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Unit Seven
Radical Legal Theories
Critical Legal Studies
Conception of justice
Concept of justice
the interpretation of the role of
the role of its principles in
Justice these principles in a particular
assigning rights and duties and in
situation. (subjective)
defining the appropriate division
of social advantage. (objective)
Self-government Rights
It is important to note that these claims are Polyethnic Rights Special representation right
not seen as a temporary measure, or as a are intended to help ethnic groups and there is increasing interest in the idea that a certain
remedy for a form of oppression that we religious minorities express their cultural number of seats in the legislature should be
might (or ought) someday eliminate, rather particularity and pride without it reserved for the members of disadvantaged or
it is permanent and inherent. hampering their success in the economic marginalized groups
One mechanism for recognizing claims to and political institutions of the dominant it would seem to be a corollary of self-government
self-government is federalism, which society. that the national minority be guaranteed
divides powers between the central Mostly by migrant populations from representation on any body which can interpret or
government and regional subunits diffrent ethinicity. modify its powers of self-government (e.g. the
(provinces/ states/ cantons). Supreme Court in USA hypothetically and the
House of Federation in Ethiopia actually).
C. Defenses For Group Specific Rights
a. The Equality Argument
This equality-based argument will only endorse special rights for national minorities if there actually is a disadvantage with respect
to cultural membership, and if the rights actually serve to rectify the disadvantage. Hence, the legitimate scope of these rights will
vary with the circumstances
What is a fair way to recognize languages, draw boundaries, and distribute powers?
We should aim at ensuring that all national groups have the opportunity to maintain themselves as a distinct culture, if they so
choose.
Hence group-differentiated self-government rights compensate for unequal circumstances which put the members of minority
cultures at a systemic disadvantage in the cultural marketplace; regardless of their personal choices in life.
b. The Role of Historical Agreements
A second argument in defense of group-differentiated rights for national minorities is that they are the result of historical agreements,
such as the treaty rights of indigenous peoples, or the agreement by which two or more peoples agreed to federate.
E.g. how Axumite, Zagwe and other kingdoms acquire the will of people….
Forming a federation is one way of exercising a people's right of self-determination, and the historic terms of federation reflect the group's
judgment about how best to exercise that right.
c. Sticking a Balance
If we wish to defend group differentiated rights, we should not rely solely on historical agreements. Since historical agreements must
always be interpreted, and inevitably need to be updated and revised, we must be able to ground the historical agreements in a deeper
theory of justice.
The historical and equality arguments must work together.
CHAPTER NINE
LIBERTY
What are the common forms liberty?
Negative' Freedom
is simply the area within which a man can act unobstructed by others
Coercion implies the deliberate interference of other human beings Positive Freedome
within the area in which I could otherwise act. This demonstrates that conceptions of freedom directly derive from
Mere incapacity to attain a goal is not lack of political freedom. (e,g, views of what constitutes a self, a person, and a man (Iam the master of
poverity that hinder individual from attaining his goal is not lack of myself). Enough manipulation with the definition of man and freedom
political freedom) can be made to mean whatever the manipulator wishes.
The criterion of oppression is the part to be played by other human at times justifiable, to coerce men in the name of some goal (let us say,
beings, directly or indirectly, with or without the intention of doing so, justice or public health)
in frustrating my wishes. The wider the area of non-interference means
that the wider my freedom.
Charles Librety
What are the problems of the negative concept? Can it work independently?
There are some considerations one can put forward straight off to show that the pure (negative) concept won't work that there are
some discriminations among motivations which are essential to the concept of freedom as we use it.
Even where we think of freedom as the absence of external obstacles, it is not the absence of such obstacles simply, for we make
discriminations between obstacles as representing more or less serious infringements of freedom. And we do this, because we deploy
the concept against a background understanding that certain goals and activities are more significant than others.
e.g. Thus we could say that my freedom is restricted if the local authority puts up a new traffic light at an intersection close to
my home; so that were previously I could cross as I liked, consistently with avoiding collision with other cars, now I have to wait
until the light is green.
Why this difference between the two cases?
Because, we have a background understanding of some activities and goals as highly significant for human beings and others
as less so.
‘Equality’ can be used in the very same sense both to describe and prescribe;
a. Descriptive Use Of Equality: the common standard is itself descriptive, e.g. two people weigh the same
b. Prescriptive use of equality: is present when a prescriptive standard is applied, i.e., a norm or rule, e.g. people ought to be equal
before the law. The standards grounding prescriptive assertions of equality contain at least two components;
A descriptive component: the assertions need to contain descriptive criteria, in order to identify those people to which
the rule or norm applies. The question of this identification -- who belongs to which category? -- may itself be normative,
e.g. to whom do the Ethiopian or U.S. laws apply?
A prescriptive component: the comparative standards contain something normative -- a moral or legal rule, in the
example, the U.S. laws -- specifying how those falling under the norm are to be treated.
Equality essentially consists of a tripartite relation between two (or several) objects or persons and one (or several) qualities.
Two objects a and b are equal in a certain respect if, in that respect, they fall under the same general terminus. ‘Equality’ denotes
the relation between the objects that are compared.
Every comparison presumes a concrete attribute defining the respect in which the equality applies -- equality thus referring to a
common sharing of this comparison-determining attribute.
We are going to deal with four principles of equality. Accordingly, the three principles of equality hold generally and primarily for
all actions and treatment of others and for resulting circumstances.
From the fourth principle onward, i.e., starting with the presumption of equality, this section is mainly concerned with distributive
justice and the evaluation of distribution
A. Formal Equality
If so, which respects are normatively relevant and which are not?
Some authors see this formal principle of equality as a specific application of a rule of rationality: it is irrational, because inconsistent,
to treat equal cases unequally without sufficient reasons.
But most authors instead stress that what is here at stake is a moral principle of justice, basically corresponding with acknowledgment
of the impartial and universalizable nature of moral judgments, namely, the postulate of formal equality demands more than
consistency with one's subjective preferences.
What is more important is possible justification vis-à-vis others of the equal or unequal treatment in question -- and this on the sole
basis of a situation's objective features.
B. Proportional Equality
What is proportional equality and what is its difference from formal equality?
According to Aristotle, there are two kinds of equality;
a. Numerical Equality: A form of treatment of others when it treats all persons as indistinguishable, thus treating them identically
or granting them the same quantity of a good per capita. However, that is not always just.
b. Proportional Equality: is treating relatively equal when it treats all relevant persons in relation to their due.
N.B. Just numerical equality is a special case of proportional equality
When numerical equality is appropriate?
Numerical equality is only just under special circumstances, viz. when persons are equal in the relevant respects so that the relevant
proportions are equal.
When proportional equality is appropriate?
Proportional equality further specifies formal equality; it is the more precise and detailed, hence actually the more comprehensive
formulation of formal equality. It indicates what produces an adequate equality.
When factors speak for unequal treatment or distribution, because the persons are unequal in relevant respects, the treatment or
distribution proportional to these factors is just. Unequal claims to treatment or distribution must be considered proportionally:
that is the prerequisite for persons being considered equally.
C. Moral Equality
What does it mean to say human beings are morally equal? What are the grounds of moral equality?
Until the eighteenth century, it was assumed that human beings are unequal by nature i.e., that there was a natural human hierarchy.
Against Plato and Aristotle, the classical formula for justice according to which an action is just when it offers each individual his
or her due took on a substantively egalitarian meaning in the course of time, viz. everyone deserved the same dignity and the same
respect
The principle of equal dignity and respect is now accepted as a minimum standard throughout mainstream Western culture
To say that men are equal is not to say they are identical. The postulate of equality implies that underneath apparent differences,
certain recognizable entities or units exist that, by dint of being units, can be said to be ‘equal.’
Fundamental equality means that persons are alike in important relevant and specified respects alone, and not that they are all
generally the same or can be treated in the same way.
To recognize that human beings are all equally individuals does not mean having to treat them uniformly in any respects other than
those in which they clearly have a moral claim to be treated alike.
D. Presumption of Equality
What is the presumption of equality?
The presumption of equality, in contrast, is a formal, procedural principle of construction located on a higher formal and
argumentative level.
The presumption of equality is a prima facie principle of equal distribution for all goods (usually related with distributive justice)
politically suited for the process of public distribution.
The presumption of equality requires that everyone, regardless of differences, should get an equal share in the distribution unless
certain types of differences are relevant and justify, through universally acceptable reasons, unequal distribution.
Strict principle of equal distribution is not required, but it is morally necessary to justify impartially any unequal distribution. The
burden of proof lies on the side of those who favor any form of unequal distribution.
What should be raised to attain the effective role of equality in distributive justice?
The presumption of equality provides an elegant procedure for constructing a theory of distributive justice. The following questions
would have to be answered in order to arrive at a substantial and full principle of justice.
What goods and burdens are to be justly distributed (or should be distributed)? Which social goods comprise the object of
distributive justice?
What are the spheres (of justice) into which these resources have to be grouped?
Who are the recipients of distribution? Who has a prima facie claim to a fair share?
What are the commonly cited yet in reality unjustified exceptions to equal distribution?
Which inequalities are justified?
Which approach, conception or theory of egalitarian distributive justice is therefore the best?
What goods and burdens are to be justly distributed (or should be distributed)? There are various opinions as to which social
goods comprise the object of distributive justice.
Does distributive justice apply only to those goods commonly produced, i.e., through social and economic fair cooperation, or
to other goods as well, e.g. natural resources that are not the result of common cooperation?
Conceptions of Distributive Equality: Equality of What?
We need to know the dimensions within which striving for equality is morally relevant. What follows is a brief review of the seven
most prominent conceptions of distributive equality.
a. Simple Equality and Objections to Equality in General
Simple equality, meaning everyone being furnished with the same material level of goods and services, represents a strict position
as far as distributive justice is concerned. It is generally rejected as untenable.
As an idea, simple equality fails because of problems that are raised regards to equality in general;
that equality of material goods can lead to unequal satisfaction
The time span needs to be indicated for realizing the desired model of equal distribution
Equality distorts incentives promoting achievement in the economic field, producing an inefficiency grounded in a waste of
assets arising from the administrative costs of redistribution. Equality and efficiency need to be placed in a balanced relation.
Moral objections: A strict and mechanical equal distribution between all individuals does not sufficiently take into account
the differences among individuals and their situations
Is very often associated with equality of results (although these are two distinct concepts). However, to strive only for equality
of results is problematic.
there is a danger of (strict) equality leading to uniformity, rather than to a respect for pluralism and democracy
b. Libertarianism
Libertarianism and economic liberalism represent minimalist positions in relation to distributive justice. They both postulate an
original right to freedom and property, thus arguing against redistribution and social rights and for the free market.
They assert an opposition between equality and freedom: the individual (natural) right to freedom can be limited only for the sake
of foreign and domestic peace.
For this reason, libertarians consider maintaining public order the state's only legitimate duty.
Many egalitarians, however, wish for more -- namely, an equality of (at least basic) life conditions.
c. Utilitarianism
It is possible to interpret utilitarianism as concretising moral equality -- and this in a way meant to offer the same consideration to
the interests of all human beings.
From the utilitarian perspective, since everyone counts as one and no one as more than one (Bentham), the interests of all should be
treated equally without consideration of contents of interest or an individual's material situation,
d. Equality of Welfare
The concept of welfare equality is motivated by an intuition that when it comes to political ethics, what is at stake is the individual's
well-being.
The central criterion for justice must consequently be equalizing the level of welfare. But taking welfare as what is to be equalized
leads into major difficulties, which resemble those of utilitarianism.
e. Equality of Resources
Represented above all by both Rawls and Dworkin, resource equality avoids such problems.
It holds individuals responsible for their decisions and actions, not, however, for circumstances beyond their control -- race, sex, and
skin-colour, but also intelligence and social position -- which thus are excluded as distributive criteria.
Equal opportunity is insufficient because it does not compensate for unequal innate gifts. What applies for social circumstances
should also apply for such gifts, both these factors being purely arbitrary from a moral point of view and requiring adjustment.
According to Rawls, human beings should have the same initial expectations of "basic goods,".
f. Equality of Opportunity for Welfare or Advantage
This approaches are meant to equalize outcomes, insofar as they are the consequences of causes beyond a person's control (i.e.,
beyond circumstances or endowment), but to allow differential outcomes in so far as they result from autonomous choice or ambition.
But the approaches are also aimed at maintaining the insight that individual preferences have to count, as the sole basis for a necessary
linkage back to the individual perspective: otherwise, there is an overlooking of the person's value.
g. Capabilities Approaches
For the value goods have for someone depends on objective possibilities, the natural environment, and individual capacities. Hence,
in contrast to the resourcist approach, Amartya Sen proposes orientating distribution around "capabilities to achieve functionings,"
i.e., the various things that a person manages to do or be in leading a life.
In other words, evaluating individual well-being has to be tied to a capability for achieving and maintaining various precious
conditions and "functionings" constitutive of a person's being, such as adequate nourishment, good health, the ability to move about
freely or to appear in public without shame, and so forth.