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Pipeline right-of-way encroachment in Arepo, Nigeria
Article in Journal of Transport and Land Use · July 2017
DOI: 10.5198/jtlu.2017.1217
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T J T L U http://jtlu.org
V. 10 N. 1 [2017] pp. 715–724
Pipeline right-of-way encroachment in Arepo, Nigeria
Michael Ajide Oyinloye Benjamin Lanre Oladosu
Federal University of Technology Federal University of Technology
[email protected] [email protected]Isaac Oluwadare Olamiju
Federal University of Technology
[email protected]Abstract: Encroachment by host communities on pipeline right-of- Article history:
way (PROW) constitutes a major problem for the oil and gas sector Received: May 9, 2017
of the economy. This paper uses remote sensing and geographic infor- Received in revised form: April
mation system (GIS) technologies to assess the level of vulnerability 25, 2014
of people living along the PROW in Arepo, Ogun State, Nigeria. A Accepted: May 10, 2017
satellite imagery of the community was acquired and processed using Available online: July 10, 2017
ArcGIS computer software. A GIS buffering operation was performed
on the PROW using 15 m, 30 m, 60 m, and 90 m distances, respective-
ly. Three hundred and forty buildings were identified in the buffered
zones, out of which 200 (60%) were randomly selected for the study.
A structured questionnaire was administered to household heads in the
sampled buildings. Empirical analysis shows that 140 buildings (70%)
observed less than a 30 m setback to the pipeline. Also, residents ben-
efit from incidents of oil spillage and see these as an avenue to vandal-
ize the pipeline, making them more vulnerable. GIS analysis shows
that more than 30% of respondents are highly vulnerable to the hazard
of pipeline explosion incidents. Enforcement of setback regulations
by the Town Planning Authority and public education and awareness
of risks associated with encroachment on the PROW are canvassed
among others.
Keywords: pipeline right-of-way, encroachment, vulnerability, re-
mote sensing, GIS, and Arepo
1 Introduction
Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and the 11th largest globally, and oil remains the mainstay
of the nation’s economy. This sector has remarkably brought buoyancy to the country’s economy (Okoli
& Orinya, 2013).
Refined crude oil products from the central refineries are typically transported to various pump
stations and depots by rail, road, coastal waterway, and pipeline systems (Okoli & Orinya, 2013).
Copyright 2017 Michael Ajide Oyinloye, Benjamin Lanre Oladosu & Isaac Oluwadare Olamiju
http://dx.doi.org/10.5198/jtlu.2017.1217
ISSN: 1938-7849 | Licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution – Noncommercial License 3.0
The Journal of Transport and Land Use is the official journal of the World Society for Transport and Land Use (WSTLUR)
and is published and sponsored by the University of Minnesota Center for Transportation Studies.
716 JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT AND LAND USE 10.1
However, the road and pipeline systems are dominant in Nigeria because of a limited rail network and
lack of inland waterways.
A pipeline right-of-way (PROW) is a strip of land over, under, and around crude oil pipelines
where some of the property owner’s legal rights have been granted to a pipeline operator. Usually, a
PROW is established about 15 m from each side of a pipeline, excepting special conditions like swamps
and coastal areas (Phillips 66 Pipeline, 2012).
Pipeline operation can be compromised by accidental manmade threats such as seismic disturbanc-
es caused by legitimate civil engineering works in the area or even by farming activity. Pipeline safety
and security, therefore, generally involve federal agencies, oil and gas pipeline associations, and pipeline
operators as well as the local communities through which the pipelines pass.
Nigeria has a total pipeline grid of just above 5000 km. This consists of 4315 km of multiproduct
pipelines and 666 km of crude oil pipelines (PPMC, 2015). These pipelines traverse the country, form-
ing a network that interconnects the 22 petroleum storage depots and the four refineries (two of which
are at Port-Harcourt, one at Kaduna, and one at Warri) and connecting the off-shore terminals at Bonny
and Escravos and the jetties at Alas Cove, Calabar, Okirika, and Warri. This system of oil pipelines trans-
ports crude oil to the refineries in Port-Harcourt, Warri, and Kaduna, covering a total distance of 719
km. The multiproduct pipelines are used to transport products from the refineries and import-receiving
jetties to the 22 petroleum storage depots at various places in the country. The storage infrastructure,
consisting of 22 loading depots where the products are stored for distribution, linked by pipelines of 6
to 8 inches diameter range, have combined installed capacities of 1,266,890 metric tons of Premium
Motor Spirit (PMS); 676,400 metric tons of Dual Purpose Kerosene (DPK); 1,007,90 metric tons of
Automotive Gas Oil (AGO); and 74,000 metric tons of Aviation Turbine Kerosene (ATK).
This paper aims to assess the effect of community encroachment on PROW and its socioeconomic
implications on Arepo, Ogun State, Nigeria using remote sensing and GIS techniques. The objectives
are to examine the existing pipeline infrastructure in the study area; identify the extent of encroachment
on PROW using buffering operations in GIS environment; and assess the security implication due to
this encroachment.
The issue of encroachment on PROW by host communities constitutes a major problem to the
oil and gas sector of the economy. Encroachment breaches the planning standard set for development,
which is often the main reason for infringement and vandalism.
2 Materials and methods
2.1 Research locale
Ogun is one of the 36 states of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, with an estimated population of
3,751,140 people (NPC, 2006), ranking 16th in population. It has a total land area of about 17,000
km2 and an average density of 220 persons per km2. Ogun, popularly known as the “Gateway State,”
is in South Western Nigeria as shown in Figure 1, bounded on the north by Oyo, on the northeast by
Osun, on the west by Ondo, and on the south by Lagos.
Pipeline right-of-way encroachment in Arepo, Nigeria 717
Figure 1: Map of Nigeria showing the study area in its national setting
Source: Survey Department, Ministry of Works, 2016
The study area is located in the Obafemi Owode local government area of the State. Obafemi
Owode is one of the 20 local government areas in Ogun. The Arepo community is located along Lagos-
Ibadan Express. Figure 2 shows the study area in its regional setting while Figure 3 shows the satellite
image of the study area.
Figure 2: Map of Ogun State showing the study area in its regional setting
Source: Survey Department, Ministry of Works, 2016
718 JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT AND LAND USE 10.1
Figure 3: Google Earth imagery of the study area
Source: Google Earth, 2016
Figure 4 shows the buffer distances from the PROW. The figure shows 26 buildings housing an
estimated 728 persons within the 15 m buffer, violating the statutory standard setback for the PROW.
Figure 4: Vulnerability zones/buffer along the PROW in Arepo, Nigeria
Source: Authors’ fieldwork, 2016
The vulnerability levels indicate the impact of incidents of pipeline explosion that could occur from
incessant oil bunkering, sabotage, or domestic fire accidents. This could further result in causalities and
property loss due to the impact of the pipeline incident.
Pipeline right-of-way encroachment in Arepo, Nigeria 719
2.2 Database description
A shapefile of the pipeline network passing through the community was created and digitized through
the use of ArcMap GIS software. This provides a clear overview of the existing pipeline infrastructure
in the study area. The study area was divided into 4 zones using buffers of 15 m, 30 m, 60 m, and 90
m, respectively. The total number of encroaching buildings and the estimated total number of persons
affected in the study area were determined by the buffering operation.
The total number of buildings constitutes the population for this study. Table 1 shows sampling in
the study area. A structured questionnaire was used to generate the attribute data. Using the building
population, a 60% sample was purposively taken due to homogeneity characterizing the study area. In
this way, a total of 204 structured questionnaires were administered to household heads in the commu-
nity, out of which 200 were found fit for analysis. The simple random sampling technique was used to
administer the selected sample.
Table 1: Sampling in the Arepo community (the study area)
Buffer distance from Pipeline Zone Total no. of buildings 60% of buildings
15m A 26 16
30m B 78 47
60m C 89 53
90m D 147 88
Total 340 204
Source: Authors’ fieldwork, 2016
3 Results and discussion
The data acquired from the administered questionnaire (see appendix) based on implications of com-
munity encroachment on PROW are as described below.
3.1 Planning implications of encroachment on the PROW
Table 2 shows the relationship between respondents’ length of stay in the study area and the distance
of their respective buildings to the pipeline. From the Table, it is evident that 140 buildings (70%)
observed less than a 30 m setback to the pipeline. Those nearest the pipeline have the least tenure of
residence, indicating people prefer to live farther from the pipeline, as locations near the pipeline have
higher residential turnover. In addition, 55.7% of respondents have stayed in the PROW for more than
10 years.
The final row of the table shows the number of buildings in the study area by distance from the
pipeline. It is evident that the farther one moves away from the pipeline, the more buildings there are.
This implies that the pipeline affects the location of buildings in the study area and a willingness to
encroach. In other words, residents are reluctant to build too close to the pipeline, probably due to well-
understood impacts on building and human health.
720 JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT AND LAND USE 10.1
Table 2: Length of stay of respondents vs. distance to pipeline
Distance of Respondent’s Residence from
Length of stay Total Freq Total %
< 15 m 15 -29 m 30-59 m 60 – 90 m
below 5yrs 33 16 0 0 49 24.5
5-10yrs 0 15 14 11 40 20.0
11-15yrs 27 16 0 0 43 21.5
above 15yrs 0 33 21 14 68 34.0
Total 60 80 35 25 200 100.0
Source: Authors’ fieldwork, 2016
Table 3 shows reasons residents moved to the community. The largest number of people (57%)
moved to the area to engage in retail trading rather than being employed by another organization. Only
43% of respondents migrated to the community for employment purposes by other organizations. This
shows that the community is a center for commercial and employment opportunities.
Table 3: Attraction factor to community vs. distance to pipeline
Distance of Respondent’s Residence from
Attraction Factor Pipeline Total Freq Total %
< 15 m 15 -29 m 30-59 m 60 – 90 m
Lumbering 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trading 43 46 14 11 114 57
Employment 17 34 21 14 86 43
Grand Total 60 80 35 25 200 100
Total 60 80 35 25 200 100.0
Source: Authors’ fieldwork, 2016
Table 4 shows the response of the community to cases of oil spills; 22% of the respondents claimed
the community reported oil spill cases to security agencies, 25.5% claimed they evacuated the area
whenever there is an oil spill, and 44.5% agreed that the community took advantage of oil spills to scoop
petroleum because of their closeness to the area.
Table 4: Community response to oil spillage vs. distance to pipeline
Distance of Respondent’s Residence from
Response Pipeline Total Freq Total %
< 15 m 15 -29 m 30-59 m 60 – 90 m
Report to security
20 17 4 3 44 22.0
agency
Evacuate from area
22 18 7 4 51 25.5
of spill
Vandalize the
42 21 19 7 89 44.5
pipeline
Do nothing 10 6 0 0 16 8.0
Grand Total 94 62 30 14 200 100.0
Source: Authors’ fieldwork, 2016
Pipeline right-of-way encroachment in Arepo, Nigeria 721
However, Plate 1 illustrates people scooping petroleum during oil spillage in the study area. This
indicates that whenever there was oil spillage, at least some residents saw it as an avenue to vandalize the
pipeline to gain from black-market sales (see Plate 1).
Plate 1: Residents scooping petroleum after an explosion
Source: Yusuf, A., 2015.
Table 5 shows possible safety measures. Of the sample, 45% opined that the use of “No Trespass”
signs was the best measure, 1% suggested aerial surveillance of the PROW was the best safety technique,
19% believed security personnel should patrol the PROW periodically, 14% opted for enforcement of
regulations by the town planning authority against houses located on the PROW, and 21% strongly
believed that the use of all the available techniques will serve the best purpose in ensuring a safer PROW.
This implies a majority support for relocation of encroaching residents.
Table 5: Suggested safety measure on the PROW vs. distance to pipeline
Recommended Distance of Respondent’s Residence from Pipeline
Total Freq Total %
Measure < 15 m 15-29m 30-59 m 60- 90 m
Erection of "No
10 20 30 30 90 45.0
Trespass" signs
Aerial surveillance 2 0 0 0 02 1.0
Security patrol along
10 12 9 7 38 19
pipeline right-of-way
Enforcement of
Town Planning 20 8 0 0 0 14
Regulations
All of the above 10 10 10 12 12 21
Total 60 80 35 35 24 100
Source: Authors’ fieldwork, 2016
Table 6 shows dominant building uses along the PROW. Of the sample 70% believed that resi-
dential buildings are most dominant in the community, 22% opted for commercial buildings as most
prevailing, and 4% and 3.5% suggested industrial and mixed uses, respectively. Interestingly, more resi-
dential buildings (53/141) are found within a less-than-15 m statutory setback to the pipeline. This
implies lack of adequate town planning regulations and enforcement operations in the community.
722 JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT AND LAND USE 10.1
Table 6: Dominant building uses along the PROW vs. distance to pipeline
Dominant Build- Distance of Respondent’s Residence from Pipeline
Total Freq Total %
ing Use < 15 m 15-29m 30-59 m 60- 90 m
Commercial 0 33 11 0 44 22.0
Residential 53 39 24 25 141 70.5
Industrial 3 5 0 0 8 4.0
Mixed 4 3 0 0 7 3.5
Total 60 80 35 25 200 100.0
Total 60 80 35 35 24 100
Source: Authors’ fieldwork, 2016
3.2 Remote sensing and GIS results
Figure 4 shows the buffer distances from the PROW at 15 m, 30 m, 60 m, and 90 m representing the
zones of vulnerability, respectively. At the 15 m buffer distance (Zone A), the total number of encroached
buildings on the PROW is 26 and the estimated total number of persons within this zone is 728. This
indicates that the number of residents is very highly vulnerable to incidents of pipeline explosion in the
community. The figure shows it as the area of highest vulnerability, depicted with the color red.
At the 30 m buffer zone (Zone B), 78 buildings with an estimated population of 2184 persons fall
within this zone. The buildings and persons in this buffer zone are considered to be under high vulner-
ability in the incidence of an explosion from the oil pipeline. Buildings that fall within this zone are
depicted with the color blue as shown also in Figure 4.
Also at the 60 m and 90 m buffer zones (Zones C and D), the total number of buildings is 89 and
147, with an estimated population of 2492 persons and 4116 persons, respectively. The buildings in
these zones are considered to be under medium and low vulnerability levels in the incidence of an oil
pipeline explosion. These vulnerability levels are depicted by turquoise blue and green colors, respec-
tively; buildings with no vulnerability are shown with pink (Figure 4).
The vulnerability levels indicate the impact of a potential pipeline explosion, which could occur
as a result of human activities such as incessant oil bunkering or sabotage as well as domestic fire acci-
dents. The implication of these findings for planning is that buildings that fall in zones A and B should
be marked for contravening town planning regulations and consequent removal or demolition. Only
buildings in Zone D (area of no vulnerability) are expected to remain.
4 Conclusion and recommendations
This study has revealed the degree of encroachment on the PROW in the study area. The study
also demonstrated the use of remote sensing and GIS technologies in infrastructure management. This
paper therefore recommends that:
1. Aerial surveillance of the pipeline using remote sensing and GIS technologies should be em-
ployed for effective development control operations in the study area.
2. Enforcement of setback regulations by the town planning authority will ensure more orderly
development of infrastructure and promote safety of both the residents and the pipeline.
3. Removal of structures on the PROW should also be carried out for public safety. However, this
requires finding adequate replacement housing for the displaced residents. The pipeline com-
pany should engage in community development for the displaced residents, including creating
replacement communities with the project such as construction of good roads and boreholes
Pipeline right-of-way encroachment in Arepo, Nigeria 723
and provision of electricity and schools. This is to foster a good relationship between the pipe-
line companies and the community and mitigate the negative outcomes from displacement.
4. Public sensitization and awareness on the level of vulnerability and risks associated with en-
croachment on the PROW should be carried out by the pipeline company. This should be done
while recognizing the need for peaceful oil company–community relationships for an enduring
business environment.
724 JOURNAL OF TRANSPORT AND LAND USE 10.1
References
National Population Commission (NPC) of Nigeria. (2006). Retrieved from http://www.population.
gov.ng/
Okoli, A., & Orinya, S. (2013). Oil pipeline vandalism and Nigeria’s national security. Global Journal of
Human Social Science, 13(5), 67–75.
Phillips 66 Pipeline. (2012). A Phillips 66 Pipeline LLC core value commitment to safety. Retrieved from
http://www.phillips66pipeline.com
Survey Department, Ministry of Works and Housing. (2016). Akure, Ondo State, Nigeria: Ministry of
Works and Housing.
Yusuf, A.(2015, July 29). The cost of Arepo explosion. New Telegraph, p 33.
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