Special

184
no.
Security, Economy, and Ecology: Setting
Priorities for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific
Ambar Kumar Ghosh, Debosmita Sarkar,
Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury

FEBRUARY 2022
© 2022 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, archived, retained or transmitted through
print, speech or electronic media without prior written approval from ORF.
Introduction

I
n the 20th century, the Indo-Pacific has
emerged as one of the pivotal theatres of
inter-state contestation and competition, Indo-Pacific rim (also called littoral states). The
yet also of cooperation. The term ‘Indo- region has gained enormous political, strategic,
Pacific’ itself has been propounded by some and economic importance for the emerging Asian
of the key stakeholders in the region, including order, especially amidst two crucial developments.
the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, and One is the meteoric rise of China in the Asia-
is considered a combination “of the Indian Ocean Pacific and beyond, which has compelled other
and the Pacific Ocean,” or “these two oceans and powers to temper the balance of power in the
the surrounding countries.”1 However, while it region. China’s irredentist claims, especially
is largely considered as “an interconnected space in the East and South China sea regions, leave
between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean” room for territorial contestations with states
by most nations, its geographic expanse is variedly such as Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan.3
defined.2 The other is the relative decline of US influence
in the region, which has made it imperative and
Politically, prominent players in the Indo-Pacific opportune for other notable powers such as
include China, Japan, India, Australia, South Japan, Australia and India, to play their own roles
Korea, along with ASEAN (Association of Southeast in maintaining political stability and promoting
Asian Nations), and different island states in the economic sustainability in the Indo-Pacific.4

Attribution: Ambar Kumar Ghosh, Debosmita Sarkar, and Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, “Security, Economy,
and Ecology: Setting Priorities for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” ORF Special Report No. 184, February 2022,
Observer Research Foundation.

2
 Economically, the Indo-Pacific is a centre of
global trade and commerce, and therefore a
potential area of economic prosperity for the This report discusses the Indo-Pacific as a
countries in the region. It accounts for 65 percent theatre of strategic contestation and explores
of the world’s population, 63 percent of the world’s potential areas of inter-state cooperation in the
GDP, and 46 percent of the world’s merchandise region—especially in the spheres of security,
trade.5 The region also dominates 50 percent of connectivity, and economy—while considering
the world’s maritime trade.6 Additionally, the Indo- emerging environmental concerns.
Pacific is home to some of the most diverse global
commons of the world, making great-power rivalry
over access to such resources a potential flashpoint
in the region.7

Declining US influence in the Indo-

Pacific makes it imperative for other
powers such as Japan, Australia,
and India, to play their own roles in
maintaining political stability and
promoting economic sustainability in
the region.

3
The Dynamics of the
Indo-Pacific Construct

T
he ‘Indo-Pacific’ construct is
envisaged primarily as a counterpoise
to the increasing strategic and
economic dominance of China in the
region, but the various stakeholders
have differing interpretations of what constitutes growing US-China trade war, though the two
it. Thus, a coherent vision of the region remains countries have made efforts to initiate discussion.8
elusive. Moreover, while a broad consensus exists Japan, meanwhile, while sharing the US’s vision
for the need to uphold a “free and open Indo- of a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’, gives greater
Pacific”—argued by Japan and the US, and priority to infrastructure development—not
supported by nations such as Australia and India— only in the East Asian region but also in the
the countries remain ambiguous in their stance vis- Middle East and Africa. In recent years, the US
à-vis China’s role in the visualisation of the region. has encouraged India to play a more prominent
role in the region to consolidate its response to
The US is driven primarily by its desire to play China’s strategic advancements. However, India
a balancing role in the region and contain the has cautiously pitched for an inclusive vision for
hegemonic consolidation of China in the region. the region for all powers, through the concept
The situation has only exacerbated with the of SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the
Region).

4
 Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in
his address at the Shangri La Dialogue in 2018,
reiterated that India’s conceptualisation of the balancing between the US and China and have
Indo-Pacific stretches “from Africa to Americas, “emphasised the need to acknowledge the
thereby covering the entire Indian and Pacific indispensability of ‘ASEAN centrality’ for all
oceans, in tandem with that of Japan.”9 He said strategic-economic collaborations in the region.”11
India’s vision was not directed against any country. The rising prominence of the region has also
This, despite China’s aggravated border disputes been acknowledged by extra-regional actors such
with India, which makes Chinese influence in as the European Union (EU), which views the
South Asia and in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) region from its own strategic vantage point.
a strategic concern for India. Indeed, India’s
reservations over the China-Pakistan Economic Therefore, the construct of the Indo-Pacific
Corridor (CPEC), part of China’s grand Belt and as a counter to China’s strategic overreach is
Road Initiative (BRI), makes it India’s priority to replete with limitations due to the divergent
balance China through alternative multilateral strategic interests and economic imperatives of
collaborations. the stakeholder nations. For now, it is imperative
to find areas of convergence that transcend the
Australia too, has taken a non-confrontationist diversities, to constructively engage countries
view of the region as it has economic stakes with through economic, connectivity, and ecological
China. It is advocating for a free and stable Indo- imperatives in the region.
Pacific, while maintaining an alliance with the US
and working on newer collaborations with Japan,
South Korea, and India.10 The ASEAN countries,
being at the heart of the Indo-Pacific region,
have taken a more “transactional” perspective
on the Indo-Pacific concept based on a strategic

5
Security Cooperation

T
he Indo-Pacific has emerged as a
prominent geostrategic landscape
in recent years, especially in light India, as one of the aspiring powers in the
of China’s growing presence in the region, has been an active participant in platforms
region. The region has witnessed such as the East Asia Summit Association of South-
the proliferation of multilateral and minilateral east Asian Nations Defence Ministers’ Meeting
platforms for cooperation and dialogue amongst Plus, ASEAN Regional Forum, BIMSTEC
various stakeholders, such as the Quadrilateral (Bay of Bengal Multi-Sectoral Technical and
security dialogue (Quad) of India, the US, Australia, Economic Cooperation), and India-Pacific
and Japan; the India-Australia-Japan and the Islands Cooperation.15 Despite India’s strained
India-Indonesia-Australia trilaterals; and the newly geopolitical relations with China in recent years,
created AUKUS, an alliance of Australia, the UK, their multi-layered engagements—along with the
and the US.12 While these forums prioritise strategic historically promising India-Russia relationship—
security concerns in the region, they also have the can play a key role in promoting shared
potential to expand their cooperation to domains prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region. India’s
such as the economy and health security. The growing naval cooperation16 with countries such
Quad, for instance, played an instrumental role in as Vietnam, Singapore, and Indonesia17 adds to
Covid-19 vaccine diplomacy in the region.13,14 this dynamic of security cooperation in the region.

6
Moreover, since the early 2000s, the Japan-India
strategic relationship has grown,18 allowing both
countries to overcome domestic and regional last three decades. For instance, the emergence
hurdles. China’s growing geoeconomic prominence of prominent security partnerships such as the
and its territorial disputes with other states have Quad and AUKUS, while not explicitly seeking
driven India-Japan cooperation. to replace ASEAN or ASEAN-led initiatives,
illustrate the keenness of other countries outside
There is potential for the two nations to engage in of Southeast Asia to play a more prominent role
joint exercises, similar to those that India conducts in furthering security and economic growth in
with Russia, the US, and the UK. India and Japan the region.
can also collaborate on expanding expeditionary
capabilities such as cadet-training, mid-career Similarly, Southeast Asian countries face key
training programs, and intelligence-sharing; policy challenges that hinder regional economic
defence, trade and technology;a and contingency integration. While the ASEAN Outlook on the
planning for specific scenarios, akin to the Japan- Indo-Pacific adopted in 201921 was a step towards
US exercise.19 Identifying complementarities in creating a common framework, the document
Official Development Assistance (ODA),20 for the fails to merit the urgency with which the
developing as well as less developed countries, also ASEAN countries should take cognisance of the
presents scope for future cooperation. intensifying geo-political dynamics in the region.
It merely serves as a set of guiding principles
At the same time, these developments raise that the members of the ASEAN can refer to
questions about the centrality of the Southeast while formulating their national foreign policy
Asian nations in the region. After all, these countries documents to pursue their individual goals in the
have shaped the ambit of socioeconomic progress Indo-Pacific. It does not provide concrete ground
and regional security in the Indo-Pacific over the on which the South-east Asian countries can come
together in the context of geopolitics, security and
regional integration in the Indo-Pacific region.

a However, the two countries will have to share ground through finding common projects, aligning domestic goals and balancing costs.

7
 Overall, there remains a gap between what is
needed and what is provided in terms of functional
security or strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. has only been fast-tracked by the Covid-19
It is important to fill this gap, amidst the churning pandemic.22 To this end, the diverse actors in
of the geopolitical landscape in the region, which the region must explore common grounds
for enhancing cooperative endeavours—with
a broader view of security, to include health,
information as well as human security.

Partnerships such as the

Quad and AUKUS, while not
seeking to replace ASEAN or
ASEAN-led initiatives, show the
keenness of other countries outside
of Southeast Asia to play a role in
the region’s security, and economic
growth.

8
Trade and Connectivity

W
ith the prospects of a changing
global economic order looming
large against the backdrop of The Indo-Pacific region consists of 38
China’s BRI, it is necessary to countries—constituting a large share in world
examine the internal dynamics population and global gross domestic product
of the countries in the Indo-Pacific region with (GDP)—making it a key player in both product
respect to regional connectivity23 and economic and factor markets.27 With a 46-percent share
integration. The emergence of insulating tendencies in world merchandise trade and a sizeable
amongst economies that were once proponents of percentage of global maritime28 trade routed
a more globalised world order, rising nationalistic through this region, the issues of trade, commerce
fervours and ‘strongman’ rulers,24 and the Covid-19 and connectivity can be pivotal to regional
pandemic,25 have further challenged the status integration and development in the Indo-Pacific.
quo. While potential security arrangements such Key to boosting regional commercial ties will
as the Quad have attempted to combat these be enhancing physical and digital connectivity;
challenges, their influence in the purely economic diversifying trade networks; and building resilient
sectors have remained largely limited. For instance, systems of communication and infrastructure.
despite significant geopolitical tensions between However, it remains imperative to understand
the countries, China-India trade volumes exceeded the optimal scope of such a market, its role in
USD 100 billion in October 2021—indicating a the Global Value Chains (GVCs), the existing or
decoupling between their political interests and potential forward and backward linkages, the
economic goals.26 nature of trade arrangements that would be most
favourable, and the existing trade-offs between
national economic goals and broader regional
ones.

9
 Both digital connectivity and physical
connectivity and infrastructure are instrumental
in the progress of trade and economic growth in Enhancing overall connectivity will help
the region—facilitating the movement of goods generate greater economic opportunities for
and other factors of production. In particular, the entire population in the Indo-Pacific region.
the poor state of digital connectivity in the region Promotion of e-commerce can also lower
has hindered economic integration in the Indo- transaction costs and create a level playing
Pacific. Many island states in the region, for field for small businesses. While the Fourth
example, East Timor, are unable to adequately Industrial Revolution was already paving the
participate in regional trade due to lack of proper way for such advances, the Covid-19 pandemic
digital connectivity.29 While most countries to the has fast-tracked the process. The Indo-Pacific
east of the Indo-Pacific have sufficient undersea region includes both smaller and larger players
cable connectivity, the Bay of Bengal region with varied endowments and capacities to fund
lags behind.30 The absence of terrestrial cables diverse infrastructural development, which
further worsens the situation in these parts of can potentially drive a digital divide among the
the Indo-Pacific.31 Despite solutions such as the regional partners. However, careful collaboration
UNCTAD Automated System for Customs Data and cooperation can make technology work more
(ASYCUDA)—b a customs information database efficiently in the region. Regulatory issues related
aimed at removing barriers to trade—connectivity to cybersecurity, fraud, information-sharing,
issues continue to affect trade significantly.32 digital-inclusion strategies, and digital literacy
Countries in Europe and North America, on the should also be considered.
other hand, are well-connected by terrestrial cables
that are more resilient against disruptions.

b Its member countries include Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.

10
 Enhancing overall
connectivity will help
generate greater
economic opportunities
for the Indo-Pacific Finally, it is now critical to develop an
underlying broader and more robust economic
population. architecture to support economic integration
in the Indo-Pacific region. While the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)
The pandemic and the subsequent lockdowns encompasses some of the countries in the region
and supply chain disruptions have underlined the under a common free trade agreement (FTA), it
need for diversifying and increasing supply chain still covers only a relatively small part of the entire
resilience. In this context, some recent initiatives Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, commitments made
such as the ASEAN-Japan Joint Initiative for by countries as part of the RCEP are much less
Economic Resilience and Supply Chain Resilience stringent than their bilateral commitments, which
Initiative (involving the Quad countries) were further restricts its scope as a common operating
introduced to facilitate the flow of goods and framework. Unless a broader conceptual
build more resilient supply chains.33 India has framework can be worked out, it falls upon
exerted efforts to insert itself into the global supply individual nations and private multi-nationals to
chains that exist in the region by supporting drive commerce and connectivity in the region.34
the formation of larger Indian multi-nationals.
Cooperation from countries such as the US or
Japan, in the form of opening up their existing
supply chains to enable India’s integration, is a
critical first step. Additionally, the emerging trends
of de-globalisation and consolidation among multi-
nationals pose further challenges to India’s ability
to plug itself into global supply chains.

11
Environmental Concerns

C
ountries in the Indo-Pacific region,
particularly around the Bay of Bengal,
are vulnerable to a large number cyclones being common occurrences, but most
of Non-Traditional Security (NTS) of them have managed to implement adequate
threats, which sometimes outweigh disaster-management measures. These countries
the more traditional ones. Various anthropogenic have also done well in terms of addressing
changes have emerged in the region over the past NTS challenges, particularly those caused by
years, such as river flows, sedimentation patterns, natural disasters—for example, by resorting to
groundwater or land-use patterns. Moreover, community-based resilience and best practices.35
adverse fallouts of human commercial activities and These include mitigation strategies aimed at
their ecological impacts demand urgent attention. reducing the immediate impact of the disasters,
e.g. working on better building materials or
It is important to investigate the current structures, training community members in
challenges in the region that need to be addressed emergency response, educating children at a
on priority. Moreover, it will help to identify younger age by bringing in disaster-risk reduction
national or regional strategies that have successfully curriculum into early learning experiences. Such
addressed NTS challenges in the region, to replicate local efforts have also been critical in shaping up
these best practices wherever relevant. For instance, larger national strategies.
Asian countries are disaster-prone, with floods and

12
 One of the most critical challenges that persist
is the lack of communication support and needs- Bangladesh, for one, has scored remarkable
based resource allocation to the areas that are most progress in responding to NTS challenges.38 It
vulnerable, for example those living in low-lying has established the Coastal Crisis Management
locations and dependent on ecosystem services Centres (CCMCs),39 improved resilience through
for their livelihoods. Thus, it is imperative to a concerted approach towards capacity-building,
develop more dynamic and flexible frameworks, and transformed itself into a provider of disaster
with tailored approaches. Regional cooperation, relief to other countries around the Bay, for
education, policy tools for disaster-risk reduction, instance, during the 2016 Sri Lanka floods or the
and private-sector engagements can pave the way, 2014 water crisis in Maldives.40 Japan and the US41
depending on each partner country’s capacity and have been important partners in supporting the
financial resources. establishment of these crisis management setups
in countries such as Maldives and Bangladesh.
The US-based Vision Planning and Consulting However, there remains significant scope to
(VPC)36 is developing a database to include disaster- improve trust among partners in the context of
risk reduction, risk management, and navigation military or para-military involvements to support
strategies and plans for governments to align relief measures on overseas land.
their initiatives. So far, the VPC has yielded good
results. The IOM Asia-Pacific Regional Data Hub is Various incidents over the past two years
another example of such concerted efforts towards have highlighted the need for widening the
knowledge-sharing in the region.37 One challenge is aperture of environmental governance to
posed by climate-change-induced migration, which include risk mitigation or rehabilitation strategies
has received little attention in the US in terms of a in response to incidents such as oil spills or
broader strategic thinking. Asia, on the other hand, chemical leaks into the high seas. These factors
has been dealing with these issues for a long time, are not only a serious threat to environmental
due to frequent instances of coastal flooding and security in terms of depletion of quality of life
other natural disasters. This is one area where the under water and other ecosystem services they
US can learn from Asia. support, but are also critical to various economic
sectors across countries in the region, such
as the luxury tourism industry in Maldives.

13
To ensure the collective sustainable use of the
high seas, international legal requirements are a
welcome start. In 2020, the International Maritime effectiveness of monitoring, control, surveillance
Organisations (IMO) introduced legal curbs on and enforcement mechanisms, through increased
the sulphur content of ship fuels, requiring global regional cooperation and collaboration.44
stakeholders to operationally address the impacts of
environmental threats.42 A security partnership platform in the Indo-
Pacific region, similar to the Pacific Security
Two other crucial issues that have recently Partnership Forum, can be established and
emerged in the Indian Ocean Region are Illegal spearheaded by sponsoring countries to hold talks
Unregulated Unreported (IUU) fishing and about the impending threats. Such a forum can
marine litter.43 The Covid-19 pandemic has only then formulate suitable mitigation and response
exacerbated these threats. While some countries strategies at the regional level. Without concerted
in the region—for example, Southeast Asian efforts to combat the threats emerging from NTS
states—have national action plans, there is a challenges in the region, they can quickly translate
need for complementary responses such as joint into conventional security challenges, altogether
capacity-building. The coastal states in the Indian destabilising the Indo-Pacific construct.45
Ocean Region can draw lessons from the Pacific
Island states on the importance of enhancing the

There is a need for widening the

aperture of environmental
governance to include risk
mitigation or rehabilitation
strategies in response to incidents
such as oil spills or chemical leaks
into the high seas.

14
Conclusion

G
lobal powers are increasingly
recognising the political and economic
significance of the Indo-Pacific region
in catering to the present and future To keep up with the deeply embedded forces of
needs of the states in the region and a globalised economy, regional stakeholders must
beyond. While concerted attempts are being made proactively work towards the institutionalised
by the constituent states in the region to explore advancement of interconnected technology-
areas of cooperation to balance China’s growing sharing initiatives, digital cooperation,
strategic and economic influence over the Indo- knowledge-sharing, and sustainable development
Pacific, such security alliances pose a unique set of in the domain of trade, connectivity and
structural limitations and challenges. Indeed, given infrastructural growth. An increased focus on
China’s economic and diplomatic heft in the region, human security in the spheres of health, people-
engaging with it in constructive endeavours will be to-people links, and cultural exchanges can help
helpful for the larger prosperity goals of the region. forge more durable interconnectedness in the
region. Finally, regional actors must address the
burgeoning environmental threats and climate-
change-induced challenges in the region, through
effective joint disaster mitigation and resilient
management architectures.

The authors have referred to the deliberations of the “International Conference on Strategic High Tide in the Indo-
Pacific: Economics, Ecology and Security,” held on 9-10 November 2021, organised by ORF Kolkata in collaboration
with the Consulate General of Japan in Kolkata.

15
Endnotes

1 Wada Haruko, “The Indo-Pacific Concept: Geographical Adjustments and their Implications,” S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, Singapore Working Paper 326, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/WP326.pdf.

2 Udayan Das, “What is the Indo=Pacific?” The Diplomat, July 13, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/07/what-is-the-indo-
pacific/.

3 “China’s Maritime Disputes,” Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/chinas-maritime-disputes/#!/chinas-

maritime-disputes?cid=otr-marketing_use-china_sea_InfoGuide.

4 Ambar Kumar Ghosh, “The Praxis of Indo-Pacific: Mapping the Impediments and Challenges,” KIIPS, October 20, 2019,
http://www.kiips.in/research/the-praxis-of-indo-pacific-mapping-the-impediments-and-challenges/.

5 Prabir De, “Navigating the Indo-Pacific Cooperation,” The Economic Times, March 11, 2019, https://economictimes.indiatimes.
com/blogs/et-commentary/navigating-the-indo-pacific-cooperation/.

6 Soumya Bhowmick, “The Indo-Pacific economics: Inextricable Chinese linkages and Indian challenges,” Raisina Debates,
ORF Expert Speak, December 8, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-indo-pacific-economics-inextricable-
chinese-linkages-and-indian challenges/#:~:text=In%20fact%2C%20above%2050%20percent,the%20intensifying%20
presence%20of%20China

7 Udayan Das, “What is the Indo-Pacific?”

8 “Talking amid conflict: On U.S. and China relations,” The Hindu, September 14, 2021, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/
editorial/talking-amid-conflict-on-us-and-china-relations/article36441708.ece

9 Prabir De, ““Navigating the Indo-Pacific Cooperation,” The Economic Times, March 11, 2019, https://economictimes.
indiatimes.com/blogs/et-commentary/navigating-the-indo-pacific-cooperation/.

10 “The Indo-Pacific Construct in Australia’s White Papers: Reflections for ASEAN-Australia Future Strategic Partnership,”
Centre for International Relations and Strategic Studies, Vol 5, No. 6, March 2018, https://fsi.gov.ph/the-indo-pacific-
construct-in-australias-white-papers-reflections-for-asean-australia-future-strategic-partnership/

11 Premesha Saha, “ASEAN’s Indo-Pacific outlook: An analysis,” ORF Expert Speak, June 28, 2019, https://www.orfonline.org/
expert-speak/aseans-indo-pacific-outlook-an-analysis-52542/.

12 Harsh V. Pant and Rahul Kamath, “AUKUS and the Indo-Pacific: Stakeholders Weigh their Wins and Losses,” Special
Report, December 10, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/research/aukus-and-the-indo-pacific/#:~:text=Regional%20
Security%20in%20the%20Indo,grown%20as%20a%20common%20concern.

16
13 Teesta Prakash, “The Quad gives a boost to India’s vaccine diplomacy,” The Interpreter, 16 March, 2021, https://www.
lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/quad-gives-boost-india-s-vaccine-diplomacy#:~:text=India’s%20vaccine%20diplomacy,-
Teesta%20Prakash&text=plays%20to%20the%20strengths%20of%20the%20grouping.&text=The%20most%20
notable%20takeaway%20from,expanding%20the%20global%20vaccine%20supply.

14 Teesta Prakash, “The Quad gives a boost to India’s vaccine diplomacy.”

15 “East Asia Summit 2020 | India expresses concern over actions that erode trust in South China Sea,” The Hindu, November
14, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/east-asia-summit-2020-india-expresses-concern-over-actions-that-
erode-trust-in-south-china-sea/article33100778.ece

16 Premesha Saha, “India Calibrates its South China Sea Approach,” ORF Issue Brief No. 477, July 2021, Observer Research
Foundation, https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-calibrates-its-south-china-sea-approach/.

17 Ristian Atriandi Supriyanto, “A sea of opportunities: South East Asia’s growing naval cooperation with India,” in India’s
Naval Strategy and Asian Security, eds Anit Mukherjee & C. Raja Mohan, 2016, pp.192-214.

18 Harsh V. Pant, “The rising sun in India-Japan relations,” ORF Expert Speak, May 1, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/
research/the-rising-sun-in-india-japan-relations/.

19 “Japan and U.S. hold joint drills in Okinawa,” The Japan Times, November 12, 2021, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2021/11/12/national/japan-us-drills/.

20 “Official Development Assistance (ODA),” OECD, https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/

development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm.

21 “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,” ASEAN, June 23, 2019, https://asean.org/speechandstatement/asean-outlook-on-the-

indo-pacific/.

22 This section encapsulates the points made by the speakers at ORF-Japan’s conference on “Strategic High Tide in the Indo-
Pacific: Economics, Ecology, and Security – Business Session I: Geopolitics and Security.” The session was chaired by Anasua
Basu Ray Chaudhury, Senior Fellow at ORF Kolkata. The following were the speakers:

a. Dhruva Jaishankar, Executive Director, Observer Research Foundation, America

b. Collin Koh Swee Lean, Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, Singapore

c. Satu Limaye, Vice President & Director, East West Center, USA

d. Shruti Pandalai, Associate Fellow, Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi

e. Daisuke Kawai, Research Fellow Indo-Pacific Affairs, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, Japan

f. Akriti Vasudeva, Research Analyst with the South Asia Program at the Stimson Center and Editor-at-large at South
Asian Voices, US

17
23 Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury, Pratnashree Basu and Sohini Bose, “Exploring India’s maritime connectivity in the extended
Bay of Bengal,” ORF Monograph, November 28, 2019, https://www.orfonline.org/research/exploring-indias-maritime-
connectivity-in-the-extended-bay-of-bengal-58190/.

24 Monica de Bolle, “The Rise of Economic Nationalism Threatens Global Cooperation,” Peterson Institute for International
Economics, September 4, 2019, https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/rise-economic-nationalism-
threatens-global-cooperation.

25 Philippe Legrain, “The Coronavirus Is Killing Globalization as We Know It,” Foreign Policy, March 12, 2020, https://
foreignpolicy.com/2020/03/12/coronavirus-killing-globalization-nationalism-protectionism-trump/.

26 Ananth Krishnan, “India’s trade with China set to exceed $100 billion in 2021,” The Hindu, October 13, 2021, https://www.
thehindu.com/business/indias-trade-with-china-set-to-exceed-100-billion-in-2021/article36991136.ece.
27 Natasha Jha Bhaskar, “India’s developing economic ties with the Indo-Pacific,” ORF Expert Speak, April 26, 2021, https://
www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/india-developing-economic-ties-indo-pacific.

28 “Review of Maritime Transport 2021,” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, https://unctad.org/system/
files/official-document/rmt2021_en_0.pdf.

29 “A way forward for LDCs,” The World Academy of Sciences (TWAS), January 20, 2020, https://twas.org/article/way-forward-ldcs.

30 Aroon Deep, “What It Took To Build The Undersea Internet Cable Between Chennai And Andaman & Nicobar Islands,”
Medianama, August 16, 2021, https://www.medianama.com/2021/08/223-undersea-internet-cable-chennai-andaman-
nicobar/.

31 Rohan Samarajiva, Digital connectivity as an enabling factor in Asian resurgence,” ORF Expert Speak, December 15, 2021,
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/digital-connectivity-as-an-enabling-factor-in-asian-resurgence/.

32 “ASYCUDA in Action Compendium 2019,” United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, https://unctad.org/
system/files/official-document/dtlasycudamisc2019d2_en.pdf.

33 “India, Australia and Japan to launch resilient supply chains for Indo-Pacific,” Hindustan Times, September 1, 2020, https://
www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-australia-and-japan-to-launch-resilient-supply-chains-for-indo-pacific/story-
0e4j7CfG9kz0AmH0tK1ndL.html.

34 This section encapsulates the points made by the speakers at ORF-Japan’s conference on “Strategic High Tide in the Indo-
Pacific: Economics, Ecology, and Security – Business Session II: Commerce and Connectivity.” The session was chaired by
Nilanjan Ghosh, Director of ORF Kolkata. The following were the speakers:

a. Rohan Samarajiva, Founder, LIRNEasia, Sri Lanka

b. Takuma Otaki, Advisor to Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Government of Japan, and Policy Director of
JETRO, New Delhi

c. Akshay Mathur, Director, Observer Research Foundation, Mumbai

d. Arpita Mukherjee, Professor, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi

e. Saon Ray, Senior Fellow, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi

18
35 Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury and Sohini Bose, “Disasters without borders: Strengthening BIMSTEC cooperation in
humanitarian assistance,” ORF Issue Brief No 207, November 2017, https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/
ORF_Issue_Brief_207_BIMSTEC-HADR.pdf. Sohini Bose, “BIMSTEC and Disaster Management: Future Prospects for
Regional Cooperation,” ORF Issue Brief No 383, July 2020, https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ORF_
IssueBrief_383_BIMSTEC-Disasters.pdf.

36 Vision Planning and Consulting (VPC), https://planvpc.com/about-vpc/.

37 IOM UN Migration, https://publications.iom.int/books/iom-asia-pacific-regional-data-hub-regional-secondary-data-review-

march-2021.

38 Md Abdul Karim, “Bangladesh succeeds in effective disaster management,” The Financial Express, October 26, 2020, https://
thefinancialexpress.com.bd/views/bangladesh-succeeds-in-effective-disaster-management-1603722306.
39 The Daily Star, “First Coastal Crisis Management Centre inaugurated,” March 14, 2013, https://www.thedailystar.net/news/
first-coastal-crisis-management-centre-inaugurated.

40 Nilanthi Samaranayake, “Non-traditional security in the Bay of Bengal,” ORF Expert Speak, December 13, 2021, https://
www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/non-traditional-security-in-the-bay-of-bengal/.

41 “Part II: Military Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Response Capacity in the Indo-Pacific Region,” UPTEMPO: The United
States and Natural Disasters in the Pacific, New America, https://www.newamerica.org/resource-security/reports/uptempo-
united-states-and-natural-disasters/part-ii-military-humanitarian-and-disaster-relief-response-capacity-in-the-indo-pacific-
region/.

42 “TUV NordGroup,” https://www.tuv-nord.com/in/en/blog/blog-details/article/the-2020-international-maritime-organization

-imo-fuel-sulphur-regulation/

43 “Fourth Our Ocean Conference Generates Over €7 Billion in Pledges,” IISD, October 6, 2017, https://sdg.iisd.org/news/
fourth-our-ocean-conference-generates-over-e7-billion-in-pledges/.

44 ADB, “Disaster Risk Reduction and Management in the Pacific,” https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/30374/

disaster-risk-reduction-management-pacific.pdf.

45 This section encapsulates the points made by the speakers at ORF-Japan’s conference on “Strategic High Tide in the Indo-
Pacific: Economics, Ecology, and Security – Business Session III: Environmental Concerns and Engagements.” The session
was chaired by Anamitra Anurag Danda, Senior Visiting Fellow at ORF Kolkata. The following were the speakers:

a. Nilanthi Samaranayake, Director, CNA’s Strategy and Policy Analysis Program, USA

b. Ashley Johnson, Director for the Energy and Environmental Affairs Group, The National Bureau of Asian Research,
US

c. David Brewster, Senior Research Fellow, National Security College, Australian National University, Australia

d. Anthony Bergin, Senior Fellow, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Australia

e. Julius Cesar I. Trajano, Research Fellow, Centre for Non-Traditional Security Studies Centre, S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, Singapore

f. Tariq Karim, Director, Centre for Bay of Bengal Studies at Independent University, Bangladesh

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About the Authors

Ambar Kumar Ghosh is a Junior Fellow, Debosmita Sarkar is a Research Assistant, and Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury is a Senior Fellow
at ORF-Kolkata.

Cover image: Getty Images/by wildestanimal

Back cover image: Getty Images/Andriy Onufriyenko

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