2024-03-11 Chinese Nuclear Command and Control
2024-03-11 Chinese Nuclear Command and Control
2024-03-11 Chinese Nuclear Command and Control
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Cover Image: Satellite Vehicles and Troposcatter Communication Vehicles support a DF-31
Exercise
Image Source: “A long sword is sharpened in ice and snow, and a brigade of the Rocket Force
conducts actual combat training under severe cold conditions “[冰天雪地砺长剑,火箭军某
旅严寒条件下开展实战化训练], PLA Daily, 20 February 2020.
http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2020-02/20/content_4860792.htm
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to thank JJ Long and Ma Xiu of BluePath Labs for their comments and
edits. Any remaining inaccuracies or oversights are the authors’ own.
ABBREVIATIONS
The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) and China’s Nuclear Deterrence
Capabilities Have Grown Considerably in the Past 15 Years
Originally, the PLARF was constructed as purely a delivery force for China’s nuclear weapons.
However, that role has expanded dramatically in recent decades to include conventional missile
launch and nuclear co-mingling. The PLARF has also increased in size, with the number of launch
brigades increasing from 22 to 41 since 2005. In 2021, China began construction of at least three
large ICBM silo fields, which will increase the number of silos under the PLARF’s command.
Further, the PLA has diversified its delivery systems for nuclear deterrence. These systems now
include mobile launch options, silo-based missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and
possibly air-launched nuclear ballistic missiles.
Although the PLARF Will Contribute to Conventional Campaigns, Nuclear Authority Rests
with the Central Military Commission
The PLARF follows a “dual deterrence, dual operations” mission requirement that creates two
differing lines of command. Regarding conventional campaigns, the PLARF is being integrated
into China’s nascent joint command structure. In these situations, commands would pass from the
Central Military Commission (CMC) to the Joint Campaign Command and then down to the
relevant conventional PLARF elements. However, in a nuclear campaign, command would most
likely flow from the CMC directly to the nuclear launch units, bypassing Joint Campaign
Command and ensuring swift launch capabilities.
A Note on Terminology: In 2016 the Second Artillery Force (SAF) was reorganized into the PLA
Rocket Force (PLARF). Throughout this report the authors use both terms depending on the date
of the sources used. In particular, most authoritative sources on Chinese nuclear operations
predate the reorganization, so “Secord Artillery” or SAF is used when translating materials or
discussing specifics from these sources.
The unique arrangement of China’s strategic missile forces (chiefly the SAF/PLARF), wherein
conventional and nuclear-armed missiles are deployed side by side in the same base and even on
the same launcher, and the ambiguity surrounding its nuclear policy, strategy, and deterrence
theory, represent significant barriers to a clear-eyed assessment of China’s nuclear command,
control and communications (NC3) arrangements.
Writing in 2012, John Lewis and Xue Litai provided a framework for understanding China’s
conceptual approach to nuclear weapons in the form of a six-tier hierarchy of guidance and policies.
This framework provided increasing granularity, from high-level grand strategy down to specific
guidance for units during a nuclear conflict.1 Tiers 1-4 are directly referenced in China’s defense
white papers, albeit in abbreviated form. Tiers 5 and 6 involve more direct discussions about
China’s NC3 arrangement, and can be inferred from PLA doctrinal writings, including those
reviewed for this study. The secrecy and perhaps intentional ambiguity surrounding tiers 1-4 casts
doubt on the trustworthiness of some PLA publications that are often deemed authoritative and
restricts the types of analysis that can be performed on the specifics of China’s plans set forth in
tiers 5 and 6.
According to the 2006 Defense White Paper, China’s nuclear strategy is subject to the national
nuclear policy and military strategy. An anonymized Chinese source also states that the SAF’s
strategy falls under national military strategy and that the specific objectives, approaches, and
methods of its force building, and employment must be designed in accordance with the overall
This type of “uncertainty as deterrent” tactic permeates the hierarchy. China’s no-first-use
pledge (Tier 2) is the most important and widely promulgated element of China’s nuclear policy
and forms the starting point for understanding China’s approach to nuclear weapons. However,
critical uncertainty surrounds this idea, which Fiona Cunningham and Taylor Fravel examine in
detail in their 2015 International Security article assessing China’s nuclear posture in the context
of U.S.-China strategic stability.
In their paper, Cunningham and Fravel described how China fosters “limited ambiguity” over
its no-first-use (NFU) policy to deter the United States from launching conventional attacks against
i
For a more detailed discussion of the etymology of these terms, see Gregory, Kulacki, “Chickens Talking with Ducks: The U.S.-Chinese
Nuclear Dialogue,” Arms Control Association, Accessed 17 November 2020, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2011-09/chickens-talking-ducks-
us-chinese-nuclear-dialogue.
However, the term took on additional shades of meaning when it was used to specifically refer
to DF-26-equipped PLARF brigades capable of launching nuclear or conventional warheads.20
PLARF personnel have more recently been observed training for both nuclear and conventional
missions in he chang jianbei brigades, with drills involving conventional precision strikes
immediately followed by nuclear counter strikes.21
As the current strategic requirement [战略要求] is for the PLARF to “have both nuclear and
conventional capabilities and deter wars in all battlespaces,”22 this configuration may be adopted
more widely throughout the force. The Science of Military Strategy 2017 (SMS 2017), published
by the PLA National Defense University, also illustrated this trend in stating that “the higher stage
of development of he chang jianbei is ‘nuclear-conventional unity’” [核常一体 (he chang yiti)],
which refers to the organic integration [有机融合] of nuclear counterstrike capabilities with
conventional strike capabilities. 23
In summary, China’s conceptual approach to nuclear weapons remains ambiguous by design,
at least to outsiders, making high-confidence assessment difficult. The point in SMS 2013 on using
both consistent and inconsistent messaging to enhance deterrence further complicates the
analytical process, casting doubt over the value of PLA doctrinal writings. As Larry Wortzel noted
in 2012, the number of “secret” PLA documents, particularly the 2004 Science of Second Artillery
Campaigns (SSAC 2004), also raises red flags.24 According to Wortzel:
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An alternative explanation to the existence of so many highly classified
documents leaking out to the West in so short a time is that the PLA is involved
in a major perception management and disinformation campaign. Could what
many of us have accepted, this writer included, as established PLA doctrine
because of these books be part of a more nuanced effort designed to reinforce
the effort in the United States to reduce the size of our nuclear forces and to
rethink the scope and deployment of U.S. efforts on ballistic missile defenses?
Consequently, while these publications on the one hand represent the best insights available to
analysts in the open-source domain, they should also be regarded with a degree of skepticism and
contextualized with additional materials. As will be discussed in later sections, this report attempts
to contextualize observations of these materials with observed developments regarding other
aspects of Chinese NC3.
China has the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world, and according to the DOD is on track
to roughly double the size of its stockpile.25 Moreover, China is making major investments in the
size and survivability of its nuclear forces. China’s 2015 Defense White Paper, for example, noted
that:
China will optimize its nuclear force structure, improve strategic early warning,
command and control, missile penetration, rapid reaction, and survivability and
protection, and deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear
weapons against China.26
While the 2000 DOD report to congress on China's military concluded that “China’s C4I
infrastructure, including the command automation data network portions, is not capable of
controlling or directing military forces in a sophisticated, western-style joint operating
environment […],” this is no longer the case for nuclear operations.
Discussion of China's nuclear capability is overwhelmingly skewed toward its nuclear strategy
or deployed missile forces. As with many of the other gaps in Chinese military studies, this is as
much a function of the lack of sources as of inattention to the topic. As a result, the literature on
Chinese nuclear command authority, much less the national command and control system, is very
small and largely based on outdated sources.
These difficulties persist, but by using new documents and a combination of untapped sources,
including authoritative Chinese teaching and military education publications, along with
declassified U.S. intelligence reports and commercially available satellite imagery, this study
attempts to bridge the gap in the literature to provide readers with a snapshot of China's evolving
nuclear command, control, and communications.
ii
Since 2020, the PLARF has added at least two more brigades, bringing the total to 41.
iii
Given the dates of the articles reporting on the exercises we can infer a date at or before 30 May 2018.
Operational employment
These submarines have multiple crews (believed to be three groups) to allow for higher
operational tempos. The PLAN has sent its submarines on long patrols in tandem with its missions
to the Gulf of Aden, and, according to then-Vice Admiral Joseph Mulloy, Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations for capabilities and resources, kept submarines on patrol for as long as 95 days.57
Despite advancements in quieting technology, Chinese SSBNs remain at risk from peer
competitors and appear to be deployed in protected areas, called bastions. The Yellow Sea has
been mentioned as a possible bastion area, and is proximate to SSBN bases at Qingdao, Shandong
Province and Dalian, Liaoning Province.58 However, despite protection from shore-based aircraft,
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and antiship missiles, the relative shallowness of the Yellow Sea
(44m on average and 152m in its deepest parts) and high traffic make it a less secure area. The
Bohai Sea, which is sometimes mentioned as an option, is even shallower, and most submarines
would be unable to transit the area submerged (see map below). These submarines’ deployment at
the base in Yulin, Hainan Province, as well as favorable geography and bathymetry, make the
South China Sea the safest area. Yulin appears to offer an ideal position as the coastal shelf drops
off dramatically close offshore, likely allowing SSBNs to make a faster transit to safer depths more
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quickly. However, the far southern location of the South China Sea significantly limits the
effective range of the PLAN’s SLBMs.
China’s expansion of reefs and shoals into extensive military bases dotting the South China Sea
supports air and surface monitoring of the SSBNs’ likely patrol areas, and SAMs and fighter
aircraft have been deployed to the bases and used to intercept U.S. maritime patrol aircraft flying
in international airspace over the area. The graphic below shows the bathymetry of the seas
surrounding China and notional bastion areas, giving a sense of how shore- and island-based SAMs,
based on identified sites, could contribute to air defense of the area.
Paralleling China's construction of hardened structures to protect its nuclear forces and
command centers, as well as its fortified islands in the South China Sea, China is also building an
“Underwater Great Wall” [水下长城] of layered anti-submarine defenses. Described as similar to
1.2 POSTURE
China’s overall nuclear force has changed dramatically and is adopting increasingly survivable
basing modes as well as developing a command and control architecture to match. The DOD’s
2023 report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
noted that China’s nuclear posture is changing:
iv
Coordinates: 32.973889, 111.884444.
v
Launch on Warning (LOW) and Launch Under Attack (LUA) have been used interchangeably, most commonly with LUA used to describe U.S.
postures. One public assessment of survivable nuclear architecture for a LUA posture in the United States noted that ICBMs gave leaders
roughly 30 minutes to act, but that submarine-launched ballistic missiles shortened this timeline to 5-10 minutes. While these numbers represent
an assessment of a Soviet-US confrontation, they act as a baseline for understanding the faith that must be placed on early warning systems and
the pressures to respond put on leaders to react in a timely manner. See "MX Missile Basing" Office of Technology Assessment, September 1981,
https://ota.fas.org/reports/8116.pdf, 150. Highlighting these problems, the report also notes, "The risks of LUA arise not from technically difficult
problems, but from the uncertainties of the interface between men and machines."
Chinese missiles have previously been described as being kept with their warheads de-alerted,
de-mated, and unfueled.75 However, the technical aspects of certain missiles, such as the nuclear
DF-21A, make it unclear if that is possible for all missile types.vi
vi
The DF-21A’s canister configuration may require a more complex warhead mating process, though this is speculative based on available
images of the system and comparisons to other missile architecture.
Alert & Launch Order Chinese nuclear forces have been described as
Sequence78 following a six-stage sequence, consisting of a
1 Standing War Preparedness Alert standing war preparedness alert, followed by alerts of
2 Class 3 Alert
increasing intensity. This is followed by a preparatory
3 Class 2 Alert
4 Class 1 Alert order in which forces review intelligence and ensure
5 Preparatory Order [预先号令] that it is up to date and begin organizing forces for
6 Formal Order [正式命令] battle. Finally, forces are given a formal order to launch
against targets with nuclear weapons.
‘Dual Command’
This section lays out what is known about the PLA’s command and control of its nuclear forces.
Given that the maritime and airborne legs of China’s nuclear triad are still emerging, few details
regarding their command arrangements are known. Therefore, this section focuses on the PLARF,
by summarizing information regarding the SAF’s command arrangement according to PLA
doctrinal writings. It is presented using the PLA’s discourse system and terminology.
Although the reorganization of the SAF as the PLARF, a separate co-equal service [军种], has
led to many changes, key aspects of its campaign command arrangement [战役指挥体制],
especially concerning command authority [指挥权限], have not been altered significantly. While
the PLARF’s organization and force structure continue to evolve, and the command and
communication systems are being modernized, its core mission set has remained the same.
In the 1990s, the CMC ordered the SAF to carry out “dual deterrence and dual operations” [双
重威慑、双重作战] to adapt to the new military strategic guideline of winning high-tech localized
wars [高技术局部战争]. 79 To fulfill the “dual deterrence” requirement, the SAF was to use
“conventional missile weapons to effect conventional deterrence against the enemy [对敌实施常
规威慑] and strategic nuclear weapons to carry out counter nuclear deterrence [反核威慑].”80 To
fulfill the “dual operations” requirement, the nuclear missile force’s mission set included nuclear
deterrence and nuclear counterstrikes, while the conventional missile force is responsible for
conventional deterrence and long-range firepower strikes in joint operations.81
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According to recent PLA papers, the PLA’s mission set remains similar to those articulated in
the 1990s, including the enhancement of the SAF/PLARF’s credible and reliable capabilities of
nuclear deterrence and counterattack, and the strengthening of intermediate and long-range
precision strike forces.vii 82
The SSAC 2004 delineated two types of campaigns undertaken by the SAF based on the types
of weapons employed: nuclear counterstrike campaigns [核反击战役] and conventional missile
strike campaigns [常规导弹突击战役].83 A nuclear counterstrike campaign can be executed alone,
or jointly with the nuclear forces of other services. As Cunningham and Fravel have pointed out,
the PLA’s doctrinal writings consistently describe the nuclear counterstrike campaign as the only
type of campaign conducted by Chinese nuclear forces.84 A conventional missile strike campaign
is often carried out as part of a joint campaign but can also be executed independently. The below
chart overviews the types and composition of missile campaigns envisioned for the SAF.
According to SSAC 2004, to fulfill its nuclear-conventional “dual deterrence, dual operations”
mission requirement, the SAF adopts a campaign command arrangement [战役指挥体制] of
“nuclear-conventional unity, two lines of command” [核常一体、双线指挥].86 This phrasing is
confusing, and the book provides no detailed explanation as to the meaning of “nuclear-
conventional unity.” The “two lines of command” arrangement is illustrated in the graphic below.
vii
Although it appears the PLARF no longer clearly distinguishes between nuclear and conventional roles
There does not appear to be a consensus on how to translate Juntuan [军团], though it has previously been given as “large formation.” See
viii
Kenneth W. Allen, “Introduction to the PLA’s Organizational Reforms: 2000-2012” in PLA as Organization 2.0, Defense Group Inc, 2016, 53.
PLA references from the early 2000s take into account the need for both the SAF’s nuclear and
conventional forces to carry out joint campaigns with other forces. This command arrangement
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appears to fit well with recent English-language analysis that PLARF conventional missile Bases
are being integrated into PLA theater commands under the new joint command structure to conduct
joint operations.87 A PLA media article from September 2018, for example, noted that Base 63 has
worked to integrate into the local Theater Command’s joint operations system of systems [战区联
合 作 战 体 系] and has participated in the trial run of the theater command joint operations
command arrangement [战区联合作战指挥体制运行试点].88
It is worth noting that while theater command JOCCs might have command authority over at
least some of the PLARF’s conventional force, SMS 2013 stressed the critical role of the CMC in
the decision-making process for not only the nuclear forces, but also the conventional forces. Its
authors note:
ix
This is not always the case, however. Hu Jintao became CCP General Secretary in 2002 but did not head the CMC until 2004. It is unclear what
happens in instances where this is the case.
x
The state CMC is officially elected by the National People’s Congress but is identical to the Party CMC.
This differs from Cunningham’s 2019 analysis, however, which likely incorporates
organizational changes made since 2016. Outlined below, the launch authority appears to have
become more formalized.99 Cunningham writes:
CMC orders to alert or use nuclear weapons are likely transmitted to the CMC
Joint Operations Command Center, then to the Rocket Force Headquarters,
then to missile bases and down the chain of command to launch companies.
Alternatively, orders may be transmitted directly from the Rocket Force
Headquarters to missile brigades, battalions, or launch companies, making use
of the skip-echelon function of the automated command system.
Further, according to a confidential source (dubbed Source 2), SAF campaign guidelines [战
役方针] can be decided three ways: 1) by the CMC; 2) by the CMC after consultation with SAF
commanders; 3) submitted to the CMC for approval by the SAF commander(s) according to the
CMC’s intentions.100 The source clarifies that under normal circumstances, the SAF can only make
suggestions [一般只有建议权] regarding the targets for nuclear counterstrike campaigns.101
Missile bases, according to the orders and instructions of the Central Military Commission and
SAF, have the authority to:
▪ Set up command posts.
▪ Organize communication methods [组织通信联络].
▪ Determine the time for the missile brigade to pick up or receive missile bodies and
warheads.
▪ Determine concealment areas [确定部队的隐蔽地域].
▪ Prepare and execute anti-air raids, counter paratrooper assaults, counter electronic
interference, and organize ground defenses.
▪ Organize campaign coordination.
▪ Organize campaign operational support.
▪ Execute nuclear strikes.
Nuclear-Conventional Co-mingling
One of the key debates among U.S. and Chinese scholars involves the co-mingling of nuclear
and conventional command and control infrastructure, which creates risks for inadvertent
escalation. For example, Lewis and Xue argue that in the event of a Chinese “self-defensive”
preemptive conventional attack, China’s adversary (and its allies) might not be able to pinpoint
the exact nature of the attack and could justifiably respond with retaliatory measures against all
Chinese missile assets and command and control infrastructure, greatly increasing the chances of
escalation to nuclear war.103
Western scholars holding the view that China’s nuclear and conventional co-mingling applies
to their command-and-control infrastructure and systems often cite Lewis and Xue’s findings from
2012 stating that despite China’s no-first-use policy, “conventional missiles can be fired first from
bases that also contain nuclear missiles, using the same command-and-control infrastructure as
would be used for a nuclear launch.”104 They appear to have made this assertion based on a remark
by a SAF commander in the late 2000s that the strategic rocket force exercises, in their translation,
“double command” [双重指挥/shuangchong zhihui], although they note that researchers know
very little about this concept, which is “most complex and unpredictable.”105
Chinese scholars have raised issues with this assertion. Wu Riqiang argues that there is scant
information about the SAF’s command and control systems and no clear evidence of nuclear and
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conventional units sharing command and control infrastructure. Additionally, Wu notes that the
Chinese term shuangchong zhihui could mean two completely separate systems.
Interestingly, the Chinese term shuangchong zhihui that Lewis and Xue cited is missing from
PLA doctrinal texts reviewed for this report. Instead, as explained earlier, SSAC 2004 references
“Dual Command” [双线指挥], or “two lines of command,” which carries entirely different
meanings and seems to prove Wu’s point about separation rather than collocation.106
According to the Phase VIII Report of the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue held in June 2014,
the issue of Chinese co-mingling/collocating of conventional and nuclear weapons was raised by
U.S. participants, but the Chinese side “flatly denied that co-mingling occurred.”107 In addition,
“the co-mingling of C2 for nuclear and conventional forces was also denied,” writes the report.108
As of the writing of this report, there is still no clarity on this critical issue, nor is there widespread
agreement among scholars. For example, the Union of Concerned Scientists’ analysis from 2017
states that “China has separate command and control systems for conventional and nuclear missiles,
and missiles and warheads are stored separately under different commands.” 109 Cunningham,
writing in 2019, argues that “China’s conventional and nuclear missiles share infrastructure,
including command and control systems, for bureaucratic reasons, the overlap in C3I systems has
diminished over time.”110
Due to the difference in key nuclear vocabulary in use in the United States and China, however,
it is often unclear what scholars are referencing exactly when they use the term “command and
control infrastructure” or “command and control systems.” The authors of this study are not privy
to previous conversations among Chinese and western nuclear experts on these issues, and
therefore have no knowledge of what exact terms and translations were used during these strategic
dialogues. However, it is worth noting that there is a difference in the basic lexicon of nuclear-
related terms, both between the DOD and the PLA and between the PLA and Chinese academia
that might have contributed to miscommunications between China and the United States.
While this report, which is intended for English-speaking audiences, uses the term “NC3,” the
PLA does not have a precise analog to this term regarding arrangements for direction of nuclear
forces. References to terms such as NC3, C3I, or C4I texts in PLA doctrinal writings and
authoritative reporting are either generic, conceptual discussions, or used to describe practices of
other nations, such as the United States. While U.S. and Chinese arms control experts have made
extensive efforts to bridge this gap and reached an agreement on around 1,000 terms related to
nuclear security, there are still key concepts that lack a mutually acceptable definition. 111 Experts
from Chinese academia, on the other hand, are much more familiar with western terminologies
and are comfortable using them in their writings and discussions with western counterparts.112 As
Li Bin explains, there has been a divergence in the nuclear lexicons adopted by the SAF and
academia:113
…whereas the Second Artillery and most parts of the PLA (for example, PLA’s
National Defense University and Academy of Military Science) use native words
to describe strategic nuclear issues, the nuclear establishment [academic
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community studying nuclear issues] uses words directly translated from Western
literature and United Nations documents. This results in serious confusion about
the meaning of some terms, with perhaps the best example being the term
“deterrence.” The nuclear establishment uses the term “weishe” [威慑] for the
meaning of “deterrence.” However, for the PLA, “weishe” means “coercion.”
PLA doctrinal publications such as SSAC 2004 did not offer as clear a framework of reference,
but there is a group of frequently used terms on the same subject. The book dictates that the
“campaign command system” [战役指挥系统] is an organic whole that exercises command
functions and consists of the agent, object, and means of command [指挥主体, 指挥对象, and 指
挥手段, respectively]. The term used to dictate the configuration of organizations for operational
command, their functions, and the relationship between various command levels is referred to by
PLA sources as a “command arrangement” [指挥体制], an umbrella term that involves discussions
about the following topics:
▪ Command authority [指挥权限]
▪ Command organization [指挥机构]
▪ Command relationship [指挥关系]
▪ Command activity [指挥活动]
▪ Command and control procedures [指挥控制程序]
xi
The CMC Joint Staff Department Information and Communications Bureau (JSD-ICB) [联参信息通信局] appears to be a major component of
the centralized satellite communication system See: John Costello and Joe McReynolds, “China’s Strategic Support Force: A Force for a New
Era,” China Strategic Perspectives 13, National Defense University, October 2018,
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/stratperspective/china/china-perspectives_13.pdf, 35
Training exercises involving these units are focused on ensuring an uninterrupted flow of
communications in hostile and complex environments, as well as quickly repairing lines and other
equipment.127 Numerous reports in Chinese media emphasize preparations for deploying without
prior warning, mitigating jamming, and improving the speed at which networks can be established
in the fieldxii 128 in adverse environmental conditions or while under attack. 129
Generally, Comprehensive Support Regiments [综合保障团] provide additional equipment
transport, storage, and maintenance support. Operations Support Regiments [作战保障团] provide
support through specialized functions such as survey and mapping, meteorology, chemical defense,
security, and engineering. Finally, Equipment Inspection Regiments [装检团] are responsible for
storage, management, and distribution of the nuclear warheads assigned to each Base.xiii
2.2 FACILITIES
Due to the larger nuclear arsenals and limited early warning that Chinese leadership would
likely receive in the event of an attack, the PRC and the PLA rely heavily on hardened facilities to
protect civilian and military leaders, associated command, control, and communications functions,
critical defense industrial facilities, weapons storage and handling, and other assets and activities.
China has gone to great lengths to prepare for nuclear and conventional war, apparently engaging
in several large-scale efforts to build hardened bunkers, command posts, storage facilities, and
xii
One regiment under Base 62 for example, has claimed to have decreased its deployment times for a C2 platform by 33 percent.
xiii
For more information on PLARF force structure, see Ma Xiu, "PLA Rocket Force Organization," China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2022,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLARF/2022-10-24%20PLARF%20Organization.pdf
Historical Examples
Date Name Purpose
May Third Front Construction Many projects and investments in national defense and industry
1964 [大三线建设]
1965 Project 6501 Massive, three-level Army base
[6501 工程]
1966 Project 816 Build an underground nuclear reactor to produce nuclear weapons
[816 工程]
December Zhuhai Baili Island Naval Base Hardened underground naval base
1967 [珠海白沥岛海军基地]
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Sino-Soviet Split was a major source of concern for Chinese defense
planners. Chairman Mao Zedong issued a call for China to “Dig deep, store grain, and not seek
hegemony.”130 Subsequently, massive projects were carried out to fortify China against a possible
Soviet invasion. During the Second World War, both the CCP and Nationalist Party made
extensive use of China’s mountainous interior to mount a strong defense against invasion. Thus,
xiv
On 25 November 1951 for example, the “Chinese Volunteers Army” command post was struck by U.S. bombers, killing Mao Anying, Mao
Zedong’s eldest son, and narrowly missing Peng Dehuai, commander of Chinese forces in Korea at the time. Peng would go on to play a major
role in the PLA’s modernization until his fall from political favor in 1958. See: Wang Yan [王焰], Ed. Official Chronicle of Peng Dehuai [彭德
怀年谱], Beijing: People's Daily Press, 1998. 450
xv
China’s armed forces place continued emphasis on improving cities’ abilities to withstand various types of attacks including air attack, and
many cities have annual air-attack drills using militia and civilian assets to organize both defenses and protective measures such as evacuations.
xvi
Coordinates: 41.703999, 88.367963.
xvii
Uxxaktal Airbase to the west of the village has been previously identified as having a weapons storage UGF. See: 42.203028, 87.153722
Construction Considerations
To address the possibility of a nuclear war, China’s military planners placed its DF-5 missiles
in underground, reinforced silos starting in 1979. In order to deceive the sophisticated
reconnaissance and precision delivery systems of would-be belligerents, decoy silos were also
utilized.137 However, despite reinforcement and the deployment of decoy silos, the likelihood of
missiles being damaged beyond use in an attack remained high. However, technological
limitations meant that mobile launch platforms were prone to unacceptable inaccuracy issues.
Thus, the resulting plan, called Deep Deployment [ 深 埋 部 署 ], sought to combine the
survivability of underground facilities with the accuracy of fixed, above-ground positions.138 The
underground facilities house the missiles, delivery platforms, and the crews to man them. When
the time comes, the platforms will be properly set-up and prepared in the safety of the underground
facility, and then deployed to hardened concrete pads where the launch will take place.139 This
mixed method improves both survivability and accuracy but requires massive investments to
hollow out tunnels and prepare the concrete pads for launch.
xviii
One account mentioned the build-up of radioactive dust in the missile storage sections and blisters and rashes appearing on the skin of
workers in the area. Reportedly, more than 4,000 personnel became disabled due to workplace injury, and 512 died outright, though a timeframe
for these injuries was not mentioned.
Survivability
Survivability is of utmost importance to the PLARF’s underground facilities. In addition to
reinforcement with concrete and rebar around the tunnels themselves, the facilities benefit from
compartmentalization and monitoring. Multiple thick blast doors separate different sections of the
facility, allowing a segment to be sealed off in case of nuclear, biological, or chemical attack. 153
Likewise, the underground facilities have started integrating information technology systems into
construction designs to allow for more robust monitoring within the base. Reportedly, this allows
for support to be rapidly dispatched to vital points in the facility should the need for repair arise.154
It can be inferred that during an attack, the command and control elements of the facility would be
able to rapidly assess inflicted damage and determine the best course of action to ensure a
retaliatory strike. Thus, training activities at these facilities revolve around a combination of
simulated system failures (destroyed ventilators, cave-ins155, water contamination156, hunger, and
chain-of-command disruption), and initiating retaliatory strikes.
However, steps to ensure the survivability of underground facilities are moot if there is no way
to get the delivery systems above ground to the launch sites. Thus, an important aspect of these
facilities is the maintenance of access roads, as well as training focused on road maintenance,
obstruction clearing, and disassembling and relocating launch sites.157 Further, to ensure that the
launch system is not struck before it can deliver its payload, training for the launch teams also
focuses on properly applying camouflage. One PLARF brigade trained for countermeasures and
camouflage application against simulated enemy satellite reconnaissance and electromagnetic
xix
Many members of the senior leadership maintain residences in the nearby Jade Spring Hill [玉泉山] area.
xx
Coordinates given in the report as the main site at 36.698611, 113.362500.
xxi
Coordinates 36.696284, 113.346378.
xxii
Specifically, Licheng is identified as being supported by Shahe and Changzhi Airfields and the Handan heliport.
xxiii
Coordinates: 29.850132° 114.468529°; Also called 中国澄水洞地下军事工程.
xxiv
Hohhot, Inner Mongolia was also previously identified as the location of another alternate command center, but this appears instead to be a
widely reproduced error. For example, David Shambaugh's Modernizing China’s Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects (2002) gives
Hohhot as home to a command center on page 169, citing FAS "China: Command and Control Facilities," which in turn cites William Arkin and
Richard Fieldhouse’s “Nuclear Battlefields,” pages 290-291, which does not appear to provide this information.
xxv
These may be analogous to DOD’s Defense Red Switch Network (DRSN)
xxvi
The PLA may use a maroon color to differentiate their lines from the brighter red phones seen used by top leaders, perhaps pointing toward
another set of encrypted lines.
The PLA also uses airborne command posts [ 机 载 指 挥 所 ] (helicopters equipped with
communications suites) to support theater command posts and similar operations. The PLAAF
also operates at least two B-737-300 aircraft in a command, control, communications, and
intelligence role. 176 One source identifies these aircraft as based at Beijing’s Daxing Airport.
Additional variants of the Y-8 aircraft (Y-8T), which appear to be equipped with a large
communications suite, may be in service with the 76th or 78th Airborne Command and Control
Regiments based in Wuxi, Jiangsu.177
While it is currently unclear if China has dedicated (fixed-wing) airborne command posts with
specialized equipment for communications with nuclear forces (along the lines of the Russian IL-
80 or U.S. E-6B Mercury aircraft), given the expanding triad and need for survivable systems, the
authors consider it likely that such a system will be developed. In the past decade, China has been
successful in producing a large number of domestic aircraft that would be suitable for such a role,
and the PLA has substantially improved the airborne refueling capabilities necessary for extended
flight.
The equipment utilized for NC3 includes early-warning radars and satellites to identify and
characterize threats, and communication systems to link sensors to higher echelons as well as to
allow headquarters to issue commands to nuclear forces.
Li Xianyu (back row, center) pictured with Wang Jianxin [王建新], chief designer of the PLA-wide Integrated
Command Information System, and other researchers. 191
xxvii
Now the 6th Research Institute, also known as the Institute of Information and Special Support, following reforms to the PLARF Research
Academy.
xxviii
Li is a uniformed civilian cadre, under the track called special technical officers [专业技术军官]
The PLA Daily article from 2017 offered no further details regarding the system upgrades Li
was working on, but a documentary on CCTV Channel 7 about Li, which aired on 18 January
2013, provided additional information about the SAF’s first- and second-generation command and
control systems.193
According to the documentary, Li participated in the development of the SAF’s first-generation
automated command system in the 1990s. This system reportedly played a role in the Third Taiwan
Strait Crisis when the SAF conducted a series of missile tests in the waters surrounding Taiwan.194
However, with the commission of multiple conventional missile models, which relied on different
command and control systems, beginning around 2003, the SAF needed a system capable of
enabling integrated command and control [一体化指挥控制] of multiple brigades and missile
types.
The SAF Equipment Research Academy [第二炮兵装备研究院]xxix was ordered to upgrade
the existing system, but Li Xianyu, despite opposition and criticism, insisted on developing a new
software system with independent intellectual property rights. As the documentary put it, Li’s
“integrated command and control system” translated the “dialect” of conventional missile combat
command into universally understood “Mandarin,” allowing integration of different types of
communication systems. The documentary described a training mission conducted by a SAF
missile brigade in December 2012 that successfully tested a combat method [战法], namely, a
simultaneous multi-salvo [多弹齐射] firepower attack. The narrator noted the instrumental role
played by Li in designing a command-and-control system that enabled the multi-salvo attack.
The documentary laid out in great detail the features of the “missile integrated command and
control system” [导弹武器一体化指挥软件系统] that Li was responsible for designing. Given
xxix
Now the PLARF Research Academy.
xxx
Shi has been identified as commander of the “1st Conventional Missile Brigade” [常规导弹第一旅], the 613 Brigade under Base 61 in Jiangxi
Province. Until recently, this brigade was equipped with DF-15 missiles, which appears to match imagery in the video. See: "Demystifying the
1st Conventional Missile Brigade of the Rocket Force: Which "firsts" have been created," [揭秘火箭军常规导弹第一旅:究竟创造了哪些"第
一"], Global Times [环球时报], 31 July 2020. https://m.us.sina.com/gb/china/huanqiu/2020-07-31/detail-ifzysrcs1744292.shtml
Images from the brigade operations duty office and a launch vehicle. The equipment, resembling a laptop, is used to
transmit launch orders197
xxxi
As shown in the video, the code typed in is 警报信号 100.
7010 Radar202
xxxii
The radars were designated TREE FORK 2 and Suji D by American analysts. The inset image strongly resembles the J-14 LLQ-105
Surveillance Radar, an example of which can see seen at the China Aviation Museum outside Beijing. A review of these sites beginning in
January 1971-1979 identified eight radars, with at least two sites in Heilongjiang and Jilin Provinces were still occupied as of 2020.
A CIA assessment from 1978 noted that the Xuanhua radar/7010 was “ideally suited to detect
ICBMs launched from most Soviet complexes, and will be able to give up to eight or 10 minutes
of warning of missile attacks from the central and western Soviet Union.”203 The same report noted
that “conventional radars provide coverage of missile launches from the Sea of Japan and eastern
Siberia, but their warning time might only be 2 or 3 minutes.”
To further support the development
of domestic satellite communications
capabilities, work began on the
requisite ground segment
infrastructure. In 1974, the Seventh
Ministry of Machine Building [第七
机 械 工 业 部 ], predecessor to the
China National Space Administration
(CNSA), China Aerospace Science
and Technology Corporation (CASC),
and China Aerospace Science &
Industry Corporation (CASIC),
launched the 450 Project [450 工程], a
system of tracking and measurement
radars for the Dongfanghong-2 [东方
红 2 号 ], China’s geostationary
communication test satellite. 204 The
first Dongfanghong-2 mission in January 1984 failed to achieve geostationary orbit (GEO), but a
second test satellite, launched in April of that year, was successful.
xxxiii
Specifics for the different types of radars identified here are not available, but a brochure from the Zhuhai Airshow in 2016 depicts a Phased
Array Theater Ballistic Radar designated GLC-4 developed by the Nanjing Research Institute of Electronics Technology (CETC 14th RI). The P-
band radar has a min-max range of 50-3000km and is described as capable of tracking satellites in low-earth orbit as well. There do not appear to
be authoritative sources with specifics of ranges and altitudes, but it is clear that these systems have an arc of greater than 60° and a range of over
4,000 kilometers. The map above uses a conservative estimate.
xxxiv
Coordinates: 41.641194, 86.236749.
xxxv
The Impact Area (Test) Department has been connected with the LPAR MUCD (63615). In addition, the LPAR unit, the Department and
Complex have similar locations and similar MUCDs, as both the Department [落区测量试验部/落区部] (MUCD 63610) and Complex [落区部
库尔勒站] (MUCD 63618) are also in Korla and under the Jiuquan SLC MUCD block, with the LPAR MUCD of 63615 falling between them.
The LPAR unit may also be known as the Impact Area (Test) Department Bayingol Station [落区部巴音郭楞站].
xxxvi
Coordinates: 35.483025, 106.571871.
xxxvii
Coordinates: 46.528092, 130.755276.
xxxviii
Based on MUCD blocks (the XSCC has 63750-63780) and close physical proximity to another XSCC radar, the Jiamusi Deep Space
(TT&C) Station [佳木斯深空站].
xxxix
Coordinates: 30.286492, 119.128783.
xl
The former General Staff Department Third Department’s 12 th Bureau (Unit 61486). The unit has conducted research on satellites.
P-band long-range early warning phased array radar215 and Huanan, Heilongjiang LPAR216
Other types of radars described as having One additional LPAR may be present in
Hui’an, Fujian Province, collocated with PLAAF
missile detection and early warning roles:
• Type 390A (JL3D-90A) and PLAN radar units, though it may just be
• YLC-8/8A VHF Band Long Range 2D another type of radar or electronic attack device.
Surveillance Radar
In addition to the LPARs, the PLA fields a
• YLC-4 2D Long Range Surveillance Radar
• JY-14 wide variety of passive and active radars likely
• JY-27A CVLO (counter-very-low- involved in detecting cruise missile, bomber, and
observable) radar ballistic missile threats, including the JY-27,
• JY-27 VHF Band Long Range which has a range of 390km,217 YLC-8B UHF 3D
Surveillance Radar
long-range radar, with a quoted detection range of
218
500km for aircraft and 700km for missiles, and the JY-50 passive radar.
Over-the-Horizon Radars
OTH Radar Type Detection Range (km) While the radars described in the previous
Groundwave 10-400 section can track ballistic missiles high in their
Skywave 1000-4000 trajectory or as they descend, their detection
range is limited by the horizon. To overcome this
limitation, China has developed and deployed at least two types of over-the-horizon (OTH) radars,
to provide layered detection capabilities close to its shores and beyond the Ryukyu Island Chain
of Japan. While both types of OTH radar can be used against surface or airborne targets, they also
have utility against ballistic missiles in their launch phase.219 They may also have better results in
xli
Coordinates: 36.024856, 118.092048.
CHINA AEROSPACE STUDIES INSTITUTE
54
tracking hypersonic waveriders, which can fly at much lower altitudes than ballistic missile reentry
vehicles and can spend more time below the horizon and therefore outside the detection range of
LPARs.
However, due to the strong influence of environmental factors on the propagation of these
radars, as well as their high susceptibility to jamming, multiple redundant systems are needed for
a reliable early warning system. Other countries, including Russia, have deployed these
systems.xlii220
Russia’s “Konteiner” over-the-horizon radars for example are described as capable of detecting cruise missiles and hypersonic weapons
xlii
2,000km away. It has a system of Voronezh-type radar stations to detect and track ballistic missiles.
Chinese research institutions also appear to be developing several other OTH Groundwave
projects. For example, Wuhan University [武汉大学] and Wuhan Deweisi Electronic Technology
Co. [ 武 汉 德 威 斯 电 子 技 术 有 限 公 司 ] have jointly developed a portable high-frequency
groundwave OTH maritime monitoring system called OSMAR-S that has a range of 200km.xliii227
Further, materials shown at the 2016 Zhuhai Airshow depict a surface-wave OTH (SW-OTH)
High frequency system designated LD-JHC300 able to “continuously monitor over-the-horizon
maritime targets and provide sea-situation information.” The materials further state that “several
LD-JHC300 SW-OTH radars can be netted into an operating network as well as fuse data with
those from other coastal surveillance radars.”228 The system can provide enhanced early warning
at ranges of over 200km. Most importantly, from the perspective of nuclear early warning, these
systems have the potential to detect low-flying aircraft, including those equipped with stealth
technology, and sea-skimming cruise missiles. A second OTH system shown at the same
exhibition, the “LD-JXC100” Microwave OTH radar, uses an X-band phased array.
China may also have gained access to foreign technology to speed development of this system.
Unconfirmed reports suggest that China purchased three sets of the Russian Sunflower-E [向日葵
xliii
The system has apparently been deployed on the Zhoushan and Dachen islands in Zhejiang province.
CHINA AEROSPACE STUDIES INSTITUTE
56
-E/Подсолнух-Э] system in 2000. The Sunflower system has a range of approximately
300km for sea-surface targets.229
xliv
Coordinates: 40.503892, 116.024913. This appears to be a dedicated communications or similar site, as seen by the large number of satellite
communication dishes at 40.501333, 116.026226.
xlv
Coordinates: 36.758255, 121.310091. The U.S. has tested an aerostat, the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor
System, (JLENS) as part of the airspace defense network around Washington, DC to help detect low-flying targets such as UAVs and cruise
missiles.
xlvi
The line of sight at that altitude is ~195km (red) and radio horizon is just over 225km (yellow).
Overview
Strategic communications connect the Supreme Command [最高统帅] with units at the corps
level and above.241 China’s communication units trace their origins to the Signal Corps established
to support the August 1927 Nanchang Uprising, the beginning of the PLA. Work on a national
defense communications network began after May 1961, but was reliant on uninsulated wires and
short-wave radio. 242 After a winter storm in January 1969 significantly disrupted the national
communications network, Zhou Enlai directed the creation of a reliable buried cable network.xlvii
Successive expansions and upgrades of this network were undercut, however, by China’s lack of
modern switching technology, meaning that many of the exchanges faced significant bottlenecks.
Communications were one of the priorities for modernization that came out of the December 1978
xlvii
Called the "National Underground Cable Communication Network Construction Plan" [全国地下电缆通信网建设规划]
Current Situation
The following map provides a notional depiction of the lines of communication connecting the
Central Military Commission with PLARF Bases, Communications Regiments, and nuclear-
weapons-equipped brigades or dual-capable brigades.
In 1978 the Communication Department of the General Staff proposed construction of what would become China’s first real military
xlviii
communications network with multi-channel lines, special secure lines and integration with units in the field.
Microwave Communications
Left: SAF drill featuring microwave communications vehicle, 2012.256 Right: PLARF comms unit.257
China’s military radio communications network predates its buried cable networks. While
careful to avoid detection, as cryptographic schemes were only introduced for some systems in the
mid-1970s, these nevertheless remain an important leg of communication networks for the PLA
Rocket Force and other services.xlix
By 1985, China had a microwave radio relay (radrel) network connecting Beijing to remote
regions (except Tibet and Xinjiang) stretching over 14,000km, but this system was apparently not
trusted due to fear of interception.258 The SAF began building a microwave network in 1995, which
entered service in the late 1990s, providing all-weather communications.259
xlix
PLAAF units, including H-6 bombers, communicate with HF/UHF radio, but the arrangements for the newly established ALBM units are
currently unknown .
Troposcatter Systems
Troposcatter systems use the troposphere to reflect microwave radio signals over distances
typically between 300-700km. The fact that they do not require line-of-sight or significant
supporting infrastructure other than a mobile transmitter-receiver provides additional flexibility in
communications and makes them useful for China’s missile forces operating in remote and often
mountainous areas. In the mid-1960s, the 10th Academy’s 19th Research Institute [十院 19 所] and
the 760 Factory developed the Type 6171 Troposcatter transmitter.261 Encryption for the device
was developed by the 10th Academy’s 30th Research Institute, the 716 Factory, and Tsinghua
University in the early 1970s.
By the 1980s, China had built a troposcatter network of over 20 stations for both military and
civilian applications.262 Current systems, such as the ones displayed during the various military
parades in Tiananmen Square, include the TS-504 or TS-510 tropospheric scatter communications
systems produced by the CETC’s 54th Institute, with a range of roughly 200km.
Launched in early 2017, the Space-Earth Integrated Information Network Mega Project [国家
天地一体化信息网络重大工程], managed by the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST)
and led by China Electronics Technology Company (CETC), is intended to achieve the
comprehensive integration of a space-based information network, future internet, and mobile
communications network. l269 Put another way, the megaproject is designed for the purpose of
“providing information network coverage wherever [China has] national interests.”li270 According
to China Academy of Sciences (CAS) academician and CMC Equipment Development
Department (EDD) researcher Yin Hao [尹浩], when completed, the information network will
consist of various types of satellite systems (reconnaissance and surveillance satellites,
communications satellites, navigation and positioning satellites, early-warning satellites,
meteorological satellites, etc.) on different orbits, supplemented by land, sea, and space-based
information systems and application terminals to form an organic, intelligent, distributed, space-
Earth integrated global information network system.271 This integrated network will support four
application areas: spacecraft, guided missile and space launch centers, near-spacelii flight vehicles,
and unmanned aircraft (UAVs).
China is also testing high-throughput satellites (HTS) that offer significant increases in
transmission capacity compared to other communications satellites. liii 272 In the longer term,
Chinese scientists envision a layered approach of satellites in high and low Earth orbits linked by
datalink satellites in orbit and via high-speed 5G connections on the ground providing redundant
and interconnected communications links.
l
The original Chinese is “天地一体化信息网络。推进天基信息网、未来互联网、移动通信网的全面融合,形成覆盖全球的天地一体化信
息网络.” The National Science and Technology Innovation Plan for the 13 th Five Year Period, released by the State Council in July 2016,
announced plans to launch a group of national S&T R&D megaprojects called titled S&T Innovation 2030, which includes the Space-Earth
Integrated Information Network Mega Project. These megaprojects are designed to “reflect national strategic intentions” [体现国家战略意图],
and, as the name suggests, seek to achieve significant breakthroughs by 2030.
li
The original Chinese is “国家利益到哪里, 信息网络覆盖到哪里.”
lii
Near space is defined as the upper atmosphere above 20 kilometers and reaching the “Kármán Line” at 100 km, typically used to define the
beginning of space.
liii
HTS satellites transmit at greater than 100 Gigabits/second, whereas conventional communications satellites typically transmit at 10
Gigabits/second or less.
liv
Coordinates 39.912267, 116.094027.
Low-Frequency Communications
Low frequency communications systems are used to communicate with ballistic missile
submarines on patrol, which are typically unable to receive other types of transmissions. Receiving
low-frequency transmissions requires submarines to rise to depths of about 18m and to tow long
antennas. 279 Transmission of low frequency communications requires specialized facilities to
generate long wavelengths. Extremely Low Frequency (ELF) systems have superior ability to pass
through seawater, allowing them to be detected by SSBNs hiding in the depths of the open ocean,
but carry the least amount of information in a signal and require very large facilities, often
kilometers wide.
lv
The transmitter appears to have been first identified by U.S. intelligence in June 1965 from imagery collected by the Corona imagery satellite.
A more extensive report from March 1969 by the National Photographic Interpretation Center noted the identification of a large VLF
communication facility in Datong.
lvi
Coordinates: 39.946502, 113.248151. The station appears to be active, and it is likely operated by a Navy unit with the MUCD 92325.
lvii
Coordinates: 48.485833, 134.819067.
lviii
Chinese media does not use the internationally accepted terms VLF, ULF, SLF, or ELF to differentiate between types of waves, and instead
typically uses long-wave [长波], ultra-long wave [超长波], etc., which are not equivalent.
lix
The project is also called “New 01 “[“新 01”工程] to differentiate between the Datong facility, which had been referred to as the 01 Project.
lx
It is possible this Lengshuixiang station is the first Project 6984 transmitter. However, it is also possible that another station in Cili, some
400km north, is the 6984 transmitter.
lxi
The new chip has apparently been incorporated into various radar systems. A more recent chip developed by the 38 th Research Institute, the
Hunxin-1 [魂芯一号] has been incorporated into the KJ-500 early warning aircraft.
For more on Chinese C4ISR developments, see: Peter Wood and Roger Cliff, “Chinese Airborne C4ISR,” China Aerospace Studies Institute,
lxii
In the past few years, the PLARF has expanded significantly in size and delivery options. This
expansion includes not only the number of launch brigades but also mission scope, methods of
delivery, and the ability to accurately track incoming threats. The mobility of PLA nuclear forces
has also improved to include capable road-mobile systems, a submarine-launched ballistic missile
force, and an air-launched ballistic missile in the near future. These expanded options suggest that,
along with China's extensive tunneling and hardening programs, its nuclear forces would have a
greater chance of survival compared with previous decades.
China has also been improving its capabilities in the information arena. Most sources on the
PLARF's system of warning date to prior to 2010. In the interim, the PLA has made significant
strides in improving its ISR and C2 architecture. Not only does the PLA have an extensive system
of coastal radar stations, but it also possesses modern satellite communications and fiber-optic
networks, along with a growing network of early warning satellites.
Although the supporting architecture and delivery methods for a nuclear campaign have
expanded significantly, China’s doctrine surrounding nuclear use remains opaque. China publicly
maintains a no-first-use policy for its nuclear forces but may consider a conventional attack on its
nuclear stockpile to be worthy of nuclear retaliation. This is particularly dangerous considering
that the PLARF often stores nuclear and conventional stockpiles at the same locations, sometimes
co-mingling its nuclear and conventional forces within the same units. While China maintains that
its nuclear weapons are for defensive use, the Chinese concept of “active defense” only adds to
the uncertainty of when China would deploy nuclear assets. From the outside, Chinese leadership
appears to consider this convolution an extra layer of deterrence. Considering the determined push
for nuclear development, an explicit evolution of China’s nuclear doctrine may follow.
However, a number of hurdles still remain for the PLA. Regarding sensing capabilities, the
development of space-based remote detection still poses significant challenges. Further, although
China may have improved its “shield” in the past year, its likely opponents have also improved
their spears. The U.S., for example, has tested missiles that can strike targets less than six inches
across after traveling at hypersonic speeds for thousands of miles.305 Despite this, China’s progress
does not appear to be slowing down or reversing. In the coming years, we may yet see China with
an advanced nuclear triad, survivable facilities, and a committed strategy of uncertainty to keep its
opponents on the back foot.
1
John W. Lewis and Xue Litai, “Making China’s Nuclear War Plan,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 68(5), 2012, 46.
2
“China’s National Defense in the New Era” [新时代的中国国防], State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China [国务院
新闻办公室], 24 July 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-07/24/c_1124792450.htm.
3
This source was sensitive and has thus been anonymized for safety concerns. Herein referred to as “Source 1”
4
Wu Riqiang [吴日强], “Issues in Sino-US Nuclear Relations: Survivability, Coercion and Escalation,” Gov.Uk, 21 June 2013,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/issues-in-sino-us-nuclear-relations-survivability-coercion-and-escalation.zh.
5
Wu Riqiang, 2013.
6
For example, see Thomas J. Christensen, “The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China’s Strategic Modernization and U.S.-China Security
Relations,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 35, No. 4 (August 2012), 453.
7
Source 1.
8
Shou Xiaosong, ed., Science of Military Strategy, PLA Academy of Military Sciences, 2013, 173.
9
Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Strategy and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,”
International Security 40(2), (Fall 2015), 10.
10
Thomas J. Christensen, “The Meaning of the Nuclear Evolution: China’s Strategic Modernization and U.S.-China Security Relations,” Journal
of Strategic Studies, 35(4) (August 2012), 453.
11
Shou Xiaosong, ed., Science of Military Strategy, 175.
12
“Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2023,” Department of Defense, 2023,
https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-
PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.
13
Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Strategy and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,”
International Security 40(2) (Fall 2015), 24.
14
Cunningham and Fravel.
15
Cunningham and Fravel.
16
Lewis and Xue, 47.
17
Lewis and Xue, 49.
18
Wu Riqiang [吴日强], “Issues in Sino-US Nuclear Relations: Survivability, Coercion and Escalation,” Gov.Uk, 21 June 2013,
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/issues-in-sino-us-nuclear-relations-survivability-coercion-and-escalation.zh.
19
“‘Chinese Military, nuclear and conventionally-equipped unit’ The mighty east wind, the thunderbolt, fortify the sword of the great power”
[【中国军队·核常兼备导弹部队】东风浩荡 雷霆万钧 砥砺大国剑锋], CCTV, 22 July 2017,
https://military.cctv.com/2017/07/22/ARTISRZrXEl1cztsrXJ9rZSw170722.shtml.
20
“Chinese Army - Nuclear and Standing Missile Forces] The East Wind and the Thunderbolt Sharpen the Sword of a Great Power” [【中国军
队·核常兼备导弹部队】东风浩荡 雷霆万钧 砥砺大国剑锋], CCTV, 22 July 2017,
https://military.cctv.com/2017/07/22/ARTISRZrXEl1cztsrXJ9rZSw170722.shtml; “DF-26 ‘hechang jianbei’ regular missile formation: he chang
jianbei a new strategic weapon with both nuclear and regular capabilities” [东风-26 核常兼备导弹方队:核常兼备的新型战略利器], Xinhua, 1
October 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-10/01/c_1125063262.htm. For more details on the implication of this practice, see Austin
Long, “Myths or Moving Targets? Continuity and Change in China’s Nuclear Forces,” War on the Rocks, 4 December 2020,
https://warontherocks.com/2020/12/myths-or-moving-targets-continuity-and-change-in-chinas-nuclear-forces/
21
P.W. Singer and Ma Xiu, “China’s ambiguous missile strategy is risky,” Popular Science, 11 May 2020, https://www.popsci.com/story/blog-
network/eastern-arsenal/china-nuclear-conventional-missiles.
22
“China’s National Defense in the New Era” [新时代的中国国防], State Council Information Office [国务院新闻办公室], 24 July 2019,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-07/24/c_1124792450.htm
23
Xiao Tianliang [肖天亮], ed. “Science of Military Strategy,” National Defense University Press [国防大学出版社] (2017), 380.
24
Larry M. Wortzel, “China’s Nuclear ‘Leakage’,” The Diplomat, 7 August 2012, https://thediplomat.com/2012/08/chinas-nuclear-leakage/.
25
“Russian and Chinese Nuclear Modernization Trends,” Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), 29 May 2019.
https://www.dia.mil/News/Speeches-and-Testimonies/Article-View/Article/1859890/russian-and-chinese-nuclear-modernization-trends/.
26
“China’s Military Strategy (2015)” [中国的军事战略], State Council Information Office, May 2015,
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5e356cfae72e4563b10cd310/5e357ec10b0012481a9a59c3/5e357ec00b0012481a9a58a2/1580564160391/C
hina%E2%80%99s-Military-Strategy-2015.pdf.
27
“Xi Jinping: Efforts to build a strong and modernized rocket force” [习近平:努力建设一支强大的现代化火箭军], Xinhua, 26 September
2016. http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2016-09/26/c_1119627545.htm
28
John Wilson Lewis and Hua Di, "China’s Ballistic Missile Programs: Technologies, Strategies, Goals," International Security, 17(2), Fall 1992,
6.
29
Ian Easton and Mark Stokes, "Half Lives: A Preliminary Assessment Of China’s Nuclear Warhead Life Extension And Safety Program,"
Project 2049 Institute, 29 July 2013, https://project2049.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/half_lives_china_nuclear_warhead_program.pdf, 11;
See also Mark Stokes, “China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System,” Project 2049, March 12, 2010,
http://project2049.net/documents/chinas_nuclear_warhead_storage_and_handling_system.pdf.
30
“BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILE THREAT,” Defense Intelligence Ballistic Missile Analysis Committee, 2017, 3,
https://www.nasic.af.mil/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=F2VLcKSmCTE%3d&portalid=19.
31
“DF-31 (Dong Feng-31 / CSS-10),” Missile Defense Project, Center for Strategic and International Studies 9 August 2021,
https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-31/#easy-footnote-bottom-5-521.