JOBNAME: No Job Name PAGE: 1 SESS: 1 OUTPUT: Sun Nov 30 15:12:24 2014

Tan Jye Yee & Anor v Public Prosecutor

[2014] 6 MLJ (Tengku Maimun JCA) 609

A
Tan Jye Yee & Anor v Public Prosecutor

COURT OF APPEAL (PUTRAJAYA) — CRIMINAL APPEAL

B
W-09–327–12 OF 2013
MOHTARUDIN BAKI, ROHANA YUSUF AND TENGKU MAIMUN
JJCA
6 AUGUST 2014
C
Criminal Law — Sedition — Publication of offensive pictures and message
— Appellants posted offensive picture and message on Facebook account
— Application to strike out charge dismissed by High Court — Appeal to Court
of Appeal — Whether s 298A of the Penal Code is in pith and substance, a
D legislation on religion of Islam — Whether legislation concerning public order
— Sedition Act 1948 s 4(1)

The appellants were charged in the sessions court under s 4(1) of the Sedition
Act 1948 (‘the Act’) and s 298A(1)(a) of the Penal Code for the offence of
E
posting on their Facebook a Hari Raya greetings, the contents among which
were the photographs of the appellants enjoying Bak Kut Teh with the ‘Halal’
logo. In addition to that, the appellants were also charged under s 5(1) of the
Film Censorship Act 2001 for certain obscene publications in the Tumblr
F website. The appellants then applied to the High Court to strike out the charge
under s 298A of the Penal Code for creating enmity between persons of
different religions as a result of the said posting. Essentially, the application was
premised on the fact that the Supreme Court had already decided on the
legality of s 298A of the Penal Code. Relying on Public Prosecutor v Mohamed
G Nor & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 200b (‘Mohamed Nor’) and the minority judgment
in Mamat bin Daud & Ors v The Government of Malaysia [1988] 1 MLJ 119
(‘Mamat bin Daud’), the High Court dismissed the application. Aggrieved by
the said decision, the appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal. The issues
that arose were whether s 298A is, in pith and substance, a legislation on the
H religion of Islam or whether it is a legislation concerning public order. Reliance
was again placed by the respective parties on the Supreme Court decisions in
the abovementioned cases.

Held, allowing the appeal:

I
(1) Given that the Supreme Court had decided on s 298A, it was not open
for the Court of Appeal to investigate the true character or substance of
s 298A. There was no necessity to consider whether the pith and
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610 Malayan Law Journal [2014] 6 MLJ

substance of s 298A is a subject matter of religion or public order. What A

the Court of Appeal had to consider was the application of the doctrine
of stare decisis (see para 19–20).
(2) The decision of the Supreme Court in Mamat bin Daud was on a
principle of law. The facts would not have mattered. In considering the B
issue whether Parliament or the State Legislative Assemblies should
legislate the impugned section, the Supreme Court had, by majority
ruled that s 298A is, in pith and substance, a law on religion while the
dissenting judgment ruled that it is on public order and criminal law. It is
the majority judgment of the Supreme Court that creates the binding C
precedent. The dissenting judgment could not be accepted as the correct
state of law over the majority judgment (see para 24).
(3) Since the issue before the Supreme Court was purely on the adequacy of
sentence, there was no proposition as such by the Supreme Court in
D
Mohamed Nor, on the true character and substance of s 298A.
Section 298A was designed to preserve law and order, was not the
pronouncement of the Supreme Court as perceived by the judge but was
the finding of the High Court. In the circumstances, it could not be said
that the ratio decidendi of the two decisions of the Supreme Court was in
E
conflict with one another (see para 29).
(4) The High Court judge had erred in refusing to follow the majority
decision of the Supreme Court on the true character and substance of
s 298A. The order of the High Court was set aside (see para 30).
F
[Bahasa Malaysia summary
Perayu-perayu telah dituduh di mahkamah sesyen di bawah s 4(1) Akta
Hasutan 1948 (‘Akta tersebut’) dan s 298A(1)(a) Kanun Keseksaan kerana
kesalahan meletakkan posting di Facebook mereka ucapan Hari Raya, yang
mana kandungannya, antara lain, adalah gambar perayu-perayu menikmati G
makanan Bak Kut Teh dengan logo ‘Halal’. Selain itu, perayu-perayu juga
dituduh di bawah s 5(1) Akta Penapisan Filem 2001 untuk penerbitan lucah
tertentu di laman web Tumblr. Perayu-perayu kemudian telah memohon
kepada Mahkamah Tinggi untuk membatalkan pertuduhan di bawah s 298A
Kanun Keseksaan kerana menimbulkan permusuhan antara orang-orang yang H
berbeza agama akibat posting tersebut. Pada dasarnya, permohonan itu
berasaskan fakta bahawa Mahkamah Agung telah pun memutuskan
berhubung kesahan s 298A Kanun Keseksaan. Berdasarkan Public Prosecutor v
Mohamed Nor & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 200b (‘Mohamed Nor’) dan penghakiman
minoriti dalam kes Mamat bin Daud & Ors v The Government of I
Malaysia [1988] 1 MLJ 119 (‘Mamat bin Daud’), Mahkamah Tinggi menolak
permohonan itu. Terkilan dengan keputusan tersebut, perayu-perayu merayu
kepada Mahkamah Rayuan. Isu-isu yang timbul adalah sama ada s 298A
adalah, suatu perundangan tentang agama Islam atau sama ada ia adalah
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Tan Jye Yee & Anor v Public Prosecutor

[2014] 6 MLJ (Tengku Maimun JCA) 611

A perundangan berkenaan ketenteraman awam. Kebergantungan sekali lagi

diletakkan oleh pihak-pihak berkenaan kepada keputusan-keputusan
Mahkamah Agung dalam kes-kes yang tersebut di atas.

Diputuskan, membenarkan rayuan:

B
(1) Oleh kerana Mahkamah Agung telah membuat keputusan tentang
s 298A, ia tidak terbuka untuk Mahkamah Rayuan menyiasat sifat atau
kandungan sebenar s 298A. Tiada keperluan untuk mempertimbangkan
sama ada kandungan sebenar s 298A adalah hal perkara berhubung
C
agama atau ketenteraman awam. Apa yang perlu dipertimbangkan oleh
Mahkamah Rayuan adalah permohonan doktrin stare decisis (lihat
perenggan 19–20).
(2) Keputusan Mahkamah Agung dalam kes Mamat bin Daud adalah
berdasarkan prinsip undang-undang. Fakta itu tidak penting. Dalam
D mempertimbangkan isu sama ada Parlimen atau Dewan Undangan
Negeri patut menggubal seksyen yang dipersoalkan, Mahkamah Agung
telah, dengan majoriti memutuskan bahawa s 298A adalah, dari segi isi
dan kandungan, suatu undang-undang berhubung agama manakala
penghakiman yang menentang memutuskan bahawa ia adalah
E berhubung ketenteraman awam dan undang-undang jenayah. Ia adalah
penghakiman majoriti Mahkamah Agung menjadi duluan yang
mengikat. Penghakiman yang menentang tidak boleh diterima sebagai
undang-undang yang betul mengatasi penghakiman majoriti (lihat
perenggan 24).
F
(3) Oleh kerana isu di hadapan Mahkamah Agung semata-mata berhubung
kesesuaian hukuman, tiada saranan sedemikian oleh Mahkamah Agung
dalam kes Mohamed Nor, berhubung sifat dan kandungan s 298A.
Seksyen 298A digubal untuk memelihara undang-undang dan
G
ketenteraman, bukan keputusan Mahkamah Agung sebagaimana dilihat
oleh hakim tetapi penemuan Mahkamah Tinggi. Dalam keadaan
berikut, tidak boleh dikatakan bahawa ratio decidendi kedua-dua
keputusan Mahkamah Agung adalah bercanggah dengan satu sama lain
(lihat perenggan 29).
H (4) Hakim Mahkamah Tinggi terkhilaf kerana enggan mengikut keputusan
majoriti Mahkamah Agung berhubung sifat dan kandungan s 298A.
Perintah Mahkamah Tinggi telah diketepikan (lihat perenggan 30). ]

Cases referred to
I Barat Estates Sdn Bhd v Parawakan a/l Subramaniam & Ors [2000] 4 MLJ 107,
CA (refd)
Dato’ Tan Heng Chew v Tan Kim Hor [2006] 2 MLJ 293; [2006] 1 CLJ 577,
FC (refd)
Fawziah Holdings Sdn Bhd v Metramac Corp Sdn Bhd (previously known as
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612 Malayan Law Journal [2014] 6 MLJ

syarikat Teratai KG Sdn Bhd) [2006] 1 MLJ 435, CA (refd) A

Mamat bin Daud & Ors v The Government of Malaysia [1988] 1 MLJ 119;
[1988] 1 CLJ (Rep) 197, SC (refd)
PP v Mohamed Nor & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 200b, SC (refd)

Legislation referred to B
Criminal Procedure Code s 294
Federal Constitution arts 4, 10(1)(a), 11(4), (5), Ninth Schedule, List I,
Federal List, Items 3, 4, para 4(k), List II, State List, Item 1
Film Censorship Act 2002 s 5(1)
C
Penal Code s 298A, 298A(1)(a)
Sedition Act 1948 s 4(1)(c)

Appeal from: Criminal Application No 44–94–08 of 2013 (High Court,

Kuala Lumpur) D
Chong Joo Tian (Wong Kee Them and Nur Adilah bt Kamarzaman with him) (JT
Chong Assoc) for the appellants.
Wan Shaharuddin bin Wan Ladin (Haffiza bt Jemali with him) (Deputy Public
Prosecutor, Attorney General’s Chambers) for the respondent.
E
Tengku Maimun JCA (delivering judgment of the court):

[1] The appellants had posted on their Facebook a Hari Raya greetings, the
contents among which are the photographs of the appellants enjoying Bak Kut F
Teh with the ‘Halal’ logo and the following comments:
Selamat Berbuka Puasa (dengan Bak Kut Teh … wangi, enak menyelerakan!!! …
Izinkan kami memperkenalkan cara kami memupuk semangat 1 Malaysia dengan
bertukar-tukar makanan antara kaum-kaum Malaysia pada musim perayaan yang
mulia ini. Hak untuk menikmati juadah enak tempatan seharusnya merentasi G
batasan bangsa dan juga agama. Kepada saudara-saudari yang beragama Islam,
selamat berbuka puasa dan Salam Aidilfitri.

[2] The appellants were charged in the Sessions Court Kuala Lumpur for the
following offences: H

(a) under s 4(1)(c) of the Sedition Act 1948 in relation to the appellants’
posting of a Hari Raya greeting on their Facebook intituled ‘Selamat
Berbuka Puasa (dengan Bak Kut Teh … wangi, enak, menyelerakan)’;
I
(b) under s 298A(1)(a) of the Penal Code for the same posting; and
(c) under s 5(1) of the Film Censorship Act 2002 for certain obscene
publication in their Tumblr website.
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Tan Jye Yee & Anor v Public Prosecutor

[2014] 6 MLJ (Tengku Maimun JCA) 613

A [3] The appellants pleaded not guilty and claimed trial to all the three
charges.

[4] The appellants then sought to strike out the charge under s 298A of the
Penal Code for creating enmity between persons of different religions as a result
B of the said posting. They filed an application in the High Court seeking, inter
alia, the following declaration:
(a) that s 298A is unconstitutional as it contravenes the appellants’ right to
freedom of expression under art 10(1)(a) of the Federal Constitution;
C and/or
(b) that s 298A is a legislation made by Parliament under art 10(1)(a) of the
Federal Constitution and para 4(k), (Federal List) of the Ninth Schedule
of the Federal Constitution relating to the religion of Islam for the federal
territory and is therefore not applicable to the appellants who are
D
non-Muslims.

[5] Essentially, the application was premised on the fact that the Supreme
Court had already decided on the legality of s 298A of the Penal Code.
E
[6] For convenience, s 298A is reproduced below:
(1) Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible
representations, or by any act, activity or conduct, or by organizing, promoting or
arranging, or assisting in organizing, promoting or arranging, any activity, or
F otherwise in any other manner —
(a) causes, or attempts to cause, or is likely to cause disharmony, disunity, or
feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will; or
(b) …
G on grounds of religion, between persons or group of persons professing the same or
different religions, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term of not less two
years and not more than five years.
(2) Sections 173A and 294 of the Criminal Procedure Code shall not
apply in respect of an offence under subsection (1).
H
(3) Where any person alleges or imputes in any manner specified in
subsection (1) —
(a) that any person, or any class, group or description of persons,
professing any particular religion —
I
(i) had ceased to profess that religion;
(ii) should not be accepted, or cannot be accepted, as professing
that religion; or
(iii) does not believe, follow, profess, or belong to, that religion; or
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614 Malayan Law Journal [2014] 6 MLJ

(b) that anything lawfully done by any religious official appointed, or A

by any religious authority established, constituted or appointed, by
or under any written law, in the exercise of any power, or in the
discharge of any duty, or in the performance of any function, of a
religious character, by virtue of being so appointed, established or
constituted, is not acceptable to such person, or should not be B
accepted by any other person or persons, or does not accord him or
fulfil the requirements of that religion, or is otherwise wrong or
improper;
he shall be presumed to have contravened the provisions of subsection (1) by having
acted in a manner likely to cause the disharmony, disunity or feelings of enmity, C
hatred or ill will, or likely to prejudice the maintenance of harmony or unity,
between persons or groups of persons professing the religion referred to in the
allegation or imputation.
(4)(a) Where, on the ground of a religious character, any person professing
D
any particular religion uses for burial or cremation of any human corpse a
place other than one which is lawfully used for such purpose by persons
professing that religion, he shall be presumed to have contravened the
provisions of subsection (1) by having acted in a manner likely to cause
disharmony, disunity or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill will, or likely to
prejudice the maintenance of harmony or unity, between persons or E
groups of persons professing that religion.
(b) Where any person, on any ground of a religious character, counsels,
advises, instigates, urges, pleads with or appeals or propagates to, or in any
manner or by any means calls upon, whether directly or indirectly, any
other person or persons professing any particular religion: F
(i) to use for burial or cremation of any human corpse a place other
than one which is lawfully used for such purpose by persons
professing that religion —
(ii) not to use for burial or cremation of any human corpse any place G
which is lawfully used for such purpose by persons professing that
religion; or
(iii) not to use for worship any place which is lawfully used for such
purpose by persons professing that religion,
H
he shall be presumed to have contravened the provisions of subsection (1) by having
acted in a manner likely to cause disharmony, disunity or feelings of enmity, hatred
or ill will, or likely to prejudice the maintenance of harmony or unity, between
persons or groups of persons professing that religion or different religions.
(5) Where any person who is not a religious official appointed, or a I
religious authority established, constituted or appointed, by or under any
written law purports to exercise any power, or to discharge any duty, or to
perform any function, of a religious character, being a power, duty or
function which can be lawfully exercised, discharged or performed only by
a religious official appointed, or a religious authority established,
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Tan Jye Yee & Anor v Public Prosecutor

[2014] 6 MLJ (Tengku Maimun JCA) 615

A constituted or appointed, by or under any written law, he shall be

presumed to have contravened the provisions of subsection (1) by having
acted in a manner prejudicial the maintenance of harmony or unity,
between persons or groups of persons professing the same or different
religions.
B (6) The foregoing provisions of this section shall not apply to —
(a) anything done by any religious authority established, constituted or
appointed by or under any written law and conferred by written law
with power to give or issue any ruling or decision in any manner
pertaining to the religion in respect of which the authority is
C established, constituted or appointed; or
(b) anything done by any person which is in pursuance of, or which
accords with, any ruling or decision given or issued by such religious
authority, whether or not such ruling or decision is in writing, and
if in writing, whether or not it is published in the Gazette.
D
(7) It shall not be a defence to any charge under this section to assert that what
the offender is charged with doing was done in an honest belief in, or in any
honest interpretation of, any precept, tenet or teaching of any religion.
(8) If in any proceedings under this section any question arises with regard to the
E interpretation of any aspect of, or any matter in relation to any religion, the
Court shall accept the interpretation given by any religious authority referred to
in subsection (6), being a religious authority in respect of that religion.

PROCEEDINGS IN THE HIGH COURT

F
[7] Central to the arguments of learned counsel for the appellants and
learned deputy public prosecutor was the two decisions of the Supreme Court
in the case of Public Prosecutor v Mohamed Nor & Ors [1985] 2 MLJ 200b and
Mamat bin Daud & Ors v The Government of Malaysia [1988] 1 MLJ 119;
G [1988] 1 CLJ (Rep) 197.

[8] Relying on Mohamed Nor, and the minority judgment in Mamat bin
Daud, the High Court dismissed the application.

H [9] Aggrieved by the said decision, the appellants appealed to the Court of
Appeal. We had unanimously allowed the appeal and we now give our reasons.

THE APPEAL

I [10] As in the High Court, the crux of the submissions before us was on the
issue whether s 298A is in pith and substance a legislation on the religion of
Islam or whether it is a legislation concerning public order. Reliance was again
placed by the respective parties on the Supreme Court decisions in the
abovementioned cases.
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616 Malayan Law Journal [2014] 6 MLJ

[11] Given the reliance on the two decisions, we think it is appropriate to A

state the gist of those cases.

[12] In Public Prosecutor v Mohamed Nor, the first and fourth respondents
were charged for acting in a manner likely to prejudice the maintenance of
unity on grounds of religion between persons professing the religion of Islam B
by acting as Bilal during the performance of Friday prayers, an offence under
s 298A of the Penal Code. The second respondent was charged under the same
section but as Imam and the third respondent, as Khatib. The learned trial
judge bound them over a period of three years to keep the peace and be of good C
behaviour under s 294 of the Criminal Procedure Code . The public prosecutor
appealed on the ground that the learned judge had failed to impose a deterrent
sentence. The appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court.

[13] In Mamat bin Daud, the petitioners, pursuant to leave obtained under D
art 4 of the Federal Constitution, filed their suit for declaratory orders to the
effect that s 298A of the Penal Code is invalid on the ground that it makes
provision with respect to a matter which Parliament has no power to make law.
The petitioners contended that having regard to the pith and substance of the
section, it is a law which ought to be passed not by Parliament but by State E
Legislative Assemblies, it being a legislation on Islamic religion according to
art 11 cl (4) and Item 1 of List II, Ninth Schedule. For the respondent, it was
contended that the section is valid as it is a law passed by Parliament on the
basis of public order, internal security and also criminal law according to
art 11 cl (5) and Items (3)–(4) of List 1, Ninth Schedule. The Supreme Court F
allowed the petitioners’ application by majority.

[14] Mohd Azmi SCJ, in the majority judgment said:

In determining whether s 298A in pith and substance falls within the class of subject
G
matter of ‘religion’ or ‘public order’, it is the substance and not the form or outward
appearance of the impugned legislation which must be considered. The impugned
statute may even declare itself as dealing with religion, but if on investigation of the
legislation as a whole, it is in fact not so, the court must so declare. Conversely, it is
not sufficient for the impugned legislation to declare itself as dealing with public
order, if in substance, it seeks to deal directly or indirectly with religion or religious H
law, doctrine or precept, for no amount of cosmetics used in the legislative make up
can save it from being struck down for pretending to be what it is not. The object,
purpose and design of the impugned section must therefore be investigated for the
purpose of ascertaining the true character and substance of the legislation and the
class of subject matter of legislation to which it really belongs. … I
On the scope and meaning of the doctrine of colourable legislation BK Mukherjee J
had this to say in KCG Narayan Deo v State of Orissa AIR 1953 SC 375:
… The whole doctrine resolves itself into the question of competency of a
particular legislature to enact a particular law …
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Tan Jye Yee & Anor v Public Prosecutor

[2014] 6 MLJ (Tengku Maimun JCA) 617

A If the Constitution of a State distributes the legislative powers amongst different

bodies, which have to act within the respective spheres marked out by specific
legislative entries, … questions do arise as to whether the legislature in a
particular case has or has not … transgressed the limits of its constitutional
powers. Such transgressions may be patent, manifest or direct, but it may also be
B disguised, covert and indirect and it is to this latter class of cases that the
expression ‘colourable legislation’ has been applied in certain judicial
pronouncements. …
Applying the above principles, we shall now proceed to examine the provisions of
s 298A with strictness (as was done by the Privy Council in Attorney General for
C Ontaria v Reciprocal Insurers [1924] AC 328), the real substance of the legislation
for the purpose of determining whether it is a colourable legislation, as alleged by
the petitioners.

[15] Having alluded to the specific sub-sections of s 298A, the learned SCJ
D then said:
ln our view, all these specified acts and conducts have nothing to do with ‘public
order’ as envisaged by the Federal List; but they are directly concerned with religious
matters or religious affairs. …
From our investigation, the claim that religion is merely incidental to the legislation
E cannot hold water. We therefore find neither Item 3(a) not Item 4(b) of the Federal
List forms the substance of the subject matter of the impugned section. Nor can the
impugned section take refuge under art 11 cl (5) of the Constitution, as it simply
cannot pass the subjective test of being a legislation relating to public order, public
health or morality. Having considered and examined the provisions of s 298A as a
F whole, we rule that it is a colourable legislation in that it pretends to be a legislation
on ‘public order’, when in pith and substance it is a law on the subject of religion
with respect to which only the states have power to legislate under arts 74 and 77 of
the Constitution. …
For reasons discussed, we allow the first two orders sought in the suit, viz (1) a
G declaration that s 298A of the Penal Code is a law with respect to a matter with
respect to which Parliament has no power to make law, and (2) a declaration that
s 298A of the Penal Code is invalid and therefore null and void and of no effect. …

[16] Salleh Abas LP who also wrote the majority judgment said:
H Viewed in its proper perspective, the impugned section … is a law, the object of
which is to ensure that Islamic religion practised in this country must conform to
the tenets, precepts and practices allowed by states. … In enacting this impugned
section I do not think that Parliament can really rely on its powers to legislate on
public order because the exercise of such power comes in a direct conflict with state
I powers to legislate on, and control, the practices of Islamic religion.

[17] To sustain the charge under s 298A(1)(a) and to support his submission
that the application of s 298A is not exclusive to the Muslims as the object of
the said section was to ensure public order, the learned deputy made reference
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618 Malayan Law Journal [2014] 6 MLJ

to the Hansard. Indirectly, the learned deputy was inviting us to revisit the issue A
on the true character and substance of s 298A.

[18] The learned deputy submitted thus:

Mengguna pakai ratio di dalam penghakiman Mohd Azmi SCJ ini adalah jelas B
Mahkamah sekarang ini perlu membuat penyiasatan di dalam bentuk penilaian
bukan sahaja secara am terhadap Seksyen 298A Kanun Keseksaan tetapi khususnya
apakah subject matter pertuduhan yang dikenakan kepada Perayu-perayu dan
apakah objektif, tujuan dan mengapa pertuduhan dirangka ke atas Perayu-perayu.
Jika kandungan pertuduhan ke atas Perayu-perayu dibaca dengan teliti ia adalah C
bukan secara langsung berkenaan pentadbiran ajaran agama Islam tetapi
penghinaan terhadap ajaran serta fahaman agama Islam oleh orang bukan Islam.
Memandangkan kedua-dua perayu adalah bukan penganut agama Islam sudah
tentu mereka tidak akan dapat diambil tindakan di bawah mana-mana Enakmen
Syariah. Perayu-perayu tidak boleh dilepaskan summarily pada peringkat ini tanpa
D
kami dapat memanggil sebarang saksi kerana Seksyen 298A Kanun Keseksaan
secara amnya dan pertuduhan tersebut secara khususnya in substance adalah
berkenaan public order dan public tranquillity.

[19] With respect, given that the Supreme Court had decided on s 298A, it E
was not open for us to investigate the true character or substance of s 298A. We
thus found no necessity to consider whether the pith and substance of s 298A
is a subject matter of religion or public order.

[20] What we had to consider was the application of the doctrine of stare F
decisis. The submission of learned counsel for the appellants was that the
learned trial judge was bound by the majority decision in Mamat Daud. The
learned deputy, on the other hand, submitted that the decision of Mamat Daud
was not applicable; that the doctrine of stare decisis should not be followed
blindly and that the decision in Mamat Daud should not be given a blanket G
application.

[21] The importance of the doctrine of stare decisis had been enunciated in
a number of cases. We will only refer to one of them. In Dato’ Tan Heng Chew
v Tan Kim Hor [2006] 2 MLJ 293; [2006] 1 CLJ 577, Steve Shim CJ (Sabah H
and Sarawak) said:
[3] Judicial hierarchy must be observed in the interests of finality and certainty in
the law and for orderly development of legal rules as well as for the courts and
lawyers to regulate their affairs. Failure to observe judicial precedents would create
chaos and misapprehensions in the judicial system. This fact was certainly borne in I
mind by the Court of Appeal in Periasamy s/o Sinnapan & Anor v Public Prosecutor
[1996] 2 MLJ 557 wherein Gopal Sri Ram JCA said:
We may add that it does not augur well for judicial discipline when a High Court
judge treats the decision of the Supreme Court with little or no respect in
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Tan Jye Yee & Anor v Public Prosecutor

[2014] 6 MLJ (Tengku Maimun JCA) 619

A disobedience to the well-entrenched doctrine of stare decisis. We trust that the

occasion will never arise again when we have to remind High Court judges that
they are bound by all judgments of this court and of the Federal Court and they
must, despite any misgivings a judge may entertain as to the correctness of a
particular judgment of either court, apply the law as stated therein.
B
[22] The learned judge had given his interpretation on s 298A contrary to
that of the majority decision of the Supreme Court in Mamat Daud when His
Lordship said:
C [19] Mahkamah ini juga bersetuju dengan hujahan balas Tuan TPR yang bijaksana
yang menyangkal hujahan peguambela pemohon-pemohon bahawa s 298A Kanun
Keseksaan hanya berkaitan dengan agama Islam semata-mata. Mahkamah ini
bersetuju dengan hujahan Tuan TPR bahawa tujuan s 298A Kanun Keseksaan
digubal oleh Parlimen adalah untuk tujuan bagi menjaga ketenteraman awam di
kalangan rakyat Malaysia yang berbilang kaum, bangsa dan juga berbilang agama.
D
Turut dihujahkan bahawa s 298A Kanun Keseksaan tersebut tidak menyatakan
bahawa peruntukan itu secara khususnya terpakai kepada orang-orang yang
beragama Islam semata-mata. Mahkamah ini memilih untuk mengikuti pandangan
dan keputusan yang telah diberikan oleh Mahkamah Agung dalam kes Mohamed
Nor dan juga pandangan ‘dissenting’ dalam kes Mamat Daud.
E
…
[21] … membaca peruntukan di bawah s 298A(1)(a) Kanun Keseksaan di atas, amat
jelas sejelas gelas kristal bahawa peruntukan tersebut langsung tidak menyebut
secara khusus bahawa peruntukan tersebut ditujukan khas kepada penganut (sic)
beragama Islam. Perkataan-perkataan yang digunakan ‘… professing the same or
F different religions, …’ menunjukkan bahawa peruntukan tersebut terpakai bukan
sahaja kepada penganut agama Islam malahan terpakai kepada penganut
agama-agama atau kepercayaan yang lain juga.

[23] In departing from the majority decision of the Supreme Court in

G
Mamat Daud, His Lordship had sought to distinguish the present case in the
following words:
22. Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa fakta, keadaan dan situasi dalam kes
Mamat Daud adalah berbeza dengan fakta, keadaan dan situasi yang timbul dalam
H kes terhadap pemohon-pemohon. Pertuduhan dalam kes Mamat Daud melibatkan
isu berkaitan dengan pegawai masjid yang tidak mempunyai tauliah dan
melibatkan orang beragama Islam di Terengganu. Pertelingkahan berlaku apabila
sembahyang Jumaat diadakan di dua masjid berbeza dalam satu kariah disebabkan
oleh perbezaan fahaman politik. Sedangkan dalam kes terhadap
pemohon-pemohon, selain berlaku di Kuala Lumpur, ianya melibatkan orang
I bukan Islam yang didakwa telah menghina orang-orang yang beragama Islam di
dalam bulan Ramadan yang mulia dan lagi berkat bagi orang-orang Islam.
[23] Dalam kes Mamat Daud juga melibatkan perpecahan di kalangan orang-orang
Islam di Terengganu dan tidak melibatkan kaum atau penganut agama atau
kepercayaan yang lain. Sedangkan kes terhadap pemohon-pemohon melibatkan isu
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620 Malayan Law Journal [2014] 6 MLJ

yang lebih meluas dan lebih sensitif yang jika tidak dibendung boleh menimbulkan A
pertelingkahan antara kaum, agama dan bangsa yang terdapat di Malaysia. Tujuan
utama s 298A(1)(a) Kanun Keseksaan adalah untuk mencegah dari berlakunya
perkara-perkara tersebut sehingga boleh menggugat ketenteraman awam serta
keselamatan negara secara keseluruhannya. Peruntukan tersebut turut
memperuntukkan hukuman terhadap pelaku-pelaku yang melakukan kesalahan B
yang dipandang amat serius tersebut di mana sabit kesalahan boleh membawa
hukuman penjara maksima lima tahun.
[24] Mahkamah ini berpandangan bahawa keputusan majoriti Mahkamah
Persekutuan (sic) dalam kes Mamat Daud tidak mengikat mahkamah ini atas alasan
yang dinyatakan di atas. Dalam keadaan sedemikian, mahkamah ini lebih memihak C
kepada dapatan dan keputusan yang dibuat oleh Mahkamah Agung dalam kes
Mohamed Nor dan pandangan yang diberikan oleh minoriti dalam kes Mamat
Daud.

[24] The decision of the Supreme Court in Mamat Daud was on a principle D
of law. The facts would not have mattered. In considering the issue whether
Parliament or the State Legislative Assemblies should legislate the impugned
section, the Supreme Court had, by majority ruled that s 298A is, in pith and
substance, a law on religion while the dissenting judgment ruled that it is on
public order and criminal law. It is the majority judgment of the Supreme E
Court that creates the binding precedent. The dissenting judgment cannot be
accepted as the correct state of law over the majority judgment (see Barat Estates
Sdn Bhd v Parawakan a/l Subramaniam & Ors [2000] 4 MLJ 107; Fawziah
Holdings Sdn Bhd v Metramac Corp Sdn Bhd (previously known as syarikat
F
Teratai KG Sdn Bhd) [2006] 1 MLJ 435).

[25] The true character and substance of s 298A had thus been determined
by the Supreme Court, which ruling had nullified the submission of the
learned deputy and the finding by the learned judge that s 298A is, in pith and G
substance, a law on public order. We (as the learned judge) were in no position
to examine the section to make a new ruling or to decide otherwise.

[26] The learned judge had also stated that ‘… mahkamah ini lebih memihak
kepada dapatan dan keputusan yang dibuat oleh Mahkamah Agung dalam kes H
Mohamed Nor …’. In this regard, the learned deputy submitted that the ratio
decidendi of the two decisions of the Supreme Court was in conflict and hence
the High Court may choose which ratio decidendi it will follow.

[27] It must be noted that in Mohamed Nor, there was no challenge on I

s 298A. Unlike in Mamat Daud where the Supreme Court was called upon to
determine the true character and substance of s 298A, in Mohamed Nor, the
only issue before the Supreme Court was whether the sentence passed by the
High Court was appropriate.
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Tan Jye Yee & Anor v Public Prosecutor

[2014] 6 MLJ (Tengku Maimun JCA) 621

A [28] In dismissing the appeal by the prosecution against sentence, Abdul

Hamid CJ (Malaya) in Mohamed Nor said:
In the instant case the learned judge recognised that this section is designed to
preserve law and order to maintain a state of harmony, unity and goodwill between
persons or groups of persons professing the same or different religions that are being
B practiced in this country by preventing such persons from causing or attempting to
cause disharmony or disunity or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will, and that the
offences of the nature committed by the four respondents will have the effect of
jeopardising Islamic unity, in the result, prejudicing the maintenance of unity and
harmony in the country. The learned judge proceeded to bind them over, to keep
C peace and good behaviour under s 294 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
…
The question now remains whether we should disturb the sentence in the instant
case.

D [29] Since the issue before the Supreme Court was purely on the adequacy of
sentence, there was no proposition as such by the Supreme Court in Mohamed
Nor, on the true character and substance of s 298A. What was set out in the
judgment quoted above, that s 298A was designed to preserve law and order,
was not the pronouncement of the Supreme Court as perceived by the learned
E judge but was the finding of the High Court. In the circumstances, it cannot be
said that the ratio decidendi of the two decisions of the Supreme Court was in
conflict with one another.

[30] Having regard to all the above, we found that the learned judge had
F
erred in refusing to follow the majority decision of the Supreme Court on the
true character and substance of s 298A. We set aside the order of the High
Court and we granted the orders prayed for by the appellants.

Appeal allowed.
G
Reported by Afiq Mohamad Noor