The Russian military has been unable to decisively defeat Ukrainian forces despite advantages in size and resources. It has suffered significant losses of personnel and equipment due to outdated tactics, command problems, and inexperienced recruits. However, Russia remains capable of launching offensive operations and adapting its forces. Continued high casualties are depleting experienced personnel and hindering operations, though Russia is using various means to replenish its ranks, including incentives, coercion, and mobilization. Its defense industry also allows it to sustain combat operations through production, though modernization efforts face challenges.
The Russian military has been unable to decisively defeat Ukrainian forces despite advantages in size and resources. It has suffered significant losses of personnel and equipment due to outdated tactics, command problems, and inexperienced recruits. However, Russia remains capable of launching offensive operations and adapting its forces. Continued high casualties are depleting experienced personnel and hindering operations, though Russia is using various means to replenish its ranks, including incentives, coercion, and mobilization. Its defense industry also allows it to sustain combat operations through production, though modernization efforts face challenges.
The Russian military has been unable to decisively defeat Ukrainian forces despite advantages in size and resources. It has suffered significant losses of personnel and equipment due to outdated tactics, command problems, and inexperienced recruits. However, Russia remains capable of launching offensive operations and adapting its forces. Continued high casualties are depleting experienced personnel and hindering operations, though Russia is using various means to replenish its ranks, including incentives, coercion, and mobilization. Its defense industry also allows it to sustain combat operations through production, though modernization efforts face challenges.
The Russian military has been unable to decisively defeat Ukrainian forces despite advantages in size and resources. It has suffered significant losses of personnel and equipment due to outdated tactics, command problems, and inexperienced recruits. However, Russia remains capable of launching offensive operations and adapting its forces. Continued high casualties are depleting experienced personnel and hindering operations, though Russia is using various means to replenish its ranks, including incentives, coercion, and mobilization. Its defense industry also allows it to sustain combat operations through production, though modernization efforts face challenges.
Despite advantages of a larger recruitment base and defense Additionally, the Russian military leadership has proven industrial capacity, the Russian military has been unable to capable of adaptation and of implementing changes in force decisively defeat the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) since structure, operations, and equipment since the 2022 Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The Russian invasion. Observers continue to debate the speed and military has suffered significant losses in personnel and breadth of these changes, as reforms in some cases appear equipment. Its performance arguably has been hindered by isolated to addressing specific problems or implemented a rigid command and control structure, a weakened corps of after extended debate that leads to delays. trained and professional units, and a reliance on tactics with high casualty rates. The Russian military, however, remains Personnel a resilient and capable adversary. In January 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that Russia had over 600,000 personnel in Ukraine, while Since 2022, Congress has supported Ukraine’s defense some observers estimate the number at 470,000 forces. against Russia’s renewed invasion. In November 2023 Continued casualties and challenges fielding well-trained testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, troops have hindered, but not stopped, Russian military Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian operations. Affairs James O’Brien assessed, Casualties Ukrainian forces have used Western weapons to U.S. intelligence agencies reportedly estimated in great effect against Russian forces: Ukraine has December 2023 that the Russian military had suffered liberated a significant part of its territory initially 315,000 killed and injured. The rates arguably reflect the seized by Russia. It destroyed thousands of Russian continued use of tactics that resulted in high casualty rates tanks and combat vehicles as well as hundreds of in the past. These tactics include a reliance on massed aircraft, and Russia has suffered a significant loss of personnel attacks, indiscriminate artillery fire, and limited combat power. tactical-level flexibility. Casualty totals likely include mobilized personnel, volunteers, National Guard, recruited Nevertheless, the Russian military continues to launch prison convicts, and personnel from Russian-occupied offensive operations and, in February 2024, captured the Ukrainian regions. Overall, the casualties represent 87% of Ukrainian town of Avdiivka. Members may consider the Russia’s estimated pre-war ground strength of about Russian military’s condition and performance as they 360,000 personnel. evaluate the state of the war, assess the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions, and debate whether to appropriate additional The loss of experienced soldiers has been particularly military assistance for Ukraine. detrimental to the effectiveness and capability of the Russian military. Many of Russia’s casualties have been Command and Control among elite and professional soldiers, as well as the junior Despite attempted reforms to increase lower-level officer corps. New recruits often have less training than leadership and autonomy, the Russian military arguably those they are replacing, exacerbating the impact of the continues to operate with a Soviet-style centralized losses and apparently eroding the effectiveness of some command. This command style at the tactical level often Russian military units. Some observers say the loss of such has contributed to the types of inflexible operations that experienced troops will have a long-term detrimental effect contributed to previous failures and casualties. on Russian military capabilities.
Some observers argue that Russia’s leadership prioritizes Recruitment and Mobilization the perceived political loyalty of officers over their To replenish the Russian military’s ranks, President Putin battlefield effectiveness, particularly since the June 2023 has increased the military’s official size to 1.32 million. Wagner Group mutiny, in which a Russian private military Russian authorities announced a mobilization of 300,000 company engaged in armed revolt against Russia’s military personnel in September 2022 but have yet to announce leadership. Multiple Russian military leaders, including another large-scale mobilization, likely due at least in part some reported to be among the most competent, have been to domestic political considerations. There are some relieved of command, apparently for perceived criticism of, indications of growing dissent, including public protests by or insufficient loyalty to, Russian political leaders. the families of mobilized personnel. Some observers posit that Putin is unlikely to announce another mobilization until Nevertheless, the Russian military leadership remains a after the scheduled March 2024 Russian presidential cohesive force. It has gradually consolidated various semi- elections. independent security force units and organizations fighting for Russia and brought them under its central command. https://crsreports.congress.gov Russian Military Performance and Outlook
“We have created, staffed, and equipped two components designed exclusively for the military) in combined arms armies, a mixed aviation corps, as well missiles and helicopters and reactivation of Soviet-era tanks as 50 formations and military units, including four and artillery. divisions, 18 brigades, and 28 regiments.” With its wartime production posture, Russia’s defense Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, Expanded Meeting of industry appears capable of building, upgrading, and Russian Defense Ministry Board, December 19, 2023. repairing most equipment and weapon systems to sustain combat operations. It remains unclear whether the defense Russia offers a variety of incentives to recruit new industry will be able to mass produce modern or advanced personnel. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) offers weapon systems or sustain production over the long term. salaries that can be three times the average Russian monthly wage, as well as bonuses and payments should soldiers be Current Military Performance and killed or wounded. Volunteers in units formed by local Outlook authorities and mercenary units reportedly receive the same After several defeats in 2022 and spring 2023, Russian pay and benefits; unlike professional troops, volunteers are forces constructed extensive defensive lines in southern able to leave service after the end of their contracts. In Ukraine and stabilized their command situation to blunt the addition, prisoners are recruited with a promise of amnesty. counteroffensive Ukraine launched in summer 2023. Since that offensive, Russian forces have resumed localized The MoD also employs more coercive recruitment methods, offensive operations. These offensives are not of the same including increased penalties for ignoring draft summons, size and scale witnessed during 2022 and early 2023 but pressure on conscripts to sign contracts, and punishments involve large numbers of troops and amounts of equipment. for canceling contracts. Russian law prohibits the Russian operations often retain many of the same deployment of conscripts to combat. characteristics as previous operations that resulted in heavy casualties and limited territorial gains and have similar In December 2023, Putin stated that the military had results. Nevertheless, the Russian military’s strategy of recruited 486,000 personnel in 2023 and 1,500 personnel a slowly wearing down the UAF appears to be working in day had signed contracts. Some observers assert these some areas, as demonstrated by the capture of Avdiivka. figures are exaggerated and do not accurately reflect the variety and often ad hoc nature of current Russian military Despite ineffective operations in some areas, the Russian recruitment. Additionally, reports suggest the training of military also continues to adapt. It has deployed new recruits is often substandard and rushed, undermining the equipment and tactics to counter UAF operations, including Russian military’s ability to conduct complex offensive the increased use of drones and electronic warfare. Russian operations. Regardless, some observers assert Russia logistics also have successfully adapted several times over continues to recruit sufficient personnel to replenish and the course of the conflict in response to improved UAF rotate units for operations in Ukraine. long-range strike capabilities provided by the United States and other Western allies. Equipment and Ammunition In addition to inflicting heavy personnel losses on the UAF long-range strikes continue to challenge Russian Russian military, the UAF has destroyed large quantities of operations (including forcing Russia’s Black Sea Fleet to Russian equipment, including tanks, armored personnel relocate much of its operations out of occupied Crimea) but carriers, artillery and rocket systems, helicopters, and naval arguably may be insufficient on their own to halt Russian vessels. Russia has responded to those losses by mobilizing advances. Russia also continues its own long-range its economy to support the war effort. Among other actions, precision strike campaign targeting key Ukrainian military it has directed civilian enterprises to produce products with and infrastructure targets, after likely stockpiling enough military applications, transitioned the defense industry to drones and missiles to launch coordinated attacks. round-the-clock production, and directed about 30% of the federal budget to the military in 2024. Russia also has The Biden Administration, allied partners, and the received assistance from Iran and North Korea (including Ukrainian government have warned that recent Russian ballistic missiles, drones, and artillery ammunition) that has military successes will continue absent further U.S. security helped sustain its stockpiles. assistance. Other observers, including some Members of Congress, assert the UAF cannot defeat the Russian Such efforts mentioned above have contributed to the military regardless of U.S. security assistance. Some Russian defense industry’s resilience in the face of U.S. and observers also note the continued presence of Western other international sanctions restricting the import of components in Russian military equipment, leading some critical components. Russia has continued to increase its Members of Congress to call for greater oversight of production capacity and output—including dramatically current sanctions on the Russian defense industry. scaling drone production. However, a lack of sufficient components and manufacturing tools, combined with the Andrew S. Bowen, Analyst in Russian and European need to continue producing equipment and ammunition, Affairs arguably has forced the Russian defense industry in many IF12606 cases to prioritize quantity over quality. Examples include the use of dual-use items (which are less effective than
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