Disputes Involving Youth Street Gang Members - Micro-Social Contexts

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DISPUTES INVOLVING YOUTH STREET

GANG MEMBERS: MICRO-SOCIAL
∗
CONTEXTS
LORINE A. HUGHES
University of Nebraska at Omaha
JAMES F. SHORT, JR.
Washington State University
KEY WORDS: gangs, disputes, status management, microsocial,

macrosocial, third parties
This paper examines microsocial contexts of violent and nonviolent

dispute-related incidents involving gang members. Data consist of
reports of field observations of twelve black and eight white youth street
gangs in Chicago between 1959 and 1962. Dispute-related incidents (N
= 2,637) were classified according to three primary pretexts: normative
or order violations, identity attacks and retaliation. Findings show that
disputes associated with each of these generally unfolded consistently
with expectations based on the extent to which status concerns were
likely to be outweighed by such situational constraints as a close
relationship between disputants and audience intervention. We suggest
that understanding violence in the gang context will be enhanced greatly
by further consideration of the microsocial level of explanation and
linkages to its macro- and individual-level counterparts.
After decades of neglect following the pioneering studies of Frederic

Thrasher (1963/1927) and Clifford Shaw and his collaborators (Shaw,
Zorbaugh and McKay, 1929; Shaw and McKay, 1942), adolescent street
gangs again became a major public and scholarly concern during the 1950s
and 1960s. Gangs then were primarily a large city phenomenon, most
∗
We are grateful to the National Consortium on Violence Research (NCOVR) for
support of this research. We are also grateful to Irving Spergel for permission to use
as yet unpublished material and to Ray Paternoster and the anonymous reviewers
for their criticisms and suggested revisions.
CRIMINOLOGY VOLUME 43 NUMBER 1 2005 43

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44 HUGHES AND SHORT
prominently in Chicago, Los Angeles and New York, and large-scale

programs aimed at preventing the predations of gangs were launched in
each of these cities. A few such programs included a research component
designed to evaluate the effectiveness of ameliorative efforts and/or
focused on documenting the nature of gangs and testing theories about
them (see, for example, Carney, Mattick and Callaway, 1969; Gold and
Mattick, 1974; Miller, 1962; New York City Youth Board, 1960; Short and
Strodtbeck, 1965; Spergel, 1966; Klein, 1971).
The proliferation of gangs and the emergence of a few “super gangs”
attracted increasing law enforcement and media attention and stimulated
further research. The result has been a virtual explosion of information
concerning the distribution of gangs, their composition and behavior, the
nature of gang-community relationships, and various approaches to gang
control (see Coughlin and Venkatesh, 2003; Huff, 1990, 1996, 2002; Klein,
Maxson and Miller, 1995). Understanding the behavior of gangs and their
members is still elusive, however. This paper seeks to advance theoretical
coherence by focusing on the frequently neglected interaction processes
and situational characteristics that form the microsocial contexts of
disputes involving gang members (see Short, 1998).
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
David Luckenbill’s (1977) study of criminal homicide as a “situated
transaction” is generally recognized as the first serious attempt to
understand the microsocial contexts of violent encounters. In reviewing a
variety of official documents surrounding seventy fatal transactions
(including one double murder), Luckenbill (1977:176) discovered that, in
all cases, “murder was the culmination of an interchange between an
offender and victim, resembling what Goffman [1967] termed a ‘character
contest,’ a confrontation in which opponents sought to establish or
maintain ‘face’ at the other’s expense by remaining steady in the face of
adversity.”
Students of violence increasingly emphasize the importance of such
face-work in the resolution of disputes, focusing in particular on the role
played by third parties as peacemakers or promoters of violence (Cooney,
1998; Felson, 1982; Felson and Steadman, 1983). As Kubrin and Weitzer
(2003; see also Cooney, 1998) note, however, the uneven distribution of
homicide suggests that the extent to which status is managed through
violence varies across social contexts. Drawing on structural and cultural
approaches to violence, they argue that certain types of violent
encounters, particularly retaliatory homicides, can be understood as
resulting from a subcultural value system or “street code” that develops in
response to social disadvantage and “mandates deferential treatment of
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DISPUTES INVOLVING YOUTH GANG MEMBERS 45
others and aggressive sanctions against those who show disrespect”

(Kubrin and Weitzer, 2003:158).
Similar processes may account for the gang-violence relationship
frequently reported in the literature (for example, Battin, Hill, Abbott,
Catalano and Hawkins, 1998; Thornberry, Krohn, Lizotte, Smith and
Tobin, 2003; see also Huff, 2002), as well as for research findings that show
retaliatory attacks against members of rival gangs to be the predominant
type of gang violence (see Decker, 1996). Theoretically, the gang has been
viewed as a collective response to harsh economic and social conditions,
and special attention has been directed to the normative and sanctioning
systems developed by gangs, systems in which a high value is placed on
status within the gang. Thrasher’s early work described the constant
struggle for status among gang members, who tended to fare poorly by the
standards of society at large:
Internally the gang may be viewed as a struggle for recognition. It
offers the underprivileged boy probably his best opportunity to
acquire status and hence it plays an essential part in the
development of his personality.... [T]he gang boy’s conception of
his role is more vivid with reference to his gang than to other
social groups. Since he lives largely in the present, he conceives of
the part he is playing in life as being in the gang; his status in other
groups is unimportant to him, for the gang is his social world. In
striving to realize the role he hopes to take he may assume a
tough pose, commit feats of daring or of vandalism, or become a
criminal. (1963/1927:230–231)
Although the notion of status management remained prominent in later
gang literature (see, for example, Whyte, 1943), theories advanced by
Cohen (1955), Miller (1958), and Cloward and Ohlin (1960) directed
attention away from status in relation to the gang world toward status in
relation to the larger class system. Research designed explicitly to test
these theories, however, found that status considerations within the gang
context were of more immediate importance to understanding the
behavior of gang members (Short and Strodtbeck, 1965). Observations of
gang conflicts suggested that violent behavior was frequently initiated in
response to status threats, that is, threats to the respect or honor one
deserves “as a leader, as a male, as a member of a particular gang, or as an
aspiring adult” (Short, 1965:162). Decisions by gang members, especially
leaders, to fight were attributed in part to the rational balancing of
immediate status losses or gains within the gang against the more remote
possibility of punishment by the larger society.
Later work on male and female gangs representing a variety of ethnic
backgrounds reaffirmed the importance of status in relation to peers as a
major factor in violence (for example, Anderson, 1999; Campbell, 1991;
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46 HUGHES AND SHORT
Erlanger, 1979; Giordano, 1978; Horowitz, 1983; Horowitz and Schwartz,

1974; Vigil, 1988; see also Cartwright, Tomson and Schwartz, 1975; Suttles,
1968), even when not recognized explicitly (for example, Jankowski,
1991). This is perhaps “the most agreed-upon finding in the gang research
literature” (Short, 1996:56). Still, too little is known about the conditions
under which status considerations translate into violent behavior.
We address this issue by focusing on micro-level contexts of disputes
involving street gang members. Specifically, we explore the extent to
which the outcome of these disputes varies according to who is involved,
what is at issue, how the parties in interaction behave and the nature of
audience behavior. Although other research has focused on such
situational factors (see Sampson and Lauritsen, 1994), they have not been
studied systematically in the gang context.
DATA AND METHODS

Data for the study consist of reports of field observations of twelve
black and eight white street gangs1 in Chicago between 1959 and 1962.
Findings from the larger project have appeared in a series of articles and
books published between 1962 and 1980 (see Cartwright et al., 1975, 1980;
Short and Strodtbeck, 1965). Limited computer technology during this
period, however, precluded systematic analysis of the observational
component. Only recently have the 16,566 pages of transcribed reports
been digitized and coded for use in analyses (see Hughes, in press).
“Detached workers” assigned by the YMCA of Metropolitan
Chicago to work with the gangs were interviewed, for the most part on a
weekly basis. Because the basic strategy of the research program was to
“keep a window open” on the gangs as a way to gain entry for specially
designed research projects, instructions given to the workers were broad.
Each worker was asked to describe all contacts with gangs and gang
members since his most recent interview. In addition, assigned graduate
students observed the gangs, nearly always in the company of a detached
worker, and wrote reports about their field experiences.2
All detached worker interviews and observer reports were read in their
entirety and then analyzed with a coding scheme designed to facilitate
examination of micro-level influences in conflict situations. Because our
1. Our use of the term encompasses youth groups variously referred to in the
literature as “youth gang” (Spergel, 1995), “street gangs” (Klein, 1995), “delinquent
gangs” (Cloward and Ohlin, 1960), “violent gangs” (Yablonsky, 1962), and
“cliques” (Sullivan, 1989).
2. Of the 16,566 pages of transcription, 82 percent consisted of detached worker
interviews.
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primary interest is in exploring contexts and processes associated with

violent and, alternatively, nonviolent encounters between gang members
and between gang members and others, dispute-related incidents involving
at least one gang member were chosen as units of analysis. Dispute-related
incidents were defined as interactions involving blatant disrespect, some
other kind of alleged wrongdoing, or an existing and targeted hostility of
at least one of the disputants toward the other.3 In all, 2,637 dispute-
related incidents involving one or more gang members were identified.
The primary dependent variable—dispute outcome—was coded
dichotomously, with 0 = nonviolent and 1 = violent. An incident was coded
as nonviolent if there was no evidence of a physical attack (for example,
grabbing, pushing, chasing, hitting, or fighting with or without weapons),
even though there had been some indication of a desire, intention,
likelihood, and/or pressure to engage in violence. Escalation of potentially
violent incidents was considered to have occurred when any type of
physical attack was initiated.4
Because this general measure does not distinguish between violence
committed by either of the primary disputants (or violence committed by
the primary disputants and others), separate measures of physical attack
by each of the main disputants were also constructed (0 = no, 1 = yes). For
analytical purposes, the initial aggressor—that is, the first person who
became angry or threatened, ordered, reproached, issued an identity
attack, physically attacked, or otherwise confronted another—was
considered “the offender,” regardless of outcome. By default, the other
party was considered “the victim.” When there was no clear initial
aggressor, three decision rules were applied. First, gang members take
precedence over nongang individuals as the offender. Second, members of
the gang under observation take precedence as the offender in disputes
involving two gangs, unless the member of the second gang was clearly
shown to have inflicted more physical damage or demonstrated greater
aggression. Third, no one takes precedence as the offender in disputes
involving members of the same gang, except for instances when greater
aggression or inflicted physical harm is undisputed.
Eight independent variables were examined and scored for their
influence on dispute outcome: dispute pretext, gang relationship between
3. This definition is similar to that employed by Stafford and Gibbs (1993:72), who
identify disputes and dispute settlements as measurable, interactional phenomena
suitable for empirical research and theorizing (see also Gibbs, 1989).
4. Because detached worker and observer reports frequently indicate only that a
“fight” occurred, with no further details concerning the nature of the violence, we
do not examine the extent to which findings vary according to differences in level of
violence.
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48 HUGHES AND SHORT
disputants, race relationship between disputants, offender acquiescence,

victim acquiescence, co-offender presence, co-victim presence, and
audience mediation. They were then dummy coded, with the first category
selected for omission.
Based on a careful reading of the disputes, and with the aid of previous
work on action types (see Felson, 1984:115; Felson and Steadman,
1983:62–63), dispute pretexts were classified into the following general
categories:
1. Norm violation: “annoying” behavior, failure to fulfill an
obligation, ignoring, causing or contributing to another’s loss,
boasting or “getting bad,” cheating, unacceptable demeanor, and
taking and/or violating another person’s property.
2. Noncompliance with an order: begrudging acquiescence or
(implicit or explicit) refusal to comply with demands to engage in
or to not engage in a certain behavior.
3. Actions that suggest a need to defend others: behaviors directed
toward one party that elicit a verbal or physical sanction from one
or more observers.
4. Money/Debts: failure to repay a financial loan upon collection by
the lender.
5. Unfair/Rough play: actions that are inconsistent with the explicit
or implicit rules governing participation in an organized athletic
contest.
6. Identity attack: any direct attack on personal and/or gang identity,
including accusations, insults, challenges, physical violations that
do not result in bodily harm, and degrading rejections and yelling.
7. Concern regarding opposite sex relations: behaviors that are
upsetting because of the challenge they represent to another
party’s claim to a romantic interest.
8. Territory/Neighborhood honor: actions undertaken by one party
that directly threaten another’s claim to a particular territory.5
9. Racial concerns: physical or verbal actions undertaken by one
party against another solely because of race.
10. Fun/Recreation: physical or verbal actions that lead to hostilities
during leisure activities such as “playing the dozens” and less
organized body-punching and horsing around.
11. Retaliation: action undertaken by one party to avenge a previous
attack or any other perceived or actual wrongdoing by the
targeted party or a close associate.
5. Behaviors placed into this category differ from those placed elsewhere (that is,
identity attack) in that they specifically include a territorial component.
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12. Rumors: physical or verbal actions undertaken by one party to

seek redress for negative information allegedly disseminated by
the targeted party.
13. Robbery: intimidating or violent actions undertaken by one party
to acquire money or property from another.
14. Misunderstanding: intended or actual actions directed at one or
more persons who are mistakenly identified or accused of a
wrongdoing that did not occur.
15. General troublemaking: physical or verbal harassment for no
apparent reason.
16. Other: physical or verbal actions undertaken for other reasons,
such as doing what someone else asked, indirectly harassing one
person or group of persons by harming others, and preempting an
anticipated attack.
For analytical purposes, these pretexts were collapsed into three major
categories. First was normative or order violations, which include all
behaviors that are inappropriate or likely to be perceived as such, thereby
subsuming incidents initiated by a norm violation, noncompliance with an
order, actions that suggest a need to defend others, money/debts, and
unfair/rough play. Second were identity attacks, which include all
behaviors that represent or are likely to be perceived as an attack on
another’s personal or gang identity, thus accounting for incidents that
occur as a result of direct identity attacks as well as concerns regarding
opposite-sex relations, territory/neighborhood honor, racial concerns, and
fun/recreation. Third is retaliation, which includes all behaviors
undertaken to exact revenge for a wrongdoing committed or perceived as
such on the basis of rumors. A residual category, other, includes all
described behaviors for which no commonality could be discerned.
Although these categories are to some extent arbitrary, examination
suggested that gang norms included defense of others, payment of debts
and fairness in sports activities; and relations with girl friends, race, gang
turf, and such recreational activities as body punching were viewed in
terms of boys’ personal or gang identities.
The gang relationship between disputants was coded: 1 = intragang/
disputes between members of the same gang; 2 = intergang/disputes
between members of two different gangs; and 3 = extra-group/disputes
between a gang member and an individual with no known gang affiliation.
The race relationship between disputants was coded as 0 = intra-racial and
1 = inter-racial. Acquiescence, which includes such behaviors as apologies
and other types of “aligning action” (for example, explanations, and so
forth), was coded for the offender and for the victim as 0 = no and 1 = yes.
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Co-offender presence and co-victim presence6 were each coded as 0 = no

and 1 = yes. Finally, audience mediation was coded as 0 = no and 1 = yes.
We do not examine the effect of audience instigation because of its
overall rarity among individuals who did not become further involved in
disputes. Due to missing data problems (see below), we also do not
disaggregate by individual worker or by the specific relationship between
audience members and disputants. For the same reason, we do not
examine differences between gangs. Development of each of these topics
must await further in-depth qualitative analyses.
INTER-RATER AGREEMENT
A random sample of approximately 5 percent of all dispute-related
incidents (n = 126) was coded by another researcher (Coder B) following
the presentation of detailed instructions by the original coder. Although it
was at times necessary for the original coder to clarify codes and
categories and help locate names on gang rosters, the two coders worked
independently of one another. Overall, a high degree of inter-rater
agreement was achieved, with the majority of fields having over 80 percent
agreement. The coders met afterwards to determine the source of the
discrepancy for the two fields with low agreement: offender acquiescence
(61.9 percent) and victim acquiescence (57.9 percent).7 Differences were
accounted for primarily by Coder B’s assumption that acquiescence did
not occur (as opposed to being indeterminable) if such behavior had not
been reported.
DATA ANALYSIS
Although the major strength of these observations is as qualitative data,
a careful search suggested that patterns related to our primary interests
might also be examined quantitatively. As expected, results of bivariate
6. Co-offenders and co-victims are defined as individuals who act or are treated as key
participants in a dispute but who are not identified as either the offender or victim.
While some authors (for example, Cooney, 1998) include co-offenders and co-
victims in their definition of “third parties,” we conceptualize third parties as being
synonymous with (nondisputing) audience members.
7. Agreement between coders for the remaining fields was as follows: dispute outcome
= 98.4 percent; dispute pretext = 78.6 percent; relationship between disputants =
81.7 percent, race relationship between disputants = 77.0 percent; gang relationship
between disputants = 93.7 percent, co-offender presence = 91.3 percent; co-victim
presence = 90.5 percent; detached worker presence = 92.9 percent; detached worker
behavior = 91.3 percent; third party presence = 89.4 percent; and third party
behavior = 84.9 percent. Differences often resulted from Coder B’s more extensive
use of the “indeterminable” option, but no other pattern was detected.
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analyses between dispute outcome and the independent variables

(available from either author) revealed major missing data problems.
Because most of the data were provided by untrained observers who
were asked not to focus on theoretically important factors or processes,
the comprehensiveness of observations varied greatly. Complete
information on the variables was provided for fewer than 25 percent of the
more than 2,500 identified dispute-related incidents. Some reports
contained enough information to code most variables (dispute pretext,
relationship between disputants, co-offender and co-victim presence,
acquiescence and audience behavior), but only a few contained data on
more than two or three of these variables. Missing data were more
extensive for some variables than for others. Workers and observers
generally reported on who was involved in a dispute and the context. In
contrast, complete information on all audience members (that is, who was
there and how they behaved) was reported infrequently. Instead, worker
and observer reports of third parties typically discussed the characteristics
and behavior of those who were most noticeable and/or with whom they
were most familiar. In addition, the difficulty of observing and recalling all
of the steps in an interaction sequence contributed to missing data for
offender and victim acquiescence.
Although missing data present serious problems for multivariate
analyses, we followed Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken’s (2003) recommen-
dation of categorizing missing data as an additional group on a nominal
scale and then used logistic regression to further assess the effect of our
independent variables on dispute outcome. This method is preferable to
complete-case analysis when the missing data problem is severe in that it
makes use of all available information.
Before turning to the results of these analyses, we discuss briefly the
background contexts of disputes; these were the major social conditions
that structured interaction processes among gang boys and between gang
boys and others.
RACE, CLASS AND SEX

All of the gangs served by the detached worker program were lower-
or working-class and, with few exceptions, intra-racial—black or white—
and male. Gang membership typically coincided with residence in a
particular geographic area within disadvantaged neighborhoods, and
although class-consciousness was not particularly evident among either
white or black gang boys, awareness of barriers to advancement in
conventional society was strong, especially among the latter. Gang boys
also were acutely aware of their racial identity and of the uneasy tension
that existed between blacks and whites. Nearly all lower- and working-
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class white neighborhoods in Chicago were undergoing racial transition

during the period of observation, and white gang members often were
supported by neighborhood adults in their active resistance to blacks’
use of “their” parks and other perceived forms of invasion (Short and
Strodtbeck, 1965:112–14). Although racial conflicts were rare and did
not preoccupy white gangs, when they did occur, the tenor of white
resistance was clear:
Friday night, after the dance, Tom and myself and a couple of
guys went over to Rossi’s [restaurant]... a goodly crowd there, I’d
say about twenty or thirty kids. Freddie comes barreling in from
across the street, and he started going from table to table
whispering, and pretty soon, the guys started to get up and leave...
they were primarily Dukes... they started to drift out. So, I
followed them. Rich had a flat tire at the time, and he was fixing it
across the street in this gas station. They all clustered around his
car, and it looked like there were weapons being passed out in the
form of clubs and jack handles, etc. All of a sudden, they barrel-
th
assed down Dobson heading towards 78 and the park. I knew
something was up, so I drifted out behind them. They got three-
quarters of the way down the street, stopped and started to talk
back and forth very heatedly, and then turned around and came
back. I said, “what’s up fellows?” They said, “we heard there were
some coloreds down there in the park. We’re not ready to give in
that easily to them. We were going to go down there and throw
them out.” Then, they all backtracked to Rossi’s. Apparently,
they had encountered somebody coming up from the park who
said that there were no colored kids down there, and that
disbanded the group. (Adapted from worker JL interview)
In an effort to promote better race relations and broaden the social
horizons of gang youth, the detached worker program occasionally
brought white and black gang members together for athletic competitions
and pool tournaments. While tensions sometimes occurred between
contestants, violent confrontations were rare. Detached workers were
especially careful to mediate potential inter-racial disputes, and gang
youth were conscious of the possibility that they might lose the valued
services and opportunities provided by the workers should they be held
responsible for any outbreak of violence.
With few exceptions, gangs were exclusively male.8 Relationships with
girls occupied a great deal of male gang members’ time, however. Such
8. In two cases, a female gang developed as a small, auxiliary unit associated with a
well-known black male gang (see Fishman, 1995). One of the black gangs also had a
female member who was accepted as a (fringe) member by her male counterparts.
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relationships tended to be exploitative and occasionally were sources of

conflict, but serious concerns with long-term commitments often were
evident (see also Fishman, 1995). While boy-girl relationships almost
always were intra-racial, some white gang members participated in “zebra
parties” in which they associated intimately with black girls. Black gang
members generally were more sensitive to the risks associated with black-
white liaisons and fearful of the consequences of crossing that line.
GANG STATUS
In a social environment divided sharply on the basis of race and sex,
gang identification (especially on the street) was the most immediate
identity for both white and black gang youth (Short and Strodtbeck, 1965;
see also Suttles, 1968). It was important to others in their communities as
well. Many young boys looked up to gang members, mimicked them, and
aspired to gang membership, accounting in part for “senior,” “junior” and
“midget” gangs of the same name. Gangs with especially notorious
reputations also were well known to neighbors, police and other officials,
school and other agency personnel, and community businesspersons.
No white gang in this study could be characterized as a “conflict gang.”
Conversely, all of the highest ranking gangs on a measure of conflict were
black (see Short, Tennyson and Howard, 1963). Intra-racial gang
relationships reveal this contrast. While friendly relationships between
white gangs were promoted by strong community ties, relationships
between black gangs in contiguous neighborhoods were characterized by
rivalries that resulted in frequent clashes. Gang membership was fluid for
both races, however, and individual boys sometimes shifted allegiances
from one gang to another. In addition, “peace treaties” and “truces”
among the black gangs—almost always facilitated by detached workers, at
times in collaboration with local police—were effective in alleviating or, to
a lesser extent, eliminating rival gang hostilities. A few incidents also
involved alliances between rival black gangs in response to real or
perceived transgressions by whites, suggesting the primacy of racial over
gang identity.9 In the face of inter-racial conflict, even a lengthy history of
intergang antagonism quickly became less important:
Thursday night is when I saw all those Cobras and many
Imperials, about forty-five to fifty kids, and Vice Lords, too. They
never, never stand out there and drink wine together. They were
th
on 16 Street drinking wine together, talking and laughing. This
was all because of the incident of the boy who supposedly was an
9. The fact that members of one’s own race were often excluded as acceptable targets
of predatory violence also highlights the importance of racial identity.
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54 HUGHES AND SHORT
Imperial and was shot and killed. They claim that some white boys
shot him, and it was all directed around that. It was Imperials
mostly, and Warriors were mostly buying drinks for the Vice
Lords because they wanted to get the help of the Vice Lords to go
over there and jack up some guys. (Adapted from worker BG
interview)
NORMS AND SANCTIONS

Countervailing conventional and unconventional pressures combined in
the operative normative structures and sanctioning systems of these gangs.
The line between them often was a fine one, however, with few clear-cut
rules to delineate when generally accepted behaviors might be considered
unacceptable. Excess in either direction often resulted in ridicule,
relegation to the fringe, or—in extreme cases—ostracism. Several gang
members lost status within the gang after becoming “too committed” to
school or family, for example. Conversely, excessive drug use, violence
committed by a boy against his mother, or behavior that caused too much
trouble with fellow gang members, rival gangs or the law all were likely to
invoke sanctions as well. The following case, in which some of the Nobles
laugh at and make fun of Dickie when he arrives at the dance “knocked
out on narcotics,” is apposite:
Friday night, I went to a party given by some of the female peers
for the Nobles. It was held in the Orlando Homes, where we hold
our club meetings on Thursday nights. They had it all decorated
up, with potato chips and cupcakes and punch, you know, and the
box was playing. The Nobles were the only fellows there. They sat
around and ate up all the food and danced. They were very well
mannered, and at this particular juncture nobody was high, but
later on that night, they all got high. Smackdaddy came into the
dance and was so knocked out on narcotics that the fellows
laughed at him. He was in a stupor, and the kids made fun of him.
He was real sharp, though; he had a new suit and hat and coat and
shoes. But, he looked like he was sleepwalking. His speech was
slow and deliberate but inarticulate. I was surprised at the boys.
They just looked at him and shook their heads, you know, “That
damn fool”... “that’s pitiful.” They were really poking fun at him.
He resented it, and he resents this name Smackdaddy. He doesn’t
want them to call him Smackdaddy, “Get up off that. Don’t call
me Smackdaddy.” He wants them to call him Dickie. He just told
me hello that night. He left, because the boys were sort of getting
on him. (Adapted from worker BR interview)
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Provided that they were not too self-centered or “square,” status

generally was conferred on members with special abilities or skills (for
example, with girls or in athletics, “smartness,” or singing and dancing) or
who had access—legal or illicit—to alcohol, cars, money, “sharp” clothes
or other desirable commodities. Although gang members with established
reputations as fighters were awarded the most status and influence, the
majority of gang members relied on alternative means of achieving status
as they became available.
In general, gang members’ concerns and behaviors appeared to be
similar to those of their nongang counterparts. Most of the gangs were
organized and operated much like more conventional social clubs, with a
formal leadership structure, scheduled meetings and elections, business-
like negotiations with other gangs, membership dues and planned events.
Aside from a heavy emphasis on getting high, strong-arming others for
money and using violence to settle disputes, the daily activities of
individual members also were largely conventional. Much of their time
was spent taking steps to obtain a job, participating in sports, making plans
and preparations for the future (enlisting in the Navy, for example), and
socializing with male and female peers. Individual gang boys often were
reluctant to engage in violence, and in cases in which violence appeared to
be imminent, they generally were realistic about not acting foolishly if
faced with overwhelming odds (for example, when they were up against a
fearsome opponent or were disadvantaged in terms of numbers or
weaponry) or if there was a high likelihood of getting into trouble with the
law or with youth center personnel, their detached worker, and/or fellow
gang members. Overall, these boys resembled Anderson’s (1999) portrayal
of the ordinary social type residing in poor inner-city neighborhoods.
Individual gang boys (and gangs as groups), for the most part, were
“decent” despite strong and pervasive social pressures to engage in
“street” or unconventional behaviors.
DETACHED WORKERS
During the period of observation, detached workers occupied a central
position in the gang social world. Although the workers varied a great deal
in style and effectiveness, it is clear from both worker interviews and
observer reports that their role as third parties in disputes prevented a
great deal of fighting, as well as some other forms of delinquency, such as
gang rape, robbery, and theft (cf. Klein, 1969).
Interviews with the gang boys and their nongang member counterparts
in both lower and middle-class areas strongly suggested that detached
workers compensated for “‘deficits’ in gang boys’ relations with other
adult roles” (Short, Rivera and Marshall, 1964:64; see also Rivera and
2 HUGHES.DOC 1/26/2005 1:14 PM
56 HUGHES AND SHORT
Short, 1967). Indeed, for many gang members, workers were the strongest
link to conventional society. The workers did special favors for the boys,
supporting them in court and in other contacts with the law, getting them
out of trouble with parents, helping them find work, securing a place for
club meetings, intervening when they were in danger, transporting them
and providing access to professional sporting events and opportunities to
participate in athletics, dances and a wide range of other activities.
Consequently, they had considerable influence over rank and file gang
members and, in most cases, were able to cultivate close relationships with
gang leaders, who then could be counted on to play an active role in the
control of other gang members and in negotiations for peace with rival
gangs.
MICRO-LEVEL CONTEXTS
OF DISPUTE-RELATED INCIDENTS
The gang context was conducive to violence, and for gang youth,
willingness to fight often was critical to status management. However,
detached workers—frequently with the support of other gang members—
tended to uphold reasonably conventional behavioral standards, as did
most of the boys when assessing the consequences of their actions. Gang
youth thus were confronted with a delicate balancing of behavior
expectations and limits when they became involved in disputes. We
examine the nature of the pretexts for these disputes and the manner in
which gang youth managed this balance.
Table 1 shows the frequency and percentage distribution of dispute
pretexts. Normative and order violations accounted for more than a third
of all dispute-related incidents (37.7 percent) and half (50.3 percent) of
those for which a pretext could be determined. Identity attacks and
retaliation each accounted for approximately one in five dispute-related
incidents (18.4 percent and 17.1 percent, respectively) and nearly a quarter
of those for which a pretext could be determined (24.4 percent and 22.7
percent, respectively). Fewer than 3 percent of the disputes for which a
pretext could be determined, and slightly less than 2 percent of all
disputes, were associated with the “other” category.
Disputes varied considerably by pretext category (Table 2). Note,
however, that nearly two-thirds of all dispute-related incidents for which a
pretext could be determined were resolved nonviolently.10
10. Pretext-missing cases were especially violent (72.0 percent of 657 cases). Our
understanding of this anomaly is informed by examining the extent to which such
disputes were directly observed as opposed to based on secondhand information.
Pretext-missing disputes came to the attention of detached workers and graduate
2 HUGHES.DOC 1/26/2005 1:14 PM
Table 1. Dispute Pretext

Dispute Pretext N = 2637 % Valid %
Normative/Order Violation 995 37.7 50.3
Identity Attack 484 18.4 24.4
Retaliation 450 17.1 22.7
Other 51 1.9 2.6
Subtotal 1980 75.1 100.0
Indeterminable 657 24.9
Total 100.0
Table 2. Dispute Outcome by Dispute Pretext

Dispute Pretext
Normative
Dispute Identity
Order Retaliation Other Total
Outcome Attack
Violation
Nonviolent 683 (68.6) 312 (64.5) 202 (44.9) 25 (49.0) 1222 (61.7)
Violent 312 (31.4) 172 (35.5) 248 (55.1) 26 (51.0) 758 (38.3)
Total 995 (100.0) 484 (100.0) 450 (100.0) 51 (100.0) 1980 (100.0)
Note: Percentages in parentheses
2
χ = 79.162; df = 3; p < .001
Why were dispute-related incidents not resolved more often by violent

means, and what accounts for the varying levels of violence across pretext
categories? To answer these questions, we read through the full set of
detached worker interviews and observer reports twice, guarding against
“anecdotalism” by using quantitative data as a check on our inter-
pretations (see Silverman, 2001).
student observers via secondhand information more than twice as often as was the
case for disputes with a non-missing pretext (53.5 percent v. 22.9 percent) (data not
presented). Additional analysis (not presented) reveals that reports of violent
dispute outcomes were significantly more likely to be based on secondhand
information than on direct observation and, conversely, that reports of nonviolent
dispute outcomes more often were based on direct observation than on secondhand
2
information (χ = 354,871; df = 1; p < .001). Although the mere presence of workers
and their mediating behavior surely contributed to the low rate of violence among
directly observed pretext-missing disputes, the rate of violence among pretext-
missing disputes that were reported by participants is likely to be artificially
inflated. Data based on secondhand information, particularly when obtained from
those who are likely to report only those incidents that escalate into violence or
who have a stake in making themselves appear to be especially tough, skilled as
fighters, and macho, may be more questionable in terms of reliability and validity
than are data based on direct observation.
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58 HUGHES AND SHORT
The narrative data suggest that there were a number of micro-level

factors mitigating dispute escalation, most notably a close relationship
between disputants and audience disapproval of and actions to prevent
violence. Indeed, the outcome of disputes associated with each of the
three major pretexts appeared to depend largely on the extent to which
status concerns were outweighed by such constraints.
Although disputes emerged most often as a result of a normative or
order violation, such disputes were the least likely to be resolved with
violence (31.4 percent). These disputes tended to occur during the course
of routine interaction between members of the same gang or between a
gang member and another person with whom the gang member was in
frequent contact and on friendly terms (for example, detached worker,
other authority figure, neighborhood peer and so forth). Status concerns in
such cases were unlikely to be a major issue. Moreover, nonviolent
responses in these disputes were generally not perceived as indicative of a
lack of honor, and audience members (most of whom were closely
associated with both disputants) were especially likely to intervene, as in
the following case:
One of the days when the corner was pretty crowded, I was
standing around the tavern on the other side of the street. There
must have been about five or six of the Lords on this side and
about fifteen on the other corner and a few on the other corner. I
told Leonard that I wanted him to take the employment
applications downtown the next day, which he said he would do. I
took him home with the applications, because I didn’t want him to
lose them, and when he went up to the house, he stayed about 2
minutes and came back. Ball had gotten out of the middle seat
and gotten Leonard’s seat. Leonard has got to have the front seat,
and this is a known fact. Leonard is the only one who is particular.
Anyway, Leonard came down and Ball was in his seat, and he
said, “Get out of my seat, man,” and Ball said, “I’m not getting
up,” just like that, and Ball opened up his coat. I looked down and
there was a meat clever. I said, “Ball, get out of my car now.” Ball
said, “What’s wrong, Gil?” I said, “You carrying that crap. You
want me to get busted? You are not riding with me with that crap.
Why are you carrying a meat cleaver?” He didn’t say anything,
th
but he got out of the car and walked on down 15 , and Leonard
got in the car. And, they started talking about him being a fool.
(Adapted from worker BG interview)
Identity attack disputes resulted in violence slightly more often than
disputes resulting from a normative or order violation (35.5 percent).
Challenges to status in these situations were explicit, thus increasing the
likelihood of a violent outcome. In the following case, for example, Harold
2 HUGHES.DOC 1/26/2005 1:14 PM
of the Vampires attacks a newcomer to the area who had been talking bad
about him:
Some of the Seniors were in Seward Park. When I got there,
Harold had an argument with a boy and knocked him out. He hit
him twice, out like a light. The boy is new in the area, lives in the
new projects, and has been telling everybody he is going to form a
new group of Lords. The first time he came in the area I guess was
in November, and that night he had a fight with Tracy because he
asked Tracy if he wanted to get in his group, and Tracy said, “No,
Harold runs the groups over here.” The guy asked who Harold
was, and Tracy said, “My brother-in-law, and if you want to go, we
can go.” So, they had a fight that night, and Tracy beat him up. So,
this night, he had four of his buddies, huge kids, all over 6 feet,
and he was knocking off about starting this new club and getting
members. Tracy pointed him out to Harold, and he had made
some remark about he didn’t give a damn who Harold was and
that Harold didn’t mean a fuck to him or something like that, and
Harold said to him, “I don’t even know you, so what do you want
to be talking about me for?” The other guy said, “You are
supposed to be so much, the president of groups over here, but
we’re starting a new branch of the Lords over here,” and Harold
said he didn’t give a damn, but he didn’t want the stud talking
about him, and the guy said, “I talk about who I ... ” Bam! First
one knocked him down and the second knocked him out. Finally,
when we got him up, his buddies were going to take him out and
he collapsed again, but they finally got him outside and took him
out the back way of the park. I said, “This is worse than the Wild
West.” (Adapted from worker EM interview)
As with normative or order violation disputes, however, close
relationships between identity attack disputants encouraged a high rate of
nonviolent resolutions, as did mediation on the part of third parties (most
often, detached workers and/or fellow gang members). In the case below,
for example, detached worker BG, aided by one of the Nobles, prevents
Kenneth from responding with violence after being called a “punk” by an
older neighborhood local:
Saturday night, we went to the Vincennes. It’s an old rundown
hotel over there on the edge of the project that has something like
a little club in there. They sell drinks and you can dance. The kids
go in there and buy their drinks. About eight of us altogether
went around there and went in—Wallace, Bobby, Harvey, the
regular crowd... William, Buddy, Kenneth. A lot of grown-ups
were in there drinking and dancing and whatnot. During the
course of the evening, Vernon, one of the local older fellows who
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60 HUGHES AND SHORT
knows me and all the fellows, came in. Kenneth said, “How you
doing, Vernon?” and Vernon said, “How you doing, punk?” This
copped Kenneth. Kenneth was making it with some little girl. So
then, Kenneth said, “Don’t call me no punk. Who in the [so and
so] do you think you are?” Vernon’s a man, and I’m sure he
doesn’t respect Kenneth’s ability to fight. So, Vernon jumped up
and was getting ready to slap Kenneth. Kenneth had been
drinking. So, I got up along with Wallace and talked to both of
them and got them to calm down. They were all drinking. Looked
like the police were going to come in any minute or looked like
some type of fight was going to break out there. After the
commotion, I tried to pacify Kenneth. Vernon walked on out, and
Kenneth was steady making comments about how he was going to
kill Vernon for saying that. He said, “I don’t take that kind of
stuff off nobody.” I encouraged them to leave, and we went on
back to the poolroom. (Adapted from worker BG interview)
Disputes associated with retaliation escalated into violence more often
than did disputes associated with the other major pretexts (55.1 percent).
Because these disputes typically emerged between members of rival gangs,
they were the most likely to involve strong social pressures supportive of
violence (see also Decker, 1996).11 Violence in such cases often was
opportunistic and took the targeted party by surprise. This dispute
between members of the Warriors and Senior Vice Lords is a good
example.
So all the guys were over there, and some of the Warriors walked
up, wanting to talk peace. I told my boys that, if anything goes on,
I don’t want them to get involved. So, they told the Midgets not to
fight. They came to talk peace, so let them talk and then leave the
area. So, they were talking, about fourteen Warriors. They started
talking, and everything was nice, and Ball said, “There is one of
the mother-fuckers that hit me on top of my head,” and Glen ran
over and said, “No peace, no mother-fucking peace.” Pep was
across the street, and he started over there, and G [detached
worker] told him not to go. So, Ball ran over there and knocked
the boy down and then everybody got in it, except Sammy.
11. Most intergang disputes did not involve a large number of gang members; rather,
they took the form of so-called “wolf-packing,” in which smaller groups of rival
gang members took it upon themselves to stir up trouble with the enemy. The rare
occasions when rival gangs came together in large numbers specifically to do battle
were more volatile and even the potential for serious harm and the presence of
constraining influences such as third party intervention did not ensure a nonviolent
outcome.
2 HUGHES.DOC 1/26/2005 1:14 PM
Sammy chased a boy, but he didn’t hit anybody. Big James

grabbed a couple of fellows and walked them away, and some of
the Seniors say that Ball and Glen were wrong because the
Warriors came over to talk peace, and they should have let them
go away without molesting them. A boy got stabbed through his
neck and chest. He’s supposed to die. Little Lord hit the boy in
the head with a board, and he was wrong for doing that. I chewed
their asses, the Juniors. The next day, the police picked up
Sammy. I ran into him in the station at about 5:00. My friend,
Officer Howard, asked me if I could come down to the station. I
went down, and Sammy was there and his mother and sister and
his uncle were with him. They kept Sammy, but the boy couldn’t
identify Sammy. The boys told me Sammy didn’t do it. Ball had a
knife in his hand. (Adapted from worker GD interview)
When members of one gang were “jumped” by members of a rival gang
(often on the pretext of revenge), they were expected to protect their own
and their gang’s status through a successful defense or some type of
violent retribution. Gang youth could also elevate their personal status by
refusing to back down from violence with rival gang members seeking
revenge, especially when the latter possessed some type of unfair
advantage. Gang members who stood their ground in the face of
unfavorable numerical odds gained prestige, for example, even in cases in
which they had been defeated and in which the reputation of their gang
may have suffered.
Despite group norms supporting violence, retaliatory disputes often
were resolved without violence, usually as a result of mediation. While
retaliatory attacks frequently were undertaken outside the purview of
detached workers and other authority figures, it was not uncommon for
violence to be prevented as a result of intervention by these or, as follows,
other third parties:
The closest thing to a gang fight was that of the Comanche with
the Vice Lords around Hess elementary school. It was arranged
where they would meet in front of Hess and fight. I heard it from
the Juniors in the Comanche that they, all the Midgets that were
going to Hess school, were going to jump on them. The Juniors
heard this and so they went to Hess to help defend the Midgets.
This was Friday. Fortunately, the consultant [a gang leader who
was paid a small stipend by the detached worker program for
helping the worker in a variety of ways], Big John, heard about
this and went around the school with the Juniors, and instead of
fighting, he went over to talk to the Lords to see what the fighting
was about. When things were talked over with John, it was found
that some of the Comanche had jumped on a couple of the Vice
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62 HUGHES AND SHORT
Lords at different times and the same thing with Vice Lords
jumping on Comanche at different times, and I guess both groups
wanted to bring it to a head and have a showdown. But, by them
talking to each other and not yelling, the fight never came off.
They know John’s role as consultant, and they all felt glad that
John was there to arbitrate for them, because most of these boys
in the Juniors are not able to talk to different groups, especially
groups they are fighting against. (Adapted from worker CB
interview)
Table 3 presents outcome findings of the disaggregated pretext
categories, revealing important variations within each of the major pretext
categories.
Table 3. Dispute Outcome by Dispute Pretext, Specific Categories

Dispute Outcome
Dispute Pretext Nonviolent Violent Total
Normative/Order Violation
Normative/Order violation* 583 (70.2) 247 (29.8) 830 (100.0)
Actions suggesting a need to
defend others 39 (45.9) 46 (54.1) 85 (100.0)
Money/Debts 21 (70.0) 9 (30.0) 30 (100.0)
Unfair/Rough play 40 (80.0) 10 (20.0) 50 (100.0)
Identity Attack
Identity attack 277 (75.9) 88 (24.1) 365 (100.0)
Opposite sex relations 13 (25.0) 29 (75.0) 52 (100.0)
Territory/Neighborhood honor 18 (54.5) 15 (45.5) 33 (100.0)
Fun/Recreation 4 (12.1) 29 (87.9) 33 (100.0)
Racial concerns 0 (0.0) 1 (100.0) 1 (100.0)
Retaliation
Retaliation 195 (44.1) 247 (55.9) 442 (100.0)
Rumors 7 (87.5) 1 (12.5) 8 (100.0)
Other
Robbery 1 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (100.0)
Misunderstanding 14 (46.7) 16 (53.3) 30 (100.0)
General troublemaking 1 (33.3) 2 (66.7) 3 (100.0)
Other 9 (52.9) 8 (47.1) 17 (100.0)
Total 1222 (61.7) 758 (38.3) 1980 (100.0)
NOTE: Percentages in parentheses.
χ2 = 205.147; df = 14; p < .001
2 HUGHES.DOC 1/26/2005 1:14 PM
Within the normative/order violation category, violence was much more

likely to result when disputes involved defense of others (54.1 percent of
eighty-five cases). “Others” included parents, girlfriends of the boys (and
of their fathers or uncles), members of other ethnic groups and apparent
strangers. If there is a pattern in the data, it suggests that the gang boys
resented verbal or physical harassment of anyone who appeared to be at a
physical disadvantage or with whom they had a close relationship.
Big George told me that he had hurt his hand. He had it all
bandaged up and I asked him how he had done it. He said, “Well,
I was up on Clark Street the other day and this little boy was
shining a hillbilly’s shoes and the stud gave him a dime and the
little boy told him that it was 20 cents. He had it on his box and
everything. The man started calling him names and a whole bunch
of bullshit, so I offed him. I hit him above the temple and knocked
him out. Hurt my hand. This stud was almost as big as I am and
I’ll be dammed if I ain’t going to stop using my hands on people.
I’m going to start taking up the stick.” I said, “As big as you are,
you wouldn’t need a stick to fight a bear.” He said, “Well, I’m
going to start getting me a stick.” (Adapted from worker EM
interview)
We had a little party over at Wardell’s house. They were dancing
until midnight. Dorothy, the girl Blue goes with, has been
prostituting on the corner quite a bit. She walks up to me and said,
“Mr. George, Blue is down the block fighting.” I said, “What
happened?” She said, “Well, some fellow knocked me down, and
Blue is over there fighting.” So, I had to go see what the problem
was. The fellows were trying to hold Blue to keep him from
hitting him, but Blue got a right across. They hit each other, so
they tried to get each other with guns. It was all over within ten
minutes. He knows she is prostituting, but he said he doesn’t want
anyone to knock her down. (Adapted from worker GD interview)
Within the identity attack category, concerns regarding opposite sex
relations, territory/neighborhood honor, fun/recreation and racial
concerns all were associated with a relatively high rate of violence. Many
of the disputes over concerns regarding opposite-sex relationships
involved a gang member using violence to control the behavior of his
girlfriend. When, in other cases, a gang member’s claim to a particular girl
was somehow threatened, emotions ran especially high and negotiations
rarely were given a chance to develop.
Guy had an incident with one of the girls there, and he hit the girl
in the face and started a nose bleed. He has been going with this
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64 HUGHES AND SHORT
girl for quite some time, and he was displeased about something
she had done. It had to do with another ... she was sitting with the
boy at the show. The girl went into restaurant, and the fellow let
her go back to wash her face and try to stop her nose from
bleeding. (Adapted from worker LW interview)
Toward the end of the dance, I noticed Bobby dancing with one of
the more attractive girls at the dance. This was unusual, because
Bobby seldom dances with a girl. I had never seen him do so
before. After the dance, he told John and me about it. He said he
was dancing with this girl when Freddie came over to him and told
him that was his girl and for Bobby to stop dancing with her.
Freddie also hit Bobby as he told him this, sending all the stuff in
his shirt pocket flying. Bobby said usually he doesn’t, but this time
he controlled his temper and didn’t swing back at Freddie. The
girl told Fred to get lost, and he quickly disappeared. Bobby
continued to dance with her. (Adapted from observer WP interview)
Raymond was telling me that some older fellow was talking to
Laddy’s girl. Laddy hit him with a steel pipe and put him in the
hospital. He hit him about three or four times and broke his arm
and some ribs. Laddy doesn’t like anyone talking to his old lady.
(Adapted from worker GD interview)
Although disputes associated with “fun/recreation” typically involved
members of the same gang or a gang member and another person with
whom he had a close relationship, the high rate of violence in such cases
appeared related to the sometimes fluid and uncertain boundaries
between acceptable behavior (wrestling, body-punching, and so forth) and
more direct challenges to status (use of excessive force or force directed at
the “wrong” body part):
Friday night, Frank and Tracy were body-punching, and Frank hit
Tracy in the jaw accidentally. Tracy got mad and they fought.
Frank split his hand—a gash about an inch and a half or two
inches—on Tracy’s tooth and by the time they got them broken
up both of them had gotten their licks in. Tracy is crazy. He’s on
the verge of being nuts, especially when he gets that wine in him.
(Adapted from worker EM interview)
Only one dispute developed solely over racial concerns, and the
resulting violence reflects the tenor of black-white relationships during the
period of observation. Interracial relationships also appeared to increase
the likelihood of violence among territory/neighborhood honor disputes,
as did intergang relationships.
Disputes stemming from “rumors” were placed in the retaliation
category because they hinted strongly that retaliatory action might be
2 HUGHES.DOC 1/26/2005 1:14 PM
required against those who were accused of disseminating such

information. Nearly all were resolved nonviolently, however, in large part
because of mediating actions taken by detached workers and/or the
surfacing of information that exposed the rumor as unfounded.
Overall, variations in resolutions to disputes associated with each of the
pretext categories were consistent with the balance between pressures
favoring violence and situational limitations on such behavior. Heightened
status concerns combined with lowered situational constraints to produce
a high rate of violence among disputes involving retaliation. In contrast,
with the exception of coming to the defense of others—perhaps a type of
noblesse oblige—the coupling of lowered status concerns and a high level
of situational constraints clearly reduced escalation of disputes initiated on
the pretext of a normative or order violation. Although identity attacks
presented obvious status challenges, the rate of violence among these
types of disputes was moderated by the frequent involvement of intragang
disputants or others with whom the relevant gang member was in frequent
and close contact. The notable exceptions of disputes developing out of
concerns over opposite sex relationships and the less frequently observed
disputes arising out of what began as recreational “horsing around” reveal
the strength of gang members’ personal investments in relations with the
opposite sex and their desire to appear tough when things go wrong in the
rough and tumble of street gang life.
STATUS MANAGEMENT
The importance of audience behavior to the outcome of potentially
violent encounters has been noted by other researchers (Anderson, 1999;
Cooney, 1998; Felson, 1982; Felson and Steadman, 1983; Luckenbill, 1977;
Luckenbill and Doyle, 1989), as have relationships between the
participants (see Sampson and Lauritsen, 1994). However, the gang
literature is virtually silent with respect to both of these issues. Qualitative
data suggest that the manner in which disputes involving gang boys are
resolved depends largely on such micro-level variables.
We use logistic regression to analyze the impact of disputant (gang and
race) relationship and audience behavior on our three dichotomous
measures of dispute outcome and to examine the influence of other micro-
level variables (dispute pretext, the presence of co-offenders and co-
victims, and acquiescent behavior by the offender or victim). The results
of these analyses are presented in Table 4.12
12. Data were recoded such that the partial coefficient associated with the missing data
category reflects the difference between cases with missing data and all other cases.
The significance of this coefficient for dispute pretext (Models 1, 2 and 3), gang
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66 HUGHES AND SHORT
relationship between disputants (Models 1, 2 and 3), co-victim presence (Models 1

and 2), victim acquiescence (Models 1 and 2), offender acquiescence (Model 3), and
audience behavior (Models 1, 2 and 3) indicates a nonrandom missing data pattern
(not presented), which is consistent with our earlier suggestion regarding
secondhand information. As with disputes for which a pretext could not be
determined, disputes for which data were missing on the other variables frequently
did not involve direct observation and thus tended to be associated with elevated
reports of violence.
2 HUGHES.DOC 1/26/2005 1:14 PM
Model 1 confirms that disputes initiated on the pretext of retaliation

were significantly more likely to escalate than disputes with a normative or
order violation pretext (reference category). As indicated by the odds
ratio, the odds of violence among retaliation disputes were more than
twice the odds of violence for normative or order violation disputes.
Disputes occurring as a result of an identity attack did not differ
significantly from the latter, however. When violent cases are limited to
those in which the offender engaged in a physical attack (Model 2),
retaliation disputes again are shown to be the most likely to escalate into
violence. In contrast, Model 3 indicates that victims in retaliation disputes
were no more likely to engage in a physical attack than those involved in
disputes resulting from a normative and order violation. A likely reason is
that violence by the offender in retaliation cases often was based on an
element of surprise, thus giving the victim little or no time to react prior to
being attacked and disabled. When the offender’s identity attack provoked
the victim, however, the latter was significantly more likely to engage in
violence than in cases involving a normative or order violation.
Models 1 and 2 confirm that intergang disputes were significantly more
likely to escalate than were intragang disputes (reference category). In
both models, the odds of violence among disputes involving members of
different gangs were more than twice the odds of violence among
intragang disputes. Although victims in intergang disputes were more
likely to engage in violence than were victims in intragang disputes, the
difference is not statistically significant (Model 3). No significant
differences between the outcomes of extra-group and intragang disputes
are found in any of the models.
Findings for the race relationship between disputants show that the
outcome of disputes involving an interracial relationship generally did not
differ significantly from the outcome of intraracial disputes (reference
category). Only when violent cases are limited to those in which the victim
engaged in a physical attack (Model 3) is an interracial relationship
between disputants associated with dispute escalation compared to
intraracial disputes (odds ratio = 2.7).
Although Model 3 indicates that a physical attack by the victim was less
likely to occur in disputes involving offender acquiescence than in disputes
in which the offender did not engage in such behavior (reference
category), the difference is not statistically significant. However, Model 1
shows offender acquiescence to be associated with a significant reduction
in dispute escalation overall. When the offender did not acquiesce, the
odds of violence were 2.3 times (1/.43 = 2.3) that of disputes in which
offender acquiescence was reported.
Models 1 and 2 reveal the importance of victim acquiescence to the
avoidance of violence. Compared to disputes in which the victim did not
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68 HUGHES AND SHORT
acquiesce (reference category), disputes involving such behavior were

significantly less likely to escalate. As indicated by the odds ratio, the odds
of violence developing when the victim did not acquiesce were
approximately three times the odds of violence developing following
acquiescence by the victim (1/.34 = 2.9 in Model 1; 1/.32 = 3.1 in Model 2).
Findings for co-offender presence show that disputes involving co-
offenders were significantly more likely to escalate than were disputes in
which the offender acted alone (reference category). However, Model 3
indicates that the presence of co-offenders was unrelated to a physical
attack by the victim. There also was no relationship between co-victim
presence and violence on the part of the victim. On the other hand, co-
offenders were significantly less likely to engage in a physical attack when
co-victims were present than when the victim was alone (Model 2).
Finally, audience mediation is associated with a significant reduction of
violence across all three models. The odds of violence among disputes that
did not involve mediation (reference category) were between five times
(1/.18 = 5.6 in Model 3) and seventeen times (1/.06 = 16.7 in Model 1; 1/.07
= 14.3 in Model 1) the odds of violence among disputes in which at least
one audience member intervened.
These findings provide additional evidence of the importance of such
micro-level variables as who was involved, why the disputants were in
conflict, and whether either party acquiesced to the other or an audience
member intervened. It appears as though violence was most likely to
develop when features of the immediate context suggested that such
behavior was expected and necessary to the achievement or maintenance
of status, as in cases involving a retaliation pretext, an intergang
relationship between disputants, the presence of co-offenders (for
offender violence), or an identity attack (for victim violence). Conversely,
nonviolent outcomes were more likely when micro-level variables
appeared to suggest that violence was not necessary for status
maintenance (acquiescence and mediation) or was potentially the most
socially or physically costly behavioral alternative (mediation and, for the
offender, the presence of co-victims).
A possible limitation of these findings concerns the reliability of the
data—both their source and their quality. In more than three-quarters of the
cases (77.7 percent), the source of information was discernable. Of these,
well over two-thirds (71.1 percent) were based on direct observation. The
remaining 591 cases involved the detached workers or observers reporting
on what they had been told either by participants (23.3 percent),
nonparticipant observers (4.3 percent) or nonparticipant nonobservers (1.2
percent). The use of secondhand information is especially problematic, since
the extent of violence reported in these cases was substantially greater than
for those that were directly observed. Cases based on secondhand
2 HUGHES.DOC 1/26/2005 1:14 PM
information did not weigh heavily into the analyses, however, because of the
limited amount of useful material they typically contained. Moreover, few
substantive differences emerged when such cases were omitted.13 Of
greater significance is the variation in the quality of reports based on
direct observation. Because detached workers were interviewed at weekly
or, at times, biweekly intervals, they were not always able to recall
comprehensively and/or accurately the dispute-related incidents they had
observed. In addition, despite the fact that the research team actively
discouraged workers from imputing theoretical significance to what they
observed, the perception of some of the detached workers and what they
eventually reported may have been influenced by ideas about the
importance of status threats and opportunity structure, to which they had
been exposed in staff meetings and in interaction with members of the
research team. Some detached worker reports also may have been
compromised intentionally. While workers were informed of the strict
rules of confidentiality adhered to by the research team, they were aware
that the information contained within their reports would be read by
members of the research team whom they held in high regard and knew to
be closely associated with the Director of the Program for Detached
Workers. The role workers played in preventing disputes from escalating
into violence occasionally may therefore have been exaggerated.
Unreliability is likely to be especially serious when reasons for
behaviors are imputed. Throughout the research, however, pains were
taken to avoid or minimize imputations of motivation. Furthermore, it was
often possible to combine reports from multiple workers and observers,
with each serving as a check on the other. Because graduate student
reports were required to be completed within a day or two following
observation, they tended to be more detailed than the worker reports and
were less susceptible to problems of recall.
DISCUSSION
Youth gangs have increased in numbers in the United States (Klein,
1995; National Youth Gang Center, 2000) and elsewhere in the world
(Hagedorn, forthcoming; Klein, Kerner, Maxson and Wietekamp, 2001),
suggesting that gangs remain of continuing theoretical and empirical
significance. Recent studies have yielded important insights into the
nature of gangs and their influence on the adult lives of gang members (for
13. When all cases known to be based on secondhand information were excluded from
the analyses, co-offender presence is no longer significant in Models 1 and 2.
However, the direction of the relationship remains unchanged.
2 HUGHES.DOC 1/26/2005 1:14 PM
70 HUGHES AND SHORT
example, Cureton, 2002; Hagedorn, 1998, 2002), but understanding of

micro-level gang processes remains undeveloped.
Although major changes have occurred in the decades since these
Chicago data were collected, the dynamics of gang and community life
appear to remain much the same: personal and group identity,
oppositional relationships with other groups, and occasional violence and
involvement in other types of crime and delinquency (cf. Hagedorn, 2002,
forthcoming). Irving Spergel’s “Little Village” Chicago research has
special relevance in this regard. Compared to the gangs in the present
study, Spergel documents increased participation of gang (and Little
Village community) members in drug markets, the presence of more and
more-lethal guns on the street, and greater use of automobiles (hence,
more drive-by shootings). Data concerning intra- and intergang disputes,
however, are strikingly similar to those analyzed in this paper. Space
limitations limit us to these illustrative assessments and observations:
Drivebys, factional disputes, intergang fights, plans and
preparations for fights, graffiti forays, torching of opposing gang
members’ property (especially vehicles), sporadic nongang
batteries, robberies and other criminal occurrences were known to
the youth workers almost as soon as they occurred or were
rumored in the community.... The cause of such more limited
(intragang) fights, whether on the streets, at parties, or a chance
encounter... could be disputes over a girlfriend, antagonisms
between individual gang members, attempts to punish individual
gang members within or across factions for a general gang rule
violation (Spergel, Wa and Sosa, 2004:5.10).
Three carloads of Latin Kings were cruising their own
neighborhood ... late one night. They suddenly stopped and
busted out the windows of a reputed Two-Six (a rival gang) girl’s
car. The windows were tinted and the Latin Kings may have
thought that Two-Six males were also in the car. The worker
heard the attacking youths shout “King Love” (Spergel et al.,
2004:5.11).
Socioeconomic conditions in local communities, ethnic and racial
tensions, and group norms structure the micro-level contexts of disputes
involving gang members. Although status considerations generally are
heightened in the gang milieu, dispute escalation results less often than
might be expected. Our findings suggest that, in order to understand
dispute outcomes, it is important to take into account the influence of
close relationships among disputants, interaction processes, peer backup,
and audience intervention on the status management process.
2 HUGHES.DOC 1/26/2005 1:14 PM
Individual-level factors no doubt also enter into gang boys’ dispute-

related decisions. Observational data are here limited to suggestions that
“craziness” and fatalistic attitudes, which sometimes developed out of
frequent trouble with the law and/or a continuous cycle of retaliatory
attacks, were occasionally associated with violent behavior. Limited
cognitive abilities and other social disabilities of some boys also appeared
to increase the likelihood of violent reactions in the course of disputes.14
In contrast, some youth would not fight because of their lack of ability, a
recently acquired stake in conformity, and/or fear of formal or informal
sanctions. These tended to be fringe members for whom status in the gang
world did not appear either to be realistic or important.
The extent to which the behavior of gang youth reported here
transcends historical and geographical boundaries remains unclear.
However, the research literature is unambiguous in showing that status
concerns are amplified in gang contexts. This study adds to this body of
knowledge by demonstrating the importance of both the macrosocial and
microsocial levels in understanding status management processes and
explaining both the occurrence and the avoidance of violence in disputes
involving gang members. Further integration of these, as well as
individual-level, influences ought surely to be given high priority in future
studies of gangs.
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Lorine A. Hughes is assistant professor in the Department of Criminal

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include youth gangs, sex offenders and computer crime.
James F. Short, Jr. is professor emeritus of sociology at Washington
State University. His research on youth gangs has moved from the street
to the computer, the library, and correspondence with active field
researchers.

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2 HUGHES.

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DISPUTES INVOLVING YOUTH STREET

KEY WORDS: gangs, disputes, status management, microsocial,

This paper examines microsocial contexts of violent and nonviolent

After decades of neglect following the pioneering studies of Frederic

CRIMINOLOGY VOLUME 43 NUMBER 1 2005 43

44 HUGHES AND SHORT

prominently in Chicago, Los Angeles and New York, and large-scale

DISPUTES INVOLVING YOUTH GANG MEMBERS 45

others and aggressive sanctions against those who show disrespect”

46 HUGHES AND SHORT

Erlanger, 1979; Giordano, 1978; Horowitz, 1983; Horowitz and Schwartz,

DATA AND METHODS

DISPUTES INVOLVING YOUTH GANG MEMBERS 47

primary interest is in exploring contexts and processes associated with

48 HUGHES AND SHORT

disputants, race relationship between disputants, offender acquiescence,

DISPUTES INVOLVING YOUTH GANG MEMBERS 49

12. Rumors: physical or verbal actions undertaken by one party to

50 HUGHES AND SHORT

Co-offender presence and co-victim presence6 were each coded as 0 = no

DISPUTES INVOLVING YOUTH GANG MEMBERS 51

analyses between dispute outcome and the independent variables

RACE, CLASS AND SEX

52 HUGHES AND SHORT

class white neighborhoods in Chicago were undergoing racial transition

DISPUTES INVOLVING YOUTH GANG MEMBERS 53

relationships tended to be exploitative and occasionally were sources of

54 HUGHES AND SHORT

NORMS AND SANCTIONS

DISPUTES INVOLVING YOUTH GANG MEMBERS 55

Provided that they were not too self-centered or “square,” status

56 HUGHES AND SHORT

DISPUTES INVOLVING YOUTH GANG MEMBERS 57

Table 1. Dispute Pretext

Table 2. Dispute Outcome by Dispute Pretext

Why were dispute-related incidents not resolved more often by violent

58 HUGHES AND SHORT

The narrative data suggest that there were a number of micro-level

DISPUTES INVOLVING YOUTH GANG MEMBERS 59

60 HUGHES AND SHORT

DISPUTES INVOLVING YOUTH GANG MEMBERS 61

Sammy chased a boy, but he didn’t hit anybody. Big James

62 HUGHES AND SHORT

Table 3. Dispute Outcome by Dispute Pretext, Specific Categories

DISPUTES INVOLVING YOUTH GANG MEMBERS 63

Within the normative/order violation category, violence was much more

64 HUGHES AND SHORT

DISPUTES INVOLVING YOUTH GANG MEMBERS 65

required against those who were accused of disseminating such

66 HUGHES AND SHORT

relationship between disputants (Models 1, 2 and 3), co-victim presence (Models 1

DISPUTES INVOLVING YOUTH GANG MEMBERS 67

Model 1 confirms that disputes initiated on the pretext of retaliation

68 HUGHES AND SHORT

acquiesce (reference category), disputes involving such behavior were

DISPUTES INVOLVING YOUTH GANG MEMBERS 69

70 HUGHES AND SHORT