Energies 17 00646

energies
Article
Expectations for the Role of Hydrogen and Its Derivatives in
Different Sectors through Analysis of the Four Energy
Scenarios: IEA-STEPS, IEA-NZE, IRENA-PES,
and IRENA-1.5◦ C
Osama A. Marzouk
College of Engineering, University of Buraimi, Al Buraimi 512, Oman; [email protected]
Abstract: Recently, worldwide, the attention being paid to hydrogen and its derivatives as alternative
carbon-free (or low-carbon) options for the electricity sector, the transport sector, and the industry
sector has increased. Several projects in the field of low-emission hydrogen production (particularly
electrolysis-based green hydrogen) have either been constructed or analyzed for their feasibility.
Despite the great ambitions announced by some nations with respect to becoming hubs for hydrogen
production and export, some quantification of the levels at which hydrogen and its derived products
are expected to penetrate the global energy system and its various demand sectors would be useful
in order to judge the practicality and likelihood of these ambitions and future targets. The current
study aims to summarize some of the expectations of the level at which hydrogen and its derivatives
could spread into the global economy, under two possible future scenarios. The first future scenario
corresponds to a business-as-usual (BAU) pathway, where the world proceeds with the same existing
policies and targets related to emissions and low-carbon energy transition. This forms a lower bound
for the level of the role of hydrogen and its penetration into the global energy system. The second
future scenario corresponds to an emission-conscious pathway, where governments cooperate to
implement the changes necessary to decarbonize the economy by 2050 in order to achieve net-zero
emissions of carbon dioxide (carbon neutrality), and thus limit the rise in the global mean surface
Citation: Marzouk, O.A.
temperature to 1.5 ◦ C by 2100 (compared to pre-industrial periods). This forms an upper bound for
Expectations for the Role of
the level of the role of hydrogen and its penetration into the global energy system. The study utilizes
Hydrogen and Its Derivatives in
the latest release of the annual comprehensive report WEO (World Energy Outlook—edition year
Different Sectors through Analysis of
the Four Energy Scenarios:
2023, the 26th edition) of the IEA (International Energy Agency), as well as the latest release of the
IEA-STEPS, IEA-NZE, IRENA-PES, annual comprehensive report WETO (World Energy Transitions Outlook—edition year 2023, the
and IRENA-1.5◦ C. Energies 2024, 17, third edition) of the IRENA (International Renewable Energy Agency). For the IEA-WEO report, the
646. https://doi.org/10.3390/ business-as-usual situation is STEPS (Stated “Energy” Policies Scenario), and the emissions-conscious
en17030646 situation is NZE (Net-Zero Emissions by 2050). For the IRENA-WETO report, the business-as-
usual situation is the PES (Planned Energy Scenario), and the emissions-conscious situation is the
Academic Editor: Muhammad Asif
1.5◦ C scenario. Through the results presented here, it becomes possible to infer a realistic range
Received: 11 January 2024 for the production and utilization of hydrogen and its derivatives in 2030 and 2050. In addition,
Revised: 24 January 2024
the study enables the divergence between the models used in WEO and WETO to be estimated,
Accepted: 27 January 2024
by identifying the different predictions for similar variables under similar conditions. The study
Published: 30 January 2024
covers miscellaneous variables related to energy and emissions other than hydrogen, which are
helpful in establishing a good view of how the world may look in 2030 and 2050. Some barriers (such
as the uncompetitive levelized cost of electrolysis-based green hydrogen) and drivers (such as the
Copyright: © 2024 by the author. German H2Global initiative) for the hydrogen economy are also discussed. The study finds that the
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. large-scale utilization of hydrogen or its derivatives as a source of energy is highly uncertain, and it
This article is an open access article may be reached slowly, given more than two decades to mature. Despite this, electrolysis-based green
distributed under the terms and hydrogen is expected to dominate the global hydrogen economy, with the annual global production
conditions of the Creative Commons of electrolysis-based green hydrogen expected to increase from 0 million tonnes in 2021 to between
Attribution (CC BY) license (https:// 22 million tonnes and 327 million tonnes (with electrolyzer capacity exceeding 5 terawatts) in 2050,
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
depending on the commitment of policymakers toward decarbonization and energy transitions.
4.0/).
Energies 2024, 17, 646. https://doi.org/10.3390/en17030646 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/energies

Energies 2024, 17, 646 2 of 34
Keywords: hydrogen; IEA; IRENA; STEPS; NZE; PES; 1.5◦ C; scenario; net zero emissions
1. Introduction
1.1. Energy-Emission Modeling
Due to the anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), particularly carbon
dioxide (CO2 ), the global average surface (both land and sea) temperature of the earth has
increased; and this rise reached about 1.2 ◦ C in 2020 compared to 1850 as a baseline for
the pre-industrial periods [1–5]. In relation to this, the global average atmospheric CO2
concentration in 2020 reached 415 ppm (parts per million), compared to its pre-industrial
level of 285 ppm, in around 1850 [6]. When the average temperature increases by an amount,
the local temperature (especially on the land rather than the sea) may actually increase
by a multiple of that amount. Thus, the relatively small amount of the average surface
temperature rise can be misleading in terms of describing the size of the global warming
problem [7,8], which extends to the broader problem of climate change through the altered
pattern of other climate variables besides temperature [9]. In order to properly combat the
CO2 emissions that cause global warming, it is important to understand the dependence of
these CO2 emissions on their source activities, such as electricity generation and industrial
processes. Through long-term global predictive models, the energy-emissions nexus can be
understood [10].
1.2. IEA-WEO
The International Energy Agency (IEA) adopted the Global Energy and Climate (GEC)
model as a large-scale simulation tool to replicate how energy markets function, and to
generate detailed long-term scenarios for the global energy system as well as its dependent
emissions. The IEA’s GEC model replaced (in 2021) a couple of older models that used to
be implemented in parallel to each other, which are the IEA’s World Energy Model (WEM),
and the IEA’s Energy Technology Perspectives (ETP) model [11]. The specific energy-
emissions scenarios (or pathways) covered by the GEC include (1) the Stated Policies
Scenario, or Stated Energy Policies Scenario (STEPS), (2) Announced Pledges Scenario
(APS), and (3) the Net-Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario (NZE). STEPS predicts the direction
of energy system progression assuming that the current policies remain in action and
no additional mitigating changes are seriously taken to curb climate change by limiting
energy-based and process-based emissions [12]. This type of forecasting that has a clear
starting point and a clear assumption that guides the progression path but does not aim to
reach a specific target is described as “exploratory”. The additional IEA energy-emissions
pathway (Announced Pledges Scenario, APS) was introduced in 2021. It can be viewed as
an intermediate scenario between STEPS and NZE. It is an exploratory forecasting model
(like STEPS), but its assumption is that all the announced major national ambitions and
targets (such as net zero “carbon neutrality” pledges) are fulfilled on time [13]. In the
current study, APS is not covered because the two other limiting pathways of STEPS and
NZE are more relevant to the aims of the study’s aims. On the other hand, NZE shows
a predicted set of changes for the global energy sector that enables reaching the global
target of net zero CO2 emissions by 2050. Additionally, NZE is consistent with limiting the
global average temperature rise to 1.5 ◦ C, with at least a 50% probability [14]. This type
of forecasting that has a clear starting point and a clear end point (target), and predicts a
path to reach that target is described as “normative”. The World Energy Outlook (WEO)
is an annual public report published by IEA, where modeling is used to provide in-depth
analysis for different aspects of the global energy system. Although an edition of WEO was
published in 1977, it became a regular annual publication in 1998 [15,16]. Thus, the first
edition is considered here to be the first one in the series form, which is the 1998 edition.
Thus, the 2023 edition (released in October 2023) of IEA’s WEO is considered here as the
26th edition. It was the latest edition at the time of preparing the current study [17].
Energies 2024, 17, 646 3 of 34
1.3. IRENA-WETO
The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) launched an annual report
series in 2021, which is titled World Energy Transitions Outlook (WETO). Thus, WETO-2021
was the first edition, while WETO-2023 was the third edition, and was the latest edition at
the time of preparing the current study [18]. In its third edition, the WETO publication was
divided into two volumes, with volume 1 focusing on progress across all energy sectors, and
suggesting (based on available technologies) a set of actions that should be implemented
by 2030 in order to limit the global average temperature rise to 1.5 ◦ C by 2100 (relative
to pre-industrial levels), by achieving net-zero CO2 emissions (carbon neutrality) by 2050.
Volume 2 of WETO-2023 is based on econometric modeling by IRENA, and it focuses on
the socio-economic impacts of the proposed IRENA-1.5◦ C pathway, compared to current
policy settings, which are referred to as the Planned Energy Scenario (PES) by IRENA. Thus,
volume 1 of WETO-2023 aims to address the technological and regulatory aspects of the
energy transition, while volume 2 of WETO-2023 focuses its attention on the socio-economic
implications of such an energy transition (such as its effect on employment and on welfare).
In the present study, only volume 1 is covered, because volume 2 is outside the scope of the
study. It might be useful to add that WETO-2021, WETO-2022, and WETO-2023 (volume 1
only) were made available in an interactive online version in addition to the offline version
(in the form of a PDF document). WETO-2021 was released in June 2021, WETO-2022 was
released in March 2022, volume 1 of WETO-2023 was released in June 2023, and volume 2
of WETO-2023 was released in November 2023.
1.4. Hydrogen and Its Derived Products as Alternative Energy Carriers

While hydrogen and its derived synthetic fuels (or e-fuels, or electrofuels) do not
currently represent a significant portion of the global energy market, efforts have been
made toward more exploitation of these emerging energy carriers (particularly for environ-
mental reasons) and thus to establish a large-scale hydrogen economy with alternatives to
conventional fossil fuels [19–25].
Hydrogen can be produced in a clean way that releases no (or little) CO2 emissions.
Electrolysis-based green hydrogen requires electricity to power water electrolyzers that
split water into molecular hydrogen and molecular oxygen. The electricity should be
from a renewable energy source, such as solar energy or wind energy, in order for the
produced hydrogen to qualify as green [26–29]. Furthermore, products derived from green
hydrogen can also be described as green (or electricity-based); such as green ammonia (or
e-ammonia); green methanol (or e-methanol); and green kerosene (or e-kerosene), which
may also be called e-SAF: electricity-based sustainable aviation fuel [30,31]. Blue hydrogen
is produced from a fossil fuel, but with reduced CO2 emissions through a carbon capture
technology. Environmentally, electrolysis-based green hydrogen is a preferable option to
blue hydrogen, where indirect CO2 emissions due to the extraction of the feedstock fossil
fuels are unavoidable [32]. On the other hand, green hydrogen is more expensive than blue
hydrogen, although this may be reversed if green hydrogen electrolyzers and renewable
energy costs for powering these electrolyzers drop sufficiently in the future [33,34].
Applications of hydrogen and its derived products include electricity generation via fuel
cells [35], electricity generation via gas turbines [36], fuel-cell electric vehicles—FCEVs [37],
fuel-cell electric unmanned aerial vehicles—UAVs [38], iron industry through direct reduc-
tion iron—DRI [39], oil refining [40], ammonia (NH3 ) production via the power-to-liquid
(PtL) concept [41,42], alternative synthetic non-fossil fuels derived from electrolysis-based
green hydrogen (via PtL, PtG, PtX) like e-methane or e-kerosene [43–48], and electricity
storage by combining electrolyzers for hydrogen production and fuel cells for subsequent
electricity production at the time of demand [49].
The combustion of hydrogen (or its dissociation followed by oxidation in PEM fuel
cells) does not release any carbon dioxide, which is an environmental advantage over any
carbonaceous fuel [50–53]. The replacement of fossil fuels with hydrogen (like replacing
natural gas with gaseous hydrogen for heating homes and for cooking, or replacing gaso-
Energies 2024, 17, 646 4 of 34
line/petrol with hydrogen for cars) helps to mitigate direct CO2 emissions, which in turn
helps to stop global warming and support sustainability [54–57]. Such decarbonization
(even at a partial level) of the energy sector or the building sector improves the outdoor
environment quality, and consequently the indoor environment quality [58–62].
1.5. Barriers to a Large Global Hydrogen Economy

Despite the apparently attractive shift toward hydrogen and its derivatives (in the
electricity sector, the transport sector, the industry sector, and the building sector), expan-
sion in the utilization of hydrogen and its derivatives is hampered by some barriers that
need to be addressed before the investment in hydrogen and its products can be accelerated
globally [63–67].
One of the barriers to a large-scale hydrogen economy is the relative high cost per
unit energy of hydrogen compared to other conventional fuels. Based on the lower heating
value (LHV), 1 kg of hydrogen has 120 MJ or 33.3 kWh [68,69]. On the other hand, gasoline
(petrol) has a volumetric LHV (its LHV-based volumetric energy density) of 32.4 MJ/L or
9.00 kWh/L [70,71] and a gravimetric LHV of 43.0 MJ/kg or 11.9 kWh/kg (with a similar
value for diesel fuel) [72,73]. Thus, for energy equivalence, 1 kg of hydrogen (1 kg H2 )
can replace 2.79 kg of gasoline or 3.70 L, which is approximately 1 U.S. gallon [74]. Based
on recent data, the price of 1 U.S. gallon of regular gasoline in the USA is nearly USD
3.1 [75]. Thus, 1 kg H2 should be sold at this rate in order to be both economically and
thermally equivalent to gasoline. In the Sultanate of Oman, the recent price of gasoline is
nearly 0.23 OMR/L [76]. Thus, 1 kg H2 should be sold at a price of OMR 0.85 (less than
1 Omani rial) in order to be both economically and thermally equivalent to gasoline. The
levelized cost of hydrogen (LCOH) largely depends on the country, the hydrogen produc-
tion technology, and the hydrogen production capacity [77,78]. However, recent studies
suggest that for electrolysis-based green hydrogen, LCOH may be in the range of USD
1.35–7.7 globally [79,80], RMB 16.4–51.8 (or USD 2.3–7.3, assuming a rate of 7.10 RMB/USD)
in China [81,82], OMR 2.17 (or USD 5.63, assuming a rate of 2.60 USD/OMR) in Oman [83],
and EUR 1.0 (or USD 1.1 assuming a rate of 1.1 USD/EUR in the Atacama Desert, Chile or
EUR 2.7 (or USD 3.0 assuming a rate of 1.1 USD/EUR) in Helsinki, Finland [84,85]. It is
expected that the production costs of hydrogen will fall in the future, due to the increase
in the manufacturing scale of the electrolyzers, the maturity of the electrolyzers’ supply
chains, and the decline in the cost of renewable electricity to power the electrolyzers [86–88].
However, the listed costs do not suggest that hydrogen is globally competitive compared
to conventional fuels, but that the gap is not dramatic. Green hydrogen is more expensive
than blue hydrogen (about twice or thrice the cost), which is partly due to the cost of the
renewable electricity required for powering the electrolyzers, and partly due to the cost of
the electrolysis system that consists of the electrolyzers and their auxiliary components,
such as cooling units [89].
A second barrier to the hydrogen economy is the high water consumption of hydrogen
production (regardless of the technology); such as the water required to supply electrolysis,
steam in a steam reforming, liquid coolant, or for the auxiliary carbon capture, utilization
and storage (CCUS) process. For example, PEM-based electrolysis may consume 17.5 L
of water, and require about 8.2 L of additional recirculating water to produce 1 kg H2 .
Alkaline-based electrolysis may consume 22.3 L of water, and require about 9.9 L of
additional recirculating water to produce 1 kg H2 . Natural gas steam-methane reforming
(SMR) combined with CCUS may consume 32.2 L of water, and require about 4.5 L of
additional recirculating water to produce 1 kg H2 . Without CCUS, the water requirements
for the SMR of natural gas may drop from 32.2 L to 17.5 L (consumption) and from about
4.5 L to about 2.5 L (reuse). Coal gasification with CCUS may consume 49.4 L of water, and
require about 30.8 L of additional recirculating water to produce 1 kg H2 . Without CCUS,
the water requirements for coal gasification drop from 49.4 L to 31.0 L (consumption) and
from about 30.8 L to about 18.8 L (reuse) [90–92]. This matter can be specifically important
for countries with limited access to renewable potable water. Despite this apparent concern,
Energies 2024, 17, 646 5 of 34
a recent study [93] showed that if only electrolysis-based green hydrogen is produced
(no blue hydrogen, thus no water-consuming carbon capture and storage—CCS), then
globally there should be no water problem even if the global production of hydrogen
reaches 2300 Mt H2 /yr, with a negligible amount of water consumed relative to the amount
of water available. It should be noted that the study mentioned assumed that 1 kg H2
requires only 9 kg of water (consumption). This is just the theoretical demand based on
stoichiometric (perfect) splitting of water, with zero water loss and with zero additional
water needs for auxiliary operations. Therefore, this study assumed that the global water
demand for hydrogen production does not exceed about 20,500 Mt of freshwater (or
20.5 billion m3 of freshwater) per year.
A third barrier that hinders the rapid growth of the hydrogen economy is the lack of an
adequate governmental regulatory framework for low-emission hydrogen and its deriva-
tives (as relatively new commodities). This barrier is related to licensing and coordination
with local authorities for hydrogen production projects and the related infrastructure, such
as hydrogen pipelines and hydrogen storage facilities. This barrier is also concerned with
establishing internationally recognized standards for the export/import of hydrogen and
its derivatives, certification of the hydrogen grade, clearly defining what low-emission
hydrogen (or clean hydrogen or sustainable hydrogen) is, and international trade of not
only hydrogen and its derivatives but also electrolyzers and equipment for electricity
generation using renewable energy [94–96].
There are minor issues that affect the growth of the hydrogen economy, such as the
safety concerns regarding the handling of hydrogen [97–100]. Hydrogen is a flammable
gas that has the most hazardous flammability level (level 4) in the National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) 704 diamond classification. This level indicates a substance that burns
readily at atmospheric pressure and normal ambient temperature [101]. Another issue
is building sufficient competence and specialized skills to ensure qualified personnel are
available to work in the various stages of the hydrogen supply chain, from the production
to the end-use [102,103]. Increasing public awareness and acceptance of the transition to
hydrogen and its derivatives is a third issue, where people’s behavior should adapt to the
alternatives provided by hydrogen and its derivatives. This includes, for example, the use
of a hydrogen refueling station (HRS) instead of a traditional gas station (petrol station),
and the willingness to choose a fuel-cell electric vehicle rather than a conventional gasoline
vehicle [104,105].
1.6. Drivers for a Large Global Hydrogen Economy

Despite the mentioned barriers, there are also drivers that encourage the develop-
ment of a hydrogen economy. Such hydrogen economy drivers include the formal or
voluntary aims to adopt environmentally friendly solutions with emissions mitigation, and
local (national) incentives or subsidies [106,107]. The H2Global Foundation (“H2Global
Stiftung” in German) is an international incentivizing scheme to accelerate a global hydro-
gen market. Through the H2Global funding instruments, large electrolysis-based green
hydrogen production projects outside the European Union (EU) can apply for a 10-year
fixed-price hydrogen purchase agreement (HPA) where they guarantee they can market
their green hydrogen-derived product to the German government-backed off-taker com-
pany HINT.CO (Hydrogen Intermediary Network Company GmbH), which is a subsidiary
of the German non-profit project H2Global Foundation. HINT.CO acts as an intermediary,
by purchasing hydrogen-derived products (lot 1: green ammonia, lot 2: green methanol,
lot 3: green kerosene or electricity-based sustainable aviation fuel—e-SAF) from a supplier
outside the EU through auction-based HPAs, and then selling that green hydrogen product
in Germany or another EU country through auction-based hydrogen sales agreements
(HSAs), whose duration is limited to a maximum of 1 year. The operation of HINT.CO
resembles the Contracts for Difference (CfD) or the Carbon Contracts for Difference (CCfD)
approach [108,109], with the difference between the supply prices (including both the pro-
duction stage and the transport stage) and the demand prices is offset by available grants.
Energies 2024, 17, 646 6 of 34
The H2Global Foundation was established in June 2021. It was financially supported by the
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy in Germany (BMWi: Bundesministerium
für Wirtschaft und Energie), which in December 2021 became the Federal Ministry for
Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und
Klimaschutz). The German ministry provides the necessary financial aid to cover any gap
between the selling price of the green hydrogen product (in EU) and the production cost
of it (outside the EU). The initial governmental funding grant in 2021 was EUR 900 mil-
lion [110,111]. In the first HPA tender (started 30 November 2022), only green ammonia
(lot 1) was demanded, and the 10 contract years were 2024–2033 [112].
2. Aims and Contributions of the Study

The primary aim of the current study is to describe the expected size of the hydrogen
role in the future, within the energy economy in general and in specific sectors such as
the transport sector, by analyzing the latest outlook reports (the 2023 edition) of IEA and
IRENA. This helps in answering questions like:
• Can low-carbon hydrogen and its derivatives totally replace conventional fuels?
• Which hydrogen type/color (particularly, either green hydrogen or blue hydrogen) is
expected to dominate low-carbon hydrogen production?
The second aim of the current study is to assess the gap between the future predictions
of the energy models by IEA and IRENA, when similar sets of assumptions are implied. In
particular, this aim is about identifying the prediction dissimilarity between IEA-STEPS
and IRENA-PES, and between IEA-NZE and IRENA-1.5◦ C.
The third and final aim of the current study is to present miscellaneous forecasting
data related to various variables in the global energy system, as well as the CO2 emissions,
for 2030 or 2050.
The above stated aims are also viewed as the contributions made by the current study
to the broad fields of hydrogen energy, energy transition, and emissions forecasting.
Dillman and Heinonen [113] described the development of the hydrogen economy
as being largely unknown. They used the 2021 edition of WEO, whereas the present
study uses the updated edition of 2023, and thus it is contributing to the previous research
conducted about that topic. Dillman et al. [114] reported a socio-technical transition
study of the mobility sector in Iceland. The aim was to study temporal changes and
associated sustainability outcomes. Their work reflects a comprehensive analysis but
it is mainly in the form of a case study (one country and one sector). In contrast, the
current study addresses global developments and in multiple sectors. Wang et al. [115]
warned against environmental degradation as a consequence of intensified global economic
activities, and how this can largely affect the sustainable development goals (SDGs). Their
findings provided policy recommendations for improving sustainable development. Their
study focused on 36 OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)
countries, while the current study covers global performance metrics. Their study did not
dedicate a big part specifically to hydrogen and its derivatives, while the current study
does that. So, the current study is considered to be contributing to the field of sustainable
development and SDGs at a global level, and with emphasis on the nascent hydrogen
energy. Other researchers performed a number of studies [116–120] that included using
a modified linear ordinary least squares (OLS) model and a non-linear panel threshold
regression (NPTR) model to investigate how foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade
openness influence carbon neutrality, through economic growth with limited carbon dioxide
emissions. Their work was geographically broad, covering 114 countries. The current
study also covers carbon neutrality from multiple perspectives, including the region-to-
region low-carbon hydrogen trade, which was not covered in their work. In addition, the
current study compares the pathway to carbon neutrality as recommended by different
models, which was not mentioned in their work. Zheng et al. [121] proposed a roadmap
for hydrogen development in the coastal Chinese province “Guangdong”, and it can
be applied in other regions. They discussed the technical maturity of five methods for
Energies 2024, 17, 646 7 of 34
hydrogen production, namely as industrial byproducts, from coal, using wind energy, using
hydropower, and using solar photovoltaic (PV) energy. In the current study, electrolysis-
based green hydrogen is treated as one type of hydrogen, irrespective of the exact renewable
energy used in producing it. This is a preferred simplified approach, where specifying
additional details about the exact energy source type becomes undesired as it does not
strongly serve the aims of the current study. Again, the current study gives a global
overview, rather than treating a case in a certain geographic location. Hassan et al. [122]
studied the integration of green hydrogen into different sectors, including power generation,
industry, and transport. They emphasized the ability of green hydrogen to decarbonize
carbon-intensive activities, by reducing the use of fossil fuels. Their work does not include
an assessment of IEA and IRENA forecasting models, as performed in the current work,
making the present study useful in providing novel findings.
3. Research Method
The current study relies on the analysis of existing data. However, as a result of the
data processing, novel sets of results are derived from the collected raw data through
careful data curation, data inspection and validation, deriving new data through mathe-
matical processes, extracting data from published charts by digitizing them, and preparing
customized tables and charts that particularly fit the aims of the study. In addition, many
resources in the literature were used for auxiliary purposes, such as for discussing barriers
and drivers with regard to clean or low-emission hydrogen advancement.
Although the raw data came mostly from two sources, namely: the IEA’s WEO-2023
report and the IRENA’s WETO-2023 report (a small portion was taken from data released
by IEA, made available through its “Data and Statistics” online portal); this should not be
considered a drawback. It is actually aligned with the scope of the study; whose second
aim is to identify the gap between the two sources when describing a similar quantity. In
addition, either annual report is considered a comprehensive flagship publication issued by
a reputable expert organization with a worldwide scope of interests. This reduces concerns
about the reliability of the raw data. There are various published works in the literature
that followed a similar research method and utilized WEO data in their findings [123–126],
and this further justifies the method followed here. In addition, having many sources of
raw data may raise problems of discrepancies and ambiguity of terminology. In fact, this
matter was faced here even with only two sources. For example, the use of “low-emissions
hydrogen” (by IEA) versus the use of “clean hydrogen” (by IRENA). The term LCH (low-
carbon hydrogen) is thus used here as a generalized term that can refer to either of those
two terms. Finally, the use of raw data issued by international organizations (rather than
local research groups) enabled access to global data not focusing on a particular country or
region. All the data presented in the coming parts are thus global, which is considered a
favored feature in the current study.
4. Results (Part 1 of 4): Non-Hydrogen Common Quantities in IEA and IRENA

In this part, some data that appear commonly in IEA and IRENA reports are presented
together. This facilitates the identification of any differences in the reported predictions.
There are four quantities covered in this part, which are: (1) global carbon dioxide emissions,
(2) global electric-energy generation, (3) global electric-power generation capacity, and
(4) global final total energy consumption.
4.1. CO2 Emissions

Carbon dioxide (CO2 ) emissions form an important variable to consider in global
energy scenarios. Although such emissions by themselves are not among traditional
energy sources, they depend on energy production and consumption. Also, global CO2
emissions can be used to set a target for an energy scenario (as in the case of NZE).
Thus, it is reasonable to start the results sections in the current study with this important
environmental indicator.
4.1. CO2 Emissions
Carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions form an important variable to consider in global en-
ergy scenarios. Although such emissions by themselves are not among traditional energy
sources, they depend on energy production and consumption. Also, global CO2 emissions
Energies 2024, 17, 646 can be used to set a target for an energy scenario (as in the case of NZE). Thus, it is8 of rea-
34
sonable to start the results sections in the current study with this important environmental
indicator.
Figures 1 and 2 show historical (past) records for global CO2 emissions, as well as
Figures 1 and 2 show historical (past) records for global CO2 emissions, as well as
predictedvalues
predicted valuesinin2030
2030and
and2050,
2050, under
under thethe four
four scenarios
scenarios covered
covered (STEPS,
(STEPS, NZE,
NZE, PES,PES,
and
and◦ 1.5°C). The first observation to make here is that the
◦ 1.5°C scenario does
1.5 C). The first observation to make here is that the 1.5 C scenario does not reach exactly not reach
0exactly
Gt CO02 Gt CO2 in
in 2050, 2050,
but but a slightly
a slightly negative negative
value ofvalue
−0.2ofGt−0.2
COGt CO2. The second observa-
2 . The second observation is
tion is that the STEPS scenario predicts fewer CO 2 emissions than PES for either 2030 or
that the STEPS scenario predicts fewer CO2 emissions than PES for either 2030 or 2050. In
2050. In particular,
particular, in 2030,
in 2030, STEPS STEPS apredicts
predicts decline aindecline in CO2 emissions
CO2 emissions comparedcompared to PES,
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whereas
PES PESthe
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opposite situation. Thus,
Thus, it can it canthat
be stated be stated that IEA-STEPS
IEA-STEPS is more
is more optimistic
optimistic than IRENA-PES with regard to CO 2 emissions. On the other hand,
than IRENA-PES with regard to CO2 emissions. On the other hand, IRENA-1.5 C is more ◦ IRENA-
1.5°C is more
optimistic thanoptimistic
IEA-NZE thanwith IEA-NZE with
regard to CO regard to CO2 emissions, ◦ with the 1.5°C sce-
2 emissions, with the 1.5 C scenario predicting
nario predicting fewer CO emissions than NZE
fewer CO2 emissions than NZE for both years 2030 and 2050.
2 for both years 2030 and 2050.
Figure 1. Global CO2 emissions, including industrial processes and flaring emissions (data source:
Figure 1. Global CO2 emissions, including industrial processes and flaring emissions (data source:
IEA).
IEA). The
The black line (from
black line (from 2010
2010 to
to 2022)
2022) represents
represents historical
historical values
values rather
rather than
than predictions,
predictions, and
and thus
thus
these values are identical for either the STEPS scenario or the NZE scenario.
these values are identical for either the STEPS scenario or the NZE scenario.
4.2. Electricity Generation

The total amount of electricity generation is also an important element in the energy
system. More electricity generation implies electrification of processes that were relying
on fossil fuels. It also implies more exploitation of renewable energy sources, which are
commonly exploited in the form of electricity.
Figures 3 and 4 show the trends of global total electricity generation as predicted
by the four scenarios covered. The gap between the IEA scenarios (STEPS and NZE) in
2050 is smaller than its counterpart gap for the IRENA scenarios (PES and 1.5◦ C). The
reason is that STEPS overestimates the electricity generation compared to PES, while NZE
underestimates it, compared to 1.5◦ C. Despite this, both NZE and 1.5◦ C scenarios expected
an accelerated rate of electricity generation between 2030 and 2050 compared to the period
before 2030. According to either NZE or 1.5◦ C, the world electricity generation in 2050 is
expected to be more than twice its value in 2030. On the other hand, the STEPS and PES
scenarios expect a nearly fixed rate of growth in electricity generation from now till 2050,
with the annual electricity generation in 2050 at about 1.5 times its value in 2030. According
to IRENA, the annual global total electricity generation in 2020 was 26.991 PWh, which
Energies 2024, 17, 646 9 of 34
Energies 2024, 17, x FOR PEER REVIEW 9 of 35

is compatible with the reported IEA’s value of 28.346 PWh for the following year of 2021
(which then increased to 29.033 PWh in 2022).

Figure
Figure 2. Global net
2. Global net annual
annual CO
CO22 emissions,
emissions, related
related to
to energy
energy and
and process
process activities
activities (data
(data source:
source:
IRENA).
4.2. Electricity Generation

The total amount of electricity generation is also an important element in the energy
system. More electricity generation implies electrification of processes that were relying
on fossil fuels. It also implies more exploitation of renewable energy sources, which are
commonly exploited in the form of electricity.
Figures 3 and 4 show the trends of global total electricity generation as predicted by
the four scenarios covered. The gap between the IEA scenarios (STEPS and NZE) in 2050
is smaller than its counterpart gap for the IRENA scenarios (PES and 1.5°C). The reason is
that STEPS overestimates the electricity generation compared to PES, while NZE under-
estimates it, compared to 1.5°C. Despite this, both NZE and 1.5°C scenarios expected an
accelerated rate of electricity generation between 2030 and 2050 compared to the period
before 2030. According to either NZE or 1.5°C, the world electricity generation in 2050 is
expected to be more than twice its value in 2030. On the other hand, the STEPS and PES
scenarios expect a nearly fixed rate of growth in electricity generation from now till 2050,
with the annual electricity generation in 2050 at about 1.5 times its value in 2030. Accord-
ing to IRENA, the annual global total electricity generation in 2020 was 26.991 PWh, which
is compatible with the reported IEA s value of 28.346 PWh for the following year of 2021
(which then increased to 29.033 PWh in 2022).
Figure 3. Global total electricity generation (data source: IEA). The black line (from 2010 to 2022)
represents historical
represents historical values
values rather
rather than
than predictions,
predictions, and
and thus
thus these
these values
values are
are identical
identical for
for either
either the
STEPS scenario or the NZE scenario.
the STEPS scenario or the NZE scenario.
Energies 2024, 17, 646 represents historical values rather than predictions, and thus these values are identical for either
10 of 34
the STEPS scenario or the NZE scenario.
Figure
Figure 4. Globaltotal
4. Global total electricity
electricity generation
generation (data
(data source:
source: IRENA).
IRENA).
4.3. Electricity Capacity

4.3. Electricity Capacity
Related to the generation of electricity (as energy), the electricity capacity (as power)
Related to the generation of electricity (as energy), the electricity capacity (as power)
is also an indication of the size of the electricity sector.
is also an indication of the size of the electricity sector.
Figures 5 and 6 show the global electricity capacity expectation till 2050 based on the
Figures 5 and 6 show the global electricity capacity expectation till 2050 based on the
four covered scenarios. In 2030 and 2050, NZE and 1.5◦ C predict similar values near 15 TW
four covered scenarios. In 2030 and 2050, NZE and 1.5°C predict similar values near 15
and 36 TW, respectively, (36.956 TW for NZE, and 35.339 TW for 1.5◦ C). However, PES
underestimates the electricity capacity compared to STEPS for both 2030 (by 18% of the
STEPS value of 14.168 TW) and 2050 (by 24% of the STEPS value of 25.956 TW).
4.4. Total Final Energy Consumption

Figure 7 shows the expected growth in the global total final energy consumption
(TFEC) till 2050 based on the two IEA scenarios covered. IRENA-WETO has TFEC pre-
dictions only for 2050 for the 1.5◦ C scenario (but no information for the PES scenario or
for 2030), as well as the historical value from 2020, as visualized in Figure 8. The 1.5◦ C
predicted annual value is 353 EJ in 2050, compared to a higher value of 374 EJ in 2020. This
is larger than (but close to) the NZE value of 343 EJ in 2050 (compared to the higher IEA
value of 442 EJ in 2022), and it is much lower than the 2050 STEPS value of 536 EJ. Although
the predicted decline in TFEC from now till 2050 is not huge, it actually reflects a big boost
in the energy efficiency and better use of the total primary energy supply (TPES) from
natural resources, because the consumption declines despite the anticipated population
growth and the extended urbanization level [127–129].
IRENA also gives additional details about the share of four energy carriers in TFEC.
In 2020, clean hydrogen and its derived fuels made practically no contribution to TFEC.
However, their share is expected to be 14% in 2050. Simultaneously, the share of fossil fuels
in TFEC is expected to shrink from 63% in 2020 to 12% (but not totally eliminated) in 2050.
IRENA-WETO explains the presence of fossil-fuel use in 2050 by clarifying that these are
(1) natural gas, which is expected to remain in use mainly within the industry sector and
the transport sector; (2) crude oil, whose derived products are expected to be mainly in
use within the industry sector and the transport sector; and (3) coal, which is expected to
remain in use within the industry sector for producing cement, chemicals (petrochemical),
and iron. Thus, in 2050, the expected share of clean hydrogen and its derivatives in TFEC
exceeds the expected share of all fossil fuels. The electrification level (as expressed by the
Energies 2024, 17, 646 11 of 34

TW and 36 TW, respectively, (36.956 TW for NZE, and 35.339 TW for 1.5°C). However,
TW and 36 TW, respectively, (36.956 TW for NZE, and 35.339 TW for 1.5°C). However,
PES underestimates the electricity capacity compared to STEPS for both 2030 (by 18% of
PES underestimates the electricity capacity compared to STEPS for both 2030 (by 18% of
the STEPS value
percentage of 14.168inTW)
of electricity and 2050
TFEC) (by 24% of the STEPS value of 25.956 TW).
the STEPS value of 14.168
◦
TW) and is expected
2050 (by 24%toofgrow from 22%
the STEPS inof
value 2020 to 51%
25.956 TW).in 2050
according to the 1.5 C scenario.
Figure
Figure5.5. Global
Global
5.Global total electricity
total electricitycapacity
capacity(data
(datasource: IEA).
source: The The
IEA). blackblack
line (from 2010 2010
line (from to 2022) rep-
to rep-
2022)
Figure total electricity capacity (data source: IEA). The black line (from 2010 to 2022)
resents historical
represents values
historical rather
values than
rather predictions, and thus these values are identical for either the
resents historical values rather thanthan predictions,
predictions, andand
thusthus these
these values
values are are identical
identical for for either
either thethe
STEPS scenario or the NZE scenario.
STEPSscenario
STEPS scenarioororthe
theNZE
NZEscenario.
scenario.
Figure 6.
Figure Global total
6. Global total installed
installed electricity
electricity capacity
capacity (data
(data source:
source: IRENA).
IRENA).
Figure 6. Global total installed electricity capacity (data source: IRENA).
sector and the transport sector; (2) crude oil, whose derived products are expected to be
mainly in use within the industry sector and the transport sector; and (3) coal, which is
expected to remain in use within the industry sector for producing cement, chemicals
(petrochemical), and iron. Thus, in 2050, the expected share of clean hydrogen and its de-
rivatives in TFEC exceeds the expected share of all fossil fuels. The electrification level (as
Energies 2024, 17, 646 expressed by the percentage of electricity in TFEC) is expected to grow from 22% in 2020 12 of 34
to 51% in 2050 according to the 1.5°C scenario.
Figure 7. Global total final consumption of energy (data source: IEA). The black line (from 2010 to
Figure 7. Global total final consumption of energy (data source: IEA). The black line (from 2010 to
2022)2022)
Energies 2024, 17, x FOR PEER REVIEWrepresents historical
represents historicalvalues
valuesrather thanpredictions,
rather than predictions,andand
thusthus
thesethese values
values are identical
of 35 for either
13for
are identical
either the
the STEPS STEPS scenario
scenario or thescenario.
or the NZE NZE scenario.
Figure
Figure 8. Breakdownofofthe
8. Breakdown the global
global total
totalfinal energy
final consumption
energy by energy
consumption carrier (data
by energy source:
carrier (data source:
IRENA). Hydrogen in the figure refers to clean hydrogen (electrolysis-based green hydrogen and
IRENA). Hydrogen in the figure refers to clean hydrogen (electrolysis-based green hydrogen
blue hydrogen). E-fuels in the figure refer to e-ammonia (green ammonia) and e-methanol (green
and methanol).
blue hydrogen). E-fuels in the figure refer to e-ammonia (green ammonia) and e-methanol
(green methanol).
5. Results (Part 2 of 4): Additional IEA Non-Hydrogen Quantities
This part provides a selected set of results that correspond only to the IEA-WEO re-
port (no similar ones appeared in IRENA-WETO). Although they are not directly con-
nected to hydrogen, they are presented here as useful variables that influence modeling
the energy and emissions pathways.
Figure 9 shows the expected trend of world population, which is expected to reach
9.681 billion in 2050 (compared to 7.95 billion in 2022). This population profile is inde-
pendent of the specific energy scenario (it is the same for STEPS and NZE).
Energies 2024, 17, 646 13 of 34
5. Results (Part 2 of 4): Additional IEA Non-Hydrogen Quantities

This part provides a selected set of results that correspond only to the IEA-WEO report
(no similar ones appeared in IRENA-WETO). Although they are not directly connected to
hydrogen, they are presented here as useful variables that influence modeling the energy
and emissions pathways.
nergies 2024, 17, x FOR PEER REVIEW 14 of 35
Figure 9 shows the expected trend of world population, which is expected to reach
9.681 billion in 2050 (compared to 7.95 billion in 2022). This population profile is indepen-
dent of the specific energy scenario (it is the same for STEPS and NZE).
Figure 9. World population (data source: IEA).

Figure 10 shows an expected decline in the CO2 intensity of electricity generation,
whose global average in 2022 was 460 gCO2 /kWh. In STEPS, this CO2 intensity of elec-
tricity generation is expected to drop largely (although STEPS is a relatively passive sce-
nario in terms of not taking new steps for emissions mitigation and energy transition) to
131 gCO2 /kWh in 2050. In NZE, the CO2 intensity of electricity generation is even expected
to be negative in 2050, where generating electricity leads effectively to absorbing atmo-
spheric CO2 . This can happen as a result, for example, of using BECCS (bioenergy combined
with carbon capture, utilization, and storage), which has negative CO2 emissions [130,131].
Figure 11 shows an expected decline in the global conventional crude oil demand,
which was 62.8 Mb/d in 2022. In NZE, this is expected to fall to 15.8 Mb/d (but not be
totally eliminated, as explained earlier). In the case of STEPS, crude oil demand nearly
remains unchanged (there is a slow decline to 61.3 Mb/d in 2030, and then to 58.2 Mb/d
in 2050).
Energies 2024, 17, 646 14 of 34
Figure 10. Global CO2(there

remains intensity of electricity generation
to 61.3(data source: IEA).and
The black line (from 2010 in
Figure 10.unchanged
Global CO₂ intensity is of
a slow decline
electricity generation Mb/d
(data in 2030,
source: then
IEA). The to 58.2
black Mb/d
line (from
to 2022)
2050). represents historical values rather than predictions, and thus these values are identical for
2010 to 2022) represents historical values rather than predictions, and thus these values are identi-
either the STEPS scenario or the NZE scenario.
cal for either the STEPS scenario or the NZE scenario.
Figure 11 shows an expected decline in the global conventional crude oil demand,
which was 62.8 Mb/d in 2022. In NZE, this is expected to fall to 15.8 Mb/d (but not be
totally eliminated, as explained earlier). In the case of STEPS, crude oil demand nearly
Figure 11. Global demand for conventional crude oil (data source: IEA). The black line (from 2010
Figure 11. Global demand for conventional crude oil (data source: IEA). The black line (from 2010
to 2022) represents historical values rather than predictions, and thus these values are identical for
to 2022) represents historical values rather than predictions, and thus these values are identical for
6. Results (Part 3 of 4): Additional IRENA Non-Hydrogen Quantities

Similar to the previous part, the current part includes additional IRENA-specific re-
sults that are beneficial in depicting the expected progress in the global energy system,
and this may be useful for discussing potential developments in hydrogen and its deriva-
tives (for example, by setting benchmarking levels for comparisons with the hydrogen
Energies 2024, 17, 646 15 of 34
6. Results (Part 3 of 4): Additional IRENA Non-Hydrogen Quantities

Similar to the previous part, the current part includes additional IRENA-specific results
that are beneficial in depicting the expected progress in the global energy system, and this
may be useful for discussing potential developments in hydrogen and its derivatives (for
example, by setting benchmarking levels for comparisons with the hydrogen results).
As its full name implies, IRENA pays attention to renewable energy sources. Figure 12
shows the IRENA’s expectations for global renewable electricity (electricity generation
from renewables), and the share of that generation to the total electricity generation (from
renewables, nuclear fuels, and fossil fuels). In PES and 1.5◦ C, the share of renewable
◦
Energies 2024, 17, x FOR PEER REVIEWelectricity is expected to grow from 28% in 2020 to either 73% (PES) or 91% (1.5 C) 16 in
of 35
◦
2050. Furthermore, the 1.5 C scenario forecasts a rapid increase in the share of renewable
electricity to reach 68% in 2030 (thus, close to the share of PES in 2050).
Figure
Figure12.
12.Global
Globalelectricity
electricitygeneration
generation from renewables,and
from renewables, andits
itsshare
shareinintotal
total electricity
electricity generation
generation
(data source: IRENA).
Figure 13 has similar types of information, but for the renewable-based electricity
capacity. The renewable share in the total electricity capacity according to PES and 1.5◦ C is
expected to grow from 37% in 2020 to either 80% (PES) or 94% (1.5◦ C) in 2050. As was the
case for electricity generation, the expected 2030 share according to 1.5◦ C (77%) is close
to the 2050 share according to PES (80%). For renewables, having a higher capacity share
than the share in the electricity generated can be explained by the relatively lower capacity
factor for power plants operating on renewable energy sources (particularly solar energy
and wind energy) compared to conventional fossil-fuel-fired power plants and nuclear
power plants. Thus, the nominal (nameplate) installed electric power capacity is not fully
exploited most of the time in many cases of renewable energy power plants.
Energies 2024, 17, 646 Figure 12. Global electricity generation from renewables, and its share in total electricity 16
generation
of 34
Figure
Figure 13.13. Globaltotal
Global totalinstalled
installed electricity
electricity capacity
capacityfrom
fromrenewables, andand
renewables, its share in total
its share electricity
in total electricity
capacity (data source: IRENA).
capacity (data source: IRENA).
Figure 14 shows a breakdown of the global total electricity generation by source ac-
cording to the 1.5◦ C scenario. As mentioned previously, the share of renewables is expected
to increase from 28% in 2020 to 91% in 2050. The figure gives additional information about
the share of nuclear power, which is expected to decrease from 10% in 2020 to only 4% in
2050. The figure also gives additional information about the share of fossil fuels, which is
expected to decrease from 62% in 2020 to only 5% in 2050.
Figure 15 shows the expected growth in the global electrification percentage in the
total final energy consumption (TFEC). In 2020, it was 22%. In either the PES or the
1.5◦ C scenario, this percentage is expected to increase. For the 1.5◦ C scenario, about half
(51%) of TFEC is expected to be in the form of direct use of electricity in 2050. This is an
advantage due to the eliminated direct CO2 emissions (compared to any carbonaceous
fuel) [132,133]. For the PES scenario, the TFEC electrification percentage is expected to
increase by only 6 percentage points in 2050, reaching 28% (about half the predicted share
in the 1.5◦ C scenario).
Figure 14 shows a breakdown of the global total electricity generation by source ac-
cording to the 1.5°C scenario. As mentioned previously, the share of renewables is ex-
pected to increase from 28% in 2020 to 91% in 2050. The figure gives additional infor-
mation about the share of nuclear power, which is expected to decrease from 10% in 2020
Energies 2024, 17, 646
to only 4% in 2050. The figure also gives additional information about the share of fossil17 of 34
fuels, which is expected to decrease from 62% in 2020 to only 5% in 2050.
Figure Breakdown
14.14.
Figure Breakdownofoftotal
total electricity generationbyby
electricity generation source
source (data
(data source:
source: IRENA).
IRENA).
Figure 15 shows the expected growth in the global electrification percentage in the
total final energy consumption (TFEC). In 2020, it was 22%. In either the PES or the 1.5°C
scenario, this percentage is expected to increase. For the 1.5°C scenario, about half (51%)
of TFEC is expected to be in the form of direct use of electricity in 2050. This is an ad-
vantage due to the eliminated direct CO2 emissions (compared to any carbonaceous fuel)
[132,133]. For the PES scenario, the TFEC electrification percentage is expected to increase
by only 6 percentage points in 2050, reaching 28% (about half the predicted share in the
1.5°C scenario).
Figure Globalelectrification
Figure15.15. Global electrification percentage
percentage in the in
totalthe total
final final
energy energy consumption
consumption (data source: (data
IRENA).
source: IRENA).
7. Results (Part 4 of 4): Hydrogen-Specific Quantities

The last set of results concerns hydrogen, and thus it is the most important part of
the overall results in the current study. This set is divided into three topics: (1) hydrogen
production, (2) hydrogen demand and international trade from one geographic region to
another, and (3) hydrogen use (in the electricity sector, in TFEC, in the transport sector, in
the industry sector, and in the building sector).
Energies 2024, 17, 646 18 of 34
7. Results (Part 4 of 4): Hydrogen-Specific Quantities

The last set of results concerns hydrogen, and thus it is the most important part of
the overall results in the current study. This set is divided into three topics: (1) hydrogen
production, (2) hydrogen demand and international trade from one geographic region to
another, and (3) hydrogen use (in the electricity sector, in TFEC, in the transport sector, in
the industry sector, and in the building sector).
7.1. Hydrogen Production

Figure 16 shows a breakdown of the global annually produced hydrogen (regardless
of the emissions being abated or unabated) in 2019, 2020, and 2021, by the production
technology according to IEA data published online (not part of WEO-2023) [134]. It can
be seen that the total amount of produced hydrogen was nearly constant (approximately
90 Mt H2 ) in the three consecutive years. It even decreased slightly in 2020 compared to
2019. There was no green hydrogen production, and the share of blue hydrogen was very
small, while gray hydrogen (from fossil fuels without CCS/CCUS) being the dominant
portion. Based on this figure, the annual global low-emission hydrogen (LEH) or clean
Energies 2024, 17, x FOR PEER REVIEW
hydrogen (which practically was blue hydrogen only) was about 0.6 Mt H2 (not 19 of 35
counting
by-product hydrogen).
Figure
Figure 16. 16. Global
Global hydrogenproduction
hydrogen production by
by technology,
technology,historical
historicalvalues (data
values source:
(data IEA).IEA).
source:
Figure
Figure 1717 anditsitscompanion
and companion Table
Table11show
showthe expected
the expectedprofile of annual
profile globalglobal
of annual low- low-
emission hydrogen (LEH) production, and the share of electrolysis-based green hydrogen
emission hydrogen (LEH) production, and the share of electrolysis-based green hydrogen
in this LEH, according to IEA modeling. In 2022, there was only 1 Mt H2 (rounded to the
nearest integer) of LEH produced, with practically zero green hydrogen contained in this.
Regardless of the IEA scenario (STEPS or NZE), electrolysis-based green hydrogen is ex-
pected to dominate (more than 70%) the production of LEH in the future, with a share of
73% in 2050 according to STEPS, and a higher share of 78% in 2050 according to NZE.
Energies 2024, 17, 646 19 of 34
in this LEH, according to IEA modeling. In 2022, there was only 1 Mt H2 (rounded to
the nearest integer) of LEH produced, with practically zero green hydrogen contained in
this. Regardless of the IEA scenario (STEPS or NZE), electrolysis-based green hydrogen is
expected to dominate (more than 70%) the production of LEH in the future, with a share
of 73% in 2050 according to STEPS, and a higher share of 78% in 2050 according to NZE.
According to NZE, in 2050, it is expected that LEH production will reach 420 Mt H2 . For
STEPS, the expected annual LEH production is limited to 10% or less of the annual LEH
production for NZE, either in 2030 (7 Mt H2 compared to 70 Mt H2 ) or in 2050 (30 Mt
H compared to 420 Mt H2 ). This is an important observation, where fast growth
Energies 2024, 17, x FOR PEER REVIEW2
in
20 of 35
LEH production requires support by policymakers taking emission mitigation actions and
fostering energy transitions.
Figure 17. Global low-emission hydrogen production, and the portion of electrolysis-based green
hydrogen in this
hydrogen in this (data
(data source:
source: IEA).
IEA).
Table 1.
Table 1. Global
Global low-emission
low-emission hydrogen
hydrogen production,
production, and
and the
the share of the
share of the electrolysis-based
electrolysis-based green
green
hydrogen of this production (IEA).
hydrogen of this production (IEA).
Share of Electrolysis-Based
Low-Emission Hydrogen Pro- Water-Electrolysis Hydrogen Share of Electrolysis-Based
Low-Emission Hydrogen Water-Electrolysis Hydrogen Hydrogen Production (in
duction, in Mt H₂
Production, in Mt H
Production, in Mt H₂
Production, in Mt H
Hydrogen Production (in
2 2 Low-Emission Hydrogen)
Low-Emission Hydrogen)
Year STEPS NZE STEPS NZE STEPS NZE
2022 1 0 0%
2022 1 0 0%
2030 7 70 5 51 71% 73%
2030 7 70 5 51 71% 73%
2050 30 420 22 327 73% 78%
2050 30 420 22 327 73% 78%
Table 2 summarizes the historical (2020) and the expected (2030 and 2050) annual
global production of clean hydrogen, according to IRENA s PES and 1.5°C scenarios. The
reported annual production in 2020 (0.7 Mt H2) is not very diﬀerent from the 0.6 Mt H2
mentioned earlier in the same year (based on IEA data). In 2050, the PES estimation of
annual clean hydrogen production is 21 Mt H2 (compared to 30 Mt H2 of LEH according
to STEPS), and the 1.5°C estimation is 523 Mt H2 (compared to 420 Mt H2 of LEH according
Energies 2024, 17, 646 20 of 34
Table 2 summarizes the historical (2020) and the expected (2030 and 2050) annual
global production of clean hydrogen, according to IRENA’s PES and 1.5◦ C scenarios. The
reported annual production in 2020 (0.7 Mt H2 ) is not very different from the 0.6 Mt H2
mentioned earlier in the same year (based on IEA data). In 2050, the PES estimation of
annual clean hydrogen production is 21 Mt H2 (compared to 30 Mt H2 of LEH according to
STEPS), and the 1.5◦ C estimation is 523 Mt H2 (compared to 420 Mt H2 of LEH according
to NZE). Despite the differences in these estimation pairs, the two IRENA scenarios agree
with the two IEA scenarios that there is a huge suppression in the production of low-
carbon hydrogen (LCH) if the global energy transition for carbon neutrality is not activated
through the adoption of adequate measures to reach zero CO2 emissions by 2050.
Table 2. 2.
Table Global production
Global ofof
production clean hydrogen,
clean inin
hydrogen, Mt HH
Mt 2/yr (IRENA).
2 /yr (IRENA).
Year
Year PES
PES 1.5°C
1.5◦ C
2020
2020 0.70.7
* *
2030 2 125
2030 2 125
2050 21 523
2050 21 523
* Based on operational projects capacity through October 2022 (IRENA used the IEA Hydrogen
* Based on operational projects’ capacity through October 2022 (IRENA used the IEA Hydrogen Project
Project Database [135]).
Database [135]).
Figure 18 shows the expected electrolyzer capacity for producing green hydrogen,
Figure 18 shows the expected electrolyzer capacity for producing green hydrogen,
according to the IRENA-1.5 °C◦ scenario. From zero capacity in 2020, a capacity of 513 GW
according to the IRENA-1.5 C scenario. From zero capacity in 2020, a capacity of 513 GW
is expected in 2030, which is expected to increase significantly (11 times) to reach 5647 GW
is expected in 2030, which is expected to increase significantly (11 times) to reach 5647 GW
or 5.647 TW (16.0% of the 35.339 TW electricity generator capacity according to 1.5 °C, as
or 5.647 TW (16.0% of the 35.339 TW electricity generator capacity according to 1.5 ◦ C, as
mentioned earlier), in 2050.
mentioned earlier), in 2050.
Figure
Figure 18.18. Global
Global total
total electrolyzer
electrolyzer capacity
capacity forfor producing
producing electrolysis-based
electrolysis-based green
green hydrogen
hydrogen (data
(data
source: IRENA).
source: IRENA).
7.2. Hydrogen Demand and Longr-Distance Trade

7.2. Hydrogen Demand and Longr-Distance Trade
Figure 19 shows a breakdown of the global annual hydrogen demand in 2019, 2020,
Figure 19 shows a breakdown of the global annual hydrogen demand in 2019, 2020,
and 2021; by the demand sector; according to IEA data published online (not part of WEO-
and 2021; by the demand sector; according to IEA data published online (not part of WEO-
2023) [136]. It can be seen that the demand within each sector remained nearly the same
2023) [136]. It can be seen that the demand within each sector remained nearly the same
over the three years. Refining was the application with highest demand, with a share of
over the three years. Refining was the application with highest demand, with a share of
more than 40% in each of the three years. The application with the second highest demand
was ammonia production, with a share of more than 35% in each of the three years. The
third highest was methanol production, with a share of about 15% in each of the three
years. The fourth was iron production, with a small share of about 5% in each of the three
Energies 2024, 17, 646 21 of 34

noted that one reason for such a high ratio is the big decline in the demand for conven-
tional crude oil (from 62.8 Mb/d in 2022 to 15.8 Mb/d in 2050, thus a drop to about only
25% of the recent demand). However, the expected demand of 6.0 Mboe/d for low-emis-
more than 40% in each of the three years. The application with the second highest demand
sion hydrogen-based liquid fuels in 2050 according to NZE is approximately 10% of the
was ammonia production, with a share of more than 35% in each of the three years. The
recent
third2022 demand
highest for conventional
was methanol crude
production, with oil, which
a share of aboutmakes LELsofathe
15% in each clear
threecontributor
years.
among liquid fuels.
The fourth was iron production, with a small share of about 5% in each of the three years.
Figure
Figure 19.19. Global
Global hydrogendemand
hydrogen demand by
bysector,
sector,historical
historicalvalues (data
values source:
(data IEA).IEA).
source:
Table 3.Table
Global3 low-emission
presents the global demand for
hydrogen-based low-emission
liquid fuel demand, hydrogen-based
and its ratio toliquid fuels
the conventional
(LELs), and its
crude oil demand (IEA). ratio to the conventional crude oil demand (which was discussed earlier),
based on IEA modeling. The use of conventional crude oil demand is carried out here just
Low-Emission forHydrogen-
benchmarking, and the ratio shown is not a fraction Ratio(not limited to an upper
of Low-Emission limit of
Hydrogen-
100%). Despite the Conventional
expected large Crude
ratio of 38.0% in 2050 according to NZE, it should be
Based Liquid Fuel * De- Based Liquid Fuel Demand to Conven-
noted that one reasonOil forDemand,
such a highin Mb/d
ratio is the big decline in the demand for conventional
mand, in Mboe/d ** tional Crude Oil Demand
crude oil (from 62.8 Mb/d in 2022 to 15.8 Mb/d in 2050, thus a drop to about only 25%
Year STEPS NZE demand). STEPS
of the recent NZE demand ofSTEPS
However, the expected 6.0 Mboe/d for low-emission NZE
2010 0hydrogen-based liquid fuels in67.4 2050 according to NZE is approximately 0.0% 10% of the recent
2022 02022 demand for conventional crude
62.8 oil, which makes LELs a clear contributor
0.0% among
liquid fuels.
2030 0 0.7 61.3 48 0.0% 1.5%
Figure 20 shows the expected annual global region-to-region trade (long-distance
2050 0.2 trade) of6.0
LEH and its derived 58.2 energy products,
15.8 according to 0.3%
IEA data. It also shows 38.0%
the
* Low-emission hydrogen-based liquid fuels (LELs) include ammonia,
computed share of this traded LEH and its derivative products and the demand for LEH methanol, and other syn-
thetic
andliquid hydrocarbons
its derivative (such as
products. kerosene)
Similar to the derived
case offrom
LEH low-emission
production,hydrogen.
there is a If carbon
huge gapinputs
(like CO2) are
between theneeded
STEPSto synthesize
scenario suchNZE
and the fuels, they must
scenario not come
in terms of thefrom
amount fossil
of fuel emissions or
anticipated
from process
trade emissions.
of LEH ** Low-emission
and its derivatives. hydrogen-based
This emphasizes liquid fuels
the sensitivity (LELs)
of the LEHare expressed
market to thein en-
ergy equivalent volumes, and are reported in Mboe/d (million barrels of oil
attention given by policymakers to emissions mitigation. The share of this region-to-regionequivalent per day).
traded LEH in the global LEH demand is limited to 21% only for both scenarios, in either
Figure
2030 20 shows the expected annual global region-to-region trade (long-distance
or 2050.
trade) of LEH and its derived energy products, according to IEA data. It also shows the
computed share of this traded LEH and its derivative products and the demand for LEH
and its derivative products. Similar to the case of LEH production, there is a huge gap
Energies 2024, 17, 646 22 of 34
Table 3. Global low-emission hydrogen-based liquid fuel demand, and its ratio to the conventional
crude oil demand (IEA).
Ratio of Low-Emission
Low-Emission Hydrogen-Based
Conventional Crude Oil Hydrogen-Based Liquid Fuel
Liquid Fuel * Demand, in
Demand, in Mb/d Demand to Conventional Crude
Mboe/d **
Oil Demand
Energies2010
2024, 17, x FOR PEER REVIEW 0 67.4 0.0% 23 of 35
2022 0 62.8 0.0%
2030 0 0.7 61.3 48 0.0% 1.5%
2050 0.2 between the6.0 STEPS scenario58.2 and the NZE scenario 15.8 in terms of0.3% the amount of anticipated
38.0%
* Low-emission hydrogen-based liquid fuels (LELs) include ammonia, methanol, and other syntheticto
trade of LEH and its derivatives. This emphasizes the sensitivity of the LEH market the
liquid
attention
hydrocarbonsgiven
(such by policymakers
as kerosene) to emissions
derived from low-emission mitigation.
hydrogen. If The
carbonshare
inputsof this
(like COregion-to-re-
2 ) are needed to
synthesize such fuels, they must not come from fossil fuel emissions or from process
gion traded LEH in the global LEH demand is limited to 21% only for both scenarios, in emissions. ** Low-emission
hydrogen-based liquid fuels (LELs) are expressed in energy equivalent volumes, and are reported in Mboe/d
either 2030
(million barrelsor
of2050.
oil equivalent per day).
Figure 20. Globally

Globally region-to-region
region-to-region traded
traded low-emission
hydrogen and its derivatives, and the
share
share ofof these
these traded
traded items
items in
in the
the global
global low-emission
hydrogen demand
demand andand its
its derivatives
derivatives (data
(data
source: IEA). Trading here refers to the exchange between any two geographic regions
source: IEA). Trading here refers to the exchange between any two geographic regions (not be- (not between
individual countries), and excludes exchange within the same region. There are seven geographic
tween individual countries), and excludes exchange within the same region. There are seven geo-
regions considered in IEA modeling, which are: (1) North America (Canada, USA, Mexico), (2) Cen-
graphic regions considered in IEA modeling, which are: (1) North America (Canada, USA, Mexico),
tral and South America, (3) Europe (including Turkey), (4) Africa (including all North African coun-
(2) Central
tries), and South
(5) Middle East America,
(including(3) Europe
Iran), (including
(6) Eurasia Turkey),
(Russia (4) Africa
and the Caspian(including all(7)
zone), and North
AsiaAfrican
Pacific
countries), India
(including (5) Middle East (including Iran), (6) Eurasia (Russia and the Caspian zone), and (7) Asia
and Pakistan).
Pacific (including India and Pakistan).
7.3. Hydrogen Use
With regard to the utilization of hydrogen, Table 4 gives the IEA s past (2010, 2021,
2022) and future expectations (2030, 2050) for the global electricity generation (either by
direct combustion or through fuel cells) from low-emission hydrogen (LEH), and from
derived low-emission ammonia (LEA) as a low-emission liquid fuel and hydrogen carrier.
Energies 2024, 17, 646 23 of 34
7.3. Hydrogen Use

With regard to the utilization of hydrogen, Table 4 gives the IEA’s past (2010, 2021,
2022) and future expectations (2030, 2050) for the global electricity generation (either by
direct combustion or through fuel cells) from low-emission hydrogen (LEH), and from
derived low-emission ammonia (LEA) as a low-emission liquid fuel and hydrogen carrier.
The table also gives the share of this type of hydrogen-originated electricity generation in
the total electricity generation. Regardless of the energy forecasting scenario (STEPS or
NZE), the combined role of LEH and LEA in electricity generation is of minor importance,
with the best estimate being only 2% (more precisely 1.51%) in 2050 according to NZE.
Table 4. Global electricity generation from low-emission hydrogen and derived ammonia, and the
share of this in total electricity generation (IEA).
Share of Electricity Generation

Electricity Generation from
Total Electricity Generation, in from Low-Emission Hydrogen
Low-Emission Hydrogen and
TWh and Derived Ammonia (in Total
Derived Ammonia, in TWh
Electricity Generation)
2010 0 21,533 0%
2021 0 28,346 0%
2022 0 29,033 0%
2030 22 373 35,802 38,207 0% 1%
2050 91 1161 53,985 76,838 0% 2%
Table 5 has a similar structure of the previous table, also with IEA’s results, but it is for
global electricity capacity (rather than global electricity generation). It affirms the relatively
weak role of low-emission hydrogen and derived low-emission ammonia in the electricity
sector, with only a 1% combined share (more precisely 1.16%, with 427 GW by LEH and
LEA compared to the expected total electricity capacity of 36,956 GW) in 2050 according to
NZE. A comparison of the small percentage values in this table with the larger ratio values
discussed earlier (describing the global demand for low-emission hydrogen-based liquid
fuels—LELs, relative to global demand for conventional crude oil) suggests that the role of
LELs as liquid fuels (for any purpose, including heating) may be much more pronounced
than the role of LEH and LEA in the narrow purpose within the electricity sector alone.
Table 5. Global electricity capacity due to low-emission hydrogen and derived ammonia, and the
share of this in the total electricity capacity (IEA).
Share of Electricity Capacity by

Electricity Capacity by
Low-Emission Hydrogen and
Low-Emission Hydrogen and Total Electricity Capacity, in GW
Derived Ammonia (in Total
Derived Ammonia, in GW
Electric Capacity)
2010 0 5187 0%
2021 0 8230 0%
2022 0 8643 0%
2030 8 129 14,168 16,180 0% 1%
2050 19 427 25,956 36,956 0% 1%
Energies 2024, 17, 646 24 of 34
Moving from IEA data to IRENA data, Table 6 shows the IRENA’s past and expected
global share of clean hydrogen (through both direct use, and indirect use as derived e-fuels)
in the total final energy consumption (TFEC). The two IRENA’s TFEC values mentioned
earlier (past value for 2020, and expected future value for 2050 according to 1.5◦ C) are
included in the table. Similar to a previous remark made when discussing IEA results for
expected future LEH production and discussing IRENA results for expected future clean
hydrogen production, unless the 1.5◦ C scenario is realized, the role of clean hydrogen and
its derivatives may be very limited in TFEC (less than 1% energy share, even in 2050).
Table 6. Global clean hydrogen (direct use and e-fuels) share in total final energy consumption (IRENA).
Year PES 1.5◦ C

2020 <1% (TFEC 374 EJ/yr)
2030 <1% 2%
2050 <1% 14% (TFEC 353 EJ/yr)
Finally, sector-specific estimations of the past and the expected global share of clean
hydrogen (from both direct use, and indirect use as derived e-fuels) in the final energy
consumption (FEC) within the three sectors are presented, still using IRENA data. Table 7
shows that the transport sector has good potential for utilizing clean hydrogen or its derived
fuels, with the share in transport FEC is expected to reach 24% in 2050 according to the
1.5◦ C scenario. Thus, hydrogen could play a noticeable role in decarbonizing the transport
sector through fuel-cell electric vehicles (FCEVs) and fuel-cell electric trains (FCETs). Table 8
shows the corresponding share for the industry sector, where the maximum expected share
in industry FEC (17%) is also appreciable. Direct reduced iron (DRI), for example, is one
way where clean hydrogen can become an important feedstock for producing iron in a
clean way compared to the conventional use of carbon as a reduction agent of iron ore (iron
oxides) [137,138]. Table 9 shows the corresponding share for the building sector. Unlike the
previous two sectors, the expected share of clean hydrogen and its derived e-fuels in the
building FEC is negligible (less than 1%) in either 2030 or 2050, according to both the PES
scenario and the 1.5◦ C scenario.
Table 7. Transport sector: global clean hydrogen (direct use and e-fuels) share in the final energy
consumption within that sector (IRENA).
Year PES 1.5◦ C

2020 <1%
2030 <1% <1%
2050 2% 24%
Table 8. Industry sector: global clean hydrogen (direct use and e-fuels) share in the final energy
Year PES 1.5◦ C

2020 <1%
2030 <1% 5%
2050 <1% 17%
Energies 2024, 17, 646 25 of 34
Table 9. Building sector: global clean hydrogen (direct use and e-fuels) share in the final energy
Year PES 1.5◦ C

2020 <1%
2030 <1% <1%
2050 <1% <1%
8. Conclusions
In the current study, various barriers and drivers for a large-scale hydrogen economy
(especially electrolysis-based green hydrogen) were discussed. A selective analysis of
the most-recent edition (2023) of the World Energy Outlook (WEO, 26th edition) of the
International Energy Agency (IEA), and the most-recent edition (2023) of the World Energy
Transitions Outlook (WETO, third edition, volume 1 of two volumes) of the International
Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) was presented.
With regard to the first (and the primary) aim of the current study, the future of
hydrogen (particularly green hydrogen) is largely speculative, with a very wide range
of its possible development (from being negligible to being far-reaching), depending on
whether or not governments take serious action to mitigate global carbon dioxide (CO2 )
emissions by 2050, by decarbonizing various sectors. Assuming that a fully decarbonized
global economy (in terms of net-zero CO2 emissions) is realized in 2050, the annual green
and blue hydrogen production may exceed 500 Mt H2 in 2050 (with most of this being
green hydrogen from water electrolysis, with a global electrolyzer capacity exceeding
5000 GW). With such fully decarbonized global activities in 2050, the share of green and
blue hydrogen in the global total final energy consumption (TFEC) may reach 14%, which
is a little more than the share of fossil fuels (12%), and a little less than the share of biomass
(16%). Hydrogen and its derived fuels have a better chance of being exploited within the
transport sector and within the industry sector, but not within the building sector.
With regard to the second aim of the current study, it was found that IEA’s Stated
Policies Scenario (STEPS), and IRENA’s Planned Energy Scenario (PES) vary noticeably
in their predictions for 2030 and 2050 in some cases (with the deviation exceeding 20%,
such as in the predicted total electricity capacity in 2050 being 25.956 TW for STEPS and
19.748 TW for PES), but can also be consistent in other cases (the deviation is less than
1% for the predicted annual total electricity generation in 2030 of 35.802 PWh for STEPS
and 36.119 PWh for PES). IEA’s Net-Zero Emissions by 2050 (NZE), and IRENA’s 1.5◦ C
pathway (1.5◦ C) were found to be overall similar, but not identical, in terms of their
examined forecasting. For example, the deviation in their predicted global total final energy
consumption (TFEC) in 2050 was only about 10 EJ, which is less than 3% of either of the
other reported values, (343 EJ for NZE, and 353 EJ for 1.5◦ C).
With regard to the third (and the last) aim of the current study, the share of direct
electricity use in TFEC is expected to be approximately one-half in 2050 under the condition
of net-zero global emissions of CO2 at that time. However, in that situation of global
decarbonization, fossil fuels (coal, crude oil, and natural gas) are not expected to be totally
phased out, but their use is expected to be mostly limited to the transport sector and some
industries. If the current energy policies and targets remain in place, the share of renewable
energy sources in global electricity generation is expected to increase from 28% in 2020 to
nearly half of the global total electricity generation in 2030, and to nearly three-quarters
of the global total electricity generation in 2050. In relation to this boosted electrification,
the corresponding carbon dioxide emissions per kWh of generated electricity decline by
34.1% from 460 gCO2 (global average) in 2020 to 303 gCO2 in 2030, and then decline by an
additional 37.4% (relative to the 2020 value) to 131 gCO2 in 2050.
Energies 2024, 17, 646 26 of 34
8.1. Policy Implications

Based on the findings of the current study, the current policies and energy targets are
inadequate to achieve global carbon neutrality by the middle of the current century. The
current policies do not even enable a considerable drop in the carbon dioxide emissions in
2050 compared to the 2022 value, which was near 37 Gt CO2 . It should be noted that this
shortcoming does not pertain to a specific country, but it is about the overall collection of
all governmental energy-related policies.
Because CO2 emissions and the induced global warming are worldwide problems,
only international collaboration can lead to adequately controlling them. Isolated na-
tional or regional efforts are not sufficient. The study recommends that cooperative
technical, economic, and legislative support is provided to the national governments
to accelerate the deployment of green hydrogen production, trade, certification, and uti-
lization. The study also recommends community awareness activities, particularly for
school students, about the opportunities that low-carbon hydrogen can bring for improving
our lives.
8.2. Limitations and Future Recommendations

The current study did not provide technical details or mathematical modeling infor-
mation about the processes of producing hydrogen or consuming it. For example, the
amount of renewable electricity needed to produce 1 kg H2 of green hydrogen using water
electrolysis was not discussed. Also, how the conversion efficiency of this input electric
energy depends on the electrolyzer type (particularly alkaline electrolyzers versus proton
exchange membrane electrolyzers) was missing. Similarly, details about hydrogen fuel
cells and their advantages/disadvantages relative to other clean electricity generation
technologies were not given. When the water needs for hydrogen production were dis-
cussed, the quality requirements of this water (such as the permissible level of dissolved
solids) for the electrolysis operation were not covered. The drivers for having a large-scale
hydrogen economy were largely focused on the H2Global initiative in Germany as a sin-
gle demonstrative case, rather than covering multiple cases from different countries. For
example, the National Green Hydrogen Mission in India [139] (which provides govern-
mental incentives to strengthen the production of green hydrogen and the manufacturing
of electrolyzers), the Hydrogen Program of the United States Department of Energy [140]
(which involves activities to scale up the role of hydrogen and fuel cells through tech-
nology validation, research, and awareness), and the Hydrogen Oman or Hydrom in the
Sultanate of Oman [141] (which was established as a central government-owned entity for
coordinating the national interest in large-scale green hydrogen projects) are additional
examples that were not mentioned. Despite apparently being limitations, it is actually
reasonable to skip these additional details as they do not crucially influence the current
study and they may make it unsuitably large and incoherent. Future work may address one
or more of these topics, as a narrower but deeper investigation regarding the viability of
hydrogen energy.
Funding: This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.
Informed Consent Statement: Not applicable.
Data Availability Statement: Data are contained within the article.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
Energies 2024, 17, 646 27 of 34
Nomenclature
It is a normative forecasting model, showing a possible pathway to limit the
global temperature rise to 1.5 ◦ C by 2100 relative to the pre-industrial level.
It simultaneously implies bringing CO2 emissions to a nearly net-zero (slig-
1.5◦ C (by IRENA)
htly negative) value by 2050. As a reference, the global average rise in the
average rise in the earth’s surface temperature in 2021 reached around 1.2 ◦ C
above the pre-industrial level.
APS Announced Pledges Scenario.
A type of hydrogen produced though abated fossil-based hydrogen produ-
ction, where hydrogen is obtained from a fossil fuel (such as by steam-meth-
Blue hydrogen ane reforming “SMR” of natural gas, or by autothermal reforming “ATR” of
natural gas), but the process is combined with a form of CCS/CCUS to largely
reduce the CO2 emissions to the atmosphere.
German: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz (English: Fe-
BMWK deral Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action). In December 2021,
it replaced the former BMWi.
German: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie (English: Federal
BMWi Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy). In December 2021, it was replaced
by BMWK.
CCS Carbon capture and storage (or sequestration).
CCUS Carbon capture, utilization (or usage), and storage.
A term used by IRENA to refer collectively to: (1) green hydrogen, and
Clean hydrogen (2) blue hydrogen. This is approximately equivalent to “low-emission
hydrogen” or LEH for IEA.
CO2 Carbon dioxide.
DRI Direct reduced iron.
e-fuel Electricity-based fuel (or electrofuel).
EJ Exajoule (1018 J).
e-SAF Electricity-based sustainable aviation fuel.
EU European Union.
gCO2 Gram of carbon dioxide.
GEC (by IEA) Global Energy and Climate.
A type of hydrogen produced by either (1) electrolysis of water, with the
required electricity generated from a renewable energy source, or (2) biomass
Green hydrogen gasification using renewable energy for powering the process. The electrolysis-
based green hydrogen is the dominant type of both categories, and often the
term “green hydrogen” refers exclusively to electrolysis-based hydrogen.
Gt CO2 Gigatonne (1012 kg) of carbon dioxide.
GW Gigawatt (109 W).
HINT.CO Hydrogen Intermediary Network Company GmbH.
HPA Hydrogen purchase agreement.
HRS Hydrogen refueling station.
HSA Hydrogen sales agreement.
IEA International Energy Agency.
IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency.
kg H2 Kilogram of hydrogen.
kWh Kilowatt hour (3.6 MJ).
L Liter.
Low-carbon hydrogen (a generic term that refers to either clean hydrogen
LCH
or low-emission hydrogen).
LCOH Levelized cost of hydrogen.
Low-emission ammonia. It is a low-emission hydrogen-based liquid fuel
(NH3 ) produced from low-emission hydrogen (such as electrolysis-based
LEA
hydrogen where the consumed electricity to produce it comes from low-
emission electricity generation sources).
Energies 2024, 17, 646 28 of 34
Low-emission hydrogen. It is a term used by IEA to refer collectively to:

(1) green hydrogen, (2) blue hydrogen, (3) pink hydrogen, and (4) turquoise
LEH
hydrogen. This is approximately equivalent to “clean hydrogen” according
to IRENA terms.
LELs Low-emission hydrogen-based liquid fuels.
LHV Lower heating value (of a fuel).
Million barrels of crude oil (petroleum) per day. One barrel has a volume of
Mb/d
42 U.S. gallons (about 159 L).
Million barrels of oil equivalent per day. If 1 tonne of oil equivalent (toe) has
7.40 boe, and 1 toe has a lower heating value (LHV) of 41,868 MJ, then 1 boe
Mboe/d
is equivalent to a LHV of 5658 MJ (1572 kWh). However, there is no universal
value of boe.
MJ Megajoule (106 J).
Mt H2 Million tonnes of hydrogen.
National Fire Protection Association. It is a US-based global nonprofit prof-
NFPA essional organization, and an internationally recognized leader in providing
fire safety standards.
Net-Zero Emissions by 2050. It is a normative forecasting model, predicting
the necessary mix of clean energy technologies to reach net-zero energy-
NZE (by IEA) related CO2 emissions by 2050. NZE corresponds to an increase of 1.5 ◦ C in
the average global surface temperature in 2100 (with a 50% probability), with
limited overshoot before that.
PEM Proton exchange membrane (also called polymer electrolyte membrane).
Planned Energy Scenario. It is an exploratory forecasting model, predicting
PES (by IRENA) the expected developments in the energy system and the dependent emissions
based on currently existing governments’ energy plans and targets.
A type of hydrogen produced by electrolysis of water, with the needed
Pink hydrogen
electric power generated from a nuclear power plant.
PtG or P2G Power-to-gas.
PtL or P2L Power-to-liquid.
PtX or P2X Power-to-X (X is a generic energy carrier).
PWh Petawatt-hour (3.6 EJ).
Renewable energy sources, including hydroelectric energy, solar energy, wind
Renewables energy, bioenergy, geothermal energy, and ocean/marine energy (from tides
or from waves).
SMR Steam-methane reforming.
Stated (Energy) Policies Scenario. It is an exploratory forecasting model,
predicting the expected developments in the energy system and the
dependent emissions based on currently existing sector-by-sector energy
STEPS (by IEA)
policies and measures by different countries or geographical regions. STEPS
corresponds to an increase of 2.4 ◦ C in the average global surface temperature
in 2100 (with a 50% probability).
Total final energy consumption. IEA uses the abbreviation “TFC”, while
IRENA uses the abbreviation “TFEC”. It is the sum of consumption by the
TFC/TFEC
end-use sector, for example by the industry sector (such as manufacturing,
mining, chemicals production, blast furnaces), and by the transport sector.
A type of hydrogen produced through a pyrolysis process (called methane
pyrolysis, methane splitting, or methane cracking), when the gaseous methane
(or natural gas) is heated electrically such that it is broken down into gaseous
Turquoise hydrogen
hydrogen and solid carbon. The process does not release carbon dioxide
emissions (like green hydrogen), but it is based on a fossil fuel (like blue
hydrogen).
TW Terawatt (1000 GW).
WEO (by IEA) World Energy Outlook.
WETO (by IRENA) World Energy Transitions Outlook.
yr Year.
Energies 2024, 17, 646 29 of 34
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energies

College of Engineering, University of Buraimi, Al Buraimi 512, Oman; [email protected]

Energies 2024, 17, 646. https://doi.org/10.3390/en17030646 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/energies

1.4. Hydrogen and Its Derived Products as Alternative Energy Carriers

1.5. Barriers to a Large Global Hydrogen Economy

1.6. Drivers for a Large Global Hydrogen Economy

2. Aims and Contributions of the Study

4. Results (Part 1 of 4): Non-Hydrogen Common Quantities in IEA and IRENA

4.1. CO2 Emissions

4.2. Electricity Generation

Energies 2024, 17, x FOR PEER REVIEW 9 of 35

Energies 2024, 17, x FOR PEER REVIEW 10 of 35

4.2. Electricity Generation

4.3. Electricity Capacity

4.4. Total Final Energy Consumption

Energies 2024, 17, 646 11 of 34

5. Results (Part 2 of 4): Additional IEA Non-Hydrogen Quantities

Figure 9. World population (data source: IEA).

Energies 2024, 17, x FOR PEER REVIEW 15 of 35

Figure 10. Global CO2(there

6. Results (Part 3 of 4): Additional IRENA Non-Hydrogen Quantities

6. Results (Part 3 of 4): Additional IRENA Non-Hydrogen Quantities

Energies 2024, 17, x FOR PEER REVIEW 18 of 35

7. Results (Part 4 of 4): Hydrogen-Specific Quantities

7. Results (Part 4 of 4): Hydrogen-Specific Quantities

7.1. Hydrogen Production

7.2. Hydrogen Demand and Longr-Distance Trade

Energies 2024, 17, 646 21 of 34

Figure 20. Globally

7.3. Hydrogen Use

Share of Electricity Generation

Share of Electricity Capacity by

Year PES 1.5◦ C

Year PES 1.5◦ C

Year PES 1.5◦ C

Year PES 1.5◦ C

8.1. Policy Implications

8.2. Limitations and Future Recommendations

Funding: This research received no external funding.

Low-emission hydrogen. It is a term used by IEA to refer collectively to:

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