World War II Infantry Tactics

World War II Infantry Tactics
Squad and Platoon

(Elite 105)
An extract from ‘Squad Tactics – Offensive’
Basic American squad formations as described in the Rifle Company manual of 1942 were
remarkably similar to the German equivalents. The US ‘squad column’ saw the squad strung out,
with the leader and BAR man to the fore, and the remainder in file to the rear to a length of roughly
60 paces. Such a formation was ‘easily controlled and manoeuvred’, and ‘suitable for crossing areas
exposed to artillery fire, for utilising narrow covered routes, and for movement in woods, fog,
smoke, and darkness’.
The ‘skirmish line’ was similar to the Schützenkette. The squad was deployed in a rough line about
60 paces long; the skirmish line was of benefit in bringing all weapons to bear, and useful for short
rapid dashes, but not so easy to control. An alternative was the ‘squad wedge’, suitable for ready
movement in any direction and when emerging from cover or a defile. More vulnerable than a
skirmish line, wedges were best used beyond the range of effective rifle fire. Once under fire the US
squad was taught to advance either by short rushes, or by ‘creep’ and ‘crawl’, taking advantage of
cover. Although it may only rarely have been practicable, a detailed scheme of ‘fire distribution’
formed part of squad training for the fire fight:
‘Each member of the squad fires his first shot on that portion of the target corresponding generally
to his position in the squad. He then distributes his next shots right and left of his first shots,
covering that part of the target on which he can deliver accurate fire without having to change
position. The amount of the target which one man can cover will depend upon the range and
position of the firer. Frequently each man will be able to cover the target with accurate fire; this
should be done whenever possible. Fire is not limited to points within the target known to contain
an enemy; on the contrary, all men space their shots so that no portion of the target remains unhit.
Automatic riflemen fire bursts of about five rounds at the slow cyclic rate (in about one second).
This method of fire distribution is employed without command. The squad leader observes the fire
to insure that the entire target is kept under fire. If other targets appear, he announces such
changes in fire distribution as are necessary.’
Even if the niceties were ignored, the implication is inescapable: the US infantryman was taught to
treat the enemy position as an area target, to be evenly filled with lead whether or not specific
individuals could be seen and hit. Frequently this is exactly what was done; it was definitely no
mere ‘theory’. A letter of instruction issued in April 1944 by Gen Patton to his unit commanders in
US Third Army specifically stated that ‘If you cannot see the enemy, you can at least shoot the
place where he is apt to be.’ According to Patton’s opinion fire was better aimed short than long in
cases of doubt, since ‘ricochets make nastier sounds and wounds’.
For the textbook attack, US squad leaders were enjoined to give specific orders to individuals and
as much information as possible about what was intended. The squad would then move forward,
‘fire and movement’ being employed when ‘fire action’ became necessary to cover the advance. At
the first firing position the squad attempted to gain superiority of fire over the enemy – this being
achieved ‘by subjecting the enemy to fire of such accuracy and intensity that his fire becomes
inaccurate or so reduced in volume as to be ineffective’. In order to maintain this superiority it
would often be necessary for some squad members to remain in position, putting down large
volumes of fire, while others moved forward to new positions, from which they in turn would take
up the fire fight. Suitable cover, including rises and depressions, could allow short moves at small
hazard, but open areas would need longer rushes prepared by commensurately greater applications
of fire. The BAR man was best placed to support the advance from a flank, husbanding his fire to
the needs of the situation so as not to exhaust his ammunition prematurely.
Again, Patton’s Third Army instructions of 1944 had an even more aggressive tone, and encouraged
even heavier use of fire. It was to be seen as integral to movement: ‘Infantry must move in order
to close with the enemy. It must shoot in order to move.’ Moreover, ‘marching fire’ was to be
encouraged as the infantry went in, since it increased confidence and unsettled the enemy. ‘To halt
under fire is folly. To halt under fire and not fire back is suicide. Move forward under fire.’
World War II Infantry Tactics
Company and Battalion
(Elite 122)
The machine gun was frequently the key support weapon of the infantry battle. It aided the attack,
but was probably at its most dramatically effective in defence. Machine gun fire alone was perfectly
capable of halting an advance, as B Company, 4th Bn Somerset Light Infantry would discover near
Mont Pincon in Normandy. Lieutenant Sydney Jary recalled:
‘The forward platoon… had barely crossed the stream when concentrated Spandau fire came from
the front and both flanks. There must have been about twelve machine guns firing at one time. This
devastating firepower stopped the battalion dead in its tracks. There was no way forward or around
it and no way to retire.’
At longer ranges machine gun fire was no longer ‘flat trajectory’, covering all the space between the
firer and the target, but rose and fell, creating more limited ‘beaten zones’ which varied in size
according not only to the type of weapon but the relative elevations of the gun and target. As
distance increased corrections for wind, temperature, and the elevation of the firer became more
important, making supporting MG fire a much more complex subject than simply ‘pointing and
shooting’.

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World War II Infantry Tactics

Squad and Platoon

An extract from ‘Squad Tactics – Offensive’

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