Bradley Textbook Chapter

Chapter 12
The Greek world 500–440 BC
420
Figure 12.1 The caryatid porch of the Erechtheion on the Acropolis of Athens (421 BC)
ISBN 978-1-108-41347-3 © Pamela Bradley 2019 Cambridge University Press
Photocopying is restricted under law and this material must not be transferred to another party.
Figure 12.2 Map showing the relative sizes of Greece and
the Persian Empire at the beginning of the 5th century BC
Where are we headed?

Focus Students develop an understanding of the Greek World 500–440 BC
through a range of archaeological and written sources.
Key issues • The chronological and geographical context

• The Persian Wars
• The development of Athens and the Athenian Empire 478–440 BC
• Athens and Sparta
We did nothing extraordinary, nothing contrary to human nature in

accepting an empire when it was offered to us and then in refusing to give it
up. Three very powerful motives prevent us from doing so: security, honour
and self-interest.
Source 12.1 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Bk I. 76
421

Critically see, think, wonder
Figure 12.3 An artistic depiction of Athens in the 5th century BC
Figure 12.4 A tribute list
Study Figures 12.3 and 12.4 carefully. Note everything that you can see in Figure 12.3. What does this
reveal about Athens in the 5th century BC? What does the image in Figure 12.4 suggest about the possible
relationship between it and Figure 12.3?
422 The ancient world transformed

Chapter 12 Overview
Key idea Why it matters today Key terms AND names
This period in Greek history, A study of this period in Greek • acropolis • oligarchy
which focuses chiefly on the history reveals how a small • agora • oracle
city-states of Sparta and Athens, state can overcome tremendous • Areopagus • ostracism
is marked by inter-city tensions military odds with courage, unity • autonomous • ostraka
and rivalries, invasion and and motivation, as well as the • cleruchy • panhellenic
change. It traces the ways each nature of imperialism even in • democracy • phalanx
city reacted to outside forces and the ancient world. This period • dioklos • phoros
includes stories of outstanding also reveals the development • epigram • poleis (sing.,
military achievements, of the first Western democracy • epigraphic polis)
courage, sacrifice, betrayal and in history, which was, however, • hegemony • polemarch
selfishness. Out of all of this only possible with the wealth • heliaea • Pythia
emerged an aggressive Athenian from empire and the presence • Hellentamiae • secession
empire and a radical democracy of slavery in society. The city of • lot • strategoi
that created fear and suspicion Athens, the stunning remains of • medism • trireme
in oligarchic Sparta, with its which are still visited by millions
oppressed helot population. today, emerged from this period.
These events became the
prelude to a massive Greek civil
war at the end of the century.
Painting the picture

Inquiry question
The major themes of the period between 500 and 440 BC are threefold: the Persian
Wars, the development of Athens and its empire, and the changing relations between What part did the
Athens and Sparta. navy play in defending
Although the initial conflict between Greece and Persia began in 499 with the Greece during the
Ionian Revolt, it was the First Invasion of Greece in 490 and the Second Invasion Persian wars and in
in 480–479 that were the most significant events for the future of Greece. In 490 Athens’ growth to
the Athenians, under the leadership of Miltiades, defeated the Persians at the Battle power?
of Marathon, which proved to be a test for the infant democracy. In the 10 years
before the next Persian invasion in 480, Athens developed a navy under the initiative of Themistocles, and
31 Greek states joined a Hellenic League under the leadership of Sparta. After massive preparations, King
Xerxes of Persia began a combined military and naval attack on Greece. At the Battle of Thermopylae,
the Greeks under the Spartan King Leonidas were defeated and central Greece lay open to the invaders.
Athens was evacuated and then destroyed by the Persians, but at the naval Battle of Salamis and the Battles
of Plataea and Mycale in the following year (479), the Persians were defeated.
The Persian Wars revealed the strengths and weaknesses of the Greek city-state system, and laid the
basis for the dominance of Athens over the next 50 years, first as leader of a voluntary league of sea states
(Delian League) and then as the leader of a fully-fledged Athenian empire comprising allies and subject
Chapter 12 The Greek world 500–440 BC 423

states. During this time, the two key developments were the further growth of democracy in Athens and
the change in Athens’ relations with its allies and its willingness to use force against them.
Tension between Sparta and Athens began developing in the immediate post-Persian war period
when Sparta withdrew from wider Greek affairs and Athens assumed the leadership of its Greek allies.
At this time, the conservative Athenian, Cimon, was pro-Sparta and believed in a dual hegemony in
Greece (military leadership of Sparta and naval leadership of Athens). However, from the mid 460s radical
democrats came to power, Athens developed a blatant imperial policy and the relationship between Athens
and Sparta deteriorated into open rivalry. Under the leadership of Pericles, Athens’ growing political and
economic power inspired fear and resentment in Sparta and other Peloponnesian states.
Table 12.1 A summary of major developments in the Greek world between 500–440 BCE
Dates Major developments

499–93 The Ionian Revolt
490 First Invasion of Greece by the Persians
487 Democratic changes in Athens
482 Development of the Athenian navy under the guidance of Themistocles
480–79 Second Invasion of Greece
478 Formation of a naval league of Aegean states under the leadership of Athens (Delian League)
470–69 First secession from the League. Naxos reduced to subject status
468 League forces defeated the Persians at the Battle of Eurymedon
465 Thasos seceded and reduced to subject status
464 Revolt of the helots in Sparta
463–61 Democratic reforms in Athens and suspicion of Sparta. Athenian leader, Cimon, ostracised
460–55 Leadership of Pericles in Athens, which gained control of Megara, Aegina, Troizen and Achaea
454 Removal of the Treasury of the Delian League from Delos to Athens. Military expedition sent
by Athens into the Corinthian Gulf
453 Restrictions placed on members of the Delian League (Erythrae Decree)
451 Five-Year Truce signed between the Athenians and the Peloponnesians. Citizenship decree
passed in Athens
449–48 Peace negotiated with Persia – Peace of Callias
446–45 Revolt of Megara and Euboea against Athens. Harsh Chalcis Decree
445 Thirty-Year Peace between the Athenian and Peloponnesian Leagues
441 Pericles supreme in Athens
440 Samos, an independent member of the Delian League/Athenian empire, revolts against
Athens. A fleet sent by Pericles to overthrow Samos’ oligarchic government.
12.1 The chronological and geographical context

The nature of Hellas
Hellas was the name by which Greece was known in ancient times and its people were known as Hellenes.
However, they rarely thought of themselves as Greeks, rather they identified with their cities or poleis (city-
states) as Athenians, Spartans, Thebans, Corinthians and so on. In fact, Greece did not exist as a country

in the modern sense, and its history was rather that of small political units, with first one predominating
for a time, and then another. Rarely did they unite to fight a common enemy; they were so busy fighting
each other.
This characteristic of separate, autonomous city-states, each with its own form of
autonomous independent,
government, institutions and community life, led to strong feelings of independence, self-governing
commercial jealousies, shifting alliances and inter-state wars.
A comment on…
The nature of a Greek polis

There is no equivalent word for polis in English. It is often translated as ‘city-state’
but it was neither a city nor a state in the modern sense. The closest we can come acropolis (‘high town’) a
to it is ‘a community of people’. A polis was a self-governing community which high rocky outcrop, usually
fortified; the stronghold of a
included an acropolis (stronghold of the community); the town or city with an
community
agora (place of meeting/marketplace) built around the stronghold; the villages
agora marketplace
and the countryside; the people of the city and countryside; and the political,
cultural, religious and economic way of life. The ideal size of a city-state according
to Aristotle was such that its citizens should know one another by sight.
The landform of Greece

The presence of many small city-states was the result
of Greece’s particular landform.
1 Rugged limestone mountains ran north to south,
dividing central Greece. In the west these ranges
bordered the sea, and in the east, they cut laterally,
separating the plains of Thessaly, Boeotia and
Attica from each other. In the Peloponnese, they
again ran north to south, extending out into capes
and promontories, but they did not stop there, for
their peaks and ridges formed the islands of the
Aegean. Narrow valleys and long gulfs separated
these high mountains.
2 There were few large plains, but many small fertile
ones: some coastal, others totally cut off from
the sea by a ring of mountains like Laconia, the
homeland of the Spartans.
3 The mountain barriers and high infrequent
passes made communications and transportation
difficult and so movement of people and goods
was usually by sea. The highly indented coastline
provided many safe harbours and anchorages,
especially along the east coast, and meant that the Figure 12.5 The landform of Hellas and its territorial
sea penetrated far inland. divisions

4 Although armies did sometimes cross these rugged barriers, the mountains provided some defence for
city-states (for example, Sparta), and the narrow mountain passes were important in that they allowed
large armies to be contained by smaller forces.
5 The narrow Isthmus produced by the indentations of the Corinthian and Saronic Gulfs was important
for the defence of the Peloponnesian states as it could be easily defended while the cities on the Isthmus,
such as Corinth and Megara, had access to trade of both western and eastern seas
dioklos a paved roadway and controlled traffic along the main north–south route into central Greece. Light
across the Isthmus on which
ships were often dragged on carts along a stone-paved way (dioklos) built across the
to drag ships
Isthmus to save the long haul around the Peloponnese.
Figure 12.6 A satellite view of the Figure 12.7 A satellite view of Isthmus of Corinth
Peloponnese
Despite their lack of unity, Greek city-states shared a language, a literature such as the epic poems of
Homer, a pantheon of gods, the Panhellenic Games and the Oracle of Delphi through which the Greeks
sought to learn the will of the gods for practical guidance about specific matters in everyday life.
A COMMENT ON…
The Oracle of Delphi

• There were a number of oracles in the Greek world but the most renowned was the Oracle of Apollo
at Delphi in central Greece. People came from all over the Greek world to consult it. They made
their enquiries in writing and presented them to the priests of Apollo. However,
the medium through whom Apollo spoke was a woman known as the Pythia.
Pythia a prophetess, female
mouthpiece of the god Apollo According to tradition, she had to be over the age of 50, having passed the change
at Delphi of life and have lived a blameless life. Once she was selected, she observed
certain taboos and lived in a residence of her own in the sacred enclosure.

• There is no straightforward version of how she prepared herself to be inspired by the god, although
there are various tales about her waving a laurel branch, chewing on laurel leaves, drinking sacred
water from an underground spring and breathing in vapours from a fissure in the earth. All of these
have been dismissed in favour of the theory that it was her own suggestions as she took up her
position on an upturned tripod, which put her into a trance. Her supposed frenzied mutterings in
answer to the questions put to her by the priests from the enquirers were always ambiguous.
• It was the priests, who had an extensive knowledge of the Greek world, who interpreted the
ambiguous prophecies of the Pythia. She was simply a messenger of sorts and had no influence on
the interpretation of the message.
Figure 12.8 Temple of Apollo
The major cities of the Greek mainland

Table 12.2 The city-states of Athens and Sparta, the two most powerful at the beginning of the 5th century
Sparta Athens
• The Spartans were Dorians who moved into • The Athenians were Ionians who were part of the
Greece around 1200–1100 BC and settled in the pre-Dorian population of Greece, many of whom
fertile valleys of the Peloponnese. had migrated to the islands
• By the 6th century, Sparta was known for its of the Aegean and the coast oligarchy rule by the few
democracy rule by the
militaristic way of life in which all citizens were of Asia Minor.
people (demos – the people,
full-time soldiers (Spartiates). • During the 6th century, the kratis – rule of strength)
• It governed a huge population of subject people Athenians had experimented
(state-owned serfs known as helots) who were with different forms of government until they
likely to revolt at any time. finally produced a blueprint for democracy,
• Its form of government was predominantly which gave its citizens the chance to vote, make
oligarchic in which power was in the hands of laws and stand for office, although there were
the dominant Spartiate class. still many undemocratic features.

Table 12.2 (continued)
Sparta Athens
• Spartans tended to be suspicious of democratic • Unlike Sparta, Athens had a more open society
trends. and foreigners were encouraged to live and work
• The main aim of their foreign policy was to there.
keep Messenia (home of the majority of helots) • During the 6th century it had become a great
in check, and to isolate its traditional enemy, city with a prosperous economy and a rich
Argos. They achieved this by allying themselves cultural life.
in separate defensive alliances with most of the • The Athenians looked outward and benefited
other city-states in the Peloponnese in what was from an exchange of ideas with the Greeks in
called the Peloponnesian League. Asia Minor, and with others beyond Hellas.
• The Spartans were rather inward looking,
foreigners were not always welcome and they
tended to be uneasy moving too far away from
Sparta for any length of time.
The Greeks of Asia Minor and the kingdom of Lydia

Greeks (Ionians, Aeolians and others) from mainland Greece had migrated across the Aegean Sea and
settled in the isolated valleys and on the islands along the coast of Asia Minor (modern Turkey). For
several centuries (7th and 6th BC), the cities along that part of the coast, known as Ionia, sent out colonies
under the pressure of an increasing population. Miletus, one of the greatest of the Ionian cities, sent out
90 colonies around the fertile Black Sea area alone. Although the cities of Asia Minor were cultural
and intellectual centres, their freedom was always precarious, since – like the mainland Greeks – they
lacked unity.
1 Initially, they came under the influence of the adjacent Lydian Kingdom ruled by the legendary King
Croesus from Sardis. In 560, Croesus subjugated all the Greeks along the coast, except for those of
Miletus. Although Croesus was more oriental than Greek, he appreciated the Greek culture and its
language, which spread throughout his kingdom. He honoured the Greek gods, gave generously to
Greek sanctuaries and consulted the Delphic Oracle. The Lydians allowed the Greeks a large amount
of freedom and they benefited from the introduction by Lydia of the first coinage of electrum (an alloy
of gold and silver), which facilitated trade.
2 It was not long before their lives changed considerably. In the mid 550s, the Persian king, Cyrus the
Great, emerged on the scene. In 446 he took Sardis, having already sent a message inviting the Ionians
in the Lydian army to change sides. They refused and Cyrus not only brought the Lydian kingdom to
a sudden end, but he also conquered the Greek cities along the coast. Despite Cyrus’ usual preference
to use local elites to administer his conquered territories, he was forced to appoint Greek pro-Persian
‘puppet tyrants’, answerable to the local Persian satrap (governor) because the Greeks were difficult to
rule: disunited and factional in nature. They were forced to pay tribute to Persia and contribute military
and naval forces when requested. This left a legacy of hostility among the Asian Greeks, particularly
those in Ionia, which would have severe consequences for the future.
The Persian Empire continued to increase in size under Cyrus, Cambyses and Darius I who, sometime
around 512–510, crossed into Europe and embarked on what is referred to as his Scythian/Danube
expedition.

ACTIVITY 12.1
1 What was a Greek polis?

2 Explain what is meant by the statement: ‘Greece (Hellas) was not a country as we know it’.
3 Identify three major landform features of Greece and explain how they impacted on the:
• the growth of city-states
• defence
• communications and transport.
4 Discuss the significance of the Delphic Oracle in the Greek world.
5 Describe the ways in which the major city-states of Sparta and Athens differed at the beginning of
this period.
6 Write half a page about the Greeks of Asia Minor at the beginning of this period.
7 Identify the Persian King at the beginning of the 5th century.
Contemporary written sources for the Persian Wars

Although ‘contemporary’ means ‘living at the same time’, with regards to the Persian War it is reasonable
to include those who had written within 50 years of the period. Unfortunately, these sources are all Greek,
and therefore must be treated with a considerable amount of caution. Two of these are:
1 Herodotus, Histories
2 Aeschylus, Persae (‘The Persians’)
The ancient Persians themselves wrote almost nothing – at least nothing that has survived –
in the way of narrative history. As with many ancient peoples, records were kept alive through
oral tradition. These ‘records’ manifest themselves in the written sources in a number of
compelling, but often puzzling ways.
Source 12.2 Matt Waters, Ancient Persia, p. 11
Our image of Achaemenid Persia is usually one of a tyrannical enemy that unleashed an
overwhelming onslaught against the freedom-loving Greeks, who because of their society’s
values and virtues, were able to defeat them. This is the stereotypical view, one that is
indebted to the modern recasting of that historical sequence as it is to the Greek tradition
itself. Herodotus wrote roughly two generations after the invasion and his first six books build
towards the cataclysmic confrontation. His account is suffused with cautionary tales of hubris
and imperial overreach.
ACTIVITY 12.2
Discuss what Sources 12.2 and 12.3 reveal about the lack and bias of the sources for this period.

Herodotus’ Histories
Historians rely chiefly on Herodotus’ Histories or Researches for information about the conflicts between
the Greeks and the Persians and he is often referred to as the ‘father of history’, but in the ancient world
‘history was the creation of the historian … a mental construct that the historian put in permanent literary
form’.1 Herodotus was a great storyteller whose work was originally meant to be read in public. He has often
been criticised for being gullible: inclined to accept what people believed in ancient religions, mythology
and oracle’s dreams, prophecies, and presented this information without critical analysis.
Herodotus’ background and aims

Herodotus was born in Halicarnassus in Caria (southern Asia Minor) about 484 BC, four years prior to
the Second Persian Invasion of Greece in 480. He travelled extensively, after which he migrated to Athens.
It was during this period that he developed his pro-Athenian attitude and composed his Histories.
He was writing about the history of a war and yet he was no military expert. In fact, he did not have
the most elementary knowledge of warfare and therefore could be misled by his sources and had
difficulty interpreting and evaluating the military information he was given about battles. His figures for
the numbers of men and ships are suspect (usually grossly exaggerated).
His history of the Persian Wars was He is biased in favour of the Greeks.
coloured by the events of his day He openly declares his admiration for
when Athens and Sparta and her Athens and his account of the First
allies were hostile to each other after and Second invasions of Greece is written
464. This may explain his failure largely from the Athenian point of view,
to really give Sparta credit for its part expressing that the Athenians were
in the war, his hostility to King truly the saviours of Greece, even though
Cleomenes of Sparta and to particular he knew that his opinion would be
cities, such as Thebes, Corinth and Aegina. unpopular in some areas.
Limitations of
Herodotus
Much of his material when he settled in Although one of the aims of Herodotus
Athens came from Athenian family was to record the causes of the conflicts
traditions, particularly from the Alcmaeonid between the Greeks and the Persians,
family, whose picture of Themistocles and he does not consider anything other than
his part in the Persian conflicts was less the ambitions, whims or desires of
than favourable. There is a tendency with individuals. He does not delve into
families to glorify their own past. deeper causes.
Although Herodotus tends to the best source for Persian history, since the Persians did not write their
own narrative history, he seems to have misunderstood much about the ideology of the Persian
kingship, about many of their customs, and, like all Greeks who regarded the Persians as 'barbarians',
reflected Greek stereotypes of their kings: hubristic, oppressive, oriental despots who reigned over an
empire where wealth, luxury and harem intrigues had a corrupting influence. However, hidden beneath
the Greek bias, he provides some insightful details, and inadvertently reveals information about Persian
imperialism: 'a limited kind of circumstantial evidence’.
Figure 12.9 The limitations of Herodotus’ Histories

He explains clearly that his aim ‘was to preserve the memory
of the past by putting on record the astonishing achievements
both of our own and other peoples’,2 and he particularly wanted
to show how and why the Greeks and the Persians came into
conflict. He says that ‘my business is to record what people say,
but I am no means bound to believe them –and this may be taken
to apply to this book as a whole’.3 Much of his material came
from oral sources as he collected material from wherever he could,
speaking to people of all kinds: he was informed of Athenian
and Spartan family traditions, appears to have had some Persian
sources and consulted inscribed monuments.
Aeschylus
Apart from Herodotus, the other contemporary source is
Aeschylus’ historical tragedy, Persae (‘The Persians’), first
performed in front of an Athenian audience in 472, only eight
years after the destruction of the Persian forces at the Battle of
Salamis, which is the focus of the play.
• It is believed that Aeschylus may have taken part in the
Battle of Marathon in 490, and was either an eyewitness or
participant in the Battle of Salamis in 480. His account in his
Figure 12.10 Statue of Herodotus
play is the earliest record of that battle.
• However, Aeschylus streamlined his account of the Battle of Salamis for dramatic purposes and, as was
the way with poets, he was expected to teach a moral or religious lesson. In this case, it was that arrogant
pride or hubris is punished severely by the gods.
• To focus on this issue, Aeschylus deliberately omitted certain facts and included information that was
inaccurate.
• Also, to make it more tragic he wrote it from the Persian perspective.
Other useful sources for this period

Although Thucydides wrote his History of the Peloponnesian War towards the end
epigraphic referring to
of the 5th century, he provides some useful observations of Athens and individuals inscriptions on monuments,
during the Persian War period. There are also useful contemporary epigraphic sources stelae, and stone and clay
such as the Troezin Decree dealing with the evacuation of Athens, commemorative tablets
inscriptions from Marathon, the gold Serpent tripod recording the names of the 31 ostraca (sing. ostracon)
pieces of broken pottery often
Greek cities that contributed to the Battle of Plataea in 479 and the hundreds of
used for writing on
ostraca that record the names of those exiled from Athens.
ACTIVITY 12.3
Assess the reliability of each of the following as a source of information for an understanding of the
Persian conflicts with Greece:
• Herodotus’ Histories
• Aeschylus’ Persae.

12.2 The Persian wars
The nature of Persian imperialism
It seems appropriate to look at some aspects of Persian imperialism before starting to analyse the various
conflicts between the Greeks and Persians.
There were several strands to Persian imperialism:
1 Specifically-targeted revenge that was used as a deterrent and to restore a king’s reputation
2 Desire for expansion to enhance the glory of the king.
Although Herodotus tends to blur these imperialistic features (Bk 7. 5–11), there is some evidence for
the ideology of revenge and punishment in the Persian inscriptions. For example: ‘Who does harm, him
according to the damage, this I punish’4 and ‘In these countries, the man who was loyal, him I treated well;
him who was disloyal, I punished severely’;5 Persians did not just seek revenge for disloyalty to the king
alone, but for disloyalty to the Persian people. However, revenge was targeted and proportional to the crime.
It appears that Persians did not have clear aims for far-flung conquests, but rather an ideology of ‘pride
in conquest for its own sake’.6
… If now you shall think that ‘How many are the countries which King Darius held?’ Look
at the sculptures [of those] who bear the throne, then shall you know, then shall it become
known to you: the spear of a Persian man has gone forth far: then shall it become known to
you: a Persian man has delivered battle far indeed from Persia.
Source 12.4 Inscription at Naqsh-I Rustam, DNa 15–47
When I became king of Persia, I began to wonder how to avoid being left behind by those who
preceded me in this position of honour and how I might increase the Persian empire just as
much as they did.
Source 12.5 Herodotus, Histories, 7.8.2
Another aspect of Persian imperialism was the strategy of gaining select support to win over opposition.
This was the basis of their demands for earth and water.
They also believed that if a king’s general was successful, the credit was given to the king; if he lost,
although it might be a disaster, it didn’t matter as long as the king and household survived.
Keep all of these things in mind when studying the various conflicts on the following pages.
A COMMENT ON…
Tokens of submission
To the Persians, an offer of earth and water by foreign cities or states signified submission to the
king, and if help was requested from the Persians, these tokens had to be offered. It was seen by the
Persians as ‘both a diplomatic agreement, and a solemn oath, and those Greek states that complied
were acknowledging the king’s superiority in return for his protection and patronage. Breaking the bond,
therefore, was an insult, and it required the king to respond’.7

ACTIVITY 12.4
1 Describe the main features of Persian imperialism.

2 What are our best sources for this?
Darius’ first incursion into Europe in 512

In 512, King Darius I, with an army and navy manned by Ionians and other
Greeks from the coast of Asia Minor, crossed the Bosphorus – the narrow
body of water that separates Asia and Europe – via a pontoon bridge. While
his navy sailed from the Black Sea up the Danube River (Ister River) to build
another bridge, he and his army marched overland through Thrace (today’s
Bulgaria, north-eastern Greece and part of European Turkey), subduing all
the tribes along the way. His ultimate aim seems to have been to engage the
Scythians who lived on the far side of the Danube. However, the details of
his campaign are sketchy and there is no clear motivation for Darius’ actions:
perhaps conquest, to show his power in a foreign land or, as Herodotus records,
to wreak vengeance on the Scythians on the far side of the Danube for some
past deed. Although he crossed the river and moved deep into Scythian territory,
he was unable to deal with the Scythian style of fighting and their refusal to
engage in direct military contact. Eventually he withdrew. Herodotus claims
that the expedition was a failure, but for any ‘Greeks paying attention, Persian
expansion in the northern Aegean must have created some unease’.8
While Darius returned to Asia, he left his general Magabazus with an army:
• to subdue Thrace, subjugate its peoples and establish forts and supply depots Figure 12.11 Relief of King
Darius of Persia
• that sent envoys to Macedonia, where they received earth and water as
tokens of submission, making Macedonia a vassal of Persia.
The Ionian Revolt 499–493

Between 499 and 493 the Ionian Greeks along the coast of Asia Minor revolted against Persian control,
causing Darius to invade Greece in 490. Of course, it is possible that Darius’ imperial ambitions, like those
of his predecessors, would have eventually led him to make a move on Greece, but the Ionian Revolt made
this a certainty.
Causes
Underlying causes
These have already been touched on. The Ionian Greeks:
• had lost their independence to decide their own lifestyle, something that was precious to all Greeks
• were subjects of an oriental ‘barbarian’ king to whom they paid a heavy tribute, most of which was not
returned into local circulation
• were ruled by Greek tyrants who were puppets of the Great King and who held their position through
the support of the local satrap or provincial governor to whom they were responsible; tyranny, which
had once been a common form of government in Greece, was no longer acceptable to the Greeks
• had their trade restricted by the Persian takeover of Thrace, the Bosphorus and Dardanelles.
Herodotus maintains that the Ionians had long been contemplating a revolt, but lacked leadership
and unity.

Direct cause
A particular incident instigated by Miletus, one of the wealthiest cities along the coast, sparked the revolt,
or series of revolts, but in his usual fashion, Herodotus lays the blame ultimately at the feet of one man.
According to Herodotus:
• Histiaeus, tyrant of Miletus and a successful commander under Darius, was summoned to the Persian
capital of Susa and detained there indefinitely by the king, who suspected his ambitions.
• He left his son-in-law, Aristagoras, to rule Miletus in his absence.
• When a group of exiles from Miletus’ commercial rival, the island of Naxos, asked Aristagoras to help
them recover their position, he saw an opportunity to make himself governor of Naxos.
• Needing help with his plan, he proposed to the Persian satrap, Artaphernes (the half-brother of Darius)
that if he helped in returning the Naxian exiles, Persia might gain control of Naxos and the other islands
of the Cyclades. The King could then use these islands as stepping stones to extend his empire across
the Aegean. Artaphernes submitted the plan to Darius and gained his consent.
• The Naxians got word of the attack and prepared for a long siege. After four months, the costly expedition
had failed to gain anything and was called off. Aristagoras, fearful of Artaphernes’ reaction at his failure
to keep his promise, was in a dilemma as to what to do.
• According to Herodotus, ‘these various causes of alarm were already making Aristagoras contemplate
rebellion’9 when Histiaeus sent a message to him, tattooed into the head of a slave, urging him to revolt.
Histiaeus hoped that Darius would send him back down to the coast to restore order.
• Aristagoras renounced his own tyranny and urged other Greek leaders to do the same. However,
Aristagoras needed support from mainland Greece.
• He went first to Sparta and tried everything, including bribery, to gain the support of King Cleomenes,
but according to Herodotus, the king sent Aristagoras away on the advice of his daughter, before
Cleomenes could be corrupted.
• Aristagoras had more success in Eretria and Athens.
• Eretria agreed to send five ships as repayment of a debt. In a previous war with their neighbour, Chalcis,
Miletus had sent help.
• Athens agreed to contribute 20 ships because:
– it was already on bad terms with Persia; their ex-tyrant Hippias, residing at the court of the satrap
Artaphernes, was moving heaven and earth ‘to procure the subjection of Athens to himself and Darius’10
– there was a close link between Athens and Ionia: ‘Miletus had been founded by Athenian settlers so
it was only natural that the Athenians, powerful as they were, would help her in her need’11
– the new democracy of Athens was opposed to tyranny
– the Greeks generally were becoming alarmed at Darius’ movements into Europe (Thrace).
The course of the war

Herodotus commented on the significance of the decision by Athens and Eretria to help the Ionians in
the following way: ‘The sailing of this fleet was the beginning of trouble not only for Greece but for other
peoples’.12
The Athenians and Eretrians sailed across the Aegean, landed at Ephesus, were joined by Ionian troops
and marched inland. They took Sardis – the capital of the province – and in the attack set fire to several
thatched houses. The fires spread rapidly until the whole lower town, including the temple of the goddess
Cybele, was destroyed. The Ionians, Athenians and Eretrians withdrew to the coast pursued by the Persians
and were forced into battle near Ephesus, where they lost many men. The mainland Greeks sailed home
and took no more part in the revolt. However, despite their limited participation, they were to suffer at the
hands of the Persians in the years to come.

Figure 12.12 Map showing the main events of the Ionian Revolt against Persia
Between 499 and 493, revolt spread up and down the coast, even as far as the large island of Cyprus.
The Ionians had 353 ships, including some from the powerful islands in the Aegean such as Samos (49)
and Lesbos (70). The rebels took control of the Hellespont, the vital sea route for shipping between the
Black Sea and the Aegean
Despite their initial spectacular results, the revolt began to fall apart due to:
• sustained Persian opposition and resources
• the lack of unity and discipline on the part of the Ionians
• the desertion of Aristagoras, who fled to Thrace
• ultimately, the withdrawal by Samos and Lesbos.
By 494, only six cities on the coast fought on and the revolt came to an end following the Battle of Lade
off the coast of Miletus.

Results and their significance
The great city of Miletus was totally destroyed, its temple burned and plundered, and its inhabitants killed
or taken into captivity to Susa. It ceased to be a force in history and its economic supremacy passed to the
mainland of Greece.
The Persians invaded Miletus by land and sea. They dug saps under the wall, brought up rams
of all kinds, and five years after the revolt of Aristagoras, overwhelmed it. So, Miletus was
reduced to slavery … most of the men were killed by the Persians, the women and children
made slaves, and the temple at Didyma, both shrine and oracle, was plundered and burnt: the
men of the city whose lives were spared were sent as prisoners to Susa; Darius did them no
harm, and settled them on the Persian Gulf, near the mouth of the Tigris.
Source 12.6 Herodotus, Histories, 6.16
Generally, the Persians treated the Ionians

with tolerance but they were still under Persian
control. Miltiades, a Greek tyrant of Athenian
background, fled to Athens during the revolt
where his vast knowledge of the customs of the
Persians and their military tactics were put to
great use several years later.
Darius was determined to punish Athens
and Eretria for their assistance in the revolt
and, according to Herodotus, he prayed: ‘Grant
O gods that I may punish the Athenians’ and
had one of his servants repeat three times
whenever he sat down to dinner ‘Master
remember the Athenians’.13
Figure 12.13 The remains of the stoa at the harbour of Miletus The Ionian Revolt was the first round in
the struggle between Greece and Persia.
ACTIVITY 12.5
1 Explain what is meant by the statement ‘for any Greeks paying attention, Persian expansion in the
northern Aegean must have created some unease’.
2 Give two reasons why the Greeks of Ionia in Asia Minor were discontented with Persian rule.
3 Why did Athens and Eretria send help to them?
4 Discuss the repercussions of the rebellion for:
• Miletus
• the rest of the rebellious cities.
5 Explain what is meant by Herodotus’ statement: ‘The Athenian and Eretrian show of friendship and
support for the Greeks of Asia Minor was the beginning of trouble, not only for Greece but for other
peoples.’
6 Analyse how the Persian response to the rebellion reflected the features of Persian imperialism
described on p. 431.

Figure 12.14 The routes of the Persian expedition under Mardonius in 492 and the Persian invasions of Greece in 490 and 480–479
The expedition of Mardonius 492 BC

Darius set in motion a joint military and naval expedition against Greece under the command of his
son-in-law, Mardonius.
According to Herodotus, his aim was to march through Europe with Eretria and Athens as his main
objective, but with instructions to regain control of the areas in the northern Aegean, lost during the revolt,
and to subjugate as many towns as he could on the way. Matt Waters maintains that Herodotus’ claim that
Athens and Eretria were Mardonius’ main targets ‘is suspect’ and that ‘this campaign, should probably be
viewed only as the reassertion of Persian power in Thrace and Macedonia’.14
Mardonius had ordered the Ionians to contribute ships to ferry the troops across the Hellespont and to
accompany the army along the coast. Thrace and Macedonia submitted without resistance and the large
island of Thasos, just off the coast, also came under Persian control. However, the forces suffered several
disasters.
A violent storm drove the fleet onto the rocky promontory of Athos with much loss of life: some being
taken by ‘monsters’ and others dying from exposure. This was followed by an attack on the army by a
Thracian tribe during which Mardonius was wounded.

From Thasos the fleet … proceeded along the coast to Acanthus, and from there attempted to double
Athos; but before they were around this promontory, they were caught by a violent northerly gale,
which proved too much for the ships to cope with. A great many were driven ashore and wrecked on
Athos – indeed, report says that something like 300 were lost with over 20 000 men.
Source 12.7 Herodotus, Histories, Bk VI. 44
While the expedition was aborted, Herodotus probably exaggerated the disastrous nature of the
campaign. It was hardly the failure he suggested. Persian prestige did not suffer, nor did it deter Darius.
Preparations were immediately put into effect for a new attempt at revenge and conquest.
The first invasion of Greece and the Battle of Marathon 490 BC

A sequel to Mardonius’ expedition was already underway that involved a planned direct naval strike from
Samos, via the islands of the Aegean, to Eretria and Athens.
1 Darius tested the attitude of the Greeks to find out whether they would resist him or surrender. He sent
heralds to the various Greek states to demand earth and water for the King …15 Most of the islands of
the Aegean, as well as the island of Aegina, a long-time commercial rival of Athens and just off its coast,
indicated their submission. Although Athens and Sparta refused, the submission of Aegina presented a
particular threat to the Athenians, who took some of their leading citizens as hostages to prevent Aegina
from helping the Persians.
2 The Persian king then sent orders to the Asiatic coastal towns that were already tributary to him for
the provision of ships (200) to carry the invasion force plus its cavalry. The force would not have been
much more than 25 000.
3 Darius relieved Mardonius of his command and appointed an experienced general, Datis, and his
nephew, Artaphernes, to lead the invasion.
Although Herodotus says that ‘their orders were to reduce Athens and Eretria to slavery, and bring
the slaves before the king’, it is highly unlikely that Darius would have wanted to totally destroy Athens.
Also, the ex-tyrant of Athens, Hippias, accompanying the Persians on their invasion, was apparently to be
installed as a puppet ruler.
The situation in Greece
medism the imitation of, sympathising

The Greeks, particularly Athens and Eretria,
with, collaboration with or siding with
had no joint plan for the imminent invasion.
Persians in Ancient Greece
There had been substantial medism.

The Peloponnesian states were
Most worrying for Athens was
The situation in reluctant to join a united defence of
submission of their commercial enemy,
Greece Greece, believing it was the
the island of Aegina, just off the coast
responsibility of Athens and Eretria.
of Attica (the territory of Athens).
Within Athens was considerable political rivalry, which meant that a united defence
of Athens against future attack by the Persians would be extremely difficult. Athenian democracy
was in its infancy and political events still reflected the rivalries between prominent men and
families. There were those who were prepared to deal with the Persians. For example, Hippias had
supporters who would welcome him back and possibly open the gates of the city to the Persians.
Figure 12.15 Diagram of the situation in Greece

The route through the Aegean islands and attack on Eretria
The Persian fleet sailed from Samos to Naxos, which it took and plundered, then moved on to Delos
(sacred to Apollo and Artemis) where the Persians made offerings to the gods and ‘repatriated a statue of
Apollo’.16 They moved on to the large island of Euboea, ravaged the lands of the city of Carystus (Karystos)
and then moved on to Eretria.
The Eretrians had no intention of leaving their defences to meet the coming attack in the
open; their one concern was to defend their walls … The assault soon came and for six days,
fighting continued with many killed on both sides; then on the seventh, two well-known
Eretrians … betrayed the town … The Persians entered, and … stripped the temples bare and
burnt them in revenge for the burnt temples of Sardis, and carried off all the inhabitants as
prisoners. Having mastered Eretria, the Persians waited a few days and then sailed to Attica
flushed with victory and confident that they would treat Athens the same way.
Source 12.8 Herodotus, Histories, Bk 6. 101
Athens in peril
Hippias guided the Persians across the Straits of Euboea to the Bay of Marathon
about 40 kilometres on the coast north-east of Athens. He knew that:
• it provided good anchorage for their ships behind the ‘Dog’s Tail’ promontory,
was close to their base of supplies in Euboea and had suitable areas to graze
their horses on the edge of the marsh in the north
• it would enable them to take Athens by surprise and also give his supporters
in Athens time to organise themselves
• if the Athenians chose to fight at Marathon, there would be room for the
Persian cavalry to manoeuvre.
The Athenians argued over whether to stay in the city and defend the walls or
march out and meet the enemy. Miltiades, who was one of the 10 tribal generals
(strategoi) elected in 490, urged the Athenians to choose the latter for he feared
his enemies might open the gates of the city to the Persians. He also knew the Figure 12.16 A bust of
Miltiades
enemy’s skill at siege warfare. Eventually, Miltiades’ view prevailed.
Before marching out, they sent word to the Spartans who, when informed of Athens’ peril, replied that
they were unable to come to help defend Greece as they were celebrating the Karneian Festival of Apollo.
(See the comment box.) There were approximately 10 000 Athenians and a force of 600–1000 from Plataea,
north of Athens, to face the Persian troops.
A COMMENT ON…
The Spartan reaction to Athens’ call for help

The Spartans took their religion very seriously and obeyed the gods strictly. There were at least nine
festivals on the Spartan calendar that brought the community together, defined the Spartan identity
and reinforced the values of Spartan society. The Karneian was one of the three most important,
beginning at the first new moon after the mid-summer solstice and culminating at the full moon. The
week leading up to the full moon was the most sacred part of this sacred month. It was a month in
which the Spartans did not engage in warfare, and their religious principles were sincere. They could not
leave Sparta until the moon was full.

Prior to and during the battle
‘There are no Persian sources to offer insight
on the Battle of Marathon, so Persian goals and
perspective must be extrapolated from the Greek
accounts’.17
The Greek troops, weak in cavalry but strong
in heavily-armed infantry (hoplites) on arriving
at Marathon, took up a safe defensive position in
the foothills of Mt Pentelicus where they could
wait, perhaps for the Spartans to arrive, or for the
Persians to attack. Their site was well watered
and protected by an area of scattered trees that
would provide obstacles for an attack by the
enemy cavalry; and, if necessary, trees could be
cut down to further impede the horses. From this
Figure 12.17 The plain of Marathon today position they could cover both the coastal road
and hill path to Athens, gain reinforcements or
retire quickly if necessary.
The bulk of the Persian forces left their camp
and took up a position within 1.5 kilometres of
the Greeks. For several days both armies waited.
Perhaps Datis’ aim was to keep the Greek army
where it was while he embarked some troops
including the cavalry and moved against an
undefended Athens. Or he may have been waiting
for Hippias’ friends to signal that the time was
right to swoop on Athens.
The Athenians were divided on how to
proceed. Five of the generals, including Miltiades,
were for giving immediate battle. The other five
preferred to wait because their numbers were
too small. According to Herodotus, Miltiades
Figure 12.18 The deployment of troops appealed to Callimachus, the polemarch, to vote
for fighting, with the words: ‘It is now in your
hands Callimachus either to enslave Athens, or to make her free.’18 Callimachus was
hoplite a heavily armed
finally convinced to vote Miltiades’ way.
infantry soldier
Herodotus does not mention the Persian cavalry taking part in the battle that
polemarch magistrate in
charge of military matters; followed, but a Byzantine source (the Suda) recorded that on the day of Miltiades’
commander-in-chief command (the 10 generals supposedly took it in turns to be in command), the Ionians
came up to the trees and indicated to Miltiades that the cavalry was away. Perhaps
the Persians were already embarking some of their troops for an attack on Athens by sea, or the horses
might have been grazing in the northern part of the plain. Whatever the case, Miltiades understood their
message and ordered the attack.
According to Herodotus’ account of the Battle of Marathon in Bk VI. 106–16, Miltiades used
unconventional tactics both before and during the battle.
1 At dawn, the Greeks ‘charged at a run’19 towards the surprised Persians. Miltiades’ aim was to get so
close that the Persian archers were ineffective.

2 H e also realised that the usual
eight-deep phalanx of the Greeks
would be out-flanked by the more
numerous Persians. He weakened
his centre and strengthened his
wings, hoping they would converge
on his centre.
3 The ‘elite’ Persians broke through
the centre but were surrounded by
the Greek wings.
While the Greek casualties were
light (192), it is believed that 6400
Persians died. Many Persians fled to
the north-east where they were cut Figure 12.19 A reconstruction of beached Persian ships at Marathon
down in the narrow area between the
sea and the marsh. Others fled towards the sea and were taken aboard the waiting phalanx a massed body of
ships, of which the Greeks captured seven. The Persians collected the Eretrian heavily armed infantry
prisoners and sailed for Athens.
The Athenian generals, realising the danger to Athens from Hippias’ friends and a possible landing
of Persian troops, left Aristides and his regiment to guard the prisoners and spoil and rushed back the 26
miles (the origin of the modern marathon) to defend the city. They were just in time to prevent the Persians
making a landing at Phalerum (Phaleron) – the port of Athens at the time and within sight of Athens.
Having missed the opportunity to punish Athens, the Persians sailed for Asia, and Athens was saved from
the fate of Eretria.
After the full moon, two thousand Spartans set off for Athens [220 kilometres]. They were so
anxious not to be late that they were in Attica on the third day after leaving Sparta. They had,
of course, missed the battle; but such was their passion to see the Persians, that they went to
Marathon to look at the bodies. That done, they complimented the Athenians on their good
work, and returned home.
Source 12.9 Herodotus, Histories, 6.123
The Athenian and Plataean dead were cremated and their ashes buried under a epigram a short poem or
mound (soros), originally 12 metres high. Inscribed marble slabs were placed on the pithy saying
mound commemorating those who fell. One epigram dedicated to the Athenians
read: Fighting at the forefront of the Greeks, the Athenians at Marathon laid low the army of the gilded Medes.
When the mound was first excavated in 1890, a flat pavement was found covered in bones and ashes,
as well as a pit for sacrificial animals and a large number of funerary vessels. Today the mound is still nine
metres high.
Reasons for the Athenian and Plataean victory at Marathon

The following are some of the suggested reasons for Greek victory.
• The political leadership of Callimachus and Miltiades in convincing the Athenian Assembly that they
should send an army to Marathon prevented Miltiades’ enemies and Hippias’ friends from giving aid
to the Persians.

• Callimachus, as elected commander-in-
chief, listened to the advice of Miltiades who
had firsthand knowledge and experience of
Persian methods of fighting and arms.
• Marathon proved suitable for the Athenians,
as its strategic position – on the heights
commanding both roads to Athens – allowed
them to wait in safety until the right moment
to attack.
• Miltiades grasped the right time to engage
the Persians, when he was informed that the
Persian cavalry was absent. The fact that
the expert Persian cavalry took no part in the Figure 12.20 The mound of Marathon today
battle was one of the significant reasons for
the Greek victory.
• Miltiades knew the Persians would position their best troops in the centre, and the disposition of his
infantry allowed the wings to encircle the stronger Persian centre. The charge (on the run) of the Greek
hoplites created surprise and confusion among the Persians, as well as allowing the Greeks to get close
to the Persian bowmen before the latter could release their barrage of arrows.
• The Persians were confined between the sea and the hills and their only chances of escape were to flee
to the north where many perished on the edge of the great marsh, or to reach their ships, which were
positioned offshore.
• Although only citizen soldiers, the Greek hoplites were far more disciplined than their Persian
counterparts.
• The Greeks were better protected with their bronze-visor helmets, breastplates, greaves (protection
of lower legs), bronze shields and javelins. The Persians were generally lightly clad, with wicker
shields and bows and arrows, although sometimes they had body armour of scales sewn onto leather
vests.
• The Greeks, defending their homeland, were more motivated and the Athenians proved more solid and
united than Hippias’ friends had hoped.
• Fear of Sparta’s arrival is a factor often overlooked, according to J. Burn in Persia and the Greeks. The
possibility of the Spartans marching to Marathon had a real influence on the campaign by forcing the
Persians to hurry their operations.
Significance of Marathon
Significance for the Greeks
• The moral victory for Athens was far greater than the military victory. They believed the gods had been
with them and would continue to help them in any future confrontation. For many of them Marathon
was a victory for democracy and this led to further democratic changes.
• Athens gained in prestige; it was the beginning of its emergence as the leading state in Greece, although
it was forced to accept Spartan military and naval leadership until 479.
• The Greeks no longer believed that the Persians were unbeatable and they would be more inclined to
join a common cause if the Persians attacked again. By their examination of the battlefield, the Spartans
had learnt something of the conditions under which the Persians could be defeated.
• However, their ‘belief that Persian superior power was not invincible created a false idea of the enemy
…’,20 and in their optimism, the Greeks underestimated the future danger to them and continued their
quarrelling. They made no plans to defend themselves despite adequate warnings of Persian activities.

The exception to this was the Athenian statesman, Themistocles, who Plutarch says believed that
Marathon ‘was only the prelude to a far greater struggle’.21
• Marathon almost immediately acquired a mystique, and the image of the ‘men of Marathon’ took on
heroic proportions.
For the Persians it was a minor set-back at the end of an otherwise successful campaign
Conversely, it is hard to overstate the importance that this battle had for the Athenian
mindset and civic pride.
Significance for the Persians

• For the Persians, their defeat at Marathon was not a great
disaster. In the context of the power of their empire, it
was probably seen as no more than an irritating trivial
skirmish.
• However, Darius was more determined than ever on
revenge against Athens.
• The Persians had learnt a great deal about the Greeks
and realised the mistake in their strategy. In any future
invasion they would return to the plan of Mardonius’
aborted campaign in 492; that is, a combined military
and naval advance around the northern Aegean. Figure 12.21 A Corinthian-type bronze helmet
They believed that far greater forces and more careful inscribed with the words, ‘Miltiades dedicated me’. It
was probably worn at the Battle of Marathon.
preparations would be needed next time.
ACTIVITY 12.6
1 Describe the problems facing the Greeks, particularly Athens, on the eve of the first invasion in 490.
2 Who led Persia’s attack on Greece? Who accompanied the Persians? Why?
3 Describe the fate of Eretria.
4 Explain why the Spartans could not send help to Athens for the defence of Greece.
5 Justify why Marathon was chosen as the landing place in Greece for the Persians in 490 BC.
6 Explain how Miltiades contributed to the Greek victory at Marathon.
7 Suggest reasons why the Persians did not use their cavalry during the Battle of Marathon.
8 Identify the most significant result of Marathon for the Athenians.
9 Analyse, according to Source 12.10, the difference in attitude of the Persian and Greeks to the
result of the Battle of Marathon.
10 Summarise the lessons the Persians learned from this first invasion of Greece.
The interwar period: developments and preparations in Greece and Persia

Ten years elapsed before Persia made another attempt to invade Greece because:
1 Darius died in 486, and his son, Xerxes, was preoccupied with rebellions in his empire.
2 The preparations, already begun by Darius, for a joint military and naval assault on Greece were massive.

The Greeks during the interwar period
Athens during this period was:
• faced with intense power struggles for leadership
• engaged in a war with her commercial rival, Aegina
• involved in building a navy under the influence of Themistocles.
Power struggles and ostracisms

In the decade after Marathon, the struggle between members of the leading Athenian families to influence
the Assembly continued, but new leaders like Themistocles and Aristides, without powerful connections,
came to dominate the political scene. Themistocles was ‘seized with the desire to
ostracism the temporary win the leading place in the state, and so he accepted without hesitation the hostility
banishment for ten years of
any powerful citizen who
of those who were already established at the head of affairs’.22 This power struggle
threatened the stability of was reflected in the number of cases of ostracism carried out between 488 and 482.
the state Ostracism became an integral part of the political campaigns waged by Themistocles
and his opponents.
A COMMENT ON…
The nature and use of ostracism in the interwar period

• During the 6th month of the year, the people of Athens were asked in their assembly if they wanted
an ostracism to be held.
• A quorum of 6000 citizens had to be present for an ostracism to be valid.
• The votes for an individual to be ostracised were scratched on a piece of broken pottery (ostracon).
• The person voted to be exiled had to leave Athens for 10 years but his property and family were
untouched.
• Numerous ostraca were found scratched with the name of Themistocles, dated to the period
488–482. One hundred and ninety-one ostraca bearing his name were found in a disused well. The
similarity of material, spelling and writing indicates that they may have been prepared beforehand
and distributed to his enemies’ supporters.
• The fact that he was not exiled during this period is evidence of his ability to organise supporters to
concentrate their votes against first one member, then another of the leading families.
War between Athens and Aegina

The hostility between Athens and Aegina
continued, and when Athens supported a proposed
rebellion in Aegina, war broke out. While Aegina
had the most powerful navy in Greece, Athens
was forced to borrow 20 warships from Corinth
and the war continued for years. It was this
conflict that accelerated the transformation of
Athens into a naval power under Themistocles.
As Herodotus comments, ‘the outbreak of this war
at that moment saved Greece by forcing Athens
to become a maritime power’.23 Figure 12.22 An ostracon from 487 BC

Themistocles and the Athenian navy
• Although Themistocles had no political backing from any faction, he
was elected in 493 as archon (the highest office in Athens). Plutarch
says he was an astute politician who gained the support of the ordinary
people and ‘was always introducing sweeping reforms’.24
• He had a vision for Athens, which was to unite the city to the sea and
make Athens into a great naval power. Before Marathon he had already
begun to establish a naval base and commercial harbour at Piraeus,
8 kilometres from Athens, by fortifying its rocky bays to replace the
unprotected beaches of Phalerum. His project was interrupted by the
first Persian invasion.
• He served at Marathon and realised that, despite Athens’ victory, the
danger from Persia was not past. He believed that when the Persians
came in greater force, the only way to defeat them would be to cut off Figure 12.23 The Athenian
their supply lines by defeating them at sea. statesman Themistocles
• After 490, Themistocles completed the fortification of Piraeus and set
about developing a powerful navy. To achieve this, he had to:
– convince the people of the need to build 100 triremes (warships)
– overcome the opposition of the conservative landholding class who provided thetes in Ancient Greece,
the hoplites for the army. They were led by Aristides, who was afraid of the these were the lowest social
influence a navy would give to the lower class of thetes from whom the rowers class of citizens
for the ships would come
– find the finances for building the hulls. Once the ships were built, it would be up to individuals from
the wealthy classes to provide funds to equip, maintain and often command a warship.
• When a new vein of silver was discovered at Laurium near Athens, Themistocles saw this as a way to
fund a fleet, but Aristides proposed that the surplus from the mines should be shared out among the
people at a rate of 10 drachmas a man. However, by very clever use of propaganda, Themistocles was
able to convince the people to ostracise Aristides in 483–482 and to agree to build the 100 triremes, by
playing on the people’s anger against the Aeginetans.
• The navy, which ultimately was not used against Aegina, was at the disposal of Greece by the time
the Persians next invaded Greece in 480. Athens now had a navy manned by thousands of peasants
and agricultural labourers whom
Themistocles had turned into
efficient rowers.
The Hellenic League

In 481 and 480, Athens and Sparta
called congresses at the Isthmus of
Corinth to decide the best way to
defend Greece. Thirty-one states
responded and formed the Hellenic
League. Those from the northern
states did not join as they knew they
would bear the brunt of the initial
Persian attack and wanted to make
sure first that the other states would
march north. Figure 12.24 A marble plaque of a trireme

Adopt a strategy, devised by Themistocles,
of choosing terrain, such as mountain
passes and restricted waterways,
to counter the enormous numbers of
Persian troops and ships
Put aside all feuds and disputes, Send spies to Asia to assess
such as that between Athens Xerxes' strength and
and Aegina preparations
Dispatch envoys to other cities

to request help (although those Decisions made by Seek advice from the oracle
approached could or would the Hellenic League at Delphi
not help)
(Delegates agreed to:)

Tithe any state that 'Medised'
Send an advance force of or went over to the Persians.
10 000 to the Vale of Tempe That meant confiscating its
in Thessaly wealth and giving a tenth to
the god Apollo at Delphi
Appoint Sparta to overall military and naval

command. King Leonidas was chosen as
military commander and Eurybiades as
admiral. Although Athens now had a large
navy, the other Greek states would not
accept its naval leadership. The Athenians
yielded to this for the greater good.
Figure 12.25 Decisions made by the Hellenic League
A COMMENT ON…
Why ‘Medise’ and not ‘Persianise’?

• The expression ‘to Medise’, referring to those who went over to the Persians, and used throughout
Herodotus, is rather strange.
• Scholars have not really come up with a reason for the adoption of this term, although there are a
number of suggestions:
– That the Greeks did not ‘differentiate between the culturally and linguistically related Medes and
Persians’.25
– That when Cyrus captured Lydia, he left two Median generals to organise Asia Minor and deal
with the Greeks along the coast, leading to the Ionians believing that it was the Medes who
conquered them.
Advice from the Delphic Oracle

Review the information on the Delphic Oracle on p. 426.
When Sparta and Athens consulted the oracle, they both received depressing prophecies, described in
Herodotus in Bk VII. 220 and 140–3. The Spartans were told that their city would be sacked or a Spartan
king would be killed. The original prophecy to Athens told them to ‘fly to the world’s end, leaving home

and height, … ‘all is ruined, for fire and the headlong God of War, speeding in a Syrian chariot, will bring
you low’,26 and the city totally destroyed. Were the priests of Apollo being cunning here, already believing
that the Persians would win in any contest with the Greeks?
However, the Athenian theopropoi or oracle-seekers would not return home until they received a second,
less menacing prophecy.
… Zeus the all-seeing grants to Athene’s prayer

That the wooden wall only shall not fall,
but help you and your children.
But await not the host of horse and foot coming from Asia,
Nor be still, but turn your back and withdraw from the foe.
Truly a day will come when you will meet him face to face.
Divine Salamis, you will bring death to women’s sons
When the corn is scattered, or the harvest gathered in.
Figure 12.26 A depiction of the Pythia

Source 12.11 Herodotus, Histories, Bk 7.140
making a prophecy on a Greek vase
This prophecy created an intense debate in the Athenian assembly. Some believed the ‘wooden walls’
referred to the walls around the Acropolis, but Themistocles argued that the ‘wooden walls’ referred to their
ships and that they should make a stand against the Persians at sea near the island of Salamis. He was able
to get his view accepted. Children, women and old men were to be evacuated if the Persians succeeded in
breaking through central Greece.
At the same time, the Athenians buried their internal enmities and recalled all ostracised men of ability
from exile, including Aristides and Xanthippus, so that Athens could face Persia in unity.
Persian motives, plans and preparations

Xerxes continued with the preparations begun by his father Darius. His motivation, according to Herodotus,
was deduced from the council meeting between Xerxes, Mardonius and Artabanes in 7.3–13. His motives
appear to have been:
1 revenge against Athens. ‘My intent is to throw a bridge over the Hellespont and march an army
through Europe against Greece and thereby I may obtain vengeance from the Athenians for the wrongs
committed against the Persians and against my father’.27
2 the need to surpass his predecessors in adding both territory and resources to
the empire and thereby gaining glory. ‘We shall so extend the empire of Persia
that its boundaries will be God’s own sky, so the sun will not look down upon
any land beyond the boundaries of what is ours’.28
You know well enough the famous deeds of Cyrus, Cambyses, and my
father Darius, and their additions to our empire. Now I myself, ever
since my accession, have been thinking how not to fall short of the
kings who have sat upon this throne before me, and how to add as
much power as they did to the Persian Empire. And now, at last, I have
found a way to win for Persia not glory only but a country as large as
our own … and at the same time to get satisfaction and revenge.
Source 12.12 Herodotus, Histories, 7.82 Figure 12.27 King Xerxes

The Persians had already decided to revert to the route taken in 492, and Xerxes was encouraged in
his plans by the arrival of envoys from the ruling family of Thessaly, the Aleuadae, offering the Persians
assistance if they invaded.
However, the massive physical preparations between the Hellespont and Mount Athos had to be
completed and Xerxes had to raise an army and navy.
Table 12.3 Persian preparations
Type Description and comments Reference

Bridging the This was the greatest of Xerxes’ engineering feats. There were two Hdt. 7.30–36
Hellespont floating bridges, in two places, constructed across the Hellespont
from Asia to Europe. These were approximately 1.4 kilometres long,
one made by the Phoenicians with flax cables and another by the
Egyptians using papyrus cables. After a violent storm smashed the
bridges and carried them away, two more had to be built.
Establishing Carefully selected sites along the coast of Thrace and Macedonia Hdt 7.23
supply depots were used as provision ‘dumps’ for enormous quantities of grain and
salt meat. These were not only meant to feed the army and animals
in transit, but to draw on, as the army moved further and further
into hostile country. Some of these already existed from previous
campaigns.
Bridging the The great Strymon River was bridged near its mouth, a task Xerxes Hdt. 7.23
Strymon River entrusted to the Phoenicians and Egyptians.
Digging a canal This was undertaken in view of the previous disaster to the fleet off Hdt. 7.23
through Mt Mt Athos and preparations had been underway for the previous three
Athos years. The canal through the rocky promontory was 4 kilometres long
and was dug by men from the various nations who were sent over in
shifts and put to work under the lash.
Herodotus believed it was not really necessary and that it was
mere ostentation that made Xerxes build it, as he wanted to leave
something by which to be remembered.
Recruiting an Xerxes, in the process of assembling his armies, had every corner of Hdt. 7.18–23,
army and navy the continent ransacked. This continued for four years, and there was 41–42, 54–98
not a nation in Asia that he did not take with him against the Greeks.
The coastal provinces provided horse transports, crews, warships,
boats for floating bridges and other naval craft.
Herodotus, in his usual manner, exaggerated the numbers. He
believed that the forces were in the vicinity of 3 million, but modern
estimates range from 50 000–200 000, 75 000 animals, and 500–800
warships, plus horse transports, supply ships and boats to act as
floating bridges.
Unlike Darius, Xerxes led the forces himself and the Persians, Medes
and Cissians made up the core of the infantry, of which 10 000 were
the famous Persian Immortals, referred to as such because their
number was always maintained at 10 000.
The royal family and court nobles featured in the expedition, with five
of Xerxes’ own sons among the 30 generals.

Figure 12.28 The nations of the Persian Empire from which Xerxes recruited his army and navy
The size of the army and navy, and the fact that Xerxes himself accompanied the invasion force, indicates
how important it was for him not only to defeat the Greeks, but to prove that he was the equal of Cyrus,
Cambyses and Darius.
When the army reached Sardis, on the way to the Hellespont, ‘Xerxes first act was to send representatives
to every place in Greece except Athens and Sparta with a demand for earth and water and a further order
to prepare entertainment for him against his coming’.29
The passage of this massive army was so memorable that Herodotus provides endless details of the
order and magnificence of the march, and the outfits and weaponry of the national contingents. However,
throughout, he describes omens of doom for the expedition and stresses the King’s hubris in ‘violating the
natural order of things’.
A COMMENT ON…
Herodotus’ perspective on the Persian army

It is hard to estimate the effectiveness of the Persian forces from Herodotus’ insistence on the inferiority
and inexperience of the Persian infantry compared to the Greeks (in his description of the second
invasion by Xerxes). There is no doubt that the Persians were confronted by Greek heavily armed hoplites
fighting in tight phalanx formation and that they faced the greatest army (the Spartans) in the known
world. It is also true that the conscripts from all parts of the Persian Empire did not have the armour and
weaponry of the core of the Persian forces or of the Greeks. However, we must remember Herodotus’ bias
and Greek stereotypes of the Persians, as well as the fact that had the Persian army not been effective it
could not have conquered and retained such a large empire for so long.

ACTIVITY 12.7
1 Define ostracism and explain how it was used in Athens in the decade between the Persian
invasions of 490–480 BC.
2 Explain how Themistocles’ plans for Athens, and the Athenian conflict with Aegina, were of great
significance for Athens and Greece in the conflict with the Persians in 480.
3 Describe the Hellenic League and its significance.
4 Compare the two prophecies for Athens from the Delphic Oracle.
5 Evaluate how Themistocles used the prophecy to pursue his policy.
6 What does Herodotus reveal about the Persians’ motives for the 480 invasion?
7 Refer to Table 12.3 and Herodotus’ references to draw a detailed mind map of Xerxes’ preparations.
8 Take notes as you read Herodotus’ account of:
• the Persian march from Sardis to the Hellespont (Bk VII. 41–42)
• the crossing of the bridge of boats at the Hellespont (Bk VII. 54)
• the advice given to Xerxes about the Spartans by the ex-Spartan king, Demaratus, who was
travelling with Xerxes (Bk VII. 103–107).
The Persian invasion 480–479 BC

In line with Themistocles’ strategy of choosing restricted terrain and waterways to counter the difference
in numbers between the Greeks and the Persians, the Spartan king, Leonidas, initially led an advance force
of 7000 to 8000 hoplites (300 Spartans, 2000 helots and others from the Peloponnese and central Greece
including 1000 Phocians) north to the Vale of Tempe in Thessaly. However, when the king of Macedonia
warned them that Tempe could be bypassed, Leonidas ordered his troops to retreat further south where
they took up a position at Thermopylae.
The defence of Greece at Thermopylae and Artemisium – 480 BC

At Thermopylae, the road south wound its way through a narrow pass, about 1.5 kilometres long and in
places barely the width of a cart track,
between the mountains and the sea.
Midway along the pass was an ancient
wall that could be used as protection
if rebuilt. Leonidas and his troops
could advance and retire through
this pass, while its narrowness would
restrict the numerically superior
Persian force and the use of its
cavalry. Leonidas hoped to delay
the Persians’ southward march until
reinforcements arrived.
It was believed that the position
could not be reached by any detour,
but when Leonidas arrived he was
informed of a mountain path. He sent
the 1000 Phocians to guard it as they Figure 12.29 The site of Thermopylae today. The present road is where the
knew the country well. original shoreline ran in the 5th century BC.

Figure 12.30 The sites of the battles of Artemisium and Thermopylae
In the meantime, the Greek fleet of 271 triremes under the command of Eurybiades, the Spartan
admiral, and Themistocles, the Athenian commander, chose Artemisium, close to Thermopylae, as its
anchorage. This was ideal as it covered the entrance to the channel between Euboea and the mainland. It
also gave the Greeks a sheltered line of retreat if necessary. The narrows would restrict the larger Persian
navy and the Greeks could stop them making contact with their army. In order to cut the Greeks off, the
Persians would have to circumnavigate Euboea, losing contact with its army.
Figure 12.31 Site and deployment of troops at Thermopylae

The Battle of Thermopylae
When the Persian forces arrived, they made camp, but waited several days before attacking, then for two
days Xerxes sent his infantry unsuccessfully against the Greeks. Finally, he ordered his famed Immortals
under the command of Hydarnes into battle.
… they advanced to the attack in full confidence of bringing the business to a quick and easy
end. But, once engaged, they were no better than the Medes had been; all went as before, the
two armies fighting in a confined space, the Persians using shorter spears than the Greeks,
and having no advantage from their numbers. On the Spartan side it was a memorable fight;
they were men who understood war pitted against an inexperienced enemy, and amongst
the feints they employed was to turn their backs on a body and pretend to be retreating in
confusion, whereupon the enemy would pursue them with a great clatter and roar; but the
Spartans would wheel and face them and inflict in the new struggle innumerable casualties …
At last the Persians, finding that their assaults upon the pass … were all useless, broke off the
engagement and withdrew.
Source 12.13 Herodotus, The Histories, Bk 7. 209–13
Unfortunately for the Greeks, Ephialtes, a local, betrayed the Greeks and guided Hydarnes and the
Immortals across the mountain by night. The Phocians guarding the pass were prepared to fight, but the
Persians moved quickly on.
Leonidas, informed of this attempt to encircle him, sent most of his troops away, keeping only his 300
Spartans, the Thebans (as hostages) and the Thespians who volunteered to remain. Leonidas led his men
out into the wider part of the pass where they fought with great courage, inflicting further heavy losses, but
Leonidas was killed and a battle ensued over his body.
By the time the Immortals arrived, the Greeks had retired to the narrow part of the pass and taken up
a position on a mound. There they were completely surrounded, defending themselves with anything at
hand. The Spartans and Thespians died fighting; the Thebans surrendered.
Xerxes went over the battlefield to see the bodies and having been told that Leonidas was
king of Sparta, and commander of the Spartan forces, ordered his head to be cut off and fixed
on a stake. This in my opinion … that King Xerxes, while Leonidas was still alive, felt fiercer
anger against him than against any other man; had that not been so, he would never have
committed this outrage upon his body; for normally the Persians, more than any other nation
I know of, honour men who distinguish themselves in war.
Source 12.14 Herodotus, the Histories, Bk 7. 238
The dead were buried where they fell, and ‘there is a special Spartan epitaph: Go tell the Spartans, you
who read, We took our orders, and are dead’.30

This is one of the most celebrated battles
in the western tradition, one that became
equated with self-sacrifice and heroism, the
stand of free men against tyranny. It has
been told and retold countless times. And all
retellings are indebted to Herodotus. Some
take more liberties than others and add to an
already weighty legend with the result that
the truth becomes even harder to discern.
The symbolism and significance attached
to the battle make it easy to forget that the
pass was indeed forced. From the Persian
perspective, Thermopylae was a victory. Figure 12.32 An artistic reconstruction of the Spartans’ last
stand at Thermopylae
The naval battle of Artemisium – 480 BC

The Persian fleet, hoping to keep in touch with
the army, had waited near Cape Sepias for the
army to reach Thermopylae. However, a storm
raged for three days and the exposed Persian
fleet suffered great losses, with wreckage
spread along the coast for 80 kilometres. The
Greeks, however, rode out the storm in the lee
of Euboea but left lookouts on the headlands.
The Persian fleet moved to Aphetae and
sent 200 ships south, to round Euboea, but
these were destroyed on the rugged south coast.
The Athenians made two raids on the greatly
diminished Persian fleet, inflicting heavy
losses, but then the Persian naval commanders
received a message from Xerxes to break
Figure 12.33 A bronze statue of the Spartan king, Leonidas
through, as the army was running out of food.
The two fleets faced each other in the straits. The Persian ships crowded and fouled each other and
the Greeks suffered severely. The battle was indecisive and when the Greeks received news of the loss at
Thermopylae, they took the decision to withdraw under cover of night.
Results and significance of Thermopylae and Artemisium

• Despite the Greek loss at Thermopylae, Leonidas and his small force deserve an honoured place among
military heroes, for their rearguard action prevented the Persians overtaking the rest of the retreating
force. Although for a Spartan king there was no other choice of action and Leonidas died according to
Spartan law, his courage and sacrifice was an inspiration to the Greeks and boosted their morale.
• It has been suggested that the Greeks lost approximately 4000 men to the Persians’ 20 000, but these
figures could be exaggerated.
• Themistocles’ plan to hold the Persian fleet at Artemisium played a decisive role in the outcome of the
war. The Persian naval losses were considerable, possibly half the fleet. This meant that they would not be
able to divide their fleet and make raids against the Peloponnesian coastline for the purpose of creating

diversions and seizing strategic points. They could not afford to risk the defeat of the fleet, so were forced
to concentrate at one point only. The Persian fleet took its time sailing south, sacking and burning villages.
• The loss of Thermopylae, the strongest position for defence north of the Isthmus of Corinth, forced
the submission of most of central Greece. Rather than submit, the Thespians and Plataeans fled to
the Peloponnese. Their cities were burnt to the ground. The Spartans could be partly to blame for this
situation as they were too slow to mobilise the Peloponnesian reinforcements for Leonidas. Many of
the Peloponnesian states did not approve of Themistocles’ northern strategy and believed that Greece
should have been defended at the Isthmus from the beginning. They retired to the Isthmus, where they
supposedly built a wall against possible Persian attack, but there is no archaeological evidence for it.
• Themistocles ordered a general evacuation of Athens. It is not known whether the Athenians agreed to this
before Artemisium and put it into effect hurriedly when they realised that the Peloponnesian army had no
intention of confronting the Persians in central Greece, or whether a partial evacuation had already been
carried out before Artemisium. Whatever the case, Themistocles had six days in which to supervise such
a massive population move. Women, children and those unable to fight were transported by the warships
to places of safety such as Aegina, Salamis and Troizen. The Athenian navy then joined the rest of the
Greek fleets off the island of Salamis to await the Persian navy, which eventually appeared off Phalerum.
• The Persian army marched into Attica, set fire to the countryside, and entered an almost empty Athens
– there were a few priests, priestesses and old men taking refuge on the Acropolis. The Persians took the
Acropolis, slaughtered those remaining there, stripped the temple of its treasures and burnt everything.
Xerxes was now the absolute master of Athens.
ACTIVITY 12.8
1 Explain the reason behind the stand made by Leonidas and his small Greek force at the Vale of
Tempe in northern Greece.
2 Analyse the advantages of Thermopylae and Artemisium as defensive positions for the Greeks.
3 Describe the Battle of Thermopylae in your own words.
4 Use Source 12.15 to explain why the Greek loss at Thermopylae was a ‘glorious defeat’. What was the
Persian perspective?
5 Describe the effect of Artemisium on Persian naval strategy.
6 Describe the fate of Athens and explain how this was associated with one of the features of Persian
imperialism.
The Battle of Salamis – 480 BC

Themistocles had argued for a naval stance
at Salamis because he believed:
• the narrow, restricted waterway off
Salamis would favour the smaller
number of Greek ships, which were more
manoeuvrable than the Persian ships
• Salamis, crowded with Athenian
refugees, as well as Aegina and Megara,
would be defended and hopefully saved
• if the Greeks were successful at Salamis,
the Persians would not advance to
attack the Greeks in the Peloponnese. Figure 12.34 The island and Straits of Salamis from the air

Twenty-one Greek states contributed
370 warships under the command
of the Spartan, Eurybiades, for their
next encounter with the Persians in
the Straits of Salamis. Athens was the
largest contributor of ships (180 under
the command of Themistocles), followed
by Corinth (40) and Aegina (30).
A series of war councils were held
to decide whether to keep the fleet at
Salamis to protect Athens or to move it
closer to the army defending the Isthmus
at Corinth. With news of the destruction
of Athens, the Peloponnesians were all
for sailing away towards the Peloponnese
immediately.
Themistocles’ strategem Figure 12.35 The deployment of naval forces on the eve of the Battle of Salamis
1 Because the Greeks f rom the

Peloponnese were in a state of acute
alarm, Themistocles was forced to threaten Eurybiades, the Spartan naval leader, that if they did not
stay and defend at Salamis he would withdraw the Athenian ships from the Greek navy, embark the
Athenians and sail away to Siris in Italy. Whether this is true or not, Eurybiades must have known that
without an Athenian contingent he would not have enough strength to go into battle. He accepted
Themistocles’ argument.
2 Just to be sure the Peloponnesian naval forces had no chance to slip away, Themistocles put into effect a
plan to deceive the Persians and force the Greeks to stay at Salamis. This involved dividing the Persian
fleet and drawing the Persians into a trap.
He sent a secret message to the Persians, via a personal slave, indicating that the Greeks were disunited
and were retreating towards the Peloponnesian coast. This is described in Aeschylus’ play Persae where a
messenger informs Atossa, Xerxes’ mother, what happened.
Some evil god, or an avenging spirit

Began the fray. From the Athenian fleet
There came a Greek, and thus thy son bespoke:
‘Soon as the gloom of night shall fall, the Greeks
No more will wait, but, rushing to their oars. Each man will seek his safety where he may
By secret flight.
Source 12.16 Aeschylus, Persae, Lines 209–13
Xerxes reacted to this deception by dividing his naval force and dispatching the strong Egyptian squadron
to sail around Salamis to block the western exit and prevent the Greeks from escaping. He then stationed
Persian troops to land on the islet of Psyttaleia, and ordered the Ionians and Phoenicians to advance into
the straits. The Greek squadrons were already in position, hidden behind two promontories. Although
Xerxes’ fleet was significantly reduced, it still substantially outnumbered the Greeks.

Table 12.4 Two descriptions of the battle
Aeschylus, Persae Herodotus, Histories, 8. 85–97
Nor more delay, but straight … the greater part of the Persian
Trireme on trireme, brazen beak on beak, 50 fleet suffered severely in the battle,
the Athenians and Aeginetans
Dashed furious. A Greek ship led on the attack,
accounting for a great many of
And from the prow of a Phœnician struck their ships. Since the Greek fleet
The figure-head; and now the grapple closed worked together as a whole, while
the Persians had lost formation and
Of each ship with his adverse desperate.
were no longer fighting for any plan
At first the main line of the Persian fleet 55 … When the Persian rout began
Stood the harsh shock: but soon their multitude and they were trying to get back to
Phalerum, the Aeginetan squadron,
Became their ruin: in the narrow firth
which was waiting to catch them
They might not use their strength, and, jammed together, in the narrows, did memorable
Their ships with brazen beaks did bite each other, service. The enemy was in hopeless
And shattered their own oars. Meanwhile the Greeks 60 confusion; such ships as offered
resistance or tried to escape were
Stroke after stroke dealt dexterous all around,
cut to pieces by the Athenians, while
Till our ships showed their keels, and the blue sea the Aeginetans caught those which
Was seen no more, with multitude of ships attempted to get clear, so that any
ship which escaped the one enemy
And corpses covered. All the shores were strewn,
promptly fell amongst the others
And the rough rocks, with dead: till, in the end, 65 … During the confused struggle a
Each ship in the barbaric host, that yet valuable service was performed by
the Athenian Aristides … he took
Had oars, in most disordered flight rowed off.
a number of the Athenian heavy
As men that fish for tunnies, so the Greeks, infantry, who were posted along the
With broken booms, and fragments of the wreck, coast of Salamis, across to Psyttaleia,
Struck our snared men, and hacked them, that the sea 70 where they killed every one of the
Persian soldiers who had landed there.
With wail and moaning was possessed around …
The results of Salamis

Herodotus suggests that Xerxes was faced with a dilemma: to depart Greece altogether, or leave a substantial
military force to continue the fight. According to Mardonius, the infantry still had a desire to continue the
conflict against the Peloponnese. Xerxes consulted Artemisia, queen of Caria, who had previously given
him good advice.
My Lord … circumstances being what they are, I think you should quit this country and leave
Mardonius behind with the force he asks for … If his design prospers and success attends his
arms, it will be your work, master for your slaves performed it. And even if things go wrong
with him, it will be no great matter, so long as you yourself are safe and no danger threatens
anything that concerns your house.
Source 12.17 Herodotus, The Histories, Bk 8.101

The Persian fleet was weakened
The narrow waterways favoured
by the absence of the Egyptian
their smaller number of ships
squadron
The lower Greek triremes were The Persians were taken by

able to manoeuvre more Reasons for Greek surprise; they expected the
effectively than the higher success at Salamis Greeks to be withdrawing
Persian warships towards the Isthmus
Themistocles understood the importance of The Greeks' knowledge of the winds and
naval power in the defence of Greece, the currents aided them; they waited until a southerly
advantages of fighting in the Bay of Salamis and swell turned the higher Phoenician ships on their
the need to force the Peloponnesian squadrons side, enabling the ramming techniques to be
to stay and fight more effective
Figure 12.36 Reasons for Greek success at Salamis
1 Xerxes, with a large military escort of 60 000 troops led by Artabazus, marched to the Hellespont, leaving
Mardonius and an army in central Greece. Artabazus and his troops later returned to join Mardonius.
Xerxes did not – as the Greek sources suggest – leave Greece in fear as a desperate and humiliated
fugitive. He had achieved one of his major objectives (the destruction of Athens), the Persian army still
remained undefeated on Greek soil, and was in control of central and northern Greece. It is believed
that Xerxes was concerned that the Ionians might revolt and there was an expectation that he would
return to Persia to perform his New Year religious duties.
2 The Persian fleet sailed for Asia Minor where it made its headquarters at the island of Samos. The loss
of so many ships left the Persian army in Greece without a supply line. The Greek navy pursued the
Persians as far as the island of Andros.
3 Mardonius, with a picked force of infantry and cavalry, wintered in Thessaly, intending to attack the
Peloponnese in the following spring. The war was not yet over.
4 The Greeks made dedications to the gods and awarded the prize for valour to the Aeginitans, and the
second prize to the Athenians. Even though Themistocles should have received the individual prize,
it was not awarded because he was the subject of great envy. However, ‘Themistocles’ name was on
everyone’s lips, and he acquired the reputation of being by far the most able man in the country’.31
Immediately after this, he went to Sparta where he was given a splendid welcome and treated with the
highest respect. He was presented with an olive wreath, a chariot and received high praise.
The significance of Salamis for the Greeks

There is no doubt that the Battle of Salamis was a turning point in the war.
1 It totally justified Themistocles’ policy of developing Athens into a naval power, which played the major
role in the future rise to power of Athens.
2 The Greek victory at Salamis saved the Peloponnese. If the Persians had won, no Greek army could
have defended the Peloponnesian coastline. Thucydides says that the result at Salamis ‘proved that the
fate of Hellas depended on her navy’.32
3 The victory of Salamis had an important bearing on the future of democracy in Athens. The opinions and
needs of the class of thetes, who manned the ships as rowers, would need to be considered in the future.

ACTIVITY 12.9
1 Describe the actions that Themistocles took to ensure the Peloponnesian naval contingents fought
at Salamis as well as their reasons for this.
2 Relate how Aeschylus in Source 12.16 described Themistocles’ ploy.
3 Rewrite, in your own words, Aeschylus’ account of the battle in Table 12.4. Use this, plus Herodotus’
account, to make a list of the main features of the battle.
4 Explain what Thucydides meant when he said that Salamis ‘proved that the fate of Hellas depended
on her navy’.
5 How does Artemisia’s advice in Source 12.17 illustrate one aspect of the Persian attitude to military
losses?
The Battle of Plataea – 479 BC

Threats to Greek unity
• Mardonius made diplomatic moves to detach Athens from the Hellenic League using Alexander of
Macedonia as an intermediary. He promised the Athenians their independence, any land they wanted
and the rebuilding of their temples if they joined the Persians. If not, the Persians would once again
occupy and devastate their city.
• The Persians sent gold to Sparta’s enemies in the Peloponnese – notably Argos – in the hope of
undermining Sparta’s resistance.
• The Athenians refused Mardonius’ offer, once again they evacuated their city, retreated to Salamis and
Athens was destroyed for the second time.
• The Athenians demanded the Peloponnesians march north immediately to support them or they would
withdraw from the Hellenic League and take their fleet away.
The Spartans eventually gave the orders, and Pausanius, the nephew of Leonidas and regent for Leonidas’
son, moved north to face the Persians with a force of Peloponnesians. The Athenian military contingent,
led by Aristides, joined them.
The battle
Mardonius had taken up a position on the
Plain of Plataea in central Greece because it
was cavalry country. He built a huge stockade
on the north side of the Asopus River in case
of defeat in the field and placed his troops
along the river facing the passes by which the
Greeks would emerge from the south.
The Greeks descended f rom the
Cithaeron ranges, spread out along the lower
slopes and would go no further. Mardonius
used his cavalry under Masistius to harass
them but they refused to move into the
plain. Eventually they moved westward to
an area where they had more room, access to
water supplies and could unload food supply Figure 12.37 The deployment of Greek and Persian forces during the
wagons safely. Battle of Plataea

Mardonius used his cavalry to prevent the Greeks getting water from the river, poisoned a spring and
waylaid the Greek food supplies, slaughtering 500 animals and their escorts, but still did not move his forces
across the river to engage the Greeks.
After a council of war, Pausanius decided to move during the night. The centre moved closer to Plataea,
the Spartans kept to higher ground and the Athenians moved along the low ground.
Mardonius, thinking the Greeks were fleeing, ordered his troops to cross the Asopus River and attack.
His Greek allies, the Thebans and other Boeotians fought the Athenians on the Greek left wing, where
they were defeated. The Spartans and Tegeans fought on the right against the Persian infantry in a long,
hard-fought and disciplined battle. Eventually, Pausanius charged. Mardonius was killed and his troops
fled in disarray to the stockade.
Artabazus, the other Persian commander, retreated with his troops, and eventually returned to Asia. The
Persian stockade was taken and all within slaughtered.
The results and significance of Plataea

• This was a decisive battle which put an end to the Persian invasion of the
mainland.
• It showed that the Greeks could work together when their freedom was
threatened. For three weeks at Plataea over 100 000 men from 24 Greek
states (40 000 hoplites of which 5000 were Spartan, and 69 000 light
armed troops) under the overall command of the Spartan regent Pausanius
defended Hellas. Herodotus says, ‘Pausanius … won the most splendid
victory which history records’.33
• This victory also encouraged many of the Greeks of Asia Minor to consider
rebellion against Persia.
For 10 days after the battle, the Greek troops camped on the battlefield. They
buried their dead outside the city of Plataea and collected enormous quantities
of spoils, one-10th of which was dedicated to Apollo at Delphi. The Greek
survivors then marched on Thebes, besieged it and demanded that the leaders
be handed over to be punished for ‘Medising’. They were taken back to the
Isthmus and put to death.
The symbol of the alliance against the Persians was a gold tripod resting on
the bronze coils of a three-headed serpent inscribed with the names of the 31
Figure 12.38 The Serpent
cities that had contributed to victory both at Salamis and Plataea. Column, now in Istanbul
The Battle of Mycale – 479 BC

While the Greeks under Pausanius faced the Persians at Plataea, the Greek fleet under the command of the
other Spartan king, Leotychides, sailed for Ionia and a showdown with the Persian fleet, stationed at Samos.
Refugees from Samos informed the Greeks that the Persian navy was in a bad way and that the mere
sight of their fleet would encourage the Ionians to revolt. When they reached Samos, they found the Persians
had retreated to the mainland, beaching their ships along the narrow coastal area of the Mycale promontory.
The troops aboard the Persian boats built a stockade on shore and guarded the paths inland. Leotychides
sailed his flagship close to shore, proclaiming freedom to the Ionian Greeks if they mutinied against the
Persians, then landed his troops further down the coast. The Athenians under Xanthippus attacked the
stockade and the Spartans marched inland to take the Persians from the rear.
The Ionians among the Persian forces changed sides and the Milesians ‘joined in the slaughter and proved
their [Persians] bitterest enemies. Thus this day saw the second Ionian revolt from Persian domination’.34
The Greeks then burnt the Persian ships and the fort, and retired to Samos to debate the future of Ionia.

This battle eventually:
• led to the enrolment of Ionians in the Hellenic League
• ushered in a new phase in Greek history based on the supremacy of Athens.
ACTIVITY 12.10
1 Discuss the reasons why the Persian commander, Mardonius, took up a position at Plataea.
2 Describe how he used his cavalry.
3 Read Herodotus and summarise the part played by the Spartans under the regent, King Pausanius.
4 Discuss the significance of the Battles of Plataea and Mycale in 479 to the future of Greece.
Contribution of Themistocles, Leonidas, Eurybiades and Pausanius during the

Persian Wars
The following table is a summary of the roles, achievements and influence of Themistocles, Leonidas,
Eurybiades and Pausanius. The later careers of Themistocles and Pausanius are discussed in the next section
on the development of Athens and its empire.
Table 12.5 Roles, achievements and influence of Themistocles, Leonidas, Eurybiades and Pausanius
Themistocles: Athenian statesman
• Persuaded the Athenians to pursue a naval

policy, which was critical in the war; fortified Themistocles was a man who showed unmistakable
the harbour at Piraeus and convinced people to natural genius; in this respect he was quite
spend silver from Laurium on building a fleet of exceptional, and beyond all others deserves our
triremes. admiration. Without studying a subject in advance
• Played a crucial part in calling the Congress of or deliberating over it later, but simply using the
Corinth and keeping the independent 31 states intelligence that was his by nature, he had the power
of the Hellenic League together. to reach the right conclusion in matters that have
• Convinced the Athenians to interpret the to be settled on the spur of the moment and do not
Delphic Oracle’s second prophecy about ‘the admit of long discussions and in estimating what
wooden walls’ as Athenian ships and the need was likely to happen, his forecasts for the future
to take to the sea to escape the Persians. were always more reliable than those of others …
• Contributed to the Greeks’ strategy of To sum him up in a few words, it may be said that
confronting Persians in narrow places where through force of genius and by rapidity of action this
the navy and army could use their smaller man was supreme at doing precisely the right thing
forces to greater effect and was a key player in at precisely the right moment.
the Battle of Artemisium. Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Bk 1. 138
• Organised for Athenian women, children and Themistocles’ name was on everyone’s lips, and he
those unable to fight to be evacuated while the acquired the reputation of being by far the most able
men took to the triremes. man in the country. The Spartans granted Themis-
tocles a wreath of honour ‘for his ability and skill.
He was also presented with a chariot, the finest in
Sparta and received high praise’.
Herodotus, Histories, Bk 8.124

Themistocles: Athenian statesman (cont.)
• Worked hard at preventing disunity among the

Greeks and was responsible for the decision to But the greatest of all his achievements was to put an
fight at Salamis rather than at the Isthmus. He end to all the fighting within Greece, to reconcile the
convinced Eurybiades to stay at Salamis and various cities with one another and persuade them
ensured the Persian fleet also did by his secret to lay aside their differences because of the war with
message to the Persians. Persia.
• Contributed to the growth of Athenian democracy Plutarch, The Rise and Fall of Athens: Themistocles, 6
by giving more power to the lower classes of
Athens, who were the rowers in the fleet.
Leonidas: Spartan king
• Led a small advance force, including

300 Spartans, north to the Vale of Tempe to The Persian army was now close to the pass and the
stall the Persian advance. Greeks suddenly doubting their power to resist, held
• Realised Tempe could not be held and a conference to consider the advisability of retreat …
moved south to defend Greece at the pass of Leonidas gave his voice for staying where they were and
Thermopylae to await reinforcements. sending, at the same time an appeal for reinforcements
• Employed tactics at Thermopylae that confused to the various states of the confederacy, as their
and kept the Persians at bay for crucial days, numbers were inadequate to cope with the Persians.
allowing other Greeks to organise. Herodotus, Histories, Bk 7. 208
• Sent the bulk of his force away when he knew It is said that Leonidas himself dismissed them to
that Ephialtes betrayed the Greeks by leading spare their lives, but thought it unbecoming for the
the Persian Immortals over a mountain pass, Spartans under his command to desert the post for
allowing them to surround the Greeks. which they had originally come to guard. I myself
• Exhibited courage, skill and determination when am inclined to think that he dismissed them when
encircled by the Persians and died doing what he realised they had no heart for the fight and were
was expected of a Spartan king. unwilling to take their share of the danger.
• Inspired, by his example, other Greeks to persist Herodotus, Histories, Bk 7. 220
in their fight against the invader.
Eurybiades: Spartan general in charge of the Greek fleet
• Given charge of the Greek fleet by the Hellenic

League despite Athens’ pre-eminence. The Athenians waived their claim in the interest of
Commanded at Artemisium and Salamis. national survival, knowing that a quarrel about the
• Paid a bribe by Themistocles from the Euboeans command would certainly mean the destruction of
to stay and defend at Artemisium. Greece.
• Convinced finally by Themistocles to stay and Herodotus, Histories, Bk 8. 2
fight at Salamis despite opposition from other This was enough to secure Eurybiades’ consent.
Peloponnesian states. Herodotus, Histories, Bk 8. 5
• Spoke out against Themistocles’ desire, after
Eurybiades objected on the grounds that to destroy
Salamis, to immediately sail north and destroy
the bridges would be to do Greece the worst possible
the bridges over the Hellespont.
service. If, he argued, Xerxes were cut off in Greece,
he would hardly be likely to be inactive.
Herodotus, Histories, Bk 8. 108

Pausanius: Spartan regent for the son of Leonidas
• Commanded a combined force of 24

independent Greek city-states against the While Mardonius was alive they continued to
Persian army in central Greece at the Battle of resist and to defend themselves, and struck down
Plataea. many Lacedaemonians; but after his death and
• Kept disunity among the Greeks in check and the destruction of his personal guard – the finest
overcame many difficulties prior to battle: of the Persian troops – the remainder yielded to
harassment by Persian cavalry, difficulties the Lacedaemonians and took to flight … thus
of getting drinking water and the logistics of Mardonius rendered satisfaction to the Spartans for
supplying an army of 100 000 (hoplites and light- the killing of Leonidas; and Pausanius … won the
armed troops). most splendid victory which history records.
• Fought in an area that suited the Persian Herodotus, Histories, Bk 9. 61
cavalry, but confused Mardonius by Leader of the Hellenes in war, victorious over the
repositioning his troops during the night. Persians, Pausanius to the god Phoebus erected the
• Led the Spartan contingent who, with the trophy.
Tegeans, made a disciplined stand against the Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Bk 1.132 (Concerning the
Persian infantry led by Mardonius. Original Inscription On The Serpent Column)
• Changed the circumstances of the war by
putting an end to the Persian invasion of the
mainland.
Reasons for Greek victory and Persian defeat 480–479 BC

Ancient and modern writers point to numerous specific factors that played a part in the Greek victory and
Persian defeat during the invasion of 480–479.
The role of geography and the weather

• The distance of the march from Sardis to Athens
and the strain this put on supply lines and the
difficulties for the Persians in living off the land as
they moved through mountainous terrain.
• The problems presented by the necessity of keeping
the Persian army and navy in close contact.
• The disastrous storms off Cape Sepias and southern
Euboea that considerably reduced the Persian fleet.
• The Greek knowledge of their own coastlines and
weather.
• The restricted mountain pass at Thermopylae and
the use the Greeks made of this in delaying the
Persian march south, overcoming the larger Persian
forces and preventing the use of their cavalry.
• The tightness of the Straits of Salamis in restricting
movement of the larger Persian navy and the
local swells that turned the larger Persian ships
broadside, making them more easily rammed by
the Greeks. Figure 12.39 A statue of Themistocles at Piraeus

Leadership on both sides
• Xerxes has been accused of hubris that led to impulsive and over-confident behaviour, while Mardonius
revealed early on that he was ambitious for glory.
• Themistocles showed foresight in developing Athens into a naval power; revealed his understanding of
the greater good of Greece by bowing to Greek demands for Spartan leadership of the navy; contributed
to the strategy of the Greeks; and was determined to do whatever was needed to force the Greeks to
fight at Salamis.
• Leonidas’ leadership was shown in his decision to abort their stand at Tempe; to take up a position at
Thermopylae; to employ delaying tactics against the Persians; and to send away most Greeks when he
knew that he would be forced to make a last stand to the death against the Persians once they had been
betrayed. His courage also had a positive impact on the morale of the Greeks.
• Eurybiades’ leadership was displayed in his ability to work with Themistocles, follow the Athenian’s
advice, and his refusal to destroy the bridges over the Hellespont immediately after Salamis.
• Pausanius displayed his leadership in his ability to lead and hold together the forces of 24 Greek states
in a battle at a site of the Persians’ choosing (the Plain of Plataea) and one that benefited the Persian
cavalry. By overcoming the difficulties facing the Greeks and defeating the Persians, he changed the
course of the war.
The question of Greek unity/disunity

Despite the fact that some Greeks remained neutral (Argos) and others ‘Medised’ (Thebes), the examples
of Greek cohesion were remarkable considering the selfishness and jealousies that normally marked the
relationships between Greek city-states, such as that between Athens and Aegina.
The Greeks united in a Hellenic League of 31 states, accepted Spartan leadership of the overall forces
and agreed on the punishment for ‘Medising’ and on a general strategy. The Athenians contributed to Greek
unity by agreeing to Sparta’s leadership of the navy.
Despite some minor instances of disunity at Plataea, 24 states put themselves under the command of
Pausanius.
However, Greek unity was not without its problems: for example, the initial reluctance of the Spartans
and Peloponnesians to fight north of the Isthmus, and their desire to leave Salamis and retreat closer to
the Peloponnesian coast.
The difference in Greek and Persian arms, equipment and tactics

According to R. Sealey, ‘In the fighting of 480 and 479 the Greek hoplites were better equipped than any
of the various infantry contingents which the Persians could put into the field: in particular their defensive
armour was more comprehensive’.35 They wore bronze helmets, bronze greaves and breastplates reinforced
with metal scales, and carried large bronze and leather shields, a 2–3-metre-long spear with bronze shaft
and iron head, and an iron sword.
The Persians, according to Herodotus, wore no protective head covering: instead they used either a
floppy felt hat or the soft cloth covering of the Immortals that could be drawn across the face to keep out
the dust. They wore a corselet of fish-like iron scales under a loose embroidered tunic, and trousers. Their
main weapons were large bows, short spears and daggers, and a wicker shield that may have protected them
from arrows but was no match for the thrusting Greek spear. Their arrows were largely negated by the
Greek hoplite armour. The way the Immortals appeared on the battlefield was different from the way they
are usually depicted in Persian reliefs.
The strength of the heavily armed Greek hoplite and phalanx was their ability to fight in close quarters
and move in a disciplined pack, which made it difficult for the lighter-armed Persian troops, whose strengths
were fighting from a distance (bowmen). Their cavalry had few opportunities to use their skills.

Figure 12.40 A Persian Immortal Figure 12.41 A Greek hoplite
ACTIVITY 12.11
1 Assess the role of Themistocles in the war between the Persians and Greeks in 480.
2 Compare the roles that Leonidas, Eurybiades and Pausanius played in the conflicts of 480–479.
3 Explain the reasons for the Greek victories in 480–479.
12.3The development of Athens and the Athenian Empire

478–440 BC
The three threads running through this period – the growth and nature of Athenian imperial power, the
development of Athenian democracy and the deteriorating relations between Athens and Sparta – are often
impossible to disentangle. It is a controversial subject of study because:
• Thucydides, who provides some of the only material available for this period, lived at a time when Athens
already had a powerful empire and his theme in his Peloponnesian War was Athenian imperialism. He
was selective in his material, choosing only those events that illustrated that theme
• the epigraphic material is fragmentary
• there is a long-held traditional view that idealised Athens, overlooking ‘the odious implications of its
imperial rule’.36
The Delian League 478–468 BC

The Hellenic League, led by Sparta during the Persian Wars, was replaced in 478–7 by a league of sea states,
led by Athens, commonly known as the Delian League or the Confederacy of Delos. These are modern
terms: in the 5th century, it was described as ‘The Athenians and their Allies’.
Reasons for change of leadership

When the Spartan king, Pausanius, was set out in charge of an allied fleet after Mycale to free those Greek
states still under Persian control, his ‘officiousness and absurd pretensions’ upset the Greeks of Asia Minor,
where he scattered ‘insults far and wide’.37 The Greeks had initially respected Pausanius because of his
achievement at Plataea, but he revealed an arrogance and ambition that upset the Spartans and offended
the other Greeks. Apart from his arrogant attitude towards the eastern Greeks, he communicated with the
Persian king and adopted Persian dress and ways of behaviour. The Ionians made overtures to the Athenians,

suggesting they take over the leadership. The Spartan government recalled Pausanius, and replaced him
with another commanding officer, Dorcis, but he too was rejected.
Because Sparta was reluctant to continue the war against Persia in the east, preferring to return to its
isolationist policy and concentrate on keeping its helot population under control, it did not protest when
Athens took over the leadership of a league of sea states. Besides, Sparta was a military power and its rigid
system made it unsuitable as a leader of other Greeks. Spartans preferred ‘to have their citizens behave with
moderation and abide by their traditional customs instead of lording it over the rest of Greece’.38
Athens had a large and experienced navy and was held in high regard after the Battle of Salamis. The
Athenians also shared a common racial descent with the Ionians.
The Ionians wanted the Athenian, Aristides, to organise the League. He had already proven himself as
a general at Marathon, Salamis and Plataea, and he was known as ‘a sturdy champion of justice’, ‘a steadfast
character’39 and one not motivated by greed or trickery.
… What was particularly admirable about him was his strength of purpose amid the ebb and
flow of political fortunes. He was never unduly elated by any honours that were paid him,
while he bore his reverses with composure and he believed it his duty to give his services to
his country at all times freely and without reward, not merely in terms of money, but also of
reputation.
Source 12.18 Plutarch, The Rise and Fall of Athens: Aristides, 3
We did not use force in acquiring [the hegemony]. But you [Lacedaemonians – Spartans] did
not wish to remain by our side for what was left to accomplish against the barbarian, and the
allies approached us and by their own pleading caused us to become hegemon.
Source 12.19 Thucydides on Athenian leadership (47 years later); Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 1.75.2–4
Table 12.6 Organisation of the League
Aims The aims of the League appear to have been both offensive and defensive:
• to compensate the Greeks ‘for their losses by ravaging the territory of the king
of Persia’.40 This aim of an aggressive, offensive war against Persia might have
attracted the states initially
• to liberate those states of Asia that were still under the control of the Persian king
• to maintain the freedom of the Greeks.
As well as the stated motives of the League, there would certainly have been economic
motives for Athens, such as safeguarding trade and gaining valuable resources.
Thucydides suggests that Athens had a hidden agenda when it first organised the
Delian League. Their real reason (pretext) for accepting leadership of the League, he
says, was to bring the allies under its control.
Finances To maintain a permanent league and carry out its aims, adequate funds were needed.
• Because the allies wanted each city to be fairly assessed, they appointed Aristides
‘to survey the various territories and their revenues, and to fix their contributions
according to each member’s worth and ability to pay’.41 The total assessment of
contribution amounted to 460 talents. A talent was a weight and a unit of currency.
One talent equalled 6000 drachmas. A skilled worker in Athens at the time earned
approximately 1 drachma a day.

• Aristides ‘drew up the assessments with scrupulous integrity and justice, but also
in such a way that all the states felt they had been appropriately and satisfactorily
dealt with’.42 The contributions took two forms: a money payment (phoros) and
ships. The money payment was collected and supervised by 10 Athenian officials
called Hellenotamiae (stewards of the Greeks), and went straight into the League’s
treasury at Delos.
• Those who contributed ships, such as the large Aegean islands of Chios, Lesbos,
Samos, Naxos and Thasos, retained control of them but were expected to serve the
League fleet for a portion of each year.
Headquarters The island of Delos was chosen as the League’s headquarters and site of its treasury
and meetings of allies because it:
• was the ancient centre of Ionian culture and religion based on the cult of Apollo
• was midway between Athens and the coast of Asia Minor
• had a good harbour
• was politically neutral.
Voting in The allies were initially independent states with their own particular forms of
the synod or government and willing participants in the League. It is not known if all states had
council equal voting rights in the League’s council, but it is probable that Athens, as the leader
and most influential state, could control the vote by its patronage and intimidation of
smaller states who would follow its lead.
Athenian officials carried out the League policy and strategy. Cimon, the Athenian, was
commander of the League’s fleet and forces.
The oath of The oath of allegiance supposedly taken by all allies implied that they would have the
loyalty same foreign policy. To confirm their loyalty, they were supposed to have thrown lumps
of iron into the sea, suggesting permanency of the League or continuance of it until
secession breaking
the Persians were no longer a threat. If this was the meaning of the symbolism, then
away or withdrawing
from an alliance secession would have been seen as rebellion and other members would be justified in
forcing these members back into the League.
After taking the hegemony over allies who desired it because of their hatred of Pausanius,
the Athenians made an assessment of those cities that were required to provide ships.
Their professed purpose [proschema] was to avenge themselves for what they had suffered
by ravaging the land of the king. The treasurers of the Hellenes [hellenotamiae] were first
established at that time as an Athenian magistracy to receive the tribute [phoros]. …The first
tribute assessed was four hundred and sixty talents. Delos was its treasury and the revenues
accrued in the temple. Though at first the Athenians commanded allies who were autonomous
and who made decisions that arose from common meetings, they accomplished the following
things by wars and the management of affairs.
Source 12.20 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 1.96–97.1; this is the earliest and best account of the foundation of the
Delian League.

From the beginning Athens had the potential to enhance its own best interests, as it:
• was the permanent leader
• contributed the largest number of ships and men
• presided over the League council and could influence policy
• provided the man who assessed the tribute (Aristides), the fleet commander (Cimon) and the 10 officials
who collected the tribute.
Figure 12.42 The island of Delos, headquarters of the League
ACTIVITY 12.12
1 Describe how the Delian League originally came into existence.

2 Give three reasons why Sparta did not protest when it was replaced by Athens as leader of
the Greeks.
3 What was Thucydides’ view of Athenian leadership expressed in Source 12.19?
4 Describe the qualities of Aristides that made him the best choice of person to organise the league.
5 Make a list of the features of the Delian League according to Thucydides in Source 12.20.
6 Describe the two types of members in the original League.
7 Analyse what the oaths of allegiance indicate about the League.
8 Explain how and where decisions were made, and who led the League’s forces.
9 What potential did Athens have from the beginning to change the League into an Athenian empire if
it wished?
Activities of the League under Cimon until the Battle of Eurymedon in 468
The number of original members is not known, but the extremities of the area of the League covered in
the first year were Byzantium in the Propontis, the Aineum promontory in the north-west, Rhodes in the
south-east and Siphnos in the south-west.
Cimon, the son of Miltiades, was chosen to lead the League forces because, while serving under Pausanius
in Asia Minor in 478, he had gained a reputation for dealing with the Ionians sympathetically. Also, his
own soldiers ‘were a byword for their discipline’ and he had ‘skill in handling men’.43

Figure 12.43 The League’s main area of operations until the revolt of Thasos in 465
The League’s main actions directed against the Persians

478 Byzantium was captured, giving the Greeks access once again to
the valuable trade of the Black Sea.
476–475 Eion on the Strymon River. This was of great economic and
strategic significance as it dominated the main east–west land route
and was a natural centre for the resource-rich hinterland. Cimon
removed the Persians living there and, because the surrounding
country was fertile, handed the region to the Athenians, who
established a colony there.
476–475 Southern Asia Minor (Caria and Lycia). Cimon ‘sacked or
destroyed some cities and induced others to revolt or annexed them,
until not a single Persian soldier was left on the mainland of Asia
Minor from Ionia to Pamphylia’.44
The League’s most revealing activities

474 Skyrus (a pirate stronghold) was on one of the main Aegean trade Figure 12.44 A statue of Cimon,
routes. Athens established a cleruchy there as a means of getting rid commander of the League forces
of its excess population and to act as a watchdog
cleruchy a settlement of for its own interests in the area. Cimon also returned to Athens the bones of their
Athenian citizens overseas legendary king Theseus, who was buried on Skyrus. According to Plutarch, ‘this affair
did more than any other achievement of Cimon’s to endear him to the people’.45
472 Carystus, a neutral state, was deprived of its independence and enrolled in the League.

470–469 Naxos, one of the large ship-contributing members, tired of having to man the ships of the fleet,
attempted to secede from the League. It lost its independence and was forced to pay tribute, rather than
ships. This action created a third type of League member (tribute-paying subjects) and was the first
example of what was to become a recurring pattern.
Thucydides maintained that these early activities of the League – Eion, Skyrus, Carystus and Naxos –
were stepping stones to Athenian power, as an increasing number of member states became tribute-paying
subjects and the League’s fleet was increasingly manned by Athenians.
The Battle of Eurymedon in 468 and its significance

In 468, the Persian king Xerxes assembled another military and naval force at the mouth of the Eurymedon
River in Pamphylia in southern Asia Minor, ‘waiting for 80 Phoenician ships to arrive from Cyprus’.46
Cimon planned to attack before this contingent could reach him and to put to sea prepared to
bring the enemy to battle if they tried to avoid it. At first the Persians retired up the river to
avoid being forced into action, but when the Athenians bore down on them, they sailed out
to meet Cimon … in the naval battle they certainly achieved nothing worthy of such a strong
force, in fact, they immediately turned tail and ran for the shore. The leading crews abandoned
their ships and took refuge with the land forces … while the rest were overtaken and killed and
their ships destroyed … he landed his hoplites, still hot from fighting in the naval battle, and
they charged the enemy at a run … after a fierce battle, they threw back the barbarians with
great slaughter and captured the army and the camp which was full of all kinds of spoil … in
this way Cimon carried off two victories in a single day.
Source 12.21 Plutarch, The Rise and Fall of Athens: Cimon, 13
Cimon then sailed south and took the Phoenician fleet by surprise, and destroyed all their ships and
crews. This dashed Xerxes’ hopes and he accepted the ‘terms of a peace’, by which he agreed to stay a day’s
sail from the coast of Asia Minor.
The Eurymedon campaign … secured the removal of the Persian navy from the Aegean and
eliminated pressure from the east on the allied city-states. … Though it should not be inferred
that a formal peace resulted from Cimon’s victory at Eurymedon … This victory marked an
epoch such that it was legitimate for contemporaries as well as posterity to regard the Persian
menace in the Aegean as ended once and for all, and to consider that the league, having
vindicated itself superbly, was now redundant.
Source 12.22 C.W. Fornara and L.J. Samons II, Athens from Cleisthenes to Pericles, p. 85
What now for the League?
ACTIVITY 12.13
1 To what extent can the League’s activities against Skyrus (474), the neutral state of Carystus (472:
note its location) and Naxos, one of its own members (470–469), be justified?
2 Consider Thucydides’ view of these actions.
3 Use Source 12.22 to describe the Battle of Eurymedon in your own words.
4 Explain the significance of the Battle of Eurymedon for the future of the League.

Transformation of the Delian League into the Athenian Empire
After Eurymedon, the League continued as a naval entity but its interests increasingly identified with those
of Athens. Although this transformation is often regarded as having been gradual, ‘Thucydides’ case for
the rapidity of the transformation of Athens from hegemon to imperial mistress is unambiguous’, and ‘he
leaves no doubt of the critical importance of the series Naxos–Eurymedon–Thasos’.47
If there was any doubt up to this point of Athens’ future intentions, her treatment of the rich,
ship-contributing member, Thasos, cannot be ignored.
The revolt of Thasos 465

Thasos was the richest island in the northern Aegean, with extensive mining and trading interests on the
adjacent mainland of Thrace. When Athens claimed a share in the trade and mining of gold in the area,
a dispute broke out and Thasos seceded from the League. This revolt was significant for three reasons:
1 Even though the Battle of Eurymedon, three years earlier, had removed any further threat from the
Persians, Athens showed it had no intention of allowing members to leave the League.
2 It was the first time (for which there is evidence) that Athens used the League forces against a member
state in a private quarrel.
3 For the first time a conflict between League members involved a Peloponnesian state, namely Sparta
(questionable).
The League fleet under Cimon laid siege to Thasos, which appealed to Sparta for help. Although the
Spartans are supposed to have secretly offered help by promising to attack Athens, they were unable to
fulfil their promise due to a disastrous earthquake and widespread helot revolt. This record of a so-called
Spartan promise to help is open to debate.
The siege of Thasos lasted two years. The Athenians:
• confiscated the Thasians’ navy
• demolished their walls
• closed their mint
• annexed their possessions on the mainland
• forced them to pay a fine immediately
• took away their independence
• reduced them to a tribute-paying subject state dependent on the will of Athens.
Athens’ treatment of Thasos gave fair warning to other members of its future intentions.
Changes in the internal politics of Athens and the beginning of an imperial strategy 465–445
This period is marked by the:
1 appearance of radical democrats on the scene in Athens and the souring of Athens’ relationship with
Sparta, which had been reasonably ‘friendly’ due to the conservative influence of the pro-Spartan Cimon
2 ostracism of Cimon from 461–451
3 aggressive imperial policy of Pericles, which had a significant impact on Sparta and its Peloponnesian
allies and which started with Athens making an alliance with Argos, Sparta’s traditional enemy.
A COMMENT ON…
The ostracism of Cimon

• When Sparta suffered a disastrous earthquake in Laconia in 464 and a subsequent helot revolt, a
public debate was held in Athens over whether to send help to the Spartans. Cimon, with his policy

of conservative politics at home and cooperation with Sparta, was
opposed by Ephialtes, a radical democrat, who believed Sparta was
Athens’ natural enemy. While the radical democrats, including the
young Pericles, had been gaining in power and popularity, the fact that
Cimon was able to persuade the Assembly to send him, with a force
of 4000 troops to help Sparta, indicates that the majority of Athenians
still supported a policy of friendship and cooperation with Sparta.
• However, during Cimon’s absence in the Peloponnese, radical
democratic changes were taking place in Athens and, according to
Plato, reported in Plutarch, ‘Ephialtes poured out neat a full draught
of freedom for the people and made them unmanageable’.48
• Due to Sparta’s fear of the bold and revolutionary ideas of the
Athenians, the Spartans refused Cimon’s aid and ordered him and
his troops to leave Sparta and return home. This deeply offended the
Athenians, as they considered ‘this was not the sort of treatment they
deserved from Sparta’.49
• The rebuff of Cimon’s expeditionary force brought a humiliating end
Figure 12.45 A bust of
to his career and to his policy of joint leadership of Greece. Despite
Pericles, bearing the inscription
all his former successes, he was ostracised in 461 and during his 10- ‘Pericles, son of Xanthippus,
year absence, the radical democrats under Pericles implemented an Athenian’
aggressive imperial policy.
The imperial policy of Pericles

The imperial policy of Pericles between 460–445 involved:
• a commitment to the continuing existence and expansion of the Delian League, which saw Athens
becoming more ruthless in its treatment of its allies and following a policy more in its own interests
than in theirs
• an attempt to build up a land empire and undermine the Spartan-led Peloponnesian League by enrolling
some of its members into the Delian League (Megara and Aegina), blocking access to central Greece,
gaining control of the western trade routes to Sicily via the Corinthian Gulf and crippling the commercial
giants of Corinth and Aegina. The member of the Peloponnesian League that had the most to fear
from Athens was Corinth. According to Fornara and Samons, ‘Athens had become predatory in Greece,
openly challenging the members of the Peloponnesian League and intending to use the same principles
by which she had imposed her rule in the Aegean’.50
It was about this time that Pericles began building the Athenian Long Walls down to the sea: one to
Phalerum and one to Piraeus.
At this time Megara also joined the Athenian alliance, abandoning her alliance with Sparta
because the Corinthians were attacking her in a war concerning the frontier boundaries. Thus
the Athenians held Megara and Pegae, and built for the Megarians their long walls from the
city of Nisaea, garrisoning them with Athenian troops. It was chiefly because of this that
the Corinthians began to conceive such a bitter hatred of Athens … After this war broke out
between Athens and Aegina, there was a big battle at sea between the Athenians and the
Aeginetans, with the support of allies on both sides. The battle was won by the Athenians who
captured 70 enemy ships. They then landed on Aegina and started to besiege the place … At

the same time the Corinthians and their allies … moved down into the Megarid believing that
it would be impossible for the Athenians to come to the relief of Megara, since they had two
large forces already serving abroad in Aegina and Egypt … At about this time the Athenians
began to build their two long walls down to the sea, one to Phalerum and one to Piraeus.
Source 12.23 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Bk I. 103–106
Figure 12.46 The Long Walls of Athens
A COMMENT ON…
The nature and significance of Athens’ Long Walls

The approximate 6-kilometre Long Walls at Athens that joined the ports of Phalerum and Piraeus to the
city in the 450s were part of a wider version of a naval strategy originally devised by Themistocles. This
naval strategy continued at the time of the Delian League and expanded as
part of Pericles’ imperialistic policy. Pericles’ purpose in linking the city and
ports into a fortification complex was to maintain a permanent link to the
sea, to make sure they would never be cut off from supplies during a land
siege as long as they remained a naval power. With the building of the Long
Walls, Athens became like an island on the mainland, creating a major point
of contention with Sparta.
Removal of the League treasury from Delos to Athens 454

Between 459 and 454, Athens and its allies suffered a disastrous defeat in
Egypt at the hands of a Persian army and a Phoenician fleet, with great losses
in both ships and men.
Without consulting the allies, Pericles used this disaster as a pretext for
moving the League treasury from Delos to Athens. Although reasons of safety
could be justified, the move was a significant step in Athens’ imperial policy, Figure 12.47 A tribute list

although it could be said that by 455, the League had already ‘atrophied and its charter was not even worth
lip-service’.51 The Council of the League ceased to meet at Delos and the League’s revenue became part of
Athens’ own treasury. The Athenian Assembly decided without consulting the allies how the funds were
to be used, and the Athenian Council supervised and checked the annual income and assessed the amount
of tribute that was due from each state.
One-60th of the tribute was paid into the sacred treasury of Athena, and Pericles proposed the diversion
of 5000 talents into a building fund. The League funds, now regarded as imperial tribute, were used to:
• cover the costs of further military and naval expansion
• glorify and beautify Athens by implementing a building program
• take the final steps to full democracy.
The fragments of the Quota Lists (Tribute Lists) date from this period.
Table 12.7 Summary of the imperial policy of Pericles 460–445 BC
Actions against Sparta

War between Athens and Aegina. Athens forces Aegina to join the Delian League as a tribute-paying
subject member.
Athens takes control of Boeotia and most of the northern side of the Corinthian Gulf.
Athens settles rebellious Messenian helots at Naupactus, a strategic site at the mouth of the
Corinthian Gulf.
Athens gains the south side of the Corinthian Gulf by the addition of Achaea to the Athenian
alliance.
The League forces suffer a disastrous defeat by Persia in Egypt.
Cimon returns from exile in 451 and brokers the Five-Year Truce with Sparta and resumes war
against Persia.
Athens loses control of Boeotia, Phocis and Locris (448–447).
Megara and Euboea revolt from the Athenian alliance in 447–446. Athens loses Megara but crushes Euboea.
Relations with allies in the Delian League
New members enrol, for example, Megara.

More members choose to contribute money instead of ships, increasing Athens’ naval strength at their
own expense.
The allied council at Delos is dominated by Athens.
More members are reduced to the status of a subject, tribute-paying state, for example, Aegina.
Allied contingents are involved in the Battle of Tanagra in Boeotia against Sparta (nothing to do with the
original objectives of the League).
Athens moves the allied treasury from Delos to Athens. League finances are now in Athens’ hands.
At some point the allied council at Delos ceases to meet, and Athens no longer consults its allies, who
have little control over their foreign affairs.
Athens’ degree of control over allies increases and decrees affecting Athens’ changing relations
with allies and subjects are issued between 453 and 446. See pp. 475–77.

ACTIVITY 12.14
Discuss what part each of the following events played in the transformation of the Delian League into
an Athenian empire:
• the revolt of Thasos
• the humiliation of Cimon and Athenian forces in Sparta
• the frontier dispute between Megara and Corinth
• the war between Aegina and Athens
• the building of Athens’ Long Walls
• the Athenian actions along the Corinthian Gulf and around the coast of the Peloponnese
• the defeat of League forces in Egypt and the removal of the League treasury from Delos to Athens.
The nature of Athenian imperialism

Once Athens ventured on to its imperialistic path there was no turning back, particularly under the
leadership of Pericles, who was intensely patriotic and believed in Athens’ greatness. For this reason, he
knew that the Athenian empire had to be maintained and any threats to it quickly addressed. His attitude
is reflected in Source 12.24.
We did nothing extraordinary in accepting an empire when it was offered to us and then in
refusing to give it up. Three very powerful motives prevent us from doing so: security, honour
and self-interest.
Source 12.24 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Bk 1.76
For some time, there had been three types of members: a few large ship-contributing states, those
who paid a money contribution and an ever-increasing number of tribute-paying subject states. As a
result, Athens had control of the allied fleet and had shown that it was willing to use it forcefully if
necessary.
For this position it was the allies themselves who were to blame. Because of this reluctance of
theirs to face military service, most of them, to avoid serving abroad, had assessments made
by which, instead of producing ships, they were to pay a corresponding sum of money. The
result was that the Athenian navy grew at their expense, and when they revolted they always
found themselves inadequately armed and inexperienced in war.
Source 12.25 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Bk I. 99
From 451, there was discontent within the League. It appears that at least two states (Miletus and
Erythrae), possibly more, revolted from the League at this time. The tribute list for 448 indicates hostility
to Athens over payment of tribute, as many important members such as Miletus and Aegina were missing
from the list, and others like Thasos paid only part of what they owed. Then in 447–446, the island of
Euboea revolted and Megara destroyed its Athenian garrison.
Pericles subdued the island of Euboea and issued a decree relating to the city of Chalcis. This decree
left no doubt that the original members of the League were now subjects of an imperial power.

Methods used by Athens to control its ‘allies’
Athens' fleet became a deterrent to

anti-Athenian elements throughout To keep political rivalries
Pericles planted a number the Aegean – only Chios, Lesbos between local democrats
of cleruchies on the territory and Samos contributed ships by 450 and oligarchs in check
of its allies (Naxos, Andros,
in Thrace, Chersonese)
A powerful navy
Protect Athenian officials
Garrisons of
Athenian soldiers
Cleruchies
Resented loss of Military/
judicial independence naval
Use of Athenian standards

Legal interference
Methods used by Athens
Tribute re-assessed
Judicial to keep its allies under Economic
each year
control
Use of Athens law courts Use of Athenian coinage

for many disputes
Political All local currencies were
Political cases became melted down and mints closed
more frequent as Athenian officials Oaths of loyalty
discontent increased
Democratic Promised not to desert
To carry out investigations, governments or disrupt the League
make reports and take
action on Athens’ behalf
An act of
imperialistic
control
Figure 12.48 Summary of Athenian methods of control
Garrisons
Athens stationed garrisons in rebellious cities and those cities suspected of opposition. They served not
only a military purpose, to ensure loyalty for the future, but also to protect the Athenian inspectors or
commissioners sent out to collect tribute and install ‘puppet’ governments, or at least governments favourable
to Athens.
Democratic governments
In most cases, Athens set up a democratic form of government closely modelled on its own. They usually
replaced oligarchic or Persian-inspired tyrannies, and although the imposition of an altered constitution
favourable to Athens was imperialistic, generally the majority of the people in the state favoured a democracy.
The establishment of cleruchies

Between 450 and 446 Athens inaugurated a system of cleruchies – settlements of Athenian settlers abroad –
to strengthen its hold on its empire. There had been some Athenian cleruchies established before the
formation of the League: at Ennea Hodoi in Thrace, Chalcis and Salamis, and after it at Skyrus and
Karystos, but this was the first time that Athens planted settlements on the territory of its allies, although
they might have planted an unrecorded one on Naxos earlier. Cleruchies were located at strategic points
in the Aegean. This policy was associated with Pericles and – although popular with the Athenians – it
caused more bitterness and resentment than any other aspect of Athenian policy.

The bitterness was greatest in the islands where the best land, which was limited, was given to the
Athenian cleruchs. The dispossessed locals, often three or four times as numerous as the newcomers, often
became quite destitute.
The Athenian cleruchs were drawn from the two lowest classes, and not only did this system relieve ‘the
city of a large number of idlers and agitators and raised the standards of the poorer classes’, but at the same
time it implanted among the allies ‘a healthy fear of rebellion’.52 These settlements became the watchdogs
of the empire and provided safe ports of call for the fleet, as well as being an important part of Pericles’
social policy to relieve unemployment.
Cleruchies were established on the islands of Andros, Naxos and Euboea and in the Chalcidic,
Dardanelles and Chersonese areas. Pericles personally led 1000 cleruchs to re-establish Athenian control
of the Chersonese. This was vital for control of the corn trade from the Black Sea.
Oaths sworn in support of Athens

As time went on, the oaths of loyalty required of allies implied increasing subservience to Athens, as can
be seen in the different wording of the Erythrae and Chalcis Decrees.
I will perform my duties as councillor to the best of my ability and faithfully to the people of
Erythrae and of Athens and the allies. I will not revolt from the people of Athens nor will I
permit another to do so …
Source 12.26 The Erythrae Decree 453–452
Seven years later, the citizens of Chalcis were required to make promises solely to Athens, not to the
other members of the alliance. The oaths were:
• ‘I will not revolt against the Athenian people by any art or device, either in word or in deed.’
• ‘I will pay the tribute to the Athenians.’
• ‘I will aid and succour the Athenian people if any one wrongs the Athenian people.’
• ‘I will be obedient to the Athenian people’.53
Anyone who refused to sign this oath lost his citizenship and had his property confiscated.
Athenian judicial control

Interference in the legal affairs of the allies was another form of control. In the Erythrae Decree (453–452)
legal involvement concerned only political matters, but seven years later, with the issuing of the Chalcis
Decree (446–445), the autonomy of the local courts was severely restricted as Athens demanded that more
and more trials concerning allies be heard in the Athenian law courts. Despite being treated fairly in the
Athenian courts, the allies became discontented with this further loss of independence.
Control of allies’ finances: the Cleinias Decree

In 447, the Cleinias Decree informed the cities of the League of Athens’ decisions to continue exacting
contributions, and outlined details for their annual collection. Those who refused to pay or reduced their
payments would have to plead their cases in the Athenian courts. The tribute was reassessed every four years
and published at the Great Panathenaic Festival attended by delegates from each state. These contributions
were used to further Pericles’ building program, develop democracy and maintain Athenian forces over a
wide area.
There were critics within Athens, and Plutarch records that when Pericles’ policy was denounced as
‘bare-faced tyranny’, he replied ‘that the Athenians were not obliged to give the allies any account of how
their money was spent provided that they carried on the war for them and kept the Persians away’.54 Athens
could use the surplus any way it wished.

Economic dominance
Apart from control of the allies’ contributions, Athens rigorously enforced, by means of the Coinage Decree,
the uniformity of weights, measures and coinage throughout the empire. Athenian silver coins were to be
used throughout the area under Athens’ control, local mints were closed down and all local currencies had
to be taken to Athens to be melted down and reminted. Although these measures undoubtedly made trade
easier, the ‘allies’ resented the loss of their city or state’s independence and individuality.
Control of allies’ foreign policy

It was obvious that the members of the League had no control over their own foreign policy. They were:
• forbidden to leave the ‘alliance’
• unable to have any contact with Persia or Sparta unless sanctioned by Athens
• unable to engage in war with another member.
In 440, Samos, one of the few independent, reliable and ship-contributing members, stood up for its
rights to go to war with Mytilene – another member of the empire – over a dispute. When Samos refused
to abide by Athens’ demands to cease fighting and accept Athenian arbitration, Pericles, with 40 ships,
attempted to reassert Athenian control. He seized hostages, established a garrison and set up a democratic
government. When the Samian leaders overthrew the newly established democracy, it was a test of Athens’
power. It was crucial that Samos be subdued before the Persians intervened or other allies followed its
example. It took a siege of nine months to end Samos’ independent existence: it was forced to pull down
its walls, surrender its fleet, pay a sum of 1276 talents and swear an oath of loyalty.
According to Thucydides, Pericles said ‘that although it might have been wrong to take it [empire]; it
was certainly dangerous to let it go’.55
Advantages of membership in the Athenian empire

Allies of Athens received:
• peace
• protection
• democratic governments
• prosperity through increased trade.
However, the loss of independence in domestic and foreign affairs, economic dependence on Athens
and its high-handed actions far outweighed any advantages gained. Members saw Athens becoming a
tyrant state.
Benefits to Athens
Athens gained great benefits from its empire.
It received not only tribute, but also court
fees, mine rents, market and harbour dues,
rents and confiscations. The funds collected
were used for:
• the payment of state officials and jurors
in the courts
• payment of rowers and soldiers
• maintenance of the fleet
• building of temples
• subsidising festivals.
For 15 years after 447 the Athenians did
not have to pay any direct taxes to the state. Figure 12.49 An artistic 19th-century reconstruction of the Acropolis

ACTIVITY 12.15
1 Explain what Thucydides (Bk I. 99) meant by ‘for this position it was the allies themselves who were
to blame’.
2 Discuss the ways in which Athens restricted the autonomy and rights of the members of its alliance.
3 State the benefits that Athens gained from its increasing control over the members of its alliance.
Key democratic developments in Athens

Table 12.8 Athenian democracy prior to 461
By 500 BC From 500–461

In 500, the government of Athens had some After Marathon in 490, which many saw as a
important democratic features. victory for the infant democracy, there were further
• The People’s Assembly (ecclesia) was open to all democratic developments. These occurred over a
citizens, including the lowest class (thetes), who period of about 40 years, and were the result of:
voted on laws, elected magistrates and decided • Athens’ increasing involvement in military
issues of war and peace. affairs against Persia and Sparta, and the role of
• The heliaea comprised all those who sat in the generals (strategoi)
the Assembly, called together to act as a • the importance of the Athenian navy and the
court. The heliaea could appeal against a rowers in the fleet, who came from the lowest
magistrate’s decision and try a magistrate for social class (thetes) and whose demands had to be
mismanagement. acknowledged.
• The strategoi (sing. strategos) were 10 generals The key democratic changes that occurred in the first
elected by the people. half of the 5th century were:
However, there were still undemocratic aspects of • the use of ostracism (refer back to p. 443).
the constitution: • changes to the archonship – in 487 the Assembly
• The chief magistrates (archons) were elected opened up to the archonship to the second
from only the top socio-economic class. highest socio-economic class as well, and the
• The Areopagus, which made the key decisions archons were no longer elected but chosen by lot.
within the state, was a conservative council • the use of lot, which was regarded as a more
made up of the ex-archons who came from the democratic method as it prevented undue
old aristocratic families. influence being imposed by factions, but it
• The Council of 500 (boule), which considered tended to produce more mediocre officials.
proposals for laws and then passed them on to • the weakening of the conservative, aristocratic
the ecclesia to be voted on, was recruited from Areopagus. Since this comprised ex-archons,
the top two classes only. the use of lot changed the composition and
This was only an infant status of this aristocratic body.
archon chief Athenian magistrate democracy and Athens • the military power of the archon polemarch
lot random or chance selection, was really still governed was taken over by the generals (strategoi), who
as of drawing a name out of a by the conservative continued to be elected from the men best
receptacle aristocratic factions in suited for the job.
society.

From 458, the archons’ position was further weakened by opening it up to all classes and making it a paid
position.
Changes to Athenian democracy from 461

The weakening of the Areopagus
As radical democrats such as Ephialtes and Pericles increased their influence with the people, the power of
the conservative Areopagus was no longer compatible with their policies. In the 460s, when the conservative
Cimon was absent helping the Spartans with their helot revolt, the reformer Ephialtes began an all-out
attack on the Areopagus.
First, he removed many of the Areopagites by laying charges against them for their
mismanagement of affairs. Then … [462–461] he took away all their additional powers
through which they were ‘guard of the state’ and gave some to the council of 500, others to the
demos [people] and the law courts.
Source 12.27 Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution, 25, 1–2
Ephialtes’ laws took away the Areopagus’ right to punish public officials if they broke the law, and their
right to supervise government administration and make sure laws were obeyed. All they were left with were
predominantly sacred duties. The result of Ephialtes’ reform ‘leaves no room for doubt that its purpose
was to convey power to the demos and to eviscerate the aristocratic establishment’.56
demos ‘the people’
Payment for public service
When Ephialtes was murdered in 461, Pericles introduced ‘a sweeping policy allowing
Athenians to participate in all aspects of their government at state expense’.57 Since the use of lot had already
been introduced, what was needed now was payment for service. Pericles introduced:
• payment of 2 obals a day for jury duty. The courts dealt with civil cases of citizens, resident foreign
craftsmen, allies and subjects. There were often as many as 10 courts sitting each day and juries tended to
be large, ranging from 201 to 501 jurors. The amount of judicial business involving allies had increased
so much that it would have been difficult to find enough jurors without some form of compensation.
The payment of 2 obals, although not quite enough to live on, attracted the city’s poor and aged who
became obsessive full-time jurors. These men were the subjects of Aristophanes’ comic play Wasps.
• payments of 4 obals a day for the archonship. This meant there was no need to restrict it to the two
richest classes. Members of the third property class were admitted at this time.
• payment of 1 drachma for members of the Council of 500 and other officials, except generals.
Aristotle, an opponent of radical democracy, says that some people alleged that it was ‘as a result of this
that courts deteriorated, since it was always the ordinary people rather than the better sort who were eager
to be picked for jury service’.58
The extension of democracy under Pericles by means of state payment for public service
required a deliberate decision to rely on the permanent availability of imperial treasure … thus
it presumes the strict interdependence of the Athenian democracy and the Athenian empire.
Source 12.28 C. Fornara and L. Samons, Athens from Cleisthenes to Pericles, p. xvi

Citizenship law
The growth of the Athenian empire provided wealth and slaves, which allowed for citizens to participate
in government. However, because citizens were now paid to serve the state, it was in the interest of Athens
that the number of citizens be restricted.
In 451, Pericles introduced a decree into the Assembly that tightened up the qualifications for
citizenship, controlling the numbers who might enjoy the benefits of Athenian democracy. So strict were
these qualifications that several prominent men, such as Themistocles, would not have been classified as a
citizen had they still been alive. To be a citizen in 451:
• both parents of a candidate had to be Athenian citizens, and legally married
• the members of the deme (local territorial unit) had to be satisfied that a candidate had reached the age
of 18 and was freeborn
• the candidate had to be registered on the deme roll and was scrutinised by the councillors
• the candidate had to spend two years in the army as a cadet before becoming a member of the Assembly.
Possession of the citizenship entailed tremendous and hitherto undreamed of economic

advantages. Athenian public policy became a mirror-image of Athens’ reduction of its allies to
subjects, thus generating the paradox that the perfect democracy of the ancient world required
the subservience of others [subjects and slaves] in order to succeed.
Source 12.29 C. Fornara and L. Samons, Athens from Cleisthenes to Pericles, p. 75
ACTIVITY 12.16
1 Define the archons and explain what changes occurred in their selection and status from 490 to 458.
2 Define the Areopagus and explain why it was undemocratic.
3 Describe the changes that the radical democrat, Ephialtes, brought about in the power of the
Areopagus.
4 Discuss how the position of strategos became more important in the state.
5 The selection process of lot, for choosing many officials, was not effective until payment for service
was introduced. Describe what reforms Pericles introduced in this respect.
6 How does Source 12.28 show the relationship between Pericles’ citizenship law and the development
of an Athenian empire?
12.4 Athens and Sparta

At the beginning of the 5th century, Sparta and Athens were the leading states in Greece, but their
development in the previous centuries had taken them down different roads. The Persian Wars revealed
these fundamental differences, as did the events of the next 50 years, until it was almost inevitable – or so
Thucydides believed – that these two great states would face each other in a major war (the Peloponnesian
War) in the last quarter of the 5th century.
Impact of the Persian Wars

Both Athens and Sparta emerged from the Persian Wars with increased respect and admiration, and were
still in alliance with each other in 478. Their relationship seemed cordial enough, even when the Ionians
refused to carry on the war against Persia under Spartan leadership due to the behaviour of Pausanius.

The Spartans:
• realised the danger posed by Persian wealth and luxury to their kings and citizens.
• had already seen the possibility of corrupt and arrogant behaviour of its leaders once they were away
from their highly structured society. There was a tightening up of the Spartan system to prevent any
liberalising effect on the people.
• feared the possibility of revolts by their helots if they remained for too long outside the Peloponnese
and a worsening of their relationship with their Peloponnesian allies.
For these reasons they accepted Athenian leadership of the continuing war against the Persians in Asia
Minor. Thucydides said, ‘this was a time when Sparta was particularly friendly to Athens because of the
courage displayed by Athens against the Persians’.59 However, this may have been going a bit too far as
there were already hints of ill-will and jealousy between 478 and 472.
Themistocles’ anti-Spartan policy 478–472 BC

The rebuilding of Athens’ walls
After the expulsion of the Persians, Themistocles supervised the rebuilding and fortification of Athens. This
alarmed the Spartans and their allies, who suggested that the Athenians should refrain from rebuilding
their walls and join with Sparta ‘in pulling down all fortifications which still existed in cities outside the
Peloponnese’.60 They concealed their real fear, which was the sudden growth of Athenian sea power, and
used the pretext that a fortified Athens could be a base for the Persians if they came again.
Themistocles went to Sparta, denied that the walls were being built and suggested that envoys be sent to
see for themselves. In this he completely outwitted the Spartans, because the envoys were held as hostages
until the walls were high enough. He then announced that the walls were finished and that in the future
Athens was capable of making up its own mind about what was in its interests.
The issue of the Amphictyonic Council

Immediately after the Persian Wars, the Greek states met at the Amphictyonic Council (a religious
organisation which controlled Delphi). The Spartans suggested that all those Greek states that had remained
neutral or sided with Persia should be expelled from the Council. Themistocles realised that if all these
states were removed, the members of the Peloponnesian League would dominate the Council. He said it
would be intolerable if the Council was controlled by two or three large states.
Plutarch says that this ‘gave particular offense to the Spartans and made them try to strengthen Cimon’s
position by showing him favours and thus establish him as a political rival to Themistocles’.61
The ostracism of Themistocles

In 472, Themistocles was ostracised, as he had made many enemies due to his radical policies, his
outspokenness, his vanity and his continued opposition to Sparta. Many envied him his success and wished
to bring him down. He moved to Argos, Sparta’s traditional enemy, and from there he spread anti-Spartan
propaganda throughout the Peloponnese.
The Spartans wanted him removed, and when he became implicated in the intrigues of Pausanius (of
which there was no proof ), he was accused of high treason and pursued by both Spartan and Athenian
officials. It is hardly likely that he was communicating with Persia as was charged, but he may well have been
plotting against the Spartan constitution. All the same, he fled to the court of the Persian king Artaxerxes,
even becoming a governor of Magnesia in Asia Minor. He died in 460 BC.
The pro-Spartan policy of Cimon 471–462 BC

After the ostracism of Themistocles, the Spartans showed goodwill towards Athens because of Cimon,
to whom they gave honours and favours. Some people described him as more of a Peloponnesian than
an Athenian. He aimed at maintaining good relations with Sparta by emphasising the dual hegemony of
Greece through Spartan military leadership and Athenian naval leadership.

This policy helped postpone a rift between Athens and Sparta, although it is possible that Sparta may
have had some dormant fear of Athens’ early aggressive actions against Skyrus, Carystus and Naxos, and
jealousy of the great success of Cimon and the League forces at Eurymedon.
If these feelings were not openly expressed, the more radical democratic changes happening in Athens
in the late 460s could not be overlooked by Sparta. It was unlikely that Cimon would remain influential
for much longer, or that Sparta would not respond to the changes occurring in Athens.
When Sparta suffered a disastrous earthquake in Laconia in 464 and a subsequent helot revolt, a public
debate was held in Athens over whether to send help to the Spartans. Cimon, with his policy of conservative
politics at home and cooperation with Sparta, was opposed by Ephialtes, a radical democrat, who believed
Sparta was Athens’ natural enemy. The radical democrats, including the young Pericles, had been gaining
in power and popularity, but the fact that Cimon was able to persuade the Assembly to send him with
a force of 4000 troops to help Sparta indicates that the majority of Athenians still supported a policy of
friendship and cooperation with Sparta.
While Cimon was away in Sparta, the radical democrats in Athens (including the young Pericles)
were introducing democratic reforms. Thucydides recorded that the Spartans, ‘fearing the daring and
revolutionary spirit of the Athenians, worried that if they remained at hand they might be persuaded by
the helots at home to cause trouble’.62 So the Athenians were dismissed and ordered home.
This deeply offended the Athenians as they considered ‘this was not the sort of treatment they deserved
from Sparta’,63 and the Spartan rebuff brought a humiliating end to Cimon’s policy of joint leadership
of Greece. Despite all his former successes, he was ostracised in 461 and during his 10-year absence, the
radical democrats led by Pericles (after the murder of Ephialtes in 461) broke the Athenian alliance with
Sparta (which still existed), formed a new alliance with its enemies, Argos and Thessaly, and initiated an
expansionist foreign policy aimed at weakening the Peloponnesian League. This opened a ‘new chapter in
Athenian-Spartan relations, one of open-enmity’.64
Pericles’ policy against the Peloponnesian League
A COMMENT ON…
The Peloponnesian League or ‘Lacedaemonians and the Allies’

• This was formed at the end of the 6th century to create a strong military cordon in the Peloponnese,
as well as provide insulation for Sparta and security for its neighbours.
• This loose confederation of Peloponnesian states (except Argos and Achaea) was strictly speaking a
league for its members who were not allied with one another but only with Sparta.
• It recognised the autonomy of its members, and generally favoured oligarchies.
• It was restricted in purpose to questions of war and when military issues arose, a Council of Allies
met. This consisted of two independent bodies:
– Assembly of Spartiates
– Congress of Allies, in which each state had one vote and a majority vote was binding on all
members.
If both of these bodies voted alike on matters of policy, then the whole alliance was committed to
the policy.

• No tribute was levied except in times of war, when two-thirds of the allies’ military forces were
required for a certain number of months.
• Sparta had to take into account the sentiments and interests of its allies, particularly Corinth which
could, and did, sometimes sway the majority of the Congress against Sparta.
• The allies did not always agree with everything Sparta did, but they were generally loyal and the
League was a very stable organisation; it formed the basis of the Hellenic League that fought the
Persians.
Between 460–450, the Peloponnesian League was undermined as:

• Megara, Corinth’s neighbour, deserted the Peloponnesian League and became an ally of Athens
• Athens gained control of the valuable western trade routes via the Corinthian Gulf at the expense
of Corinth
• Athens engaged in conflicts with Corinth and Aegina, in both of which it was successful
• Mantinea and several other states in the Peloponnese introduced democracy
• Achaea, in the Peloponnese, was encouraged to join the Athenian alliance.
In 457, Sparta, concerned at Athens’ expansion into central Greece, attempted to strengthen Thebes
and enrol some Boeotian cities in the Peloponnesian League. As the Spartan forces returned home they
encountered an Athenian force at Tanagra near the Attic border and a bloody battle ensued, with a victory
to the Spartans.
The Five Years Truce, major Athenian setbacks and a Thirty Years Peace
In 451, Cimon returned from exile and secured a Five Years Truce with Sparta, but in 447, Athens lost its
land empire in Boeotia, and was faced with anti-Athenian revolts in Euboea and Megara. Pericles subdued
the Euboean revolt but was forced to accept that Boeotia and Megara were lost to Athens.
In 445, Athens and the Peloponnesians signed a Thirty Years Peace whereby:
• Athens surrendered the Peloponnesian territories of Nisaea, Pagae, Achaea and Troizen
• they agreed not to interfere with one another’s allies or accept them into their alliance
• they permitted neutral states to join either alliance
• they ensured Aegina’s independence.
This peace established a balance of power between two great rival systems of alliance, involving the
states of mainland Greece, the Aegean and Asia Minor. In this situation neither side could tolerate any
action that would threaten the stability of its alliance, and so any minor conflict involving members of one
alliance or the other could lead to war.
The Thirty Years Peace lasted only 15 years before the Peloponnesian War broke out between Athens
and Sparta in 431.
Thucydides believed war was inevitable because of ‘the growth of Athenian power and the fear this
caused in Sparta’.65 He believed that:
• since 479 Athens had been growing more powerful and had given offence to many states
• from 460 a noticeable rift had occurred between Athens and Sparta
• between 456 and 446 Athens had incurred the hostility of Sparta’s most influential ally, Corinth.

ACTIVITY 12.17
1 Describe the effect on the Athenian/Spartan relationship of:

• Themistocles’ anti-Spartan policy
• Cimons’ pro-Spartan policy
• Pericles’ imperialistic policy.
2 Compare the features of the organisations known as ‘The Lacedaemonians and their allies’ and the
‘Athenians and their allies’. Consider such things as:
• aims
• permanency
• independence of allies
• decision-making bodies
• contributions.
Chapter review
Chapter summary
12.1 THE CHRONOLOGICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL CONTEXT

• The rugged landform of Greece – with only a few large plains – contributed to the emergence of
many small independent city-states (poleis) with their own form of government and way of life. Due to
jealousies, economic rivalries and destructive quarrels, they found it hard to unite against a common
enemy. Also, they did not identify as Hellenes, but were known by their city-states, for example:
Athenians, Spartans, Thebans, Corinthians. Athens and Sparta were the two most powerful states at
the beginning of the 5th century BC.
• Greek city-states existed on the mainland, all around the Mediterranean, across the Aegean, along
the coast of Asia Minor and around the edge of the Black Sea. Those in the east came in contact with,
and were impacted by, the Kingdom of Lydia, and subsequently the extensive Persian Empire of Cyrus,
Cambyses, Darius and Xerxes, under whom they were subjects.
12.2 THE PERSIAN WARS

• Persian imperialism comprised territorial expansion to enhance the glory of the king, and specifically
targeted revenge as a deterrent and to restore a king’s reputation. Along with this, they demanded
tokens of submission: earth and water.
• Between 499–493, the Greek subjects of Persia along the coast of Asia Minor revolted (initiated by
the Ionian city of Miletus) against Persia. In this they were helped by Athens and Eretria. The revolt,
eventually quelled by Persians who destroyed Miletus, was the catalyst that brought about the first
Persian invasion against Greece in 490, its aim to punish Athens and Eretria.

• Darius launched a seaborne attack across the Aegean to Eretria (destroyed) and onto the Plain of
Marathon, hoping to take Athens by surprise. Miltiades led a predominantly Athenian defence (including
a force of Plataeans) and by innovative tactics defeated the Persians. The Spartans were unable to
arrive in time due to the celebration of an important festival. This was seen as a victory for the young
democracy and a myth developed around the ‘Men of Marathon’.
• Between this invasion and the next carried out by Xerxes in 480, the Athenians were faced with internal
power struggles and the development of a navy, and the League of Greeks met at the Isthmus of Corinth
to decide how to react to the danger of another threat from Persia. In the meantime, Xerxes was making
massive preparations for a combined land and sea assault via northern Greece.
• The Greeks and Persians faced each other at sea at Artemisium and on land at Themopylae, where
the courageous last stand of Leonidas failed to stop the march of the Persians on Athens. Although
the city had been evacuated, it was destroyed by the Persians. The next defence was the famous
sea battle at Salamis (a Greek victory owing to the part played by Themistocles) and in 479, a united
Greek force under the command of the Spartan, Pausanius, at Plataea put an end to the Persian
invasion of the mainland. The Greek fleet destroyed the Persains at Mycale in Asia Minor that same
year and the Ionians enrolled in the Greek League.
12.3 THE DEVELOPMENT OF ATHENS AND THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE 478–440 BC

• The Hellenic League led by Sparta during the Persian wars was replaced in 478–7 by a league of sea
states led by Athens, known as the Delian League after the island of Delos. The league was organised
(aims, finances, contributions, oath of loyalty) by Aristides and its navy led by Cimon. From early on it
became apparent that there was the potential for Athens to enhance its own position at the expense
of the allies and therefore some members chose to secede. From 465 Athens began to show its true
intentions and over the next 20 years gradually gained an empire with previous allies becoming subjects.
The empire reached its peak under Pericles, who began an aggressive imperialistic policy that created
suspicion and hostility from Sparta and the members of the Peloponnesian League.
• By 500, Athens was an infant democracy, but from 487–460 more democratic changes were made and in
461, when radical democrats came to power, pay for public service was introduced, and in 451 Pericles
restricted citizenship and participation in the democracy.
12.4 ATHENS AND SPARTA

• The Persian Wars, and the events of the following 50 years, revealed the fundamental differences
between Sparta and Athens and the differences in their respective Leagues.
• Athens’ growth to power and radical democracy created suspicion and fear in oligarchic Sparta,
and Pericles’ aggressive imperialism threatened the economies of many of the large members of the
Peloponnesian League such as Corinth. Despite attempts at establishing truces between the two blocs,
there was an inevitable drift to civil war.

Chapter summary questions 5) Summarise the perspectives of Thucydides on:
• the contribution of Athens to the defence of
Key terms and names
Greece in 480
Use the following in a sentence for each to show your
• the reasons for Athenian leadership of the
understanding of these important historical terms.
Delian League in 477
• cleruchy
• the growth of the Athenian empire.
• Delphic Oracle
• medism Historical skills
• ostracism 1) Assess the degree of unity among the Greeks
• phoros between 490–479.
• polis 2) Evaluate the significance of naval battles in
the course of the second Persian invasion in
• secession
480–479.
• strategoi
3) Explain the reasons for Greek victories over the
• trireme
Persians in 490 and 480–479.
Familiarise yourself with the following historical
4) Analyse to what extent the Persians were
concepts and skills, and identify where they have
responsible for their own defeat during the
been used throughout this study
Persian Wars.
• Causation; continuity and change; perspectives;
5) Assess the careers of Aristides and Cimon in the
significance and contestability
decade after the Persian expulsion from Greece.
• Analysis and use of sources
6) Explain the transformation of the Delian League
• Historical interpretation and investigation
into the Athenian empire.
• Explanation and communication
7) Explain what the following source indicates
about Athenian democracy under Pericles.
Historical concepts and skills
Historical concepts
‘The extension of democracy under
1) Discuss the causes of the Ionian Revolt in
Pericles by means of state payment
499–493 BC.
for public service required a deliberate
2) List the changes that occurred in : decision to rely on the permanent
• the Delian League from 478–454 availability of imperial treasure … thus
• Athenian democracy from 500–451. it presumes the strict interdependence
3) Explain the significance of: of the Athenian democracy and the
• the Greek defeat in the Ionian revolt Athenian empire’.66
• the part played by Miltiades in the Athenian
and Plataean victory at Marathon 8) Discuss how the Spartans reacted to Athens’
• Aegina’s submission to Persia growing power between 479–445.
• the discovery of a vein of silver at Laurium
near Athens
• the prophecy of the Delphic Oracle to
the Athenians
• the role of Leonidas at Thermopylae.
4) Evaluate the significance of the following for the
Athenian allies:
• the Battle of Eurymedon
• the Revolt of Thasos.


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Chapter 12

The Greek world 500–440 BC

Where are we headed?

Key issues • The chronological and geographical context

We did nothing extraordinary, nothing contrary to human nature in

ISBN 978-1-108-41347-3 © Pamela Bradley 2019 Cambridge University Press

Figure 12.3 An artistic depiction of Athens in the 5th century BC

Figure 12.4 A tribute list

422 The ancient world transformed

ISBN 978-1-108-41347-3 © Pamela Bradley 2019 Cambridge University Press

Painting the picture

Chapter 12 The Greek world 500–440 BC 423

ISBN 978-1-108-41347-3 © Pamela Bradley 2019 Cambridge University Press

Dates Major developments

12.1 The chronological and geographical context

424 The ancient world transformed

ISBN 978-1-108-41347-3 © Pamela Bradley 2019 Cambridge University Press

The nature of a Greek polis

The landform of Greece

Chapter 12 The Greek world 500–440 BC 425

ISBN 978-1-108-41347-3 © Pamela Bradley 2019 Cambridge University Press

The Oracle of Delphi

426 The ancient world transformed

ISBN 978-1-108-41347-3 © Pamela Bradley 2019 Cambridge University Press

Figure 12.8 Temple of Apollo

The major cities of the Greek mainland

Chapter 12 The Greek world 500–440 BC 427

ISBN 978-1-108-41347-3 © Pamela Bradley 2019 Cambridge University Press

The Greeks of Asia Minor and the kingdom of Lydia

428 The ancient world transformed

ISBN 978-1-108-41347-3 © Pamela Bradley 2019 Cambridge University Press

1 What was a Greek polis?

Contemporary written sources for the Persian Wars

Source 12.2 Matt Waters, Ancient Persia, p. 11

Source 12.3 Matt Waters, Ancient Persia, p. 120

Chapter 12 The Greek world 500–440 BC 429

ISBN 978-1-108-41347-3 © Pamela Bradley 2019 Cambridge University Press

Herodotus’ background and aims

Figure 12.9 The limitations of Herodotus’ Histories

430 The ancient world transformed

ISBN 978-1-108-41347-3 © Pamela Bradley 2019 Cambridge University Press

Other useful sources for this period

Chapter 12 The Greek world 500–440 BC 431

ISBN 978-1-108-41347-3 © Pamela Bradley 2019 Cambridge University Press

Source 12.4 Inscription at Naqsh-I Rustam, DNa 15–47

Source 12.5 Herodotus, Histories, 7.8.2

432 The ancient world transformed

ISBN 978-1-108-41347-3 © Pamela Bradley 2019 Cambridge University Press

1 Describe the main features of Persian imperialism.

Darius’ first incursion into Europe in 512

The Ionian Revolt 499–493

Chapter 12 The Greek world 500–440 BC 433

ISBN 978-1-108-41347-3 © Pamela Bradley 2019 Cambridge University Press

The course of the war

434 The ancient world transformed

ISBN 978-1-108-41347-3 © Pamela Bradley 2019 Cambridge University Press

Chapter 12 The Greek world 500–440 BC 435

ISBN 978-1-108-41347-3 © Pamela Bradley 2019 Cambridge University Press

Source 12.6 Herodotus, Histories, 6.16

Generally, the Persians treated the Ionians