FQS - 1 - 3 - Ashmore - Innocence and Nostalgia in Conversation Analysis - The Dynamic Relations of Tape and ...
FQS - 1 - 3 - Ashmore - Innocence and Nostalgia in Conversation Analysis - The Dynamic Relations of Tape and ...
FQS - 1 - 3 - Ashmore - Innocence and Nostalgia in Conversation Analysis - The Dynamic Relations of Tape and ...
3
S O C IA L R ES EA RC H December 2000
S O ZIA LFO RS C HU N G
Key words: Abstract: This paper attempts an analysis of some of the methodological practices of Conversation
conversation Analysis (CA); in particular, tape recording and transcription. The paper starts from the observation
analysis, tape that, in the CA literature, these practices, and the analytic objects they create (the tape and the
recording, transcript), are accorded different treatment: simply put, for CA the tape is a "realist" object, while
transcription, the transcript is a "constructivist" one. The significance of this difference is explored through an
rhetoric, analysis of the dynamics of CA practice. We argue that the "constructivist transcript" is premised on
epistemology, an understanding of CA as predominantly concerned with maximising its "analytic utility": a concern
phenomenology, of one distinct temporal stage of CA work: that of the "innocent" apprehension of objects in the "first
realism, time through". The "realist tape", in contrast, is based on a different aspect of the work of CA: its
constructivism quest for greater "evidential utility", achieved by the "nostalgic" revisiting of previously produced
objects for purposes of checking them against each other; work done in the "next time through". We
further argue that both the ontology and the epistemology of CA's objects are changed in any next
time encounter. We conclude with a cautionary speculation on the currently-projected, transcript-
free, digital future of CA.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. The Realist Tape and the Constructivist Transcript
2.1 Taping
2.2 The tape
2.3 Transcription
2.4 What counts as data: The mutual elaboration of tape and transcript
3. The General Epistemo-Phenomenological Schema
4. The General Schema Applied to CA
4.1 Nostalgia dynamics
4.2 Reverse checking: Doubting the tape
5. Innocence and Nostalgia: First Time, and Next Time, Through
5.1 First time through—Innocence
5.2 Next time through—Nostalgia
6. Concluding Discussion
References
Authors
Citation
1. Introduction
CA is a "unique" (ten HAVE 1990) form of qualitative social research, both in its
restricted topical orientation and its rigorous methodological procedures. CA is
exclusively concerned with the analysis of "talk-in-interaction"; usually, but not
always, of casual, or mundane, conversation. According to CA, this is the
primordial stuff of social interaction: at once the most mundane and the most
consequential of all social phenomena. As a practice, ordinary talk is not
considered by its practitioners to be particularly skilled (presumably because it is
so basic, so pervasive, so ordinary); yet CA shows it to be a precision instrument,
wielded by maestros. Subtle, nuanced and highly sensitive; yet structured,
normative and accountable; it displays "order at all points" (SACKS 1984, p.22),
yet is entirely improvised. Moreover, the doing of talk produces and reproduces
all the supposedly "external" phenomena of the socio-psychological sciences:
persons, interaction, groups, membership categories (class/gender/ethnicity), the
"sense of social structure" and ultimately society itself (BODEN & ZIMMERMAN
1991, SILVERMAN 1998, HUTCHBY & WOOFFITT 1998). [2]
CA is done in a very specific way: starting with audio, and sometimes video,
recordings of "naturally-occurring" verbal interactions; transcribing them in a
manner designed to show the "hows" of talk rather than just the "whats"; and
subsequently developing highly detailed analyses of the ethnomethods of talk.
We are interested in this paper in how conversation analysts work with, work on,
and work up the series of "analytic objects" produced in and as the course of their
research. Put schematically, these objects are the Event, the Tape, the
Transcript, the Analysis and the Article.1 How does the apparently fixed, temporal,
and linear relationships between these objects change at different points of the
research process? How does the "evidential utility" of these objects vary with
respect to their "analytic utility"? What is the difference between seeing (say) a
1 Our analysis is largely schematic and "conceptual", rather than "empirical". This may be taken
to be a fault by those who argue, as conversation analysts tend to do, that it is only "in the
presence of data" (ten HAVE 1997) that sensible and relevant analyses of such matters can be
had. While we have some sympathy for this view in general, it is problematic for a project which,
among other ambitions, wishes to address the question of what counts as data, when it so
counts, and for whom does it so count.
transcript, and reading it; between hearing a tape and listening to it? At what
points during the dynamic process of research are objects encountered by the
epistemic mode of seeing/hearing as opposed to that of reading/listening? [3]
Specifically we reveal the relative reification of analytic objects such that the
original phenomenon, the tape, the transcript (and the analysis) are actively
construed differently depending on whether the object is apprehended in a state
of "innocence" or "nostalgia". This is pursued through a "first time through" and
"next time through" trope. [5]
The first thing to notice is that taping as an activity receives much less explicit
discussion than does transcribing. While transcription (in CA and other forms of
research on talk) has been the specific topic of at least one edited volume
(EDWARDS & LAMPERT 1993), several research articles (OCHS 1979,
JEFFERSON 1985, PACK 1986, COOK 1990, PSATHAS & ANDERSON 1990,
MISHLER 1991, O'CONNELL & KOWAL 1994, JEFFERSON 1996, GREEN,
GRANQUIZ & DIXON 1997), and is routinely and extensively discussed in recent
CA introductory textbooks (PSATHAS 1995, HUTCHBY & WOOFFITT 1998,
SILVERMAN 1998, ten HAVE 1999), recording has received less attention. This
is not, however, because the Tape is considered less important; indeed, in many
ways, as we shall detail, it appears to carry more weight than does the Transcript.
[6]
2.1 Taping
stubborn realism (cf. MISHLER 1991, pp.255-259). Though many, perhaps most,
(Western) children have had the vertiginous experience of hearing and not
recognising the sound of their own recorded voice, the "doubt" that this
experience potentially raises is quickly reframed as normal and explicable. [7]
1. "certain features of the details of actions in interaction are not recoverable in any
other way"
2. "a recording makes it possible to play and replay the interaction, which is
important both for transcribing and for developing an analysis."
3. "a recording makes it possible to check a particular analysis against the
materials, in all their detail, that were used to produce the analysis."
4. "a recording makes it possible to return to an interaction with new analytic
interests." (1997, p.70) [8]
Notice first that these remarks address the tape as a "found object": they are
concerned with what can be done with a recording, not with the activity of
recording itself. The origin of the Tape—its relation to any particular Event—is not
of specific interest. This lack of interest in the process of recording (whether as a
technical or conceptual issue) is an important first step in the "naturalising" of the
Tape. In effect it provides for the "forgetting" of the Event, and its wholesale
replacement by the Tape. [9]
The first desideratum attends to the technical necessity for this replacement.
Neither the Event-in-itself nor any other procedure for its "reconstruction"—
ethnographic observation, memories, post hoc inquiries, intuitive invention—is
adequate. The second reason introduces the idea of "replayability": the Tape, as
opposed to the Event, can be encountered more than once; it can be re-heard,
can be subject to repeated listening. Reasons three and four specify uses for the
Tape's replayable character: the Tape can be used as the standard against which
the Analysis can be checked; and it can be revisited to produce a new Analysis,
i.e. the Tape can be the source of more than one series of analytic objects. [10]
2.3 Transcription
"[I]t is a truism to note that all transcription is in some sense interpretation ..."
(COOK 1990, p.12)
"A first observation is that there is not, and cannot be, a 'neutral' transcription
system." (PSATHAS & ANDERSON 1990, p.75)
"[A] transcript is a text that 're'-presents an event; it is not the event itself. Following
this logic, what is re-presented is data constructed by a researcher for a particular
purpose, not just talk written down." (GREEN et al. 1997, p.172)
"Transcription as theory" (OCHS 1979, Title)
Of course, we are very far from objecting to this approach to transcription. What
we are interested in is the contrast, in CA, between this "constructivist" approach
to transcription and the "realist" approach to recording and the tape. As we will
detail below, this contrast is itself consequential for the practices of CA, and
particularly for how the mutually elaborative relation between the transcript and
the tape is understood. [12]
2.4 What counts as data: The mutual elaboration of tape and transcript
There are various formulations of the roles of tape and transcript in CA, some of
which are set out in the following five quotations. They are ordered in an array
from the most to the least "transcript-friendly".
"Audio recordings, while faithfully recording what the machine's technology allows to
be recorded, are not immediately available, in a sense. The details that the machine
records have to be remarked by the listening analyst and later made available to the
analyst's audience. It is the activity of transcribing the tapes that provides for this, that
captures the data, so to speak." (HAVE 1999, p.6)
"The best way to develop analyses is to use both a tape and a transcript. It is harder
to isolate and study phenomena when working only with a tape, and much
information is lost when working only with a transcript. Also, without hearing/seeing
the tape from which a transcript was derived, one cannot know how much confidence
to have in a transcript." (POMERANTZ & FEHR 1997, p.70-71)
"The transcription of data is a procedure at the core of analysis ... It is important to
stress that, for CA, transcripts are not thought of as 'the data'. The data consist of
tape recordings of naturally occurring interactions ... Given this conception of the
data, the aim in CA is not simply to transcribe the talk and then discard the tape in
favour of the transcript ... Conversation analysts ... do not analyse transcripts alone:
rather, they aim to analyse the data (the recorded interaction) using the transcript as
a convenient tool of reference. The transcript is seen as a 'representation' of the data;
while the tape itself is viewed as a 'reproduction' of a determinate social event."
(HUTCHBY & WOOFFITT 1998, pp.73-74)
"... any claim made about the interaction is answerable, not to a transcript, but in the
final analysis to the recording" (WILSON 1999)
"... from bitter personal experience I have learned never to trust a mere transcript too
much. The time is soon approaching when transcripts (at least in the traditional
sense) will seem far too crude for our analytic purposes—a hopeless attempt to fix on
paper what is, in its deepest sense, dynamic." (CARROLL 2000) [13]
What we want to argue here is that the disparity between these versions of the
mutual relations of tape and transcript can be accounted for by recognising a
corresponding distinction in the "phase" or "stage" of the CA research process
that these authors implicitly are addressing. A positive evaluation of the transcript
(as most clearly evidenced by ten HAVE) corresponds to a dominant concern with
what we will call the stage of First Time Through, while those accounts that find
the transcript wanting (especially WILSON & CARROLL) are more concerned
with the later stage of Next Time Through. Another way to put this is that the
value of the transcript makes itself felt most clearly in the business of building the
series of analytic objects that make up the "material" of any CA research project
3 PSATHAS and ANDERSON concur: "It should be noted ... that the status of the transcript
remains that of 'merely' being a representation of the actual interaction—i.e., it is not the
interaction and it is not the 'data'" (1990, p.77).
and thus in the search for analytic utility. On the other hand, when the tape
appears as the "better" object of the two, what is being alluded to is its value in
strengthening the evidential utility of the already-produced objects. [15]
Before we can fully explain these concepts we must first acquaint you with our
"General Epistemo-Phenomenological Schema" (see also Figure 1) which
provides the essential, if inelegantly-titled, framework for our discussion.
We are describing here a kind of dynamic continuum, whose poles are mythic: on
the left, we have "reality", or the "natural attitude", and on the right, "fiction", or
the "mediated attitude".4 These are the pure, and impossible, states in which
there is no admixture of the other. On the left, a "state of nature", apprehended
instinctively by totally embedded "members" devoid of intentionality and sense-
making ability. On the right, a "state of mind", in which all actions are self-started
by radically self-conscious agents with no direct, nor even mediated, relation to
an external world. [17]
In between these poles is our world; and perhaps any conceivable world.5 Let us
map out some of the relations we see obtaining in this space. First, note that it is
divided diagonally into two phenomenological areas: "Life", which dominates the
left hand side, and "Work", which governs the right. "Life" labels a
4 SCHUTZ (1972) and GARFINKEL (1967) use the term "scientific attitude" here. We prefer
"mediated" as this term can account for all activities of formulation, understanding,
representation, performance, whether done in the course of scientific work or not.
5 Though a kind of left-hand world is sometimes said to have existed in the past and/or in simpler
societies; a nostalgia for this "world we have lost" can be seen to have animated certain
founding sociological contrasts such as TOENNIES' Gesellschaft and Gemeinschaft. Similarly,
we are sometimes said to be entering a form of the right-hand world, such as BAUDRILLARD's
postmodern dystopia of inauthentic simulacra.
When encountered through the right hand side epistemic modes of listening and
reading, the world is interpreted rather than apprehended, and represented
instead of simply responded to. Rightward leaning epistemic activities, then, are
forms of productive work. Engaging in them results in the addition of new objects
to the world—objects that, as representations or interpretations, change what the
world is taken to be. Note, however, that we are not dealing directly here with the
products themselves (talk, texts, images, etc.) nor with their "modes of
production" (speaking, writing, imaging, ...). We are limiting ourselves to an
examination of what, in vocabularies we do not wish to buy into, might be called
"responses" or "receptive behaviours".6 [20]
We now move from the abstractions of the general schema to its concrete
application in the case of CA. Note, to begin with, that in Figure 2 we have
inserted the five analytic objects used/produced in CA—Event, Tape, Transcript,
Analysis, Article—ordered from left to right.7 Obviously, this is a temporal order of
production; but it is more than that as we shall see. Second, the
phenomenological division of the general schema, with "Life" at the left and
"Work" at the right, has been augmented with, respectively, "Evidential Utility"
and "Analytic Utility". A further change is a specification of (some of) the ways
that the "nostalgia dynamic" operates in CA, motivating, for example, a shift
"back" from Transcript to Tape. Finally, we have labelled the left-hand mythline
(which marks off the impossible "reality" pole of the continuum), as, additionally, a
"modal-line" marking the shift in modality from the Event to its recording as the
Tape; and added a second which marks the modal shift from the Tape to the
Transcript, Analysis and Article. The first of these shifts is the more radical:
crossing the modal-line from Event to Tape is permanent; there is no going back.
Indeed the Event is, in relation to the practices and objects of CA, effectively
mythic; as its position to the left of the mythline suggests. The second modal shift
7 We limit ourselves here to the objects in play in any single piece of CA research. Further
analytic objects (including text books, reviews, critiques, bibliographies, web sites, email lists,
courses, conferences, ...) constitute CA as a discipline, a culture and a literature.
—from the aural to the textual—is less irreversible, but it still has significant
consequences. [23]
When we say that the left-right ordering of the analytic objects is more than
simply a temporal one, we mean that as each object is produced, one after the
other, changes of a phenomenological and epistemic character occur too. For
example, while the Event is full of Life, it does not present itself successfully as
an object suitable for Work. It has, in its state of brute Being, minimal Analytic
Utility. On the other hand, the Event possesses a great deal of Evidential Utility.
That is, by pointing to the Event as the natural origin of its endeavours, CA can
claim an evidential grounding in the real. (CA is neither fiction nor "merely
interpretation" because it is "about" real interaction, done by real people in real
settings in real time, as evidenced by the Event.) Note, however, that this pointing
is both post hoc and other-directed: it can only occur after the production of other,
"later", analytic objects; and it is useful mainly as a rhetorical device to justify CA
to non-members.8 We have said that analytic work cannot be easily done on the
Event-as-such. In fact the only Work generated by the Event is that of its radical
transformation into something other than itself through the process of recording
and the production of the Tape. [24]
With each move to a new analytic object further to the right, the level of "original
detail" is reduced and replaced by a corresponding level of "novel detail". Though
in the move from Event to Tape, much of the lived complexity of the former is
erased, something new takes its place: the Tape introduces novelties that were
not there in the "original"; chief among these being "replayability". At the other
end of our scale, the shift from Analysis to Article involves a loss of some of the
complexity (and certainly a lot of the detail) of a specific analytic exercise, yet
compensates for this by the addition of new connections and the refinement of
the overall network of conversation analytic results. [26]
8 However, it may be used too for self-justification and encouragement: "If I didn't think that CA
was about understanding reality, there would be no point in doing it" (paraphrase of personal
communication: Charles ANTAKI to Malcolm ASHMORE, August 2000)
the Transcript, or the Transcript against the Tape. In each backwards shift
motivated in this way, the "earlier" object is treated as (relatively) fixed with
respect to the "later". Indeed, on such occasions, the former acts as an
unquestioned standard with which to assess the fidelity of its translation into the
latter. On these occasions, then, the leftward analytic object is reified. That it is
possible to treat objects in this way, however, is the result, we will argue, of how
they are treated (worked on and worked up) at the stage of the research process
we call First Time Through. [27]
But before we advance this argument, we will deal briefly with an apparent
exception to our claim that it is the earlier, leftward, object that is reified in the
activities of evidential checking we have been describing. [28]
In one of the few articles we have found which address the activity of audio
recording (MODAFF & MODAFF 2000) we find an example of evidential checking
in which an object to the right is used to check one to its left. At one point in their
paper, MODAFF and MODAFF discuss the differential quality of recordings of
each party's contribution to telephone conversations depending on the location of
the recording device:
"As a rule, the interlocutor with the recording device attached to his or her phone will
be louder and more predominant on the tape. For example, we compared two tapes
of the same interactional moment made with two Marantz audio recorders set to the
same recording settings but at different locations. Fragments 1A and 1B show the
difference in what was hearable on the two tapes:
As these fragments are (of course) transcripts, the work MODAFF and
MODAFF's reader has to do in order to find "louder and more predominant"
recordings of Jay in fragment 1A and of Dee in fragment 1B, is one of seeing,
immediately and imaginatively translated into hearing. Thus, in 1A (Jay's), line
001, we see Jay doing "uh::m (.)", whereas in 1B (Dee's), line 001, we see Jay
doing "uh:: (0.2)". With our instructions to see/hear Jay as "clearer" in 1A than in
1B, we can duly do so by finding both additional detail (the "m") and greater
refinement (the micropause "(.)"). Similarly, we can find a superior Dee in 1B. The
weak and imprecise hearing of "(yeah)" in 1A, line 003, can be seen, in Dee's 1B
(line 002, "=Okay") to be seeably/hearably more accurate in three distinct ways.
First, the hearing is disambiguated, as visually evidenced by the absence of
parentheses; consequently, we know that "yeah" is an artefact, and therefore,
that "Okay" is not. Second, then, we know that Dee said "Okay". And finally, we
see that its correct sequential placing is at the beginning of line 002, as an
utterance latched to the end of Jay's turn on line 001; the addition of the latching
symbols ("=" "=") acting as our visual evidence for this third form of increased
accuracy.9 [30]
So what we have here is a rare example of the Transcript being used as the
standard with which to check the Tape. This "reverse checking" is explicable in
that the only object "to the left" of the Tape is the Event; and, being mythic, the
Event is unavailable for this kind of work. Moreover (however "merely technical" it
may be—MODAFF and MODAFF's treatment being entirely within the frame of
technical adequacy) the examination of recording as a practice disturbs the
unproblematic treatment of the Tape as immutable "data". Suddenly, the Tape is
as "insecure" and "untrustworthy" as all the other, more obviously crafted,
objects. And also, of course, the Transcript in such a procedure takes on the
qualities of immutability more frequently attributed, in CA, to the Tape. The
contingencies of its production have to be erased, just as the local histories of
particular recordings routinely are in CA's rhetoric of method, so as to enable the
Tape to act as the data: the object to which claims about the interaction are "in
the final analysis" (WILSON 1999) answerable. [31]
9 Actually, though, there is a problem here. The technical aim of this comparative exercise is to
recommend the use of doubled recordings of telephone conversations (MODAFF & MODAFF
2000, p.111). But an even closer comparative analysis of the lines we have just been looking at
suggests that having two recordings may produce radical kinds of undecidability. Note that in
fragment 1A (better for Jay), line 002, Jay continues his line 001 turn with "and". However, as
we have seen, Dee's version (1B) has the first syllable of Dee's latched utterance "Ok[ay]" at
this precise point. So what is being done here? Jay's "and"? Dee's "Ok"? Or, perhaps, both,
overlapped? And how could this be decided?
Figure 3: Epistemic Modes: First Time Through and Next Time Through [32]
Let us unpack and elaborate this rather opaque formulation, using the Tape as
our example (see Figure 3). A recording of a piece of talk has been made
(whether audio or video is immaterial to our analysis). A conversation analyst
coming to it for the first time will use the tape to make another analytic object: the
Transcript.10 This is accomplished through listening to the tape. Note that there is
no Transcript there already; in fact (of course) there are as yet no analytic objects
to the right of the Tape on our timeline: they are only projected. [33]
10 We are ignoring here the idea, increasingly mooted these digital days, of an Analysis being
made directly from the Tape. We do, however, address this possibility below.
Transcript, bound together as "image & caption", have begun to take on the
character and utility of an "immutable mobile" (LATOUR 1987). As we will see,
the immutable character of the Tape is strengthened in subsequent turns (Next
Times) which construe it as heard rather than listened to. [34]
Let us follow this First Time Through trajectory a little further to the right on our
timeline. The analyst now has two objects: the Tape and the Transcript. To make
the third in the sequence (the Analysis), the Transcript is subjected to intense and
focussed reading, with the objective of producing another set of "interpretation
rules"; this time, for "what there is to see" in the text of the Transcript. Again,
these rules are written in and as the next analytic object, the Analysis, which,
once more, acts as the caption to the Transcript's image. And to repeat, what is
produced in this process is not just a new analytic object: the "old" one, the one
being currently acted on interpretatively and productively (i.e. read), is thereby
strengthened, shored up, made more immutable.11 As this reiterated process
proceeds rightwards, the result is the production of a series of new, rightward,
objects in tandem with a set of worked-on, and thus stronger objects to the left of
the current work site. The rightward production of analytic objects in the move
towards greater analytic utility thus leaves in its wake a series of changed
objects. [35]
The work of Next Time Through typically occurs at moments of doubt or distrust.
For example it occurs when accounts are called into question, or when a
transcript is "checked", "refined" or "revised". In CA "re-listening" (to the Tape)
and "re-reading" (the Transcript) are two exemplary moments of the Next Time
Through. On these occasions what is re-experienced, according to CA's rhetoric
of method, is an unchanged analytic object: each return is construed as though it
were the first time the object had been encountered, as though it were through a
frame of innocence. This orientation ignores the reflexive effects of returning to
an object built through the search for greater analytic utility. [36]
11 The process can be likened to the building of an escape tunnel, as featured in Second World
War movies like The Great Escape and The Wooden Horse. As the tunneller (the Listener, the
Reader) digs the formless earth, behind him the tunnel is shaped, strengthened, shored up,
given a definitive form.
It is not only the character of the objects that is different in the Next Time
Through. The mode of epistemic apprehension changes too. For example,
returning to the Tape does not involve listening to it to find out what there is to be
heard in it. That work has already been done and its results have been enshrined
as and in the Transcript, as the caption to the Tape's image. But once the
nostalgia dynamic starts to operate, objects can come "under suspicion". Perhaps
there is "something wrong" with the Transcript. If so, we can find out by checking
the suspect item against an (older, stronger) item to its left. So whereas in the
First Time Through, the Transcript acted (briefly) as the warrant for the Tape, in
the Next Time Through it is the other way round. And, as we have mentioned
above, the activity of checking item A against item B involves holding B constant.
In order to hold the Tape firmly in place while the Transcript is checked against it,
it needs to be heard. Hearing, you will recall, is an epistemic action that leaves its
object as it found it. Hearing the Tape takes for granted the already-known reality
of "what there is to be heard". [38]
6. Concluding Discussion
While CA's rhetoric of method includes, at times, hints of the recognition of the
Next Time Through dynamic, it is in large part focussed on an understanding
characterised by innocence. That is, it views its various objects "naïvely": as
though they were unchanged on each occasion of apprehension. The trajectory
of innocence holds only one object—the Event—genuinely immutable by
rendering it, through its recording, forever out of reach of the researcher and the
reader. However, as we have argued, this is not the case for CA's other analytic
objects. When returning to the (apparently unchanged) tape and "re-listening" to
it, this activity, being Next Time Through, reflexively formulates it, not as a
listenable object, but as a hearable one. Similarly when a transcript is "re-read", it
is formulated as seeable. [40]
Let us add two complications to this picture. Firstly, the hearing and seeing of a
relatively reified analytic object is itself transient; a brief moment of "proof". To
question what is heard or seen is to immediately render the object once more as
The idea that objects are apprehended differently in First Time and Next Time
Through has implications for a significant plank of CA's claim to superior
scientificity. Harvey SACKS, the founder of CA, claimed that, in the sociology he
was trying to develop, "the reader has as much information as the author and can
reproduce the analysis ... I'm showing my materials and others can analyze them
as well ..." (SACKS 1995, vol.1, p.27). MAYNARD strengthens and "scientizes"
this claim by noting that: "In a sense, it is possible to obtain independent
verification of interactional patterns because those who hear or read a
researcher's report can themselves analyze the data" (MAYNARD 1989, pp.130-
131). [43]
These positions are framed by an innocent, First Time Through perspective. The
claim is that other researchers can also experience the data—whether
understood as Tape or Transcript—as naïve observers. They can return to the
starting point and simply repeat the process. But, in our understanding of this
projected task, the reader is confronted by a set of different objects than were
available to the innocent researcher in First Time Through. In an important sense,
the reader has much more information than the author had on the equivalent
occasion: they have the author's analysis which instructs the reader in what to
hear on the tape and what to see in the transcript. They are simply not in a
position to approach the task of reanalysis with the requisite innocence. [44]
stops. At present the Tape's fulfilment of this role is dependent on its being
"unavailable for questioning". Making it available for routine inspection in and as
the course of reading CA would provoke the "invention" of a new, "stronger"
analytic object (to its left in our schema) to which the Tape would relate, as,
currently, does the Transcript to the Tape. In effect, the Tape would become a
new form of Transcript. [45]
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Authors
Citation
Ashmore, Malcolm & Reed, Darren (2000). Innocence and Nostalgia in Conversation Analysis: The
Dynamic Relations of Tape and Transcript [45 paragraphs]. Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung /
Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 1(3), Art. 3, http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-
fqs000335.
Revised 8/2008