SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 256939. November 13, 2023.]

JANSSEN D. PEREZ, petitioner, vs. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK

N.A.-PHILIPPINE GLOBAL SERVICE CENTER, respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J :p

Actively participating in profane conversations with coworkers using

company resources during office hours and sending company information to
one's personal email address in violation of company rules amount to serious
misconduct, which is a just cause of terminating one's employment. HTcADC

This Court resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the
Decision 2 and Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
Resolutions 4 of the National Labor Relations Commission. The Court of
Appeals upheld the validity of the employee's dismissal for serious
misconduct that is violative of the employer's policies.
On June 27, 2008, JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A.-Philippine Global Service
Center (JP Morgan Chase) hired Janssen D. Perez (Perez) as a customer
service representative under its Human Resources Department. 5
In May 2014, Perez received a Notice to Explain from JP Morgan Chase
officers accusing him of using the Office Communicator, a private chatroom
for employees, to talk about agents, supervisors, and other colleagues using
indecent, profane, and disrespectful language with other employees. 6 In
response, he admitted to responding "hahaha" and "up down up down left
right le[f]t right" 7 in the private chatroom, but he denied using profane and
abusive language. 8
On June 3, 2014, Perez was called for an interview, where he admitted
knowing that obscenity was prohibited in the company's Code of Conduct
and pinpointed his responses in the Office Communicator. 9 He also admitted
having access to employee information and having sent emails to his
personal email address, but he denied sending any confidential company
information. 10
In July 2014, a second administrative hearing was held, where Perez
vehemently denied using profane and obscene language in the chatroom
conversation. 11
On August 19, 2014, after admitting participation in the chatroom, a
Notice to Explain was sent to Perez, ordering him to explain the charges of
possible violation of the company's Guidelines on Workplace Behavior,
particularly on general conduct and decorum. 12 Perez denied the charges
but admitted that he "was guilty of using the company resources
improperly." 13

On August 27, 2014, an administrative conference was held where

Perez was again given the chance to raise his defense. 14 CAIHTE

On October 24, 2014, Perez received a Notice of Resolution informing

him that the company decided to terminate his employment effective
October 23, 2014 for violating the Guidelines on Workplace Behavior. 15
On December 19, 2014, Perez signed a Release, Waiver, and Quitclaim
with Confidentiality Undertaking. 16
On March 2, 2018, Perez filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with a
prayer for separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement, backwages, damages,
and attorney's fees against JP Morgan Chase. 17
In a July 9, 2018 Decision, 18 Labor Arbiter Marcial Galahad T. Makasiar
(Labor Arbiter Makasiar) found Perez illegally dismissed and ordered JP
Morgan Chase to pay Perez separation pay, backwages, and attorney's fees:
ACCORDINGLY, respondent JP Morgan Chase Bank NA is
adjudged to have illegally dismissed complainant. It is ordered to pay
complainant:
a) Â SEPARATION PAY of P[HP]315,000.00;
b) Â BACKWAGES of P[HP]1,434,195.00; and
c) Â ATTORNEY'S FEES of P[HP]174,919.50.
The foregoing awards aggregate to P[HP]1,924,114.50. Only
the award for backwages shall be subject to 5% withholding tax upon
payment or execution whichever occurs first.
SO ORDERED. 19

Labor Arbiter Makasiar ruled that since the chatroom snapshots were
edited, the deplorable statements could not be imputed to Perez, who was
only proven to have responded "hahaha" and "up down up down left right
left right" to his officemates' remarks. Thus, he ruled that this was not the
"unbecoming behavior" that merited dismissal. 20 He also found no basis to
determine if the contents of the emails Perez forwarded were confidential
and proprietary information of JP Morgan Chase. 21 However, the labor
arbiter admitted that "the terms used [in the conversations] appeal to the
prurient thoughts of the participants in the chat[]room as the words
introduced exemplify abrasive sexual demeanor" deserving dismissal. 22
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission issued its
September 10, 2018 Resolution, 23 upholding the labor arbiter's Decision and
ruling that Perez was illegally dismissed because the penalty of dismissal
was not commensurate to the offense committed, thus:
[A]lthough respondent company has the right to discipline its erring
employees, exercise of such right should be tempered with
compassion and understanding. The magnitude of the infraction
committed must be weighed and equated with the penalty prescribed
and must be commensurate thereto, in view of the gravity of the
penalty of dismissal. In termination cases, what is at stake is not
 simply the job or position but a livelihood. Thus, the penalty of
dismissal is too harsh. 24
In a December 28, 2018 Resolution, 25 the National Labor Relations
Commission denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by JP Morgan Chase.
26

In its October 30, 2020 Decision, 27 the Court of Appeals reversed the
rulings of the National Labor Relations Commission, which it found to have
ignored the evidence on record, resulting in a gross misapprehension of
facts. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for the instant petition for
certiorari is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Decision dated 10 September 2018 and
Resolution dated 28 December 2018 rendered by the NLRC in NLRC
NCR CN. 03-03827-18 (NLRC LAC CN. 08-003132-18(4) [sic] are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE .
SO ORDERED. 28 (Emphasis in the original)
The Court of Appeals held that Perez was not entitled to his monetary
claims, because JP Morgan Chase validly dismissed him after sufficiently
establishing the lawful grounds. 29 It found the following established: (1)
Perez clearly participated in lewd conversation with coworkers using
company resources during office hours; and (2) he sent an official
communication by his manager to his personal email address, without any
authorization and justification. 30 aScITE

In a June 16, 2021 Resolution, 31 the Court of Appeals denied the

Motion for Reconsideration filed by Perez.
Hence, Perez filed the Petition for Review on Certiorari 32 before this
Court against JP Morgan Chase.
Petitioner first alleges that this case falls within the exception to the
rule that this Court only reviews legal questions — when the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the labor tribunals and are based
on a misapprehension of facts. 33 Petitioner claims that the rulings of the
labor tribunals should be accorded respect and finality, as there was no
proof of grave abuse of discretion on their part. 34
Petitioner next argues that he was illegally dismissed from work as the
evidence submitted against him did not justify his dismissal. 35 He claims
that there is no proof that he was an active participant in the Office
Communicator. He alleges that even his admission of uttering the words
"hahaha," and "up down up down left right left right" cannot be equated to
unbecoming behavior deserving dismissal. 36 He claims that he is not guilty
of unauthorized sharing of confidential or proprietary company information
since the information in the email was not proven to be confidential. 37
At any rate, petitioner insists that his purported acts of participating in
a discussion with several colleagues using the Office Communicator and his
office email address to send an email cannot amount to serious misconduct
sufficient to justify his dismissal. 38 Since respondent failed to prove that his
dismissal was legal, petitioner claims that he is entitled to separation pay,
backwages, and attorney's fees. 39
Finally, petitioner claims that Jamie Dimon (Dimon) should be solidarily
liable with respondent as its owner, manager, or president, for having
assented to a patently illegal act and for making it appear that he committed
acts tantamount to just causes. 40 DETACa

In line with this Court's March 16, 2022 Resolution, 41 respondent filed
its Comment/Opposition. 42
Respondent alleges that the Petition should be denied outright as it
raises purely questions of fact, which are not within the province of a Rule 45
petition. 43 It argues that petitioner raises questions of fact in claiming that
he was not an active participant in the Office Communicator and the
information he sent out to external emails was not confidential. 44 In any
case, it maintains that the Court of Appeals' factual findings should be
accorded greater weight. 45
Respondent argues that the Court of Appeals correctly upheld
petitioner's dismissal after considering the overwhelming evidence of his
active violation of company policies, which he admitted, and despite being
part of the department supposed to enforce them. 46 Respondent claims that
the labor tribunals acted with grave abuse of discretion due to their gross
misapprehension of facts, and their findings being contrary to the evidence
on record. 47 Respondent claims that petitioner's messages in the Office
Communicator are aptly considered as obscene by the Court of Appeals. 48 It
adds that the labor tribunals, in burdening it to prove that the emails were
confidential, blatantly failed to consider the nature of its business as a bank
and the confidentiality provision in its rules stating that all information in
office emails are assumed to be confidential. 49
Given petitioner's valid dismissal, respondent claims that petitioner is
not entitled to his monetary claims. 50 It adds that the claim for solidary
liability against Dimon should be dismissed for lack of factual basis, as there
was no evidence of his alleged active participation or involvement in
petitioner's dismissal, and the issue was raised for the first time on appeal.
51

The sole issue to be resolved is whether petitioner was legally

dismissed from employment.
We deny the Petition.
In illegal dismissal cases, the employer has the burden of proof to show
compliance with substantial and procedural due process, or that the
employee was dismissed for a just or authorized cause and was given an
opportunity to be heard prior to the termination of their employment. 52 HEITAD

Article 297 of the Labor Code provides the just causes for when an
employer may validly terminate the employment of an employee:
ARTICLE 297 [282]. Â Termination by Employer. — An employer
may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
 (a) Â Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;
(b) Â Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his
duties;
(c) Â Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust
reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;
(d) Â Commission of a crime or offense by the employee
against the person of his employer or any immediate
member of his family or his duly authorized
representatives; and
(e) Â Other causes analogous to the foregoing.
Misconduct has been defined as the "transgression of some established
and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment." 53
To validly justify the termination of employment, the misconduct must: (a)
be serious, or of such grave and aggravated character and not trivial or
unimportant; (b) relate to the performance of the employee's duties; and (c)
show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the
employer. As this Court has explained:
To warrant termination of employment under Article 297(a) of
the Labor Code, the misconduct must be serious or "of such grave
and aggravated character." Trivial and unimportant acts are not
contemplated under Article 297(a) of the Labor Code.
In addition, the misconduct must "relate to the performance of
the employee's duties" that would render the employee "unfit to
continue working for the employer." Gambling during office hours,
sexual intercourse within company premises, sexual harassment,
sleeping while on duty, and contracting work in competition with the
business of one's employer are among those considered as serious
misconduct for which an employees services may be terminated.
Recently, this Court has emphasized that the rank-and-file
employee's act must have been "performed with wrongful intent" to
warrant dismissal based on serious misconduct. Dismissal is deemed
too harsh a penalty to be imposed on employees who are not induced
by any perverse or wrongful motive despite having committed some
form of misconduct. 54 (Citations omitted)
In Yabut v. Manila Electric Company , 55 this Court found the petitioner
guilty of serious misconduct for violating the respondent company's code of
conduct. This Court found that installing shunting wires was a serious wrong
that was willful and deliberate; that it related to the petitioner's performance
of duties as a branch field representative, who is knowledgeable on meter
operations and handling violations of a customer's contract; and that his act
improperly used his knowledge to illegally obtain electric power from his
employer, rendering him unfit to continue performing his functions. aDSIHc

I n Ocampo v. International Ship Crew Management Phils., Inc., 56 this

Court held that the petitioner was validly dismissed from his employment for
serious misconduct after he had discriminated against his crew members
who were of different national and ethnic origin, thus:
Petitioner was dismissed on this ground due to his racist
treatment of his subordinates. Particularly, petitioner was reported to
have called his Myanmar crew members "animals," and worse, he
allegedly withheld drinking water from them and rationed it out
despite its eventual availability. This pattern of discriminatory
treatment against the Myanmar crew members shows that the acts
were deliberately done.
More than creating hostile and inhumane working conditions,
these incidents also display petitioner's prejudice against his crew
members who are of different national and ethnic origin. To refer to
other human beings as "animals" reflects the sense of superiority
petitioner has for himself and how he sees others as subhuman.
Racial discrimination is a grave issue. Discrimination on the
basis of race, nationality, or ethnic origin has deep historical roots,
and is a global phenomenon that still exists until today. Racist
attitudes have cost numerous lives and livelihoods in the past as in
the present, and they should no longer be tolerated in any way. The
State has formally made clear its intention to end racial
discrimination as early as the 1960's when the Philippines signed the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Evidently, petitioner's misconduct is considered serious, as it is
"of such a grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or
unimportant."
That he is the commander of the entire crew worsens the
situation. Being the leader of the vessel, it was his duty to inspire a
"harmonious and congenial atmosphere on board," which he failed to
do. His ill treatment of his subordinates is inevitably related to the
performance of his duties as Master and Captain, and it shows his
unfitness to continue in such capacity. Thus, his dismissal for serious
misconduct was done for a just cause. 57 (Citations omitted)
In Nissan Motors Phils., Inc. v. Angelo, 58 this Court found evidence to
support the employer's allegation of serious misconduct or insubordination,
since the letter written by the employee against his employers was grossly
discourteous in content and tenor. This Court thus upheld that "accusatory
and inflammatory language used by an employee to the employer or
superior can be a ground for dismissal or termination." 59 ATICcS

Misconduct must likewise be shown to be severe so as to warrant the

employee's termination of employment. 60 There are several factors to
consider the severity warranting employment termination:
There are several ways to manifest the severity that suffices to
qualify petitioner's alleged misconduct or breach of trust as so grave
that terminating his employment is warranted. It may be through the
nature of the act itself: spanning an entire spectrum between, on one
 end, an overlooked error, made entirely in good faith; and, on
another end, outright larceny. It may be through the sheer amount
mishandled. It may be through frequency of acts. It may be through
other attendant circumstances, such as attempts to destroy or
conceal records and other evidence, or evidence of a motive to
undermine the business of an employer.61
I n Adamson University Faculty and Employees Union v. Adamson
University, 62 this Court held that whether the teacher exclaiming "anak ng
puta" committed serious misconduct warranting dismissal from employment
is determined by the context of the phrase's use. We held that merely
uttering the expletive loudly and suddenly is not grave misconduct per se,
but the teacher's subsequent willful acts of refusing to acknowledge his
mistake and attempting to cause further damage to a minor student
aggravated the misconduct he committed and negated professionalism in
his behavior.
I n Bernardo v. Dimaya, 63 this Court considered the employee's
subsequent acts after committing a violation, such as his unjustified
insistence not to comply with the company policy and passing the blame on
his team members for their violations, in finding that the employee's
wrongful intent and willful disobedience warranted his dismissal.
Here, respondent argues that petitioner violated the following
provisions in its Guidelines on Workplace Behavior, of which petitioner was
clearly aware as an employee of its Human Resources Department, thus:
GWB L.1.1. Serious Misconduct — Dismissal
GWB L.1.10. Use or display of offensive, libelous, indecent, insulting,
profane, abusive, disrespectful, discriminatory or derogatory
language or conduct — Dismissal
GWB L.2.4. Unauthorized sharing of confidential or proprietary
company, client, supplier or employee information or material to any
person who has no business need [sic] to know — Dismissal 64
(Citations omitted)
On the first ground, the Court of Appeals held that respondent
sufficiently established that petitioner actively participated in profane
conversation with coworkers using company resources or the Office
Communicator during office hours. The Court of Appeals considered:
First, the Office Communicator is a work tool provided by
petitioner for easy communication among its employees strictly for
office-related matters. This is a fact known to Perez but he and his co-
employees used the office chatroom for private and lewd
conversations instead.
Second, the conversation in the chatroom was carried out
between Perez and co-workers making reference to female employees
and other colleagues, using very obscene and offensive language
(such as "send ko senyo pic namin habang dinidilaan ko tinggil nya"
"kinain nyo ba puke nya," "halos luwa na dede," "sarap ikiskis yung
ulo ng etits ko sa katawan nya" and many others.)
Third, it must be emphasized that Perez was an employee of
 the HR department and he had been in the office for more than six
years when the investigation was started. As such, he is expected to
be fully aware and very much familiar with office rules and
regulations, including the company's Guidelines on Work [B]ehavior.
He was also expected to be a good example in the implementation of
the company policies. Instead, Perez not only tolerated the gross and
vulgar conversation, he actively participated in it.ETHIDa

Fourth, even Perez himself admitted his wrongdoing. As he

expressed in his written explanation:
I am aware that I am guilty of using the
company resources improperly and this will serve
as a lesson for me. I love this job and I am not gonna do
things that would jeopardize my employment with the
company.
During the administrative conference, Perez admitted that (1)
the OC chat room was used for non-work related matters, (2) the OC
conversation was inappropriate, (3) it was a conversation among
friends, and (4) it was not the usual tone of conversation he would
have while inside company premises. He also admitted that there
were female colleagues described in the conversation using a sexual
tone, which he further admitted was inappropriate. He likewise
admitted that the word "gago" can be profane word. 65 (Emphasis in
the original, citations omitted)
On the second ground, the Court of Appeals considered respondent's
prevailing Code of Conduct provisions on confidentiality in ruling against
petitioner upon finding that petitioner forwarded an official communication
from his manager, without any authorization or justification, to his personal
email address:
1.4 Â Dealing with Confidential Information
Trust is essential to our business success. Customers,
suppliers and companies with which we do business trust us
to be good stewards of their confidential information,
whether that information relates to financial, personal or
business matters.
Confidential information can be written, oral, telephonic or
electronic and includes a variety of data, from technology
applications, business strategies and customer lists to credit
procedures, customer preferences and personnel information. How do
you know what information is confidential information? The best
practice is to assume that all personal information and all
information you have about the Company and its business
(including past[,] present and prospective customers,
business partners, suppliers, directors and employees) is
confidential, unless the contrary is clear.
Disclose confidential information only on a need-to-know basis.
You have a duty to protect confidential information as you would your
own personal information and to take precautions before sharing it
with anyone, inside or outside the workplace. Don't share confidential
information with friends or family, and don't discuss it in public places
 where others could hear you. Do not access, use or disclose
confidential information to fellow employees who are not involved in
providing services to the owner of the information, unless you are
authorized or legally permitted to do so. Finally, don't send
internal communications, including intranet postings, outside
the Company without authorization. 66 (Emphasis in the original)
However, the labor tribunals found that the violation of the company
rules was not sufficiently proven, such that it was not clearly established
that petitioner said the profane words, and there was no proof that the
company information from his manager was confidential. Even if it were, the
labor tribunals held that the misconduct did not warrant the termination of
petitioner's employment. TIADCc

We agree with the Court of Appeals.

Under Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. The factual findings of
the appellate courts are generally binding on this Court, especially when
supported by substantial evidence. 67 Parties should allege, prove, and
substantiate that their case clearly falls under the exception to the rule as
when questions of facts may be reviewed by this Court. 68 Rule 45 petitions
should not only raise pure questions of law, but also "questions of such
substance as to be of distinctly significant consequence and value" 69 since
review is a matter of sound judicial discretion and will only be granted when
there are special and important reasons therefor. 70
Moreover, in Hubilla v. HSY Marketing Ltd., Co., 71 this Court
emphasized that it has full discretion on whether to review the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals, that is, when a party properly pleas, proves,
and substantiates the inaccuracy in the Court of Appeals' findings, thus:
Factual findings of labor officials exercising quasi-judicial
functions are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts
when the findings are supported by substantial evidence. Substantial
evidence is "the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Thus, in
labor cases, the issues in petitions for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals are limited only to whether the National Labor Relations
Commission committed grave abuse of discretion.
However, this does not mean that the Court of Appeals is
conclusively bound by the findings of the National Labor Relations
Commission. If the findings are arrived at arbitrarily, without resort to
any substantial evidence, the National Labor Relations Commission is
deemed to have gravely abused its discretion:
On this matter, the settled rule is that factual
findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have
acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are
generally accorded not only respect but even finality by
the courts when supported by substantial evidence, i.e.,
the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. We
emphasize, nonetheless, that these findings are not
 infallible. When there is a showing that they were arrived
at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record,
they may be examined by the courts. The [Court of
Appeals] can then grant a petition for certiorari if it finds
that the [National Labor Relations Commission], in its
assailed decision or resolution, has made a factual finding
that is not supported by substantial evidence. It is within
the jurisdiction of the [Court of Appeals], whose
jurisdiction over labor cases has been expanded to review
the findings of the [National Labor Relations Commission].
cSEDTC

The Court of Appeals may also review factual findings if quasi-

judicial agencies' findings are contradictory to its own findings. Thus,
it must re-examine the records to determine which tribunal's findings
were supported by the evidence.
. . . The Court of Appeals also found that the findings of the
National Labor Relations Commission were not supported by
substantial evidence, and therefore, were rendered in grave abuse of
discretion.
Thus, in the determination of whether the National Labor
Relations Commission committed grave abuse of discretion, the Court
of Appeals may re-examine facts and re-assess the evidence.
However, its findings may still be subject to review by this Court.
This Court notes that in cases when the Court of Appeals acts
as an appellate court, it is still a trier of facts. Questions of fact may
still be raised by the parties. If the parties raise pure questions of law,
they may directly file with this Court. Moreover, contradictory factual
findings between the National Labor Relations Commission and the
Court of Appeals do not automatically justify this Court's review of the
factual findings. They merely present a prima facie basis to pursue
the action before this Court. The need to review the Court of Appeals'
factual findings must still be pleaded, proved, and substantiated by
the party alleging their inaccuracy. This Court likewise retains its full
discretion to review the factual findings. 72 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
Here, petitioner fails to convince us of the need to review the factual
findings of the Court of Appeals, as petitioner failed to plea, prove, and
substantiate the Court of Appeals' inaccuracy. Petitioner merely relied on the
labor tribunals' findings in substantiating his Petition before this Court. AIDSTE

On the other hand, petitioner's own admissions bolster the correctness

of the Court of Appeals' ruling. Petitioner admitted responding "hahaha" and
"up down up down left right left right" to lewd remarks about female
colleagues, female and male genitalia, and the act of sexual intercourse in
the Office Communicator. 73 Even the labor arbiter found that "the terms
used appeal to the prurient thoughts of the participants in the chat[]room as
the words introduced exemplify abrasive sexual demeanor that is typical of
loose and depraved morality" and "the use or display of such terms deserve
dismissal." 74
Petitioner also admitted that he forwarded company information to his
personal email address knowing that only his company-designated email
should be used for company-related purposes. Given the company policy to
presume that all office emails are confidential, sending company email to his
personal email address was a deliberate violation of the company rules.
I n Sy v. Neat, Inc., 75 this Court considered the principle of totality of
infractions in determining the sanction imposable on the employee:
In determining the sanction imposable on an employee, the
employer may consider the former's past misconduct and previous
infractions. Also known as the principle of totality of infractions, the
Court explained such concept in Merin v. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al., thus:
The totality of infractions or the number of
violations committed during the period of employment
shall be considered in determining the penalty to he
imposed upon an erring employee. The offenses
committed by petitioner should not be taken singly and
separately. Fitness for continued employment cannot be
compartmentalized into tight little cubicles of aspects of
character, conduct and ability separate and independent
of each other. While it may be true that petitioner was
penalized for his previous infractions, this does not and
should not mean that his employment record would be
wiped clean of his infractions. After all, the record of an
employee is a relevant consideration in determining the
penalty that should be meted out since an employee's
past misconduct and present behavior must be taken
together in determining the proper imposable penalty.
Despite the sanctions imposed upon petitioner, he
continued to commit misconduct and exhibit undesirable
behavior on board. Indeed, the employer cannot be
compelled to retain a misbehaving employee, or one who
is guilty of acts inimical to its interests. It has the right to
dismiss such an employee if only as a measure of self-
protection. 76 (Citation omitted)
Here, petitioner had been an employee of the Human Resources
Department for more than six years, and thus, he was expected to be fully
aware of the company rules. His own admission of participating and using
the company chatroom in uttering indecent words about female colleagues
and sending out company information to his personal email address amount
to willful transgression of the company's Guidelines on Workplace Behavior.
His transgressions patently relate to the performance of his duties as part of
the Human Resources Department, expected as he was to exhibit good
conduct. His acts rendered him unfit to continue working for respondent.
Thus, for committing serious misconduct, petitioner was validly terminated
for a just cause.
In return for the extensive obligations to the employee that the law
imposes on the employer, the employer can lawfully and reasonably expect
from its employee "not only good performance, adequate work and
diligence, but also good conduct and loyalty." 77 As such, in the exercise of
its management prerogative, the employer can discipline its employees,
impose appropriate penalties on their infractions pursuant to company rules,
and may not be compelled to continue employing persons whose
continuance in the service will be inimical to its interests. 78 SDAaTC

Since petitioner's dismissal was valid, there is no need to discuss the

alleged solidary liability of Dimon. 79 Furthermore, since there was a just
cause for terminating petitioner from employment, there is no factual or
legal basis for his monetary claims. 80
ACCORDINGLY, the Petition is DENIED. The October 30, 2020
Decision and June 16, 2021 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 160278 are AFFIRMED. The Complaint for illegal dismissal filed by
petitioner Janssen D. Perez against respondent JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A.-
Philippine Global Service Center is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Lazaro-Javier, M.V. Lopez, J.Y. Lopez and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Rollo , pp. 12-34.

2. Id. at 35-47. The October 30, 2020 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 160278 was
penned by Associate Justice Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob and concurred
in by Associate Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and Tita Marilyn Payoyo-
Villordon of the Special Seventh Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

3. Id. at 49-51. The June 16, 2021 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 160278 was penned
by Associate Justice Marie Christine Azcarraga-Jacob and concurred in by
Associate Justices Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and Tita Marilyn Payoyo-
Villordon of the Former Special Seventh Division, Court of Appeals, Manila.

4. Id. at 74-88, 90-93. The September 10, 2018 and December 28, 2018
Resolutions in NLRC NCR CN. 03-03827-18 [NLRC LAC CN. 08-003132-18(4)]
were penned by Presiding Commissioner Julia Cecily Coching Sosito and
concurred in by Commissioners Erlinda T. Agus and Dominador B. Medroso,
Jr. of the Second Division, National Labor Relations Commission, Quezon City.

5. Id. at 36.

6. Id.

7. Id. at 310.

8. Id.

9. Id. at 36, 310.

10. Id. at 36-37.

11. Id. at 310.

12. Id. at 37.

13. Id. at 37, 311. (Citations omitted)

14. Id. at 37.

15. Id.

16. Id. at 80.

17. Id. at 36.

18. Id. at 310-315.

19. Id. at 315.

20. Id. at 312.

21. Id. at 313.

22. Id. at 312.

23. Id. at 74-88.

24. Id. at 85.

25. Id. at 90-93.

26. Id. at 93.

27. Id. at 35-47.

28. Id. at 46.

29. Id. at 45.

30. Id. at 42, 45.

31. Id. at 49-51.

32. Id. at 12-34.

33. Id. at 20.

34. Id. at 21.

35. Id. at 22.

36. Id.

37. Id. at 23.

38. Id. at 24.

39. Id. at 25-26.

40. Id. at 27.

41. Id. at 381.

42. Id. at 383-410.

43. Id. at 389.

44. Id. at 390.

45. Id. at 392.

46. Id. at 388, 401.

47. Id. at 393-394.

48. Id. at 396.

49. Id. at 399-400.

50. Id. at 402.

51. Id. at 404-406.

52. Hubilla v. HSY Marketing Ltd., Co., 823 Phil. 358, 384 (2018) [Per J. Leonen,
Third Division]. See also National Labor Relations Commission v. Salgarino,
529 Phil. 355 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division].

53. Yabut v. Manila Electric Company, 679 Phil. 97, 110-111 (2012) [Per J. Reyes,
Second Division]. See also National Labor Relations Commission v. Salgarino,
529 Phil. 355 (2006) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, First Division].

54. Bravo v. Urios College , 810 Phil. 603, 617-618 (2017) [Per J. Leonen, Second
Division].

55. 679 Phil. 97 (2012) [Per J. Reyes, Second Division].

56. 900 Phil. 205 (2021) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

57. Id. at 214-216.

58. 673 Phil. 150 (2011) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division].

59. Id. at 160. (Citation omitted)

60. Rivera v. Genesis Transport Service, Inc., 765 Phil. 544, 555 (2015) [Per J.
Leonen, Second Division].

61. Id. at 558.

62. 872 Phil. 462 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

63. G.R. No. 195584, November 10, 2021 [Per J. Gaerlan, Second Division].

64. Rollo , p. 37.

65. Rollo , pp. 43-44.

66. Id. at 44-45.

67. Pascual v. Burgos, 776 Phil. 167, 182 (2016) [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
68. Id. at 169.

69. Kumar v. People , 874 Phil. 214, 216 (2020) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

70. RULES OF COURT, Rule 45, Sec. 6; Kumar v. People , 874 Phil. 214, 216 (2020)
[Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

71. 823 Phil. 358 (2018) [Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

72. Id. at 374-376.

73. Rollo , p. 310.

74. Id. at 312.

75. 821 Phil. 751 (2017) [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].

76. Id. at 766-767.

77. Sugue v. Triumph International (PHILS.), Inc., 597 Phil. 320, 341 (2009) [Per J.
Leonardo-de Castro, First Division].

78. See Philippine Span Asia Carriers Corporation v. Pelayo, 826 Phil. 776 (2018)
[Per J. Leonen, Third Division].

79. Rollo , p. 27.

80. Id. at 25-26.