
spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop
short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is
the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When
the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former
spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond. (Republic v. Manalo, G.R. No. 220129, April 24, 2018)
38. What are the grounds for denial of a petition for legal separation?
1. Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or act complained of;
2. Where the aggrieved party has consented to the commission of the offense or act complained of;
3. Where there is connivance between the parties in the commission of the offense or act constituting the
ground for legal separation
4. Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
5. Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain decree of legal separation; or
6. Where the action is barred by prescription. (Article 56, Family Code)
41. Compare effects of death of a party before and after entry of judgment in an action for legal
separation?
Death of a Party Before Entry of Judgment Death of a Party After Entry of Judgment
The court shall order the case closed and terminated The decree same shall be binding upon the
without prejudice to the settlement of estate proper parties and their successors in interest in the
proceedings in the regular courts settlement of the estate in the regular courts
(Sec. 21, A.M. 02-11-11-SC)
42. What governs the property relations between husband and wife?
The property relationship between husband and wife shall be governed in the following order:
1.By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;
2.By the provisions of this Code; and
3.By the local custom. (Article 74, Family Code)
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43. When does the property regime commence?
A property regime commences at the precise moment of the celebration of the marriage (i.e. actual time the
marriage is celebrated on a certain date). Any stipulation, express or implied, for the commencement of the
community regime at any other time shall be void. (Articles 88 & 107, Family Code)
44. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, what is the property regime of the subsequent
marriage contracted by the surviving spouse without liquidating the conjugal partnership property
either judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased spouse?
A mandatory regime of complete separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent
marriage should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without compliance with the liquidation
requirement. (Article 130, Family Code)
45. Is the sale of one-half undivided share in the subject property made by the surviving spouse without
undergoing the requirement of liquidation void?
No. Under the regime of conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and wife are co-owners of all the property
of the conjugal partnership. Thus, upon the termination of the conjugal partnership of gains due to the death
of either spouse, the surviving spouse has an actual and vested one-half undivided share of the properties,
which does not consist of determinate and segregated properties until liquidation and partition of the conjugal
partnership. (Uy v.Fernandez, G.R. No. 200612, April 05, 2017)
46. Distinguish absolute community property (ACP), conjugal partnership of gains (CGP), regime of
separation of property (SOP).
ACP CGP SOP
Default property regime for a. Default property regime for a. Agreed upon in the marriage
marriages celebrated during the marriages celebrated before settlements by the spouse
effectivity of the Family Code the b. Mandatory for subsequent
Family Code took effect marriages contracted by a surviving
b. For marriages after the spouse without judicial
Family Code, if agreed to by settlement of previous property
the parties through a marriage regime (under Articles 103 & 130 of
settlement. the Family Code)
c. Judicial separation of property
(voluntary or just cause)
d. Default property regime when
there is reconciliation between
spouses after judicial separation of
property unless the spouses agree
to revive their former property
regime (under Article 66 of the
Family Code)
Properties acquired prior and Properties acquired prior to Each spouse has complete control
during the marriage are included. the marriage are not included and ownership of his or her own
but fruits and income accruing properties acquired prior and during
during the marriage are the marriage without the consent of
included. the other.
Properties acquired during the
marriage are included.
The following are excluded: The following are excluded: The following are excluded:
(1) Property acquired during the (1) That which is brought to In partial regime of separation of
marriage by gratuitous title by the marriage as his or her property, property not considered
either spouse, and the fruits as well own; separate is presumed to pertain to
as the income thereof, if any (2) That which each acquires the ACP.
XPN: it is expressly provided by during the marriage by
the donor, testator or grantor that gratuitous title;
they shall form part of the (3) That which is acquired by
community property; right of redemption, by barter
(2) Property for personal and or by exchange with property
exclusive use of either spouse. belonging to only one of the
XPN: jewelry spouses; and
(3) Property acquired before the (4) That which is purchased
marriage by either spouse who has with exclusive money of the
legitimate descendants by a former wife or of the husband.
marriage, and the fruits as well as
the income, if any, of such
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property.
During separation in-fact, the property regime is not affected, but: In case of separation in-fact, both
1. The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live spouse shall bear in the same
therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be proportion to their income ir, as a
supported. default, to the current market value:
2. When consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other 1. the family expenses; and
is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained 2. the creditors in connection
through a summary proceeding. with such expenses,
3. In case of insufficiency of community or conjugal solidary liability
partnership property; separate property of both spouses
shall be solidarily liable for the support of the family. Spouse
present, granted with a judicial authority through a summary
proceeding, can administer or encumber any specific
property of the other spouse and use the fruits to satisfy the
latter’s share.
Terminates upon:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage.
47. Distinguish the property regimes of unions without marriage under Article 147 and 148 of the Family
Code.
Article 147, Family Code Article 148, Family Code
Applicability 1. Parties without legal impediment to With legal impediment to marry caused by:
marry; and a. adulterous relationships;
2. Void marriage on the ground of b. bigamous or polygamous marriages;
psychological incapacity. c. incestuous marriages; and
d. void marriages by reason of public
policy. (Article 38, Family Code)
Requisites 1. The man and woman must be 1. The man and woman must be
capacitated to marry each other; incapacitated to marry each other, or they do
2. Live exclusively as husband and wife; not live exclusively with each other as
and husband and wife;
3. Their union is without the benefit of 2. Their union is without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void. marriage, or their marriage is void.
(Mercado-Fehr v Fehr, GR No. 152716, 23 October
2003)
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Presumption Presumption of joint acquisition and equal No presumption of joint acquisition.
(Prima Facie) sharing as to property acquired while they
live together. When there is evidence of joint acquisition
but none as to the extent of actual
Efforts in care and maintenance of family contribution, there is a presumption of equal
and household considered contribution in sharing.
acquisition.
Forfeiture When only one of the parties to a void 1. If one of the parties is validly married to
marriage is in good faith, share of party in another, his or her share in the co-ownership
bad faith in the co- ownership shall be shall accrue to the ACP or CPG existing in
forfeited: such valid marriage;
2. If the party who acted in bad faith is not
1. In favor of their common children; validly married to another, his/her share shall
2. In case of default or waiver by any or be forfeited in the same manner provided for
all common children or their descendants in Article 147; and
each vacant share shall belong to 3. The above rules apply even if both parties
respective surviving descendants; or are in bad faith.
3. In their absence, to the innocent party.
4. In all cases, forfeiture takes place upon
termination of cohabitation.
(Articles 147 & 148, Family Code)
48. Distinguish ordinary co-ownership and “special co-ownership under Article 147 of the Family Code”.
Ordinary a co-owner may validly alienate or encumber his undivided share in the common
Co-ownership property without the consent of the other co-owners
Special as long as the cohabitation lasts and the co-ownership exists, no disposition inter vivos
Co-ownership of such undivided share can be validly made by one party without the consent of the
other
(Perez v. Perez-Senerpida, GR No. 233365, March 24, 2021)
49. Can a common-law spouse, who is capacitated to marry, encumber or dispose of a property acquired
during cohabitation to a third person without the consent of the other spouse?
No The property relation of common-law spouses, capacitated to marry each other, is governed by
co-ownership under Article 147 of the Family Code. Under the said provision, neither party can encumber or
dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and owned in
common, without the consent of the other, until after the termination of their cohabitation. Thus, a
common-law spouse, without the consent of another spouse, may not validly dispose of a property acquired
through their work during their cohabitation. (Article 147, Family Code)
50. Is consent of the common-law spouse necessary in the validity of the sale of property acquired during
cohabitation, assuming that the said spouse did not contribute money in the acquisition of the
property, and her efforts consist mainly in the care and maintenance of the family and household?
Yes. Consent of the other common-law spouse is still a prerequisite to the validity of the sale. Article 147(2) of
the Family Code provides that common-law spouses’ properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. Further, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be
deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family and of the household. As such, consent is necessary since the property is deemed
owned in common by the common-law spouses in equal shares as the same was acquired during their
cohabitation, without prejudice to the right of a buyer in good faith and for value. (Article 147, Family Code)
51. Can both male, living together as common-law spouses, be governed by the rule of co-ownership
under Article 147 of the Family Code?
No. Article 147 of the Family Code applies only when a “man and a woman, who are capacitated to marry
each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
void marriage”. Since the common-law spouses are both men, and they are incapacitated to marry each
under the Family Code, the rule of co-ownership under Article 147 is not applicable. (Articles 1, 2 & 147, Family
Code)
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52. What governs the property relations of common-law spouses who acquired a property before their
marriage was declared null and void due to the absence of a marriage license?
The spouses are governed by the “special co-ownership” under Article 147, Family Code. Under this
provision, when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, (1) their wages and
salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and (2) the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. Further, in “special co-ownership”, care and
maintenance is recognized as a valuable contribution which will entitle the contributor to half of the property
acquired. Since the property is presumed to have been acquired through their joint work and industry, both
spouses are co-owners of the said property in equal shares. (Article 147, Family Code)
53. What governs the properties acquired by spouses who were able to secure a marriage contract
without a valid marriage ceremony?
The property relationship that governs their union is a “special co-ownership” under Article 147 for having a
void marriage. This is on the presumption that there was no impediment for them to validly marry each other.
(Article 147, Family Code)
54. What is the property regime in case the marriage is declared null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity?
The property regime in case of a null and void marriage is special co-ownership under Article 147 of the
Family Code. Property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by the
rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been
obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property shall still
be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family household." Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple's
separate property are not included in the co-ownership. (Article 147, Family Code)
55. Can there be a retroactive application of Article 148 if the adulterous cohabitation occurred before the
Family Code?
Yes. Although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties or the acquisition of the property occurred before the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 applies because the said provision was intended
precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the Family Code was
enacted, there was no provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or
concubinage. (Atienza v. De Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006)
58. What is the effect of death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family upon the
family home?
The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the
family for a period of ten years or for as long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the
same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the
property or constituted the family home. (Article 159, Family Code)
59. What is the rule on the exemption of family home from execution, forced sale or attachment?
GR: The family is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment from the time of its constitution and so
long as any of its beneficiaries resides therein.
XPNs:
1. Nonpayment of taxes;
2. Debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home;
3. Debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution; and
4. Debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders, materialmen and others who have rendered
service or furnished material for the construction of the building. (Articles 153 & 155, Family Code)
60. What are the requisites in the sale, alienation, donation, assignment or encumbrance of the family
home?
13
The following must give their written consent:
1. person constituting the family home
2. the latter's spouse, and
3. a majority of the beneficiaries of legal age
In case of conflict, the court shall decide. (Article 158, Family Code)
61. Can an illegitimate father who admits paternity over an illegitimate child claim custody over such
child?
No. The general rule is that the recognition of an illegitimate child by the father could be a ground for ordering
the latter to give support to, but not custody of, the child. The law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental
authority over an illegitimate child. However, Article 213 of the Family Code provides that, generally, no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds cause to order
otherwise. (David v. CA, G.R. No. 111180 November 16, 1995; Briones v. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004)
Legitimate and Illegitimate children shall principally use the surname of their mother.
legitimated/Adopted children Illegitimate children may only use the surname of their father if their filiation
shall principally use the has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth
surname of the father appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or
private handwritten instrument is made by the father
By married woman
a.Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband’s surname, or
b.Her maiden first name and her husband’s surname or
c. Her husband’s full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as “Mrs.”
Effect of Annulment
She shall resume her a.she may resume her maiden and surname
maiden and surname b.she may choose to continue employing her former husband’s surname
c. XPN:
1. Court disagrees
2. She or his former husband has remarried to a third person
(Articles 176, 364, 365, 366, 370, 371, Civil Code)
66. Can an illegitimate child adopted by his biological father use the surname of his biological mother as
his middle name?
Yes. There is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 17611 of the Family Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The
Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Being a legitimate child by virtue
of her adoption, it follows that he is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without
discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of his father and her mother, as discussed
above. Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by his natural father to use, as
14
middle name his mother's surname, we find no reason why he should not be allowed to do so. (In the Matter of
the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005)
67. Can an illegitimate father who provides support and admits paternity of an illegitimate child compel
the latter to use his surname?
No. RA 9255 only provides the option to use either the mother’s or the father’s surname, upon recognition, to
the illegitimate child. If such a child is still a minor, the use of the father’s surname requires the consent of the
mother who has parental authority over the child. (Grande vs. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014)
68. Kimric claimed that although the surname indicated in his birth certificate is Tan, he has never used it
and in fact has only learned the same in 2009. He has already been known by the name Kimric
Casayuran. The name of his father as indicated in his birth certificate is Carlos Tan. His father also
signed the same as informant. When he renewed his driver’s licence in 2010, he was informed by the
Land Transportation Office (LTO) that he should first secure documents to change his name. Thus,
the filing of the petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). However, RTC denied the petition on
the ground that a change of name might lead to a misunderstanding as to one’s paternity or status of
legitimacy. Will the change of Kimric’s name affect his status as a legitimate child?
No. In Kimric's birth certificate, Carlos Tan is not only named as the father, but he also signed the same as
informant. Thus, even if his name is changed, his father's identity still appears in his birth certificate, where it
will always be written, and which can be referred to in cases where paternity is relevant. A change of name
does not define or effect a change in one's existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing
therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship: What is altered is only the name.
(Tan vs. Office of the Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 222857, November 10, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])
70. AAA’s claim that they are the legitimate children of the spouses BBB. However, AAA's records of birth
were not recorded in the Civil Register or their legitimate filiation embodied in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument signed by the spouses BBB. Instead, AAA offered testimonies of their
relatives, namely, CCC, DDD, EEE and FFF, to prove that they are legitimate children of the spouses
BBB. The testimonies of CCC and FFF were based on their own personal knowledge of AAA’s status
as legitimate children of the BBB couple. They are close relatives of AAA and live near the subject
property, hence, they had the opportunity to meet and know their neighbors who are also their
relatives. Both DDD and EEE testified on AAA's family pedigree based on the declarations relayed to
them by other family members who were already deceased and cannot testify in court. Did AAA
sufficiently prove their filiation through these testimonies?
Yes. In the absence of the record of birth and admission of legitimate filiation, Article 267 of the Civil Code and
Article 172 of the Family Code provide that filiation shall be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws, such as, baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which his or her
name has been entered, common reputation respecting his or her pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Here, the
testimonial evidence is sufficient to establish AAAs' status as heirs of the BBB couple. Both the Civil Code
and Family Code recognize such other means allowed by the Rules of Court to prove filiation or the legitimacy
status of a person, that includes testimonies of witnesses. Although no documentary evidence was offered by
AAA to prove their legitimacy, the testimonies of the witnesses presented preponderantly tipped the scales in
their favor. (Ende vs. Roman Catholic Prelate of the Prelature Nullius of Cotobato, Inc., G.R. No. 191867. December 6, 2021, J.
Hernando)
71. What are the rules with respect to a signature in private handwritten instruments acknowledging
filiation?
The rules with respect to a signature in private handwritten instruments acknowledging filiation are as follows:
1.Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there
should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent;
and
2.Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence (such
as an autobiography acknowledging the illegitimate child), it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be
shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence.” (Dela Cruz v. Garcia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009).
72. May an action seeking to prove filiation based on the open and continuous possession of the status
of a legitimate child under the second paragraph of Art. 172 of the Family Code be brought even after
the death of the putative parent?
No. Actions seeking to prove filiation under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code must be
brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. After the death of the putative parent, the person seeking to
establish filiation must present either a record of birth appearing in the civil register, a final judgement, or an
admission of legitimate filiation. Here, after the putative parent’s death, action should not be allowed to
15
introduce evidence of open and continuous illegitimate filiation to the putative parent. It may only be
established by admission of filiation in a public or private handwritten document signed by the putative parent.
(Ara v. Pizarro, G.R. No. 187273, February 15, 2017)
73. What are the differences between impugning and claiming legitimacy?
Category Action to Impugn Legitimacy Action to Claim Legitimacy
Legal Basis Article 166, Family Code Article 173, Family Code
Prescription 1 year - from the knowledge of the GR: During the lifetime of the child
birth or its recording in the civil XPNs:
register, if the husband/heirs (in his ● 5 years - for heirs of the child should the
default) should reside in the city or child die during minority or in a state of
municipality where the birth took insanity
place or was recorded. ● Lifetime of the putative father - in cases
2 years - if husband/heirs (in his where the action is for recognition of
default) does NOT reside in the same illegitimate children by "open and continuous
municipality or city but within PH; possession" of the status
3 years - if husband/heirs (in his “There being no allegation of such
default) is living abroad acknowledgment the action becomes one to
compel recognition which can not be brought
after the death of the putative father.”
(by analogy Art. 170, Family Code; Article 171, Family Code; Bernardo v. Fernando, G.R. Nos. 211034 & 211076, November 18, 2020,
Caguioa Case; Paulino vs. Paulino, G.R. No.L-15091, December 28, 1961)
75. AAA died intestate and was survived by his son BBB, and CCC, his other son who predeceased him,
was survived by DDD. In July 17, 2003, DDD moved that she be included in the distribution and
partition of AAA’s estate as she alleged that she was CCC’s only child and that AAA’s or their clan’s
overt acts translated to her legal recognition as CCC’s child. CCC died before she was born on
October 9, 1978. BBB opposed the same, claiming that CCC never legally recognized DDD as his
natural child in his lifetime and DDD never presented sufficient evidence to prove her filiation in
accordance with Arts. 172 and 175 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, BBB claims that DDD was already
barred from claiming her nonmarital filiation to CCC, since she was born after his death. He claims
that even if the provisions under the Civil Code were applied, DDD’s claims will not prosper since she
did not file any action for recognition within 4 years from the time she attained the age of majority,
when she turned 18 years old in 1996. Can DDD still prove her filiation even if CCC died before she
was born?
Yes. DDD, who was not yet born when the Family Code took effect, has the right to prove that she was her
father's daughter under Article 285 of the Civil Code within four years from attaining the age of majority. Under
Article 402 of the Civil Code, the age of majority is 21 years old. DDD attained majority on October 9, 1999.
She had until October 9, 2003 to assert her right to prove her filiation with CCC. In this case, when she moved
to be included in the distribution and partition of AAA's estate on July 17, 2003, she was not yet barred from
16
claiming her filiation. Moreover, DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity and filiation and the
Court has affirmed the use of DNA testing in an instance when the putative father was dead. Thus, issues on
her filiation may still be proved and may be done thru reception of DNA evidence upon consultation and
coordination with experts in the field. (Aquino vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 208912, December 07, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])
76. May a birth certificate be registered by the biological father of an illegitimate child without the
knowledge and consent of the child’s biological mother?
No.Civil Registry Law states that in case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn
to jointly by the parents of the infant or only the mother if the father refuses. Thus, it is mandatory that the
mother of an illegitimate child signs the birth certificate of her child in all cases, irrespective of whether the
father recognizes the child as his or not. (In the Matter of Petition for Cancellation of Certificates of Live Birth of Barcelote
Tinitigan vs. Republic, G.R. No. 222095, August 7, 2017)
77. May legitimation be attacked collaterally in a petition for issuance of a protection order?
No. The Court has held that "the civil status [of a child] cannot be attacked collaterally." The child’s legitimacy
"cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose." If
the instant petition sprang out of an application for a PPO, a party’s claim that the other is not his biological
son is a collateral issue, which the current Court has no authority to resolve. Notwithstanding the above
discussion, there is no absolute preclusion for such party from raising before the proper court the issue of
child’s status and filiation. (BBB vs. AAA, G.R. No. 193225, February 9, 2015)
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2. The biological parents of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality
which has legal custody of the child, except in the case of a Filipino of legal age if, prior to the adoption,
said person has been consistently considered and treated as their own child by the adopters for at least
three (3) years;
3. The legitimate and adopted children, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopters, if any;
4. The illegitimate children, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter if living with said adopter or over
whom the adopter exercises parental authority and the latter’s spouse, if any; and
5. The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
Provided, That children under ten (10) years of age shall be counseled and consulted, but shall not be
required to execute within consent. (Sec. 23, RA 11642)
82. Should a father obtain the consent from his spouse and legitimate children in adopting his illegitimate
child/children?
Yes. The law on adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not
only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children. The husband must first obtain the
consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children born out of wedlock. (Sections 21 & 23 of RA 11642 ; Castro
vs. Gregorio, G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014)
83. Can a married person with two legitimate children, aged 15 and 7, adopt his 10-year old illegitimate
child with his mistress?
Yes, he may adopt his illegitimate child provided he acquires the consent of his spouse, of his 15-year old
legitimate child, of the illegitimate child, and of the biological mother of the illegitimate child (his mistress). (Sec.
23, RA 11642)
84. Spouses, who are both foreigners residing and have been gainfully employed in the Philippines for at
least 3 continuous years, filed a petition for adoption under the Domestic Adoption Act. Should the
case be referred to Inter-Country Adoption Board (ICAB)?
No. Since the spouses have been residing and have been gainfully employed in the Philippines and are thus
living in the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing of the petition for adoption, as
required by the Domestic Adoption Act, their Petition for Adoption was appropriately filed under the Domestic
Adoption Act. Even if the instant adoption proceeding would be referred to the ICAB, there is still a high
probability that the ICAB will file a manifestation so that the domestic adoption before the trial court could be
pursued, considering the circumstances of the case. Consequently, the referral to the ICAB would only cause
a delay in the adoption proceedings, a matter that would be clearly prejudicial to the interest of the adoptee
and the AAA’s. Since the case properly falls under the Domestic Adoption Act, it is for the best interest of the
child that the instant case be speedily disposed by continuing the proceedings in the trial court for the
determination of whether AAAs are indeed qualified to adopt the child, instead of inappropriately referring the
instant domestic adoption case to the ICAB where the proceedings may have to start anew and might be
referred back to the trial court for the continuation of the domestic adoption proceedings. Settled is the rule
that in adoption proceedings, the welfare of the child is of paramount interest. (Spouses Park vs. Hon. Liwanag, G.R.
No. 248035. November 27, 2019, J. Hernando)
88. Discuss the rule on parental authority, substitute parental authority, and special parental authority.
Parental Authority Substitute Parental Authority Special Parental Authority
18
It is jointly exercised Exercised by: Exercised by:
by the father and a. Surviving grandparent; a. The school (its administrators and
the mother of a b. Oldest brother or sister, over 21 years teachers), or;
child. of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and b. The individual, entity, or institution
c. Actual custodian over 21 years of age engaged in child care
unless unfit or disqualified
89. In case of absence or death of either parent, what is the effect on the parental authority of the
surviving parent upon his/her remarriage?
The parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall
not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian
of the person or property of the children. (Article 212, Family Code)
90. In case of separation of the parents, who shall exercise parental authority?
Parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account
all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit. (Article 213, Family Code)
91. What is the liability of parents or other persons exercising parental authority for the injuries and
damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children?
Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their
parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. (Article 221, Family Code)
19
(Article 415, Civil Code)
95. Does an accretion automatically become a registered land when the lot that receives it is covered by a
Torrens Title?
No. An accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot that receives such
accretion is covered by a Torrens Title. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing; registration under the
Torrens system of that ownership is another. (Republic v. Tongson, G.R. No. 233304, July 28, 2020)
99. Is BBBs' claim of possession of the property in the concept of an owner an issue that may be
decided upon in a case for unlawful detainer?
No. BBBs' claim of possession of the property in the concept of an owner is a collateral issue that may not be
decided upon in a case for unlawful detainer. To stress, the only issue to be resolved in an unlawful detainer
case is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by
any of the parties involved. (Spouses Liu vs. Espinosa, G.R. No. 238513. July 31, 2019, J. Hernando)
100. AAA and his siblings sued BBB and others with the crime of forcible entry. BBB claimed that he
bought the land and was given a deed of absolute sale in 1988. On the other hand, AAA claimed that
they are the registered owners of the subject parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
in 1999. AAA showed proof that their actual possession of the property was in 2001 while BBB
showed pieces of evidence such as real property tax receipt in 2005. Is AAA entitled to recover in an
ejectment suit of forcible entry by proving his prior possession of the property?
Yes. Since AAA proved his prior possession, he is entitled to file forcible entry complaint pursuant to Rule 70
of the Rules of Court which provides that any person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth may file a forcible entry complaint within one year from the
discovery of unlawful deprivation. (Palajos vs. Abad, G.R. No. 205832. March 7, 2022, J. Hernando)
101. What are the elements that must be alleged and proved for a forcible entry suit to prosper?
The elements of forcible entry are as follows:
1. plaintiff had prior physical possession of the property before the defendant encroached on the property;
2. plaintiff was deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth by defendant; &
3. that the action was filed within one (1) year from the time the plaintiff learned of his deprivation of the
physical possession of the property, except that when the entry is through stealth, the one (1)-year period is
counted from the time the plaintiff-owner or legal possessor learned of the deprivation of the physical
possession of the property. (Palajos vs. Abad, G.R. No. 205832. March 7, 2022, J. Hernando)
102. In a case of forcible entry, will the suit only prosper if there is actual possession of the property?
No. Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of
possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments,
inscription of possessory information titles and the like. The reason for this exceptional rule is that
possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of
ground before it can be said that he is in possession. It is sufficient that AAA was able to subject the property
to the action of his will. (Palajos vs. Abad, G.R. No. 205832. March 7, 2022, J. Hernando)
20
Accion Interdictal Accion Publiciana Accion Reindivicatoria
Summary action for recovery of Plenary action to recover the Action to recover ownership;
physical possession of real right of possession; determines action whereby plaintiff claims
property where the dispossession who has the better right of ownership over a parcel of land
has not lasted for more than a possession of realty and seeks recovery of its full
year. independently of title possession
The jurisdiction lies in the proper Brought in the proper regional Brought in the proper regional trial
municipal trial court or trial court court
metropolitan trial court
Must be brought within one (1) Filed if more than one (1) year
year from the date of actual entry has elapsed since the
or date of last demand. dispossession
(Spouses Tobias vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 232176, February 17, 2021)
104. AAA had been occupying a lot along Creek I for more than 55 years openly, publicly, adversely, and
continuously in the concept of an owner. BBB contested that the said property is covered by a TCT
registered under its name. BBB filed a Complaint for ejectment against AAA. AAA filed a civil case
for cancellation of title with damages and other reliefs. BBB filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that
the principal issue in the case, i.e., whether Creek I is a man-made or a public creek, has been
resolved in the ejectment case when the Supreme Court affirmed and declared that Creek I is
man-made and belongs to BBB. Is the issue of ownership adjudicated in the ejectment case binding
on the civil case for cancellation of title?
No. The sole issue in ejectment cases is physical or material possession of the subject property,
independent of any claim of ownership by the parties." Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides the
exception to the rule in that the issue of ownership shall be resolved in deciding the issue of possession if
the question of possession is intertwined with the issue of ownership. In the related ejectment case, the
parties were allowed to prove how they came into possession of the property. Incidentally, the issue of the
ownership of Creek I, came into forth. In the ejectment case, the issue of ownership over Creek I was
resolved in favor of BBB. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that where the issue of ownership
is inseparably linked to that of possession, adjudication of the issue on ownership is not final and binding, but
merely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership is
only provisional, and not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. Thus, any
ruling on ownership that was passed upon in the ejectment case is not and should not be binding on the civil
case. (Tiña vs. Sta. Clara Estate, Inc., G.R. No. 239979. February 17, 2020, J. Hernando)
105. What are the requirements for an action for quieting of title to prosper?
For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely:
(1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to
be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.' (Viloria vs. Heirs of
Gaetos, G.R. No. 206240. May 12, 2021, Heirs of Marquez vs. Heirs of Hernandez, G.R. No. 236826. March 23, 2022, J. Hernando)
106. AAAs, heirs of BBB, filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title with Damages against CCC. To enforce
their claim, they presented, among others, TCT which was issued in the name of BBB and Tax
Declaration. On the other hand, CCCs presented a genealogy of certificates of title on how they
acquired the property. Will the complaint prosper?
No. Two requisites must be established in order that a complaint for quieting of title may prosper. First, the
plaintiff must have a legal or equitable title or interest in the property subject of the complaint. Second, the
deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding allegedly casting doubt over one's title must be proven to be in
truth invalid, void or inoperative despite the prima facie appearance of validity. AAAs failed to prove that they
hold a legal or equitable title over the subject property. On one hand, legal title means registered ownership,
where the subject property is registered under the name of the complainant in an action to quiet title, which
may be evidenced by presenting the certificate of title in the latter's name. On the other hand, equitable title
denotes beneficial ownership, which is "ownership recognized by law and capable of being enforced in the
courts at the suit of the beneficial owner." AAAs are neither holders of a legal title nor equitable title over the
subject property as the TCTs and tax declarations they presented were not sufficient to establish their claim.
Similarly, the second requisite was not ascertained since the certificates of title in the name of CCC and the
origin of the same were precisely demonstrated through the chain of transactions which led to CCC's
ownership of the subject property. Therefore, the alleged cloud created by CCC's certificates of title did not
exist. (Heirs of Eñano vs. San Pedro Cineplex Properties, G.R. No. 236619. April 6, 2022, J. Hernando)
107. Distinguish Right to Property Owned in Common and Full Ownership Over the Ideal Share.
Right to Property Owned in Common Full Ownership Over the Ideal Share
21
Each co-owner: Each co-owner:
1.may use the thing owned in common 1.shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
Provided the following: and benefits pertaining thereto,
1.he does so in accordance with the purpose 2.may alienate,
for which it is intended, 3.assign or
2.in such a way as not to injure the interest of 4.mortgage it, and
the co-ownership or 5.substitute another person in its enjoyment
3.prevent the other co-owners from using it XPN: when personal rights are involved
according to their rights. Note: can only pertain to the co-owner’s ideal share prior
to partition
(Articles 486 and 493, Civil Code)
108. Will a complaint for nullification of sale and recovery of ownership filed by a part-owner in case of a
sale of the entire land, made by the other part-owner in a co-ownership, to a third party, prosper?
No. It may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire
property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the
rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property. The
proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of the thing owned in
common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but
the division of the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who
possessed and administered it. (Reyes vs. Sps. Garcia, G.R. No. 225159. March 21, 2022, J. Hernando)
109. 5 of the 8 heirs, to the exclusion of 3 other heirs, executed a Kasunduan for the voluntary transfer of
the land allowed by the CARL with a 50-50 sharing condition (the heirs shall retain half of the land
and the other half will be distributed to the qualified beneficiaries). Should the entire partition be
annulled?
No. Articles 493-495 and 498 of the Civil Code allow for alienation by a co-owner of his or her share in the
co-owned property, termination of the co-ownership, and partition of the property. (Silva vs. Lo, G.R. No. 206667.
June 23, 2021, J. Hernando)
110. One of the co-heirs authorized her husband through a Special Power of Attorney to file a Complaint
for Quieting of Title with Damages involving the co-owned property. Can the husband validly institute
the case?
Yes. Every co-owner may institute a suit to protect the rights over the co-owned property for the benefit of all
other co-owners without the latter being impleaded as co-plaintiffs in the case. Yet when a co-owner
repudiates the co-ownership and claims one's rights over the co-owned property without regard to the
co-ownership, the need to implead the other co-owners to the suit becomes significant.
Thus, the husband’s personality to institute the case on behalf of the co-heirs especially since he was given
a Special Power of Attorney executed by his wife who was one of the co-heirs should be recognized. (Heirs of
Eñano vs. San Pedro Cineplex Properties, G.R. No. 236619. April 6, 2022, J. Hernando)
111. What are the rules when one builds, plants, or sows on land owned by another, using his own
materials?
Landowner Landowner:
and builder, a. Acquire improvements after paying builder, planter, or sower for their value; or
planter, or b. Oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, unless its value is
sower are considerably more than that of the building or trees, and the one who sowed, the proper
both in rent.
good faith c. If the value is considerably more, the court can force the parties to enter into a forced
(Option is lease.
given
solely to Builder, planter, and sower:
land owner) 1. Right to reimbursement for the improvement, necessary or useful expenses, and in
proper cases, expenses for luxury or mere pleasure
2. Pending land owner’s payment, has right to retention of the land (during this period,
builder, planter, and sower is not required to pay rent).
3. Whatever fruits (rents) he receives during the period of retention must be deducted from
whatever indemnity is due to him; and in case it exceeds the value of the indemnity, the
excess shall be returned to the owner of the land.
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Builder, 2. No option to sell the land and cannot compel builder, planter, and sower to buy the land
planter, and without the latter’s consent.
sower in Builder, planter, and sower:
good 1. (a) Absolute right of removal and right to indemnification for damages; or
faith (b) Right to reimbursement for the value of materials and right to indemnification for
damages.
2. Right to reimbursement of necessary expenses for preservation of the land.
112. What are the rules when one builds on another’s land using another’s materials?
He must settle first the rights of the owners of materials.
Owner of Owner of materials:
materials 1. Loses the materials;
in bad 2. Must pay damages.
faith
Land owner:
a. Appropriate the improvement without paying indemnity, and claim damages from the owner
of materials;
b. Compel the builder to buy the land, without any reimbursement to the builder.
Builder:
a. If in good faith: claim from land owner reasonable compensation for his labor;
b. If in bad faith:
(1) not entitled to anything;
(2) Must pay damages to the landowner.
Owner of Owner of materials: right to reimbursement for the value of his materials
materials
in good Builder: will be primarily liable.
faith a. If in good faith: must indemnify owner of materials
b. If in bad faith: must indemnify owner of materials and pay damages
- After payment, he becomes a builder using his own materials
Land owner:
a. Appropriate the improvement.
i. If the builder is insolvent, the land owner must indemnify the owner of the materials, and he
then becomes the owner of materials
(a) If builder is in bad faith: land owner can demand damages from the builder
(b) If builder is in good faith: he must pay the land owner reasonable compensation
ii. If the builder indemnified the owner of materials: the rules when the builder is using in own
materials will apply
b. Has other options available in rules when the bulider is using his own
materials
(Art 474, NCC)
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a. Possession in the concept of an owner (Adverse Possession) a. By material a. Possession
– possession by the owner himself or adverse possessor occupation of a in the concept
b. Possession in the concept of holder – possessor acknowledges thing or the of owner is
that another is an owner exercise of a right converted into
c. Possession in one’s own name – personal acquisition ownership after
d. Possession in the name of another – agent; subject to b. By the fact that the required
authority and ratification if not authorized; negotiorum gestio it is subject to the lapse of time
● Voluntary – as when an agent possesses for the principal action of our will necessary of
(by virtue of agreement) prescription
● Necessary – as when a mother possesses for a child still in c. By the proper
the maternal womb acts and legal b. Entitlement
● Unauthorized – this will become the principal’s possession formalities for to fruits or
only after there has been a ratification without prejudice to acquiring expenses
the effects of negotiorum gestio possession
e. Possession in good faith – not aware of any flaw or defect in
his title or mode of acquisition
f. Possession in bad faith – aware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition some flaw or defect
(Article 531, 540, 544, Civil Code)
115. Define a possessor in bad faith and when would bad faith begin?
A possessor in bad faith is one who is aware of the existence of any defect. A possessor in good faith
becomes a possessor in bad faith as soon as he becomes aware of the flaw in his title or mode of
acquisition. (Article 526, Civil Code; Pen Development Corporation and Las Brisas Resort Corporation vs. Martinez Leyba, Inc., G.R.
No. 211845, August 9, 2017)
117. Who has the burden to prove the existence of bad faith?
Burden of proof lies on the person who alleges the existence of bad faith. Possession is presumed to be
enjoyed in the same character in which it is acquired, until contrary is proven. (Article 527, Civil Code)
118. Distinguish a possessor in good faith and a possessor in the concept of an owner.
Possessor in Good Faith Possessor in the Concept of an Owner
A possessor in good faith is the one who is not A possessor in the concept of an owner is one who
aware that there exists in his title or mode of believes in good faith that he or she has just title to
acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. the property that he/she is occupying.
(Article 526, Civil Code; Republic v. Roasa, GR No. 176022, February 2, 2015)
1. Make, after notice to the 1. Take care of the property as a good 1. Return the thing upon
owner or his legitimate father of the family termination
representative, an inventory 2. Make ordinary repairs required by the 2. Pay legal interest for the
of all the property, which wear and tear due to the natural use of duration of the usufruct on the
shall contain an appraisal of the thing and are indispensable for its expenses for extraordinary
the movables and a preservation repairs, if the naked owner
description of the condition 3. Inform the owner of urgent made the repairs
of the immovables; extraordinary repairs, any prejudicial act 3. Pay proper interest on sums
2. Give security, binding to the rights of paid as taxes by the owner
himself to fulfill the ownership over the usufruct, by a third 4. Indemnify the naked owner
obligations imposed upon person for any loss caused by the
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him in accordance with this 4. Allow the naked owner to make works negligence of the usufructuary
Chapter. and improvements of which the or his transferees
immovable in usufruct is susceptible, or
make new plantings thereon, if it be rural
(Articles 583 to 601, Civil Code)
122. Discuss the three kinds of legal easement: right of way, easement of light and view and water
easement.
Legal or Compulsory Right of Way Easement of Light and View Water Easement
This may be claimed when the four (4) This refers to an easement Lower estates are
requisites are present: whereby the dominant estate obliged to receive the
(a) the estate is surrounded by other enjoys the right to have free waters which naturally
immovables and is without adequate outlet to access to light, a little air, and a and without intervention
a public highway; view overlooking the adjoining of man descend from
(b) after payment of the proper indemnity; estate, i.e., the servient estate. the higher estates, as
(c) the isolation was not due to the well as the stones or
proprietor’s own acts; and earth which they carry
(d) the right of way claimed is at a point least with them.
prejudicial to the servient estate.
123. Are the lower estates obliged to receive water from the higher estate when the latter was bulldozed
and its hills were flatted resulting to the softening of the soil that is easily carried by the water
whenever it rained and to the change in the course of water leading to the passing of said water to
the lower estates?
No. Although lower estates are legally obliged to receive waters which naturally flow from higher estates,
there is concomitant responsibility on the part of the higher estates not to make the obligation of these lower
estates/servient estates more onerous. Lower estates are only obliged to receive water naturally flowing from
higher estates and such should be free from any human intervention. Here, what flowed was not water that
naturally flowed from a higher estate. (Spouses Abraham vs. Golden Village Homeowners Association (GVHAI), G.R. No.
180808, August 15, 2018)
124. Differentiate kinds of easements (1) as to the recipient of the benefit; (2) as to the manner of the
exercise; (3) as to whether their existence are indicated; (4) as to the servient owner; (5) as to source.
As to the recipient of the benefit
Easement imposed upon an immovable for the Established for the benefit of a community, or of one
benefit of another immovable belonging to a or more persons to whom the encumbered estate
different owner. does not belong.
Those the use of which is or may be incessant, Those which are used at intervals and depend upon
without the intervention of any act of man. the acts of man.
Those which are made known and are Those which show no external indication of their
continually kept in view by external signs that existence.
reveal the use and enjoyment of the same.
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As to the servient owner
One which imposes upon the owner of the That which prohibits the owner of the servient estate
servient estate the obligation of allowing from doing something which he could lawfully do if the
something to be done or doing it himself. easement did not exist.
As to source
Established by law; those imposed by law have Established by will of the owners; those which may be
for their object either public use or the interest of established by the owner of a tenement of piece of
private persons. land as he may deem suitable, and in the manner and
form which he may deem best, provided that he does
not contravene the laws, public policy or public order.
126. What are the requisites for easement for drawing water or for watering of animals?
1. The owner of the dominant estate has the capacity to dispose of the water.
2. The water is sufficient for the use intended.
3. Proposed right of way is the most convenient and the least onerous to third persons; and
4. Pay indemnity to the owner of the servient estate. (Article 643, Civil Code)
129. What are the kinds of easements that may be acquired only by title?
1. Continuous non-apparent easements
2. Discontinuous apparent easements
3. Discontinuous non-apparent easements. (Article 622, Civil Code)
130. Can there be an easement of light and view if the windows are made in the wall of the dominant
estate and there is no formal prohibition upon the proprietor of the servient estate?
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Yes. Article 624 of the Civil Code grants title to an easement which is an exception to the general rule that a
window or opening situated on the wall of the dominant estate involves a negative easement, and thus, may
only be acquired by prescription, tacked from the time of the formal prohibition upon the proprietor of the
servient estate,. It states that the existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates,
established or maintained by the owner or both, shall be considered, should either of them be alienated, as a
title in order that the easement may continue actively and passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the
two estates is divided, (a) the contrary should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or (b)
the sign aforesaid should be removed before the execution of the deed. (Sps. Garcia v. Santos, G.R. No. 228334,
June 17, 2019)
131. AAA owns a lot whose access to the national highway is a pathway crossing BBB’s lot which had
long been in place and is the shorter route to the said highway. Can AAA demand from BBB to
remove the fence which the latter installed blocking the said pathway considering there is another
pathway for ingress and egress to the highway but is circuitous and extremely inconvenient for
AAA?
No. The easement of right of way shall be established at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and,
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be
the shortest.. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must prevail over the criterion of shortest
distance although this is a matter of judicial appreciation. In other words, where the easement may be
established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the way is shortest
and will cause the least damage should be chosen. If having these two (2) circumstances do not concur in a
single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the
shortest. (Article 650, NCC; Sps. Williams vs. Zerda, G.R. No. 207146, March 15, 2017)
132. BBB owns Lot E which was landlocked by other lots, one of which is Lot C which is also owned by
BBB. BBB gave a right of way passing through Lot C in favor of AAA when the latter purchased from
BBB Lot E. Can AAA demand the said right of way considering that when AAA returned after working
abroad for more than 10 years, BBB had already sold Lot C to XXX who fenced the right of way
contained in Lot C?
Yes, A has the right to demand the right of way because A’s work abroad for more than 10 years cannot be
construed as non-use because it cannot be implied from the facts that A is no longer using the right of way.
(Article 631, par. 2, Civil Code)
134. Differentiate prescription as a mode of acuqiring easement under Article 620 and ordinary acquisitive
prescription under Title V of the Civil Code.
Prescription under Article 620 Prescription under Title V
Requires 10 years irrespective of Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are
the good or bad faith, the acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of 10 years.
presence or absence of just title Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in
on the part of the possessor. The good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
general rules on prescription are
not applicable in cases of Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
prescription provided for by through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for 30 years,
special or particular provisions. without need of title or of good faith.
(Article 1115, Civil Code; Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Property, 2018; Articles 111, 1134, & 1137, Civil Code)
135. Differentiate the counting of the prescriptive period between Positive easement and Negative
easement.
Positive Easement Negative Easement
From the day on which the owner of the From the day on which the owner of the dominant estate
dominant estate, or the person who may have forbade, by an instrument acknowledged before a notary
made use of the easement, commenced to public, the owner of the servient estate, from executing
exercise it upon the servient estate. an act which would be lawful without an easement.
(Article 621, Civil Code)
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137. State the instances rebutting the presumption of there being an easement of party wall (thus, instead
of a party wall, we have a wall exclusively owned by a single owner)
1. Whenever in the dividing wall of buildings, there is a window or opening;
2. Whenever the dividing wall is, on one side, straight and plumb on all its facement, and on the other, it has
similar conditions on the upper part, but the lower part slants or projects outward;
3. Whenever the entire wall is built within the boundaries of one of the estates;
4. Whenever the dividing wall bears the burden of the binding beams, floors and roof frame of one of the
buildings, but not those of the others;
5. Whenever the dividing wall between courtyards, gardens and tenements is constructed in such a way that
the coping sheds the water upon only one of the estates;
6. Whenever the dividing wall, being built of masonry, has stepping stones, which at certain intervals project
from the surface on one side only, but not on the other;
7. Whenever lands inclosed by fences or live hedges adjoin others which are not inclosed.
In all these cases, the ownership of the walls, fences or hedges shall be deemed to belong exclusively to the
owner of the property or tenement which has in its favor the presumption based on any of these signs. (Article
660, Civil Code; Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Property, 2018)
138. A executed a deed of donation for B who constructed a building on the subject land. It was
acknowledged before a notary public. Days after, A died. B then executed a deed acknowledged
before a notary public accepting the donation. Is the donation valid?
No. The law requires that the acceptance to be made in a public document must be done during the lifetime
of the donor. (Article 746 & 749, Civil Code)
139. A offered to donate his car to B. B called advising A that a letter of acceptance will be mailed to him,
yet the letter was never mailed. A later learned that B died.
a. Is there a perfected donation?
There was none. Donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing, but if the value of the same
exceeds P5k, both the donation and the acceptance must be made in writing. Assuming that the car was
worth less than P5k, the donation may be oral but the simultaneous delivery of the same is needed. Since
there was none, the donation was not perfected. (Art 748, NCC)
b. What if B mailed the acceptance letter, but it was received by A days after B’s death, will the
donation be valid?
No. Article 734 Civil Code provides that the donation is perfected the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee, hence, the death of B prior to the receipt of the acceptance letter would signify
that there was no perfection.
140. AAA requested his sibling BBB to donate 10sqm of his land which encroached on his balcony.
Thereafter, BBB and his wife signed a document written in English and was not understood by them.
AAA thereafter told them that the document was for the partition of the inherited land and transfer of
their respective shares, then they signed the document. It was later on discovered that the
instrument was a Deed of Donation. Is the Deed valid?
No. An agreement between the donor and the donee is essential like in any other contract. As such, the
requisites of a valid contract under Article 1318 of the Civil Code must concur, namely: (1) consent of the
contracting parties, that is consent to donate the subject land to AAAs; (2) object certain which is the subject
matter of the contract; (3) cause of the obligation which is established. Consent is absent in the instant case.
Consent, to be valid, must have the following requisites: (1) intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to
which it refers; (2) free; and (3) spontaneous. The parties' intention should be clear; otherwise, the donation
is rendered void in the absence thereof or voidable if there exists a vice of consent. BBBs did not give their
consent to the donation of their land to AAAs. Hence, no valid donation had transpired between the parties.
(Cardinez vs. Spouses Prudencio, G.R. No. 213001. August 4, 2021, J. Hernando)
141. A debtor tendered a check which constitutes partial payment in favor of his creditor. Upon the death
of the creditor, the administrator of his estate requested the balance of the payment from the debtor.
However, the debtor refused saying that there is a note at the back of the check that reads” in full
payment.”. Is this considered an act of donation?
Yes, if the same was written by the creditor. But if it was written by the debtor, then it only proves of his
intention and not necessarily the acceptance of such intent by the creditor. (Yam v. CA, GR No. 104726, 11 Feb
1999) As such, the notation cannot be considered as condonation from the creditor making the debtor’s
defense of full payment not be valid.
142. One of the conditions in the deed of donation stated: “That the DONEE shall not under any
circumstance or in any manner Lease, Let, Convey, Dispose, or Encumber the property herein
donated or any part or portion thereof to any person or entity, except with the prior and express
knowledge and approval of the DONOR, it being the desire and intention of the latter to have the said
property for the exclusive use of the said hospital.” Is the condition in the donation valid?
No. The provision is an undue restriction to the right of the Republic for unreasonable period of time. The
provision in the deed of conditional donation did not expressly state a period of restriction on the Republic's
28
right to dispose of the donated property. The donor could not unduly restrict the right of the donee to dispose
of the donated property perpetually or for an unreasonable period of time. The prohibition in the deed of
donation that the Republic cannot lease, let, convey, dispose or encumber the donated property without
specifying the duration of the restriction should be declared as an illegal or impossible condition within the
contemplation of Article 727 of the Civil Code as it is contrary to public policy. (Estate of Rodriguez vs. Republic,
G.R. No. 214590, April 27, 2022, J. Hernando)
143. A piece of land was donated by A to B with the condition that it shall be used to construct buildings
that shall house the offices of B and that the latter shall not sell, mortgage or encumber the property.
A Deed of Revocation was made on the ground that B violated the provision of non-encumbrance by
leasing part of the building to another. Did the lease negate the intended object of the donation
which would qualify as a breach?
No. Article 764 of Civil Code states that only one infraction or failure to perform is necessary to cancel a
contribution. Given the word "any of the conditions," its use must be limited to those situations that fall under
the obligations where there has been a serious and fundamental violation that has defeated the parties'
original intent. Here, the encumbrance was not perpetual and did not cover the entire donated lot. In order
for the breach to reach the threshold of substantiality and fundamentality, the breach should be of a
permanent character as to totally and perpetually deprive B of the use of the donated lot and the building that
it constructed. (Camarines Sur Teachers and Employees Association, Inc. v. Province of Camarines Sur, G.R. No. 199666; Oct 7,
2019).
Effectivity To take effect during the donor’s lifetime To take effect upon the
donor’s death
Formalities The donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing. Donation must be in
In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must the form of a will, with
be made in a public document, specifying therein the property all the formalities for
donated and the value of the charges which the donee must the validity.
satisfy.
29
It cannot be revoked without the consent of the donee except on grounds provided by law. (Article 760, 764 &
765, Civil Code)
149. What are the grounds for revocation of donation?
The grounds are:
1. Birth of a donor's child/ren (legitimate, legitimated or illegitimate) after the donation even though born after
his death; Appearance of a donor’s child who is missing and thought to be dead by the donor; or
Subsequent adoption by the donor of a minor child.
2. When the donee fails to comply with any of the conditions imposed by the donor.
3. By reason of ingratitude such as when: the donee commit some offense against the person, the honor or
the property of the donor, or his wife or children under his parental authority; when the donee imputes to
the donor any criminal offense or any act involving moral turpitude, even though he should prove it,
unless the crime or act has been committed against the donee himself, his wife, or children under his
authority; or when donee unduly refutes him support when the donee is legally or morally bound to give
support to the donor. (Articles 760, 764 & 765, Civil Code)
149. A parcel of land was donated with the condition that it will be used for a specific purpose. However,
there is no fixed period for its fulfillment. After 50 years, the same remained unfulfilled. May such
donation be revoked?
Yes. While the general rule is that in case the period is not fixed by the parties, the same must be fixed by
court before the obligation may be demanded, the period of 50 years was more than enough for the donee to
comply with the condition. (Central Philippine University v. CA, GR No. 112127, July 17,l 1995)
151. What is the prescriptive period of an action for annulment of a Deed of Donation which is adjudged
as void ab initio?
None. The action is imprescriptible. The Deed of Donation is an absolute nullity hence it is subject to attack
at any time. This is in accord with Article 1410 of the Civil Code which states that an action to declare the
inexistence of a void contract does not prescribe. (Cardinez vs. Spouses Prudencio, G.R. No. 213001. August 4, 2021, J.
Hernando)
152. What are the prescriptive periods for purposes of reduction of revocation of a donation?
Renunciation based on ingratitude 1 year from the time the donor had knowledge of the fact
Reduction of inofficious donations 10 years from the time the right of action accrues
(Article 769, Civil Code; Article 1144, Civil Code)
153. The decedent executed a deed of conditional donation in favor of the Republic over a parcel of land
for the purpose of constructing thereon a mental facility. The deed of conditional donation, expressly
provided for the automatic revocation and/or reversion in case of breach of any of the conditions
therein. Five out of the 32 hectares of land subject of the donation are being used by the Republic for
the operation of its mental hospital, while a portion of the land is occupied by the informal settlers. In
order to utilize the subject property exclusively for the use of the mental hospital, the Republic filed
an ejectment case against the informal settlers. Thereafter, a judgment favorable to the Republic was
rendered. It became final and executory in 1995. However, the Republic failed to have the Decision
executed by filing a motion for execution within five years or a motion to revive the judgment within
10 years from the finality of Civil Case. In 2007, the estate filed a complaint against the Republic for
revocation of the donation. Was the complaint filed within the prescriptive period?
Yes. The donation involved is an onerous one since the burden imposed upon the donee is to build a mental
hospital on the donated property. Thus, the provisions of the Civil Code on the rules on contracts shall
govern. Article 1144 of the Civil Code provides that all actions upon a written contract shall be brought within
ten (10) years from accrual of the right of action. The estate’s complaint filed in 2007 is well within the
prescriptive period, which is 10 years from the lapse of the period within which the Republic could file a
motion for revival of judgment of the Civil Case. The cause of action accrued only from the time of the
alleged violation of the Republic, that is, its failure to comply with its obligation to not lease, let, encumber or
dispose any portion of the donated property, i.e., its failure to move for execution or revival of judgment of the
Civil Case, which resulted in the continuous occupation of the informal settlers on a portion of the donated
property. (Estate of Rodriguez vs. Republic, G.R. No. 214590, April 27, 2022, J. Hernando)
154. AAAs, legitimate heirs of spouses CCC, intervened in the quieting of title and recovery of possession
case filed by the plaintiffs, who claim to be surviving heirs of spouses CCC, against BBBs. AAAs
prayed for the nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of estate of the spouses CCC. BBBs contend that
30
AAAs' right to recover the subject property had already been barred by laches for failure of herein
AAAs to pursue an action to recover the subject property from BBBs for at least 30 years to at most
50 years. AAAs failed to recover the subject property immediately because they were driven away
from the land by the nephews of the spouses CCC, DDD and EEE. Nonetheless, after the death of
DDD, AAA immediately went to the persons in possession of the subject property and they were
summoned by the Office for Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC) to settle. Prior to that, AAA
sought counsel on how to recover their land as he had no knowledge on legal matters. AAA’s
daughter testified that they went to the Register of Deeds to secure a copy of the Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) only to discover that it was a clean title as there were no annotations of any documents
of sale or any conveyances on it. Also, AAAs appeared before the barangay conciliation regarding
the recovery of the subject property, wherein a representative of several purchasers, offered them
land or money in exchange for not filing a case in court. However, AAAs did not agree with the
representative’s proposal. When the plaintiffs filed the action for quieting of title, the AAAs were yet
to gather and prepare more documents in support of their own case. Are AAAs barred by laches to
recover the ownership and possession of the subject property?
No. The foregoing acts of AAAs belie the claim that they slept on their rights. Although they did not
immediately file a case in court, this does not mean that laches already set in against their favor. It must be
pointed out that AAAs consistently asserted their rights as legal heirs of the spouses CCC outside of court
but due to certain circumstances, they were unable to properly file the same for the court's consideration.
Laches does not imply that a case in court must be filed in order that it may not be successfully invoked. It
merely requires "delay in asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant's conduct
and after he has an opportunity to sue." We cannot blame AAAs for not filing immediately in court since they
were still in the process of collating the necessary documents in support of their right. To note, they
immediately intervened in the case after having knowledge of the case filed by herein plaintiffs. This shows
that AAAs were serious in asserting their right against the herein plaintiffs, who were claiming to be the
alleged heirs of the spouses CCC and in the recovery of the subject property from BBBs. (Ende vs. Roman
Catholic Prelate of the Prelature Nullius of Cotobato, Inc., G.R. No. 191867. December 6, 2021, J. Hernando)
155. From 1985 until 1999, AAAs have been in peaceful possession of a 200-sq. m. property. On December
15, 1999, AAAs received a demand letter from BBB to vacate the property. On November 2000, AAAs
filed an action for quieting of title against BBB. Should the action be dismissed on the ground of
laches?
No, since the AAA’s continuous actual possession of the subject property has rendered their right to bring an
action for quieting of title imprescriptible. AAAs are not guilty of laches or estoppel considering that they
instituted the action immediately upon receipt of the knowledge of the claim over the premises. (Heirs of
Marquez vs. Heirs of Hernandez, G.R. No. 236826. March 23, 2022, J. Hernando)
156. May an action for reconveyance, on ground of fraud and false representation in the acquisition of
free patent and Original Certiticate of Title, still prosper despite the title's indefeasibility?
Yes. The principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title means that a certificate of title registered under the
Torrens System serves as proof of an incontrovertible title over the property in favor of the individual whose
name appears on the title which may only be cancelled, altered or modified through a direct attack where the
objective of the action is to annul or set aside the judgment or enjoin its enforcement. An action for
reconveyance based on fraud is a direct attack on a Torrens title. It follows that despite the finality accorded
to a Torrens title, reconveyance may prosper as an equitable remedy given to the rightful owner of a land
that was erroneously registered in the name of another. This action recognizes the validity of the registration
and its incontrovertible nature; it does not question the indefeasibility of the Torrens title. An allegation of
fraud in an action for reconveyance must have two requisites. First, that the individual seeking reconveyance
must prove entitlement or ownership over the property in question, and second, that fraud must be
established by clear and convincing evidence, not just based on mere surmises or conjectures. (Heirs of
Leonarda Latoja vs. Heirs of Gavino Latoja, G.R. No. 195500, March 17, 2021, J. Hernando)
157. Is a petition for nullity of deed of sale proper to attack the certificates of title of the purchasers?
No. Section 43 of Presidential Decree 1529 (PD 1529), or the Property Registration Decree, states that a
certificate of title shall not be subject to a collateral attack and cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. A collateral attack is prohibited because the integrity of
land titles and their indefeasibility are guaranteed by the Torrens system of registration. The Torrens system
was adopted precisely to quiet titles to lands and to put a stop forever to any question of legality of the titles,
except claims which were noted at the time of registration or which may arise subsequent thereto.
Certificates of title, being registered in the Torrens system, can only be attacked in an action expressly
instituted for that purpose. It cannot be assailed even incidentally in an action mainly seeking a different
relief, such as in a petition to nullify the deed of sale. (Garcia vs. Esclito, G.R. No. 207210. March 21, 2022, J. Hernando)
158. May the application for land registration filed by AAA, a domestic corporation, be granted?
No. AAA, as a private corporation, cannot apply for the registration of a land in its name due to the
prohibition under the 1987 Constitution against private corporations or associations acquiring alienable land
of the public domain. (Republic vs. Herederos de Ciriaco Chunaco Disteleria Incorporada, G.R. No. 200863. October 14, 2020, J.
Hernando)
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159. Is Implied resulting trust an exception to the Constitutional ban against ownership of Philippine
lands by a non-Filipino?
No. The 1987 Constitution is clear on the right of Filipinos to own lands in the Philippines to the exclusion of
foreigners: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except
to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Our
fundamental law dictates that non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of the
public domain, except only by way of legal succession. The primary purpose of the Constitutional provision is
the conservation of the national patrimony in the hands of Filipino citizens. Not even ownership in trust is
allowed. 57 Also, an implied trust simply is not a mode of legal succession. Their main distinction is that
implied trusts take effect upon agreement by the parties to constitute the same, whereby legal succession
ensue at the moment of death of the decedent. Moreover, there is no implied trust if the enforcement of the
trust would be against law or public policy. (Gaw vs. Ben Chua, G.R. No. 206404. February 14, 2022, J. Hernando)
160. What are the guidelines on the application of R.A. 11573 (An Act Improving the Confirmation Process
for Imperfect Land Titles, amending CA 141 and PD 1529?
1. RA 11573 shall apply retroactively to all applications for judicial confirmation of title which remain pending
as of September 1, 2021, or the date when RA 11573 took effect. These include all applications pending
resolution at the first instance before all Regional Trial Courts, and applications pending appeal before the
Court of Appeals.
2. Applications for judicial confirmation of title filed on the basis of the old Section 14(1) and 14(2) of PD
1529 and which remain pending before the Regional Trial Court or Court of Appeals as of September 1,
2021 shall be resolved following the period and manner of possession required under the new Section
14(1). Thus, beginning September 1, 2021, proof of "open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain not covered by
existing certificates of title or patents under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least twenty (20) years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation" shall be sufficient for purposes of
judicial confirmation of title, and shall entitle the applicant to a decree of registration.
In the interest of substantial justice, the Regional Trial Courts and Court of Appeals are hereby directed,
upon proper motion or motu proprio, to permit the presentation of additional evidence on land classification
status based on the parameters set forth in Section 7 of RA 1157. (Republic v. Pasig Rizal Co., Inc., G.R. No. 213207,
February 15, 2022)
161. The Philippine National Police (PNP) filed an application for land title registration before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). In support of its application, it submitted the tracing cloth plan, technical
descriptions of the subject lots, the approved sketch plan and the respective tax declarations of
subject lots. Should the PNP’s application for land title registration be granted despite failure to
submit a DENR certification stating that the land subject for registration is entirely within the
alienable and disposable zone?
No. The prevailing rule during the pendency of the PNP's application for registration of land title in the RTC
was that a DENR certification stating that the land subject for registration is entirely within the alienable and
disposable zone constitutes as substantial compliance, which the PNP failed to comply with. The prevailing
rule requires that "an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or [Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO)] Certification; and (2) a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records. In the instant case, the PNP did not submit a DENR Certification to the effect that the subject
lots are alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, which was the prevailing requirement. Even
Survey Plans prepared by the DENR, containing annotations that the subject lots are alienable, do not
constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the presumption that the property sought to be registered
belongs to the inalienable public domain. (Republic vs. Philippine National Police, G.R. No. 198277. February 8, 2021, J.
Hernando)
162. AAA maintains that the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Spouses BBB and CCC was valid since
there was a valuable consideration and an identified object of sale. It contends that at the time of the
sale, despite happening after the death of BBB, the then-surviving spouse, CCC, owned the
properties in his own right and through the waivers executed by their children in his favor. However,
Atty. DDD, its president and representative, did not diligently ascertain the genuineness of the
signatures of the owners-spouses, especially that of BBB's and merely relied on CCC
representations that BBB's signature was genuine. Can AAA claim the defense of being a buyer in
good faith when it purchased and paid the fair price for the properties absent any notice that the
sellers did not have the capacity to sell?
No. In Bautista v. Silva, the Court erected a standard to determine the good faith of the buyers dealing with a
seller who had title to and possession of the land but whose capacity to sell was restricted, in that the
consent of the other spouse was required before the conveyance, declaring that in order to prove good faith
in such a situation, the buyers must show that they inquired not only into the title of the seller but also into
the seller's capacity to sell. Thus, the buyers of conjugal property must observe two kinds of requisite
diligence, namely: (a) the diligence in verifying the validity of the title covering the property; and (b) the
diligence in inquiring into the authority of the transacting spouse to sell conjugal property in behalf of the
other spouse. AAA cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser for value since Atty. DDD, being a lawyer,
should have been more circumspect to determine if the Spouses both had the capacity to sell and if they
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voluntarily and validly signed the deeds of sale. He could have requested or even demanded to personally
talk to BBB in order to affirm if she consented to the disposition of the properties. If only Atty. DDD did his
due diligence, he would have discovered that BBB was already dead, if his claim that he had no idea about
her death prior to the sale is to be believed. (Arakor Construction and Development Corporation vs. Sta. Maria, G.R. No.
215006. January 11, 2021, J. Hernando)
163. AAA was the registered owner of the subject property. He died in 1939 leaving his wife, BBB, and
legitimate children, CCC and DDD. Subsequently, his wife, BBB, and other alleged heirs of AAA,
executed several extrajudicial settlements of estate to accommodate every buyer of a portion of the
subject property and executed several documents of disposition. The documents of sale and/or
disposition described the subject property as covered by free patent application in the name of AAA
until the issuance of OCT. From the above dispositions, not one has been registered or duly
annotated in its OCT. EEEs, the purchasers, disclosed that they were not able to register their
respective documents of sale or dispositions or have them duly annotated as it was contested by
various individuals. Hence, they relied on the title of the alleged heirs. Are EEEs considered
purchasers in good faith?
No. The purchasers should have examined the certificate of title and all factual circumstances necessary for
them to determine whether or not flaws existed that might invalidate their title, especially when these
purchasers acquired the subject property or a portion thereof from persons who are not the registered
owners and whose alleged rights were not registered or duly annotated on the title. Well-settled is the rule
that "a purchaser of real estate with knowledge of any defect or lack of title of the vendor cannot claim that
he has acquired title thereto in good faith as against the true owner of the land or interest therein." The same
rule also applies to those with knowledge of facts that should have put one on inquiry and investigation as
might be necessary to be acquainted with the defects in the title of the vendor, as in the case at bar. EEEs'
willful refusal to believe that a defect exists in the vendors' title or the possibility of its existence will not make
them innocent purchasers for value if a defect indeed occurs. A buyer of registered land is expected to act
with the diligence of a prudent man, otherwise, he or she cannot be deemed as a purchaser in good faith.
(Ende vs. Roman Catholic Prelate of the Prelature Nullius of Cotobato, Inc., G.R. No. 191867. December 6, 2021, J. Hernando)
164. Does the submission of a tax declaration illustrate conclusive proof of ownership?
No, it does not, but while the tax declaration is not conclusive proof of ownership over the subject land, it is
an indication however that the one who pays for and updates the tax declaration possesses the property in
the concept of an owner for nobody in his or her right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in
his or her actual or constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title
over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only
one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the
State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. (Spouses Ponce vs.
Aldanese, G.R. No. 216587. August 4, 2021, J. Hernando)
165. AAA inherited Lot A from his father and has been paying real property taxes under his name. The
Spouses BBB claim that they bought the land from AAA’ brother, CCC, and presented a tax
declaration but without the lot number for it was issued but AAA asserts that Lot B was sold instead,
which is adjacent to Lot A. The Spouses BBB encroached upon the entire portion of Lot A, but
refused to vacate despite AAA’ demands. The two deeds executed in favor of the Spouses BBB,
Absolute Sale and Confirmation of Oral Partition made no mention of Lot A as included in the
purchased land which they are aware of. Can the Spouses BBB claim absolute ownership over Lot
A?
No, the Spouses BBB cannot claim absolute ownership over Lot A. In the absence of competent evidence
showing that Lot A is covered by the Deed of Absolute Sale, the BBBs have no right to possess the property,
much less in the concept of an owner. BBBs failed to present any proof of ownership such as payment of
real property taxes or a certificate of title in their names over Lot A. True, the Spouses BBB presented tax
declaration to support their claim over the land. However, it did not state the lot number of the land for which
it was issued. Moreover, they cannot be deemed possessors in good faith since they were aware that the
subject land is not part of the land that CCC sold to them. Besides, assuming that CCC sold Lot A to the
BBBs, the sale would be invalid as it was owned by AAA. We have repeatedly stressed that "no one can give
what one does not have.”. "A seller can only sell what he or she owns, or that which he or she does not own
but has authority to transfer, and a buyer can only acquire what the seller can legally transfer.” (Spouses Ponce
vs. Aldanese, G.R. No. 216587. August 4, 2021, J. Hernando)
166. What are the requisites that must be complied with for an order for reconstitution to be issued?
The following requisites must be complied with for an order for reconstitution to be issued: (a) that the
certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient
and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the
registered owner of the property or had an interest therein; ( d) that the certificate of title was in force at the
time it was lost and destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and boundaries of the property are
substantially the same as those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title. (Republic vs. Abellanosa, G.R.
No. 205817. October 6, 2021, J. Hernando)
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167. What are the sources or bases of the original certificates of title for filing the petition for
reconstitution?
Section 2 of RA No. 26, otherwise known as An Act Providing a Special Procedure for the Reconstitution of
Torrens Certificate of Title Lost or Destroyed, enumerates the acceptable bases for the judicial reconstitution
of an existing and valid original certificate of Torrens title:
a. The owner's duplicate of the certificate of title;
b. The co-owner's, mortgagee's, or lessee's duplicate of the certificate of title;
c. A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian
thereof;
d. An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the
original certificate of title was issued;
e. A document, on file in the registry of deeds, by which the property, the description of which is given in said
document, is mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said document showing that
its original had been registered; and
f. Any other document which, in the judgment of the court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting
the lost or destroyed certificate of title. (Republic vs. Abellanosa, G.R. No. 205817. October 6, 2021, J. Hernando)
168. AAA presented to court the owner’s duplicate copy of title in order to annul the decision of Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in reconstituting the title of the same property. Should the RTC decision
reconstituting the subject title be annulled?
Yes. This is on the ground that the first owner's duplicate copy was never lost but was in fact in possession
of AAA. Reconstitution presupposes the existence of an original certificate of title which was lost or
destroyed. If there was no loss or destruction, there is actually nothing to reconstitute. When the owner's
duplicate certificate of title was not actually lost or destroyed, but is in fact in the possession of another
person, the reconstituted title is void because the court that rendered the order of reconstitution had no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. It is, therefore, the fact of the loss or existence of the owner's
duplicate certificate, and not whether the process prescribed by applicable law was successfully complied
with, that determines the presence or lack of jurisdiction of the trial court. (Gaoiran vs. CA, G.R. No. 215925. March 7,
2022, J. Hernando)
169. Is the determination of heirship a prerequisite before one can file a civil action to enforce ownership
rights by virtue of succession?
No. Given the clear dictates of the Civil Code that the rights of the heirs to the inheritance vest immediately
at the precise moment of the decedent's death even without judicial declaration of heirship, no prior judicial
declaration of heirship is necessary before an heir can file an ordinary civil action to enforce ownership rights
acquired by virtue of succession through the nullification of deeds divesting property or properties forming
part of the estate and reconveyance thereof to the estate or for the common benefit of the heirs of the
decedent. The rule is: unless there is a pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's
estate or for the determination of heirship, the compulsory or intestate heirs may commence an ordinary civil
action to declare the nullity of a deed or instruments and for recovery of property, or any other action in the
enforcement of their ownership rights acquired by virtue of Succession, without the necessity of a prior and
separate judicial declaration of their status as such. The ruling of the trial court shall only be in relation to the
cause of action of the ordinary civil action, i.e., the nullification of a deed or instrument, and recovery or
reconveyance of property, which ruling is binding only between and among the parties. (Ende vs. Roman Catholic
Prelate of the Prelature Nullius of Cotobato, Inc., G.R. No. 191867, December 6, 2021, J. Hernando)
170. Are the liabilities of spouses AAA as sellers of a property in a contract of sale transmissible to their
heirs?
Yes, the death of spouses AAA did not extinguish their contractual obligations since as a rule, a party's
contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors. Art. 776 of the Civil Code states: “the
inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not extinguished by his/her
death.” A contract of sale and contract to sell involving land or immovable property involve patrimonial rights
and obligations, which by their nature are essentially transmissible or transferrable. Thus, the heirs of the
seller and the buyer are bound thereby as they are not deemed non-privies to the contract of sale or contract
to sell, as the case may be. (Heirs of Gonzales vs. Spouses Basas, G.R. No. 206847. June 15, 2022, J. Hernando)
34
(Arts. 17, 815, 816 & 817, Civil Code)
176. Compare the Formal Requisites of a Notarial Will from a Holographic Will.
For a Notarial Will, it must be For Holographic
Wills, it must be
1.Must be in writing 1.Must be in writing
2.Must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator 2.Must be executed
3.subscribed at the end by the testator himself or by testator’s name written by in a language or
some other person in his presence and by his express direction; dialect known to
4.Attested and subscribed by 3 or more credible witnesses in the presence of the the testator
testator and of one another; 3.Entirely written by
5.All of the pages are signed, except the last, on the left margin by the testator or the hand of the
the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses; testator himself;
6.All pages are numbered correlatively in letters places on the upper part of each 4.Entirely dated by
page; and the hand of the
7.Attestation clause executed by the witnesses showing the number of pages testator himself;
used, the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, and that and
the instrumental witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all the pages in the 5.Signed by the
presence of the testator and of one another. hand of the
8.Moreover, it must be properly acknowledged before a notary public by the testator himself.
testator and the witnesses.
(Arts. 804, 805, 806 and 810, Civil Code)
177. The attestation clause omitted to mention the number of pages comprising the will. Nevertheless, the
acknowledgment portion of the will supplied the omission by stating that the will has five pages, to
wit: "Ang HULING HABILING ito ay binubuo ng lima (5) na dahon, kasama ang dahong kinaroroonan
ng Pagpapatunay at Pagpapatotoong ito." Is there substantial compliance with Art. 805 of the Civil
Code?
Yes, such substantially complied with Article 805 of the Civil Code. Mere reading and observation of the will,
without resorting to other extrinsic evidence, yields the conclusion that there are actually five pages even if
the said information was not provided in the attestation clause. When the number of pages was provided in
the acknowledgment portion instead of the attestation clause, "[t]he spirit behind the law was served though
the letter was not. Although there should be strict compliance with the substantial requirements of the law in
order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should be brushed aside when they do
not affect its purpose and which, when taken into account, may only defeat the testator's will." (Tanchano v.
Santos, G.R. No. 204793, June 08, 2020, J. Hernando)
180. Is Article 808, which requires reading twice to the blind testator, applicable to illiterates?
Yes. Article 808 covers not just the blind but also illiterates, the same case also recognized an exception to
the rule - substantial compliance. (Guia v. Cosico, Jr., G.R. No. 246997, May 05, 2021)
181. AAA was born with a physical disability known in the locality as "lumpo", which barred her from
attending school nor learning to read and write. When AAA's mother passed away, she was left in the
custody of her aunt, BBB. At the age of 64, AAA asked for Atty. CCC’s assistance in the disposition
of her properties through preparation in her last will. In the presence of her 3 notarial witnesses, Atty.
CCC read the contents of the document to AAA and carefully explained to her its effects and
consequences. He then asked her if she fully understood its contents to which AAA confirmed. BBB
was left with all of AAA’s properties. When AAA died, years later BBB died. DDD, the adopted child of
BBB, filed a Petition for probate of AAA’s will and for her appointment as administrator of the estate,
to which, AAA’s half siblings opposed claiming that the last will was fatally defective for it was not
read twice: once by one of the witnesses, and by the notary public pursuant to Art. 808 of the Civil
35
Code. Did the last will and testament of AAA comply with Art. 808 of the Civil Code?
Yes. Notably, Atty. CCC read and explained the contents of the last will and testament to AAA. Meanwhile,
the notarial witnesses listened and understood the explanation of Atty. CCC. It is also undisputed that AAA
made no denial or correction to what she had heard. Though a Supreme Court case seemingly extended the
application of Article 808 to cover not just the blind but also illiterates, the same case also recognized an
exception to the rule - substantial compliance. We find this exception applicable here. Substantial
compliance is acceptable where the purpose of the law has been satisfied, the reason being that the
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills are intended to protect the testator from all kinds of fraud and
trickery but are never intended to be so rigid and inflexible as to destroy the testamentary privilege. (Guia vs.
Cosico, G.R. No. 246997, May 05, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])
188. AAA instructed her sister BBB, wife of CCC, to transfer her properties to AAA’s grandchildren
(DDDs), upon her death. BBB executed a Declaration of Trust with the conformity of CCC,
acknowledging that she held in trust the three parcels of land in favor of DDDs. Eventually, BBB
caused the issuance of new TCTs in her name and when she died, CCC purportedly had possession
over the properties and refused to surrender the titles to DDDs. Are DDDs entitled to the
reconveyance of the subject properties in their favor?
Yes. Jurisprudence provides that "[a] trust is the legal relationship between one person having an equitable
ownership of property and another person owning the legal title to such property, the equitable ownership of
the former entitling him to the performance of certain duties and the exercise of certain powers by the latter."
In this case, BBB, as the trustee, had the duty to properly manage the properties for the benefit of the
beneficiaries, DDDs. Notably, AAA is not a party to this trust and he only signed the document evidencing
the trust as BBB's husband. Nonetheless, there is no dispute that AAA readily admitted the due execution
and validity of the Declaration of Trust. Thus, as a signatory, he is bound by the intent and contents of the
said document and thus should honor the directives contained therein. (Daniel vs. Magkaisa, G.R. No. 203815.
December 7, 2020, J. Hernando)
36
Surviving Spouse
Concurring
Illegitimate Children
(Article. 887, Civil Code)
37
194. What are the grounds for disinheritance?
Children and Descendants Parents and Ascendants Spouse
(legitimate and illegitimate) (legitimate and illegitimate)
(1) convicted of an attempt against the life of the testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or
ascendants;
(2) has accused the testator of a crime for which the law prescribes imprisonment for six years or more,
if the accusation has been found groundless;
(3) by fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue influence causes the testator to make a will or to change
one already made;
(4) A refusal without justifiable cause to (4) The refusal to support the (4) Unjustifiable refusal to
support the parent or ascendant who children or descendants without support the children or the
disinherits such child or descendant; justifiable cause; other spouse.
(5) convicted of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the testator; (5) spouse has given
cause for legal separation
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries (6) The loss of parental authority (6) When the spouse has
with it the penalty of civil interdiction. for causes specified in this Code; given grounds for the loss
(756, 853, 674a) of parental authority;
(7) Maltreatment of the testator by word (7) When the parents have
or deed, by the child or descendant; abandoned their children or
induced their daughters to live a
corrupt or immoral life, or
attempted against their virtue;
Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary disposition Preterition "consists in the omission in the
depriving any compulsory heir of his share in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of
legitime for a cause authorized by law. them, either because they are not mentioned
therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited."
There is some legal cause Law presumes that there has been merely an
oversight or mistake on the part of the testator
If valid, compulsory heir is totally excluded from Omitted heir gets not only his legitime but also his
inheritance share in the free portion not disposed if by way of
If disinheritance is not lawfully made, the compulsory legacies and devises.
heir is merely restored to his legitime. Annuls the institution of the heir totally. The
In disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of annulment is in toto, unless in the will there are, in
the estate of which the disinherited heirs have been addition, testamentary dispositions in the form of
illegally deprived. devises or legacies.
(Article. 918, Civil Code, Nuguid v. NUguid, G. R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966)
38
197. Can AAA, the nonmarital child of BBB, who was a predeceased marital child of the decedent inherit
from her grandfather’s estate?
Yes. The Court adopted a construction of Article 992 that makes children, regardless of the circumstances of
their births, qualified to inherit from their direct ascendants — such as their grandparent — by their right of
representation. Both marital and nonmarital children, whether born from a marital or nonmarital child, are
blood relatives of their parents and other ascendants. However, this ruling will apply when the nonmarital
child has a right of representation to their parent's share in her grandparent's legitime. It is silent on collateral
relatives where the nonmarital child may inherit by themself. (Aquino vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 208912, December 07, 2021
[Landmark Case Q&A])
200. What are the rules on the successional rights of adopted children and adopting parents?
In testate and intestate succession, the adopters and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession
without distinction from legitimate filiations. However, if the adoptees and their biological parents have left a
will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern. (Section 43, RA 11642
201. What are the requisites before one can accept or repudiate an inheritance?
1. Certainty of death of the person from whom he is to inherit, and
2. Certainty of the right to inheritance. (Article 1043, Civil Code)
Made in a One resulting from acts by which the Within thirty days after the court has issued an
public or intention to accept is necessarily implied, order for the distribution of the estate in
private or which one would have no right to do accordance with the Rules of Court, the heirs,
document. except in the capacity of an heir. devisees and legatees shall signify to the
court having jurisdiction whether they accept
Acts of mere preservation or provisional or repudiate the inheritance.
administration do not imply an
acceptance of the inheritance if, through If they do not do so within that time, they are
such acts, the title or capacity of an heir deemed to have accepted the inheritance.
has not been assumed.
(Articles 1049, 1057, Civil Code)
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203. When is inheritance deemed accepted?
1. If the heirs sells, donates, or assigns his right to a stranger, or to his co-heirs, or to any of them;
2. If the heir renounces the same, even though gratuitously, for the benefit of one or more of his co-heirs;
3. If he renounces it for a price in favor of all his co-heirs indiscriminately; but if this renunciation should be
gratuitous, and the co-heirs in whose favor it is made are those upon whom the portion renounced should
devolve by virtue of accretion, the inheritance shall not be deemed as accepted. (Article 1050, Civil Code)
40
211. Distinguish pure obligation, conditional obligation, and obligation with a period.
Pure Obligation Conditional Obligation Obligation with a
Period
An obligation whose An obligation subject to a condition and the An obligation whose
performance does not effectivity of which is subordinated to the fulfillment consequences are
depend upon a future or or nonfulfillment of a future and uncertain event, or subjected in one way
uncertain event, or upon upon a past event unknown to the parties. In or another to the
a past event or upon a conditional obligations, the acquisition of rights and expiration of said
past event unknown to the loss of rights already acquired depends upon period or term.
the parties, demandable the happening of the event that constitutes the
at once condition.
(Articles 1179, 1181, Civil Code); Obligations and Contracts, Pineda, 2009; 8 Manresa 158)
213. What are the difference between suspensive or resolutory condition and period?
Condition Period
Suspensive It may or may not happen, hence It is certain that it will happen; just uncertain
uncertain whether there as to when it will happen.
Resolutory It is not certain if the obligation will It is certain that it will terminate at a future
terminate at all. time.
(De Leon, 2014)
214. What are the effects of fulfillment of suspensive condition and resolutory condition?
Real Obligations
Suspensive condition Resolutory Condition
GR: Reverts to the day of constitution of the obligation a. Mutual restitution
XPNs: b. Obligation is extinguished
1. In reciprocal obligations, the fruits and interests c. In case of loss, deterioration or improvement
shall be deemed to have been mutually compensated; of the thing, Article 1189, with respect to the
b. In unilateral obligations, the debtor appropriates the debtor, shall be applied to the party.
fruits and interest received before the fulfillment of the
condition unless from the nature and circumstances of
the obligation it should be inferred that the intention
of the person constituting the same was different.
Personal Obligations
The court will determine the retroactive day of the The courts shall determine, in each case, the
obligation. retroactive effect of the condition that has been
complied with.
(Articles 1187, 1190, Civil Code)
215. In a conditional obligation where the condition was not fulfilled, may the creditor validly demand that
the debtor perform his obligation?
Yes in the case of constructive fulfillment where the debtor voluntarily prevented the happening of the
condition, it is deemed fulfilled. (Article 1186, Civil Code) The two requisites must be present:
1. Intent of the obligor to prevent fulfillment of the condition;
2. Actual prevention of compliance (International Hotel Corporation vs. Joaquin, and Suarez, G.R. No. 15836, April 10, 2013)
Note: Mere intention of the debtor to prevent the happening of the condition, or to place ineffective obstacles
to its compliance, without actually preventing the fulfillment, is insufficient. (Villamil v. Sps. Erguiza. G.R. 195999,
2019)
216. Are the following obligations valid? If yes, when are they demandable?
Obligation Is it valid? When
demandable?
The debtor promises Yes. When the debtor binds himself to pay when his When the definite
to pay as soon as he means permit him to do so, the obligation shall be deemed period set by the
has the means to pay to be one with a period, subject to the provisions of article court arrives.
1197.
The debtor promises No. When the fulfillment of the condition depends upon the --
to pay when he likes sole will of the debtor, the conditional obligation shall be
void.
The debtor promises Yes. If it depends upon chance or upon the will of a third Upon the
to pay when his son person, the obligation shall take effect in conformity with fulfillment of the
becomes a chef the provisions of this Code. condition
41
The debtor promises Yes. Obligations for whose fulfillment a day certain has Upon the arrival of
to pay on Christmas been fixed, shall be demandable only when that day the period
2025 comes.
(Articles 1180, 1182, 1192, 1197, Civil Code)
The creditor cannot be bound to accept before the The creditor cannot enforce or demand payment
arrival of the period, but the debtor can be bound to before the period fixed. However the debtor may
perform waive the period and pay in advance.
(Articles 1196, 1236, Civil Code; Lopez v Ochoa, G.R. No. L-7955. May 30, 1958)
42
As to the impossibility Only the impossibility of all the The impossibility of the principal
of performance of one prestation due without fault of the prestation is sufficient to extinguish
of the prestation on the debtor extinguishes the obligation the obligation, even if the substitute
extinguishment of the is possible
obligation If there had already been a
communication of choice, the
obligation has already been simple.
The lost of the chosen prestation
extinguishes the obligation
As to effect of loss of When the fault is: If the loss happened BEFORE
the prestation substitution, and the prestation lost is
Due to the fault of the debtor, if the the SUBSTITUTE, the obligation is
right belongs to the debtor, he shall not extinguished
perform remaining obligations without
liability for damages. If the prestation lost is the
PRINCIPAL, the obligation is
Due to the fault of the debtor, if the extinguished.
right of choice belongs to the creditor,
he can demand the value of thing lost If the loss happened AFTER
plus damages; or choose from the substitution, and the prestation lost is
remaining things plus damages SUBSTITUTE, the obligation is
extinguished.
Due to the fault of the creditor, if the
right of choice belongs to the debtor; If the loss happened AFTER
he may rescind the obligation plus substitution, and the prestation lost is
damages; or perform one of the PRINCIPAL, the obligation is not
remaining prestations plus damages extinguished.
(Articles 1199 to 1206, Civil Code)
It is one in which each of the debtors is liable only for a It is one in which the debtor is liable for the
proportionate part of the debt or each creditor is entitled entire obligation or each creditor is entitled to
only to a proportionate part of the credit. There are as demand the whole obligation. If there is only
many obligations as there are debtors multiplied by the one obligation, it is a solidary obligation.
number of creditors
(Articles 1207, 1208, Civil Code; Tolentino, 1991; )
43
prejudice to that solidary creditor’s liability for the shares of other solidary creditors. (Articles 1214, 1215, 1216,
1217, 1219, 1222 Civil Code)
227. AAA, BBB, and CCC are solidary debtors. Up to what extent may AAA, a solidary debtor be
compelled to pay when:
a. The creditor condoned BBB’s entire share in the debt?
AAA may be compelled to pay the remaining balance except for what has been condoned by the creditor.
The remission made by the creditor of the share which affects one of the solidary debtors does not release
the latter from his responsibility toward the co debtor, in case the debt had been totally paid by anyone of
them before the remission was effected (Article 1219, Civil Code)
b. CCC is insolvent?
AAA may be compelled to pay the entire amount of the debt. When one of the solidary debtors cannot,
because of his insolvency, reimburse his share to the debtor paying the obligation, such share shall be borne
by all his co-debtors, in proportion to the debt of each. (Article 1217, par 3 Civil Code)
228. What is the remedy of a creditor when the debtor promised to pay “once his means permit?”
Under Article 1180 of the Civil Code, when the debtor binds himself to pay when his means permit him to do
so, the obligation shall be deemed to be one with a period. If the obligation does not fix a period, but from its
nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration
thereof. The courts shall also fix the duration of the period when it depends upon the will of the debtor. (Article
1197, Civil Code)
229. What is the test in determining whether the obligation is divisible or not?
The test is whether the obligation is capable of partial performance.
GR: The creditor cannot be compelled to accept partial performance.
XPNs:
1. If stipulated;
2. If the obligation is divisible;
3. If the obligation is partially liquidated and partially unliquidated, the liquidated portion may already be
performed; or
4. An obligation which would require a number of days to be performed, it may be considered divisible by
operation of law.
Note: The indivisibility of an obligation does not necessarily give rise to solidarity. Nor does solidarity of itself
imply indivisibility (Article 1210, Civil Code; Pineda, 2009)
231. Can the penalty be imposed on top of damages and payment for interest?
GR: No. The penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages and payment of interest in case of
non-compliance
XPNs:
1. There is an express provision to that effect;
2. The obligor refuses to pay the penalty; or
3. The obligor is guilty of fraud in nonfulfillment (Article 1226, Civil Code)
232. X owes P200,000 to Y, which is secured by a real estate mortgage. Y renounced his right to the
mortgage. Can he still seek payment for the obligation? Why?
Yes. The renunciation of the accessory does not extinguish the principal obligation. The Civil Code provides
that the renunciation of the principal debt shall extinguish the accessory obligations; but the waiver of the
latter shall leave the former in force. Here, what was renounced was the accessory. Hence, the principal
remains. (Article 1296, Civil Code)
234. Who has the authority to effect payment and compel the creditor to accept it?
1. Person in whose favour the obligation has been constituted;
2. His successor in interest;
3. Any person authorized to receive it; (Article 1240, Civil Code)
4. Third persons who have a material interest in the fulfilment of the obligation. (Article 1236, Civil Code)
Note: Payment made to one having apparent authority to receive the money will, as a rule, be treated as
though actual authority had been given for its receipt. Likewise, if payment is made to one who by law is
44
authorized to act for the creditor, it will work as a discharge (Sps. Miniano v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 172825, October 11,
2012)
235. What is the rule when a third person pays for the obligation?
GR: The creditor is not bound to accept payment or performance by a third person.
XPNs:
1. When made by a third person who has interest in the fulfillment of the obligation; or
2. Contrary stipulation (Article 1236, Civil Code)
237. What is the rule when payment is made to anyone who has no authority to receive the payment?
GR: Void
XPNs:
1. It redounded to the benefit of the creditor. Such benefit need not be proven if:
a. after the payment, the third person acquires the creditor's rights;
b. the creditor ratifies the payment to the third person;
c. by the creditor's conduct, the debtor has been led to believe that the third person had authority to
receive the payment.
2. Payment made in good faith to any person in possession of the credit.
3. When without notice of assignment, he pays the original creditor. (Article 1240, 1241, 1242, Civil Code; NPC v
Ibrahim, G.R. No. 168732, June 29, 2007)
45
said money Note: This is
obligation. NOT a special
form of
payment.
Requisites There must be the 1. Plurality of Debts; 1. There is a debt due;
performance of the 2. Partial or relative 2. That the
prestation in lieu of insolvency of the consignation has been
payment which may debtor; and made either because
consist in the 3. Acceptance of the the creditor to whom
delivery of a cession by the the tender of payment
corporeal thing or a creditors was made
real right or a credit refused to accept the
against the third payment without just
person cause or because any
2. There must be of the causes stated
some difference by the law for effective
between the consignation without
prestation due and previous tender of
that which is given payment exists;
in substitution 3. That previous notice
3. There must be of the consignation
an agreement had been given to the
between the persons interested in
creditor and debtor the fulfillment of the
that the obligation obligation;
is immediately 4. That the thing or
extinguished (to the amount due had been
extent of agreed placed at the disposal
valuation) by of judicial authority;
reason of the and
performance of a 5. That after
prestation different consignation had been
from that due. made, the persons
interested in fulfillment
of the obligation had
been
notified.
Is the Yes Yes Not Necessarily
consent of
the creditor
necessary?
Is the Yes. None. The Creditors Not necessarily.
transfer of are merely constituted
ownership as agents to sell the
necessary properties
upon the
delivery of
the debtor to
the creditor
Effect as to Total, unless it is Up to the extent of net Total if the payment
extinguishm not the clear proceeds, unless it is was accepted by the
ent of the intention of the not the clear intention creditor, unless the
obligation parties of the parties creditor made
reservation if the
payment is insufficient.
46
which is not a mode of
extinguishment.
Financial Not necessarily in a Debtor must be -- --
status of the state of financial insolvent
debtor difficulty
(Articles 1232 to 1261, Civil Code, Tolentino, 1991; Filinvest vs. Philippine Acetyline, G.R. No. L-50449, January 30, 1982; De Leon,
2014)
240. What are the requisites for dation in payment to extinguish an obligation?
1. There must be the performance of the prestation in lieu of payment (animo solvendi) which may consist in
the delivery of a corporeal thing or a real right or a credit against the third person;
2. There must be some difference between the prestation due and that which is given in substitution (aliud
pro alio);
3. There must be an agreement between the creditor and debtor that the obligation is immediately
extinguished by reason of the performance of a prestation different from that due. (Lo vs. KJS
ECO-FORMWORK System Phil., Inc., G.R. No. 149420, October 8, 2003).
242. AAA received a loan from XXX Corporation, but he failed to repay it. He turned in his other two motor
vehicles to the corporation, which will sell them and use the profits to pay off his loan. However, XXX
Corporation never consented, or at least intended, that the mere delivery to, and acceptance by it, of
the motor vehicle be construed as actual payment. Was the duty extinguished by the dacion en
pago?
No. In dacion en pago, as a special mode of payment, the debtor offers another thing to the creditor who
accepts it as equivalent of payment of an outstanding debt. The undertaking really partakes in one sense of
the nature of sale, that is, the creditor is really buying the thing or property of the debtor, payment for which is
to be charged against the debtor's debt. As such, the essential elements of a contract of sale, namely,
consent, object certain, and cause or consideration must be present. The mere turning over of the two
motored vehicles by AAA to XXX Corporation does not constitute dation in payment or dacion en pago in the
absence, express or implied, of the true intention of the parties. (Filinvest vs. Philippine Acetyline, G.R. No. L-50449,
January 30, 1982)
243. What are the circumstances when the debtor shall be released from responsibility by the
consignation of the thing or sum due?
1. If the creditor to whom tender of payment has been made refuses without just cause to accept it
2. When the creditor is absent or unknown, or does not appear at the place of payment;
3. When he is incapacitated to receive the payment at the time it is due;
4. When, without just cause, he refuses to give a receipt;
5. When two or more persons claim the same right to collect;
6. When the title of the obligation has been lost. (Article 1256, Civil Code; Spouses Cacayorin v. Armed Forces and Police
Mutual Benefit Association, Inc., G.R. No. 171298, April 15, 2013).
245. Is payment by check (including cashier's check) considered payment in a legal tender? Can a
creditor be compelled to accept them?
Personal checks, cashier’s or managers checks are not legal tender.
GR: A creditor cannot be compelled to accept them as payment.
XPNs:
1. Such is stipulated as the mode of payment.
2. If the creditor accepts the check or no prompt objection to the form of payment is made. (Pabugais v.
Sahijwani, G.R. No. 156846, 2004)
246. When can the delivery of a check result in the payment effect?
When payment in check is delivered and accepted, it produces the effect of payment only when the check is
cleared (retroacts to the date the check was deposited) and the funds are transferred to the account of the
creditor. Stale checks (those not presented for payment within 6 months from date of check) do not produce
the effect of payment and debtor can be required to issue a new check or pay in cash since the obligation is
not yet deemed paid. Debtor cannot however be liable for interest or penalty and cannot be declared in
default since creditor could have immediately presented it for payment. It is only in cases where the value is
impaired through creditor’s fault (i.e., creditor misplaced the check and someone else encashed it), that the
47
debtor is deemed to have paid his obligation without having to issue a new check or paying in cash.
(Evangelista v. Screenex, Inc., G.R. No. 211564, 2017)
248. The Bank debited from AAA's savings and current accounts some amounts to offset its (AAA's)
outstanding obligation with the Bank under a loan agreement. The Bank averred that since AAA
defaulted in its obligations to the Bank as embodied in a Credit Agreement and Promissory Note, its
entire obligation immediately became due and demandable without need of demand or notice. It
asserted that since the Bank and AAA were creditors and debtors of each other, legal compensation
already took effect. It did not however specify the date when AAA defaulted or pinpoint which
installment it failed to pay. Did legal compensation take place ipso jure as between the Bank and
AAA?
No. It is settled that compensation is a mode of extinguishing to the concurrent amount the debts of persons
who in their own right are creditors and debtors of each other. Article 1279 provides that in order that
compensation may be proper, it is necessary that the two debts be due and that they be liquidated and
demandable. The Bank failed to specify the date when AAA actually defaulted in its obligation or particularly
pinpoint which installment it failed to pay. In this case, the time of default and the amount due were not
specific and particular. Without this information, a simple arithmetic computation cannot possibly be done
without risking errors especially with regard to the application of interest and penalties. (Banco de Oro Unibank,
Inc. vs. Ypil, G.R. No. 212024. October 12, 2020, J. Hernando)
249. Can a creditor invoke compensation to set-off the payment of the sureties to answer for the
principal’s interest without the consent of the sureties?
No, the creditor may not set-off the amounts without the consent of the sureties because consent is required
for conventional compensation. Neither can the creditor invoke legal compensation because the same
requires each of the debtors to be bound principally, and in the case, while the sureties are directly liable for
their principal’s loan, their liability stems not from a principal contract, but a secondary one, i.e., Deed of
Suretyship. (Spouses Genotiva vs. Equitable-PCI Bank, G.R. No. 213796. June 28, 2021, J. Hernando)
250. AAA entered into a Construction Agreement with BBB for the Exposition Theme Park. On an even
date, CCC submitted a Materials Only Proposal to BBB for the supply of materials in constructing a
special Philippine flag structure for the Expo, which BBB accepted. The materials were shipped.
Subsequently, BBB submitted to AAA a proposal for the design, supply, and installation of the flag
structure using CCC's spaceframe subject to the following terms and conditions: (a) full payment of
the imported CCC spaceframe structures upon its delivery on-site; (b) 50% payment of installation
and lighting of spaceframe structures upon receipt of the notice to proceed while the remaining 50%
shall be paid. In a letter, CCC was allowed by BBB to collect payment directly from the AAA as
requested by the former. CCC made a final demand from BBB, but to no avail, hence, remained
unpaid for the value of the spaceframe. Did BBB's approval of CCC's request to collect directly from
the AAA extinguish BBB's obligation to pay CCC by way of novation?
No. Under the Civil Code, in order that an obligation may be extinguished by another which substitute the
same, it is imperative that it be so declared in unequivocal terms, or that the old and the new obligations be
on every point incompatible with each other. Novation which consists in substituting a new debtor in the
place of the original one, may be made even without the knowledge or against the will of the latter, but not
without the consent of the creditor. First, there is nothing in the letters that unequivocally states that the
obligation of BBB to pay CCC would be extinguished. Second, there is also no mention that CCC would
substitute or subrogate BBB as AAA's payee/obligee as the letters merely show that CCC was allowed by
BBB to try collecting from AAA directly. Lastly, using the test of incompatibility, BBB's non-objection to CCC's
request to collect from AAA directly is not incompatible with the obligation of BBB to pay CCC. It merely
provided an alternative mode in collecting payment to CCC, which is not even valid as far as AAA is
concerned since the latter did not even consent to the same, not to mention there is no existing contractual
relationship between CCC and AAA. If the exchange of letters between CCC and BBB was intended to
novate the original agreement between the parties, AAA must have first agreed to the substitution of CCC as
the new payee/creditor, at least to the extent of the amount representing the payment for the flag. The
exchange of letters must have also stated in clear and unequivocal terms that it has replaced the criminal
obligation of BBB to CCC. Neither of these circumstances is present in this case. Since there was clearly no
novation, BBB's obligation to CCC remains valid and existing. (Asian Construction and Development Corporation vs.
Mero Structures, Inc., G.R. No. 221147. September 29, 2021, J. Hernando)
48
251. Would the proposal of an entrustee for a staggered mode of returning the money representing the
proceeds of the sale of the goods/items tantamount to a “novation” or a change of terms of the trust
receipt agreement as to blunt the ill-effects of the breach and reduce the crime of Estafa into a mere
civil liability?
No. A necessary element of novation is the cancellation of the old obligation by the new one, which may be
effected expressly or impliedly. It is never presumed and must be proven as a fact. There is an express
novation if the new obligation unequivocally declares that it extinguishes or substitutes the old obligation; on
the other hand, there is an implied novation if the old and the new obligations are on every point
incompatible with each other. The test of incompatibility is whether the two contracts can stand together,
each one having an independent existence. The incompatibility must take place in any of the essential
elements of the obligation, such as its object, cause or principal conditions thereof; otherwise, the change
would be merely modificatory in nature and insufficient to extinguish the original obligation. (Chua vs. Secretary of
Justice, G.R. No. 214960. June 15, 2022, J. Hernando)
252. AAA claims that she and her husband owned three (3) parcels of land: Lot A, Lot B, and Lot C. The
parties entered into a Compromise Agreement prepared by AAA’s lawyer which stated that Lot A will
belong to AAA and Lot B will belong to BBB. The Compromise Agreement was approved by the trial
court in its January 17, 2008 Decision which became final and a Writ of Execution was subsequently
issued. On July 8, 2008, AAA filed a motion to set aside the order. She argues that there was no
meeting of the minds of parties since she intended to transfer Lot C and not Lot B which was
erroneously reflected on the Compromise Agreement. Is the compromise agreement void?
No. Article 1305 of the Civil Code provides that a contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons,
whereby one is bound to give something or to render some service to the other. A valid contract requires the
concurrence of the essential elements pursuant to Article 1318 which are: consent of the contracting parties,
object certain, and cause of the obligation. The Compromise Agreement was clear that the contracting
parties mutually agreed to transfer to each other the properties indicated therein. Even if it was AAA's
counsel who prepared the written instrument, she or her representative was expected to exercise due
diligence in reviewing the entries therein before signing the instrument. Moreover, if indeed there was a
mistake on which property should be transferred to the spouses BBB, AAA should have availed of her
remedies immediately. (Aromin vs. Heirs of Wilfredo, G.R. No. 204447. May 3, 2021, J. Hernando)
253. The owner of the property, AAA, executed a compromise agreement with BBB and CCC over the
property. Thereafter, CCC sold her property indicated in the compromise agreement to Spouses DDD,
who then possessed the subject property in good faith. While Spouses DDD were already in
possession and were enjoying the subject property, AAA changed his mind and executed a
revocation and cancellation of the compromise agreement. Is the revocation and cancellation of the
compromise agreement done by AAA valid?
No, it is not. A compromise agreement, being a contract that has the force of law, is also governed by the
requisites and principles of contracts under Title II of the Civil Code. It is a contract that created real rights as
it was a contract for division of property. Third persons, Spouses DDD, who came into possession of the
object of the contract are thus bound by the contract or compromise agreement. Revocation or cancellation
of the compromise agreement, cannot take place because the objects of the contract are already in the legal
possession of the DDDs who did not act in bad faith. At the time the compromise agreement was revoked by
AAA, the DDDs were already legal co-owners of the property by virtue of a valid sale. As such, their
respective shares in the disputed property may not be validly included in the revocation of the compromise
agreement without their knowledge and consent. Although it is clear that the DDDs are not parties to the
compromise agreement, their objection to its revocation can be treated as an adverse claim over the
disputed property. (Domilos vs. Spouses Pastor, [G.R. No. 207887. March 14, 2022, J. Hernando)
254. What is the principle of mutuality of contracts? Do contracts of adhesion violate this principle?
The principle of mutuality of contracts, found in Article 1308 of the Civil Code, states that a "contract must
bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them." In
accordance with this principle, when the execution of the contract's terms is skewed in favor of one party, the
contract must be rendered void. A contract of adhesion is so-called because its terms are prepared by only
one party while the other party merely affixes his signature signifying his adhesion thereto. Nevertheless,
contracts of adhesion are not invalid per se and they are not entirely prohibited. The one who adheres to the
contract is in reality free to reject it entirely, if he adheres, he gives his consent. Accordingly, a contract duly
executed is the law between the parties, and they are obliged to comply fully and not selectively with its
terms. A contract of adhesion is no exception. (Goldwell Properties Tagaytay, Inc. vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company,
G.R. No. 209837, May 12, 2021, J. Hernando)
255. The payment for the fourth installment was dishonored due to insufficient funds and AAA sent a
demand for BBB otherwise the title shall be consolidated. Despite the nonpayment of the fourth
check, BBB issued the fifth check which was cleared and credited. AAA subsequently informed BBB
through a letter dated December 23, 1994 that it had already consolidated its title to the subject
property. Has AAA validly rescinded the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)?
No. There was no valid rescission of the MOA, primarily for the reason that the requisites of the Maceda Law
were not complied with. The Court laid down the four conditions under Section 4 of the Maceda Law that
should be met before the seller may cancel the contract: (1) the defaulting buyer has paid less than two (2)
49
years of installments; (2) the seller must give such defaulting buyer a sixty (60)-day grace period, reckoned
from the date the installment became due; (3) if the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the expiration of
the said grace period, the seller must give the buyer a notice of cancellation and/or a demand for rescission
by notarial act; and (4) the seller may actually cancel the contract only after the lapse of thirty (30) days from
the buyer's receipt of the said notice of cancellation and/or demand for rescission by notarial act. The letter
dated December 23, 1994 informing BBB that the AAA is already "consolidating title to the subject property,"
should have effectively canceled the MOA; the said letter, however, did not comply with the Maceda Law
which requires that the seller must give a notice or a demand for rescission by notarial act. Further, the
Maceda Law provides that actual cancellation can only be effected after 30 days from buyer's receipt of the
notarial rescission. In this case, there is no showing that this requirement was observed by AAA as it
intended that the letter dated December 23, 1994 to be the termination of the MOA. (Integrated Credit and
Corporate Services vs. Cabreza, G.R. No. 203420. February 15, 2021, J. Hernando)
256. AAAs pray that the Memorandum of Agreement and Consolidated Deed of Sale be rescinded as both
these contracts caused damage to the interests and participation of the AAAs of their 40% share in
the proceeds of the sale of the Montemar Villas lots. However, there was evidence that through
AAAs’ representative, BBB, they gave their consent to the changes in the contract. Can the AAAs
avail of remedy of Rescission?
No. Rescission is a remedy granted by law to the contracting parties, and even to third persons, to secure
the reparation of damages caused to them by a contract, even if it should be valid" by reason of external
causes resulting in a pecuniary prejudice to one of the contracting parties or their creditors, the result of
which, is the restoration of things to their condition at the moment prior to celebration of said contract. The
kinds of rescissible contracts are the following: first, those rescissible because of lesion or prejudice; second,
those rescissible on account of fraud or bad faith; and third, those which, by special provisions of law, are
susceptible to rescission. None of the above circumstances are present in this case. As discussed above,
the records of the case are replete with evidence that the AAAs, through BBB, gave their express conformity
to the new concept of the Montemar Project and the entrance of Philcomsat as new investor for the said
project. Having expressed their consent to the changes brought about by these new contracts, and having
been made aware of the effects thereof, the AAAs cannot now feign ignorance and assert that they were
prejudiced in their rights and interests. (Valdes vs. La Colina Development Corporation, G.R. No. 208140. July 12, 2021, J.
Hernando)
a. Those a. Those entered a. Those which are entered into by a. Those whose cause, object
where one into in guardians whenever the wards whom or purpose is contrary to law,
of the the name of they represent suffer lesion morals, good customs, public
parties is another person by more than one-fourth of the value of order or public policy;
incapable by one who has the things which are the object thereof; b. Those which are absolutely
of giving been given no b. Those agreed upon in representation simulated or fictitious;
consent to authority or legal of absentees, if the latter suffer the c. Those whose cause or
a contract; representation, lesion stated object did not exist at the time
b. Those or who has acted in the preceding number; of the transaction;
where the beyond his c. Those undertaken in fraud of creditors d. Those whose object is
consent is powers; when the latter cannot in outside the commerce of
vitiated by b. Those that do any other manner collect the claims due men;
mistake, not comply with them; e. Those which contemplate
violence, the Statute of d. Those which refer to things under an impossible service;
intimidatio Frauds. litigation if they have been entered into f. Those where the intention
n, undue c. Those where by the defendant of the parties relative to the
influence both parties are without the knowledge and approval of principal object of the
or fraud. incapable of the litigants or o competent judicial contract cannot be
giving consent to authority; ascertained;
a contract. e. All other contracts specially declared g. Those expressly prohibited
by law to be subject to or declared void by law.
rescission.
(Articles 1381, 1390, 1403, 1409, Civil Code)
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258. How may a party invoke illiteracy under Article 1332 of the Civil Code to invalidate a contract?
The contracting party who alleges fraud or vitiated consent must establish the same by full, clear and
convincing evidence. The party must show clear and convincing evidence of one’s personal circumstances
and that he or she is unable to read at the time of the execution of the consented contract. (Cabilo vs. Tampan,
G.R. No. 209702. March 23, 2022, J. Hernando)
259. AAA and BBB executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs with Absolute Sale (Deed)
adjudicating between themselves the two parcels of land and transferring the same to spouses CCC.
The Deed was notarized. However, AAA was illiterate at the time of the execution of the Deed. She
was unable to read and write. AAA alleged that the spouses took advantage of her illiteracy and old
age and that her thumb mark was affixed by employing deceit, false pretenses and false
representations. She testified that her children were not present during the execution of the Deed
and that its contents were not explained to her when she affixed her thumbmark on it. Is the Deed
valid?
No, it is voidable. When one of the contracting parties is unable to read or is otherwise illiterate, and fraud is
alleged, a presumption that there is fraud or mistake in obtaining consent of that party arises. To rebut the
presumption, the other contracting party must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the terms and
contents of the contract were explained to the contracting party who is unable to read. The Spouses failed to
rebut this by clear and convincing evidence. Consequently, fraud or mistake was present. Therefore, the
Deed, despite being notarized, was defective. (Spouses de Vera vs. Catungal, G.R. No. 211687. February 10, 2021, J.
Hernando)
260. When AAA retired, BDO refused to release her retirement benefits unless AAA and her spouse, as
sureties for the loan of BBB from BDO, would execute a real estate mortgage over a house and lot to
secure BBB’s loan. The spouses acceded to BDO’s demand and executed a REM. Is the REM
voidable on ground of duress or intimidation?
No. Duress or intimidation is present when one of the contracting parties is compelled by a reasonable and
well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave evil upon their person or property or upon the person or
property of their spouse, descendants or ascendants, to give their consent. For intimidation to vitiate
consent, the following requisites must be present: (1) that the intimidation must be the determining cause of
the contract, or must have caused the consent to be given; (2) that the threatened act be unjust or unlawful;
(3) that the threat be real and serious, there being an evident disproportion between the evil and the
resistance which all men can offer, leading to the choice of the contract as the lesser evil; and (4) that it
produces reasonable and well-grounded fear from the fact that the person from whom it comes has the
necessary means or ability to inflict the threatened injury. Here, BDO's supposed "threat," i.e., its withholding
of AAA's retirement benefits, is not the intimidation referred to by law. It is important to differentiate consent
that is reluctantly but freely given, on one hand, from consent that was obtained through duress or any other
vice of consent, on the other. Contracts entered into with reluctance are not necessarily voidable. It is
necessary to distinguish between real duress and the motive which is present when one gives his consent
reluctantly. A contract is valid even though one of the parties entered into it against his wishes and desires or
even against his better judgment. Contracts are also valid even though they are entered into by one of the
parties without hope of advantage or profit. Here, the Genotivas, in executing the subject contract in
exchange for the release of AAA's retirement benefits, agreed to accept what they thought was a better
option. (Spouses Genotiva vs. Equitable-PCI Bank, G.R. No. 213796, June 28, 2021, J. Hernando)
261. What are the conditions for fraud to constitute a basis to annul contracts?
1. the fraud must be dolo causante or it must be fraud in obtaining the consent of the party;
2. fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence and not merely by a preponderance thereof.
(Valdes vs. La Colina Development Corporation, G.R. No. 208140. July 12, 2021, J. Hernando)
263. What is the prescriptive period for assailing the validity of voidable contracts and when is the
reckoning period for the same?
The action for annulment shall be brought within four years.
Reckoning Period for Assailing Validity
In cases of intimidation, violence or undue From the time the defect of the consent ceases.
influence
In case of mistake or fraud From the time of the discovery of the fraud
When the action refers to contracts entered into From the time the guardianship ceases
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by minors or other incapacitated person
(Article 1391, Civil Code)
266. What are the responsibilities of the contracting parties when a voidable contract has been annulled?
The contracting parties shall restore to each other the things which have been the subject matter of the
contract, with their fruits, and the price with its interest, except in cases provided by law. In obligations to
render service, the value thereof shall be the basis for damages. (Article 1398, Civil Code)
267. Are incapacitated persons obliged to make restitutions once a voidable contract has been annulled?
Yes, but only insofar as he has been benefited by the thing or price received by him. (Article. 1399, Civil Code)
270. Is the Deed of Absolute Sale valid when it was signed and executed by the seller after her death?
No. If any one party to a supposed contract was already dead at the time of Its execution, such contract is
undoubtedly simulated and false, and, therefore, null and void by reason of its having been made after the
death of the party who appears as one of the contracting parties therein. Indeed, "no one can give what one
does not have; nemo dat quod non habet. One can sell only what one owns or is authorized to sell, and the
buyer can acquire no more right than what the seller can transfer legally." (Arakor Construction and Development
Corporation vs. Sta. Maria, G.R. No. 215006. January 11, 2021; see also City of Tanauan vs. Millonte, G.R. No. 219292. June 28, 2021,
J. Hernando)
SPECIAL CONTRACTS
275. Does gross inadequacy of price affect the validity of a contract of sale?
No. Gross inadequacy does not affect the validity of a contract of sale, unless it signifies a defect in the
consent of the parties actually intended for a donation or some other contract. Inadequacy of cause will not
invalidate the contract unless there has been fraud, mistake, or undue influence. (Cabilo vs. Tampan, G.R. No.
209702. March 23, 2022, J. Hernando)
276. In a Deed of Sale and an Agreement executed by AAA and his brother BBB, the subject property was
allegedly ceded unto BBB for Php15,000 and was agreed that AAA shall enjoy the usufruct during his
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lifetime. Aproniana, BBB and AAA’s sister, filed a complaint against BBB and his wife, seeking the
nullification of the subject Deed of Sale and Agreement on the ground that they are fictitious and
without consideration since the market value of the said property during that time was Php150,000.
Aproniana also stated that AAA had told her that the sale was simulated and that no consideration
was paid. Did gross inadequacy of the price nullify the contract between AAA and BBB?
No. Two presumptions find relevance in this case. First, a contract enjoys the presumption that it is
supported by an existing and lawful cause or consideration. This presumption is disputable and may be
overthrown by preponderance of evidence to the contrary. Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit,
and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the
term "greater weight of evidence" or "greater weight of credible evidence." Second, notarized documents,
being public in nature, require no further proof of their authenticity and due execution. They are entitled to full
faith and credit on its face and are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. To overturn this
presumption of regularity, clear and convincing proof is required. To debunk the existence of consideration in
the Deed of Sale, there must be more than mere preponderant evidence showing that AAA did not truly
execute the disputed document or that the parties had not truly intended a contract of sale. However,
whether preponderant, clear, or convincing, Aproniana never submitted any controverting evidence. (Bacala vs.
Heirs of Spouses Poliño, G.R. No. 200608. February 10, 2021, J. Hernando)
277. AAA, through a deed of sale, ceded a property unto BBB for Php15,000. It was agreed in the deed
that AAA shall enjoy the usufruct during his lifetime that upon AAA's death, BBB shall support and
give financial assistance to CCC and DDD. They also agreed that breach of the terms and conditions
of the Agreement shall render the Deed of Sale non- effective and nugatory. What is the contract
between AAA and BBB?
Sale subject to a resolutory condition. Gross inadequacy or simulation of price neither affects nor invalidates
a sale, but it can be shown that the parties may have really intended a donation or some other act or
contract. The burden of proof weighs on the party making the allegation against these presumptions.
Donation has three indispensable elements: (1) the reduction of the patrimony of the donor; (2) the increase
in the patrimony of the donee; and (3) the intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi. Not all three are
present. While AAA's patrimony may have decreased with the correlative increase in that of BBB by virtue of
the Deed of Sale and Agreement, it does not appear that this was impelled by liberality on the part of AAA.
Had animus donandi really been the true motive for the transfer of the subject property, AAA and BBB would
have so stated in the documents that they executed.
The elements of a contract of sale are: (1) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer
ownership in exchange for the price; (2) determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in money or its
equivalent. The Deed of Sale contains all the three basic requisites of a contract of sale. A resolutory
condition extinguishes a transaction that, for a time, existed and discharges the obligations created
thereunder. The stipulations in the Agreement are resolutory. (Bacala vs. Heirs of Spouses Poliño, G.R. No. 200608.
February 10, 2021, J. Hernando)
278. Is there a valid contract of sale when the sale was allegedly entered into through a verbal agreement,
the only evidence presented being the receipts where the signature of the alleged seller was forged,
where the exact portion of the lot sold was not specified, and where there is no evidence as to the
purchase price?
No. The elements of a contract of sale are: a] consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer
ownership in exchange for the price; b] determinate subject matter; and c] price certain in money or its
equivalent." "A contract of sale is a consensual contract. Under Article 1475 of the Civil Code, the contract of
sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract
and upon the price. Here, the absence of consent or meeting of the minds is established. The object of the
supposed sale in the instant case is ambiguous. It is well settled that the object of every contract must be
determinate. "The requisite that a thing be determinate is satisfied if at the time the contract is entered into,
the thing is capable of being made determinate without the necessity of a new or further agreement between
the parties. Finally, the price for the sale of the subject property is also uncertain. Hence, there is no valid
contract of sale. (Seming vs. Alamag, G.R. No. 202284. March 17, 2021, J. Hernando)
280. AAA and BBB are co-owners of a property. AAA sold to CCC a definite portion of the same property.
When AAA pointed out to BBB the boundaries of the said portion, BBB did not object. Was the sale
between AAA and CCC valid even if the sale was made without the consent of the co-owner BBB?
Yes, because the moment AAA pointed out the boundaries of the property and BBB made no objection, there
is, in effect, a partial partition of the co-owned property. The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the
moment the co-owner as vendor pointed out its location and even indicated the boundaries over which the
fences were to be erected without objection, protest or complaint by the other co-owners, on the contrary
they acquiesced and tolerated such alienation, occupation and possession, a factual partition or termination
of the co-ownership, although partial, was created. (Heirs of Marquez vs. Heirs of Hernandez, G.R. No. 236826. March 23,
53
2022, J. Hernando)
281. Two days prior the expiration of the redemption period, AAA offered to redeem the property by
paying the stipulated redemption price to be paid in installments. BBB and AAA then entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) which stipulated that BBB agreed to postpone the consolidation
of the property, and allowed AAA, with spouses CCC as guarantors, to redeem the property on an
agreed redemption price to be paid in stipulated installments. Is the MOA between BBB and AAA
with spouses CCC as guarantors a valid contract of sale?
Yes. Despite not being denominated as a "Deed of Sale," a contract is what the law defines it to be, and not
what the contracting parties call it. Article 1458 of the Civil Code defines a contract of sale to be a contract
where "one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership and to deliver a determinate
thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent." The essential elements of a
contract of sale are: (a) consent; (b) object; and (c) price in money or its equivalent. Here, the MOA contains
all the essential elements of a contract of sale. As previously stated, it was sufficiently shown that BBB and
AAA with the spouses CCC consented to the execution of the MOA. The subject property, that is owned by
BBB, is the object of the contract. Lastly, the amount to be paid in installments on the period set by the
parties constitutes the price. Hence, the MOA is a contract of sale of the subject property entered into by
BBB and AAA with the spouses CCC. (Integrated Credit and Corporate Services vs. Cabreza, [G.R. No. 203420. February 15,
2021, J. Hernando)
Ownership is reserved to the seller and is not Title passes to the buyer upon delivery of the thing
passed until full payment of the purchase price. sold.
Full payment is a positive suspensive condition, the Non-payment of the price is a negative resolutory
failure of which is not a breach –casual or serious condition and the remedy of the seller is to exact
but simply prevents the obligation of the vendor, to fulfillment or to rescind the contract.
convey the title, from having binding force.
Title remains in the vendor if the vendee does not Vendor loses and cannot recover ownership of the
comply with the condition precedent of making thing sold and delivered until the contract of sale is
payment at the time specified in the contract. resolved and set aside.
(Coronel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103577, October 7, 1996)
284. Is the earnest money paid by the buyer refundable if the sale in a contract to sell does not push
through and the seller is not at fault?
No, the earnest money should not be returned. In a contract to sell, the payment of earnest money
represents the seller’s opportunity cost of holding in abeyance the search for other buyers or better deals.
(Racelis v. Spouses Javier, G.R. No. 189609, January 29, 2018).
287. The contract to sell provides that it shall be considered automatically cancelled 30 days after service
by the seller to the buyer of a notarized notice of cancellation or rescission and that service by
registered mail is sufficient proof of service and constructive receipt. Is it valid under Maceda law?
No. The conditions in the Contract to Sell conflict with RA 6552, which dictates "receipt" and not "service" of
the notice of rescission to the buyer as the reckoning point of the thirty (30)-day period before actual
cancellation. The Contract to Sell even dispensed with this legal requirement of receipt by deeming mere
54
service by registered mail as sufficient proof of service and constructive receipt. For being contrary to
Section 4 of RA 6552, these stipulations are rendered null and void, and the general provisions governing a
contract to sell under RA 6552 shall govern. (Pryce Properties Corp., vs. Nolasco, Jr., G.R. No. 203990. August 24, 2020, J.
Hernando)
288. Is an answer with counterclaim filed by AAA a valid notarial rescission under Maceda Law?
No. A notarial rescission contemplated under RA 6552 is a unilateral cancellation by a seller of a perfected
contract thereunder acknowledged by a notary public and accompanied by competent evidence of identity.
This notarial notice of rescission has peculiar technical requirements. AAA violated all of them. The notarial
act converting the private notice of cancellation into a public one must be an acknowledgment. An
acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent officer or court
and declaring it to be his act or deed. AAA's Answer with Counterclaims, however, was notarized through a
jurat. A jurat is that part of an affidavit in which the notary certifies that before him or her, the document was
subscribed and sworn to by the executor. Under notarial rules, acknowledgments cover written deeds and
acts, whereas jurats confirm affidavits and pleadings. A deed of rescission notarized via acknowledgment is
already a piece of evidence all on its own. On the other hand, an allegation of rescission contained in an
affidavit or a pleading and confirmed by a notarial jurat still remains to be proved; it merely implies that the
signatory thereof sets out to prove the fact of the rescission before a notary public. (Pryce Properties Corp., vs.
Nolasco, Jr., G.R. No. 203990. August 24, 2020, J. Hernando)
When applicable Conventional redemption shall take place Legal redemption is the right to be
when the vendor reserves the right to subrogated, upon the same terms and
repurchase the thing sold, with the conditions stipulated in the contract, in
obligation to return: the place of one who acquires a thing
1. the price of the sale; by purchase or dation in payment, or
2. the expenses of the contract, and any by any other transaction whereby
other legitimate payments made by reason ownership is transmitted by onerous
of the sale; title.
3. he necessary and useful expenses made
on the thing sold
Period to GR: Follow period stipulated in contract, but • Within thirty days from the notice in
Redeem should not exceed ten (10) years. writing by the prospective vendor, or
Otherwise, automatically reduced. by the vendor, as the case may be.
XPNs: • The deed of sale shall not be
• In the absence of a stipulation, the right recorded in the Registry of Property,
must be exercised within four (4) year from unless accompanied by an affidavit of
the date of contract. the vendor that he has given written
• If no period stipulated but the parties notice thereof to all possible
intended a period, then it shall be ten (10) redemptioners.
years from the date of the contract.
• But the vendor may still exercise the right
to repurchase within thirty days from the
time final judgment was rendered in a civil
action on the basis that the contract was a
true sale with right to repurchase.
Who may • Vendor, after returning to vendee price of • Co-owner in case the shares of all
Exercise sale plus expenses of the contract, other the other co-owners or of any of them,
legitimate payments made by reason of are sold to a third person.
sale, and necessary and useful expenses If the price of the alienation is grossly
made on the thing sold excessive, the redemptioner shall pay
• His heirs, assigns or agents only a reasonable one.
• Creditor, after he has exhausted the • Adjoining landowners of rural land,
property of the vendor when a piece of rural land, the area of
• Co-owners of an immovable, if they sold which does not exceed one hectare, is
their interests to the same person, may only alienated, unless the grantee does not
redeem their respective shares own any rural land.
• Adjoining landowners of urban land,
whenever a piece of urban land which
is so small and so situated that a major
portion thereof cannot be used for any
practical purpose within a reasonable
time, having been bought merely for
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speculation, is about to be re-sold
(Articles 1600, 1606, 1610, 1612, 1616, 1619, 1620, 1621, 1623, Civil Code)
290. What are the remedies of a defaulting buyer of real property on installments in the absence of a valid
rescission?
A defaulting buyer of real property on installments, whether or not she or he has paid two (2) years of
installments has three (3) common legal remedies in the absence of a valid rescission, granted by Section 6
of RA 6552 and jurisprudence (a) Pay in advance any installment at any time, necessarily without interest;
(b) Pay the full unpaid balance of the purchase price at any time without interest, and to have such full
payment of the purchase price annotated in the certificate of title covering the real property subject of the
transaction under RA 9552; or (c) Claim an equitable refund of prior payments and/or deposits made by the
defaulting buyer to the seller pertinent to their transaction under RA 9552, if any. (Pryce Properties Corp., vs.
Nolasco, Jr., G.R. No. 203990. August 24, 2020, J. Hernando)
291. Spouses AAA borrowed P140,000.00 from BBB, to be paid in double to be collected from rental
income of some apartment units to be constructed by the spouses using said money. Consequently,
the parties executed a Deed of Sale in consideration of the amount of P140,000.00. A TCT was
thereafter issued constituting BBB as the new registered owner of the subject land. When BBB had
collected the full amount of P280,000.00 in rental income from the four apartment units, the AAAs
asked for the return of the subject lot. BBB, however, held on to the title and refused to yield the
subject lot to the AAAs. Should BBB’s title to the subject property be nullified and reconveyed to
Sps. AAA?
Yes. The transaction between the parties is an equitable mortgage and title may be nullified and real property
may be reconveyed in case of equitable mortgage. When in doubt, courts are generally inclined to construe a
transaction purporting to be a sale as an equitable mortgage, which involves a lesser transmission of rights
and interests over the property in controversy. There are two badges of fraud against AAA — gross
inadequacy of price in the Deed of Sale and continued possession of the subject property by BBBs-spouses
as debtors of AAA. The mortgagee's consolidation of ownership over the mortgaged property upon the
mortgagor's mere failure to pay the obligation constitutes pactum commissorium. The mortgagor's default
does not operate to automatically vest on the mortgagee the ownership of the encumbered property. Such
arrangements as contrary to morals and public policy and thus void. If a mortgagee in equity desires to
obtain title to a mortgaged property, the mortgagee's proper remedy is to cause the foreclosure of the
mortgage in equity and buy it at a foreclosure sale. Having proceeded to cause the cancellation of
BBBs-spouses title to the mortgaged property and its transfer to his name without availing of the remedy of
foreclosure, the transaction is consequently rendered void, and title to the subject property should be
reverted to BBBs-spouses. (Dacquel vs. Spouses Sotelo, G.R. No. 203946. August 4, 2021, J. Hernando)
292. AAA and BBB entered into a Contract of Lease. When the term of the lease ended, the contract was
impliedly renewed on a monthly basis after. With the acquiescence of BBB, AAA continued to occupy
the premises for an increased rental rate. Eventually, the lease was terminated. AAA commenced the
transfer of its operations to its new site. However, BBB alleged that AAA did so without settling its
(AAA's) outstanding rentals and service (electricity and water) charges, plus interest/surcharges.
BBB retained the properties of AAA's as security in accordance with Paragraph 23 of the Contract of
Lease in case of breach of default. AAA denied that the lease contract was still in effect when the
properties were confiscated. It submitted copies of check vouchers payable to BBB to answer for its
liabilities but these were not actually tendered to the latter. Is AAA liable for the unpaid rentals and
service charges to BBB?
Yes, AAA is liable to BBB for rental arrears and service charges. AAA’s obligations must be fulfilled in
accordance with law and the lease contract. Particularly, AAA incurred liabilities because it violated the
provisions of the Contract of Lease which it willingly signed. It is well to remember that a contract is the law
between the parties. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties
and should be complied with in good faith. (PNTC Colleges, Inc. vs. Time Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 219698. September 27, 2021,
J. Hernando)
293. Is a stipulation on a contract of lease providing prerogative on the part of the lessor to retain the
property of lessee in case of breach of default valid?
Yes, it is valid. The parties are allowed by law to enter into stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions they
may deem convenient which bind the parties as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy." Essentially, such stipulation is clear and shows no contravention of law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy. As such, they are valid, and the parties' rights shall be
adjudicated according to them, being the primary law between them. When the terms of the contract are
clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, the rule is settled that the literal
meaning of its stipulations should be controlled. (PNTC Colleges, Inc. vs. Time Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 219698. September
27, 2021, J. Hernando)
294. May the court reduce the interest on unpaid rentals stipulated and agreed by the parties?
Yes, as the imposition of an interest on unpaid rentals takes the nature of a penalty clause. Even if such was
specified in the contract, public morals and policy dictate that the interest rate should still be reasonable and
equitable. Although a court is not at liberty to ignore the freedom of the parties to agree on such terms and
56
conditions as they see fit that contravene neither law nor morals, good customs, public order or public policy,
a stipulated penalty, nevertheless, may be equitably reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or
unconscionable or if the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with. As provided in
Article 1229 of the Civil Code, The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal obligation has
been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the penalty
may also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable. (PNTC Colleges, Inc. vs. Time Realty, Inc.,
G.R. No. 219698. September 27, 2021, J. Hernando)
301. When is the principal not liable for acts of its agent?
a. Acted in contravention of principal’s instruction;
b. Fault of agent;
c. Agent incurred with knowledge of unfavorable result; or
d. Stipulated (Article 1918, Civil Code)
303. BBBs, through a Special Power of Attorney (SPA), mortgaged several parcels of land to the AAA.
After the lapse of 17 years without the AAA demanding payment or filing a case to collect or
foreclose the mortgage, can BBBs file a case to cancel the mortgage liens notwithstanding that they
were only vested with special power to mortgage?
Yes. Article 1882 of the Civil Code expressly provides: “The limits of the agent's authority shall not be
considered exceeded should it have been performed in a manner more advantageous to the principal than
that specified by him.” Given this and considering that BBB was already given special authority to encumber
the mortgagors-principals' titles with the subject mortgage contracts, then it is indeed implicit that BBB is also
authorized to do all the necessary acts to release the mortgagors-principals from such encumbrance. Thus,
57
the filing of the instant case to cancel the mortgage liens, which were annotated in the mortgagor-principals'
respective titles through the special authority granted by them to BBB, should be considered within the limits
of BBB's authority since disencumbering the mortagagors-principals' titles of the same mortgage liens are
obviously advantageous to the latter. To reiterate, unlike a foreclosure of a real estate mortgage, which
involves real property rights, the cancellation of a real estate mortgage is merely personal in nature. In fact,
the mortgaged properties do not even come into the picture until there is a default on the loan as the
mortgage's purpose is merely to secure such loan. (PNB-Republic Bank vs. Sian-Limsiaco, G.R. No. 196323. February 8,
2021, J. Hernando)
304. Can BBBs who executed a Real Estate Mortgage through a Special Power of Attorney file a case to
cancel the mortgage liens in their own name without joining their principals?
Yes. Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides: “An agent acting in his own name and for the benefit of an
undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without joining the principal except when the contract involves
things belonging to the principal.” Clearly, the Rules allow agents to bring actions for the principals in their
own name without joining their principals, provided that the contract does not involve things belonging to the
principal. As applied in this case, while it may seem that the mortgage contracts "involve" real property of the
principals, such contracts are actually not of that nature. With respect to mortgage, the rule on real actions
only mentions an action for foreclosure of a real estate mortgage. It does not include an action for the
cancellation of a real estate mortgage. It must be emphasized that whether or not the petition to cancel the
mortgage liens was granted, no transfer or disposition of real property rights would have occurred either way.
This is in contrast to a case involving the foreclosure of a mortgage, wherein property rights will clearly be
transferred or at least be affected depending on the ruling of the court hearing such a case. Therefore, since
neither the subject mortgage contracts nor the instant case involved the mortgagors-principals' real property
rights, there was no need to join them and hence, BBB validly instituted the action in her own name but still
in her capacity as an agent of the mortgagors-principals. (PNB-Republic Bank vs. Sian-Limsiaco, G.R. No. 196323.
February 8, 2021, J. Hernando)
306. AAA posits that the amendments to the original contract with BBB are not binding on the corporation
since the officer had no actual authority from its board of directors. On the other hand, BBB argues
that the amendments are binding pursuant to the doctrine of apparent authority since in over a span
of two (2) years, with over eighty nine (89) billings and three (3) instances of amendments, AAA
never contested the amended toll fees. Did AAA cloth its officer with apparent authority to amend the
contract?
Yes. It bears stressing that the existence of apparent authority may be ascertained not only through the
"general manner in which the corporation holds out an officer or agent as having the apparent authority to act
in general", but also through the corporation's "acquiescence in his acts of a particular nature, with actual or
constructive knowledge thereof, whether within or beyond the scope of his ordinary powers." Here, it is easy
to see that AAA, reasonably appearing to have knowledge of the amendments, acquiesced to the same.
Indeed, AAA never contested nor protested the amendments. "When a corporation intentionally or
negligently clothes its officer with apparent authority to act in its behalf, it is estopped from denying its
officer's apparent authority as to innocent third parties who dealt with this officer in good faith." (Agro Food and
Processing Corp. vs. Vitarich Corporation, G.R. No. 217454. January 11, 2021, J. Hernando)
One of the parties delivers to another, either One of the parties delivers to another, money or other
something not consumable so that the latter may consumable thing, upon the condition that the same
use the same for a certain time and return it. amount of the same kind and quality shall be paid.
The bailor retains the ownership of the thing The ownership passes to the borrower.
loaned.
(Article 1933, Civil Code)
58
1. Obligation Interest due on
As per written Computed from Not unless NA
breached involving principal as of
agreement default stipulated by
monetary payment judicial demand
(allowed if not (extrajudicial/judi parties, law, or
(loan or earns an
excessive/unco cial demand) regulation.
forbearance) and additional legal
nscionable). until full payment
interest is stipulated interest
by parties. SEPARATELY
at the prevailing
rate by Bangko
Sentral ng
Pilipinas, UNTIL
full payment.
2. Obligation Prevailing legal Computed from Not unless Interest due on NA
breached involving interest rate by default stipulated by law principal as of
monetary payment Bangko Sentral (extrajudicial/judi or regulation. judicial demand
(loan or ng Pilipinas. cial demand) earns an
forbearance) without until full additional legal
stipulated interest. payment. interest
SEPARATELY
at the prevailing
rate by Bangko
Sentral ng
Pilipinas, UNTIL
full payment.
Begins when
3. Obligation Imposed by Not unless NA No interest
claim is made
breached not court at stipulated by law on
(extrajudicially/ju
involving a loan or prevailing legal or regulation. unliquidate
dicially) until full
forbearance. interest rate by d claims or
payment. Starts
Bangko Sentral damages
from the
ng Pilipinas. until
judgement date
demand
if the claim's
can be
amount is not
establishe
reasonably
d with
ascertained at
reasonabl
the time of
e certainty
demand.
(Lara's Gifts & Decors, Inc. vs. Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc., G.R. No. 225433 (2019).
309. Can the computation of legal interest for default in the deed of sale include the time in which the
injunction was issued which prevented the bank from paying the proceeds of the Letter of Credit
(LOC), considering that there is no stipulation of interest rate and that the bank did not advance any
amount or offer any alternative to pay in spite of the issuance of the injunctive order which was
eventually dissolved by the Court?
Yes. The Bank failed to present sufficient factual or legal basis to support its contention that the time in which
the injunction was in effect should not be included in the computation of the legal interest, it being
established that the parties to the Deed of Sale did not stipulate an interest rate in case of default when they
entered into the sale. Furthermore, the Bank did not advance any amount or offer any alternative in order to
show that it was willing to pay the proceeds of the LOC in spite of the issuance of an injunctive order (which
was eventually dissolved by the Court anyway). Withal, the legal interest on the face amount of the LOC
shall commence to run from the time extrajudicial demand was made. (Equitable PCI Bank vs. Manila Adjusters &
Surveyors, Inc., G.R. No. 166726. November 25, 2019, J. Hernando)
310. In the absence of an express provision as to the rate of interest that would govern the parties to a
loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits, what should apply?
The rate of legal interest for loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in
judgments shall no longer be twelve percent (12%) per annum, but will now be six percent (6%) per annum
effective July 1, 2013. It should be noted, nonetheless, that the new rate could only be applied prospectively
and not retroactively. Consequently, the twelve percent (12%) per annum legal interest shall apply only until
June 30, 2013. Come July 1, 2013 the new rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be the prevailing rate of
interest when applicable. (Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Danico, G.R. No. 196476. September 28, 2020; see also
Equitable PCI Bank vs. Manila Adjusters & Surveyors, Inc., G.R. No. 166726. November 25, 2019, J. Hernando)
59
market based reference rates plus a margin as may be agreed upon by the parties. This BSP requirement is
consistent with the principle that the determination of interest rates cannot be left solely to the will of one
party. It further emphasized that the reference rate must be stated in writing, and must be agreed upon by
the parties. Hence, in order for the concept of a floating rate of interest to apply, it presupposes that a
market-based reference rate is indicated in writing and agreed upon by the parties. (Goldwell Properties Tagaytay,
Inc. vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 209837. May 12, 2021, J. Hernando)
312. What would be the effect if the interest rate scheme imposed by the bank was struck down because
of the stipulation that allows the bank to unilaterally determine and Increase the imposable interest
rate?
Only the interest rate imposed is nullified; hence, it is deemed not written in the contract. The agreement on
payment of interest on the principal loan obligation remains. “Relevantly, "the Court shall apply the applicable
legal rate of interest, which refers to 'the prevailing rate at the time when the agreement was entered into.”
(Goldwell Properties Tagaytay, Inc. vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, G.R. No. 209837. May 12, 2021, J. Hernando)
The person binds himself to the creditor to fulfill The person binds himself solidarily with the
the obligation of the principal debtor in case the principal debtor.
latter should fail to do so.
Guarantor can avail of the benefit of excussion Surety cannot avail of the benefit of
and division in case creditor proceeds against him. excussion and division.
(Articles 2047 & 2058, Civil Code)
314. Is Banco De Oro (BDO), the creditor, entitled to retain the P500,000.00 deposit of the sureties under
the Deed of Suretyship and apply it to the interest due on the loan without the consent of the
sureties?
No, BDO is not entitled to retain the P500,000,00. The creditor's right to proceed against the surety does not
give him any right to deprive said surety of his property without due process of the law. It does not
contemplate a situation where the creditor is allowed to take by force or without consent the property of the
surety. If BDO indeed rejected the offer of redemption, the proper course of action for the bank was to return
the amount to the sureties or inquire if the latter would be interested in applying the payment to the
principal’s due interest. BDO may not simply retain the money and apply it to another account under the
excuse that it was exercising its right as a creditor to collect from the sureties. It must do so through lawful
means, i.e., through the institution of proceedings for collection or enforcement of the surety contract.
(Spouses Genotiva vs. Equitable-PCI Bank, G.R. No. 213796. June 28, 2021, J. Hernando)
315. If there are many properties used as collateral, can borrowers compel the bank to release certain
collateral upon payment of loan values of said collateral even if the total loan is not yet paid?
No. Under this Article 2089 of the Civil Code, it provides that the "debtor cannot ask for the release of any
portion of the mortgaged property or of one or some of the several lots mortgaged unless and until the loan
thus secured has. been fully paid, notwithstanding the fact that there has been a partial fulfillment of the
obligation. Hence, it is provided that the debtor who has paid a part of the debt cannot ask for the
proportionate extinguishment of the mortgage as long as the debt is not completely satisfied." Thus, the fact
that the borrower paid for the loan value of certain properties is immaterial; the mortgage would still be in
effect since the loans have not been fully settled. (Goldwell Properties Tagaytay, Inc. vs. Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company, G.R. No. 209837. May 12, 2021, J. Hernando)
316. It was alleged that the deed of mortgage was spurious because: the document was supposedly
executed and notarized on March 4, 1998, but was entered in a 2001 notarial book by a notary public
whose notarial commission ended in 2001; that the entry indicated in the notarial register actually
pertained to a deed of sale of a motor vehicle; that different typewriters were used in typing the
contents of the Deed of Mortgage and its notarization; and that the acknowledgment was written on
the back of the document, despite the considerable space allotted and remaining below the Deed of
Mortgage. Will these infirmities in the notarization of the instrument invalidate the mortgage?
No. An irregular notarization merely reduces the evidentiary value of a document to that of a private
document, which requires proof of its due execution and authenticity to be admissible as evidence. The
irregular notarization — or, for that matter, the lack of notarization — does not thus necessarily affect the
validity of the contract reflected in the document. Errors in, or even absence of, notarization on a deed of
mortgage will not invalidate an already perfected mortgage agreement. If anything, these would only
depreciate the evidentiary value of the said written deed, as the same would be demoted from a public
document to a private one. (Ganancial vs. Cabugao, G.R. No. 203348. July 6, 2020, J. Hernando)
317. AAA is the registered owner of a lot, which, upon her death and during the settlement of her estate,
was discovered to have been donated to one of her children, BBB. BBB was able to obtain a Transfer
60
Certificate of Title (TCT) over the property. BBB then mortgaged the property to CCCs in
consideration of a Php 7,000,000.00 loan. The mortgage was registered in 2001. CCCs conducted an
ocular inspection, whereby they confirmed that BBB was in possession and occupation of the
property. However, the mortgage was contested by DDD, BBB’s sister, by an Affidavit of Adverse
Claim which was annotated in 2002. When BBB’s siblings were informed that the lot was scheduled
for auction they filed a complaint with prayer for injunction for the annulment of the Deed of
Donation favouring BBB and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage. With the denial of the injunction by
the Regional Trial Court, the extrajudicial sale pushed through and CCCs emerged as highest
bidders. Subsequently, the RTC found that AAA’s signature in the Deed of Donation was forged.
Thus, the Deed of Donation was declared void.
Do CCCs have a right over the disputed property as mortgagees in good faith?
Yes, CCCs were mortgagees in good faith. The doctrine of mortgagees in good faith applies when the
following requisites concur, namely: (a) the mortgagor is not the rightful owner of, or does not have valid title
to, the property; (b) the mortgagor succeeded in obtaining a Torrens title over the property; (c) the mortgagor
succeeded in mortgaging the property to another person; (d) the mortgagee relied on what appears on the
title and there exists no facts and circumstances that would compel a reasonably cautious man to inquire into
the status of the property; and (e) the mortgage contract was registered. All these requisites were satisfied in
this case, viz.: (a) BBB was found to have no valid title to the property as his title was derived from a forged
Deed of Donation; (b) he was able to obtain a TCT; (c) he succeeded in mortgaging the property to CCCs;
(d) CCCs found nothing on the TCT that would have notified them of BBB's invalid title. In fact, CCCs even
went beyond the title and conducted an ocular inspection, whereby they confirmed that BBB was in
possession and occupation of the property; and (e) the mortgage contract was registered. Thus, CCCs were
mortgagees in good faith. CCCs were mortgagees in good faith. (Jimenez v. Jimenez, G.R. No. 228011, February 10,
2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])
Can DDD’s adverse claim affect the rights of CCCs, the purchasers in the foreclosure sale?
No. A subsequent lien or encumbrance annotated at the back of a certificate of title of a foreclosed property
will not affect the rights of a purchaser in a foreclosure sale because such sale retroacts to the date of the
registration of the mortgage, making the sale prior in time to the lien or encumbrance. The foreclosure sale
retroacts to the date of registration of the mortgage because it is incidental to the fulfilment of the mortgagor's
obligation in the mortgage contract upon his default. In turn, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale essentially
derives his right from the previously registered mortgage. Once the mortgagor defaulted in the fulfilment of his
obligation, the mortgagee in good faith can still cause the foreclosure of the mortgage. In such case, the
purchaser in the foreclosure sale acquires the right of the mortgagee in good faith, making the sale prior in
time as against any subsequent lien or encumbrance. The protection granted to a mortgagee in good faith
extends to the purchaser at a public auction even if he or she had notice of the adverse claim. Otherwise, the
value of the mortgage could be easily destroyed by a subsequent record of an adverse claim, for no one
would purchase at a foreclosure sale if bound by the posterior claim. Accordingly, DDD's adverse claim, which
was annotated after the registered mortgage in favor of CCCs, cannot prevail over CCCs's rights as
mortgagees in good faith and purchasers in the foreclosure sale. Being mortgagees in good faith, they have a
superior lien over that of DDD, and their right to foreclose is reserved. Therefore, CCCs's purchase of the
property in the foreclosure sale in 2002 retroacted to the date of the registration of the mortgage in 2001,
making the sale superior to the adverse claim in 2002. Their knowledge of the adverse claim is of no moment
because their right as mortgagees in good faith extends up to the time of the foreclosure sale and in their
capacity as purchasers. (Jimenez v. Jimenez, G.R. No. 228011, February 10, 2021 [Landmark Case Q&A])
318. Can the land covered by an Emancipation Patent issued in favor of AAA on November 20, 1998, be
foreclosed by the bank on February 27, 2003, or four years after the issuance, for AAA’s failure to pay
the loan, and thus the foreclosure sale is valid?
No. While the bank’s right to foreclose the mortgage over the subject land property had its basis on AAA’s
failure to pay the loan, it arose within the 10-year period during which AAA was supposed to keep the subject
land to his name, under Sec. 27 of RA 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program. There was, therefore, a factual impediment to the bank’s action to foreclose the mortgage, and a
legal imperative to await the lapse of the 10-year retention period before pursuing his case against AAA. The
sale of the subject land by foreclosure to the bank, being violative of the law and public policy embodied in
PD 27 and RA 6557 as amended by RA 9700, is void ab initio. (Heirs of de Lara, Sr. vs. Rural Bank of Jaen, Inc., G.R.
No. 212012, March 28, 2022, J. Hernando)
319. Is there unjust enrichment on the act of AAA retaining the properties of BBB for the unpaid rentals,
pursuant to Paragraph 23 of the Contract of Lease which provided that AAA can retain the properties
of BBB's as security in case of breach of default?
No. There would be no unjust enrichment to speak of, as AAA withheld the properties pursuant to Paragraph
23 of the Contract of Lease, a provision which BBB knowingly agreed to. In other words, AAA retained the
said properties as security to compel BBB to pay and not to unduly enrich itself. Jurisprudence holds that
there is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person
retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience. The statutory basis for the principle of unjust enrichment is Article 22 of the Civil Code which
provides that 'every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
61
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the
same to him.' The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 33 requires two conditions: (1) that a person is
benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at another's expense or
damage. There is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such benefit.
Here, it does not show that AAA unjustly benefitted from the retention of the properties without valid basis, as
it merely acted in accordance with the lease contract to ensure recovery of what is due to it. If anything, the
so-called "benefit" which AAA is "enjoying" by withholding the properties is the assurance that it would be
able to collect from BBB. (PNTC Colleges, Inc. vs. Time Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 219698. September 27, 2021, J. Hernando)
Fault or negligence resulting in damage Obligation arises from the breach Existence of a law clearly
or injury to another of the contract because of the punishing the act (Nullum
defendant's failure to exercise due crimen sine lege).
care in its performance
Direct, substantive and independent Negligence is merely incident to Direct, substantive and
the performance of an obligation independent
already existing because of a
contract
Preponderance of evidence (Rule 133, Preponderance of evidence (Rule Proof beyond reasonable
Section 1, Rules of Court; Casupanan 133, Section 1, Rules of Court; doubt (Ibid.).
vs. Laroya, GR No. 145391, August 26, Barredo vs. Garcia, GR No. L-
2002). 48006, July 8, 1942).
As to the Employer’s Defense of Exercising the Diligence of “Good Father of a Family” in the
Selection and Supervision of his Employees
As a general rule, a complete proper Not a complete and proper Not a proper defense
defense. However, even if the employer defense.
can prove the diligence in the selection
and supervision (the latter aspect has
not been established herein) of the
employee, still if he ratifies the wrongful
acts or takes no step to avert further
damage, the employer would still be
62
liable.
Governed by Article 2176; Articles Governed by Arts. 1170-1174 of Governed by Article 365
1172-1174 are also applicable. the Civil Code. of the Revised Penal
Code.
(Articles 1173, 2176, 2178, Civil Code; Huang vs. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. GR No. 180440, December 5, 2012; Spouses Fontanilla vs.
Hon. Maliaman, GR No. L- 55963, December 1, 1989; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Company, GR No. L-12191, October 14, 1918; FGU
Insurance Corporation vs. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation, GR No. 141910, Aug. 6, 2002; Torres-Madrid Brokerage, Inc. vs. FEB
Mitsui Marine Insurance Co. Inc., GR No. 194121, July 11, 2016, Albano, Torts and Damages, supra at 7).
324. Two employees of the CBP (Central Bank of the Philippines) - a bookkeeper and a janitor-messenger
- were convicted of three counts of estafa through falsification of public documents for having
committed fraud against Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), a member of the Clearing House
established by CBP." Can CBP be liable for the torts committed by its employees?
No. CBP is not liable for the acts of its employees because they were not “special agents” nor acting within
the scope of their assigned tasks. Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that the State is responsible for the
damages caused by its employees when it acts through a special agent; but not when the damage has been
caused by the official to whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176
shall be applicable. A special agent is defined as one who receives a definite and fixed order or commission,
foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office. Evidently, both CBP employees are not considered as
special agents of CBP during their commission of the fraudulent acts against BPI as they were regular
employees performing tasks pertaining to their offices, namely, bookkeeping and janitorial-messenger. Thus,
CBP cannot be held liable for any damage caused to BPI by reason of its employees’ unlawful acts. Even
assuming that CBP is an ordinary employer (and not a , it still cannot be held liable. Article 2180 of the Civil
Code provides that an employer shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees acting within the
scope of their assigned tasks. An act is deemed an assigned task if it is "done by an employee, in
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of
the injury or damage." Obviously, the fraudulent acts of tampering with and pilfering of documents are not in
furtherance of CBP's interests nor done for its account as the said acts were unauthorized and unlawful.
(Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Central Bank of the Philippines and Citibank, G.R. No. 197593. October 12, 2020, J. Hernando)
325. Philippine National Bank (PNB) filed a complaint for a sum of money against the client, AAA and one
of its own branch heads, BBB. PNB claimed that BBB approved various cash withdrawals by AAA
against several checks without waiting for them to be cleared. When these checks were dishonored,
PNB claimed that BBB allowed AAA to deposit several checks to partially cover AAA's various cash
withdrawals. Nevertheless, these new checks were also dishonored for insufficient funds. PNB
further asserted that AAA had already acknowledged and confirmed his outstanding obligation to the
bank in the amount of P520,000.00 and executed a promissory note in its favor. Despite demand,
however, AAA failed to pay PNB the stipulated amount. PNB also alleged that BBB violated the
bank's policy on the prohibition against drawing on uncollected deposits pursuant to its General
Circular. In addition, PNB claimed that BBB violated and exceeded his limited authority to approve
encashment of other bank checks under its Manual of Signing Authority. Because of these, PNB
averred that it incurred losses in the amount of P520,000.00 and that BBB is personally liable to the
bank pursuant to its Manual of Policies on Cash, Checks and Other Cash Items and Deposits. PNB
Administrative Adjudication Panel penalized BBB with four (4) months suspension without prejudice
to the filing of an appropriate court action on the part of the bank. BBB, on the other hand, claimed
that it is only after careful evaluation of the track record and dealings of the depositor that he
decided to approve the check deposit of AAA. Can BBB be held personally and solidarily liable with
AAA for the amount of P520, 000.00?
63
No, because BBB's questioned acts were made within his discretion as branch manager and settled is the
rule that solidarity is never presumed. There is solidary liability when the obligation so states, or when the
law or the nature of the obligation requires the same, which are unavailing in the instant case. As claimed by
BBB, it is only after careful evaluation of the track record and dealings of the depositor that he decided to
approve the check deposit of AAA. In Tan v. People, it was held that as to the uncollected cheek deposits,
the bank may honor the check at its discretion in favor of clients. BBB's position as branch head entails the
exercise of such discretion. Additionally, since BBB was already penalized by PNB for his violations by way
of a four-month long suspension, making him personally accountable for the liability that AAA had already
acknowledged to be his would be tantamount to penalizing him twice for the same offense. The phrase
“without prejudice to the filing of an appropriate court action on the part of the bank - referred only to the
recovery of the amount involved from the one who actually benefited from the fraud, that is, AAA. (Philippine
National Bank vs. Bal, Jr., [G.R. No. 207856. November 18, 2020, J. Hernando)
326. Allied Bank ascribes all blame to the acts of its employee since the latter approved the unauthorized
debit of the transactions which led to the closure of the Spouses’ deposit account. What is the
liability, if any, of Allied Bank?
Its liability under the deposit agreement with the Spouses is primary and not vicarious. Articles 1172, 2176
and 2180 of the Civil Code lay down the following principles: (1) the responsibility of the obligor arising from
negligence in the performance of the obligation is demandable; (2) the fault or negligence of the obligor
causing damage to another obliges him to pay for the damage done; and (3) the obligation to pay for the
damage is demandable not only for one's own acts or omission, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible. Paragraph 5 of Article 2180 provides that "employers shall be liable for the damages caused
by their employees xxx acting within the scope of their assigned tasks xxx." (Allied Banking Corporation vs. Spouses
Macam, G.R. No. 200635. February 1, 2021, J. Hernando)
327. A six-year old child was sideswiped by AAA's vehicle driven by driver named BBB and dragged for
three meters, resulting in a fractured right leg. BBB was found to be negligent. Can AAA be held
vicariously liable?
Yes. In relation to Article 2176, Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides the basis for the concept of vicarious
liability in our jurisdiction, to wit: “The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one's
own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. Employers shall be liable
for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.” Applying these concepts to the
present case, the finding of negligence against BBB gave rise to the presumption of negligence on the part
of AAA in the latter's selection and/or supervision of the former. Therefore, it is incumbent upon AAA to prove
that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her employee,
BBB. (Maitim vs. Aguila, G.R. No. 218344, March 21, 2022, J. Hernando)
328. Can the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur be applied to presume the driver negligent for sideswiping a
six-year old child?
Yes. It is sufficient that the accident itself be established, and once established through the admission of
evidence, whether hearsay or not, the rule on res ipsa loquitur already starts to apply. Since it is clearly
established that there was a vehicular accident that caused injuries, then the rule on res ipsa loquitur shall
apply. An inference of negligence on the part of the driver, the person who controls the instrumentality
(vehicle) causing the injury, arises, and he has the burden of presenting proof to the contrary. (Maitim vs. Aguila,
G.R. No. 218344, March 21, 2022, J. Hernando)
329. The respective townhouse units of AAA and BBB are approximately nine meters apart, separated
only by a driveway jointly used by the townhouse unit owners. While AAA’s vehicle was driven by
her driver CCC along the common driveway, DDD, the six-year old daughter of BBB, was sideswiped
and dragged for three meters, resulting in a fractured right leg. DDD had exited their door and was on
her way towards the garage to board their car. CCC was found to be negligent. Is there contributory
negligence on DDD's part?
No. The driveway was a common area to both parties' townhouse units, which meant that the driveway is as
much a part of BBB's residence as it is of AAA's. DDD was not just running or loitering around but was
actually on her way to board their car. There is no negligence on the part of BBB when she allowed DDD to
exit their door and walk towards their garage. There is a reasonable expectation of safety, considering that
the driveway is still within the premises of their residence and not on the street where vehicles ordinarily
drive by. Moreover, given the location and relatively narrow profile of the driveway, it can be reasonably
expected that anyone who traverses such driveway with a motor vehicle would drive slowly and with utmost
caution. (Maitim vs. Aguila, G.R. No. 218344, March 21, 2022, J. Hernando)
330. Is an airline liable for breach of contract for the lost luggage of its passenger?
Yes. Considering that a contract of carriage is vested with public interest, a common carrier is presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently in case of lost or damaged goods unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence. Hence, in an action based on a breach of contract of carriage, the
aggrieved party does not need to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. He or she is
only required to prove the existence of the contract and its non-performance by the carrier. (KLM Royal Dutch
Airlines vs. Tiongco, G.R. No. 212136. October 4, 2021, J. Hernando)
64
331. How is the airline’s liability for damages determined?
Under Article 2216 of the Civil Code, the assessment of damages is left to the discretion of the court
according to the circumstances of each case. The courts must adhere to the principle that the amount of
damages awarded should not be palpably excessive as to indicate that it was the result of prejudice or
corruption on the part of the trial court. It must therefore be fair, reasonable, and proportionate to the injury.
(KLM Royal Dutch Airlines vs. Tiongco, G.R. No. 212136. October 4, 2021, J. Hernando)
332. Is an airline liable for moral and exemplary and nominal damages if a passenger loses his luggage
containing his resource materials and other possessions to be used in a speaking engagement,
without which, the latter would not have been done properly, considering that nobody from the
airline’s personnel updated the passenger of what happened to the search for the luggage, that it
was only when the passenger wrote the airline a demand letter that the latter reached out to him
asking for time to investigate the matter, that it did not even notify him of the result of the purported
investigation, and that when it was eventually found, the airline did not inform the passenger that his
luggage had been found or took the necessary steps to transport it back?
Yes. The bad faith on the part of the airline renders the same liable for moral and exemplary damages. The
award of moral damages is proper to enable the injured party to obtain means of diversion or amusement
that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering they underwent because of another's culpable action. (KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines vs. Tiongco, G.R. No. 212136. October 4, 2021, J. Hernando)
333. Is an airline liable for both nominal damages and temperate damages if a passenger loses his
luggage containing his resource materials and other possessions to be used in a speaking
engagement, without which, the latter would not have been done properly?
No, the airline is liable for temperate damages only. Article 2221 of the Civil Code states that nominal
damages may be awarded in order that the plaintiff's right, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered. They are "recoverable where a legal right is technically violated and must be vindicated against an
invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or where there has been a breach of contract
and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or can be shown." On the other hand,
Article 2224 of the same Code states that temperate damages or moderate damages, which are more than
nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty. Simply
put, temperate damages are awarded when the injured party suffered some pecuniary loss but the amount
thereof cannot, from the nature of the case, be proven with certainty. (KLM Royal Dutch Airlines vs. Tiongco, G.R. No.
212136. October 4, 2021, J. Hernando)
334. AAA filed against BBB a complaint for declaration of the deed of mortgage as null and void, with
damages. The RTC ruled in favor of BBB and awarded moral and exemplary damages. The RTC
decision reads: “There is bad faith on the part of AAA. There being bad faith, she is liable for moral
damages as enunciated in the case of China Airlines, Ltd. vs. Court of Appeals, 406 SCRA 113.” Is
the award of moral, exemplary and attorneys fees proper?
No. Moral damages are not recoverable simply because a contract has been breached. They are
recoverable only if the party from whom they are claimed acted fraudulently or in bad faith or in wanton
disregard of his/her contractual obligations. As regards the assessment of exemplary damages, the wrongful
act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the award therefor would be allowed only if the guilty party acted
in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless or malevolent manner. Attorney's fees represent the reasonable
compensation paid to a lawyer by his/her client for the legal services he/she has rendered to the latter. They
may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing party to the prevailing party
in the instances specified in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. Strangely enough, none of the foregoing Civil
Code provisions, pieces of jurisprudence, or similar legal references were even slightly alluded to by the
RTC to justify the monetary awards. In fine, there was no clear and distinct citation of the RTC's factual and
legal bases as regards its positive grant of damages in favor of BBB, or any discussion as to how AAA was
liable therefor. (Ganancial vs. Cabugao, G.R. No. 203348. July 6, 2020, J. Hernando)
335. Is the award for temperate damages proper in the case of AAA who was unable to use productively
the 102 hectares of its landholdings after it was deprived of its possession in 1972?
Yes. With the passage of time, it is impossible to determine AAA's losses with any certainty. Thus,
considering the particular circumstances of this case, the award of temperate damages is reasonable. (Land
Bank of the Philippines vs. Del Moral, Inc., G.R. No. 187307. October 14, 2020, J. Hernando)
336. Can nominal damages be awarded in addition to the temperate damages granted?
No. Nominal damages should be deleted as temperate and nominal damages are incompatible and thus,
cannot be granted concurrently. (Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Del Moral, Inc., G.R. No. 187307. October 14, 2020, J.
Hernando)
337. AAA, engaged in the production of liquid forms of gasses which require a very stable source of
power, experienced power fluctuations and interruptions causing losses amounting to more than 21
million pesos. There is no indication as to where this figure was based or how it was derived. There
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is likewise no receipt nor any supporting document offered in court to support such figure. Despite
Meralco's repeated assurance of better electric supply, and despite knowledge of the serious
production losses experienced by AAA due to the power fluctuations and interruptions, it still failed
to provide any remedy. Is Meralco liable for temperate damages, exemplary damages, and attorney’s
fees?
He is liable only for temperate and exemplary damages, but not for attorney’s fees.
Liable for temperate damages: Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, "[t]emperate or moderate damages,
which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds
that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be provided
with certainty." Here, without indication as to where the figure for loss was based or how it was derived and
without any supporting receipts, the resulting figure may very well be a product of speculation or sheer
estimation. Nevertheless, Meralco cannot escape liability for this sole reason. This is because Meralco failed
to provide any concrete proof of the cause of the power interruptions and fluctuation. Meralco is liable for
temperate damages to an amount equivalent to a certain percentage of the actual damages claimed by AAA.
Liable for exemplary damages: Despite Meralco's repeated assurance of better electric supply, and despite
knowledge of the serious production losses experienced by AAA due to the power fluctuations and
interruptions, it still failed to provide any remedy, in wanton disregard of its contractual obligation to deliver
energy "at reasonably constant potential and frequency." As a public utility vested with vital public interest,
Meralco should be reminded of its "obligation to discharge its functions with utmost care and diligence."
Not liable for Attorney’s fees: Jurisprudence instructs that "the award of attorney's fees is an exception rather
than the general rule; thus, there must be compelling legal reason to bring the case within the exceptions
provided under Article 2208 of the Civil Code to justify the award." There is no compelling legal reason here.
(Go vs. Teruel, A.C. No. 11119. November 4, 2020, J. Hernando)
338. AAA filed a complaint for damages claiming that Union Bank negligently handled his credit card
account. AAA maintained that he suffered embarrassment, social humiliation, mental anguish,
serious anxieties, besmirched reputation, and wounded feelings when his card was dishonored at
Gourdo's Restaurant. Per records of the case, the card was dishonored because his account was
already in "past due" status for failure to pay the minimum amount due. Is AAA entitled to moral
damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees due to the alleged gross negligence of Union
Bank?
No. The use of a credit card to pay for a purchase is only an offer to the credit card company to enter into a
loan agreement with the credit card holder. Before the credit card issuer accepts this offer, no obligation
relating to the loan agreement exists between them. While it is true that with the issuance of the credit card
to AAA, Union Bank granted him a credit facility or a pre-approved amount which the card holder may use in
his purchase of goods and services, this is not a demandable right which the card holder may hold against
the credit card company as if he is entitled to be granted a loan whenever he or she wants to, or that the
bank owes him or her money by the mere issuance of a credit card. Union Bank may or may not approve
AAA's purchase requests based on the latter's credit standing, credit card history, and financial capability.
Union Bank disapproved AAA's use of credit card due to the latter's failure to pay the minimum amount due
of his SOA. Hence, as it was AAA's own action which was the proximate cause of his embarrassing and
humiliating experience, the award of moral damages is clearly unjustified. (Rico vs. Union Bank of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 210928, February 14, 2022, J. Hernando)
339. When the commission of a crime results in death, what awards are the heirs of the victim entitled to?
When death results in the commission of a crime, the heirs of the victim are entitled to (a) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime; (b) actual
or compensatory damages to the extent proved, or temperate damages when some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot be provided with certainty; (c) moral damages; and (d) exemplary damages
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. (People vs. Camarino, G.R. No.
222655. December 9, 2020, J. Hernando)
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