Group G: Khushi Jain Mariyah Alam Farhan Memon Zoya Shaikh Soniya Mulchandani
This case discusses an appeal of a conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant claimed the defense of insanity under Section 84 at the time of the offense. While the trial court rejected this defense and convicted the appellant, the High Court analyzed the circumstances before, during, and after the offense which indicated the appellant's potential unsound mental state, including beheading the victim in public without resistance. The Court found the appellant sufficiently proved his insanity defense and set aside the conviction, ordering that he be set at liberty.
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Group G: Khushi Jain Mariyah Alam Farhan Memon Zoya Shaikh Soniya Mulchandani
This case discusses an appeal of a conviction for murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant claimed the defense of insanity under Section 84 at the time of the offense. While the trial court rejected this defense and convicted the appellant, the High Court analyzed the circumstances before, during, and after the offense which indicated the appellant's potential unsound mental state, including beheading the victim in public without resistance. The Court found the appellant sufficiently proved his insanity defense and set aside the conviction, ordering that he be set at liberty.
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LAW OF CRIMES (IPC)
TUKAPPA TAMANNA LINGARDI v/s STATE OF MAHARASHTRA
( 1991 CRLJ 2375 BOM ) Group G : Khushi Jain Mariyah Alam Farhan Memon Zoya Shaikh Soniya Mulchandani TUKAPPA TAMANNA LINGARDI v/s STATE OF MAHARASHTRA ( 1991 CRLJ 2375 BOM )
Court : Bombay High Court
Case Type : Criminal Appeal Case No. :819 of 1987 Citation : Criminal Law Journal Date of Judgment : 30th July, 1990 Appellant : Tukappa Tamanna Lingardi Respondent : State of Maharashtra Bench : Justice V.P.Tipnis. Justice M.S.Vaidya. Facts : . It was the prosecution story itself that the deceased as well as the sister of the accused were in the market since before 1.30 noon. At about 1.30 the sister had gone to police station to complain about the deceased and had come back with the police constable when suddenly the accused attacked the deceased and beheaded him. The conduct of the accused in attacking the victim in the presence of several persons who could have watched him committing the offence was one of the pointers to his mental condition. The second important thing was that after beheading the deceased, he picked up the head and threw it in the air twice or thrice. This was certainly not a conduct of a normal human being. Much less so was the conduct of the appellant in bringing the head back near the dead body and chopping it so much so that the brain matter fell out. The accused had not stopped even at that time. After breaking the head, he again picked it up and blew it up in the air. Having done all this if he was sane he would have certainly made an attempt to run away from the place. The appellant-accused did not do so, he stood or sat quietly near the scene of offence till he was taken to the police station by the police. He did not offer any resistance to the police nor is he said to have exhibited any recalcitrance towards the police authorities. All these circumstances attending the act of the alleged crime could be a pointer to the insane mental condition of the accused. Here in the present case, it is not merely the nature of the act but the circumstances preceding and subsequent to the incident of offence do warrant a conclusion that the appellant has sufficiently discharged the burden of proof cast upon him by law to prove that he was falling within the four corners of the ambit of S.84 of the Penal Code. Arguments by the Appellant : . The appellant preferred a jail appeal contending that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge had failed to appreciate and apply properly the provisions contained in S. 84 of the Indian Penal Code to the facts of the case and further, that he had erred in appreciating the evidence on record which was in favour of the appellant. The learned advocate for the appellant relied upon the ruling in Ratan Lal v. State of M.P., and submitted that when the appellant was deprived of the opportunity right from the initial stage to establish his insanity at the relevant point of time, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge should have appreciated that fact in its due perspective and should have held that on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellant had succeeded in proving his defence in its totality by rebutting the ordinary presumption of sanity which becomes available to the prosecution in usual cases of this type. He submitted that the circumstances preceding the incident of offence, attending the incident of offence as well as the subsequent circumstances prove amply enough, that the appellant had rebutted the presumption of sanity and that the evidence on record did prove to the satisfaction of the Court his defence of insanity at the relevant point of time. He, therefore, submitted that the appeal be allowed and the conviction and sentences awarded to the appellant be set aside and that the appellant be set at liberty. Arguments by the Respondent : . Mrs. Rao, the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State, relied upon several rulings on the point of presumption of sanity, the rebuttal thereof and contended that in the circumstances of the case, the very fact that the appellant had attacked a person against whom he had had some grudge, itself indicated that the act of the appellant in committing the murder in question was motivated, a circumstance which could prove that he was not insane at the relevant point of time. According to her, the act of the accused was an act of cold-blooded murder in broad day-light in a most cruel manner and, therefore, the appellant was a rightly convicted by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. She prayed that the conviction and the sentences awarded to the appellant be confirmed. • Judgment : . VAIDYA, J. : -This appeal is directed against an order dated 29th April, 1987 under which the learned Additional Sessions Judge Sawantwadi (Mr. S. R. Ganvatkar) had convicted the appellant for an offence punishable under S. 302 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life. The name of the victim was Ajappa Fakirappa Dasapanawar. The appellant was also convicted of offences punishable under Ss. 353 and 332 of the Indian Penal Code for causing hurt to police constable Desai who was on duty on the scene of offence at the relevant point of time. For the first mentioned offence, the appellant was sentenced to suffer R. I. for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 200/-, in default to suffer R.I. for one month. For the latter mentioned offence the appellant was sentenced to suffer R.I. for two years and to pay a fine of Rs. 300/-, in default to suffer R.I. for three months. The substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The evidence was recorded in course of time and the accused was defended at the trial by an Advocate appointed by the State under the Legal Aid Scheme. The defence of the appellant at the trial was that at the relevant point of time, he was insane and that as such, he did not know the nature of the act committed by him. He had specifically claimed that he had fallen within the scope of S. 84 of the Indian Penal Code and that, therefore, he should not be held guilty for any of the offences alleged. He had examined in defence three witness to prove his defence. It as contended at the trial that in the circumstances of the case, the appellant could not be held guilty of any of the offences charged against him ant that he deserved an acquittal. Having felt aggrieved by this decision, the appellant preferred a jail appeal contending that the learned Addl. Sessions Judge had failed to appreciate and apply properly the provisions contained in S. 84 of the Indian Penal Code to the facts of the case and further, that he had erred in appreciating the evidence on record which was in favour of the appellant. The learned advocate for the appellant relied upon the ruling in Ratan Lal v. State of U. P., AIR 1971 SC 778 : ( 1971 Cri LJ 654) and submitted that when the appellant was deprived of the opportunity right from the initial stage to establish his insanity at the relevant point of time, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge should have appreciated that fact in its due perspective and should have held that on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellant had succeeded in proving his defence in its totality by rebutting the ordinary presumption of sanity which becomes available to the prosecution in usual cases of this type. He submitted that the circumstances preceding the incident of offence, attending the incident of offence as well as the subsequent circumstances prove amply enough. that the appellant had rebutted the presumption of sanity and that the evidence on record did prove to the satisfaction of the Court his defence of insanity at the relevant point of time. He. therefore, submitted that the appeal be allowed and the conviction and sentences awarded to the appellant be set aside and that the appellant be set at liberty. Mrs. Rao, the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State, relied upon several ruling on the point of presumption of sanity, the rebuttal thereof and contended that in the circumstances of the case, the very fact that the appellant had attacked a person against whom he had, has some grudge, itself indicated that the act of the appellant in committing the murder in question was motivated, a circumstance which could prove that he was not insane at the relevant point of time. According to her, the act of the accused was an act of cold- blooded murder in broad day-light in a most cruel manner and, therefore, the appellant was a rightly convicted by the learned Addl. Sessions Judge. She prayed that the conviction and the sentence awarded to the appellant be confirmed. • Coming then to the arguments on the point of S. 84 of the Indian Penal Code, the section itself says that nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. The section falls in Chap. IV of the Indian Penal Code which deals with 'General Exceptions'. The reading of this section will not be complete unless it is read with S.105 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and particularly illustration (a) to that section. The text of the section and the illustration may he quoted here with advantage : "When a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of the General Exceptions in the Indian Penal Code, or within any special exception or proviso contained in any other part of the same Code, or in any law defining the offence, is upon him, and the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances. Illustration (a) A, accused of murder, alleges that, by reason of unsoundness of mind, he did not know the nature of the act. The burden of proof is on A." The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor relied upon, in this context, the classic ruling in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ahmadulla, AIR 1961 SC 998 : (1961 (2) Cri LJ 43) which laid d own that the burden of proof that the mental condition of the accused was, at the crucial point of time, such as is described by S.84 of the Indian Penal Code lay on the accused who claimed the benefit of that exemption. In that case, the defence had led evidence of a District Civil Surgeon and Superintendent of the Mental Hospital both of whom had given evidence about the nature of epileptic insanity. On facts, it was held that the evidence could not prove the mental condition of the appellant at the time of the act. It must be pertinently noted that it was not a plea in that case on behalf of the defense that the appellant was not in a position to prove because of his insanity, that at the relevant point of time he was insane. 11. The next ruling relied upon by the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor was in S. W. Mohammed v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 2443 : (1972 Cri LJ 1523) in which it was observed that the law presumed every person of the age of discretion to be sane unless the contrary was proved. A caution note was sounded that it would be most dangerous to admit the defence of insanity upon arguments derived merely from the character of the crime and that the mere fact that no motive has been proved for the offence in question or that he had made no attempt to run away, though it was possible for him to do so, would not indicate that he was insane. Laying down the similar proposition as laid down in the former ruling, the conviction of the appellant before the Supreme Court was confirmed by that Court after finding on facts, that the appellant had failed to prove the required state of mind at the time of the commission of the offence. In this case also, it was not the plea of the defence that the appellant was unable to prove his defence of insanity on account of his insanity. 12. In Oyami Ayatu v. State of M. P., AIR 1974 SC 216 : (1974 Cri LJ 305), the Supreme Court had again referred to the presumption in favour of sanity of the person of discretion and the awareness of the natural consequences of his act. It was pointed out the presumption was rebuttable and that the accused could rebut it by placing before the Court all the relevant evidence. It was also pointed out that the burden, in such cases, though not as heavy as upon the prosecution In a criminal case, is upon the accused to prove that he was of unsound mind at the time of the commission of the offence and as such, incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that he was doing what was either wrong or contrary to law. In this case. the Supreme Court had noted (in para 5 of the AIR report) that no plea was taken on behalf of the appellant at the trial that he was not a sane person. Much less was there a plea on behalf of the defence in the trial Court that the accused before the Court was not in a position to prove, on account of his insanity, his insanity at the relevant point of time. • The evidence of the defence witnesses deserves to be appreciated on the background of the aforesaid facts which have authentically come on record. D.W. 2 Hanamant Lingardi happens to be a brother of the appellant. He told in his deposition that the mental condition of the appellant was not satisfactory for about two years prior to the incident and that it had particularly become so when one of the brothers of the appellant, by name Ramappa, was murdered by deceased Ajappa about five years ago. (It may be noted here that the first informant constable Desai had also referred to this murder, but had told that it was committed two years ago). According to defence witness Hanamant, after Ramappa's murder, the appellant became mentally affected and had become an insane. He had started having fits of lunacy and, while in such fits, he used to say that a tiger was coming to eat him or to kill him. He used to hear the voice of tiger and used to refuse to take his food. Hanamant told that the accused used to have sleepless nights and if at all he was asleep, he used to get up and run away under the stress of fear from tiger. He added that whenever he saw deceased Ajappa (victim), the appellant used to say that a tiger was coming and that he (tiger) would kill him or eat him. Hanamant told that in such conditions of the appellant, it was for Hanamant himself to control the accused. He stated that as the family had no money for proper medical treatment, he was not taken to a hospital or a doctor, but was taken to a village medical practitioner in Ayurvedic medicines for removing the accused from the influence of evil spirits. He told that the appellant used to be out of his fits - for sometime, but mostly reverted back to his fits of lunacy. Hanamant added that on the date of the offence, the appellant was wandering in the forest with a heavy sickle (pal koyta) expecting a tiger to come. The evidence of the defence witness Pawar is to be read on this background. He happens to be a village Medical Practitioner as well as probably a person professing himself to be remover of evil spirits. Those who are conversant with the life in the remotely situated interior of hilly areas of southern Konkan are conversant with the practices adopted by such professionals and they would not be surprised at the relatives of the appellant taking the appellant to such a professional for treatment. His evidence need not be discarded on the background of the aforesaid circumstances connected with the appellant. However, even if his evidence is accepted with a pinch of salt along with the story made out by the appellant's brother that the appellant had delusion about tiger, etc. one thing is clear from the evidence of this person that the mental condition of the appellant was not normal before the incident, at about the time of the incident or after the incident. In the result, we conclude that as the case of the appellant is proved to be falling within the scope of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, he is not proved to have committed the offence of murder as alleged by the prosecution. He is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal. Accordingly, we allow the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant and acquit him of all the charges levelled against him. The appellant is directed to be set at liberty forthwith, unless required in any other case, in view of the fact this pending appeal he was found to be cured of his lunacy.