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Wikipedia - Digital Physics

Digital physics is based on the premise that the universe is fundamentally informational and computable. It proposes that: 1) The universe can be conceived as the output of a computer program or a vast computational system. 2) The universe is essentially digital and can be fully described using information and computation. 3) Individual particles and forces can be modeled as simple bits that are switched on or off, allowing the entire universe to be simulated by a computer.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
22 views8 pages

Wikipedia - Digital Physics

Digital physics is based on the premise that the universe is fundamentally informational and computable. It proposes that: 1) The universe can be conceived as the output of a computer program or a vast computational system. 2) The universe is essentially digital and can be fully described using information and computation. 3) Individual particles and forces can be modeled as simple bits that are switched on or off, allowing the entire universe to be simulated by a computer.

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Peter Petroff
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Digital physics 1

Digital physics
In physics and cosmology, digital physics is a collection of theoretical perspectives based on the premise that the
universe is, at heart, describable by information, and is therefore computable. Therefore, the universe can be
conceived of as either the output of a computer program, a vast, digital computation device, or mathematically
isomorphic to such a device.
Digital physics is grounded in one or more of the following hypotheses; listed in order of decreasing strength. The
universe, or reality:
• is essentially informational (although not every informational ontology needs to be digital)
• is essentially computable
• can be described digitally
• is in essence digital
• is itself a computer
• is the output of a simulated reality exercise

History
Every computer must be compatible with the principles of information theory, statistical thermodynamics, and
quantum mechanics. A fundamental link among these fields was proposed by Edwin Jaynes in two seminal 1957
papers.[1] Moreover, Jaynes elaborated an interpretation of probability theory as generalized Aristotelian logic, a
view very convenient for linking fundamental physics with digital computers, because these are designed to
implement the operations of classical logic and, equivalently, of Boolean algebra.[2]
The hypothesis that the universe is a digital computer was pioneered by Konrad Zuse in his book Rechnender Raum
(translated into English as Calculating Space). The term digital physics was first employed by Edward Fredkin, who
later came to prefer the term digital philosophy.[3] Others who have modeled the universe as a giant computer
include Stephen Wolfram,[4] Juergen Schmidhuber,[5] and Nobel laureate Gerard 't Hooft.[6] These authors hold that
the apparently probabilistic nature of quantum physics is not necessarily incompatible with the notion of
computability. Quantum versions of digital physics have recently been proposed by Seth Lloyd,[7] David Deutsch,
and Paola Zizzi.[8]
Related ideas include Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker's binary theory of ur-alternatives, pancomputationalism,
computational universe theory, John Archibald Wheeler's "It from bit", and Max Tegmark's ultimate ensemble.

Overview
Digital physics suggests that there exists, at least in principle, a program for a universal computer which computes
the evolution of the universe. The computer could be, for example, a huge cellular automaton (Zuse 1967[9]), or a
universal Turing machine, as suggested by Schmidhuber (1997), who pointed out that there exists a very short
program that can compute all possible computable universes in an asymptotically optimal way.
Some try to identify single physical particles with simple bits. For example, if one particle, such as an electron, is
switching from one quantum state to another, it may be the same as if a bit is changed from one value (0, say) to the
other (1). A single bit suffices to describe a single quantum switch of a given particle. As the universe appears to be
composed of elementary particles whose behavior can be completely described by the quantum switches they
undergo, that implies that the universe as a whole can be described by bits. Every state is information, and every
change of state is a change in information (requiring the manipulation of one or more bits). Setting aside dark matter
and dark energy, which are poorly understood at present, the known universe consists of about 1080 protons and the
same number of electrons. Hence, the universe could be simulated by a computer capable of storing and
manipulating about 1090 bits. If such a simulation is indeed the case, then hypercomputation would be impossible.
Digital physics 2

Loop quantum gravity could lend support to digital physics, in that it assumes space-time is quantized. Paola Zizzi
has formulated a realization of this concept in what has come to be called "computational loop quantum gravity", or
CLQG.[10][11] Other theories that combine aspects of digital physics with loop quantum gravity are those of
Marzuoli and Rasetti[12][13] and Girelli and Livine.[14]

Weizsäcker's ur-alternatives
Physicist Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker's theory of ur-alternatives (archetypal objects), first publicized in his book
The Unity of Nature (1980),[] further developed through the 1990s,[][] is a kind of digital physics as it axiomatically
constructs quantum physics from the distinction between empirically observable, binary alternatives. Weizsäcker
used his theory to derive the 3-dimensionality of space and to estimate the entropy of a proton falling into a black
hole.

Pancomputationalism or the computational universe theory


Pancomputationalism (also known as pan-computationalism, naturalist computationalism) is a view that the universe
is a huge computational machine, or rather a network of computational processes which, following fundamental
physical laws, computes (dynamically develops) its own next state from the current one.[15]
A computational universe is proposed by Jürgen Schmidhuber in a paper based on Konrad Zuse's assumption (1967)
that the history of the universe is computable. He pointed out that the simplest explanation of the universe would be
a very simple Turing machine programmed to systematically execute all possible programs computing all possible
histories for all types of computable physical laws. He also pointed out that there is an optimally efficient way of
computing all computable universes based on Leonid Levin's universal search algorithm (1973). In 2000 he
expanded this work by combining Ray Solomonoff's theory of inductive inference with the assumption that quickly
computable universes are more likely than others. This work on digital physics also led to limit-computable
generalizations of algorithmic information or Kolmogorov complexity and the concept of Super Omegas, which are
limit-computable numbers that are even more random (in a certain sense) than Gregory Chaitin's number of wisdom
Omega.

Wheeler's "it from bit"


Following Jaynes and Weizsäcker, the physicist John Archibald Wheeler wrote the following:
[...] it is not unreasonable to imagine that information sits at the core of physics, just as it sits at the core of a
computer. (John Archibald Wheeler 1998: 340)
It from bit. Otherwise put, every 'it'—every particle, every field of force, even the space-time continuum
itself—derives its function, its meaning, its very existence entirely—even if in some contexts indirectly—from
the apparatus-elicited answers to yes-or-no questions, binary choices, bits. 'It from bit' symbolizes the idea that
every item of the physical world has at bottom—a very deep bottom, in most instances—an immaterial source
and explanation; that which we call reality arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes–no questions and
the registering of equipment-evoked responses; in short, that all things physical are information-theoretic in
origin and that this is a participatory universe. (John Archibald Wheeler 1990: 5)
David Chalmers of the Australian National University summarised Wheeler's views as follows:
Wheeler (1990) has suggested that information is fundamental to the physics of the universe. According
to this 'it from bit' doctrine, the laws of physics can be cast in terms of information, postulating different
states that give rise to different effects without actually saying what those states are. It is only their
position in an information space that counts. If so, then information is a natural candidate to also play a
role in a fundamental theory of consciousness. We are led to a conception of the world on which
information is truly fundamental, and on which it has two basic aspects, corresponding to the physical
Digital physics 3

and the phenomenal features of the world.[16]


Chris Langan also builds upon Wheeler's views in his epistemological metatheory:
The Future of Reality Theory According to John Wheeler: In 1979, the celebrated physicist John
Wheeler, having coined the phrase “black hole”, put it to good philosophical use in the title of an
exploratory paper, Beyond the Black Hole, in which he describes the universe as a self-excited circuit.
The paper includes an illustration in which one side of an uppercase U, ostensibly standing for Universe,
is endowed with a large and rather intelligent-looking eye intently regarding the other side, which it
ostensibly acquires through observation as sensory information. By dint of placement, the eye stands for
the sensory or cognitive aspect of reality, perhaps even a human spectator within the universe, while the
eye’s perceptual target represents the informational aspect of reality. By virtue of these complementary
aspects, it seems that the universe can in some sense, but not necessarily that of common usage, be
described as “conscious” and “introspective”…perhaps even “infocognitive”.[17]
The first formal presentation of the idea that information might be the fundamental quantity at the core of physics
seems to be due to Frederick W. Kantor (a physicist from Columbia University). Kantor's book Information
Mechanics (Wiley-Interscience, 1977) developed this idea in detail, but without mathematical rigor.
The toughest nut to crack in Wheeler's research program of a digital dissolution of physical being in a unified
physics, Wheeler himself says, is time. In a 1986 eulogy to the mathematician, Hermann Weyl, he proclaimed:
"Time, among all concepts in the world of physics, puts up the greatest resistance to being dethroned from ideal
continuum to the world of the discrete, of information, of bits. ... Of all obstacles to a thoroughly penetrating account
of existence, none looms up more dismayingly than 'time.' Explain time? Not without explaining existence. Explain
existence? Not without explaining time. To uncover the deep and hidden connection between time and existence ... is
a task for the future."[18] The Australian phenomenologist, Michael Eldred, comments:
The antinomy of the continuum, time, in connection with the question of being ... is said by Wheeler to
be a cause for dismay which challenges future quantum physics, fired as it is by a will to power over
moving reality, to "achieve four victories" (ibid.)... And so we return to the challenge to "[u]nderstand
the quantum as based on an utterly simple and—when we see it—completely obvious idea" (ibid.) from
which the continuum of time could be derived. Only thus could the will to mathematically calculable
power over the dynamics, i.e. the movement in time, of beings as a whole be satisfied.[19][20]

Digital vs. informational physics


Not every informational approach to physics (or ontology) is necessarily digital. According to Luciano Floridi,[21]
"informational structural realism" is a variant of structural realism that supports an ontological commitment to a
world consisting of the totality of informational objects dynamically interacting with each other. Such informational
objects are to be understood as constraining affordances.
Digital ontology and pancomputationalism are also independent positions. In particular, John Wheeler advocated the
former but was silent about the latter; see the quote in the preceding section.
On the other hand, pancomputationalists like Lloyd (2006), who models the universe as a quantum computer, can
still maintain an analogue or hybrid ontology; and informational ontologists like Sayre and Floridi embrace neither a
digital ontology nor a pancomputationalist position.[22]
Digital physics 4

Computational foundations

Turing machines
Theoretical computer science is founded on the Turing machine, an imaginary computing machine first described by
Alan Turing in 1936. While mechanically simple, the Church-Turing thesis implies that a Turing machine can solve
any "reasonable" problem. (In theoretical computer science, a problem is considered "solvable" if it can be solved in
principle, namely in finite time, which is not necessarily a finite time that is of any value to humans.) A Turing
machine therefore sets the practical "upper bound" on computational power, apart from the possibilities afforded by
hypothetical hypercomputers.
Wolfram's principle of computational equivalence powerfully motivates the digital approach. This principle, if
correct, means that everything can be computed by one essentially simple machine, the realization of a cellular
automaton. This is one way of fulfilling a traditional goal of physics: finding simple laws and mechanisms for all of
nature.
Digital physics is falsifiable in that a less powerful class of computers cannot simulate a more powerful class.
Therefore, if our universe is a gigantic simulation, that simulation is being run on a computer at least as powerful as
a Turing machine. If humans succeed in building a hypercomputer, then a Turing machine cannot have the power
required to simulate the universe.

The Church–Turing (Deutsch) thesis


The classic Church–Turing thesis claims that any computer as powerful as a Turing machine can, in principle,
calculate anything that a human can calculate, given enough time. Turing moreover showed that there exist universal
Turing machines which can compute anything any other Turing machine can compute - that they are generalizable
Turing machines. But the limits of practical computation are set by physics, not by theoretical computer science:
"Turing did not show that his machines can solve any problem that can be solved 'by instructions,
explicitly stated rules, or procedures', nor did he prove that the universal Turing machine 'can compute
any function that any computer, with any architecture, can compute'. He proved that his universal
machine can compute any function that any Turing machine can compute; and he put forward, and
advanced philosophical arguments in support of, the thesis here called Turing's thesis. But a thesis
concerning the extent of effective methods—which is to say, concerning the extent of procedures of a
certain sort that a human being unaided by machinery is capable of carrying out—carries no implication
concerning the extent of the procedures that machines are capable of carrying out, even machines acting
in accordance with 'explicitly stated rules.' For among a machine's repertoire of atomic operations there
may be those that no human being unaided by machinery can perform." [23]
On the other hand, a modification of Turing's assumptions does bring practical computation within Turing's limits; as
David Deutsch puts it:
"I can now state the physical version of the Church-Turing principle: 'Every finitely realizable physical
system can be perfectly simulated by a universal model computing machine operating by finite means.'
This formulation is both better defined and more physical than Turing's own way of expressing it."[24]
(Emphasis added)

This compound conjecture is sometimes called the "strong Church-Turing thesis" or the Church–Turing–Deutsch
principle. It is stronger because a human or Turing machine computing with pencil and paper (under Turing's
conditions) is a finitely realizable physical system.
Digital physics 5

Criticism
[citation needed]
The critics of digital physics—including physicists who work in quantum mechanics—object to it on
several grounds.

Physical symmetries are continuous


One objection is that extant models of digital physics are incompatible [citation needed] with the existence of several
continuous characters of physical symmetries, e.g., rotational symmetry, translational symmetry, Lorentz symmetry,
and electroweak symmetry, all central to current physical theory.
Proponents of digital physics claim that such continuous symmetries are only convenient (and very good)
approximations of a discrete reality. For example, the reasoning leading to systems of natural units and the
conclusion that the Planck length is a minimum meaningful unit of distance suggests that at some level space itself is
quantized.[25]
Moreover, computers can manipulate and solve formulas describing real numbers using symbolic computation, thus
avoiding the need to approximate real numbers by using an infinite number of digits.
A number—in particular a real number, one with an infinite number of digits—was defined by Turing to be
computable if a Turing machine will continue to spit out digits endlessly. In other words, there is no "last digit". But
this sits uncomfortably with any proposal that the universe is the output of a virtual-reality exercise carried out in
real time (or any plausible kind of time). Known physical laws (including quantum mechanics and its continuous
spectra) are very much infused with real numbers and the mathematics of the continuum.
"So ordinary computational descriptions do not have a cardinality of states and state space trajectories
that is sufficient for them to map onto ordinary mathematical descriptions of natural systems. Thus, from
the point of view of strict mathematical description, the thesis that everything is a computing system in
this second sense cannot be supported".[26]
For his part, David Deutsch generally takes a "multiverse" view to the question of continuous vs. discrete. In short,
he thinks that “within each universe all observable quantities are discrete, but the multiverse as a whole is a
continuum. When the equations of quantum theory describe a continuous but not-directly-observable transition
between two values of a discrete quantity, what they are telling us is that the transition does not take place entirely
within one universe. So perhaps the price of continuous motion is not an infinity of consecutive actions, but an
infinity of concurrent actions taking place across the multiverse.” January, 2001 The Discrete and the Continuous, an
abridged version of which appeared in The Times Higher Education Supplement.

Locality
Some argue that extant models of digital physics violate various postulates of quantum physics (as in [27]). For
example, if these models are not grounded in Hilbert spaces and probabilities, they belong to the class of theories
with local hidden variables that some deem ruled out experimentally using Bell's theorem. This criticism has two
possible answers. First, any notion of locality in the digital model does not necessarily have to correspond to locality
formulated in the usual way in the emergent spacetime. A concrete example of this case was recently given by Lee
Smolin.[28]Wikipedia:Citing sources Another possibility is a well-known loophole in Bell's theorem known as
superdeterminism (sometimes referred to as predeterminism).[29]Wikipedia:Please clarify In a completely
deterministic model, the experimenter's decision to measure certain components of the spins is predetermined. Thus,
the assumption that the experimenter could have decided to measure different components of the spins than he
actually did is, strictly speaking, not true.
Digital physics 6

References
[1] Jaynes, E. T., 1957, " Information Theory and Statistical Mechanics, (http:/ / bayes. wustl. edu/ etj/ articles/ theory. 1. pdf)" Phys. Rev 106:
620.
Jaynes, E. T., 1957, " Information Theory and Statistical Mechanics II, (http:/ / bayes. wustl. edu/ etj/ articles/ theory. 2. pdf)" Phys. Rev. 108:
171.
[2] Jaynes, E. T., 1990, " Probability Theory as Logic, (http:/ / bayes. wustl. edu/ etj/ articles/ prob. as. logic. pdf)" in Fougere, P.F., ed.,
Maximum-Entropy and Bayesian Methods. Boston: Kluwer.
[3] See Fredkin's Digital Philosophy web site. (http:/ / www. digitalphilosophy. org)
[4] A New Kind of Science website. (http:/ / www. wolframscience. com) Reviews of ANKS. (http:/ / www. math. usf. edu/ ~eclark/
ANKOS_reviews. html)
[5] Schmidhuber, J., " Computer Universes and an Algorithmic Theory of Everything. (http:/ / www. idsia. ch/ ~juergen/ computeruniverse.
html)"
[6] G. 't Hooft, 1999, " Quantum Gravity as a Dissipative Deterministic System, (http:/ / arxiv. org/ abs/ gr-qc/ 9903084)" Class. Quant. Grav.
16: 3263-79.
[7] Lloyd, S., " The Computational Universe: Quantum gravity from quantum computation. (http:/ / arxiv. org/ abs/ quant-ph/ 0501135)"
[8] Zizzi, Paola, " Spacetime at the Planck Scale: The Quantum Computer View. (http:/ / arxiv. org/ abs/ gr-qc/ 0304032)"
[9] Zuse, Konrad, 1967, Elektronische Datenverarbeitung vol 8., pages 336-344
[10] Zizzi, Paola, " A Minimal Model for Quantum Gravity. (http:/ / arxiv. org/ gr-qc/ 0406069)"
[11] Zizzi, Paola, " Computability at the Planck Scale. (http:/ / arxiv. org/ gr-qc/ 0412076)"
[12] Marzuoli, A. and Rasetti, M., 2002, " Spin Network Quantum Simulator, (http:/ / arxiv. org/ quant-ph/ 0209016)" Phys. Lett. A306, 79-87.
[13] Marzuoli, A. and Rasetti, M., 2005, " Computing Spin Networks, (http:/ / arxiv. org/ quant-ph/ 0410105)" Annals of Physics 318: 345-407.
[14] Girelli, F.; Livine, E. R., 2005, " (http:/ / arxiv. org/ gr-qc/ 0501075)" Class. Quant. Grav. 22: 3295-3314.
[15] Papers on pancompuationalism (http:/ / philpapers. org/ browse/ pancomputationalism)
[16] Chalmers, David. J., 1995, " Facing up to the Hard Problem of Consciousness, (http:/ / consc. net/ papers/ facing. html)" Journal of
Consciousness Studies 2(3): 200-19. This paper cites John A. Wheeler, 1990, "Information, physics, quantum: The search for links" in W.
Zurek (ed.) Complexity, Entropy, and the Physics of Information. Redwood City, CA: Addison-Wesley. Also see Chalmers, D., 1996. The
Conscious Mind. Oxford Univ. Press.
[17] Langan, Christopher M., 2002, " The Cognitive-Theoretic Model of the Universe: A New Kind of Reality Theory, pg. 7 (http:/ / www.
megafoundation. org/ CTMU/ Articles/ Langan_CTMU_092902. pdf)" Progress in Complexity, Information and Design
[18] Wheeler, John Archibald, 1986, " Hermann Weyl and the Unity of Knowledge (http:/ / www. weylmann. com/ wheeler. pdf)"
[19] Eldred, Michael, 2009, ' Postscript 2: On quantum physics' assault on time (http:/ / www. arte-fact. org/ dgtlon_e. html#ps2)'
[20] Eldred, Michael, 2009, The Digital Cast of Being: Metaphysics, Mathematics, Cartesianism, Cybernetics, Capitalism, Communication
(http:/ / www. arte-fact. org/ dgtlcast. html) ontos, Frankfurt 2009 137 pp. ISBN 978-3-86838-045-3
[21] Floridi, L., 2004, " Informational Realism, (http:/ / crpit. com/ confpapers/ CRPITV37Floridi. pdf)" in Weckert, J., and Al-Saggaf, Y, eds.,
Computing and Philosophy Conference, vol. 37."
[22] See Floridi talk on Informational Nature of Reality, abstract at the E-CAP conference 2006.
[23] Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: " The Church-Turing thesis (http:/ / www. science. uva. nl/ ~seop/ entries/ church-turing/ #Bloopers)"
-- by B. Jack Copeland.
[24] David Deutsch, "Quantum Theory, the Church-Turing Principle and the Universal Quantum Computer."
[25] John A. Wheeler, 1990, "Information, physics, quantum: The search for links" in W. Zurek (ed.) Complexity, Entropy, and the Physics of
Information. Redwood City, CA: Addison-Wesley.
[26] Piccinini, Gualtiero, 2007, "Computational Modelling vs. Computational Explanation: Is Everything a Turing Machine, and Does It Matter
to the Philosophy of Mind?" Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85(1): 93-115.
[28] L. Smolin, " Matrix models as non-local hidden variables theories. (http:/ / arxiv. org/ abs/ hep-th/ 0201031)"
[29] J. S. Bell, 1981, "Bertlmann's socks and the nature of reality," Journal de Physique 42 C2: 41-61.

Further reading
• Paul Davies, 1992. The Mind of God: The Scientific Basis for a Rational World. New York: Simon & Schuster.
• David Deutsch, 1997. The Fabric of Reality. New York: Allan Lane.
• Michael Eldred, 2009, The Digital Cast of Being: Metaphysics, Mathematics, Cartesianism, Cybernetics,
Capitalism, Communication (http://www.arte-fact.org/dgtlcast.html) ontos, Frankfurt 2009, 137 pp. ISBN
978-3-86838-045-3
• Edward Fredkin, 1990. "Digital Mechanics," Physica D: 254-70.
• Seth Lloyd, Ultimate physical limits to computation (http://puhep1.princeton.edu/~mcdonald/examples/QM/
lloyd_nature_406_1047_00.pdf), Nature, volume 406, pages 1047–1054
Digital physics 7

• Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, 1980. The Unity of Nature. New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux.
• John Archibald Wheeler, 1990. "Information, physics, quantum: The search for links" in W. Zurek (ed.)
Complexity, Entropy, and the Physics of Information. Addison-Wesley.
• John Archibald Wheeler and Kenneth Ford, 1998. Geons, black holes and quantum foam: A life in physics. W. W.
Norton. ISBN 0-393-04642-7.
• Robert Wright, 1989. Three Scientists and Their Gods: Looking for Meaning in an Age of Information.
HarperCollins. ISBN 0-06-097257-2. This book discusses Edward Fredkin's work.
• Konrad Zuse, 1970. Calculating Space (http://ftp.idsia.ch/pub/juergen/zuserechnenderraum.pdf). The
English translation of his Rechnender Raum.

External links
• Luciano Floridi, "Against Digital Ontology" (http://www.philosophyofinformation.net/publications/pdf/ado.
pdf), Synthese, 2009, 168.1, (2009), 151-178.
• Edward Fredkin:
• Digital Philosophy (http://www.digitalphilosophy.org)
• Introduction to Digital Philosophy (http://64.78.31.152/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/intro-to-DP.pdf)
• Gontigno, Paulo, " Hypercomputation and the Physical Church-Turing thesis (http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/cache/
papers/cs/30488/http:zSzzSzwww3.oup.co.ukzSzphiscizSzhdbzSzVolume_54zSzIssue_02zSzpdfzSz540181.
pdf/cotogno03hypercomputation.pdf)"
• Petrov, Plamen, and Joel Dobrzelewski, 1998. Digital Physics (http://digitalphysics.org/)
• Juergen Schmidhuber:
• Home page, 1996-2007 (http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/)
• Computer Universes and Algorithmic Theory of Everything (http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/
computeruniverse.html)
• " Zuse's Thesis: The Universe is a Computer (http://www.idsia.ch/~juergen/digitalphysics.html)"
• Konrad Zuse, PDF scan (ftp://ftp.idsia.ch/pub/juergen/zuse67scan.pdf) of Zuse's paper.
• Konrad Zuse, Re-edition (http://www.mathrix.org/zenil/ZuseCalculatingSpace-GermanZenil.pdf) of Zuse's
paper in modern LaTeX.
• Digital physics. (http://www.mtnmath.com/whatrh/node62.html) Mountain Math Software.
• The Oxford Advanced Seminar on Informatic Structures (http://se10.comlab.ox.ac.uk:8080/
InformaticPhenomena/IntroductiontoOASIS_en.html)
• Wired: God is the Machine (http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/10.12/holytech.html)
• Gualtiero Piccinini. Computation in Physical Systems (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
computation-physicalsystems/) Discusses the metaphysical foundations of digital physics in section 3.4.
Article Sources and Contributors 8

Article Sources and Contributors


Digital physics Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?oldid=557817253 Contributors: "alyosha", Aarghdvaark, Adam7z, America jones, Andreas Kaufmann, ArepoEn, Artefactme,
Astropiloto, Bakesnobread, BarkingMoon, Beefman, Ben Standeven, Benvewikilerim, Bill52270, Bobrayner, BrotherGeorge, CWenger, Cfftble, Charles Matthews, CharlesC, Concerned cynic,
Count Iblis, Cybercobra, Davidellerman, Davidhorman, Dcoetzee, Digitalguy451, Discrepancy, Eb Oesch, Edward, Edward Z. Yang, Faradn, Ferkel, Finell, Flammifer, Florian Blaschke, Floridi,
FlyByPC, Fredkinfollower, Fuzheado, Geropod, Gordanadodig, Gpgra, Gregbard, GregorB, Gupst1, Gzhanstong, Hmonroe, Icseaturtles, InverseHypercube, J04n, JForget, JHunterJ, Jack who
built the house, Jcbaillie, JonathanD, Joncolvin, Kavehplus, Leibniz, Leondumontfollower, Lordvolton, Lumidek, M i t r a, Machine Elf 1735, Magioladitis, Malcolmxl5, Mar2194, Maria Vargas,
Marq91, Matttoothman, Mbell, Mellery, Metric, Michael Hardy, Microsage, Midnight Madness, Mr. Stradivarius, NekoDaemon, NeonMerlin, Odkar49, OlEnglish, On you again, Pcap,
Peterdjones, Pleasantville, PyonDude, Quondum, R'n'B, RG2, Randomness, Reddi, Rjwilmsi, Ronburk, Ross Fraser, Ruud Koot, Sallantin, SamuelRiv, Serialized, Sfaefaol, SheepNotGoats,
Spartaz, Stux, TakuyaMurata, Tarotcards, TeleComNasSprVen, Thehotelambush, TonyFleet, Torchiest, Touisiau, TyA, Vagary, Vallor, Verbal, Viallet, Vipinhari, Wanderingstan, WhiteDragon,
Whitepaw, XJaM, 108 anonymous edits

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