Geopolitics & Diplomacy

Western Indian Ocean: The Missing

Piece in the U.S. Indo-Pacific
Strategy
Written by Rushali Saha September 26, 2022 9 min read

In a long-delayed move, the White House announced its intent to integrate African states
into Indo-Pacific forums, according to its latest strategy document for Sub-Saharan Africa
from August 2022.

The Biden administration’s expansion of the geographic definition of the Indo-Pacific to

include the entire Indian Ocean, while a positive first step, is merely a symbolic move
unless complemented with concrete policy action. The continued Department of Defense
divisions of the Western Indian Ocean region across the Central Command and Africa
Command hinder a whole-of-government approach resulting in fragmented policy action.
In the context of global geopolitical transformations marked by the intensifying U.S.-China
strategic competition, the Biden administration must examine its existing Indo-Pacific
policy to rationalize the emergence of the Western Indian Ocean as a potential theater for
great power competition. A failure to achieve the long-held vision of rules-based order in
the Indo-Pacific with concrete actions risks the United States being reduced to a reactive,
rather than proactive, partner in the region.

U.S. Engagement in the Western Indian Ocean: Is it Enough?

The Indian Ocean region is best understood as a “region of interlinked, yet distinct sub-
regions” broadly encompassing South Asia, the Middle East, Africa’s eastern coast, and
various island countries spanning from the Cocos (Keeling) Island in the east to the
Comoros Archipelago in the West. The Western Indian Ocean (WIO) covers the vast
oceanic space stretching from the Red Sea, along coastal East Africa, to the Gulf of Oman
and the island nations of the Arabian Sea. Linking Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, the
WIO is home to several sea lanes of communication and maritime choke points, which are
vital for sea-borne trade, uninterrupted energy supply, and overall economic security.

Still, there are discrepancies in the definitions of the Indo-Pacific Region and the Western
Indian Ocean. Previous administrations sealed the contours of the Indo-Pacific to the
western shores of India, omitting all of the WIO. In Washington’s strategic imagination, the
geography of the Indo-Pacific coincided with USPACOM’s area of responsibility, and the
command name change to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command in 2018 formalized this
perception. Recognition of India’s role in the Pacific, East Asia, and Southeast Asia was
identified as a major motivation for the United States’ reimagination of the Asia-Pacific as
Indo-Pacific, yet New Delhi itself has consistently maintained that its conception of the
‘Indo-Pacific’ extended “from the shores of Africa to that of the Americas.” Similar
dissonance emerges from the QUAD’s recognition of instability in Afghanistan is a threat
to Indo-Pacific security requiring coordinated effort from all four member countries.
Nevertheless, two key South Asian countries—Afghanistan and Pakistan—fall beyond the
geographic scope of Washington’s activities in the Indo-Pacific.

Preoccupied with tension-inducing maritime sovereignty claims

in the Western Pacific, Washington’s engagements in the region
were largely confined to security pacts and naval access
agreements with key littoral states.

Washington has traditionally maintained a notable military presence in the region.

Through naval assets in Gulf Cooperation Council member countries and a military base in
Djibouti, the United States can protect its primary security interest of ensuring
uninterrupted supply of hydrocarbons flowing through the region. Preoccupied with
tension-inducing maritime sovereignty claims in the Western Pacific, Washington’s
engagements in the region were largely confined to security pacts and naval access
agreements with key littoral states. Despite that, the WIO is no longer on the maritime
periphery of countries’ foreign policy agendas.

China’s Multi-Pronged Strategy in the Western Indian Ocean

Beijing has adopted a multi-pronged strategy for the region, which focuses not only on
increasing military presence in the region but also on diplomatic, informational, and
economic engagement. The People Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has quickly established
a near constant presence in the region, including its first overseas “logistics-support” base
in Djibouti. Just miles away from Washington’s Camp Lemonnier, there have been
instances of Chinese-deployed lasers from the base injuring U.S. airmen. The PLAN’s
active presence in the WIO is accompanied by economic and infrastructure ties with key
coastal countries, like Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Sudan under the Belt and Road
Initiative framework. Today, China is engaged in major port-building activities in Kenya,
Tanzania, and Madagascar. Furthermore, two of China’s most significant railway projects
in Africa are in Kenya and Djibouti, through which Beijing is placing itself as the driver of
economic transformation in the region.

Notably, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt have been at the center
of Chinese investments as Beijing tries to forge an Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific
(FOIP), France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy, and India’s SAGAR vision all define the Indo-
Pacific to include the entire Indian Ocean, reaching the African continent. For Japan, the
Western Indian Ocean is central in its connectivity plans for Asia, Africa, and the Middle
East under the Indo-Pacific framework. France’s centrality in the WIO region stems from its
overseas Indian Ocean territories which encompass 20 percent of France’s total exclusive
economic zone. With vital energy and resource interests in the WIO, India’s 2015 Maritime
Doctrine identifies the region as a “primary area of maritime interest.”

Japan’s engagement with the region has focused on development cooperation with
notable financial investments for port development in Mozambique, Madagascar,
Seychelles, Kenya, Oman, and Iran. In addition, France has a strong diplomatic presence in
the region with highly active and involved participation in the Indian Ocean Commission,
one of the few major institutions which focus on the WIO. France has also built strong
economic and defense relations with the Gulf countries, especially the UAE and Qatar.

Building on New Delhi’s deep-rooted cultural ties with East African nations and strong
diasporic connections, India has diversified ties to prioritize maritime security and
developmental cooperation. The African Union’s emphasis on the blue economy for the
continent’s growth aligns well with Modi governments push for the Sagarmala project,
Delhi’s blue economy vision for port-led coastal economic development. In his speech at
the Parliament of Uganda, Modi outlined India’s vision to work with African partners to
harness the benefits of the blue economy in a sustainable manner.

India’s deepening economic relations with the Gulf countries have also paved the way for
more broad-based defense cooperation. The Indian navy now conducts naval exercises
with almost all major GCC countries. The current government has clarified that New Delhi
is prioritizing the WIO starting with Prime Minister Modi’s 2015 Indian Ocean tour, which
included visits to the key WIO island states of Mauritius and Seychelles.

In light of shared concerns and common interests, these three countries have been
actively exploring bilateral and trilateral platforms for expanding cooperation. Leaders
from France, India, and the Vanilla Islands—comprising Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius,
and Seychelles—met in Saint-Denis (Reunion Island) in 2019 where Indian and French
representatives discussed areas of cooperation in the resource-rich region. Earlier this
year, in a meeting between India, France, and the UAE, the three sides discussed steps for
furthering trilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. This opens the possibility of the
UAE participating in the recently announced Indo-Pacific Trilateral Development
Cooperation Fund by France and India which focuses on sustainable innovations in the
region and future joint ventures in strengthening their presence in the WIO.

What Should the United States Do?

Despite the Pacific remaining the primary theater of U.S. engagement, the Biden
administration has positively carried forward the Trump era focus on Eastern Indian
Ocean countries in the region under the Indo-Pacific framework. Whether it is U.S.
attempts to encourage Bangladesh to participate in the IPEF, strengthening bilateral
defense relations with the Maldives to expand its role in “advancing shared interests in the
Indo-Pacific”, or promoting maritime cooperation with Sri Lanka—the message is evident;
Washington sees these countries as ‘Indo-Pacific partners.’ However, Washington’s near
lack of engagement with WIO countries to promote rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific
stands as a stark contrast.

India stands out as the viable partner and coordinated Indo-U.S.

action can strengthen support for a rules-based order in the
region. For this, Indo-U.S. naval cooperation must extend beyond
existing navy-to-navy ties and focus on wide-ranging and
comprehensive partnerships in East African littorals.

U.S. engagement in the region must be premised on a careful balancing act which does
not aggravate the regional countries’ fears of increasing militarization of the region. To do
this, Washington should consider expanding cooperation with existing Indo-Pacific
partners, which already have an established presence in the region. India stands out as the
viable partner and coordinated Indo-U.S. action can strengthen support for a rules-based
order in the region. For this, Indo-U.S. naval cooperation must extend beyond existing
navy-to-navy ties and focus on wide-ranging and comprehensive partnerships in East
African littorals. Moreover, new partnerships among India, the UAE, Israel, and the United
States create multilateral platforms for the United States and India to jointly engage in the
Gulf region and bring maritime issues to the fore.

The White House has a golden opportunity to present a revised Indo-Pacific approach,
which incorporates the entire WIO as it rolls out its much delayed National Security
Strategy. Military presence alone will not improve U.S. influence in the region. Instead,
focus should be on development cooperation and maritime diplomacy.

***

Image 1: STR/AFP via Getty Images

Image 2: Parveen Negi/The India Today Group via Getty Images

Posted in: East Africa, India, Indian Ocean, Indo-Pacific, Western Indian Ocean
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