ELECTION CASES 2

MAYOR BARBARA RUBY C. TALAGA v. COMELEC, GR No. 196804, 2012-10-09

Facts:
Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M. Castillo (Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of
candidacy (CoCs) for the position of Mayor of Lucena City
Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated as In the Matter of the Petition to
Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor
for Having Already Served Three (3) Consecutive Terms as... a City Mayor of Lucena,...
Ramon countered that that the Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from office
during his second and third terms; and that the three-term limit rule did not then apply to
him... the Court promulgated the ruling... in Aldovino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections...
holding that preventive suspension, being a mere temporary incapacity, was not a valid
ground for avoiding the effect of the... three-term limit rule.
Thus, on December 30, 2009, Ramon filed in the COMELEC a Manifestation with Motion to
Resolve, taking into account the intervening ruling in Aldovino.
When respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Mayor of Lucena City,
the rule that 'where the separation from office is caused by reasons beyond the control of
the officer i.e. involuntary the service of term is deemed interrupted'... has not yet been
overturned by the new ruling of the Supreme Court.
even if respondent was elected during the 2004 elections, which was supposedly his third
and final term as city councilor, the same cannot be treated as a complete service or full
term in office since the same was interrupted when he was suspended by the
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division.
Notwithstanding his express recognition of his disqualification to run as Mayor of Lucena
City in the May 10, 2010 national and local elections, Ramon did not withdraw his CoC.
, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution... ccordingly, Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. is
hereby declared DISQUALIFIED to run for Mayor
, Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon,
attaching thereto the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance (CONA) issued by Lakas-
Kampi-CMD, the party... that had nominated Ramon
On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but
the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute
candidate,... Castillo promptly filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC)
seeking the suspension of Barbara Ruby's proclamation
Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the COMELEC,[20] docketed as
SPC 10-024. He alleged that Barbara Ruby could not substitute Ramon because his CoC
had been cancelled and denied due course;
Issues:
issue involves the validity of the substitution by Barbara Ruby as candidate for the position
of Mayor of Lucena
Ruling:
In the event that a candidate is disqualified to run for a public office, or dies, or withdraws
his CoC before the elections, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code provides the option
of substitution, to wit:
Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal. If after the last day
for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited
political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any... cause, only a person belonging to,
and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the
candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by
the political party concerned may file his... certificate of candidacy for the office affected in
accordance with the preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If
the death, withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election
and mid-day of election day, said... certificate may be filed with any board of election
inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates
to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the Commission.
Nonetheless, whether the ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a
candidate, Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code unequivocally states that only an
official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted.
the Court concurs with the conclusion of the COMELEC En Banc that the Castillo petition in
SPA 09-029 (DC) was in the nature of a petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
Castillo's petition contained essential allegations pertaining to a Section 78 petition, namely:
(a) Ramon made a false representation in his CoC; (b) the false representation referred to a
material matter that would affect the substantive right of Ramon as... candidate (that is, the
right to run for the election for which he filed his certificate); and (c) Ramon made the false
representation with the intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for public
office or deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform,... or hide a fact that would otherwise
render him ineligible.[37] The petition expressly challenged Ramon's eligibility for public
office based on the prohibition stated in the Constitution and the Local Government Code
against any person serving... three consecutive terms, and specifically prayed that "the
Certificate of Candidacy filed by the respondent [Ramon] be denied due course to or cancel
the same and that he be declared as a disqualified candidate."[38]
The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a
finding not only that a person lacks a qualification but also that he made a material
representation that is false.[39] A petition for the denial of due course to or... cancellation of
CoC that is short of the requirements will not be granted.
To be sure, the cause of Ramon's ineligibility (i.e., the three-term limit) is enforced both by
the Constitution and statutory law. Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the... office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected.
To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions, Ramon was absolutely
precluded from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for the fourth
consecutive term. Resultantly, his CoC was invalid and ineffectual ab initio for containing
the... incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of his eligibility to run.
Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation with
Motion to Resolve on December 30, 2009 in the COMELEC.[46] That sufficed to render his
CoC invalid, considering that for all intents and purposes the COMELEC's... declaration of
his disqualification had the effect of announcing that he was no candidate at all.
We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute.
Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the concept
of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a
person take the place of somebody who does not exist or who never was. The
Court has no other choice but to rule that in all the instances enumerated in Section 77 of
the Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy seasonably
filed is a requisite sine qua non.
All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of
candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and
seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at... all. If a person
was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we
were to allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and "original" certificate of candidacy
beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be a... crystalline case of unequal protection
of the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution
Miranda v. Abaya applies herein. Although Castillo's petition in SPA No. 09-029 (DC)
specifically sought both the disqualification of Ramon and the denial of due course to or
cancellation of his CoC, the COMELEC categorically stated in the Resolution dated
April 19, 2010 that it was granting the petition. Despite the COMELEC making no finding of
material misrepresentation on the part of Ramon, its granting of Castillo's petition without
express qualifications manifested that the COMELEC had cancelled Ramon's CoC based
on his... apparent ineligibility. The Resolution dated April 19, 2010 became final and
executory because Castillo did not move for its reconsideration, and because Ramon later
withdrew his motion for reconsideration filed in relation to it.
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the first situation is categorical: a
candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes
cast for him shall not be counted
, Castillo asserts that he was entitled to assume the position of Mayor of Lucena City for
having obtained the highest number of votes among the remaining qualified candidates.
The COMELEC First Division declared Ramon disqualified through its Resolution dated
April 19, 2010, the copy of which Ramon received on the same date.[56] Ramon filed a
motion for reconsideration on April 21, 2010[57] in... accordance with Section 7 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 8696,[58] but withdrew the motion on May 4, 2010,[59]
ostensibly to allow his substitution by Barbara Ruby. On his part, Castillo did not file any
motion for reconsideration. Such... circumstances indicated that there was no more pending
matter that could have effectively suspended the finality of the ruling in due course. Hence,
the Resolution dated April 19, 2010 could be said to have attained finality upon the lapse of
five days from its promulgation and... receipt of it by the parties. This happened probably on
April 24, 2010. Despite such finality, the COMELEC En Banc continued to act on the
withdrawal by Ramon of his motion for reconsideration through the May 5, 2010 Resolution
declaring the April 19, 2010
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division final and executory.
Barbara Ruby substituted Ramon, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded with her being
regarded by the electorate of Lucena City as a bona... fide candidate. To the electorate, she
became a contender for the same position vied for by Castillo, such that she stood on the
same footing as Castillo. Such standing as a candidate negated Castillo's claim of being the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes,... and of being consequently entitled
to assume the office of Mayor.
Indeed, Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second placer.
the Court emphasized that the candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes for
the contested office could not assume the office despite the... disqualification of the first
placer because the second placer was "not the choice of the sovereign will."
Surely, the Court explained, a minority or defeated candidate could not be deemed elected
to the office.[61] There was to be... no question that the second placer lost in the election,
was repudiated by the electorate, and could not assume the vacated position.[62] No law
imposed upon and compelled the people of Lucena City to accept a loser to be their political
leader or their... representative
The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified winning
candidate is when two requisites concur, namely: (a) the candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes is disqualified; and (b) the electorate was fully aware in fact and...
in law of that candidate's disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate.
the COMELEC En Banc properly disqualified Barbara Ruby from assuming the position of
Mayor of Lucena City. To begin with, there was no valid candidate for her to substitute due
to Ramon's ineligibility. Also, Ramon did not voluntarily withdraw his CoC... before the
elections in accordance with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code. Lastly, she was not
an additional candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City because her filing of her
CoC on May 4, 2010 was beyond the period fixed by law. Indeed, she was not, in... law and
in fact, a candidate.[66]
A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such vacancy
should be filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the LGC, to wit:
[67]
Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor,
and Vice-Mayor. - If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the
vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor.
Principles:

Occena v. COMELEC, 127 SCRA 404

(1985)

Occena v. COMELEC, 127 SCRA 404

(1985)
10/30/2020
0 COMMENTS

FACTS:

Samuel C. Occena filed a petition for prohibition seeking that sections 4 and 22 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 222, otherwise known as the Barangay Election Act of 1982, be
declared as unconstitutional insofar as it prohibits any candidate in the Barangay
election of 17 May 1982 "from representing or allowing himself to be represented as a
candidate of any political party or prohibits a political party, political group, political
committee from intervening in the nomination of a candidate in the barangay election
or in the filing of his certificate of candidacy, or giving aid or support directly or
indirectly, material or otherwise, favorable to or against his campaign for election." On
this basis, it is also prayed that "judgment be rendered declaring the 1982 Barangay
elections null and void ab initio, for being unconstitutional, and directing the holding of
new barangay elections without any ban on the involvement of political parties,
political committees, political organizations and other political group."

ISSUE:

Whether the ban on the intervention of political parties in the election of barangay
officials is violative of the constitutional guarantee of the right to form associations and
societies for purposes not contrary to law.

RULING:

The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law is neither
absolute nor illimitable; it is always subject to the pervasive and dominant police
power of the state and may constitutionally be regulated or curtailed to serve
appropriate and important public interests (Gonzales vs. Comelec, 27 SCRA 835;
Imbong vs. Comelec, 35 SCRA 28). Whether a restriction imposed is constitutionally
permissible or not depends upon the circumstances of each case. Examining Section
4 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982, the right to organize is intact. Political parties
may freely be formed although there is a restriction on their activities, i.e., their
intervention in the election of barangay officials on 17 May 1982 is proscribed. But the
ban is narrow, not total. It operates only on concerted or group action of political
parties. Members of political and kindred organizations, acting individually, may
intervene in the barangay election. As the law says: "Nothing (therein) shall be
construed as in any manner affecting or constituting an impairment of the freedom of
individuals to support or oppose any candidate for any barangay office." Moreover,
members of the family of a candidate within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity as well as the personal campaign staff of a candidate (not more than 1 for
every 100 registered voters in his barangay) can engage in individual or group action
to promote the election of their candidate. There are reasons for insulating the
barangay from the divisive and debilitating effects of a partisan political campaign.
The Barangay Captain and the Barangay Council, apart from their legislative and
consultative powers, also act as an agency for neutral community action such as the
distribution of basic foodstuff and as an instrument in conducting plebiscites and
referenda. The Barangay Captain, together with the members of the Lupon
Tagapayapa appointed by him, exercises administrative supervision over the
barangay conciliation panels in the latter's work of settling local disputes. The
Barangay Captain himself settles or helps settle local controversies within the
barangay either through mediation or arbitration. It would definitely enhance the
objective and impartial discharge of their duties for barangay officials to be shielded
from political party loyalty. In fine, the ban against the participation of political parties
in the barangay election is an appropriate legislative response to the unwholesome
effects of partisan bias in the impartial discharge of the duties imposed on the
barangay and its officials as the basic unit of our political and social structure.

TALLADO V. COMELEC (SUPRA – PREVIOUSLY CITED) G.R.

NO. 246679, SEPTEMBER 10, 2019

FACTS: Petitioner Governor Edgardo A. Tallado was duly elected as Governor of Camarines
Norte in the 2010, 2013 and 2016 elections. He fully served his 2010 – 2013 and 2013-2016
terms. The controversy arises with regard to his 2016-2019 term. In 2016, the Office of the
Ombudsman held the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and oppression/abuse of authority
and ordered his dismissal from the service. Although the petitioner appealed to the CA, the
DILG implemented the OMB decision on November 8, 2016 by ordering the petitioner to vacate
his position as Governor. The DILG likewise issued a memorandum directing then Vice
Governor, Jonah Pedro G. Pimentel to assume as Governor, since there was a permanent
vacancy in the office of the Governor because of petitioner’s dismissal from service. Meanwhile,
the CA modified the penalty of dismissal to six months suspension. The DILG later directed the
reinstatement of petitioner as Governor if he had already served the six-months suspension.
Thus, petitioner took his oath of office as Governor (again). Meanwhile, on October 15, 2018,
petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Governor for the 2019 elections. This
prompted respondents to file their separate petitioners with the COMELEC, praying for the
denial of due course to and/or for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC on the ground that this
violated the three-term limit rule.

ISSUE: Does the Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled on the ground that the service of the
elected Governor violated the three-term limit rule.

HELD: No, it did not violate the three-term limit rule. Once the order of the Office of the
Ombudsman to dismiss an elective local official is executed, the dismissed official thereby loses
title to the office even if he or she has filed a timely appeal assailing the dismissal which would
have prevented it from attaining finality. The loss of
title to the office constitutes an involuntary interruption of the official’s service of his or her full
term. For the application of the disqualification under the three-term limit rule, therefore, two
conditions must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms to the same local government post; and (2) that he or she has fully served
three consecutive terms. The first requisite for the application of the three-term limit rule is
present inasmuch as the petitioner was elected as Governor of Camarines Norte for three
consecutive terms, specifically in the 2010, 2013 and 2016 elections. But the second requisite
was not satisfied because his intervening dismissals from the service truly prevented him from
fully serving the third consecutive term. Based on the foregoing, there is an involuntary
interruption in the term of an elective official when there is a break in the term as a result of the
official’s loss of title to the office. It can be concluded that the interruption of a term exempting
an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the
involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a
length of time, however, short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if
the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an
elective official’s continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using
“voluntary renunciation” as an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.

G.R. No. 180363 April 28, 2009

EDGAR Y. TEVES, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HERMINIO G.
TEVES

Facts:
In Oct 2007, petitioner was officially disqualified to run for a congressional seat in the
May 2007 election because of a Sandiganbayan decision rendered against him in 2005
involving a crime, allegedly, of moral turpitude.

The Comelec likewise rendered the issue raised by petitioner as moot since the latter
lost in the said election.

Issue:
Whether or not there WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION when Comelec disqualified petitioner in view of the
petitioner’s conviction.

Ruling:
The Court ruled that the crime for which petitioner was convicted in Sandiganbayan in
2005 did not involve moral turpitude.

As found in the Sandiganbayan, petitioner, then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his
influence, authority or power to gain pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit.
Second, while possession of business and pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by
the local government unit is expressly prohibited by the present LGC, however, its
illegality does not mean that violation thereof necessarily involves moral turpitude or
makes such possession of interest inherently immoral

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. It was
held that it was not for the judiciary to settle questions which is for other branches of the
government to deal with.

Being so, the Court reversed the Comelec’s decision of disqualifying petitioner. The
case was not moot since the resolution of which would determine petitioner’s
qualification in future elections.