Filed: 3/17/2024 12:46 PM

Carroll Circuit Court

Carroll County, Indiana

STATE OF INDIANA ) IN THE CARROLL CIRCUIT COURT

)
COUNTY OF CARROLL ) CAUSE NO.: 08C01-2210-MR-0001

STATE OF INDIANA, )
Plaintiff, )
v. )
) The Honorable Frances C. Gull,
RICHARD M. ALLEN, ) Special Judge
Defendant. )

MOTION FOR PARITY IN RESOURCES,

TO RECONSIDER THE DENIAL OF
ANTICIPATED DEFENSE COSTS, OR TO EXCLUDE EVIDENCE

The accused, Richard Allen, by and through counsel, Andrew Baldwin and
Bradley Rozzi, moves this Court to issue an order designed to provide parity in the
resources available for investigation and presentation of litigation in this
proceeding. To balance the scales of justice, Allen asks that the prosecutors working
for the State be required to pay out of their personal finances for investigative
services, evidence processing, and expert fees, as the Court’s recent Order has
effectively reduced Baldwin and Rozzi to a position where they are required to
personally advance those expenditures for Allen’s defense.
Alternatively, Allen requests that this Court prohibit the State from offering
any testimony or evidence at trial related to the bullet found at the crime scene, the
digital data collected by law enforcement, or Allen’s alleged confession.
While these requests may seem drastic, they are necessary and proper
considering this Court’s denial of access to resources to Allen. Finally, in the
alternative, Allen requests that he be granted approval for expected expenses
necessary and proper to defend himself—the less contentious and proper remedy to
address the inequitable balance of resources, which will lead to an unfair trial if
allowed to persist.

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 Relevant Facts and Procedural History
1. Allen’s defense team consists of the following 7 people:
a. Attorneys Rozzi and Baldwin,
b. Matt Hoffman, a retired fire chief of Carmel who has been
instrumental in sorting through tips, and sorting through and
analyzing evidence and is a key resource for the case.
c. Max Baker, a full-time student at IU Bloomington who assists
as he is able, including full time over the summer of 2023.
d. Brad Rozzi’s paralegal Sarah who assists with administrative
tasks related to the case.
e. Andy Baldwin’s paralegal Sarah who assists with
administrative tasks.
f. Brian Alvey. Investigator who has tracked down and spoken
with key witnesses, as well as performed other tasks.

2. Additionally, for a very short period of time, the defense team had
utilized another investigator out of Utah due to his experience but found the
geography interfered with the ability to perform the functions needed in Indiana.
3. The Court previously allowed Matt Hoffman to be paid at $15/hour not
to exceed $6,000. Hoffman was paid the $6,000. However, Matt Hoffman’s hours
have well exceeded $6,000, even at the rate of $15/hour. His time spent on the case
equates to thousands of hours, including late nights. However, after the Indiana
Supreme Court put attorneys Rozzi and Baldwin back on the case, Judge Gull has
now denied any further payment to Hoffman, who is continuing to work at least 30-
40 hours per week (and at times much more) on this case. Without Hoffman, the
defense would not be able to be prepared for trial nearly as quickly as it is.
4. In early October 2023, Attorney Rozzi submitted invoices seeking
payment to this Court for the time he had personally spent working on this case,
the administrative expenses he had incurred, and the time his investigator had
spent up to that point working on the case. The invoices totaled just over $51,000.

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 5. As a point of reference, Baldwin has been paid on two occasions, but on
both occasions, he was only paid after sending multiple emails essentially begging
the Court to be paid, as the Court’s refusal to pay attorney’s fees was having an
impact on Baldwin and his firm. The first payment came 4 months after its request.
The second payment came approximately 3 months after Baldwin’s request.
6. Presumably, the State of Indiana and all of its law enforcement
agencies, staff and experts are getting paid regularly without having to beg to be
paid.
7. On January 5, 2024, while Attorney Rozzi and Baldwin were waiting
for the Supreme Court to address their removal from this case, Attorney Rozzi sent
an email to Leslie Ross, the Allen Superior Court Financial Coordinator, seeking
information regarding his invoices that were initially submitted to the Court for
approval on October 4, 2023. Attorney Rozzi attached a copy of the invoices to the
email, and Ms. Ross indicated she had forwarded them for review to this Court.
This invoice was for work performed before October 2023.
8. A few days later, Attorney Rozzi was notified by Ms. Ross that his
invoices were being forwarded for review. On January 10th, 2024, Attorney Rozzi
was informed by Ms. Ross that orders were being forwarded to Carroll County for
payment. Shortly thereafter, Attorney Rozzi learned that Baldwin’s fees have been
satisfied but that Rozzi’s fees and investigator Alvey’s fees had not.
9. On January 10th, Attorney Rozzi inquired with Ms. Ross about the fact
that he (and Alvey) had not been paid. Ms. Ross responded and communicated that
the Judge was still reviewing said invoices. Rozzi heard nothing more. When he
(Rozzi) had not received any payment by end of February 2024, he contacted Ms.
Ross again to inquire about his requests. On March 6, 2024, Ms. Ross asked
Attorney Rozzi to submit the invoices for a third time, which he did. As of the date
of filing of this motion, Attorney Rozzi has not received payment or an update on his
requests. He has been seeking payment for services already performed now for
nearly 6 months.

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 10. On February 24, 2024, defense counsel filed a verified ex parte motion
for a hearing on funding for experts. The 8-page motion contained requests for
funding for the services of several experts and assistants counsel identified as
necessary to prepare Allen’s defense.
11. In an order dated March 7, 2024, this Court granted some of the
funding requests but denied others. The order is not noted on the CCS.
12. Rozzi’s now nearly six month old outstanding attorney’s bill, and
Rozzi’s multiple emails directed to Judge Gull and her staff concerning Rozzi not
getting paid, were not discussed in the order. Rozzi therefore remains unpaid for
work has performed on the case and has no idea if the court will ever pay him.
13. At the very least, there are three pieces of evidence critical to this case:
the bullet purportedly found at the crime scene; digital data pulled from cell phones
belonging to the victims and other individuals; and Allen’s purported post-arrest
“confession.” Allen’s request for funding related to obtaining expert assistance to
investigate each of the three critical pieces of evidence, and for general assistance
given the enormity of this case is reasonable.
14. The first piece of critical evidence is the bullet purportedly found at the
crime scene. The State utilized the Indiana State Police Crime Lab’s Firearms Unit,
which employs 15 people, to examine the bullet found at the crime scene. Defense
counsel retained a firearm/toolmark expert to conduct an independent analysis and
to assist them in reviewing the Crime Lab’s analysis. The funds needed to retain
the firearm/toolmark expert and begin working on Allen’s case were advanced by
Attorney Rozzi in the amount of $2,550. Defense counsel requested reimbursement
for that amount, as well as authorization to pay the expert for additional services
needed to prepare Allen’s defense.
This Court authorized reimbursement for the amount Attorney Rozzi had
already paid but denied the request for defense counsel to continue receiving the
expert’s services, finding that the request was “unsupported.”
15. The second piece of evidence is the digital data collected from various
sources, including cell phones, location data, and social media data. The State

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utilized the Indiana State Police Crime Lab’s Digital Forensic Unit, which employs
14 people, to examine the large amount of digital data collected in this case. Defense
counsel retained a digital forensic expert to help them decipher, interpret, and
analyze the digital data. The funds needed to retain the expert and begin working
on Allen’s case were advanced by Attorney Baldwin in the amount of $3,712.50.
Defense counsel requested reimbursement for that amount, as well as authorization
to pay the expert for additional services necessary to prepare Allen’s defense.
This Court authorized reimbursement for the amount Attorney Baldwin had
already paid but denied the request for defense counsel to continue receiving the
expert’s services, finding that this request was also “unsupported.”
16. The third piece of critical evidence is Allen’s alleged confession. The
State has utilized investigators, police officers, and experts from the Carroll County
Sheriff’s Department, the Indiana State Police, the Delphi City Police Department,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Marshals Service, the Indiana
Department of Natural Resources, and other law enforcement agencies around the
state, to assist in the investigation that led to Allen’s prosecution. Allen’s alleged
confession was obtained while Allen was held for safekeeping in solitary
confinement in the D.O.C. Since being reinstated in this case, the State of Indiana
has served up additional discovery to the Defense in the form of multiple interviews
conducted by law enforcement with Westville prisoners and correctional officers. In
these interviews, law enforcement investigators have inquired about the
interviewees’ opinions regarding Defendant Allen’s state of mental health,
practically seeking clinical diagnostic opinions from these lay witnesses. Defense
counsel retained a clinical psychologist to evaluate Allen and review health records
and video relevant to Allen’s confinement conditions. This Court previously
authorized funds for the defense to retain the expert. However, those funds are now
depleted, and additional services are still needed.
This Court authorized payment for the two-hour visit defense counsel had
scheduled with the expert but denied the request for additional funding, finding

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that the “unsupported request is denied as an unreasonable expenditure of county
funds.”
Defense counsel also requested funding to hire a confession expert to educate
counsel and possibly the jury on the impacts solitary confinement has on
individuals accused of crimes, particularly in relation to the voluntariness of a
confession made in those conditions. Through the process of conducting discovery,
Defense counsel has learned that Defendant Allen’s pre-trial detention in the
segregation unit at Westville, may be the first time an innocent man has been
confined in such a setting in the history of the institution and possibly this State.
Moreover, Allen’s detention is the direct result of the Carroll County Sheriff’s
request for a safekeeping order. He, the requesting Sheriff, created this
circumstance. It is indisputable that the issue of the impact of Allen’s unique and
unprecedented pre-trial detention circumstances on his overall mental health is
germane to his defense. Despite this, the Court declined defense counsel’s request
for additional funding as being “unsupported.”
17. Defense counsel made other requests for funding as well. Counsel
requested funding for the services of an independent forensic pathologist to review
and consult with the defense on issues related to the crime scene, the pathology of
the victims, and the cause, manner, and timing of death. This Court declined the
request as being “unsupported.”
18. Defense counsel requested funding for additional in-office assistant
services. The State has enlisted help from at least two other prosecutors, as well as
an untold number of law enforcement officers and their support staff, as well as the
prosecutor’s support staff. In February 2023, the Carroll County Prosecutor
obtained funding to hire a full-time investigator, a full-time secretary, and a special
prosecutor, all for this case; and raises for himself, his current secretary, and his
chief deputy prosecutor, given the additional hours they were working on this case.
He told his county council that his office was “drowning right now” and needed more
people to work on this case. Recognizing the uniqueness of this case, Carroll County
appropriated an additional $2.1 million in funding for Allen’s case.

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 In addition to assistance from the law enforcement agencies and the multisite
Indiana State Police Crime lab outlined above, as well as the assistance the State
received from hiring more employees to work on the case, the State has received
help from forensic pathologists, a university professor, DNA analysts, voice data
analysts, cold case investigative units, search and rescue units, helicopter pilots,
drone operators, and fingerprint examiners.
Even as this motion was being prepared, the State filed an amended exhibit
and witness list identifying no less than three new and not previously discovered
experts, Ronald Nichols (toolmark id.), David Schilling (Odinism expert), and Pat
Cicero (blood pattern/stain analysis expert). The State’s resources, both financial
and from a personnel standpoint, are endless.
To date, defense counsel has received 25 hard drives containing at least 40
TB of information, plus an additional 300 GB of e-discovery. The State has
investigated this case and collected this information over a period of 7 years.
Defense counsel has only had 1 year to organize, catalogue, and review this massive
amount of discovery, while also screening and investigating dozens of tips received
weekly, and identifying and retaining experts. Attorneys Baldwin and Rozzi have
each employed an in-office assistant to help them with the discovery, payable at a
rate of only $15 per hour.
It should be noted, and not understated, that the State of Indiana has
violated the local rules on discovery by dumping massive amounts of discovery,
much of it exculpatory in nature, on defense counsel well past the discovery
deadline forcing the defense to work beyond their capacity to view and analyze the
evidence over the course of a very short period of time rather than over the course of
months. Richard Allen, on the other hand, remains isolated, now in a solitary
confinement unit in the southwest corner of the state, some 175 miles from the
location where this case is pending; certainly not within a reasonable range for any
sense of routine visits by his lawyers while they are completely inundated with
trying to keep up with newly received discovery and trial preparation. While all of
this is ongoing, Prosecutor McLeland has violated the discovery order causing

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delays and difficulty for the defense. Due to McLeland’s discovery violations, the
defense needs funding for additional staff to review untimely discovered documents.
Defense counsel requested additional funding for their two in-office
assistants. Otherwise, they will be forced to pay for the assistants’ services from the
$100 per hour rate they are receiving as Allen’s lawyers. This Court denied the
funding request, finding that one assistant’s invoices had been “inadequate,” and
the need for the assistants was “unsupported.”

This Court’s denial of funding ensures an unfair, inequitable trial.

Underlying every facet of the criminal justice system of Indiana and the
United States of America is the immutable principle that citizens targeted and
charged by the State for prosecution will have a fair opportunity to protect their
liberty, including the opportunity to investigate the charges and the evidence, and
to defend themselves.
The scales of justice must be carefully balanced, and the courts are the
fulcrum of the scale. “It [is] the duty of the court having [defendant’s] cases in
charge to see that they were denied no necessary incident of a fair trial . . . .
[P]erhaps the most critical period of proceedings against [a] defendant [is] from the
time of their arraignment until the beginning of trial, when consultation, thorough
on-going investigation and preparation are vitally important[.]” Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45, 52, 57 (1932).
The Comprehensive Plan for Indigent Defense Services in Carroll County,
subsection B.3, requires that assigned counsel, such as Baldwin and Rozzi, “request
ex parte authorization from the judge hearing the case for expenditures for
investigative services, expert witnesses, or other services necessary to provide
adequate legal representation.” To comply, Balwin and Rozzi have submitted
detailed ex parte requests1 for expenses already incurred, and for expenses

1 Despite filing the motion ex parte and clearly labeling the motion as such in bold
lettering at the top, someone has shared those ex parte pleadings with the State. The State
chose to review them in detail, and refer to one of the motions at length in a publicly filed

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expected. The Court has denied all requests for anticipated expenses and costs that
have not yet been incurred, excluding one (services for a private investigator), and
stated that it “may authorize expenditures for paralegal services.” However, for the
investigative and paralegal services, the Court has instructed that it will require
detailed invoices, meaning that Baldwin and Rozzi will have to carry the obligation
to pay even those services out of pocket, until such time that the Court may find
that the invoices are adequate, and services are necessary.
For several reasons, this Court’s denial of offer to pay for anticipated services
and costs necessary to defend Allen, and requirement that Baldwin and Rozzi front
the obligation to pay for the very limited investigation and litigation support that
the Court offered to potentially reimburse for denies Allen of the following: due
process of law; the opportunity to the free administration of justice; due course of
law; and privileges and immunities. It also imposes upon Baldwin and Rozzi
obligations, without just compensation, altogether working a fundamental denial of
an opportunity at a fair trial.
I. Due process of law requires balance between the State and defense in
order to provide an opportunity for a fair trial, which must include a
level of parity between the resources of the defense and State.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that: “No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Further, the Sixth
Amendment provides Allen a right to “have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.” Similarly, Indiana Constitution Article 1, Section 12 provides that “All
courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done to him in his person,

pleading—letting the whole world know what should have been protected information.
Attorney Rozzi alerted this Court and the State by email of the breach of confidentiality,
requesting information as to how it occurred and whether it could be remedied. To date,
counsel has not received a response from the Court, nor the Stat, evidencing some attempt
by either to remedy the problem.

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property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law. Justice shall be
administered freely, and without purchase; completely, and without denial;
speedily, and without delay.” And Article 1, Section 13 provides Allen the rights “to
be heard by himself and counsel [and] to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor.”
The importance of a publicly funded defense is a staple of Indiana law,
recognized in cases preceding federal authority on the subject. The Indiana
Supreme Court recognized the fundamental needs of poor persons charged by the
State in one of its earliest decisions:
A poor prisoner, as to his physical wants, falls within the reason of the
law, and, to that extent, is clearly embraced in the law. If the prisoner
was brought into Court not decently or comfortably clad, and was too
poor to provide for himself, no one would doubt the power and duty of
the Court, on general principles, without any statute, to order suitable
clothes for him. It cannot be admitted for a moment that the law
regards the physical wants of the citizen of more consequence than his
life or his liberty. Whenever, therefore, the law makes provision for the
one, at the public expense, the other, being within the reason of the
law, is also embraced. It seems eminently proper and just, that the
treasury of the county, which bears the expense of his support,
imprisonment and trial, should also be chargeable with his defense.

Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 19 (1854). Inherent in the right to assistance of counsel for
one’s defense, and the right to obtain witnesses in one’s favor, is the right for poor
persons to have ordinary and necessary costs of that defense paid for at public
expense. That said, our federal contemporaries have chosen to address the right to
parity in resources from the framework of a right to a fair trial, incorporated within
the Due Process Clause.
The Supreme Court of the United States “has long recognized that when a
State brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal
proceeding, it must take steps to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to
present his defense.” Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985). “[M]ere access to the
courthouse doors does not by itself assure a proper functioning of the adversarial

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process[;] a criminal trial is fundamentally unfair if the State proceeds against an
indigent defendant without making certain that he has access to the raw materials
integral to the building of an effective defense.” Id. at 77. To effectuate these goals,
the Ake Court held that where the State had made the mental condition of a
defendant relevant to his criminal culpability and to the punishment he might
suffer, the defense must have access to a competent psychiatrist and an appropriate
examination thereby, in order to “assist in evaluation, preparation, and
presentation of the defense.” Id. at 82-83.
Moreover, there must be balance in the pretrial discovery process. “Although
the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the amount of discovery which
the parties must be afforded[,] it does speak to the balance of forces between the
accused and his accuser.” Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 474 (1973). In similar
vein, the Indiana Supreme Court “requires that discovery rules be fairly balanced
between the State and the defendant.” Wiseheart v. State, 491 N.E.2d 985, 990 (Ind.
1986).
Balance can be seen in several rules regarding pretrial proceedings designed
to provide an opportunity for a fair trial. Suppression of any evidence favorable to
the defendant by the prosecutor, either with respect to guilt or punishment, is a
violation of due process, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecutor.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). This includes access to information in
the files of any officers who have investigated the circumstances of the case that
may have a reasonable probability of impacting the result of the case. See Kyles v.
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). However, the balance created by these discovery
protections rings hollow if the defense is denied reasonable resources to review and
probe the discovery disclosed.

II. Allen has demonstrated a need for resources. By refusing to pay for
necessary expected expenses, and by requiring invoices before paying
for the limited services the Court will potentially pay, this Court has
put the defense at an unfair disadvantage.

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 The appointment of experts for indigent defendants is left to the trial court’s
discretion. Beauchamp v. State, 788 N.E.2d 881, 888 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The trial
court is not required to approve payment for any expert that the defendant might
find helpful. Id. The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating the need for the
appointment, with the central inquiry being whether the services are necessary to
ensure an adequate defense. Id.
Some factors which guide trial courts in this determination, include:
(1) Whether the services would bear on an issue generally regarded to
be within the common experience of the average person, or on one for
which an expert opinion would be necessary; (2) Whether the
requested expert services could nonetheless be performed by counsel;
(3) Whether the proposed expert could demonstrate that which the
defendant desires from the expert; (4) Whether the purpose for the
expert appears to be only exploratory; (5) Whether the expert services
will go toward answering a substantial question in the case or simply
an ancillary one; (6) The seriousness of the charge; (7) Whether the
State is relying upon an expert and expending substantial resources
on the case; (8) Whether a defendant with monetary resources would
choose to hire such an expert; (9) The costs of the expert services; (10)
The timeliness of the request for the expert and whether it was made
in good faith; and (11) Whether there is cumulative evidence of the
defendant’s guilt.
Schuck v. State, 53 N.E.3d 571, 574-75 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). These factors may be
focused on the request for funds for experts, but it is proper for the defense to
request funds for investigative- and litigation-related expenses as well. See id.
The Schuck factors reveal that defense counsel’s requests for funding are
necessary to prepare and present Allen’s defense:
• Evidence involving toolmark examination, digital data forensics, the
voluntariness of confessions, and the cause, manner, and timing of death
require consultation and testimony from expert witnesses, as they are not

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 within the common experience of the average person. This evidence is also
critical to the case;
• the charges in this case are the most serious offenses under Indiana law;
• the State has relied upon dozens of experts and investigators to assist it in
prosecuting this case. The State has utilized the assistance of several law
enforcement agencies, and the Indiana State Police Crime lab and its
numerous analysts. But even those resources were not sufficient, so last year
the State received additional funding from the county to hire an investigator
and a secretary to work full-time just on this case. Altogether, the State has
had the entirety of at least 6 law enforcement agencies available at its
disposal, 4 prosecutors, 2 investigators, and 2 secretaries working on this
case; and
• a defendant who could afford his own representation would hire these
experts, and an attorney who did not do so would be deficient in his
performance as counsel.
III. Because Allen is being prosecuted in Carroll County, where the judge
is in charge of determining what is a necessary expense for his defense,
he is being denied privileges and immunities afforded to other
similarly situated Hoosiers accused of crimes.
“Justice by geography” is a reality that shows its face in the distribution and
control of defense services in Indiana, as evidenced by this case. Although Carroll
County participates in the Indiana Public Defender Commission reimbursement
system, which is designed to provide better, more stable resources for criminal
defense, it does not have a chief public defender, or a public defense office. As a
result, the Court is in charge of determining whether a defense expenditure or cost
is appropriate or justified, as opposed to a public defender.
Indiana Constitution Article 1, Section 23 provides: “The General Assembly
shall not grant to any citizen, or class of citizens, privileges or immunities, which,
upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens.” The challenge for
violating this clause is subjected to a two-part test. Smith v. State, 194 N.E.3d 118,

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127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). “First, the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation
must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics that distinguish the
unequally treated classes, and, second, the preferential treatment must be
uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated.” Id.
In the Final Report of the Indiana Task Force on Public Defense, the Task
Force recognized the need for independence from the judiciary: “Public defense
attorneys should be as independent as possible from the judge before whom they
appear.”2 Elaborating, the Task Force explained that the “lack of independence
[from the judiciary] can ‘violate [] the right to effective assistance when it interferes
in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make independent decisions about how
to conduct the defense.’”3
Had Allen been charged in an Indiana county with a chief public defender
and a public defender office, his work-product-laden request for funds would not
have been shared with the judge ruling over his case, and would not have landed on
the desk of the prosecutor (however that occurred). More importantly, his request
for reasonable resources, that pale in comparison to the resources expended by the
State in this matter, would have likely been approved without issue. The unequal
treatment of Allen, both the hurdle to obtain defense funds, and the denial thereof,
are not related to any reasonable distinction. The failure of the State to adequately
fund and staff public defender services has served to deny Allen a constitutional
right to fair and equitable treatment and should not be tolerated.
IV. By requiring the defense to incur the obligation to pay for defense costs
and then seek reimbursement which may be available, the court has
imposed unfair obligations upon the defense.
With respect to defense’s request for paralegal services, the Court stated it
“may authorize additional expenditures . . . upon presentation of proper invoices.”

2 See https://www.in.gov/publicdefender/files/Indiana-Task-Force-Report.pdf (last

visited, March 15, 2024).

3 Id. at 38 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); see also Powell
v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 62 (1932)).

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Likewise, the Court stated that it would reimburse for criminal investigative
services, as long as a proper invoice was submitted. No indication was given as to
what limitations the Court would put on such requests for payment in the future.
Thus, in order to secure these services, Baldwin and Rozzi will be required to
incur the expenses, and carry them until such time as the Court hopefully approves
payment, but also gamble that payment will not be approved. Considering that
Attorney Rozzi has not been paid for his legal services and administrative expenses,
for which he has sought payment for nearly 6 months, it appears to be a losing bet.
As can be seen at the Carroll County Council meeting in February 2023,4
Prosecutor McLeland is required to request the Council for additional funds, but is
not required to front the money for the salaries of additional employees and
investigation/ litigation costs from his personal income prior to seeking potential
reimbursement (and subject to potential rejection).
For obvious reasons, the law providing for the appointment of counsel for
poor defendants, also requires that they be compensated. Knox Cty. Council v. State
ex rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 512, 29 N.E.2d 405, 413 (1940) (“[T]hese cases
cannot be legally tried unless the defendant, if he is pauper, is provided with
counsel; that attorneys cannot be compelled to serve without compensation[.]”). For
the same reasons that counsel appointed for indigent defendants must be paid,
counsel for indigent defendants should not be required to front necessary
expenditures for building and litigating the defense.
Because this Court has found that criminal investigation and paralegal
services are necessary to the investigation and presentation of Allen’s defense, it
should articulate a reasonable amount of funds available and dedicated to those
defense services. Furthermore, any additional awards for expert witness costs,
discovery processing and organization costs, and other defense services costs should
be granted with the amount available expressed so that Allen’s defense team is not
gambling with their personal finances in hope that reimbursement might come.

4 See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RdySWImBm6U&t=785s (last visited,

March 15, 2024).

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 Request for Relief
Allen requests that Attorney Rozzi be reimbursed for the invoices he
submitted in October 2023, which covered his legal services, his administrative
services, and the services of his investigator. These invoices totaled $51,049 and
were submitted to this Court on 3 occasions. The Court has ignored Rozzi’s requests
now for 5 months. Rozzi has staff to pay and a family to feed, and this
refusal/unwillingness to even explain why the Court has not paid Rozzi is
inexplicable.
However, the main thrust of this motion is related to Richard Allen’s right to
a fair trial. To balance the scales of justice, Allen requests that one of three
potential remedies be ordered. Preferably, this Court should reconsider the denial of
funds for defense investigative and expert expenses, as requested in the most recent
ex parte motion. Alternatively, this Court should exclude at trial any testimony or
evidence related to the bullet, the digital data, Allen’s purported confession, and the
cause, manner, and timing of death. Finally, if denial of the defense’s requests
remains, and the State is allowed to proffer testimony on the critical evidence
discussed above, the only truly equitable relief would be to order the Carroll County
Prosecutor to pay for any expert and investigative services, from this point forward,
out of his own personal finances.

WHEREFORE, the defense requests this Court to reconsider its denial of

anticipated defense costs, including administrative costs, and including those costs
associated with expert witness preparation and trial testimony. In the alternative,
the defense requests the Court to exclude all witnesses who would testify as to any
matter in which an expert could have assisted Richard Allen in his defense, but due
to this Court denying expenses for expert witnesses (because of the Court’s belief that
such requests are unsupported) will deny Richard Allen access to the same
opportunities as the State of Indiana ergo violating Allen’s due process rights. In the
event the Court is not willing to grant relief consistent with one or both of the
aforementioned prayers, the defense requests that this Court order the State of

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Indiana, through Prosecutor McLeland, to assume the expenses of all experts, law
enforcement officers, administrative staff and any other expenses arising out of the
prosecution of Richard Allen, from this point forward, from his own personal finances.
These requests are made to level the playing field between the accused, Richard
Allen, and the Government with its infinite amount of resources, all of which are
currently being used to overwhelm Allen and his understaffed and underfunded legal
team.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Andrew Baldwin

Andrew Baldwin, Atty. No.17851-41
Counsel for Defendant
BALDWIN PERRY & KAMISH, P.C.
150 N. Main St.
Franklin, Indiana 46131
317-736-0053

/s/ Bradley A. Rozzi

Bradley A. Rozzi, Atty. No.23365-09
Counsel for Defendant
HILLIS, HILLIS, ROZZI & DEAN
200 Fourth Street
Logansport, Indiana 46947
574-722-4560

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify a copy of the foregoing pleading has been provided to all
counsel of record for the opposing party, via IEFS this same day of filing.

/s/ Andrew Baldwin

BALDWIN PERRY & KAMISH, P.C.

/s/ Bradley A. Rozzi

HILLIS, HILLIS, ROZZI & DEAN

17