Adaptive Protection Scheme For Microgrids With Seamless Transition
Adaptive Protection Scheme For Microgrids With Seamless Transition
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Sabet, Jason, "Adaptive Protection Scheme for Microgrids with Seamless Transition" (2023). All Theses.
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Adaptive Protection Scheme for Microgrids
with Seamless Transition
A Thesis
Presented to
the Graduate School of
Clemson University
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Science
Electrical Engineering
by
Jason Sammy Sabet
August 2023
Accepted by:
Dr. Sukumar Brahma, Committee Chair
Dr. Sheikh Jakir Hossain
Dr. Ramtin Hadidi
Abstract
ii
multi-source distribution feeder will have bi-directional power flow and bi-directional
fault current in the event of a short-circuit. The inverter-based resource is current-
limited, providing limited fault current in the case of a short circuit. This requires
the distribution protection design to be capable of handling a wider range of fault
currents with bi-directional flow.
To overcome these challenges, protection designs utilize communication to
interchange between two separate relay settings based on the microgrids mode of op-
eration. However, for microgrids equipped with seamless transition, delays in change
of settings and communication delays introduce risk to reliable protection.
By evaluating a Duke Energy microgrid system, this thesis illustrates the prac-
tical risks of seamless transition while using an inverter and the protection deficiencies
that arise. Although conventional inverter design does not allow for seamless transi-
tion, inverter controls are designed on an actively deployed inverter to offer seamless
transition functionality. Considering cost and the protection risks from seamless tran-
sition, an adaptive protection scheme has been designed without the need for change
of settings or communication. The efficacy of the adaptive protection scheme has
been successfully demonstrated through hardware-in-the-loop simulations and relay
tests, which have validated the robustness of the protection design.
iii
Acknowledgments
iv
Table of Contents
Title Page . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
v
5.4 Recloser 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
5.5 Generation Facility Protection in Reverse Direction . . . . . . . . . . 84
5.6 Generation Facility Protection in Forward Direction . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.7 Islanding Recloser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.8 Recloser 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.9 Recloser 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
A : MATLAB functions for producing protection settings . . . . . . . . 154
B : Custom Protection Logic for 51V Voltage-Restrained Inverse-Time
Overcurrent Element in SEL Relay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
vi
List of Tables
vii
5.9 Fault data recorded at recloser 3 for simulated faults within 80K fuse
zone during grid connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.10 Fault data recorded at recloser 3 for simulated faults within 80K fuse
zone during microgrid operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
5.11 Recloser 3 protection settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
5.12 OTs of 80K fuse backed by recloser 3 for maximum and minimum faults
within the main protection zonea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
5.13 Fault data recorded at recloser 3 for simulated faults within recloser 3
zone during grid connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
5.14 Fault data recorded at recloser 3 for simulated faults within recloser 3
zone during microgrid operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.15 Fault data recorded at PCC recloser for simulated faults within recloser
3 zone during grid connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.16 Fault data recorded at PCC recloser for simulated faults within recloser
3 zone during microgrid operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5.17 Coordination of generation facility protection in reverse direction for
maximum and minimum faults within main protection zone . . . . . 88
5.18 Generation facility reverse protection settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
5.19 OTs of generation facility in reverse direction for maximum and mini-
mum faults within the main protection zonea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.20 Coordination of generation facility protection in forward direction for
maximum and minimum faults within main protection zone . . . . . 98
5.21 Generation facility forward protection settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.22 OTs of generation facility in forward direction for maximum and min-
imum faults within the main protection zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.23 Fault data recorded at islanding recloser for simulated faults within
recloser 3 zone during grid connection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.24 Coordination of islanding recloser in forward direction for maximum
and minimum faults . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.25 Islanding recloser forward protection settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.26 OTs of islanding recloser and coordinated devices in forward direction
for maximum and minimum faultsa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.27 Coordination of recloser 2 for maximum and minimum faults . . . . . 112
5.28 Recloser 2 protection settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.29 OTs of recloser 2 and coordinated devices for maximum and minimum
faultsa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.30 Coordination of recloser 1 for maximum and minimum faults . . . . . 117
5.31 Recloser 1 protection settings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
5.32 OTs of recloser 1 and coordinated devices for maximum and minimum
faultsa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
6.1 Fault current limiter setpoint for BESS inverter based on fault type . 124
viii
6.2 Comparison of PSCAD and RSCAD steady-state currents during mi-
crogrid operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
6.3 Comparison of PSCAD and RSCAD steady-state voltages during mi-
crogrid operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.4 Comparison of PSCAD and RSCAD fault currents during microgrid
operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.5 Undervoltage ride-through settings for islanding recloser . . . . . . . 127
6.6 Overvoltage ride-through settings for islanding recloser . . . . . . . . 127
6.7 Underfrequency ride-through settings for islanding recloser . . . . . . 128
6.8 Overfrequency ride-through settings for islanding recloser . . . . . . . 128
6.9 Main and backup protection for grid-connected faults in forward direction129
6.10 Main and backup protection for grid-connected faults in reverse direction131
6.11 Designed and experimental OTs during grid connectiona . . . . . . . 135
6.12 Designed and experimental OTs of recloser 3 during grid connectiona 136
6.13 Designed and experimental OTs without the generation facilitya . . . 138
6.14 Designed and experimental OTs of recloser 3 without the generation
facilitya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.15 Main and backup protection for microgrid faults . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.16 Designed and experimental OTs during microgrid operationa . . . . . 141
6.17 Designed and experimental OTs of recloser 3 during microgrid operationa 142
ix
List of Figures
x
3.13 Microgrid voltage during grid synchronization . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
3.14 Microgrid frequency during grid synchronization . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.1 Existing distribution system protection zones with the generation facility 57
4.2 Existing microgrid system protection zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
xi
5.37 Recloser 2 phase coordination with islanding recloser . . . . . . . . . 115
5.38 Recloser 2 ground coordination with islanding recloser . . . . . . . . . 115
5.39 Proposed protection zones with recloser 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.40 Recloser 1 phase coordination with 100KS fuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.41 Recloser 1 ground coordination with 100KS fuse . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.42 Recloser 1 phase coordination with recloser 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.43 Recloser 1 ground coordination with recloser 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.44 Recloser 1 phase coordination with recloser 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.45 Recloser 1 ground coordination with recloser 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
xii
Nomenclature
DC - Direct Current
AC - Alternating Current
MG - Microgrid
BESS - Battery Energy-Storage System
PV - Photovoltaic
AU X - Auxiliary
GF L - Grid-Following Mode
GF M - Grid-Forming Mode
DER - Distributed Energy Resources
IBR - Inverter Based Resources
P CC - Point of Common Coupling
RV C - Rapid Voltage Change
T CC - Time Current Curves
TD - Time Dial
M OC - Minimum Operating Current
OT - Operating Time
IN ST - Instantaneous
SHB - Second-Harmonic Blocking
P SCAD - Power Systems Computer Aided Design
RT DS - Real Time Digital Simulator
RSCAD - Real-Time Simulator Computer Aided Design
HIL - Hardware-in-the-loop
xiii
Chapter 1
Dating back to the Industrial Revolution, fossil fuels have been the domi-
nant source of energy worldwide. Oil, coal, and gas have long powered homes and
technological advancements, but they also contribute significantly to greenhouse gas
emissions, air pollution, and the risk of oil spills. Each year, this has led to millions
of premature deaths linked to the use of air-polluting fossil fuels [1].
In response, there has been a growing push for the adoption of clean, renewable
energy sources. Governments and organizations around the world have been investing
in the development of renewable energy technologies, such as hydropower, wind, and
solar. These renewable energy resources offer a sustainable alternative to fossil fuels as
they do not emit greenhouse gases. With the recognition of environmental concerns,
Fig. 1.1 demonstrates how more than 80% of the installed generation capacity within
the next year will be dominated by renewable energy resources [2].
The U.S. Energy Information Administration projects that more than half of
the new generation capacity added in 2023 will come from solar power and a quarter
1
Figure 1.1: Projected generation capacity installations in 2023 [2]
from energy storage and wind [2]. In fact, projections forecast that renewable energy
capacity in the United States will increase by more than 280 GW between 2022 and
2027, with significant contributions from solar and wind energy [3]. Following this
trend, Duke Energy has set carbon goals and a plan to use this renewable generation
to increase reliability through microgrids.
Established over a century ago, Duke Energy is a major utility provider in the
United States, serving seven states with reliable energy [4]. As a proponent of cleaner
energy, Duke Energy has committed to reducing 50% of its carbon emissions from
electrical generation by 2030 and to reach complete carbon neutrality by 2050. With
plans to generate 30 GW of renewable energy by 2035, the energy mix of the power
grid will increasingly rely on inverter-based resources (IBRs) [5]. Inverters are used
to connect direct current (DC) renewable resources, such as solar, wind, and battery
2
energy storage systems (BESS), with the alternating current (AC) power grid.
The increasing utilization of IBRs has motivated Duke Energy to strive for a
more intelligent and robust power grid. As opposed to the conventional centralized
generation system, IBRs can be decentralized and local, making them suitable for
microgrid implementation. According to the Department of Energy, microgrids are a
group of interconnected loads and distributed energy resources within clearly defined
electrical boundaries that acts as a single controllable entity with respect to the grid.
A microgrid can connect and disconnect from the grid to enable it to operate in both
grid-connected or island-mode [6]. These microgrids can both enhance the perfor-
mance of the overall grid and operate as an island during grid outages. Duke Energy
is advancing the implementation of microgrids by integrating IBRs into its existing
distribution network, prioritizing systems with regular grid service interruptions such
as the Hot Springs microgrid.
Duke Energy has applied microgrid technology to the town of Hot Springs
in order to provide reliable, clean energy to its local community. The Hot Springs
microgrid is a unique and innovative project, consisting of two IBRs, a 2 MW solar
farm, and a 4.4 MW lithium-ion BESS. This combination of resources allows the
microgrid to provide resilient energy to over 500 customers in the community. As
seen in Fig. 1.2, the microgrid sustains an isolated community by making use of
DERs [7].
The Hot Springs microgrid has the ability to operate both in connection with
the larger grid and as a standalone, self-sustained island. In grid-following mode
(GFL), it provides benefits such as voltage and frequency support and additional
3
Figure 1.2: Duke Energy Hot Springs Microgrid [7]
capacity during peak times. In grid-forming mode (GFM), the microgrid can black
start the entire town’s load using only its renewable generation resources [7].
The Hot Springs microgrid serves as a practical example of how microgrid tech-
nology can improve grid reliability and make effective use of IBRs. It demonstrates
how microgrids can provide localized, resilient energy solutions to communities, es-
pecially those that are remote and have limited backup power options. Advanced
microgrids are equipped with a sophisticated seamless transition feature that ensures
uninterrupted power supply to customers, preventing any power blinks or interrup-
tions.
4
1.2 Seamless Transition and Limitations
5
1.3 Inverter Fault Limitations and Standards
6
Figure 1.3: Comparison between traditional fault contribution of synchronous gener-
ation and inverters [7]
higher category identifications. Each category outlines specific DER voltage and fre-
quency ride-through limits during fault and the range of allowable trip times. Figs.
1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 define the voltage ride-through requirements for a grid disturbance,
meanwhile, Fig. 1.7 defines the frequency ride-through requirements for a grid dis-
turbance [9].
As seen in Figs. 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6, an increase in the category identification
of IEEE 1547-2018 results in the mandatory operation region growing in terms of
voltage range and voltage ride-through time. Meanwhile, Fig. 1.7 depicts mandatory
overfrequency operation between 61.2 Hz to 61.8 Hz and mandatory underfrequency
7
Figure 1.4: Category I DER voltage ride-through [9]
8
Figure 1.6: Category III DER voltage ride-through [9]
9
operation between 58.8 Hz to 57.0 Hz for all categories, with a minimum required
ride-through time of 300 seconds [9]. As a result, with increased DER penetration, the
standard requires IBRs to ride-through grid disturbances instead of instantaneously
tripping offline for any grid disturbance, avoiding voltage instability.
Distribution power systems use protective devices like relays and fuses to detect
and respond to faults. While mechanical devices like fuses have only one response type
and rely only on phase current, digital relays can have multiple settings with various
response types and even differentiate their operation for phase and ground faults,
resulting in fast response times. Digital relays often have separate configurations to
handle the limited fault currents caused by IBRs, while mechanical protective devices
sized for grid faults are unable to respond to inverter faults altogether. However, the
seamless transition of microgrids presents new challenges such as communication and
relay setting delays, making it necessary to develop more sophisticated protection
designs.
System protection is essential for the reliable operation of any power distribu-
tion system. It must be able to operate dependably under any fault condition within
its zone, coordinate with adjacent protection, and not operate during non-fault dis-
turbances, thus offering security. With the addition of a microgrid, customers have
power availability regardless of grid conditions, but complexity is added to the distri-
bution system. An effective microgrid protection system must focus on fast, reliable
operation in the event of a disturbance, with consideration for cost, selectivity, and
safety.
To achieve a reliable microgrid protection scheme, the system must be able to
10
respond to both distribution system faults and microgrid faults, and the microgrid
should be able to isolate from the faulted grid as soon as possible. Therefore, during
a fault condition, the protection system must be capable of adapting to bidirectional
fault current and changes in fault current magnitude. Various surveys on microgrid
protection [10, 11, 12] and an IEEE PES technical report [13] shed light on the current
state of microgrid protection systems. These schemes employ a range of techniques,
including overcurrent, voltage, harmonic content-based, distance, differential, and
current traveling wave protection. It is worth noting that these protection schemes
rely on the existence of a communication infrastructure. Moreover, researchers have
put forth adaptive protection schemes that leverage these diverse techniques to en-
hance microgrid protection.
Patel et al. [14] propose an adaptive protection scheme that utilizes bidirec-
tional protective devices but requires different settings for different operating modes.
Gupta et al. [15] propose an algorithm that utilizes a settings lookup table for sys-
tem relays that is referenced in the event of a fault. Peiris et al. [16] replace fault
lookup tables by using a microgrid central processing unit to instantly calculate and
determine tripping current for any mode of operation. Wheeler et al. [17] utilize a
combination of adaptive settings based on communication and differential relays to
overcome the change in short-circuit contributions.
All of these proposed adaptive protection schemes rely on a fast and reliable
communication infrastructure. Traditionally, in utility distribution systems, a basic
communication infrastructure is utilized outside of the substation, such as cellular.
According to Verizon, latency delays can reach up to 45 milliseconds in the North
America, with successful packet delivery dependent on signal quality and network con-
gestion [18]. A distribution system with an upgraded communication infrastructure
may use faster, wired communication such as IEC 61850 GOOSE communication,
11
Figure 1.8: Delays of communication-based protection with settings changes
12
based on IBR faults. Nevertheless, the protection scheme assumes that the micro-
grid generation is always connected, which is not necessarily true. Ndjaba et al. [22]
discuss and compare various adaptive protection techniques that are communication
and non-communication based. As a non-communication based technique, [22] men-
tions voltage-restrained overcurrent protection and demonstrates the scheme working
in PSCAD on a simple two-bus network. However, in [22], the voltage-restrained
overcurrent technique does not conform to any standard relay operating practice and
the testing was not done on a realistic system.
Overall, many adaptive protection methods have been proposed in the field of
research. However, few have practically implemented and tested an adaptive protec-
tion scheme that is not reliant on communication and cost-effective.
13
Next, the existing protection system will be analyzed in the presence of faults in
different modes of operation. The insights gathered from this analysis will inform the
development and testing of an adaptive protection scheme on legacy relays using HIL.
The scheme will leverage bi-directional, voltage supervision, and voltage-restrained
overcurrent protective elements to enhance the microgrid’s ability to adapt to dynamic
changes and protect against all system faults.
14
Chapter 2
The Duke Energy distribution system used for this work, consists of a 22.86
kV feeder that incorporates a microgrid generation facility. The feeder has a peak
load of around 11.1 MW and a valley load of approximately 2 MW. Fig. 2.1 shows a
simplified oneline diagram of the distribution system, while Fig. 2.2 shows a bird’s-eye
topology of the entire feeder.
The distribution feeder is supplied by a substation that employs a ∆/YG
transformer to step down the subtransmission voltage from 115 kV to 22.86 kV. The
transformer’s delta winding on the primary side provides balancing capability, while
the wye-grounded winding on the secondary side provides a source for ground fault
current. The substation overcurrent relay, which controls the feeder circuit breaker,
is the last protective device before the distribution line exits the substation.
The distribution system includes three 1.2 MVAR capacitor banks and three
15
16
Figure 2.1: Simplified oneline diagram of distribution system
Figure 2.2: Detailed diagram of distribution system
voltage regulators, located towards the end of the feeder. These capacitor banks
provide power factor correction and voltage support, while the voltage regulators
step up the medium voltage along the system by utilizing an autotransformer. The
voltage-supporting devices keep the voltage range within the range of 0.95 pu to 1.05
pu, as per the ANSI standard [23].
While Chapter 4 of this thesis delves deeper into the system protection, Fig.
2.1 illustrates that electronic and hydraulic reclosers are employed to safeguard the
feeder backbone.
17
2.2 Microgrid Description
18
The BESS capacity is divided into two units, each with a capacity of 3.45 MW.
Both inverters are IEEE 1547-2018 compliant and follow category II specifications.
Each BESS inverter is connected to a ∆/YG medium voltage transformer that steps
up the voltage to 22.86 kV. When the generation facility solely powers the microgrid,
the transformer is solidly grounded, providing a source for ground fault current. How-
ever, when the facility is connected to the grid, a 40 Ω neutral grounding resistance is
used to limit ground current contributions. This resistance was sized by the previous
Duke Energy study to reduce contribution to grid ground faults, while maintaining
effective grounding.
During grid-connected ground faults, the absence of a neutral grounding re-
sistor can lead to desensitization of relays upstream to the microgrid, while causing
oversensitivity in relays downstream. The term ”upstream” refers to the direction
towards the substation, whereas ”downstream” indicates the direction towards the
end of the feeder. Upstream relays become desensitized because the generation fa-
cility contributes a significant portion to the ground faults, thereby reducing the
contribution from the substation. On the other hand, downstream relays become
excessively sensitive due to the combined substation and generation facility ground
current for ground faults. This situation results in a larger disparity in ground fault
current between grid-connected and disconnected scenarios. Therefore, a grounding
resistance was used to limit ground fault contributions by the generation facility.
However, introducing a higher resistance in the neutral grounding carries the risk of
ground-fault overvoltage. To mitigate this risk, the previous study determined that
the resistance should not exceed an 80% grounding coefficient or temporary overvolt-
age levels above 1.386 pu, as specified in IEEE Std. C62.92.1-2019 [26]. Taking these
regulations into account, Duke Energy opted for a 40 Ω neutral grounding resistor
during grid-connected operation, as it was the largest resistor that ensured the system
19
remained effectively grounded, as stated in the SIS report.
The PV solar farm has a maximum rated capacity of 3.25 MW, but account-
ing for diverse solar irradiance and solar panel degradation, the solar inverters have
a maximum rated capacity of 2.1 MW. The solar inverter is also IEEE 1547-2018
compliant and follows category I specifications. The PV inverter is connected to a
YG/YG medium voltage transformer that steps up the voltage to 22.86 kV.
The generation facility is completed with the addition of an auxiliary load,
which draws 50 kW per phase to support the cooling of battery containers, power
system controllers, and power system meters. The voltage is stepped down from
22.86 kV to 480 V through a YG/YG transformer. The entire system, including the
two BESS units, the PV unit, and the auxiliary load, is connected to the grid via a
four-way switchgear.
To ensure the proper functioning of the microgrid, Duke Energy has established
export and import limitations during grid-connected operation based on load demand,
voltage limitations, and thermal analysis. The limitations are outlined in Table 2.1 for
peak and valley loading. The export limitation is designed to prevent the generation
facility from exceeding regulator 3 seen in Fig. 2.1, to avoid conflicting with regulator
operation. Similarly, import limitations are set to prevent the distribution lines from
being overloaded and exceeding its thermal limit.
Due to the BESS inverter’s incapability to switch between GFL and GFM with-
out entering a standby state, the microgrid must strictly disconnect and blackstart
during grid disturbances. For grid reconnection, microgrid customers will experience
20
a momentary outage before reconnecting. To ensure healthy voltage conditions dur-
ing a the microgrid blackstart, Duke Energy has added a load break switch within the
microgrid, which can be seen in Fig. 2.1. This switch enables a two-step blackstart
instead of a single-step blackstart, to avoid undervoltage concerns during peak load.
All reclosers and relays within the microgrid are also equipped with two separate
settings for grid-connected and islanded modes of operation. The former setting ac-
counts for high system fault currents, while the latter setting accounts for low inverter
fault currents [25].
This thesis seeks to enhance the design set by Duke Energy to improve micro-
grid resiliency and power reliability. In Chapter 3, the thesis aims to showcase the
operation of the inverter in GFM while connected to the grid, enabling a smooth tran-
sition for microgrid operation. However, this seamless transition can pose a challenge
for the current protection design. To overcome this obstacle, Chapter 5 proposes an
adaptive protection scheme that does not require communication. To achieve these
objectives, it is crucial to utilize an accurate system model to study the system in its
entirety.
21
essential system data from CYME, including conductor type, sequence impedance
data between nodes, equipment specifications, and load data. The resulting PSCAD
model depicted the original distribution system, encompassing nearly 1000 nodes.
The construction of the PSCAD model involved several stages, starting with
the modeling of the 115 kV source and the ∆/YG substation transformer. In order to
create an accurate representation of the source, the impedance data previously used in
CYME was employed. The substation transformer, on the other hand, was modeled
using three single-phase transformers, and the relevant parameters are summarized
in Table 2.2.
22
Available PSCAD libraries were utilized to incorporate capacitor banks and
voltage regulators into the model. The capacitor banks were connected in parallel at
their rated capacity of 1.2 MVAR, while each voltage regulator was modeled as three
single-phase transformers with tap changers and sharing the same parameters. The
tap changers were controlled by a ”Tap Changer” component from a PSCAD library,
initialized with the nominal system voltage, initial tap position, tap delay, desired
voltage setpoint, and voltage step per tap, as shown in Fig. 2.4 [27]. Detailed voltage
regulator specifications can be found in Table 2.4.
Finally, blackbox inverter models and medium voltage transformers were used
23
to connect the IBRs with the grid, accurately modeling the generation facility. To
model the two BESS sources, single-phase DC voltage sources at 1.3 kV were used.
The PV generation, on the other hand, was simulated using a PSCAD ”Photovoltaic
Source” component, as illustrated in Fig. 2.5, which was programmed to comply with
the vendor’s rated specifications and output up to 3.25 MW [28].
24
inverter [24]. Furthermore, an auxiliary three-phase YG/YG transformer was con-
nected to support all loads within the generation facility. The technical specifications
for these transformers are summarized in Table 2.5.
Table 2.6: Simulated steady-state voltage during peak load
Model validation was conducted by comparing the PSCAD model results with
the CYME power flow results, without the generation facility. The validation showed
that the PSCAD model results had a maximum deviation of 2% from the CYME
power flow results. Tables 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9 show the final steady-state voltages
and currents for peak and valley load without the generation facility.
25
Table 2.9: Simulated steady-state current during valley load
26
based on load conditions [24]. To comprehend how the inverter operates in these two
modes, the following subsection provides an explanation.
27
Figure 2.6: Inverter controls from Clemson University inverter model [29]
∗ ∗
troller that compares the measured voltage (Vabc ) with the voltage reference (Vabc ).
In contrast, in GFM, a PR controller with negative sequence components is used
in conjunction with the previous control loop to develop a current reference (i∗abc ).
−
These negative sequence components are extracted from the measured voltage (Vabc )
28
∗−
and voltage reference (Vabc ). The gain of the PR controller is depicted in (2.1), where
ωc is cut-off frequency and ω is the fundamental frequency [29].
2ωc s
GP R (s) = KP + Ki ∗ (2.1)
s2 + 2ωc s + ω 2
Figure 2.7: Current limiter controls from Clemson University inverter model [29]
29
waveform that executes firing pulses. The resulting output is then passed through
a low-pass filter. To filter out high-frequency outputs, this inverter incorporates an
LCL filter. As a result, the inverter is now successfully interfaced with the grid.
30
Chapter 3
In the previous chapter, the distribution system and generation facility were
discussed, highlighting the battery generation as the primary resource to support the
microgrid. To connect the BESS to the AC grid, a conventional inverter is used as an
interface. However, this inverter is not capable of instantly switching between GFL
and GFM modes, as it requires a standby period. Consequently, achieving seamless
transition is not a standard capability of the inverter.
Nevertheless, it is possible to achieve seamless transition if the inverter is set
to operate in a single mode. To this end, this thesis proposes keeping the inverter in
GFM mode continuously and implementing additional external controls to ensure its
stability while connected to the grid.
31
3.1 Implementing Inverter operation in Grid-Forming
By continuously operating in GFM mode, the inverter can eliminate the re-
quired outage that arises from the transition. Furthermore, external controls were
designed in PSCAD to maintain the inverter’s stability during grid connection and
prevent any undesired voltage or frequency variations in the grid.
In the previous chapter, it was mentioned that the microgrid generation facility
used blackbox vendor models for the BESS and PV inverters. However, the PV
inverter does not allow for operation in GFM and always remains in GFL. Therefore,
the primary focus of the development of external controls was on the BESS inverter.
To enable parallel operation of the two BESS inverters, a droop control scheme is
implemented by the vendor. The frequency and voltage droop equations that the
inverter adheres to in GFM are shown in equations 3.1 and 3.2 [30].
finverter = f ∗ − KP ∗ (P − P ∗ ) (3.1)
Vinverter = V ∗ − KQ ∗ (Q − Q∗ ) (3.2)
Equations 3.1 and 3.2 reveal that the inverter relies on four input references:
voltage, frequency, real power, and reactive power which are denoted as V ∗ , f ∗ , P ∗ ,
and Q∗ , respectively. The droop gains are represented by KP and KQ , while P and
Q correspond to the measured real and reactive power values.
In equation 3.1, the frequency setpoint of the inverter is denoted as finverter.
It is calculated as the difference between the frequency reference and the product of
the real power difference and the real power gain. During steady state operation, the
32
real power difference is minimal and the frequency reference plays a dominant role in
determining the value of finverter. Similarly, in equation 3.2, the voltage setpoint of
the inverter is represented by Vinverter. It is calculated as the difference between the
voltage reference and the product of the reactive power difference and the reactive
power gain. During steady state operation, the reactive power difference is also small
and the voltage reference is the primary driving variable that determines the value of
Vinverter.
In a previous microgrid study, the voltage reference in GFM was set at a fixed
1.04 pu, the frequency reference was set at a fixed 60 Hz, and power references were
set by the microgrid master controller to meet load conditions. Moreover, the real
power droop coefficient was set to 0.02, and the reactive power droop was set to
0.2 [24]. However, this control scheme would inherently conflict with the grid due to
the fixed voltage and frequency references.
To ensure smooth operation of the inverter in GFM while grid-connected,
changes were made to the voltage and frequency references. Specifically, they were
set to be the measured voltage and frequency at the point of common coupling (PCC),
which mimics the inverter operation during GFL by taking the grid measurements
as reference. Meanwhile, the real power setpoint was set to the desired output of
the BESS plant to provide ancillary grid support, within the limits discussed in the
previous chapter. As the BESS generation output is restricted to unity power factor
during grid-connection, the reactive power setpoint was always kept at zero. As a
result, the microgrid master controller would adjust the reference inputs of the inverter
based on the grid connection status to continuously run the inverter in GFM while
grid-connected. Fig. 3.1 illustrates the different inputs into the inverter depending
on the grid connection status.
As depicted in Fig. 3.1, with the inverter always in GFM, the first switch
33
Figure 3.1: Inverter reference inputs based on grid status
position represents the controlled inputs during grid connection, while the second
position represents the controlled inputs during grid isolation. In the first position,
the inverter reference voltage and frequency are set to match the measured values at
the PCC, ensuring smooth operation of the inverter in GFM while grid-connected. In
the second position, the inverter reference inputs are set as fixed values to generate
an independent reference to support the island. This control scheme was successfully
implemented on the PSCAD blackbox inverter in GFM and operated without con-
flicting with the grid during grid connection, enabling both charging and discharging.
Fig. 3.2 shows the inverter real power output given a real power setpoint of 1 MW
for discharge and -1 MW for charge.
34
Figure 3.2: Inverter real power export and import in GFM while grid-connected
Fig. 3.2 clearly shows that the inverter performed discharge and charge cycles
successfully, with no deviation from the rated real power setpoint. This is because,
when the inverter is in GFM while grid-connected, it utilizes the measured grid voltage
and frequency as reference, enabling it to operate similarly to GFL. While the inverter
operated smoothly during charging and discharging cycles with this control loop, the
inverter’s GFL has a feature absent in GFM, which is ramp rate. As such, if setting
a higher desired real power output, it must be done in steps to avoid surpassing the
rapid voltage change (RVC) limits and triggering overvoltages. The next subsection
explores extreme discharge and charge scenarios and demonstrates how implementing
power steps can ensure stable operation.
35
3.1.1 System Response with Grid-Forming Inverter
36
and maximum generation facility import with BESS, accounting for both generation
plant ramp-up and ramp-down. Details of these scenarios are presented in Tables 3.1,
3.2, and 3.3.
With the BESS inverter in GFM and the absence of ramping rate, the study
in PSCAD found that majority of scenarios considered failed to meet voltage or
RVC limits. When the generation facility was set to maximum rated export for the
scenarios in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, the voltage inevitably exceeded the 1.05 pu overvoltage
limit due to the sudden high power injection, particularly as the facility is located
closely downstream of a voltage regulator. As outlined in the previous chapter, the
voltage regulator setpoint is 1.04 pu, resulting in the nominal voltage at the PCC
remaining consistently close to 1.04 pu. This allows for easy exception of the 1.05 pu
limit during power export. On the other hand, returning the generation facility from
maximum rated export to no export regularly resulted in a violation of the RVC limit
37
Figure 3.3: Maximum rated export of 5.4 MW during peak load with no BESS ramp
rate
of 3%, with the voltage regularly dropping near or below 0.95 pu with the sudden
loss of power injection.
Similarly, when setting the facility to maximum rated import for the scenario in
Table 3.3, it was also routine for RVC violations to occur, while the voltage sometimes
dropped below 0.95 pu due to the sudden addition of load. Conversely, returning the
facility from maximum rated import to no import often caused violations of the 1.05
pu overvoltage limit, as the distribution system saw this as a sudden loss of load.
Extreme examples of BESS exporting and importing with no ramp rate can be
seen in Figs. 3.3 and 3.4. In Fig. 3.3, sudden power export and loss of power export
38
Figure 3.4: Maximum rated import of 6.9 MW during valley load with no BESS ramp
rate
are shown for BESS discharge of 5.4 MW during peak load, taken from Table 3.2.
Similarly, Fig. 3.4 depicts sudden power import and loss of power import for BESS
charge of 6.9 MW during valley load, taken from Table 3.3. In the figures, power
export is denoted by positive values, while power import is indicated by negative
values. Both figures display the voltage at the PCC, illustrating the voltage and RVC
violations.
To resolve the observed violations of voltage and RVC limits, incremental
ramping of the BESS inverter’s GFM real power reference was implemented. With
the selected steps, the BESS inverter’s real power reference was incremented after
39
each voltage regulator operation, allowing for the voltage regulator to correct the
system voltage in between steps. This replicates the ramp rate functionality available
in the GFL inverter and prevents abrupt changes in system voltage. The step size
for ramping was carefully calibrated to ensure that it did not exceed any voltage or
RVC limits.
For the scenarios in Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3, step sizes were selected to demon-
strate how voltage and RVC limits can be maintained, with an integer number of
steps chosen for each scenario. Tables 3.4 and 3.5 outline the step number and sizes
chosen for ramping up and down of the BESS and PV generation collectively and
solely BESS generation scenarios. Note that in the valley load scenario in Table 3.4,
the BESS does not export any power as the maximum rated export of the generation
facility is 1.25 MW during valley load, which is met by the PV system. However,
Table 3.5 shows the step number and sizes selected for the BESS exporting 1.25 MW
during valley load, as this scenario assumes solely BESS generation.
Table 3.4: BESS step sizes for maximum rated export with PV and BESS
Table 3.5: BESS step sizes for maximum rated export with BESS
Based on the simulated results, step sizes of approximately 0.63 MW are sug-
gested for ramping up the BESS export, while larger step sizes of about 1.6 MW can
40
be taken for ramping down. Due to the nominal voltage at the PCC remaining at
1.04 pu from the voltage regulator, the incremental steps for ramping up the BESS
export is smaller than those for ramping it down. Similarly, Table 3.6 displays the
step number and sizes for ramping of the BESS for maximum rated import scenarios,
taken from Table 3.3.
Table 3.6: BESS step sizes for maximum rated import with BESS
The simulated results suggest using step sizes of approximately 1.6 MW for
ramping up the BESS import, and smaller step sizes of 1.2 MW for ramping down.
In other words, ramping up the BESS to import power required smaller steps com-
pared to ramping down, which is opposite of the trend seen during power export.
This observation is reasonable since ramping up power export and ramping down
power import both cause a voltage increase, whereas ramping down power export
and ramping up power import result in a voltage drop.
To illustrate the interaction of a step ramp with the distribution system, con-
sider the ramp design in Table 3.6 for maximum rated import during peak load, which
is depicted in Fig. 3.5. For ramping up the BESS import, two steps of 1.5 MW are
taken to maintain the voltage within standard limits. On the other hand, for ramping
down the BESS import, three steps of 1 MW are taken to ensure the voltage remains
within the limits. The figure shows that tStart denotes the time the ramping begins,
tStep on the power plot indicates the time of each step, and tV R on the voltage plot
indicates the time when the voltage regulator operates. It is worth noting that since
ramping up the BESS import only required two steps, the third or final tStep and tV R
41
shown in Fig. 3.5 are specific to ramping down the BESS import, which required
three steps. Nevertheless, Fig. 3.5 shows that the voltage stays within the range of
0.95 pu to 1.05 pu, and no RVC exceeding 3% occurs, demonstrating the effectiveness
of a step ramp.
Figure 3.5: Example of step ramp with maximum power import during peak load
The careful selection of the ramping step sizes ensures that system limitations
are not exceeded under various generation conditions. Therefore, these results con-
clusively demonstrate the capability of the BESS inverter to operate in GFM mode
while grid-connected, while still meeting voltage and RVC limits.
42
3.2 Seamless Transition
The BESS inverter has been demonstrated to run in GFM mode while being
grid-connected for both discharge and charge cycles. This advancement eliminates
the need for the inverter to switch between operating modes, resulting in a single op-
erating mode and enabling seamless transition functionality. As a result, the inverter
is now capable of seamless islanding and grid reconnection.
In the next two subsection, the latest inverter configuration is successfully
demonstrated for seamless planned and unplanned islanding scenarios. The third
subsection showcases the synchronization of the microgrid with the grid to provide
seamless grid reconnection. With these advancements, the inverter provides a more
reliable solution for microgrid customers, making it a valuable asset for critical facil-
ities that cannot risk any outage.
43
already in GFM and no inverter switching required, the island was successfully formed
once minimal power flow across the islanding recloser was detected. Fig. 3.6 depicts
the voltage measured at the PCC of the microgrid during the planned islanding
scenario.
Fig. 3.6 demonstrates that the planned islanding scenario results in a neg-
ligible voltage change, with only a slight balance shift, as anticipated. Since the
planned islanding occurs under regular operating conditions rather than a grid dis-
turbance, the microgrid frequency remains steady at 60 Hz and is not shown. This
approach illustrates that the microgrid can smoothly transition from the main grid
to autonomous islanding without any blackstart, ensuring continuity of power supply
for customers.
44
3.2.2 Unplanned Islanding
45
Figure 3.7: Microgrid voltage during unplanned islanding
46
Figure 3.9: Current across islanding recloser during unplanned islanding
as depicted in Fig. 3.8. The fault current across the islanding recloser provided by
the microgrid generation facility can be seen in Fig. 3.9. Initially, it rises suddenly to
support the fault. After 0.03 seconds, the fault current is clamped and stabilizes to
0.15 kA, regulated by the inverter control loops. Finally, the fault current diminishes
to zero when the islanding recloser opens. The proposed islanding recloser protection
settings discussed in Chapter 5 will leverage this reverse fault current alongside the
IEEE 1547-2018 ride-through requirements.
The demonstration of unplanned islanding functionality was a crucial test, as
it showcased the microgrid’s ability to remain operational during unexpected power
outages or grid faults. By keeping the BESS inverter in GFM, the system was able to
seamlessly transition from the main grid to autonomous islanding, without the need
for a blackstart to restore power to microgrid customers.
47
3.2.3 Grid Synchronization
48
those of the grid. Second, the frequency of the microgid is brought close to the
grid frequency (not exactly the same). Then, the recloser is closed when the phasor
difference between the corresponding voltages is small enough as characterized by the
values given in Fig. 3.10.
In the PSCAD simulation, the BESS inverter is a blackbox model that limits
access to its internal controls and only allows control using external variables that are
acceptable for GFM. As a result, the BESS inverter’s external voltage and frequency
references must be adjusted to synchronize the island with the grid. It should be
noted that the inverter does not accept any phase reference in GFM mode, and
therefore, the frequency must be adjusted to bring the phase angle into alignment.
To illustrate the process, refer to Fig. 3.11, where θdif f represents the phase angle
difference between the grid phase angle, θgrid , and the island phase angle, θisland .
Assuming a counterclockwise rotation of the phase angle, adjusting the fre-
quency reference of the inverter can align the phase angle difference between the grid
and the island. If the grid phase angle leads the island phase angle, the inverter
frequency reference should increase to speed up phase rotation. Conversely, if the
grid phase angle lags the island phase angle, the inverter frequency reference should
decrease to slow down the rotation. Thus, Fig. 3.11 demonstrates that if the phase
angle difference falls within the first or second quadrant (θdif f 1 or θdif f 2 ), the inverter
frequency should increase, whereas if it falls within the third or fourth quadrant (θdif f 3
or θdif f 4 ), the frequency should decrease.
To achieve synchronization, two control loops were designed in PSCAD: one for
voltage and one for frequency, as depicted in Fig. 3.12. The voltage synchronization
loop ensures alignment of the voltage magnitudes between the grid and microgrid.
Simultaneously, the frequency loop serves a dual purpose: frequency and phase angle
synchronization. It aims to bring the microgrid and grid frequencies close, ultimately
49
Figure 3.10: Synchronization check
50
Figure 3.11: Utilizing inverter frequency to reduce phase difference between grid and
island
aligning the relative phase angles after a small time interval. As the frequency dif-
ference decreases, the relative phase angle becomes more precise and assumes a more
significant role in defining the frequency.
As shown in Fig. 3.12, the voltage control loop computed the RMS voltage dif-
ference (Vdif f ) between the grid RMS voltage (Vgrid ) and island RMS voltage (Visland )
and scaled it by a gain (Gv ). This difference was then added to a reference voltage
of 1.04 pu to output the inverter voltage reference (Vref ). Meanwhile, the frequency
control loop determined the frequency reference (fref ) using both the phase angle
51
Figure 3.12: Inverter synchronization controls using inverter voltage and frequency
reference
difference and frequency difference. The phase angle difference (θdif f ) was calculated
as the difference between the grid phase angle (θgrid ) and island phase angle (θisland ).
This difference was multiplied by a gain (Gθ ) and added to a reference frequency
of 60 Hz. Similarly, the frequency difference (fdif f ) was calculated as the difference
between the grid frequency (fgrid ) and island frequency (fisland ), and was multiplied
by a gain (Gf req ) before being added to the same loop as the phase angle.
An example was conducted in PSCAD to demonstrate the functionality of the
synchronization control loop, where the microgrid was synchronized with the main
grid during a worst-case scenario of the phase difference being in the third quadrant.
While achieving synchronization, the voltage measured at the PCC of the microgrid
52
can be observed in Fig. 3.13, while Fig. 3.14 displays the microgrid frequency.
Fig. 3.13 displays the voltage magnitude rising to meet the grid voltage mag-
nitude. Meanwhile, Fig. 3.14 shows that the frequency drops at the beginning of the
synchronization process to reduce the relative rotation of voltage phasors. This drop
in frequency occurs because the phase angle of the island was leading the phase angle
of the grid, as the phase angle difference was in the third quadrant. After 1.2 seconds,
the synchronization check passes, and the islanding recloser closes, connecting the mi-
crogrid with the main grid. Subsequently, Fig. 3.13 indicates that the voltage adjusts
to grid conditions, while Fig. 3.14 depicts the frequency quickly returning to 60 Hz.
This example effectively illustrates the synchronization control loop’s functionality.
While the BESS inverter cannot switch seamlessly between GFL and GFM,
this chapter showcased its ability to operate continuously in GFM. By maintaining the
53
Figure 3.14: Microgrid frequency during grid synchronization
inverter in GFM mode, the study demonstrated the possibility of seamless transitions
through planned and unplanned islanding, as well as grid synchronization in PSCAD.
Although this technique enhances microgrid resilience and customer power reliability,
it presents additional protection challenges. The remainder of the thesis proposes and
tests a protection scheme that does not depend on external communication or relay
settings adjustments to maintain system protection during seamless transitions.
54
Chapter 4
Before proceeding with the proposed adaptive protection scheme for the dis-
tribution system, the current protection devices and settings established by Duke
Energy are first examined. As outlined in Chapter 2 of this thesis and illustrated in
Figs. 2.1 and 2.3, the distribution system and generation facility are protected by
various devices such as fuses, electronic and hydraulic reclosers, and digital relays,
which utilize overcurrent as the method of protection.
The reclosers are equipped with inverse time-overcurrent settings which means
that they operate based on measured current and determine their associated operating
time based on a time-current curve (TCC), given the current exceeds a specified
threshold. Fuses are installed across multiple laterals to safeguard downstream loads,
while reclosers positioned along the distribution system backbone can implement
fuse-saving. Reclosers are specialized protective devices that can perform multiple
operations of opening and closing to attempt to clear temporary faults before locking
out for a permanent fault. Fuse-saving is a protective philosophy that aims to save a
fuse against temporary faults by allowing the recloser to operate before the minimum
melting curve for initial reclosing operations, while allowing it to blow for permanent
55
faults for later reclosing operations. Reclosers also act as a backup for the fuses and
safeguard sections of the system backbone [32].
Moreover, relays in the generation facility are equipped with inverse time-
overcurrent settings to safeguard against on-site faults. However, the introduction
of the generation facility poses two major protection challenges: fault current di-
rection and limited fault current magnitude. Firstly, in a traditional distribution
system, overcurrent protection was only required to operate in a single direction as
the system was single-sourced and radial. Yet, with the inclusion of added generation,
bi-directional settings become crucial. Secondly, traditional synchronous generation
allowed for a significant disparity between load current and fault current, which aided
in system protection. However, in the case of IBRs, load current and fault current
are closely matched in magnitude, as explained in Chapter 1 and depicted in Figure
1.3. Figure 4.1 provides a visual representation of the protection zones within the
distribution system incorporating the generation facility.
As the generation facility introduces bi-directional fault current, a forward and
reverse protection zone is defined, with the forward direction assumed to be away from
the substation, while the reverse direction is assumed to be towards the substation.
The forward main and backup protection zones can be seen in Table 4.1, while the
reverse main and backup protection zones can be seen in Table 4.2.
Fig. 4.1 displays a total of 14 protection zones across the distribution network.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the previous microgrid study assumed the microgrid to
be blackstart-only due to the BESS inverter’s limitations. Therefore, Duke Energy
engineered the PCC protection settings to isolate the generation facility during an
external fault, enabling the main grid protection to isolate the external fault. As a
result, only the protective devices within the generation facility were designed with bi-
directional settings, with reverse settings for faults external to the generation facility,
56
57
Figure 4.1: Existing distribution system protection zones with the generation facility
Table 4.1: Existing distribution system forward protection zones with generation
facility
Table 4.2: Existing distribution system reverse protection zones with generation fa-
cility
and forward settings for any internal faults from the main grid. All generation facility
protection settings were undervoltage supervised to distinguish between load current
and fault current. Within the generation facility, two fuses on the MV side of the
BESS and PV transformer provide main and backup protection for the generation
tie lines, with additional vendor-provided protection for all faults further within the
generation plants.
Additionally, Fig. 4.1 shows four fuses - 100KS, 80KS, 65KS, and 80K -
representing the various fused laterals downstream recloser 1, recloser 2, islanding
recloser, and recloser 3, respectively. The existing fuse design incorporates single fuse
58
type within each recloser zone. These reclosers coordinated with the respective fuses
for fuse-saving.
With this existing protection scheme, when the microgrid disconnects from
the main grid, the protection layout changes, as depicted in Fig. 4.2. The resultant
main and backup protection for each zone can be seen in Table 4.3. Furthermore,
the existing protection scheme requires all protective devices within the microgrid
to have a second set of settings for the different protection layout, highlighting the
disadvantage of the existing scheme for microgrids with seamless transition.
Fig. 4.2 illustrates 7 protection zones for the microgrid. During island oper-
ation, the microgrid relies solely on the generation facility for power supply, so the
protection scheme can follow a simpler, radial method, with each device strictly pro-
tecting downstream loads from faults. As a result, bi-directional settings were not
required as there was no flow of current from the main grid. It is important to note
that all of the microgrid protection settings were specifically designed to operate at
a faster pace compared to the primary distribution system protection. This design
choice was made to meet the fault ride-through constraints of the BESS inverter.
Additionally, these settings cannot be coordinated with the fused laterals since the
fault current observed by the fuse is insufficient to trip within an appropriate time
frame. Consequently, zone 8 and 9 in Fig. 4.2 are included within zone 3 and 4,
59
60
Figure 4.2: Existing microgrid system protection zones
respectively. Hence, Duke Energy has devised two sets of protection settings that
vary based on the mode of operation of the system. These changes in settings are
allowed to occur during the necessary open transition period between grid-connected
and islanded modes. However, as this transitional period is no longer present, a more
robust scheme must be implemented.
61
Chapter 5
62
5.1 Protection Design Criteria and Assumptions
63
in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Simulated system conditions for fault study in PSCAD
The grid fault study included different scenarios involving maximum rated
discharge and charge of the generation facility, with variations in BESS and PV
connections, as well as the absence of an IBR connection. On the other hand, the
microgrid fault study encompassed scenarios involving the supply of microgrid load
through both BESS and PV generation or solely through BESS. In the design of the
protection scheme, only the extreme fault values were taken into consideration.
During the grid fault study, it was observed that maximum fault currents were
generated with BESS and PV discharge or during strictly BESS discharge. Con-
versely, minimum fault currents in the grid fault study were recorded in cases where
there was no IBR connection. Meanwhile, in the island fault study, both BESS and
PV generation and strictly BESS generation resulted in the same fault currents. This
can be attributed to the fact that the BESS generation plants serves as the primary
source of fault current. While the PV generation plant supplies power to the micro-
grid load during normal operations, it is limited to GFL and only meets the baseline
requirements outlined in IEEE 1547-2018 Category I. As a result, the PV inverter re-
peatedly entered a state of momentary cessation of energization due to undervoltage
conditions. This behavior is exemplified in the example in Fig. 5.1, which depicts
a 3PH fault at the PCC during grid connection. Nonetheless, the maximum and
minimum measured fault currents at each protective device will be further discussed
in subsequent sections as the protection scheme is being devised.
64
Figure 5.1: PV inverter fault response for 3PH fault at PCC
The development of the overcurrent protection settings for each device adheres
to the constraints specified in IEEE Std. 242-2001 and references the procedure
outlined by Blackburn and Domin [32]. The ANSI protection element for inverse
time-overcurrent is ANSI 51, where 51P denotes phase overcurrent and 51G represents
ground overcurrent. For phase settings, the minimum operating current (MOC) for
each relay or recloser is set to 200% or more of the maximum rated load current while
being 50% or less of the minimum far-end phase fault current. The phase settings
are designed to operate for 3PH, LL, and LLG faults. Regarding ground settings, the
MOC is set to 200% or more of the maximum unbalance, 33% or less than the phase
MOC, and 50% or less than the minimum far-end ground fault current [32]. Similarly,
the ground settings are designed to operate for primarily SLG faults, but can also
operate for LLG faults in the presence of high enough ground current. It is worth
65
noting that the phase element also detects SLG faults, however, the ground element
is the first to operate. Nonetheless, if the MOC cannot meet these specifications,
which was common for IBR faults, voltage supervision is utilized. The design of each
recloser and relay incorporates a curve derived from the US TCC curves, as defined
by equations 5.1-5.5 [20].
0.0104
tp = T D ∗ 0.02260 + 0.02 (5.1)
M −1
5.95
tp = T D ∗ 0.18000 + 2 (5.2)
M −1
3.88
tp = T D ∗ 0.09630 + 2 (5.3)
M −1
5.67
tp = T D ∗ 0.03520 + 2 (5.4)
M −1
0.00342
tp = T D ∗ 0.00262 + 0.02 (5.5)
M −1
Equations 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 represent different overcurrent charac-
teristic curves used for the design of reclosers and relays. The moderately inverse
curve, known as U1, is defined by equation 5.1. The inverse curve, denoted as U2,
is described by equation 5.2. Equation 5.3 represents the very inverse curve, referred
to as U3. Likewise, equation 5.4 showcases the extremely inverse curve, identified
as U4. Finally, the short-time inverse curve, labeled as U5, is outlined in equation
5.5. In these equations, the variable T D represents the time-dial setting selected for
each curve, which can range from 0.5 to 15 [20]. The variable tp corresponds to the
operating time associated with the specific curve, and M represents the ratio of the
fault current and the MOC.
In order to ensure reliable and coordinated system protection, the design in-
66
corporates a coordination margin between the main protection and backup protection
devices, which is crucial in the event of a breaker or relay failure. The coordination
time interval (CTI) between each overcurrent protective device is defined and specified
in Table 5.2, where CS represents clear space between device curves [34].
Backup Protection
Main LV Circuit Electromechanical Digital
Protection Fuse Breaker Relay/Recloser Relay/Recloser
Fuse CS CS 0.22 s 0.12 s
LV Circuit Breaker CS CS 0.22 s 0.12 s
Electromechanical
Relay/Recloser 0.2 s 0.2 s 0.3 s 0.2 s
Digital Relay/Recloser 0.2 s 0.2 s 0.3 s 0.2 s
The CTI margins encompass various factors, including breaker operation delay,
overshoot, relay timing errors, CT errors, and an additional safety margin. These
margins are incorporated to ensure reliable device coordination between the main and
backup protection systems. To establish this coordination, a coordination range is
initially determined, representing the range of fault currents within which the backup
protection should operate. The coordination range for phase curves encompasses the
maximum and minimum fault currents for 3PH, LL, and LLG faults. On the other
hand, the coordination range for ground curves includes SLG faults and occasionally
LLG faults, depending on the ground current magnitude. Within this coordination
range, the CTI requirements must be satisfied.
When designing a recloser fast curve for fuse-saving protection, the curve is
designed to operate faster than the fuse minimum-melting curve. Conversely, when
designing the slow curve, the fuse is employed as the primary protection, while the
slow curve is utilized as the backup protection. This configuration ensures rapid
response to faults for initial recloser operations and allows for fuse operation in later
67
recloser operations, prioritizing fuse-saving for temporary faults.
To achieve coordination between reclosers, a coordination range is defined be-
tween main and backup protection, but sequence coordination is also assumed. With
sequence coordination, the backup recloser keeps track of the main recloser opera-
tions and increments its shot counter accordingly [20]. This ensures that repetitive
recloser operations are avoided and prevents any potential miscoordination between
the fast and slow curves. With sequence coordination functionality, the reclosers work
together harmoniously, allowing for an efficient and coordinated response to faults.
During the design of protection settings for devices within the microgrid, it
is crucial to consider the FRT capability of the BESS inverter. Analysis of the sys-
tem fault study reveals that the BESS inverter repeatedly tripped due to voltage
ride-through issues, while frequency ride-through was not a cause for tripping. As
previously mentioned, the BESS inverter complies with IEEE 1547-2018 Category II
standards, which mandates a minimum FRT duration of 2 seconds for severe faults,
as depicted in Fig. 1.5. Consequently, to prevent the BESS inverter from tripping, all
protective devices within the microgrid must operate within a 2 second time-frame,
ensuring their response aligns with the FRT capability of the BESS inverter. Mean-
while, to achieve coordination with the substation circuit breaker, an upper limit of
3 seconds is set for all protective devices within the grid.
To streamline the process of developing system settings, MATLAB functions
were created to iterate through different device settings. The functions helped facili-
tate the identification of the fastest protection settings for each device while consid-
ering the specified constraints. To do this, the script utilized the CTI margin, the
necessary fault data, and corresponding operating times (OTs) to find coordinated
settings for all fault types. Additionally, the script accounts for the individually mea-
sured fault currents at both main and backup protection devices to ensure precise
68
coordination. The various MATLAB functions associated with this process can be
found in Appendix A. Based on the fault study parameters and the assumed protec-
tion setting assumptions, the subsequent sections will delve into the development of
the proposed protection scheme.
tion
69
Figure 5.2: Voltage-restrained time overcurrent characteristic
70
findings of the system fault study. This approach allows for a lower MOC to be
applied in response to more severe voltage drops, effectively adapting the OT of the
protective device to island faults.
A graphical representation of the TCC variation as the voltage drops below
the reference can be observed in Fig. 5.3. This depiction illustrates how the MOC
reduces in response to voltage drops, demonstrating an improved OT for more severe
voltage drops. By incorporating this adaptive capability, the protection scheme can
efficiently and accurately respond to different fault scenarios.
71
72
Figure 5.4: Proposed distribution system protection zones with the generation facility
73
Figure 5.5: Proposed microgrid system protection zones
Table 5.3: Proposed forward protection zones of distribution system with generation
facility
Table 5.4: Proposed reverse protection zones of distribution system with generation
facility
ing recloser, which is to isolate the entire microgrid in the event of external faults.
This differs from the previous approach, where the PCC would isolate itself as the
BESS inverter operated in GFL. However, with the BESS inverter continuously op-
erating in GFM, the generation facility is now capable of seamlessly supporting the
microgrid, allowing the islanding recloser to disconnect from the main grid.
To ensure system protection amidst seamless transition, all devices are pro-
grammed with single settings while still meeting the criteria outlined in Tables 5.3,
5.4, 5.5, and 5.6.
Within the generation facility, with the exception of the AUX relay, all devices
74
Table 5.5: Proposed forward protection zones of microgrid system
75
designed settings.
5.4 Recloser 3
Recloser 3 serves as the sole recloser located downstream of both the genera-
tion facility and the islanding recloser, as depicted in Figs. 5.4 and 5.5. Consequently,
recloser 3 encounters a wide range of fault currents originating from either the substa-
tion or the limited generation facility. To account for this variability, recloser 3 was
programmed with the 51V protection element, which adjusts the MOC based on the
measured line voltage. As 51V operation is dependent on both voltage and current,
all fault types were individually considered rather than just a general coordination
range.
Recloser 3 must coordinate with downstream 80K fused laterals. From the
system fault study, Tables 5.7 and 5.8 present the maximum and minimum simulated
faults within the protection zone of all 80K fused laterals (referred to as zone 9 in
Fig. 5.4) during grid connection and microgrid operation. Similarly, Tables 5.9 and
5.10 display the same faults within the protection zone of the 80K fuse but provide
the corresponding voltage and current measurements obtained at recloser 3.
Table 5.7: Fault data recorded at 80K fuse for simulated faults within 80K fuse zone
during grid connection
The fault study results, presented in Tables 5.9 and 5.10, highlights a signifi-
cant difference in line voltages between grid-connected and microgrid faults. Notably,
76
Table 5.8: Fault data recorded at 80K fuse for simulated faults within 80K fuse zone
during microgrid operation
Table 5.9: Fault data recorded at recloser 3 for simulated faults within 80K fuse zone
during grid connection
Table 5.10: Fault data recorded at recloser 3 for simulated faults within 80K fuse
zone during microgrid operation
there is a more pronounced voltage drop observed during islanded conditions, as cor-
roborated by [36, 37, 38]. Therefore, this can be leveraged by utilizing the 51V
77
protection element to dynamically adjust MOC based on voltage drop.
In the context of microgrid operation, the 80K fuse experiences a minimum
fault current of 206 A. Consequently, the fuse operates after 300 seconds, which is not
a practical OT. Given that the fault current magnitude during microgrid operation
is not sufficiently high, it is necessary to extend the protection zone of recloser 3
during island mode to include the zone protected by the 80K fuse, labeled as zone 9
in Fig. 5.5. This arrangement ensures proper coverage. Fig. 5.6 visually illustrates
how recloser 3 provides backup protection for the 80K fuse during grid connection
and Fig. 5.7 demonstrate how it expands its protection zone to encompass the region
protected by the 80K fuse during island operation.
Figure 5.6: Recloser 3 and 80K fuse coordination during grid connection
Additionally, the fault study reveals that during island operation, the ground
current of an LLG fault surpasses the phase current, in contrast to grid-connected
operation. Therefore, when determining the ground setpoint, the elevated magnitude
of ground current from island LLG faults were taken into consideration.
78
Figure 5.7: Recloser 3 extended protection zone during microgrid operation
The protection settings for recloser 3 were determined by considering all the
provided fault data in conjunction with the specified CTI values in Table 5.2. For
coordinating recloser 3 with the fuse total clearing curve, a CTI of 0.12 seconds was
taken, meanwhile, 0.2 seconds was taken for coordinating with the fuse minimum
melting curve. The designed settings for recloser 3 are summarized in Table 5.11.
Table 5.12 displays the OTs of the 80K fuse backed by recloser 3, presenting the
specific OT for the maximum and minimum fault scenarios.
Table 5.11 demonstrates the implementation of 51V for the slow curves, en-
suring coordination with the 80K fuse during grid-connection and faster operation
79
Table 5.12: OTs of 80K fuse backed by recloser 3 for maximum and minimum faults
within the main protection zonea
than the fuse during island operation. Selecting the 51V base MOC for the phase
and ground slow curves resulted in a phase MOC of 274 A and a ground MOC of
55 A, decreasing based on voltage. These values were determined considering that
the maximum rated phase current at recloser 3 is 137 A, while the maximum rated
ground current is 27.1 A. The chosen MOCs were set at 200% of the rated currents,
as specified in the first section of this chapter.
As the 51V protection element adjusts the MOC dynamically, a reference
voltage was carefully selected considering the distinct voltage drop. By conducting
MATLAB optimization to ensure coordination for all faults, the phase reference volt-
age was determined to be 5 kV accompanied by a short-time inverse curve, while the
ground reference voltage was set to 17.5 kV alongside a short-time inverse curve.
Table 5.12 reveals that the coordination time of 0.12 seconds is primarily
influenced by the minimum fault. This can be attributed to the dynamic nature of
the 51V protection element, which considers both voltage and current parameters.
During fault conditions, as the voltage drops, the lowest fault current emerges as the
dominant factor for coordination.
On the other hand, the fast curves for recloser 3 were based on a standard in-
verse time-overcurrent curve, or ANSI 51, as the main requirement was for the curve
to operate faster than the fuse curve. Therefore, the fast curve did not necessitate a
dynamic response. Similar to the selection of MOC for the slow curves, determining
80
the MOC for both the phase and ground fast curves involved considering the maxi-
mum rated load and ground current. However, as the MOC remains fixed and does
not decrease, it was important to also consider that the minimum far-end phase fault
current of 209 A and the minimum far-end ground fault current of 248 A. Meeting
both criteria of exceeding 200% of the load current and remaining below 50% of the
minimum far-end fault current proved to be unattainable for the phase MOC.
In order to address this challenge, a priority was placed on selecting a phase
MOC that corresponds to 50% of the far-end phase fault current, accompanied by
the implementation of an undervoltage supervisor. Consequently, a phase MOC of
104 A was chosen, incorporating an undervoltage supervisor set at 0.8 pu. The
corresponding protection element for undervoltage is ANSI 27, and a threshold of
0.8 pu was selected to ensure the protection operates effectively during abnormal
grid conditions. Meanwhile, the ground fast curve MOC did not encounter the same
constraint. Thus, it was possible to adopt 200% of the maximum rated ground current
as the MOC.
To facilitate efficient coordination with all upstream recloser fast curves, the
time dial (TD) setpoint for the recloser fast curves was set to the fastest setting of
0.5. This decision was made to enable fast coordination among upstream recloser fast
curves, as they also need to coordinate their operation.
In Fig. 5.8, the coordination between the recloser 3 phase curves and the 80K
fuse is illustrated for both maximum and minimum phase faults occurring within the
80K fuse’s protection zone. It is important to note that the phase slow curve operates
based on the 51V reference and is dynamic in nature. To depict the coordination, an
average line was used, incorporating the maximum and minimum OTs for the phase
faults to outline the curve.
Similarly, Fig. 5.9 demonstrates the coordination between the recloser 3
81
ground curves and the 80K fuse. However, since the fuse does not operate based
on ground current but rather phase current, the recloser ground curves are referred
to phase to align with the fuse curve.
Additionally, Figs. 5.10 and 5.11 employ the same methodology, illustrating
the operation of recloser 3 for all island faults within its expanded microgrid zone,
which incorporates the 80K fuse protection zone. This demonstrates that the recloser
no longer coordinates with the fuse and operates at a faster rate for island faults.
Figure 5.8: Recloser 3 phase coordination with 80K fuse for grid faults
The TCC plots serve as evidence of the successful coordination between re-
closer 3 and the 80K fused laterals for all grid faults, as well as the effective operation
of recloser 3 with its expanded protection zone during islanded mode. The OT of
recloser 3 is successfully coordinated for all types of faults, ensuring a minimum of
0.12 seconds of CTI following the operation of the 80K fuse during grid faults. On the
82
Figure 5.9: Recloser 3 ground coordination with 80K fuse for grid faults
83
Figure 5.11: Recloser 3 ground operation for island faults
other hand, recloser 3 also achieves fast OTs during island operation, taking into ac-
count the more pronounced voltage drop. By adapting its MOC based on the voltage
conditions, recloser 3 ensures effective coordination and provides reliable protection
with a single setting.
rection
84
necessary. However, due to the presence of two sources in the system, namely the
substation and the generation facility, the protective devices face the potential of fault
current in both directions, requiring bi-directional settings. This section will delve
into the protection settings for the devices operating in the reverse direction, or the
direction of exporting fault current out of the generation facility.
Figure 5.12: Proposed reverse protection zones with the generation facility
The protection diagram, depicted in Fig. 5.12, reveals that downstream of the
generation facility lies recloser 3, which requires coordination. Additionally, 65KS
fused laterals are present downstream of the PCC recloser. However, since the gener-
ation facility cannot generate sufficient fault current to operate the fuse, fuse-saving
measures are not implemented with the PCC recloser. Instead, the islanding recloser,
which serves as the pathway for fault current from the substation, incorporates the
fuse-saving functionality and is presented later.
Additionally, the generation facility contains the PCC relay, BESS relay, and
PV relay, all of which require reverse protection settings. As shownin Fig. 5.12, the
PCC relay serves as the backup for the PCC recloser, while the BESS and PV relays
85
provide backup for the PCC relay.
In the preceding section, recloser 3 was equipped with the 51V element, which
relies on both voltage and current parameters. Consequently, to ensure proper coor-
dination between the PCC recloser and recloser 3, all fault types were individually
considered rather than a coordination range. Tables 5.13 and 5.14 showcase the mea-
surements for maximum and minimum faults within the protection zone of recloser
3 during grid connection and microgrid operation. Meanwhile, to coordinate with
recloser 3, Tables 5.15 and 5.16 exhibit the measured currents at the PCC recloser
during faults within the primary protection zone of recloser 3.
Table 5.13: Fault data recorded at recloser 3 for simulated faults within recloser 3
zone during grid connection
Given that the generation facility consistently exports fault currents within
a specific range, reaching up to 1.45 pu for both grid and island faults, the protec-
tion settings for the facility are primarily based on traditional overcurrent protection
principles. However, in cases where the MOC limitations cannot be met, voltage su-
pervision is incorporated for reliable operation. In this case, the programming of these
settings only required the consideration of a coordination range. Table 5.17 outlines
the coordination range between the main and backup protection systems within the
86
Table 5.14: Fault data recorded at recloser 3 for simulated faults within recloser 3
zone during microgrid operation
Table 5.15: Fault data recorded at PCC recloser for simulated faults within recloser
3 zone during grid connection
Table 5.16: Fault data recorded at PCC recloser for simulated faults within recloser
3 zone during microgrid operation
87
Table 5.17: Coordination of generation facility protection in reverse direction for
maximum and minimum faults within main protection zone
taken due to the short distance and absence of load between these devices. For the
remaining relays, a margin of 0.2 seconds is implemented, as shown in Table 5.2, to
ensure adequate coordination between the relays.
Following the methodology employed earlier for determining MOC and protec-
tion settings, Table 5.18 presents the reverse settings for all protective devices within
the generation facility. Meanwhile, Table 5.19 shows the OTs of the main and backup
protection devices within the generation facility in the reverse direction, demonstrat-
ing the coordinated OTs for both the maximum and minimum fault scenarios.
The phase MOCs were chosen to be 50% of the far-end fault current and were
supplemented by undervoltage supervision with a threshold of 0.8 pu. This revised
approach was implemented to ensure reliable operation for all fault scenarios, as the
primary MOC criteria could not be met. On the other hand, the ground MOCs were
88
Table 5.19: OTs of generation facility in reverse direction for maximum and minimum
faults within the main protection zonea
89
implementation of fuse-saving functionality was not considered in its operation, the
PCC recloser only required a single curve for both phase and ground protection.
Table 5.19 demonstrates the minimum fault at recloser 3 as the leading factor
in developing the PCC phase and ground settings. This is attributed to the dynamic
characteristics of coordinating with the 51V element, but also the results from the
grid-connected fault study. In Table 5.13, it can be seen that recloser 3 experiences
the highest fault current during 3PH faults and the lowest during SLG faults, as
the substation serves as the primary source of fault current. Conversely, Table 5.15
demonstrates that for the same faults, the generation facility contributes the highest
fault current during SLG faults and the least during 3PH faults. This indicates that
in the case of grid-connected faults, a minimum fault at recloser 3 corresponds to
maximum fault current export at the PCC, complicating the method of coordination
between the devices.
In the previous section, recloser 3 was designed to coordinate with an 80K fuse
during grid connection. This coordination resulted in slower OTs for ground faults,
as they were of less magnitude. As a result, recloser 3 exhibited its slowest OT of
0.89 seconds for a SLG fault occurring at the end of its primary protection zone.
Considering the fault observations made at the PCC and coordination requirements,
it was observed that the PCC phase element also needed to coordinate with this OT
to prevent premature operation, as highlighted in Table 5.19.
For the remaining PCC, BESS, and PV relays, the definite time curves were
utilized. As mentioned previously, the BESS inverter is capable of a FRT duration
of 2 seconds for severe faults. Initially, it was observed that the utilizing a standard
TCC for all the relays resulted in optimal coordination for the maximum fault and
a delayed coordination for the minimum fault, exceeding the inverter’s FRT limit.
To address this issue, the PCC relay definite time curve was coordinated with the
90
slowest OT of the PCC recloser, allowing the relay to achieve optimal operation for
the minimum fault within the coordination range. Then, the definite time curves of
the BESS and PV relays were set using the CTI margin. This adjustment successfully
addressed the FRT limitation and ensured coordination requirements were met.
Fig. 5.13 demonstrates the coordination between the PCC recloser and recloser
3 phase curves for faults occurring during grid connection. In this scenario, the PCC
recloser does not measure the same fault current as recloser 3, so the PCC recloser
phase curve is referred to the magnitude of fault current observed by recloser 3, with
the primary aim of demonstrating coordination with the minimum fault. On the
other hand, Fig. 5.14 illustrates the same coordination scenario but during island
operation, where both devices are subjected to the same fault current.
Similarly, Fig. 5.15 adopts the same approach, depicting the coordination
between the PCC recloser and recloser 3 ground curves for faults occurring during
grid connection, with a focus on demonstrating coordination with the minimum fault.
Fig. 5.16 showcases the coordination between these devices during island operation.
Since all devices within the generation facility experience a single range of
fault current, the remaining coordination plots are presented with the entire range of
fault currents from both grid-connected and islanded scenarios. Figs. 5.17 and 5.18
depict the coordination between the PCC recloser and PCC relay. Similarly, Figs.
5.19 and 5.20 showcase the coordination of the BESS relay with the 65 BAY-O-NET
fuse located at the BESS transformer MV terminal. Likewise, Figs. 5.21 and 5.22
illustrates the PV relay’s quicker response compared to the 50 BAY-O-NET fuse at
the PV transformer MV terminal, which does not operate for the specified range.
It is worth noting that in Figs. 5.20 and 5.22, the ground curves for both
the BESS and PV relays are referred to phase current as the fuse operates based
on phase current. Additionally, since the coordination between the PCC relay and
91
Figure 5.13: PCC recloser phase coordination with recloser 3 for grid faults
Figure 5.14: PCC recloser phase coordination with recloser 3 for island faults
92
Figure 5.15: PCC recloser ground coordination with recloser 3 for grid faults
Figure 5.16: PCC recloser ground coordination with recloser 3 for island faults
93
Figure 5.17: PCC relay phase coordination with PCC recloser
94
Figure 5.19: BESS relay phase coordination with 65 BAY-O-NET fuse
95
Figure 5.21: PV relay phase operation
96
BESS/PV relay is evident due to the nature of their definite time curves, a TCC for
this coordination is not presented.
These figures illustrate the successful coordination of all devices within the
generation facility for faults in the reverse direction. With these reverse settings in
place, particularly during island operation, the system will effectively isolate the fault
before it reaches the FRT limit of the BESS inverter. The next section will design the
settings for the generation facility in the forward direction. This will ensure reliable
operation in both reverse and forward fault scenarios.
rection
For the generation facility protection, the forward direction refers to fault
currents entering the generation facility or faults occurring within the facility itself.
During grid connection, as depicted in Fig. 5.23, the PCC recloser, PCC relay, BESS
relay, PV relay, and AUX relay are designed to operate on the high-magnitude fault
currents originating from the grid. On the other hand, during island operation, the
fault current contribution is supplied by the BESS. Therefore, only the PV relay and
AUX relay need to detect and respond to forward fault currents.
The protection settings for the devices within the generation facility are de-
signed based on a range of fault currents, following the traditional overcurrent ap-
proach. Table 5.20 shows the coordination range for each set of main and backup
protection in the generation facility for faults occurring in the forward direction. The
coordination range is defined by the extreme fault scenarios encountered during the
fault study, including both grid-connected and islanded scenarios.
97
Figure 5.23: Proposed forward protection zones with the generation facility
In Table 5.20, it can be observed that the PV relay and AUX relay experience
the highest fault current magnitude, which includes the combined contribution from
both the grid and the BESS. It is important to note that these relays are backed up
by the PCC relay in the forward direction and the BESS relay in the reverse direction,
ensuring the disconnection of both sources in the event of a failed operation of the
98
main protection. Meanwhile, the minimum fault within the PV and AUX protection
zones are measured during island operation. Conversely, the coordination range of
the PCC recloser, PCC relay, and BESS relay are equivalent and defined from the
grid-connected fault study.
Similar to the last section, a CTI of 0.12 seconds is taken between the PCC
recloser and PCC relay. Meanwhile, a CTI margin of 0.2 seconds is considered for the
coordination between the remaining protective devices within the generation facility.
Following the same procedure used earlier to determine the MOC and coordinate
the protective devices, Table 5.21 presents the forward settings for all the protective
devices within the generation facility. Table 5.22 displays the associated OTs for the
main and backup protection based on the designed settings.
In Table 5.21, all the selected MOCs are based on 200% the rated current in
the forward direction. The BESS, PV, and AUX relays are designed using the ANSI
50 protection element, which is the instantaneous overcurrent element. Since these
relays protect the first forward protection zone, an instantaneous trip was selected
for each relay, supplemented by a second-harmonic blocking (SHB) supervisor.
The SHB supervisor enables the relays to differentiate between transformer
99
Table 5.22: OTs of generation facility in forward direction for maximum and minimum
faults within the main protection zone
inrush current, which contains second harmonics, and fault current, which does not
contain the second harmonics. This allows the relays to operate only in the presence of
actual fault conditions while avoiding unnecessary tripping during transformer inrush
currents.
The design of the AUX relay also accounted for faults on the AUX trans-
former’s LV side or zone 14 in Fig. 5.12. Although the fault in zone 14 is within the
primary protection zone of the 12T fuse, it is considered part of the AUX relay’s zone
to save the fuse from blowing. Conversely, it is important to emphasize that the LV
side of the BESS and PV transformers are not included in the operation range of the
corresponding relays. The protection of the BESS and PV LV zones are handled by
the vendor of the generation units, while the auxiliary load is managed by the utility.
Table 5.22 shows the operating times of the BESS, PV, and AUX relays, all
of which are instantaneous (INST) due to the use of the ANSI 50 protection element.
Therefore, considering a CTI margin of 0.2 seconds, the PCC relay is configured to
operate on a definite time curve with a 0.2 second delay. Similarly, the PCC recloser
is set to operate on a definite time curve with a 0.32 second delay, with a CTI margin
of 0.12 seconds.
100
In Fig. 5.24, the coordination between the AUX phase setting and the 12T
fuse is depicted for a range of LV phase faults, spanning from 233 to 115 A. Similarly,
Fig. 5.25 demonstrates the coordination between the AUX ground setting and the
12T fuse for a range of LV ground faults, ranging from 227 to 154 A. These figures
highlight that the operation of the AUX relay is faster than that of the 12T fuse for
transformer LV faults, effectively saving the 12T fuse.
For the remaining protection devices within the generation facility, including
the PCC recloser, PCC relay, BESS relay, and PV relay, the coordination is evident
due to the characteristics of their instantaneous and definite time curves. As a result,
the TCC is not shown for this coordination.
Having established the settings outlined in the preceding sections, the coor-
dination and effectiveness of all protective devices within the microgrid have been
101
Figure 5.25: AUX relay ground coordination with 12T fuse
successfully achieved, rendering the use of only a single setting. This advancement
not only overcomes the drawbacks of the existing protection scheme discussed in
Chapter 4 but also enables continuous protection amidst seamless transition. Sub-
sequently, the upcoming section will delve into the design aspects of the islanding
recloser, the protective device responsible for disconnecting the microgrid from the
main grid.
Similar to the generation facility, the islanding recloser is equipped with both
forward and reverse protection settings. In the forward direction, it coordinates with
recloser 3, 65KS fused laterals, and the PCC recloser forward settings. This coordi-
nation arrangement can be seen in Fig. 5.26. These forward settings are designed to
102
operate for faults within the microgrid.
On the other hand, in the reverse direction, the islanding recloser must detect
any faults occurring upstream of the microgrid and promptly open its breaker. This
isolates the microgrid from the main grid to continue to provide power to microgrid
customers. The reverse settings will be designed first, followed by the forward settings.
The islanding recloser must conform to the minimum ride-through require-
ments specified in IEEE 1547-2018 Category II, as alluded to in Chapter 3. These re-
quirements necessitate the inclusion of ride-through curves for voltage and frequency,
as depicted in Figs. 1.5 and 1.7, within the settings of the islanding recloser.
To ensure that the islanding recloser remains connected to the grid during
instances such as the generation facility being disconnected or undergoing mainte-
nance, the ride-through limitations are combined with a reverse overcurrent element.
This arrangement prevents the recloser from unnecessary disconnection from the grid.
Fig. 5.27 provides a visual representation of how the various protection elements are
utilized in the design of the reverse settings for the islanding recloser.
Fig. 5.27 demonstrates the implementation of frequency ride-through using
103
Figure 5.27: Islanding recloser reverse settings
the ANSI 81O (overfrequency) and 81U (underfrequency) protection elements. Sim-
ilarly, the voltage ride-through is achieved through the utilization of the ANSI 59
(overvoltage) and 27 (undervoltage) protection elements. The practical implemen-
tation of utilizing these protection elements and how they are used to model the
corresponding ride-through curves is further discussed in Chapter 6. Nonetheless, it
can be seen by the final AN D gate that the islanding recloser will not operate unless
the instantaneous overcurrent element, ANSI 50, in the reverse direction also trips.
Considering the generation export limits, it was determined that the most
severe reverse load and ground current observed across the islanding recloser were
17 A and 9 A. Therefore, an MOC of 34 A and 18 A were set for the reverse phase
104
and ground overcurrent element, ensuring the detection of excessive current flow in
the reverse direction. Furthermore, a simulated example depicting an unplanned
islanding scenario for the farthest upstream fault was presented in Chapter 3, Section
2 of the thesis.
As shown in Fig. 5.26, the design of the forward protection settings for the is-
landing recloser involves incorporating fuse-saving functionality in coordination with
the 65KS fused laterals, as well as providing backup protection for recloser 3 and
the PCC recloser. Therefore, the forward settings of the islanding recloser was pro-
grammed with both a fast and a slow curve.
The fast curve of the islanding recloser was coordinated with the forward
settings of the PCC recloser. This coordination ensures that in the event of a fault
occurring within the generation facility, the forward settings of the generation facility
will operate before the fast curve of the islanding recloser. This arrangement is crucial
as it allows the generation facility’s protective settings to respond first, preventing
unnecessary reclosing of the entire microgrid for a fault within the generation facility.
As recloser 3 dynamically responds to different faults based on voltage and
current, a comprehensive analysis of each fault point was necessary for effective co-
ordination. Unlike the coordination between the PCC recloser and recloser 3, where
various scenarios were taken into account, the coordination between the islanding
recloser and recloser 3 only needed to consider the grid-connected scenario. In Table
5.13, which was previously shown, the measurements at recloser 3 for both maximum
and minimum faults within its primary zone are listed. In parallel, Table 5.23 pro-
vides the corresponding measurements at the islanding recloser for those same fault
points.
For the remaining device coordination, a coordination margin can be defined
to ensure sufficient margin between the device curves. The coordination range with
105
the PCC recloser forward settings and the 65KS fused laterals can be found detailed
in Table 5.24. As done previously, for coordination with the 65KS fused laterals, the
extreme fault scenarios across all laterals were considered within the range.
Table 5.23: Fault data recorded at islanding recloser for simulated faults within re-
closer 3 zone during grid connection
Table 5.24: Coordination of islanding recloser in forward direction for maximum and
minimum faults
A CTI of 0.12 seconds is taken between the 65KS fuse and islanding recloser.
Meanwhile, a CTI margin of 0.2 seconds is employed to coordinate the islanding
recloser with recloser 3 and the PCC recloser. Following the established procedure
for developing the settings, the resulting forward settings for the islanding recloser
are presented in Table 5.25. Furthermore, Table 5.26 provides the associated OTs for
the main and backup protection based on the designed settings.
After employing MATLAB optimization, an inverse curve was chosen for the
islanding recloser slow curves. Specifically, the inverse curve provided the fastest
operation for faults within the lower range of coordination. Although steeper TCC
106
Table 5.25: Islanding recloser forward protection settings
Table 5.26: OTs of islanding recloser and coordinated devices in forward direction for
maximum and minimum faultsa
curves can lead to faster OTs for higher magnitude faults, it was observed that lower
magnitude faults were approaching the 3 second limitation as these curves were too
steep in comparison to the 65KS fuse. Unlike ”T” or ”K” fuses, ”KS” fuses have
a distinct characteristic of being slower in terms of their slope. Therefore, when
considering the coordination with the 65KS fuse, the inverse curve demonstrated the
closest slope to that of the fuse within the margin of coordination. Although it is
possible to replace the 65KS fused laterals with a faster fuse, the present study does
not consider resizing the fuses due to practical cost constraints.
For the fast curves of the islanding recloser, a very inverse curve was chosen
for both the phase and ground settings, as it provided the fastest operating time
before the 65KS fuse. Consequently, the fast curve of the islanding recloser maintains
a sufficient CTI margin of 0.2 seconds with respect to the 65KS minimum melting
curve.
107
Figs. 5.28 and 5.29 demonstrate the coordination between the islanding re-
closer and the 65KS fuse. It is important to note that the islanding recloser ground
curves are referred to the phase in order to showcase their coordination with the 65KS
fuse.
Figs. 5.30 and 5.31 highlight the coordination between the islanding recloser
and recloser 3, displaying the 51V base curves. While the previous method of pre-
senting the 51V curves could have been employed, it is important to note that the
coordination with the 65KS fuse primarily influenced the definition of the islanding
recloser slow curve. Consequently, both figures effectively illustrate the coordination
between the islanding recloser and the 51V base curves of recloser 3.
Finally, the coordination between the islanding recloser fast curves and the
PCC recloser forward settings are illustrated in Figs. 5.32 and 5.33.
108
Figure 5.29: Islanding recloser ground coordination with 65KS fuse
109
Figure 5.31: Islanding recloser ground coordination with recloser 3
Figure 5.32: Islanding recloser phase coordination with PCC recloser forward settings
110
Figure 5.33: Islanding recloser ground coordination with PCC recloser forward set-
tings
5.8 Recloser 2
Based on the previous section, the islanding recloser was specifically designed
to isolate the microgrid from the main grid in the event of an external fault. Conse-
quently, recloser 2 solely requires forward settings. Fig. 5.34 illustrates that recloser
111
2 acts as backup protection for both the islanding recloser and 80KS fused laterals in
the forward direction.
A CTI of 0.12 seconds is considered between the 80KS fuse and recloser 2.
Meanwhile, a CTI of 0.2 seconds is utilized between recloser 2 and the islanding
recloser forward settings. Following the previous procedure for selecting MOCs and
developing settings, the settings for recloser 2 are presented in Table 5.28. Table
5.29 provides the OTs for both the main and backup protection based on the defined
coordination range.
In line with the design approach taken for the islanding recloser, inverse curves
112
Table 5.28: Recloser 2 protection settings
Table 5.29: OTs of recloser 2 and coordinated devices for maximum and minimum
faultsa
were carefully selected for the recloser’s slow curves to ensure optimal coordination
with the 80KS fuse while maintaining effective coordination with the islanding re-
closer. On the other hand, very inverse curves were chosen for the recloser’s fast
curves to achieve the best possible coordination with the fast curves of the islanding
recloser. Furthermore, when coordinating with the slow ”KS” fuses, the OTs speci-
fied in Table 5.29 remain below the 3-second limit. This ensures that the protection
requirements are met while providing sufficient protection against faults.
Figs. 5.35 and 5.36 visually showcase the coordination between the 80KS fuse
and recloser 2, demonstrating an ample margin to enable fuse-saving functionality for
the 80KS fuse. As done with the previous TCC plots, the ground curve of recloser 2
in Fig. 5.36 is referred to phase current to demonstrate fuse coordination. Similarly,
Figures 5.37 and 5.38 illustrate the coordination between the islanding recloser and
recloser 2 slow and fast curves, with a CTI of 0.2 seconds maintained between each
respective curve.
113
Figure 5.35: Recloser 2 phase coordination with 80KS fuse
114
Figure 5.37: Recloser 2 phase coordination with islanding recloser
115
Based on the plots, the settings designed for recloser 2 have resulted in suc-
cessful coordination with the corresponding downstream devices, while also ensuring
compliance with the 3-second OT limit. Consequently, in the upcoming section, the
settings for the final protective device will be formulated.
5.9 Recloser 1
116
Table 5.30: Coordination of recloser 1 for maximum and minimum faults
To achieve coordination with the 100KS fuse, a CTI margin of 0.12 seconds.
Similarly, a CTI margin of 0.2 seconds is employed for coordination with recloser 2.
However, a CTI of 0.3 seconds is established between the hydraulic recloser (recloser
4) and recloser 1, as indicated in Table 5.2.
Utilizing these parameters and following the same established procedure, the
designed settings for recloser 1 are presented in Table 5.31. Furthermore, the OTs
resulting from the defined coordination range can be found in Table 5.32.
117
Table 5.32: OTs of recloser 1 and coordinated devices for maximum and minimum
faultsa
Figs. 5.40 and 5.41 provide a visual representation of the successful coor-
dination achieved between the 100KS fuse and recloser 1, with the recloser ground
curve referred to phase current. Figs. 5.42 and 5.43 exhibit the coordination be-
tween recloser 2 and recloser 1, maintaining a minimum CTI of 0.2 seconds. Lastly,
Figures 5.42 and 5.43 showcase the coordination between recloser 2 and recloser 4,
demonstrating a minimum CTI margin of 0.3 seconds.
The TCC plots provide clear evidence of the maintained effective margin be-
tween each protective device amidst the different curve slopes and OTs. Overall, all
the TCC plots in this chapter demonstrate that all the coordinated protection de-
vices operate within the specified time limit of 3 seconds. It is important to note that
while faster operating times could have been achieved by altering the ”KS” fuses, this
protection design prioritizes the utilization of the existing protection elements within
the system.
In conclusion, the system has been effectively designed to operate with single-
settings, eliminating the need for communication between devices. Additionally, the
system is immune to seamless transitions, ensuring smooth and reliable protection,
while utilizing the available protection features.
118
Figure 5.40: Recloser 1 phase coordination with 100KS fuse
119
Figure 5.42: Recloser 1 phase coordination with recloser 2
120
Figure 5.44: Recloser 1 phase coordination with recloser 4
121
Chapter 6
122
6.1 Testing Background and Parameters
123
the fault current limiter of the RSCAD inverter was dynamically modified based on
the type of fault, as indicated in Table 6.1. Furthermore, the RSCAD inverter was
set with a real power droop of 0.5 and a reactive power droop of 0.1, denoted as n
and m in Fig. 2.6 of Chapter 2.
Table 6.1: Fault current limiter setpoint for BESS inverter based on fault type
The RSCAD inverter model resulted in a system and fault response within a
maximum margin of error of 4.2% in comparison with PSCAD model. This assessment
was made by comparing the currents and voltages obtained from both simulations. In
Tables 6.2 and 6.3, a comprehensive comparison of the steady-state currents and volt-
ages during the normal operation of the microgrid, as simulated in both PSCAD and
RSCAD, is presented. Furthermore, Table 6.4 provides a comparison of the microgrid
fault currents contributed by the BESS inverter. While the RSCAD inverter did not
perfectly match the PSCAD model, it should be noted that the primary objective of
the HIL simulations was to assess the performance of the proposed protection scheme.
Table 6.2: Comparison of PSCAD and RSCAD steady-state currents during microgrid
operation
Percent Distance Phase A Current [A] Phase B Current [A] Phase C Current [A]
from PCC PSCAD RSCAD PSCAD RSCAD PSCAD RSCAD
0% 137 138 133 135 136 136
25% 122 119 129 125 126 121
50% 104 96 98 89 94 90
75% 54 49 68 62 42 40
To conduct the HIL testing of the protection scheme, the SEL platform was
124
Table 6.3: Comparison of PSCAD and RSCAD steady-state voltages during microgrid
operation
Percent Distance Phase A LG Voltage [kV] Phase B LG Voltage [kV] Phase C LG Voltage [kV]
from PCC PSCAD RSCAD PSCAD RSCAD PSCAD RSCAD
0% 13.69 13.71 13.73 13.74 13.71 13.72
25% 13.67 13.69 13.7 13.72 13.7 13.71
50% 13.66 13.66 13.69 13.67 13.67 13.66
75% 13.62 13.63 13.66 13.65 13.64 13.63
100% 13.6 13.6 13.63 13.61 13.61 13.59
Table 6.4: Comparison of PSCAD and RSCAD fault currents during microgrid oper-
ation
Percent Distance SLG Fault [A] LLG Fault [A] LL Fault [A] 3PH Fault [A]
from PCC PSCAD RSCAD PSCAD RSCAD PSCAD RSCAD PSCAD RSCAD
0% 293 295 344 346 223 222 212 214
25% 290 289 334 331 222 221 211 210
50% 283 286 309 311 220 219 211 210
75% 274 278 289 281 216 214 210 209
employed. In these simulations, three SEL relays were utilized in conjunction for fault
testing, while the remaining system relays were modeled in RSCAD using software
relays. The selection of relays depended on the simulated fault location, with a focus
on using physical relays for faults in the main and backup protection zones, and
software relays for the remainder of the system.
Two SEL 421 relays were connected to the RTDS using Sampled Value (SV)
communication, allowing them to receive system data through communication [40].
The third relay, an SEL 411, was connected to the RTDS through low-voltage wiring
from the front of the relay [41]. This wiring arrangement was necessary as no am-
plifier was available to amplify the RTDS output and interface it with the relay.
Although these relays have the capability to serve various protection purposes, they
were specifically equipped with the required protection elements for testing the pro-
125
posed protection scheme. These elements included time-overcurrent, overvoltage,
undervoltage, overfrequency, underfrequency, and directional protection.
The subsequent section will explore the construction of the relay settings and
the customized programming of the voltage-restrained time-overcurrent element, pro-
viding additional insights into its integration within the relay.
126
5, the IEEE 1547-2018 voltage and frequency ride-through curves were programmed
into the recloser. This was done by sampling the ride-through curves in Figs. 1.5
and 1.7 with their corresponding ride-through times, eliminating the need for custom
curve programming. The specific settings for the undervoltage protection element
can be found in Table 6.5, which includes the associated voltage limits and ride-
through times. Similarly, the overvoltage protection element settings can be seen in
Table 6.6. The underfrequency protection element settings are presented in Table 6.7
with the associated frequency limits and ride-through times, while the overfrequency
protection element settings are displayed in Table 6.6. Within the islanding recloser,
these supervisor elements were integrated within the ”Trip Logic” in conjunction with
reverse overcurrent, as previously illustrated in Fig. 5.27.
127
Table 6.7: Underfrequency ride-through settings for islanding recloser
128
in Chapter 5.
The proposed protection scheme was validated through the use of the RSCAD
distribution system and legacy relays wired in HIL with the RTDS. The testing process
involved simulating a variety of faults, resembling those analyzed in the PSCAD fault
study, across different sections of the system. A visual representation of the tested
faults across the system can be observed in Fig. 6.1.
Fig. 6.1 displays all the tested faults during grid connection, highlighted in
orange or magenta color. However, the faults highlighted in magenta are significant
as they are chosen for in-depth analysis in this section. These seven fault scenar-
ios effectively summarize the successful operation of the proposed protection scheme
discussed in Chapter 5 during grid connection.
To enhance understanding of the protective operation during each analyzed
fault, Tables 6.9 and 6.10 present detailed information on the main and backup pro-
tective devices associated with each fault, considering both the forward and reverse
directions. Notably, the numerical fault numbers listed in these tables directly corre-
spond to the fault numbers indicated in Fig. 6.1.
Table 6.9: Main and backup protection for grid-connected faults in forward direction
129
130
Figure 6.1: RSCAD simulated faults during grid connection
Table 6.10: Main and backup protection for grid-connected faults in reverse direction
These seven faults are simulated to test the proposed single settings for each
protective device, with each device serving as either main or backup protection. First,
these settings will be evaluated for faults that occur with the presence of the substa-
tion source and the generation facility.
The experiment demonstrates the operation of recloser 3 with its proposed
dynamic 51V element through the simulation of faults 4, 5, and 6. Both faults 5
and 6 are considered to accurately demonstrate the coordination of the dynamic 51V
element with the 80K fuse for all range of faults.
Additionally, the experiment validates the proposed forward settings of the
islanding recloser using faults 2 and 3, while the proposed reverse settings of the
islanding recloser are tested through fault 1. The operation of the proposed forward
settings of the PCC recloser are verified using fault 3, and the proposed reverse
settings are tested with faults 2 and 4. Similarly, the PCC relay’s proposed reverse
settings are evaluated with fault 2 and 3, and the relay’s proposed forward settings
are tested using fault 7. The BESS relay’s proposed reverse settings are validated
using fault 3. Furthermore, the testing includes the assessment of the AUX relay’s
forward settings using fault 7.
Although it would have been possible to demonstrate additional faults within
the generation facility to showcase the effective operation of all the proposed forward
settings, it was deemed sufficient to focus on faults 3 and 7, considering that all the
devices within the generation facility employ similar forward settings.
131
To provide a comprehensive understanding of how each fault was tested in
RSCAD using HIL, Figs. 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 showcase the 51V operation of recloser
3 for maximum faults occurring within the 80K fuse zone. These fault scenarios
correspond to fault 5 in Fig. 6.1, where the 80K fuse serves as the primary protective
device and the 51V curve of recloser 3 functions as backup.
Figure 6.2: Operation of Recloser 3 slow curve for AG fault within 80K fuse zone
Within each figure, the first subplot displays the measured line voltage drop
at recloser 3, which enables the dynamic adjustment of the MOC by the 51V element.
In the second subplot, the figures display the measured fault current, giving insights
into the magnitude of the current during the fault event. The third subplot presents
the trip signal, indicating the precise moment when the recloser detects the fault and
initiates the breaker operation in the RSCAD simulation. It is important to note
that the interruption of current on each phase does not occur simultaneously; rather,
132
Figure 6.3: Operation of Recloser 3 slow curve for CAG fault within 80K fuse zone
Figure 6.4: Operation of Recloser 3 slow curve for BC fault within 80K fuse zone
133
Figure 6.5: Operation of Recloser 3 slow curve for ABC fault within 80K fuse zone
the breaker in simulation operates specifically at the zero crossing of the current
waveform.
The remaining faults tested in this chapter will be presented in a tabulated
format, showcasing their experimental OTs. These OTs will then be compared with
the OTs of the designed protection scheme discussed in the previous chapter.
As 51V operation is dependent on both voltage and current, the OTs for faults
related to recloser 3 are presented in detail, with the OT for each specific fault (SLG,
LLG, LL, or 3PH faults) individually shown. However, for the remaining devices, the
fastest and slowest OTs are shown, representing the range of OTs for each device.
In Table 6.11, the designed and experimental OTs for each protective device
are categorized based on fault number, showing the fastest and slowest OTs for faults
at that location with the generation facility connected. Meanwhile, Table 6.12 follows
134
a similar approach but presents a more detailed comparison between the experimental
OTs for recloser 3 and the OTs derived from the designed settings.
Tables 6.11 and 6.12 demonstrate the close alignment between the experimen-
tal OTs and the OTs derived from the proposed protection scheme design. However,
during the HIL testing of the proposed scheme, it was observed that the directional
element occasionally experienced a slight delay of 0.01 to 0.02 seconds, specifically
when there was a change of direction. Nonetheless, the CTI employed in the pre-
vious chapter incorporated a safety margin to accommodate any additional delays
effectively.
Overall, based on the experimental results, the proposed single settings for
each protective device have demonstrated successful operation in line with the design,
135
Table 6.12: Designed and experimental OTs of recloser 3 during grid connectiona
considering the combined presence of the substation source and generation facility.
Next, the same settings are tested with solely substation connection, i.e., without the
generation facility being connected.
The analysis with the substation connection focuses on the same faults consid-
ered in Fig. 6.1, with the exception of faults 3 and 7. These two faults are excluded
as they occur within the generation facility, which is now disconnected. Moreover,
in the absence of the generation facility, all protective devices operate in a forward
direction only. Fig. 6.6 displays the analyzed faults, following the previous naming
convention, with faults 3 and 7 removed to reflect the disconnection of the generation
facility.
Table 6.13 provides a comparison between the experimental and designed OTs
for the fastest and slowest OTs at each fault location, similar to the previous tabulated
data. On the other hand, Table 6.14 specifically focuses on the OTs of recloser 3 for
each fault type, highlighting the successful operation of the 51V element within the
recloser.
136
137
Figure 6.6: RSCAD simulated faults without generation facility
Table 6.13: Designed and experimental OTs without the generation facilitya
Table 6.14: Designed and experimental OTs of recloser 3 without the generation
facilitya
Under the same protection settings, all protective devices performed in align-
ment with the design. Furthermore, it was also confirmed that the islanding recloser
did not operate for upstream faults due to the absence of the connected generation
facility. In summary, during the HIL experimentation, the proposed single protection
settings demonstrated successful operation in the event of grid faults. All devices ad-
hered closely to the intended design requirements, remaining resilient to the presence
of the generation facility. The subsequent section will concentrate on evaluating these
138
identical settings within the context of microgrid operation.
The experimental analysis will showcase the improved response time of recloser
3 in operating for faults that were previously coordinated with the 80K fuse, specif-
ically faults 5 and 6. Moreover, the proposed reverse settings for the PCC recloser
is validated through the examination of faults 4, 5, and 6. Similarly, the proposed
139
140
Figure 6.7: RSCAD simulated faults during microgrid operation
reverse settings for the PCC relay is tested using fault 3. The AUX relay’s proposed
forward settings is tested through fault 7. Additionally, the proposed reverse settings
for the BESS relay is validated through fault 7.
These chosen fault scenarios encompass and effectively summarize the success-
ful operation of all microgrid protection, as a form of main or backup protection. As
mentioned in the previous section, although additional faults within the generation
facility could have been examined, it was determined that faults 3 and 7 would suffice
due to the similarity of the protection settings implemented in the generation facility.
Table 6.16 presents a comparison between the experimental OTs for the faults
depicted in Fig. 6.7 and the corresponding OTs derived from the design. This
comparison encompasses the fastest and slowest OTs for each fault, as done in the
previous section. A more in-depth analysis of the OTs specific to recloser 3 is shown
in Table 6.17, as it utilizes the dynamic 51V element. Table 6.17 presents a detailed
breakdown of the OTs for each individual fault, allowing for a focused examination
of the OTs, which are a function of both voltage and current.
Table 6.16: Designed and experimental OTs during microgrid operationa
With no change in settings, all microgrid protection devices in HIL have proven
141
Table 6.17: Designed and experimental OTs of recloser 3 during microgrid operationa
to experimentally operate as predicted in the proposed design. For all main and
backup protective devices, the protection operation is less than 2 seconds in order to
meet the FRT limitation of the BESS inverter. From the test results, both the main
and backup protective devices have consistently shown protection operation within
2 seconds, meeting the FRT limitation of the BESS inverter. Additionally, although
demonstrating some short delays, the directional element has accurately detected
fault current direction, allowing for proper directional overcurrent operation.
In summary, both the previous section and this section validate the adequacy
of the proposed protection scheme presented in Chapter 5, which utilizes a single set
of settings for both grid and microgrid operation. Moving forward, the next section
will focus on demonstrating the security of the protection scheme, specifically testing
its resilience against extreme operating conditions to demonstrate that it does not
operate.
142
6.5 Protection Security
143
measurements, shown in Fig. 6.8, were captured at recloser 3, which is situated
directly upstream the induction motor within the microgrid system.
Fig. 6.8 displays the current and voltage behavior during the test scenario,
revealing that the highest current magnitude occurs in phase A and reaches approxi-
mately 147 A. Meanwhile, the line voltage experiences a significant drop to 22.72 kV
or 0.99 pu, remaining above the 51V reference voltages and the undervoltage super-
visor threshold of 0.8 pu. Therefore, the 51V protection element did not even pick up
on the current draw. Furthermore, although the phase MOC threshold of 91 A for
the protective devices in the generation facility were exceeded, as the voltage drop
did not surpass 0.8 pu, these protection devices did not operate.
From this security test, no protective devices operated during the induction
motor start, indicating the successful outcome of the first security test. Similarly,
144
Fig. 6.9 illustrates the sudden energization of both 2.1 MVAR capacitor banks at
peak system voltage. Since both capacitor banks are situated downstream of recloser
3, the measurements at recloser 3 are presented in Fig. 6.9. Moreover, to highlight
the capacitor banks’ energization at the voltage peak, the instantaneous voltage and
current waveforms are shown in the figure.
Figure 6.9 depicts the energization of the capacitors at the voltage peak, specif-
ically on phase A, leading to a peak instantaneous current draw of 379 A. However,
since the protective devices operate based on current phasors, the maximum cur-
rent magnitude measured at recloser 3 is 136 A. Also, it is shown that there was
no sustained voltage drop observed during this event, with only an observed voltage
transient that lasted a few milliseconds. Given the defined voltage supervision, none
of the protective devices operated, effectively showcasing the security and reliability
145
of the protection scheme during capacitor energization.
Overall, this chapter has conclusively showcased the dependability, security,
and selectivity of the proposed protection scheme through experimental validation
utilizing HIL simulations. Notably, it has been established that all protective devices
consistently operate in accordance with the designated design, utilizing a single set
of settings for both grid and island fault scenarios. At the same time, the protection
scheme has been proven to not operate during induction motor starting and capacitor
energization events. This demonstrates the protection scheme’s ability to effectively
discriminate between normal system operation and potential fault conditions, ensur-
ing the reliable system operation.
146
Chapter 7
Conclusion
This project focused on analyzing a 22.86 kV Duke Energy system that fea-
tured a generation facility designed to facilitate the blackstarting of a microgrid sys-
tem. The main goal was to enhance microgrid resiliency and customer reliability by
transitioning from a blackstart microgrid to a seamless transition microgrid.
The analysis began by examining the existing BESS inverters and their ability
to provide seamless transition functionality in PSCAD. This involved operating the
inverters continuously in GFM while manipulating the voltage and frequency refer-
ences during grid connection. This revised configuration allowed for both planned and
unplanned islanding scenarios. Additionally, PSCAD controls were designed to syn-
chronize the microgrid with the main grid after islanding, manipulating the inverter’s
voltage and frequency reference to meet IEEE 1547-2018 synchronization check limits.
The implementation of seamless transition functionality rendered the existing
protection scheme reliant on communication obsolete due to inevitable delays in com-
munication and relay settings changes. As a result, an adaptive protection scheme
was proposed, utilizing the existing protection devices and offering single settings for
each device. This scheme incorporated elements such as inverse time-overcurrent,
147
bi-directional settings, voltage supervision, and voltage-restrained time overcurrent
protection.
To validate the proposed protection scheme, HIL simulations were conducted
on the RTDS platform. These simulations encompassed fault scenarios to demonstrate
the operation of the protection devices, as well as extreme loading conditions to
confirm the system security. The experimental results aligned with the designed
values, demonstrating the effective operation of all protective devices with single
settings and their immunity to seamless transition.
These achievements highlight the significant advancements made in both the
operational capabilities of the inverter and the system protection. Through the imple-
mentation of seamless transition and the removal of dependence on communication for
protection settings, this research effectively showcases a distribution system solution
that enhances the resilience and reliability of microgrid customers.
148
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Appendices
153
Appendix A : MATLAB functions for producing
protection settings
function Ot = oT( I , Ip ,TD,TCC) % US TCC Curves
M = I / Ip ;
i f (M>30)
M = 30;
end
f a u l t L o c= [ 1 3 5 7 9 ] ;
TD matrix =[0 0 ] ; % i n i t i a l v a l u e
TD check= 0 ;
for i= 1 : 1 : 2 % For Grid & I s l a n d c o o r d i n a t i o n
for k= 1 : 1 : 2 % For PS , GS
for j = 1 : 1 : 5
for p= 2 : 1 : 3 % Loop t h r o u g h Max and Min F a u l t s
Ip= I p m a t r i x ( k ) ;
v= f a u l t L o c ( j ) ;
% Reference to navigate f a u l t current t a b l e
i f i ==1; coordMat= c o o r d P o i n t 1 ;
f a u l t M a t= f a u l t P o i n t 1 ;
154
end % Grid c o o r d i n a t i o n p o i n t s
i f i ==2; coordMat= c o o r d P o i n t 2 ;
f a u l t M a t= f a u l t P o i n t 2 ;
end % I s l a n d c o o r d i n a t i o n p o i n t s
155
f i n a l T a b l e= a r r a y 2 t a b l e ( [ timeTable P timeTable G ] ,
’ VariableNames ’ , { ’ PhaseTime MaxFault ’ , ’ PhaseTime MinFault ’ ,
’ GroundTime MaxFault ’ , ’ GroundTime MinFault ’ } ,
’RowNames ’ , { ’ LG S ’ , ’ LLG S ’ , ’ LL S ’ , ’ LLL S ’ , ’ LLLG S ’ } ) ;
end
f i n a l T a b l e= a r r a y 2 t a b l e ( [ timeTable P timeTable G ] ,
’ VariableNames ’ , { ’ PhaseTime MaxFault ’ , ’ PhaseTime MinFault ’ ,
’ GroundTime MaxFault ’ , ’ GroundTime MinFault ’ } , ’RowNames ’ ,
{ ’ LG S ’ , ’ LLG S ’ , ’ LL S ’ , ’ LLL S ’ , ’ LLLG S ’ } ) ;
end
156
for k = 1 : 1 : 4
% Loop t h r o u g h Phase Slow , Ground Slow , Phase Fast , Ground Fast
for j = [ 1 3 5 7 9 ] % Loop t h r o u g h LG LLG LL LLL LLLG
for p= 2 : 1 : 3 % Loop t h r o u g h Max and Min F a u l t s
Ip= S e t p o i n t s ( 1 , k ) ;
TD= S e t p o i n t s ( 2 , k ) ;
TCC= S e t p o i n t s ( 3 , k ) ;
f i n a l T a b l e= a r r a y 2 t a b l e ( [ timeTable P timeTable G ] ,
’ VariableNames ’ , { ’ PhaseTime MaxFault ’ , ’ PhaseTime MinFault ’ ,
’ GroundTime MaxFault ’ , ’ GroundTime MinFault ’ } , ’RowNames ’ ,
{ ’ LG S ’ , ’ LLG S ’ , ’ LL S ’ , ’ LLL S ’ , ’ LLLG S ’ , ’ LG F ’ ,
’LLG F ’ , ’ LL F ’ , ’ LLL F ’ , ’LLLG F ’ } ) ;
end
f a u l t L o c= [ 1 3 5 7 9 ] ;
TD matrix =[0 0 ] ; % i n i t i a l v a l u e
TD check= 0 ;
for i= 1 : 1 : 2 % For Grid & I s l a n d c o o r d i n a t i o n
for k= 1 : 1 : 2 % For PS , GS
for j = 1 : 1 : 5
157
for p= 2 : 1 : 3 % Loop t h r o u g h Max and Min F a u l t s
Ip= I p m a t r i x ( k ) ;
TCC= TCC matrix ( k ) ;
v= f a u l t L o c ( j ) ;
% Reference to navigate f a u l t current t a b l e
i f i ==1; coordMat= c o o r d P o i n t 1 ;
f a u l t M a t= f a u l t P o i n t 1 ; end % Grid c o o r d i n a t i o n p o i n t s
i f i ==2; coordMat= c o o r d P o i n t 2 ;
f a u l t M a t= f a u l t P o i n t 2 ; end % I s l a n d c o o r d i n a t i o n p o i n t s
syms TD Solve
i f ( k==1 && j >2); coordTime=
coordMat { j , p}+CTI ; TD check =
round ( double ( s o l v e ( coordTime ==
oT( f a u l t M a t {v , p }∗1000 , Ip , TD Solve ,TCC) , TD Solve ) ) , 2 ) ;
end
i f ( k==1 && j <3); coordTime=
min( abs ( coordMat { j , p } ) , abs ( coordMat { j , p+2}))+CTI ;
TD check = round ( double ( s o l v e ( coordTime ==
oT( f a u l t M a t {v , p }∗1000 , Ip , TD Solve ,TCC) , TD Solve ) ) , 2 ) ;
end
i f ( k==2 && j <3); coordTime=
min( abs ( coordMat { j , p } ) , abs ( coordMat { j , p+2}))+CTI ;
TD check = round ( double ( s o l v e ( coordTime ==
oT( f a u l t M a t {v+1,p }∗1000 , Ip , TD Solve ,TCC) , TD Solve ) ) , 2 ) ;
end
158
s h e e t F a u l t 2 , sheetCoord1 , sheetCoord2 )
% setpoint calculation for recloser
% I p m a t r i x i s o r g a n i z e d as Phase and Ground
% TCC matrix & TD matrix i s o r g a n i z e d as
% Phase Slow , Ground Slow , Phase Fast , Ground Fast
c o o r d P o i n t 1= r e a d t a b l e ( ” TripTimes . x l s x ” , ’ Sheet ’ , sheetCoord1 ) ;
f a u l t P o i n t 1= r e a d t a b l e ( ” S p e c i f i c F a u l t P o i n t s . x l s x ” , ’ Sheet ’ , s h e e t F a u l t 1 ) ;
c o o r d P o i n t 2= r e a d t a b l e ( ” TripTimes . x l s x ” , ’ Sheet ’ , sheetCoord2 ) ;
f a u l t P o i n t 2= r e a d t a b l e ( ” S p e c i f i c F a u l t P o i n t s . x l s x ” , ’ Sheet ’ , s h e e t F a u l t 2 ) ;
f a u l t L o c= [ 1 3 5 7 9 ] ;
TD matrix =[0 0 0 0 ] ; % i n i t i a l v a l u e
TD check= 0 ;
for i= 1 : 1 : 2 % For Grid & I s l a n d c o o r d i n a t i o n
for k= 1 : 1 : 4 % For PS , GS, PF, GF
for j = 1 : 1 : 5
for p= 2 : 1 : 3 % Loop t h r o u g h Max and Min F a u l t s
Ip= I p m a t r i x ( k ) ;
TCC= TCC matrix ( k ) ;
v= f a u l t L o c ( j ) ;
% Reference to navigate f a u l t current t a b l e
i f i ==1; coordMat= c o o r d P o i n t 1 ;
f a u l t M a t= f a u l t P o i n t 1 ; CTI=CTI1 ; end
% Grid c o o r d i n a t i o n p o i n t s
i f i ==2; coordMat= c o o r d P o i n t 2 ;
f a u l t M a t= f a u l t P o i n t 2 ; CTI=CTI2 ; end
% Island coordination points
syms TD Solve
i f ( k==1 && j >2); coordTime=
coordMat { j , p}+CTI ; TD check =
round ( double ( s o l v e ( coordTime ==
oT( f a u l t M a t {v , p }∗1000 , Ip , TD Solve ,TCC) , TD Solve ) ) , 2 ) ;
end
i f ( k==1 && j <3); coordTime= min( abs ( coordMat { j , p } ) ,
abs ( coordMat { j , p+2}))+CTI ; TD check =
round ( double ( s o l v e ( coordTime ==
oT( f a u l t M a t {v , p }∗1000 , Ip , TD Solve ,TCC) , TD Solve ) ) , 2 ) ;
end
i f ( k==2 && j <3); coordTime=
coordMat { j , p+2}+CTI ; TD check =
round ( double ( s o l v e ( coordTime ==
159
oT( f a u l t M a t {v+1,p }∗1000 , Ip , TD Solve ,TCC) , TD Solve ) ) , 2 ) ;
end
i f ( k==3 && j >2); coordTime= coordMat { j +5,p}+CTI ;
TD check = round ( double ( s o l v e ( coordTime ==
oT( f a u l t M a t {v , p }∗1000 , Ip , TD Solve ,TCC) , TD Solve ) ) , 2 ) ;
end
i f ( k==3 && j <3); coordTime= min( abs ( coordMat { j +5,p } ) ,
abs ( coordMat { j +5,p+2}))+CTI ; TD check =
round ( double ( s o l v e ( coordTime ==
oT( f a u l t M a t {v , p }∗1000 , Ip , TD Solve ,TCC) , TD Solve ) ) , 2 ) ;
end
i f ( k==4 && j <3); coordTime= coordMat { j +5,p+2}+CTI ;
TD check = round ( double ( s o l v e ( coordTime ==
oT( f a u l t M a t {v+1,p }∗1000 , Ip , TD Solve ,TCC) , TD Solve ) ) , 2 ) ;
end
% S o l v e f o r O p e r a t i n g Times
g =1;
t =1;
for k = 1 : 1 : 4
% Loop t h r o u g h Phase Slow , Ground Slow , Phase Fast , Ground Fast
for j = [ 1 3 5 7 9 ] % Loop t h r o u g h LG LLG LL LLL LLLG
for i= 1 : 1 : 2 % Loop t h r o u g h Grid and I s l a n d Data
for p= 2 : 1 : 3 % Loop t h r o u g h Max and Min F a u l t s
Ip= S e t p o i n t s ( 1 , k ) ;
TD= S e t p o i n t s ( 2 , k ) ;
TCC= S e t p o i n t s ( 3 , k ) ;
i f i ==1; f a u l t M a t= f a u l t P o i n t 1 ;
% Grid c o o r d i n a t i o n p o i n t s
i f o r ( k==1, k==3); timeTable P ( g , p−1)=
160
oT( f a u l t M a t { j , p }∗1000 , Ip , TD, TCC) ; end
i f o r ( k==2, k==4); timeTable G ( t , p−1)=
oT( f a u l t M a t { j +1,p }∗1000 , Ip , TD, TCC) ; end
end
i f i ==2; f a u l t M a t= f a u l t P o i n t 2 ;
end % I s l a n d c o o r d i n a t i o n p o i n t s
i f o r ( k==1, k==3); timeTable P ( g , p−1+2)=
oT( f a u l t M a t { j , p }∗1000 , Ip , TD, TCC) ; end
i f o r ( k==2, k==4); timeTable G ( t , p−1+2)=
oT( f a u l t M a t { j +1,p }∗1000 , Ip , TD, TCC) ; end
end
end
function [ F i n a l S e t p o i n t , V r e f ]=
best wF ( ref Tim e , I p r e f , TD ref , TCC ref )
% Find b e s t c u r v e
[ row PS , column PS ]= find ( r e f T i m e == min( r e f T i m e ( : , 1 ) ) ) ;
[ newrow PS , newcolumn PS ]= find ( r e f T i m e == min( r e f T i m e ( row PS , 2 ) ) ) ;
161
[ newrow GS , newcolumn GS]= find ( r e f T i m e == min( r e f T i m e ( row GS , 4 ) ) ) ;
F i n a l S e t p o i n t= [ I p r e f ( newrow PS ( 1 ) , 1 ) I p r e f ( newrow GS ( 1 ) , 2 )
I p r e f ( newrow PF ( 1 ) , 3 ) I p r e f ( newrow GF ( 1 ) , 4 ) ;
TD ref ( newrow PS ( 1 ) , 1 ) TD ref ( newrow GS ( 1 ) , 2 )
TD ref ( newrow PF ( 1 ) , 3 ) TD ref ( newrow GF ( 1 ) , 4 ) ;
TCC ref ( newrow PS ( 1 ) , 1 ) TCC ref ( newrow GS ( 1 ) , 2 )
TCC ref ( newrow PF ( 1 ) , 3 ) TCC ref ( newrow GF ( 1 ) , 4 ) ] ;
end
F i n a l S e t p o i n t= [ I p r e f ( newrow PS ( 1 ) , 1 ) I p r e f ( newrow GS ( 1 ) , 2 )
I p r e f ( newrow PF ( 1 ) , 3 ) I p r e f ( newrow GF ( 1 ) , 4 ) ;
TD ref ( newrow PS ( 1 ) , 1 ) TD ref ( newrow GS ( 1 ) , 2 )
TD ref ( newrow PF ( 1 ) , 3 ) TD ref ( newrow GF ( 1 ) , 4 ) ;
TCC ref ( newrow PS ( 1 ) , 1 ) TCC ref ( newrow GS ( 1 ) , 2 )
TCC ref ( newrow PF ( 1 ) , 3 ) TCC ref ( newrow GF ( 1 ) , 4 ) ] ;
162
function [ S e t p o i n t s , maxTimePS , minTimePS , maxTimeGS ,
minTimeGS , maxTimePF , minTimePF , maxTimeGF ,
minTimeGF]= set wV ( V r e f , CTI , I p m a t r i x , TCC matrix ,
s h e e t F a u l t , sheetCoord ) % 51V s e t p o i n t c a l c u l a t i o n s
% I p m a t r i x i s o r g a n i z e d as Phase and Ground
% TCC matrix & TD matrix i s o r g a n i z e d as
% Phase Slow , Ground Slow , Phase Fast , Ground Fast
c o o r d P o i n t s= r e a d t a b l e ( ” TripTimes . x l s x ” , ’ Sheet ’ , sheetCoord ) ;
f a u l t P o i n t s= r e a d t a b l e ( ” S p e c i f i c F a u l t P o i n t s . x l s x ” , ’ Sheet ’ , s h e e t F a u l t ) ;
coordTime= c o o r d P o i n t s {v , p}+CTI ;
% Compute t h e TD n e c e s s a r y
syms TD Solve
TD Pcheck ( u ) = round ( double ( s o l v e ( coordTime
== oT( f a u l t P o i n t s { j , p }∗1000 , Ip V , TD Solve ,
TCC matrix ( 1 ) ) , TD Solve ) ) , 2 ) ;
i f ( TD Pcheck ( u ) ) > 15
TD Pcheck ( u )=15;
end
i f ( TD Pcheck ( u ) ) < 0 . 5
TD Pcheck ( u ) = 0 . 5 ;
end
u=u+1;
end
v=v+1;
end
TD matrix (1)= max( TD Pcheck , [ ] , ’ a l l ’ ) ;
163
for p= 2 : 1 : 3 % Loop t h r o u g h Max and Min F a u l t s
V r a t i o= f a u l t P o i n t s { j +1,p}/ V r e f ( 2 ) ;
% Compute v o l t a g e r a t i o
i f V r a t i o < 0 . 1 2 5 ; V r a t i o = 0 . 1 2 5 ; end
i f V r a t i o > 1 ; V r a t i o =1; end
Ip V= V r a t i o ∗ I p m a t r i x ( 2 ) ;
coordTime= c o o r d P o i n t s {v , p}+CTI ;
% Compute t h e TD n e c e s s a r y
syms TD Solve
TD Gcheck ( u ) = round ( double ( s o l v e ( coordTime ==
oT( f a u l t P o i n t s { j +2,p }∗1000 , Ip V , TD Solve ,
TCC matrix ( 2 ) ) , TD Solve ) ) , 2 ) ;
i f ( TD Gcheck ( u ) ) > 15
TD Gcheck ( u )=15;
end
i f ( TD Gcheck ( u ) ) < 0 . 5
TD Gcheck ( u ) = 0 . 5 ;
end
u=u+1;
end
v=v+1;
end
TD matrix (2)= max( TD Gcheck , [ ] , ’ a l l ’ ) ;
TD matrix ( 3 : 4 ) = [ 0 . 5 0 . 5 ] ; % SET FAST CURVE TD t o MINIMUM
% S o l v e f o r O p e r a t i n g Times
g =1;
t =1;
for i= 1 : 1 : 2 % Loop t h r o u g h Slow Curve and Fast Curve
for k = 1 : 1 : 2 % Loop t h r o u g h Phase and Ground Curves
for j = [ 1 4 7 10 1 3 ] % Loop t h r o u g h LG LLG LL LLL LLLG
for p= 2 : 1 : 3 % Loop t h r o u g h Max and Min F a u l t s
i f i==1 % Slow Curve i s 51V c o n t r o l l e d
V r a t i o= f a u l t P o i n t s { j +1,p}/ V r e f ( k ) ;
% Compute v o l t a g e r a t i o
i f V r a t i o < 0 . 1 2 5 V r a t i o = 0 . 1 2 5 ; end
i f V r a t i o > 1 V r a t i o =1; end
Ip V= V r a t i o ∗ I p m a t r i x ( k ) ;
TD= TD matrix ( k ) ;
TCC= TCC matrix ( k ) ;
164
i f k==1; timeTable P ( g , p−1)=
oT( f a u l t P o i n t s { j , p }∗1000 , Ip V , TD, TCC) ;
end % Use phase c u r r e n t f o r phase c u r v e
i f k==2; timeTable G ( t , p−1)=
oT( f a u l t P o i n t s { j +2,p }∗1000 , Ip V , TD, TCC) ;
end % Use ground c u r r e n t f o r ground c u r v e
end
i f i==2 % Fast Curve i s normal
Ip= I p m a t r i x ( k +2);
TD= TD matrix ( k +2);
TCC= TCC matrix ( k +2);
end
165
function f i n a l T a b l e V= oT wV( s h e e t F a u l t , S e t p o i n t s , V r e f )
% o p e r a t i n g t i m e s o f 51V
f a u l t P o i n t s= r e a d t a b l e ( ” S p e c i f i c F a u l t P o i n t s . x l s x ” , ’ Sheet ’ , s h e e t F a u l t ) ;
166
end
end
end
f i n a l T a b l e V= a r r a y 2 t a b l e ( [ timeTable P timeTable G ] ,
’ VariableNames ’ , { ’ PhaseTime MaxFault ’ , ’ PhaseTime MinFault ’ ,
’ GroundTime MaxFault ’ , ’ GroundTime MinFault ’ } , ’RowNames ’ ,
{ ’ LG S ’ , ’ LLG S ’ , ’ LL S ’ , ’ LLL S ’ ,
’ LLLG S ’ , ’ LG F ’ , ’LLG F ’ , ’ LL F ’ , ’ LLL F ’ , ’LLLG F ’ } ) ;
end
167
Appendix B : Custom Protection Logic for 51V
Voltage-Restrained Inverse-Time Over-
current Element in SEL Relay
# VOLTAGE RESTRAINT LOGIC
#
# CALCULATE VECTORS (VAB − VBC) , (VBC − VCA) AND (VCA − VAB)
# FIND MINIMUM MAGNITUDE OF THESE DIFFERENCE VOLTAGES
168
PSV10 := PMV13 <= PMV15
PSV11 := PMV14 <= PMV13
PSV12 := PMV14 <= PMV15
PSV13 := PMV15 <= PMV13
PSV14 := PMV15 <= PMV14
#
PMV16 := (PMV13 ∗ PSV09 ∗ PSV10 ) +
(PMV14 ∗ PSV11 ∗ PSV12 ) + (PMV15 ∗ PSV13 ∗ PSV14 )
# MIN PP VOLT
#
PMV17 := 2 . 5 0 0 0 0 0 # VNOMV ( 5KV IS THE REFERENCE)
PMV18 := PMV16 / PMV17 # MINVPU
#
PMV19 := 0 . 1 2 5 0 0 0 # NOMINAL VOLTAGE LOWER LIMIT ( 0 . 1 2 5 )
PMV20 := 1 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 # NOMINAL VOLTAGE UPPER LIMIT ( 1 . 0 )
PSV15 := PMV18 >= PMV19 # MINVPU >= 0 . 1 2 5
PSV16 := PMV18 <= PMV20 # MINVPU <= 1 . 0
PSV17 := NOT PSV15
PSV18 := NOT PSV16
#
#0.125 <= MINVPU <= 1 . 0
#
PMV21 := (PMV18 ∗ PSV15 ∗ PSV16 ) + (PMV19 ∗ PSV17 ) +
(PMV20 ∗ PSV18 ) # MIN VOLT, PU 0 . 1 2 5 <= VPU <= 1 . 0
#
PMV25 := PMV22 ∗ PMV21
# UNIT 1 VOLTAGE RESTRAINED 51V PICKUP (BEFOR SETTING LIMIT CHECK)
#
# CHECK TO MAKE SURE PICKUP IS >= 0 . 2 5 A AND <= 16 A
PMV28 := 0 . 0 5 0 0 0 0 # MINIMUM 51 PICKUP
PMV29 := 1 6 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 # MAXIMUM 51 PICKUP
PSV19 := PMV25 >= PMV28 # UNIT 1 51PU >= 0 . 2 5
PSV20 := PMV25 <= PMV29 # UNIT 1 51PU <= 16
PSV21 := NOT PSV19
PSV22 := NOT PSV20
# 51P04 UNIT 1 VOLTAGE RESTRAINED 51V PICKUP (AFTER LIMIT CHECK)
PMV30 := PMV25 ∗ PSV19 ∗ PSV20 + PMV28 ∗ PSV21 + PMV29 ∗ PSV22
169
# GROUND
#
# CHECK TO MAKE SURE PICKUP IS >= 0 . 2 5 A AND <= 16 A
PSV40 := PMV39 >= PMV28 # UNIT 1 51PU >= 0 . 2 5
PSV41 := PMV39 <= PMV29 # UNIT 1 51PU <= 16
PSV42 := NOT PSV40
PSV43 := NOT PSV41
# 51P04 UNIT 1 VOLTAGE RESTRAINED 51V PICKUP (AFTER LIMIT CHECK)
PMV44 := (PMV39 ∗ PSV40 ∗ PSV41 ) + (PMV28 ∗ PSV42 ) + (PMV29 ∗ PSV43 )
170
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