Conjugal Rights
Conjugal Rights
Conjugal Rights
UNIT- 5
Relief of conjugal rights is not Indian concept. Initially, this matrimonial relief was not present.
Sec 9 of Hindu Marriage act provides for this relief of matrimonial rights.
1. S.9 HMA
2. Historical Background
3. Society ( Cohabitation)
4. Matrimonial Home (Choice of Matrimonial Home)
5. Withdrawal from society – Weekend’s Marriage
6. Reasonable Excuse
7. Constitutional Validity of S.9 HMA
8. Provision under Muslim law, Christian law and Parsi law.
This remedy ensures that the spouse is brought back to resume cohabitation .
Marriage must be a valid marriage for this remedy.
CONCEPT UNDER THE REMEDY:-
1. SOCIETY:- society or cohabitation used interchangeably. Society implies marital cohabitation
(Summum Bonum)
In Evans v/s Evans (1947):- cohabitation is a state of affairs not merely residence that is while
performing their respective role the wife maintains and performs her wifely duties and is acknowledged
by husband as his wife and husband behaving as husband. (Lord Goddard)
Matrimonial Home:- is imp in a conjugal relationship but more imp is cohabitation as it implies each
other society , companionship etc.
Choice of matrimonial home :- who has the right to decide the locus of matrimonial home.
Halsbury’s Law of England 4th edition Vol.13:- It is the husband’s duty to provide with the home Acc. to
his circumstances there is not absolute rule whereby either party is entitled to decide to the other where
the matrimonial home shall be the matter is to be settled by agreement b/w the parties by process of give
and take and by reasonable accommodation.
DATE: 06 Oct. 23
CASES:-
1. Tirath Kaur v/s Kripal Singh AIR 1964 P&H. 28
2. Gaya Prasad v/s Bhagwati Saran AIR 1966 MP 212.
3. Pravinaben v/s Sureshbhai Tribhovan Arya AIR 1974 Guj.69.
4. N.R Radhakrishnan v/s Dhanalakshmi AIR 1975 Mad. 331.
5. Mirchumal v/s Devi Bai AIR 1977 Raj 113.
6. Swaraj Garg v/s K.M. Garg AIR 1978 Del 296.
7. Kailash Wati v/s Ayodhya 1977.
8. Shanti v/s Romesh 1971 Allahabad.
If withdrawal is there which is voluntary act the aggrieved spouse , the aggrieved one has the right to
file for restitution of conjugal right
Where court finds that there was no justifiable grounds for the spouse to withdraw , then court passes
order for restitution the conjugal right.
Where the wife has taken up the employment with w/o consent of husband or under compulsion and
then when husband ask wife to quit the job to join the husband and the wife refuses, whether such a
refusal on part of wife whether this amount to withdrawal or not?
This ques came up in Tirath Kaur v/s Kripal Singh AIR 1964 for the 1st time.
In Tirath case the parties were married and the husband was in bad financial condition and due to it
the husband has asked wife to take some training course or tailoring and upon husband’s demand she
did that but the cost of such course was unable to be paid by husband and she gets the support from
her father and thereafter she completes the degree and gets the job and that job was away from
husband’s place. As and when time permitted the wife visited her husband and use to give share to
his husband and father in law and wife was asked to quit the job and the wife refuses.
In Gaya Prasad v/s Bhagwati Saran , the facts were kind of similar and wife was asked to leave the
job and she refuses.
In Pravinaben v/s Sureshbhai Tribhovan Arya , it is after the marriage that the wife took the job
with the consent of the husband and cohabitation aspect was similar to Tirath’s case. The husband
asked the wife to quit the job and wife refuses.
In N.R Radhakrishnan v/s Dhanalakshmi, the husband and wife were employed before marriage
and the husband was a driver in state corporation and wife was a teacher and wife was in a better
financial condition , after transfer the husband moves to diff place and ask wife to move with him
leaving the job.
In Mirchumal v/s Devi Bai: they were posted in diff place and the wife use to visit him , wife
resigns the job and stays with the husband and due to financial condition again take the job which
was away from husband and husband filed petition for restitution of conjugal rights , the wife
pleaded that I am not averse to cohabitation and always willing to visit his husband but the husband
still files the petition.
In Kailash Wati v/s Ayodhya Prasad 1977:- the facts are the same.
The court’s observation in N.R Radhakrishnan v/s Dhanalakshmi case is very pertinent . Four type
of situation:-
(a) Marries women already in job
(b) Husband encourages wife to take the job
(c) Where the wife accepts the job after marriage away from matrimonial home and against the
wishes of husband.
(d) Parties under agreement take up the job with mutual understanding in different places.
Two types of view are taken by HC’s. In
1. Tirath Kaur v/s Kripal Singh
2. Gaya Prasad v/s Bhagwati Saran
3. Kailash Wati v/s Ayodhya Prasad
One view of HC :- Under the law, the wife’s first duty to her husband is to submit herself obediently
to his authority and remain under his protection and roof. Acc. To ordinary custom of Hindu society ,
wife is expected to perform the marital obligation at the husband’s residence and she could not
impose her unilateral decision on the husband by merely stating that she has no objection to allow
the husband to live with her at the place where she has accepted the service. Wife can’t take or
choose the employment against the wishes of the husband and if she has taken up the job with/
without the consent of the husband she must give it up and should go and live with him wherever he
may choose to take her otherwise this will amount to withdrawal from the society.
Other view of HC:- Justice Kaju , shanti v/s Romesh , Pravinaben and Dhanalaksmi case and
Mirchumal case:- The court has taken up different stance. Mere refusal of the wife to resign her job
at the insistence of the husband is not a sufficient ground for granting a decree for restitution of
conjugal right and wife taking up the job contrary to the wishes of husband will not amount to
withdrawal from the society. The proposition that the wife must always stay under the roof of the
husband might have been right in the past but it is no longer true in the modern times and in all
circumstances just bc the wife is working at a different place can’t be termed as withdrawal from
society of the husband. Husband is also not entitled to restitution where he had treated the wife with
cruelty. In the age of equality of opportunity to both the sexes wife taking up a job or not giving it up
at the insistence of husband can’t amount to withdrawal from the society.
REASONABLE EXCUSE:-
Sec 9 says that withdrawal should not be without reasonable excuse.
Reasonable excuse for sec 9 are those reasons which are sufficiently grey and which compels other
spouses to withdraw.
Desertion is a ground for divorce (2 year period given) but in withdrawal the time period is not given
in sec 9 , however it can be inferred by conduct of the parties.
Withdrawal need not always be physical it can be under the same roof
So , where spouses withdraw with reasonable excuse- no restitution of conjugal right.
Reasonable excuse should be a mis construct of the spouse. Any act of omission on the part of
petitioner which makes it impossible for respondent to live with him , then it amounts to reasonable
excuse.
Example:-If wife says that the financial condition of the husband is not good – so this is not a
reasonable excuse.
If persistent nagging by anyone in matrimonial home , husband is a drinker etc are justifiable ground.
In Ram Chandra v/s Adarsh 1987 (Del):- In this case, the wife goes to his home for delivery and
husband doesn’t care to visit wife or new child while being in the same city. This is not done and
when wife withdraws – it is reasonable excuse.
In Ashok V/s Shabhnam :- Constant demand of dowry and harassment and wife withdraws-
reasonable excuse.
DATE: 09 Oct. 23
CASES:-
RAMCHANDRA V/S ADARSH 1987 DEL 991.
ASHOK V/S SHABNAM
FOSTER V/S FOSTER 1956 2 ALL ER 518.
KULDEEP KUMAR DOGRA V/S MONICA SHARMA AIR 2010 HP 58.
S.18 Hindu Adoption and Maintenance act 1956, provides a remedy to a wife that a Hindu wife w/o seeking
to dissolve can seek separate residence and maintenance from her husband and this is purely her choice.
Foster v/s Foster:- Any act of commission or omission amounted to reasonable excuse must be something
grave, weighty and convincing and it should be something more than a fad/whims.
1. Here the very validity challenged as it is violative of art 21 and 14. Justice chaudhary holds the view
that remedy under s.9 must be struck down . Sec 9 of HMA is violative of right to privacy and human
dignity guaranteed by art 21of the constitution and is hence ultra vires. A degree for restitution of
conjugal right constitute the grosses form . It denies the women her free choice whether when and
how her body is to become vehicle for procreation of another human being , state coercion of this
nature can neither prolong nor preserve the voluntary union of husband and wife in matrimony.
Neither can state coercion soften the ruffled feelings nor clear the misunderstanding b/w the parties.
Sec 9 doesn’t promote any legitimate purpose based on any concept of social good and thus it is
arbitrary and violative of art 14 and 21. Sec 9 violates right to privacy through state intervention it
compels an unwilling wife to subject herself to martial intercourse with a man who is her husband it
encroaches upon human dignity bc of the forced sex and thus is an engine is operation in the hand of
husband and therefore sec 9 must be struck down.
2. Delhi HC is upholding the constitutionality. Justice Rohatgi – object of sec 9 is to bring about co-
habitation b/w estranged espouses. The remedy doesn’t only mean sexual intercourse it is one of the
elements that constitute matrimonial consortium. Matrimonial intercourse is not the “summum
bonum” while enforcing co-habitation by degree of constitution of conjugal right. Court can’t
enforce marital intercourse , it serves a social purpose as an aid to prevent break up of marriages.
Allowing constitutional law into family matters amounts to bull in the China shop. It is true that that
sexual relations constitute a most important attribute of conception of marriage but it is also true that
they don’t constitute the whole content nor can be remaining aspect of matrimonial consortium be
said to be of a trivial character. He referred to Halsbury’s law of England and further observes that
co-habitation doesn’t necessarily means sexual intercourse and refusal to sexual intercourse doesn’t
constitute refusal co-habit.
DATE:- 10 Oct. 23
DATE: 11 Oct. 23
Sec 23 though has an overriding effect has not been judicially interpreted to prevent the scheming spouse
to take advantage of his own wrong . S.9 has now failed and abolished.
In 2006 in the case “Novin Kohli v/s Neelu Kohli” SC urged the Union govt that they should look
into this aspect and add irrevetable breakdown of marriage as divorce