258

CHAPTER III

DHVANI

3«0 Dhvani theory of Anandavardhana

The dhvani theory of i^andavardhana has been

discussed profusely by ancient and m o d e m scholars from

different angles. The aim of the present dissertation

is to trace the origin of this theory in the vakyapadlya

of Bhartrhari. It also aims to analyse the suggestive

semantics of Inandavardhana. Therefore in previous chapters

an account of the theories of sphota and pratibha of

Bhartrhari has been given with special z*eference to the

prominent traits which would have been the source of the

dhvani theory. In this chapter the dhvani theory is

analysed from linguistic point of view as seen by

Anandavardhana.

The dhvani concept is a new device in Sanskrit

poetics. It deals with a secret language formula, other

than conventional denotation which is generally practised

by poets. Long before Anandavaxxihana there were traditions

of Sanskrit literary criticism. Bhamaha, Dandin, Vamana

and Rudrata are the great critics whose contributions to

Sanskrit poetics are quite considerable. They handle poetic

speech differently. Bhamah%^ .the most fundamental thinker

 259

of alamkara school, subsumes poetic speech under two

heads, namely svabhavokti and vakrokti. The svabhavoktl

is a special type of speech which describes the object

as it is and its use is approved for vartabhidhana

-1
and vamana. But vakrokti is a striking mode of
2
expression which is the mother of all figures of speech.
3
It is a type of speech which is liked by the poets.

According to them, a poet should express the poetic

situations either in natural language or artificial

language. This treatment of poetic language appears to be

haay. No evidence is available as to the fact that, the

great predecessors of Anandavardhana chalked out a

language to describe emotive s i t u a t i o n s . T h e y only analyse

the external decorations and organs of poetry without

having an insight into the inner agitation^ Anandavardhana*s

discovery of dhvani reveals many aspects about the

understanding of poetry. His concept of dhvani is a

frozen language formula vdiich manifests the ^ poetic

relish* rasa. This rasa according to him, remains in

all elements of poetry without which the poetic speech is

reduced to ordinary talk.

I
When an imaginative link between the poet and the

reader is created, poetic communication becomes possible.

The function of speech is to link vrfiat the poet speaks

and what the reader or listener comprehends. This is of

 260

two types, i.e. primary and secondairy. This law of

dichotomy is the undercurrent of Anandavardhana’s dhvani

language. He has divided speech into two halves, i.e.

’denotative* vacya and »suggestive* pratlyamana. Both

are essential for poetry. The suggestive elements of

language are more essential in poetry than the denotative

elements. But the suggestive elements of language have

no physical existence although they are indirectly

connected with the elements of speech. They are

manifested through denotative elements.

In this perspective, Anandavardhana*s view

resembles with the views of m o d e m linguists and

psychologists. According to them language may be divided

into two classes, i.e. symbolic language and emotive

language. This symbolic language is similar to the

denotative elements of speech. It expresses general ideas

pertaining to history and religious works. The emotive

language is similar to dhvani language. It describes the

poetic ideas and creates aesthetic delight in the poet

and coiuioisseurs. The difference between symbolic and

emotive language has been analysed by Ogden and ^ c h a r d s

in The Meaning of Meaning , I960, p.149* According to

them, ** the symbolic use of words is statement, the

recording, the support, the organisation and the

 261

coflunLinlcatlon of reference. The emotive use of works is

a more simple matter, it is the use of words to express

or excite feelings and attitudes «.. Each of these

contrasted functions has, it will be seen, two sides,

that of the speaker and that of the listener. Under the

symbolic function are included both the symbolisation of

reference and its communication to the listener, i.e.

the causing in the listnner of a similar reference.

Under the emotive function are included both the expression

of emotions, attitudes, moods etc. in the speaker, and

their communication, i.e. their evocation in the listener."

Like Ogden and Richards, Anandavardhana holds

bkkss

that ’denotative word’ vacaka sebda and ’denoted sense’

vacya artha are necessary for ordinary descriptions,

whereas ’suggestive w o r d ’ vyan.jaka sebda and ’suggested

sense’ vyant^a artha are to be used for poetic delinea­

tions. In poetic speech, the denotative elements are

subordinate to suggestive elements. But the latter depends

on the former for manifestation. Anandavardhana compares

the denotative elements of speech (DL 1.9) with a candle

on which the suggestive elements, as light, remain.

 2G2

Ogden and Richards state exactly the same thing :

mmmam bsbscs^s

It is true that some element of reference

probably enters, for all civilised adults at least,

Into almost all use of words, and it is always possible

to import a reference, if it be only a reference to

things in general. The two functions under consideration

usually occur together but none the less they are in

principle distinct •.• provided that the attitude or

feeling is evoked the most important function of such

language (i.e. poetic language) is fulfilled, and any

symbolic function that the words may have is instrumental

only and subsidiary to the evocative function* (The

Meaning of Me a n i n g . I960, p . 150).

Thus the truth behind the philosophy of poetic

language desci*ibed by Ogden and ^ c ^ a r d s and Anandavardhana

appears to be the same. A detailed acco\uit of Ananda­

vardhana *s linguistic philosophy is made in the fourth

coming sections.

3.1 Dhvani language and suggestion

The dhvani theory has a long tradition which come

down through the preceptors and pupils. Probably at

the time of Anandavardhana it has come to a saturation

and he propounds the theory. This dhvani language is a

 263

special type of poetic speech which is marked by the

existence of suggestion. It has a very wide field*

The phonemes, roots, prefixes, suffixes, words, part of

words, sentences, essays and complete works are varied

fields of dhvani language. By the touch of suggestion

all these above elements transform their common properties

of speech to poetic diction. Ancient Indian philosophers

admit that language has four functions to cognise meanings,

namely denotative, indicative, suggestive and purport.

V/hen a listener hears an utterance he understands the

surface meaning of the expressions. The meaning is the

relation between words and objects meant by them. The

surface meaning is known by the denotative or primary

4
function of language. Eight methods and contextual
5
factors help to determine this primary meaning. But

when this primary meaning of an expression fails to

reveal the actual intention of the speaker another

function known as indicative is invoked. This is called

amukhya vrtti or gauni vrtti. Incompatibility of the

primary sense is essential condition for accepting the

secondary sense. But when this function also fails,

we have the suggestion which is based on denotation

and indication.

According to Anandavardhana, speech is of two

types, i.e. primary and suggestive. The poetic senses

 264

are expressed by both these spe<^ches. The poetic speech

is marked by the existence of figures, merits and

different type of charming expressions. But these are

external decorations which do not enhance the beauty of

the soul. These are surface properties of the poetic

expression which are known through the denotative

function. The true spirit of poetry is something else.

It is suggestion which reveals the beautiful meaning of

the poetry. Connoisseurs admit its existence 1,3)

It pervades the whole poetic composition giving novel

charm and meaning to.it. The dhvani language is marked

by the suggestive elements. It Includes the suggestive

word, suggestive sense, suggested sense, the function

of suggestion, and the work as a whole. The suggestive

elements are different from the denotative elements in

poetry. He gives a beautiful analogy to explein it.

As the glamour of a beautiful woman is different from

her physical frame, similarly the real beauty of poetic

diction is different from the structure of poetic

expression. The real beauty of poetry is the suggestive

element which is as good as the glamour of a beautiful

enchantress. The denotative elements are

comparable
6
to the various limbs of the body of the lady. The

suggestive elements may be traceable in different forms

of speech manifestations i.e., in facts, figures and

 2G5

aesthetic delights. This Is the Idea of dhvanl language

In^nutshell. Befoz*e critical analysis, It^s existence

should be traced back in the works of earlier rhetoric. •

It will help to evaluate the concept of dhvanl properly

and its real contribution can be measured successfully.

3.2 Latent hints of dhvanl in earlier works

on rhetoric .

3.2.1 The term dhvanl is used many times in the poetic

works before Anandavardhana. The great poets, namely

Kalidasa, Bharavi and Magha etc. use the term dhvanl in

the sense of sound. Kalidasa used it either for the

murmur in the forest, or for the sound of a drum ; again

it is found to connote the sound of the sea, or sounds of

7 .
the instrumental or vocal music. Bharavi and Magha
- - ft
use the term in the same sense as Kalidasa. Bhavabhutl
d
uses the term to denote svara.

3*2.2 It has been stated that according to Anandavardhana,

<
r
dhvanl stands for a language formula of poetry. It erises

when the surface meaning of the expression loses its

significance to some other meaning. This idea of dhvanl

was in vogue long before Anandavardhana.

-J
 266

In the Natya ^astra of Biarata latent existence

of dhvanl can be traced. Abhinavagupta claims that

the existence of dhvanl In earlier works of rhetoric

Is indirect. Bharata was aware of dhvanl meaning of

the poetic expression. Rasa according to him Is

suggested. Though he analyses rasa In relation to drama,

his rasa can be applicable to poetry also. His references

to suggested sense may be found out In the Natya^astra

He says, "how Is rasa tasted? (In reply) It Is said

that just as well disposed persons while eating food

cooked with many kinds of spice, enjoy (asvadayanti)

its tastes, and attain pleasiure and satisfaction, so the

cultured people taste the durable psychological states

while they see them represented by an expression of the

various psychological states with words, gestures, and

the sattva, and derive pleasure and satisfaction.

Just as a connoisseur of cooked food (b h a k t a ) while

eating food which has been prepared from various spices

and other articles tastes it, so the learned people

taste in their heart (m a n a s ) the durable psychological

states (such as love, sorrow etc.) when they are

represented by an expression of psychological states

with gestures* Hence these durablepsychological

10
states in a drama are called sentiments."
 267

In the above passage Bharata has consciously used

two teras, namely vaganga sattvopetan *with words,

gestures, and the sattva*. and bhavabhlnayavyan.1 itan

»represented by'an expression o£^,the various psychological

states* to imply that rasa is suggested. He could have

used the term sambanddhan instead of vyanjitan which

would have given the same literal sense. But he has the

idea of suggestion in his mind. So he consciously uses

these terms.

Again in the versus V I .32-33 quoted above,

Bharata has consciously uses the terms, vudhah ’l e a m e d s * /

and manasa »in the mind*. The literal sense of these

two woxxis could have been dev^^ted by panditah and cetasa

respectively. By these particular terms Bharata intends

that the relish of rasa is dependant on suggestion. The

relisher is a connoisseur and not an intellectual. The

relish is felt in the mind and not in the intellect.

(ii) Bharata was aware of the abhivyaktivada viiich

Abhinavagupta has expounded in connection with rasa.

This theory implies that rasa is manifested by the power

of suggestion. It can neither be created nor informed

nor enjoyed. It is a state of the mind. It is brought

by various propensities which are inherited from previous

birth of a human being. Bharata suggests this idea in

 268

the following passages : '♦Now the durable psychological

states are eight in number. The complementary

psychological states are thirty three and the sattvika

states are eight in number. These are the three varieties

of psychological states. Hence we are to understand

that there are fortynine psychological statej^capable of

drawing out the sentiment from the play. These sentiments

arise from them when they are imbued with the quality of

universality. The psychological states proceeding from

the thing v/hich is congenial to the heart, is the soiu'ce

of sentiment and it pervades the body just as fire

11
spreads over dry wood” .

Further Bharata’s idea on abhivyaktivada is

prominent in the following passage : It is said in this

connection, if the fortynine psychological states being

represented by determinants and consequents coming into

contact with one another become sentiments when they are

imbued with the quality of universality, how is it that

durable psychological states only are changed into

sentiments (and not others)? (In reply to this) it is

said : Just as among persons having the same characteristics

and similar hands, feet and belly and celebrity, some due

to their birth manners, learning, skill in arts and

crafts, attain kingship, iidiile others endowed with an

 269

inferior intellect become their attendant, in a similar

manner, determinants, consequents and complementary ^

psychological states become dependant on the durable

psychological states. Being the shelter (of others) the

durable psychological states are masters. Similarly

other psychological states (lit. feelings) reduced to

subordination take shelter with them (i.e. the durable

psychological states) due to superior merit (of the

later). Those becoming their retinue are the complementary

psychological states. Is there any parallel instances ?

(Answer) Just as only a king surrounded by numerous

attendants jreceives this epithet and not any other man

be he ever so great, so the durable psychological states

only followed by determinants, consequents and compli­

mentary psychological states, receive the name of

12
sentiment

Unless one has no idea of suggestion, how can he

claim that the ’psychological states* bhavas are

suggested. Bharata was certainly aware of the poetic

f
meaning of language other than the surface meaning.

(iii) In the seventh chapter of the Natya sa s t r a . GOS,

(Verse.4-5)» it is stated that bhavas are the causes

of the manifestation of rasa. It has been stated there

. 270

that rasas are vyangya ’suggested* and bhavas are

’suggesters* vyanjakas.

(It ) Abhinavagupta In his commentary on the I^, VI.33y

analyses the terms vyanjlta and vyangya etc. In the word

asvadayantl ’relished* used by Bharata, he notes the

- 13
traces of suggestion in the prefix a* Abhinavagupta

is a true successor of Anandavardhana. He has analysed

Bharata’s concept of rasa and bhava from the standpoint

of suggestion. There are ample evidences with regard to

the fact that where Bharata would have uttered the word

r a s a , Abhinavagupta would say that sUt^estion must be

there.

(v) There are parallel ideas in the passages of the

Dhvanyaloka and the N a ty a ^ a s t r a ;

DL . 1-2 :

kavyasyatma dhvanir iti ^

’the soul of poetry is dhvani ^suggestion. ’

id. VI.3«, CX)S, p.294 :

yatha bljad bhaved yr ks £

vrkgat puspam phalam yatha

tatha mulam rasah sarve

tebhyo bhava vyavasthita

...
 271

n |. VII.7, GOS, p . 3 W I

yo^rtho h rdaya samvadi

taaya bhavo raaod bhavah

sarlram vyapyate yena

sii^akakastham ivagnina

" Just as a tree grows from a seed, and flowers

and fruits from a tree, so the sentiments are the source

(lit. r o o t ^ o f all the psychological states, and likevd.se

the psychological states exist (as the source) of all

the sentiments ” ^

" The psychological states proceeding from the

I
thing which is congenial to the heart, is the source

of the sentiment and it pejrvades the body just as

fire spreads over dry-wood."

Following the foot-steps of Bharata, Anandavardhana

15
says that rasa is the life of poetry and drama. What

Bharata implies by the term rasa, Anandavardhana suggests

16
it by rasadhvani. Both agree on the point that there

can be no poetry without the existence of rasa. This

17
concept of rasa is as old as the work of Bharata.

;s>-v
 272

(v i) Bharata has described th irty s ix natya l a k sanas*

Abhinavagupta has discussed all these laksanas exhaustively

and concludes that each of them is a peculiar type of

_ . . Id
♦denotative fimction’ abhidhavyapara, But in reality

all these laksanas are not normal denotative functions

19
obtained by various methods namely saktigraha etc.

They gradually and quickly quietly prepared the ground

for ’denotation, merged in other meanings»

arthantarasamkramitavacya ’denotation, completely lost’

atyantatiraskrta racya. ’suggestion whose sequence is

visible’ samlaksyakramavyangyadhvani. ' suggestion based

on ’idea’ vastu, ’figures of speech’ alamkara and

20
’sentiment’ rasa. In all, thirty six laksanas the

reverberation of another meaning other than surface

meaning is noticed.^ Though in each laksana^ the element / ^

of suggestion based on figures of speech laksanas listed

below it is more prominent :

S
sobha Natya^astra XVI.7

udaharana do XVI.9,11
(anubandha)

manoratha do XVI.20,36
(anubandha)

akhyana do XVI.21

do XVI.39

arthapatti do XVI.39

bhramsa do XVI.27
 273

It is clear from these above evidences that

Bharata was aware of the intrinsic meaning of the

poetic expression other than the surface meaning which

Anandavardhana calls dhvani meaning.

d.2,3 Traces of suggestion in the

kavyalaiikara of Bhamaha

Bhamaha is not the founder of the/alamkara school.

There was a long tradition of the use of figures of speech

as decorations to the poetic expression, probably before

21
Bharata. In the Rgveda figurative uses are very common.

According to Bhamaha, poetry is built of words and

senses vdiich are embellished by figures of speech. By

this act he seems to emphasise on the contextual sense of

the expression. But his awareness of non-contextual

sense is prominent from the use of certain figures of

speech. He uses certain terms, namely, gunasamyapratitih,

K L . 11.34, ^Cognition on the basis of resemblance»,

gamyate *nyo^ rthah. KL.II.79, ’another meaning being

im pl ie d’, avagamayati. K L . VII.40, ’suggested’ which are

abundantly found in the Dhvanyaloka. Bhamaha»s idea of

suggestion may be noticed in the following figures of

speech :

i) In prativastupama ’typical comparison*,

22
the common a ttrib u te s are im p lied .
 274

11) In samasoktl 'condensed metaphor* some

23
non-contextual meanings are suggested gamyete.

Ill) In paryayokta 'periphrasis* the actual Import Is

different from the surface meaning of the expression.

Bhamaha's example Is noteworthy here. When ^Isupala

requests to take food In his house, Lord Krana refused.

He says that whether In the house or outside, he does

not take food unless brahmins have taken it first. He

fears ^Isupala may mix poison with his food. Krsna’s

hesitation suggests that ^isupala will not mix poison

in the food for the fear of killing brahmins which is a

sin. According to Bhamaha this indirect beautiful

meaning of the expression is implied. In this case

l^andavardhana would have said that this is due to

suggestion.

iv) In arthantaranyasa, ]^.II.71, 'transition*

a k se pa. ^ . 1 1 . 6 3 , 'paralelpsis*, apahnutl K L .III.21,

♦fancied denial* ra savat. ia.III.6, *impassioned*,

vyajastuti, KL III.31, 'artfvil praise* the beauty lies

in the non-contextual sense.

Anandavardhana Is also aware of the fact that the

figures of speech as defined by Bhamaha are touched by

the suggestive elements. In his words : ** that the

 275

group of expressed figures of speech when it is accompanied

by a suggested element, be it either a figure of speech

or a situation as the case may be, endows them with

great beauty, has been partially shown by elder rhetoricians

Moat of the figures of speech when they are closely examined

are found to be like this (i.e. accompanied by a suggested

element). A»d thus generally dippka. samasokti and

other similar figures of speech are found to involve

some suggested figurel of speech or other, or some "

suggested situation or other. For in the first place,

all figures of speech contain some exaggeration (hyperbole).

When great poets use it, it endows with a quite special

poetic beauty. For how can a Judicious use of ’hyperbole*

atisaya fail to impart to poetry a high degree of

excellence? As has been said by Bhamaha when dealing

with hyperbole : All the figures of speech are Just this

(atisayokti). Through this, (ordinary) ideas are beautiful. /

A poet should make efforts with regard to that. What

figures of speech can there be without hyperbole? In this

matter, whatever figure of speech possesses hyperbole

through the force of poetic imagination, that figure of

speech becomes exceptionally beautiful, whereas if

hjrperbole is not there it will be merely a plain figure

of speech. And so, since hyperbole is able to incarnate

itself into all figures of speech, one says, through

 276

'metaphor based on identification* abhedopacara, that

hyperbole alone is the form of all figures of speech.

This is the only meaning that one should understand ‘

25
(from the stanza, of Bhamaha)*” Thus according to

Bhamaha the existence of hyperbole is an essential element

in all figures of speech. Inandavardhana in this case

adds that this element of hyperbole in poetic figures is

a stepping stone to the hierarchy of suggestion. In this

connection, S.K.De says that Bhamaha cannot be included

among dhvanyabhavavadins »the»e who deny the existence of

dhvani *, rather he is an antarbhavavadin who has merged

26
dhvani in the figures of speech.

From the above discussion it is clear that though

B h ^ a h a did not define the suggestive element categorically

he knew its existence through non-contextual meanings and

hyperboles. Inandavardhana has utilised this finding of

B h ^ a h a in this work.

3*2.4 Suggestion in the kavyadarsa of Dandin

Dandin knew the suggested sense. He has used the

terms pratiyate 'suggested* in the context of udaragvma

]^.I.76, and vyanjitam 'suggested* in the context of

udattalamkara. KL.II.303. He also uses the term gunavrtti

to imply the secondary meaning other than the primary

meaning, M . I . 9 5 . According to him, the *quality of

 277

27
excellence* udaraguna is suggested. In the example of

udattalamkara, he has shown that the greatness of Rama

and prosperity of Havana are suggested. Further he has

said that the behaviour of the non-contextual is super­

imposed upon the contextual in samadhiguna and condensed

29 . . .
metaphor. Dandin*s upamalamkara ’simile’ is marked

by the primary and secondary meanings, KD.II.14« In his

tulyayogita ’equal pairing’ and prativastupama

’typical comparison’, the similitude is obtained by

30
implication. Other important figures of speech, namely
/ 31 - 32
atisayokti, ’hyperbole’ paryayokti ’periphrasis’ and

aprastutaprasamsa ’vicarious reference’ convey the

beautiful meaning through implication only.

Dandin has started an objective inquiry into the

soul of poetry. Anandavaixihana succeeded in this

attempt. Vamana also investigates the causes and nature

of poetry before Anandavai*dhana. But when Bhamaha

emphasises on the surface structure of the poetry, Dandin

and V ^ a n a attempt to find out internal essence that is

soul of poetry. According to Vamana the soul of poetry

- 35
is ’style’ riti, whereas according to Anandavardhana

it is dhvani ’suggestion* which deals with the value of

speech form beyond the expressive level of language.

 278 '

3.2.5 j^lements of suggestion in the

KavyalamkarasaraSamgraha of Udbhata

Udbhata alongwlth Bhamaha and Oai^din discovers

a peculiar type of meaning in the figure paryayokta

»periphrasis», other than the denotative meaning. He

says that in this figure something is indirectly statedi

This indirect meaning is suggested by avagamana. Though

he does not state that avagamana is a function, yet

from his treatment one can infer it so. According to

36
Udbhata the periphrasis is a mode of speech which is

known by a peculiar way of expression other than the

denotative one. This avagamana is nothing but suggestion. V

Anandavardhana believes that Udbhata knows the nature of

37
suggestion. Thus what Udbhata wants to say by avagamana,

Hemacandra and Kanistha Vagbhata after hundreds of years

3« **
say by suggestion.

39
Udbhata»s idea of gunavrtti is later on developed

into indicative function. He uses certain technical terms

which are very essential for rasa. They are bhava.

40 41
anubhava etc. He has mentioned several rasas also.

From all these facts it can be assumed that he had hazy

notion of suggestion which helps to relish the

rasa.
 279

Ruyyaka, one of the leading rhetoricians of the

post dhvani period, thinks that Udbhata and others

subsume suggested sense under the figures of speech as

an embellishment of denotative sense. Instead of taking

this suggested sense independently, they consider it as

an accessory of denotative sense. They also think that

42
rasa is an accessory element. In this connection S.K*

Q e ’s remark is noteworthy. He says, "Udbhata can be

taken as we have seen, to have been cognisant of a

suggested sense, though he never speaks of dhvani or .

deals with it directly ; but pratiharenduraja refers

to it in clearest terms and attempts by forced interpre­

tation to make out that Udbhata deliberately included it

43
in the treatment of poetic figures.”

Udbhata unconsciously proceeded on the road which

led to suggestion. He got inspiration fr<>m his

predecessors in this regard and develops his ideas which

are not actually beyond the events of language. His

attempt to do so is a search for the real beauty of

poetry and poetic speech which is further clarified

by Rudra^a in his Kavyalamkara«

 2 80

3*2.6 Suggestive elements In the

Kavyalamkara of Rudrata

Rudrata has a better and clear idea on

pratiyajianartha *secondary signification* than his

predecessors. For the first time in Sanskrit poetics

he admits ten rasas adding two more namely santa

and preyan (KLR. XII.3) to Bharata*s eight ( ^ . V I . 15)

According to him, every poetic expression should have the

44
elements of rasa. ’
^ r l i e r to him Dandin had confirmed
45
the existence of rasa in poetic speech. But it was not

clearly brought out. Rudrata does not speak of dhvani

directly. He feels that poetic emotions and feelings

cannot be brought to consciousness by literal expression.

It can be made an object of direct experience only

indirectly. He has pointed out a kind of meaning in

some figures to which the suggestionists may call dhvani

meaning. His figure of speech, bh av a, can be analysed

as follows : In this figure, the actual import is a

meaning other than the expressed sense that connotes the

s p ea ke r’s attitude. Before actual communication, the

speaker has some metabolic changes in his inner being

that are manifested through various actions. The causes

of those metabolic transformations are not regular

causes. They are somehow different and they communicate

46
the actual import to the listener in an unusual way.
 281

t
A beautiful illustration is given by Rudrata, latter

quoted by Manunata (^.I,5«3) to show what bhava is.

This figure bhava is same as suggestion. A young woman

had an appointment with a young man in an asoka bower

which was a secluded place. But she could not meet him

at the appointed hour. The disappointed young man returns

with a bunch of banjula. His fiancie saw it, and her

face became dark. Here the cause of the dark countenance

is that she is deprived of the pleasure of love. This

beautiful meaning is suggested and not expressed. In the

absence of the banjula stalk she could not have

47
understood that she missed the pleasure.

Referring to the secondary meaning, Rudrata states

that a sentence connotes its actual import after expressing

its external senses. The actual import can either be

comprehended through negation or affirmation. This

actual import is bhava. Rudrata gives illustration for

it also. A rustic woman invites a traveller to her bett

through negation by stating that her mother-in-law is

^ deaf MdVsuffers from nie^t-biindnes*T~'\ She is nlone and

her husband is away. Taking this opportunity the

traveller may not creep to her bed. Here the bhava

♦feeling* is the invitation for the traveller to

the woman’s bed. This is suggested by ’intonation’

kaku.
 282

Again Rudrata’s ’periphrasis* paryayokta is

nothing but suggestion. When the literal meaning implies

another meaning which is neither producer nor produced,

k9
then the figure peiriphrasis comes into being.

Whether Rudrata was aware of the function of

suggestion, has been analysed by Ruyyaka and his

commentator Jayaratha. They mainly argue on the two

types of bhavalaj^ara of Rudrata. Sometimes the

secondaz*y sense in b h a v a l a ^ a r a is /of Indicative by nature

' 50
and sometimes it ia suggestive by nature. Jayaratha

mentions that rasa ’s e n t i m e n t preya ♦lovely* and

urjasvin »impetuous* of Rudrata are conditioned by

suggestion. Ruyyaka says that all the three types of

dhYanis of Anandavardhana can be merged in the figures

of Rudrata. Thus the vastudhvani can be found in the

figure bhava, ala^aradhvani can be found in ’metaphor’

r u pa ka,
and rasadhvani in rasavat ’impassioned’ preyas
52
’lovely’ etc. Inspite of the severe criticism lodged
53
against Ruyyaka’s interpretation of Rudrata by S.K.De,

it is evident that Rudrata has gone much closer to the

dhvani theory than his predecessors. His bhavalamkara

and rasa are really an advancement to the objective

inquiry of actual poetic beauty. The suggestive meaning

which occurs in the form of seed in Rudrata, becomes a

full grown tjree in Anandavardhana.

 283

inquiry into the secondary meaning from Bharata

to Rudra^a is not absolutely f r u s t r a t i n g ^ A new concept

in the field of literary criticism is not an immediate

product. It takes centuries for crystallisation, and

ultimately it gets concretised at the hands of a talented

man. This supposition is true in the case of dhvani

concept which is somehow connected with the elements of

language. It is revealed through primary meaning of the

words. This ^ ^ o n d a ^ meanini^is considered to be the

soul according to Anandavardhana, whereas according to

Bhamaha, Udbhata and Rudrata, it is more or less attached

to the external structure of language. That is why they

a s s i ^ it in different figures of speech. Their observation

•‘Vex. “ —
is not deep. They az*e contented at the external features

of language. But they could not see that beyond the

physical structure of language, there is something

called soul. It is invisible indeed, but not undeniable.

It is to be felt and not to be seen. Anandavardhana is

not satisfied at the symphony of sight. He searches into

I
the symphony of sense (feeling). But never the less

Bhamaha and his followers had felt the pulse of (^condary>y

meaning though faintly, like the sight of a distant star. ' S

^ T h e y think that this ^lecondaiy meaning^ is an instrument

Q'fT;
of ’ ___beautification of the body.^ They did not

introspect properly on the nature of poetic language and

 284

r .
/ Anandavardhana proceeds with introspection and

retrospection. /^Before him there is a long tradition of

granunar, Vedanta and literary criticism^ He utilises

their findings whenever necessary. He a r ^ contemplated

the verbal tradition of dhvani. Ultimately the famous

theory of dhvani emerges with wonderful insight,

engulfing all the best contributions of different

theories of different centuries.

■urr

* *
 285

3 .3 The Dhvanl theory o f Anandavardhana

In the Sanskrit poetics a new era is dawned at the

discovery of the dhvanl theory by Anandavardhana. He

shifts from subjective to absolute objective Inquiry Into

the nature of poetry. When earlier rhetoricians hotly

discussed on the external elements of poetry and poetic

language, Anandavardhana contemplates on the Inner element

of poetic language. The poetic language has certain

characteristics which separate it from ordinary speech.

r - \
' The early rhetoricians like Bhamaha and others, think 1 f'

that these characteristics are mainly figures of speech o

and poetic merits. Any ordinaxTr speech can be turaed into ^

poetic speech by virtue of figures of speech and poetic

merits. But Anandavardhana has gone further. According to

him, figures and merits are only external decorations.

The spirit or element which transforms the common speech

to poetic speech is dhvanl. This element is sparked by

pratibha ’poetic genius* and remains in all poetic speech

of great poets. This dhvanl .element in language is brought

about by suggestion. \iAien the literal meaning of an

expression loses its significance to some external meaning,

the dhvanl language comes into existence. In reality it

has no concrete shape in the form of the words or

sentences. Still it is considered to be the characteristic

Of language. iThat is to say it rests on the denotative

— -• ^
structure of language. This [secondary', meaning or
 286

dhvanl meaning is considered to be pratiyamanartha

in the Dhvenyaloka«

3»3«1 Nature of pratiyamanairtha

Anandavardhana has claimed that the dhvani is the

soul of poetry ( ^ . 1 . 1 ) . It is not necessarily manifested

in the speech of a layman which is often without emotion.

It is irevealed in the speech of gireat poets ( D L .I .^ )«

^ The soul of poetry is linked with the aesthetic enjoyment

*rasa’jV<*^en a person reads the work of a great poet he

enjoys the descriptions of the connposition. At that time,

he is forgetful of the adjoining situations, and his

personal failutes and foibles. He delves deep into the

poetic fathom of feelings. This is a peculiar and

unprecedented type of enjoyment in contrast to the

worldly enjojrmsnts. This is celled the relish of ra sa.

In worldly use, different rasas create different feelings,

for instance, pathos brings sadness, but in poetic

descriptions it brings enjoyment. But this is not a

sadistic pleasure. The person who can delineate and

communicate rasa perfectly and successfully, is a great

poet. The judgement of poetic genius depends on

appropriate display of r a s a . In this respect Valmlki

is a greet poet. He has metamorphosed the worldly sorrow

generated from the lamentation of a curlew whose

 287

counterpart was slain by a hunter, to the universal!sed

pathos through a poetic composition. (p L .1 .5 ). The

poetic language which has the potency to ccmmunicate the

the abovesaid rasa to the people of literary taste is

called dhvani language. The power which brings the

dhvani language into existence is known as suggestive

element.

Anandavardhana's linguistic philosophy can be

brought under two levels. The first level consists of

the words and senses. These words are built by the rules

of^grammar, and they convey the meaning by the potency of

denotation. The second level is completely different

from the first level. Meaning in this level has variations.

It is not fixed in nature. It is based on the denotative

function of language. The prefix, suffix, stem, pairticle,

word, sentence and the whole work can convey this meaning

of second level. The comprehension of meaning in the

first level depends on grammatical knowledge e t c ., but the

comprehension of meaning in the second level depends on

the taste of the connoisseurs (DL.1.7?^ To understand

the language of music also ccmes under the second level.

In this case the experts and appreciators realise the

language of music. Suggestion as a power of language

which Anandavardhani(^as ^ s c o v e r e ^ is the spirit of life

?
 288

at the second level. According to Anandavardhana the

first level is the denotative vacya level of language

and the second level is the ’suggestive’ pratlyamana

level of language. Both are essential for poetry. But

poetry becomes most beautiful and charming only vdth the

second level of language. This is the dhvani language

of l^andavardhana. V/hen the words and senses subordinate

their primary signification to evoke some other meaning,

namely, suggested meaning, the dhvani language emerges?^

This dhvani language is based on suggestive function of

words. The definition of dhvani contains three elements;

i) There must be suggestive element.

56
ii) The suggestive element must be predominant.

57
iii) It should shine *prominently’ sphutatva.

In a number of places Anandavardhana insists on dhvani as

a soul of poetry whose condition is the primacy of the

5d
suggested content. Rasa is an essential element in the

dhvanikavya . Anandavardhana says that the dhvanikavya

is that type of poetry in which rasa is predominantly

59
displayed. This aspect will be discussed in proper

place of this dissertation (3*5)•

^ ■ I
 289

3«3*1»1 Suggestion is dependent on denotation

The suggested meaning does not operate independently.

The 'denotative meaning* vacyartha is directly conveyed

,by the word, but the suggested meaning is not directly

conveyed by the words. It is expressed only by denotative

elements of speech, without the help of denotation, the

ft
existence of suggestion cannot be determined. Anandavardhana

explains it by an analogy. Somebody desirous of light,

brings a candle. Though the light is different from the

candle, it is based on the latter. The candle is the

receptacle. It is essential before the light is lit.

But once it is lit, the light is more important than the

candle. Similarly the denotative elements help the

suggestive elements to come to light. They are important

t
until the suggestive elements are comprehended. Once the

suggestive elements are realised, the charm of denotative

elements are aupressed by the glowing brilliance of the

60
beautiful meaning of suggestion.

Anandavardhana has produced another example which

is directly taken from Bhartrhari. Just as according to

Bhartrhari, the meanings of smaller units help to

comprehend the meaning of the whole sentence (2.2.5),

I similarly according to Anandavardhana the denotative
 290

elements help to arouse the suggestive elements which

appear as a flash of lightning. The reality of dhvani

language is marked by suggestion. Its comprehension is

an integrated and unified whole. The denotative elements

lose their significance as aoatl

as the suggestive
61 /
elements are revealed. Suggestion is a separate function

of the word which can never be subsumed under other

functions, namely, ♦de no ta ti on’ abhidha ’indication’

g a u n ivrtti or l a k sana, ’pu r p o r t ’ tatparya and

- 62
’inference’ anumana. Abhinavagupta says that

suggestion can operate through word, sense and function,

63
separately and collectively. Thus dhvani language is

linguistic by nature, fit is not extra linguistic as

sometimes it is thought o f .^ It is expressed through

various media which will be discussed in the subsequent

sections.

3.3«1«2 Process of manifestation of suggestion :

The suggestive elements of the dhvani language

appear suddenly in the unstained mind of the people of

literary taste. They appear both in the poets and in

the connoisseurs by virtue of pr at ib ha. In this connection

Anandavardhana says , ’ like-wise that ’suggested sense

bursts forth in a flash in the minds of sensitive readers

who (wish to) experience the essential meaning (of poetry)

 291

and who are (really) indifferent to the explicit

64
meaning. The suggested meaning flashes in the speech

of great poets and lends unearthly delicacy to language.

It is the harbinger of poetic speech. Anandavardhana

fancied that Goddess of speech provides in abundance the

essential suggested element to the great poets that

65
reveals a shimmering type of poetic imagination. Thus

the process of manifestation of suggestion is spontaneous

in nature.

3»3»1«3 Necessity of suggestion for poetic speech

Suggestion is the touch stone of poetic language.

No poetry is possible without suggestion. In the words of

Anandavardhana, »there is by no means anyform of poetry

which will entrance the sensitive critic where the beauty

is not caused by association with a suggested sense.

This is the highest secret of poetry which should be

66
medicated on by the wise». Emphasising the role of

suggestion, Anandavardhana brings about an analogy.

The real decoration of women is blush even though they

we ar ornaments. Similarly different shades of suggestive

meanings are most beautiful embellishments of poetic s p e e c h ,

67
though it is adorned with poetic figures.
 292

3-3•1*4 The suggestive elements of language are knovm

to connoisseurs (1^.1.12). Since the finest sentiments

are brought forth by the suggestion, only the refined

persons can realise it. They are like goldsmiths yAio

examine the chastity of gold. The excellence of poetry
66
is known by the existence of suggestion in it.

3 .3 .1.5 Are pratiyamana and vyangya different?

//^ A*Aiuala Dass

mmmm
in his Ph.D. dissertation has stated

a very objectionable view in connection with pratiyamana.

He says that pratiyamana and vyangya are different.

Defining vyangya. he says, ♦ it is not an intellectual

idea, but an emotionally experienced content, a poetic moad,

a situational and social spiritual atmosphere in which

it is produced*. According to him pratiyamana

is the
69
way or process by which vyangya is known or revealed.

But this is not so. The vyangya is not a poetic mood;

it has nothing to do with social and spiritual atmosphere.

Anandavardhana has never uttered even once about its

spiritual nature. He never says that it is produced

either in religious places or spiritual gatherings. Again,

he never says that the vyangya is revealed by pratiyamana.

The pratiyamana is never a way or process by which

vyangya is manifested. /

/Vx-v,CL C.) '

 293

According to Anandavardhana, the pratlyamana is

an undescribable potency which remains in poetic work, ‘

It is over and above the words and sense. It is similar '

to the grace of a lady which is different from the limbs

Its presence in one place, beautify the whole

composition. If the face of a lady is graceful, and

/
he r other parts of the body are not so, even then it is

said that the lady is beautiful. Anandavardhana clearly

states pratlyamana as a type of meaning. It is based on

’denotation’ va cy a, and both constitute the body of

dhvani language ( ^ . 1 . 2 ) . Its synonyms are avagamana.

vyan.iana. dyotana etc. It is nothing but suggestion, a

function and not a process as Dass thinks. It is not beyond

the elements of language which is generally used in poetry.

Thus vyangyartha is not connected with social and

spiritual atmosphere. It is rather restricted to poetic

atmosphere. It is comprehended by connoisseurs and

people of literary taste. Thus A. Da ss’s speculations

SaiBtB
are not based on the facts of the text.

3»3*1<6 Genesis of the dhvani theory of Anandavardhana

Anandavardhana has unequivocally stated that he had

70
adopted the concept of dhvani from the grammarians.
 294

It seems that he has assimilated the graomiatical

philosophy of Bhartrhari. He has built the super­

structure of the dhvani theory on the nomenclatures

of sphota and pratibha theory of Bhartrhari. The whole

fourth chapter of this dissertation is devoted to '

investigate and establish the source of the dhvani

theory of Anandavardhana in the sphota and the j 1,-^

pratibha theory of Bhartrhari.

 295

3 .4 Medium of the dhvanl languajB:e

The dhvani language propounded by Anandavardhana

deals with meaning which is over and above the denoted

meaning. This language cannot be considered beyond the

elements of the ordinary language. But the functions of

words namely denotative, indicative, import and

inferenc^ cannot explain this language. It brings out the

true spirit of poetry delineating the most delioate and

beautiful ideas and emotions in most delicious manner.

But it has no concrete shape. The denotative elements of

speech work merely as substratums, nothing more.

The vastu ’matter’, alamkara 'figures of speech’

and rasa ’poetic relish’ may act as mediums of the

dhvani language. These are ’suggested contents’ vyangyas.

The dhvani language is best manifested through rasa alone.

jj In case of vastu and alamkara also, even the little

presence of rasa expresses dhvani •)! J

The smallest units of speech, namely roots, stems,

prefixes, suffixes, particles and phonemes which build

the word can act as a medium of the dhvani language. The

words and parts of words which form the sentence are also

mediums of dhvani language. The sentences which are

collectively responsible for complete work are also

71
mediums of the dhvani language.
 296

3*4 »1 Phonemes as medium of the dhvani language.

The grammarians hotly discuss whether the phonemes

are meaningful or meaningless. Patanjali analyses this

problem in the pratyaharanhika ojf the Mahabhagya and

72
concludes that the phonemes may be meaningful or meaningless.

According to Anandavardhana, also the phonemes are

sometimes meaningful and sometimes meaningless. The

phonemes which appear to be meaningless suggest rasa

by virtue of their own capability only in some special

contexts but they fail to evoke rasa when the speaker

uses ^casually. Anandavardhana says that profuse use of

cerebral_s^, palatal £ and conjunct consonants with r and

^ are abusive to ^rngara rasa »erotic sentiment»• But

when these letters are used profusely, they suggest

bibhatsa rasa.

In this connection Abhinavagupta raises the

objection that the phonemes cannot play any role in

revealing rasa when it is evoked by excitants, ensuants

and accessories. He removes this objection by stating /

that the evocative spirit of rasa emerges from typical /

type of mellifJ^ous sounds of articulated phonemes.

The audible phonemes become tender or tarsh in impartial

way. In this respect the phonemes are conducive to the

74
evocation of rasa.
 297

Anandavardhana has stated that not only phonemes

but subtlest form of speech, namely, ’case-terminations’

sup, ’conjugational terminations* t i n , ^number*

vacana, ’power of case endings* karaka s a k t i . *primary

affixes* krt , ’secondary affixes* taddhita,’compounds*

samasa. *particles* up as a r g a , prefixes and tenses act

as medium of dhvani language of * u n d i s c e m e d sequentiality’

75
alaksyakrama vyangya* iach of these smallest units of

speech evoke rasa in association with suggestion.

Abhinavagupta develops the findings of Anandavardhana.

Though a linguistic unit is an indivisible whole which

cannot be further broken into smaller significant units,

yet for the learning of the connoisseurs and poets, the

higher linguistic units can be divisible into smallest

parts. In the words of Abhinavagupta, ”in this way when

the suggestion of sentiment of u n d i s c e m e d sequentiality

al a k syakramarasadhvani has been shown to arise from the

whole class of suggesters consisting of letters all the

way upto passages, nothing else remains to be described,

and yet, in order to instruct poets and sensitive readers,

by having recourse to negative and positive statements,

he mentions the whole collection of suggesters minutely

suptin etc."
 298

Liandavardhana has hinted that particular phonemes

are responsible for particular ’poetic merits' g\mas

77
which are the properties of rasas. The sentiments,

namely love In separation and pathos cannot further be

used for the 'poetic merit of force fulness’ o.jaguna /^

which is used in the furious sentiment. In the verses of

Bhattanarayana's y e ni sa mh ar a, i.e. cancadbhuja etc.

*/ * 7 9
and yah sastram etc. particular high sounding

phonemes bring out tremendous effect which ultimately

do
generate«( raudra rasa.

In the latter days, Mammata has developed this

idea of Anandavardhana on the role of phonemes with regard

to the evocation of r a s a . He says, "just as bravery and

such qualities belong to the soul, not to the body,

so sweetness and other excellences belong to the passion,

not to the letter. In some cases it so happens that

people find bravery co-existing with the large sized

body, and ccane to speak of the body itself as 'brave'

and hence in another case also, on seeing a large body,

they are led to believe, from the analogy of the former

case, that this other man also must be brave, and thus,

even a really braveman comes to be belived to be not brave

on the ground of the smallness of his body; and such

beliefs are very common; in the same manner people

(like Vamana and others) have tome to speak (a) of the

 2 99

soft sounding letters as *sweet*, though in reality

they are only suggestive of sweetness; and they cane

to speak of such passion and its accessories as az*e not

really ’sweet’, as ’s w e e t ’, simply by reason of the

softness of the letters (expressing them); in the same

manner, they also speak of the really ’sw ee t’ passions

and accessories as ’not s w e e t ’, when they are expressed

in such words as are not soft sounding; and in all this,

they do not take into account the passion at all (attri­

buting as they do, the sweetness to the letters). It is

in view of all this divergent usage that it has been

asserted (in the text) that sweetness and other

excellences are properties really belonging to the

passion^ and what the properly selected letters do is

only to render such qualities perceptible; and those

d2
qualities do not subsist in the letters entirely.”

In this connection Anandavardhana’s objection

and answer may be stated. When rasa is usually evoked

by the power of meaning, how it can be evoked by the

minute parts, i.e. phonemes, case terminations, etc.?

Anandavardhana answers that it is true that rasa

is evoked by the senses^ yet the denotative function

plays a major role in the case of evocation of rasa

cannot be denied. This denotative function has no power

 3 00

of conveying suggestivlty «/ Sometimes, the music evokes

rasa without depending on words. But in poetry the

meanings which are to be suggested should depend on the

words. In order to know, the suggestion properly, one

has to split the parts of the denotative word or words

through which the suggestive elements are often expressed.

By this act of spliting, one is able to kn ow the suggestive

elements in each part of the crude word.

^ a n d a v a r d h a n a has further stated that the

realisation of rasa is one and integrated experience

of the mind. It is expressed by the meanings which are

suggested. The words of the language structure give

concrete form to it. The language which expresses the

meaning leading to the realisation of rasa cannot be

divisible into smaller units. If it would be divisible,

then rasa cannot be an indivisible experience. For the

realisation of rasa one cannot divide the integrated

linguistic unit whose smaller units may have the elements

of suggestion. But for the sake of analysis, one can

split the larger units of language into smaller units.

This division helps to know which part conveys what

type of suggestion, and h o w many suggestive elements

S3
it contain.
 301

This idea is exactly an echo of Bhartrhari’s

linguistic philosophy. According to him a semantic

imit cannot be broken into further fragments. The

grammarians for the sake of analysis break an indivisible

speech unit into parts. This division is fictitious.

The reality of language is an indivisible experience.

This will be discussed further as we proceed.

3.4.2 Words as medium of the dhvani language

Anandavardhana always keeps in his mind that the

semantic units cannot be further divisible into smaller

units. In case of the analysis of words, he follows the

same principles. It has been told that the whole poetxy

65
is to be regarded as a dhvani k a v y a . A poetry is a

collection of sentences built of meaningful words. In

this light a sentence as a whole can be the medium of

suggestive sense. As to the question what should be

the role of words in the communication of suggested sense,

Anandavardhana answers that the words may act as agents

for *remembrance* sm rt i. but they cannot denote meanings

It would be a mistake, if one takes words, in its meaning

conveying capacity as prayojaka of dhvani language. But

there is an instance where words act as medium of dhvani

language which runs like this : » Merchant, how could we

possibly have elephant-tusks or tiger skins as long as

this'daughter-in-law of mine roams about in this house

 302

«7
wi t h her face covered in dangling cu rl s».Here the

word lulitalakamukhi »her face covered in dangling

curls* suggest that the himter is now interested

exclusively in making love and so has become weak and

unable to hunt. For the woman to have her hair laying

about on her face is a sign of flirtatiousness and of

V
frivolity. Perhaps there is a further suggestion, namely

that the woman has no time to braid and oil her hair

properly, so engrossed is she in lovemaking, or perhaps

since hair is likely to come undone during love-making

and to fall over o n e ’s face, the woman is reminding

her husband of love by leaving her hair in this state

all the time. These suggestive meanings are achieved

by the force of the idea denoted by these words in a

\
situation that exists outside of the p o e t ’s imagination.

Anandavardhana says that the wholeness of the dhvani

language is not affected, if the implicit meaning of a

part is analysed. To explain this, he gives an analogy.

In worldly use, if the face of some person is beautiful

we say that his whole body is beautiful. We do not say

that his face is beautiful only and other parts of his

body are not so. The beauty of one part contributes to

the total beauty of the body. Similarly with regard to

dhvani language the wholeness is taken into account.

That is why, the connoisseurs remark that the poetry is

touched by dhvani. and therefore, it is beautiful

 303

eventhough in reality a word or a part of word may add

charm to it. In the above said example vanl j aka etc.

the beauty of one word lends charm to the whole poetry.

The division of the dhvani-sentence into dhvanl element

is done for the sake of »analysis* bhedabuddhi. In fact,

the sentence is conveyer of suggestive meaning but it

does not mean that the constituents of sentence have no

role in conveying suggestive meaning.

Anandavardhana in another context has explained

the same idea. The words are the parts of the sentence.

Each word contributes to the totality of the sentences.

When the sentence is constructed and the meaning is

conveyed, the individual words and their meanings become

redundant. They become fictitious and the reality in the

form of the sentence and its meaning emerges. The

individual words in a sentence are smarakas *agents of

remembrance*. The suggestive words recollect the

beautiful suggested sense vAiich brings charm to the

whole expression. This idea is hinted at in case of the

90
verse vanijaka etc. The reality of dhvani language
9^ *
is an undivided unity. Separate parts contribute their

imports to the whole. The division of dhvani sentences

into dhvani elements is unreal. The unified dhvani

sentence is reality of the dhvani language. In the words

of Anandavardhana, “therefore there is beauty in all

fl": .
 304

the varieties of d h v a n i , which is revealed by mere wordSi^

even though words do in fact serve only as reminders#

Just as a woman appears lovely through a single ornament

beautifully arranged, so also the speech of a good poet

91
appears lovely through d h va ni. revealed in a single wordr

The role that words play may be twofold, i.e.

in their individual capacity, and in their collective

capacity. The words in their individual capacity retain ^

semantic value. But when different words are syntactically

connected with each other in particular order to form a

sentence, they surrender their semantic attzributes to the

semantic upsurge of the sentence. For the sake of the

communication of meaning, syntactically connected words

cannot be broken. In case they are broken, the meaning

cannot be conveyed. But for analysis the words can be

separated and can be split into their elements. Meanings

cannot be communicated through them. What is true in an

ordinary speech is also true in poetic speech. In case

of dhvani language, each suggested word contributes to

the suggested meaning of the whole expression. In the

92
vanijaka etc. as it is seen, a particular word

beautifies the vAiole expression with its suggested

meaning like a graceful face of a woman. Thus a single

word as medium of conveying suggested sense is

established.
 r
C305
l

3.4*3 Indivisible sentence as medium of the

dhvani language

According to Anandavardhana, the dhvani language

of alaksyakramavyangya type in the form of sentence is

a most important one. The grammarians hold that actual

communication is performed by the sentence. It is taken

as one linguistic unit which cannot be further subdivided

into smaller units if the meaning is to be conveyed.

( 2.2.4, 2.2.5).

Following the trends of the grammarians Ananda -

vardhana holds that the sentence which has suggested

elements in it, is an integral dhvani language. In the

alaksyakramavyangya dhvani of sentence, the sentence and

dhvani are inseparable from each other. It means the y

sentence has absorbed the suggested elements. It is taken

as a whole. The phonemes, words and parts of the words

in the sentence are suggesters of dhvani. These phonemes

etc. are further accessories of excitants etc. which

in turn are suggester of r a s a . The meaning of the

sentence is rasa. In support of this Anandavardhana

may be quoted : "because it is admitted that rasas are the

ultimate sense of a sentence. If the subject and the

predicate are found in the literal sentence-meaning, why

should they not be found in rasas, which are suggested by

the force of the literal sentence meaning as a

93
whole ?«
 The sentence operates naturally in connection with

rasa. As a vdiole it acquires excitants etc. and becomes

inseparable with rasa. The sentence is not an instrument

for the manifestation of raaa like the phonemes and words.

It cognises vibhavadi and manifests itself as ra s a .

So the relation between the sentence and dhvani is

inseparable. Anandavardhana maintains that the term

sarvatah in the verse k ^ a k a kupitaih etc. of the

Ramabhyudaya denotes that a particular word does not

manifest rasa. The rasa is manifested as a whole fi*om all

angles of the sentence. Here neither a word no r a part

of word is the suggester of ra sa. The sentence as a whole

is its suggester. On the one hand, the sentence suggests

the respective depth of love between Rama and Sita, and

on the other hand it (the sentence) absolutely manifests

94
the sentiment of love in separation as a whole.

Anandavardhana in number of illustrations has shown how

95
the whole sentence acts as a suggester of dhvani-meaning.

Anandavardhana has compressed his philosophy of

sentence and its meaning in a paragraph which is \

stated below : "the analogy of the meanings of

(individual) words and the meaning of a sentence (as a

whole) is not appropriate to the case of literal

meaning and suggested meaning. For the apprehension of

 307

the literal meaning of a word is unreal according to

certain learned men ( e.g. the grammarians like

Bhartrhari). Those who do not accept its unireallty

(e.g. the w L n ^ s a k a s) will have to accept the analogy

of the pot and its material cause (up a d a n a . i.e. clay)

to apply to the meaning of the sentence as a whole and

the meanings of the individual words. Just as, when

the poet is completed we cannot perceive separately its

material cause (here thought of as particles or small

bits of clay); in the same way, when a sentence and its

meanings are perceived, we cannot perceive separately

the words and their meanings. If (at that time) the

meanings of words are separately cognised, then the

apprehension of the meaning of a sentence as a whole

would recede (from our minds). But this analogy will not j
hold true in the case of literal meaning and the suggested

meaning, because when use apprehend the suggested sense,

the literal sense is not discarded (at least in the case

of rasadhvani), because its revelation is never dissociated

from the consciousness of the literal meaning. Therefore

the proper analogy between the two is that of the pot

r- - '
and the lamp (which reveals the pot in the daric). For Just

as when the pot is perceived by means of the lamp, the

light of the lamp does not disappear, so also when the

suggested sense is understood, the consciousness of the

literal meaning does not disappear, feliat however was

said in the first u d yo ta. namely ’Just as through the

 308

meaning of words* etc. was only said in order to show

the general similarity, that (the meaning of words and

the literal sense) were (both) helpful (to the under­

standing of the meaning of the whole sentence, just as

literal sense is helpful to the understanding of the

96
suggested me aning).

This above passage is the direct echo of Bhartrhari^s

97 -
philosophy of language, Anandavardhana has taken it

from him and fitted it to the dhveni language.

Thus suggestion is the heart of the dhvani language.

It is an instrument to communicate the poetic ideas.

It describes the beautiful ideas of poetry. The saturation

of the description in poetry is achieved by the delineation

of ra sa. Rasa is an integral experience of the conscious­

ness. As an experience it should be one and whole. It

is manifested by the sentence which has suggestive

elements. So the meaning of the sentence is the meaning

of the rasa. It is sparked by the denotative function

of the word. The indivisible sentence which describes \

rasa as an unified experience can be divided into

smaller units for the sake of analysis. Parts are no

reality in the dhvani language. For the sake of

realisation of the beautiful meaning of poetry one should

not split the whole sentence into parts. The sentence is

indivisible and the reality of language. This is the
L
philosophy of language of Anandavardhana.
 _ ^TV,' XvJ' 3

3 .5 Monistic concept of rasa ^ ^

Bharata is the (founder')of ,rasa school. Sometimes

it appears that rasa school of Bharata and dhvanischool

of Anandavardhana are different. But in reality the

dhvani school is complementary to rasa school. The dhvani

9d
theory is an extension of rasa theory. According to

Anandavardhana rasa is the irunning thread in the entire .a.-

dhvani language. More or less all the elements of poetry ^ C

are touched by raaa. The dhvani, pratibha. guna, riti,

vrtti and samghatana etc. are treated from the ^

standpoint of rasa in the Dhvanyaloka. All the varieties j

of dhvani have different degrees of rasa. Anandavardhana j

I
has mentioned that the body of poetry is built of theme
99
and style. Its soul is rasa. The extitants etc. bring

rasa into cognition. The suggestive power manifests

rasa through the denotative elements of speech. In case of

100
music sounds are denotative elements which manifest rasa.
101
A poet should give foremost importance to rasa. Bharata

shows on awareness of this fact in the classifications

' 102
of vrttis.

Monistic concept of rasa refers to the state when

one rasa predominates over the other rasas. It may also

mean the state when from one rasa other rasas emerge.

Bharata has classified rasa into eight types on the basis

103
of eight permanent moods. Abhinavagupta adds santa rasa
 104 //
to them. //The monistic concept of rasa of the Sanskrit

poetics seems to come from the grammatical philosophy

105
of Bhartrhari. Taking a cue from the vedas Bhartrhari

has developed his grammatical philosophy. According to

^ 106
him the *word principle* sabdabrahman is one, without

beginning and indestructible. It is the ultimate reality

which manifests itself into many because of its many

powers. It does so without losing its oneness. Almost

it is not different from its powers, but it appears to be

different. Among its many powers, the time is most

important. It is one but its divisions are superimposed

on it. On it depends all the different kinds of changes

which bring about multiplicity in being. The ultimate

which is one contains the seeds of all multiplicity. It

manifests itself as the experiencer, the experienced

107
and the experience itself.

A
It appears that Anandavardhana has taken a cue of

his oneness of rasa and oneness of its relish, from the

concept of i^abdabrahman of Bhartrhari. His realisation of "

rasa is similar to the realisation of supremebrahman.

AS brahman in Vedanta manifests into manyforms but retains

its oneness, so also the rasa manifests into many varieties,

but it retains its oneness. In the same way from one rasa

other rasas emerge. This is the central idea of

 'Ji,
-VA

lOg
mono-sentImentalismj . ^ Those who believe there is one

rasa and other rasas are different manifestations of it,

their views can be brought under mono-rasa cult. There

are few streams of mono-rasa cult. Bhoja in^^rngaraprakasa

states that only erotic is the one rasa and other rasas

emanate from it. They are as good as ghosts in the banian

109 . ~
tree. It seems that according to Anandavardhana ex*otic
110
is the only rasa, though he has nowhere mentioned about

it. He has only mentioned that it is the most delicate

and beautiful of all rasas and slightest impropriety can

111
cause severe damage to it. It is believed that

^rngararasa has been camouflaged under the name of bhakti

by Visnava rhetoricians. S.N.Ghosal states, ”the

-- --- Baasiass ' ,
neo-rasa (vaisnava) school appreciates the »devotion’

bhakti as to be the only relish. The concept of bhakti

is psychologically nothing but an extension of rati, the

feeling of the erotic. The unconditional, self-bequest

and sublime love is the other name of bhakti. Love is

either an instinct, or a feeling. Its expression is the

erotic emotion, or sex, what a modern school of psychology

counts as to be the inertia of all actions and expressions

of behaviourism. Philosophy of Indian erotics that

attained full maturity in Bhoja*s irngaraPrakasa enjoyed

perfection in works of vaisnava saint aesthetics like

Rupa Goswamin, Sanatana Goswanin, Jiva Goswamin,

112
Madhusudan Saraswati and others. This speculation of
 312

bhaktlrasa as extension of ^rngararasa is doubtful.

Psychologically both are the same as rati» This rati is

the permanent mood in both srngara and bhakti rasa. But

the bhaktlrasa is metaphysical and religious in character

whereas the sm g a r a r a s a is worldly and poetic in nature.

1H
Bhavabhuti believes in one rasa that is karunarasa.
t

Narayana, the great grand father of Visvanath kaviraj

115
holds that adbhuta is the only one rasa. Abhinavagupta

holds that santa is only rasa. Apart from these above

propounders ^aktibhadra (ascaryarasa) Visvesvara

(caaatkara rasa), Dharmadatta (adbhuta rasa) hold that

116
there is one rasa.

S .Kugguswami |£3^ri presents the development of

mono rasa cult nicely. He states that in the course of

the development of the philosophy of rasa, several attempts

were made in the direction of synthesising the various

rasas. The more important results of such attempts were

summed up in four kinds of synthesis. Firstly, there is

karuna synthesis which originated from Valmlki and found

its culmination in Bhavabhuti*s gko rasah karuna eva

on the practical side, and in Anandavardhana^s sokah

slokatvamagatah on the theoretical side,

'n
..- - I
 rI
KJ 13

Secondly, there is santa synthesis which started

perhaps from the Mahabharata, found its fulfilment in

works like Asvaghosa’s Sariputtaprakarana . ^riHarsa*s S.

Nagananda and KrsnaMlsra»s Prabodha candrodaya, and

received able advocacy on the theoretical side at the

•r
hands of the two greatest alamkarikarikas namely

Anandavairdhana and Abhinavagupta.

Thirdly, there is sragara synthesis which is

firmly rooted‘in hunian nature itself since the beginning

of the creation, reached its acme of spiritual refinement,

on the practical side, in the self effacing ideal of love

delineated in an inimitable manner by the creative genius

of great poets like Kalidasa and Bana, and on the

theoretical side, in the wellknown dictum of the royal

polymoth Bhoja, ras^ *bhimano*h a ^ a r a h sragara iti giyate.

And fourthly, there is adbhuta synthesis vAiich

on the theoretical side became crystallised in the views

of Narayana and Dharmadatta referred to by Visvanath

in his SahityaPan^ana and in the views of Ehanudatta

as expressed in his Rasataranginl , and which on the

practical side, led to the production of the wonder

dominated dramatic type represented by the older Ascarya-

cudamanl and the latter Adbhutadan>ana of Mahadeva

at the end of the seventeenth century.

 314

Thus Kuppuswami Sastrl does not establish the pure

sssTBaessxcsBtt ^asassK
monistic concept of rasa. He attempts to show the develop­

ment of pure monism of rasa which appears to be similar

to the vedic henotheism or pantheism.

3.5.1 Bharata^s idea of monism of rasa

Bharata has not told anywhere that from one rasa

other rasas emerge. Abhinavagupta interprets the

oneness of rasa as describad.in the Naty&oastra. Though

rasa is divided into eight varieties, it is one from the

standpoint of relish. The relish of rasas brings pie as ui*e.

It is a peculiar type of enjoyment which is different

ft
from other worldly enjoyments. It is^comaion trait in all

rasas. So in reality the rasa is one, and it is many

because its different manifestations. The multiplicity

of rasa is vikrtis of one maharasa.

•ni,. j
The ablative singular use of the term resa in KS
11^
suggests the monistic concept of rasa. Abhinavagupta

says, "earlier the term rasa is used in plural number

(in but here it is used in singular number. The

purpose behind it is to suggest that rasa is one.

In this sense it is used in the drama. Rasa is many

119
because of ’difference in vision’ bheda drsti.”
 315

He further says that the drama represents rasa-r The study

of drama brings the realisation of rasa* Rasa is one

from the standpoint of this realisation. All other rasas

120
originate from the principal maharasa*

Thus Bharata was aware of the fact that inspite of

external differences, rasa is one and indivisible. The

original rasa is one (maharasa) from which other rasas

evolve just as aecording to Bhartrhari, from the one word

principle, the entire speech with multiple varieties

121
evolve. Thus rasatatva »principle of rasa* is just

like the vedic deity who though one manifests into many.

From the philosophical point of view, the concept

of rasa passes through three different stages, viz.

henotheism, pantheism and monotheism.

In the first stage, all rasas and their permanent

moods are considered separately and independently. In the

next stage, a particular rasa is taken as predominant one,

for instance, srngara or karuna. In the third stage attempts

are made to discover a common under current in all rasas,

for instance, someone finds rati, others same, still

others abhimana as common trend in all rasas. Ultimately

the concept of rasa rises to the height of pure monism,

and it is identified with the concept of the sou l ^ of the

 316

Upanlaa d s . Here the concept o f rasa receives the

122
spiritual status.

3.5«3 Anandavardhana*8 monistic idea of rasa c^~

It has been stated earliel; that Anandavardhana ^

"
shows weaknes^ for srngararasa. He says that it is most ^
■ ^ 123
delicate of all rasas* While discussing the sentiments

of the Ramayana and the Mahabharata, he argues in favour

of one rasa. The karunarasa overpowers the descriptions

of the whole Ramayana from the beginning to the end.

The Santarasa is the ultimate desired rasa in the

Mahabharata. Amidst the war and strifes and material

prosperity, santarasa remains as the undercurrent in all

descriptions in the Mahabharata. Here moksa is the

ultimate goal of living beings. In Harivamsa also santa

is the only rasa. It is suggested by the devotion of

Vasudeva, the renunciation of material possession, the

final emancipation and the attainment of supreme Reality.

Even pandavas* exploitations are means of attaining the

supreme Reality. So santa is the only rasa in the

Mahabharata whose nature is tranquillity and happiness

124
at the cessation of desire.

Anaiidavardliana has dealt with the monistic concept

of rasa in a different way. The poet may desire many

rasas in his poetry. But he should stick to one rasa

 317

as »principal* angi and others should be subordinate to

it. He should carefully display other rasas which are

minor in between the description of the chief rasa, so

that the importance of chief rasa is not lost and its

125
effect on the reader is preserved.

Anandavardhana has admitted nine rasas including

126 127 12d
Santa ra sa. In the second uddyota and third uddyota

of the Dhvanyaloka. he has discussed the theories

regarding many rasas. But in the fourth uddyota he has

synthesised all the rasas into one. The principle of

oneness of rasa is followed in the Ramayana (karunarasa)

and in the ^iahabharata (santarasa). He does not say like

Bho.ia. Bhavabhuti and Rupa Gosvamin that there is particular

one rasa, i.e.- sr ^ a r a . karuna. bhakti respectively, and

other rasas are the manifestations of that particular

rasa. His intention is that any rasa can be taken as

the principal one under which other rasas may be

portrayed. One rasa should discharge tremendous influence

over other rasas even indirectly in diverse poetic

situations.
s.| He has shown(^akness f o ^ srngara and

santarasa

In reality Anandavardhana*s philosophy of rasa

is monistic in nature. The poet should maintain

propriety in their display. There may be many rasas,

 318

but all of them work for one particular rasa in a

particular poetic work. One rasa ultimately overpowers

all and emerges as a principal one. After manifesting

one rasa, the minor rasas mingle themselves with the

chief manifested rasa* Thus the reality of rasa is one

and multiplicity in it is a fiction. The minor rasas

lose significance when the principal rasa emerges.

This concept is elaborately discussed in the context of

the judgement of karuna and santarasa in the Ramayana

- - ' ‘ 129 -
and the Mahabharata respectively. Aaandavardhana♦s

leaning to the oneness of rasa can be further justified

130
from the great number of singular uses of the term rasa.

Thus the reality of rasa stated above resembles to

the reality of sentence meaning of Bhartrhari. The smaller

units of speech help to manifest the larger unit of speech

which is one and indivisible, when the larger unit is

comprehended, the smaller units have no any specific

131
function. This will be discussed in detail as we proceed.

3*5»3 Abhinavagupta*s monistic idea of rasa

Abhinavagupta is a great saivite philosopher as well

as rhetorician of repute. So it is possible that his

aesthetic doctrines might have been influenced by his

philosophical dictates. It happens in his work, as a true

medicant of i^aiva-monistic order, he brought the concept

 319

of oneness into rasa. He claims that santa is the only

rasa from which other rasas originate. When the functions

of other rasas are over they mingle in that s ^ t a r a s a .

It is the maharasa. In this regard Abhinavagupta has

taken the monistic rasa philosophy of Anandavardhana.

In the list of ^accessories^ samcarl bhavas, Bharata has

placed nirveda in the beginning. Abhinavagupta considers

this nirveda as the premanentmood of santarasa. Thus it ^

seems he supports the primacy of santarasa. This santarasa

is based on serious philosophical thought. The consciousness

of this rasa and its relish flow amidst the realisation of
132
all rasas.

Indian rhetoricians always tzled to discover a

binding thread amongst all rasas, externally and

internally. External common link is fabricated by

Anandavardhana which is further corroborated by the latter

rhetoricians, viz. Abhinavagupta, Mammata, Visvanath and

\"
Jagannath etc. It is established by the fact that one

rasa should bejprinclpal in a poetic work and other rasas

are m a n i f e ^ a ^ o n s o ^ t h ^ particular rasa. The internal

common link is established by the two common features

which remain in all rasas. Firstly, the relish of rasa

is a special type of cognition. Secondly, all rasas

bring absolute happiness. In vindication to this

Anandavardhana believes that santa is that rasa in which
 320

all desires are but to rest. It is the ultimate human

goal* It is a pleasure comparable to the happiness of

attaining supreme brahman. In other rasas also happiness

/
is the common quality. It is brought forth on the wake

of the destruction of all desires. The erotic and other

rasas sprout from the santarasa with the appropriate

excitants etc* and when the excitants are gone, the

/- 133
rasas revealed are again submerged in the santarasa.

The features responsible to establish a common

undercurrent amon^ all rasas can be linked with the

134
pleasures of realising brahman as stated in the upanisads

The brahman is characterised by the absolute happiness.

It is attainable only by the yogins through strenuous

austerities. When they realise it they enjoy absolute

happiness. This is the highest level of joyful experience

which cannot be comparable to ordinary worldly pleasure.

Ignoroance is an obstacle to attain such happiness. \t/hen

it is iremoved by knowledge, the supreme brahman characte­

rised by absolute happiness appears in full effulgence.

This is the ultimate reality. The Upanisads identify this

stage with rasa which is the supreme bliss.

The connoisseurs who read or listen a standard

poetic work enjoy absolute pleasure at a certain stage.

This is an unccHomon experience different from joyous

 321

experiences of the world. It is unshaking and singular

- 135
type of consciousness. First BhattaNayaka , then

Abhinavagupta and later on panditraj Jagannatha elaborated

this stage of realisation of rasa which seems to be

similar to the realisation of the supreme br ah ma n.

*
BhattaNayaka for the first time in Indian poetics
&^
proclaimed that the relish of rasa is hladanisyanda and

brahmasvadasahodara. jAbhinavagupta has established this "0-^

^ 136
monistic philosophy of rasa on firm philosophical ground.
yJS
C'- •«

3«5»4 Difference between brahmanubhuti and ^

rasanubhuti

The realisation of rasa and the realisation of

supreme brahman appear similar. Both the cognitions

have similarities and differences. BhattaNayaka and

Abhinavagupta were aware of them. The cognition of the

supremebrahman is one and without differentiation. On the

other hand, the cognition of rasa is a pleasure of

consciousness which is brought about by the diversified

137
elements, namely, excitants etc. In spite of this

fact both BhattaNayaka and Abhinavagupta give higher |

13 ®
status to the poets than to the yogins. However,

contrary to it, Abhinavagupta states elsevi^ere that all

types of pleasures are parts of the absolute pleasure

139
of the supreme brahman. This idea has been further
 3 22

elaborated by Kumarasvamin, the son of famous M allin ath

in his commentaiT^ of Prataparudrlya yasobhusana. ^

According to him all pleasures are similar to the

pleasure of attaining supreme brahman* The yogic pleasure

and the pleasure of the realisation of rasa are parts

of this great pleasure of brahman. The pleasure of

attaining the ultimate reality remains at the higher

140
stratum than the ordinary pleasures.

The PancadasI states that Vasanananda ^pleasures

derived from the instincts* and visayananda ’pleasures

derived from material po s s e s s i o n ’ are the products of

brahmananda. The vasananda is the residual impression

of brahmananda and the v i sayananda is the reflection of

brahmananda in psychoses which cognise object of sense.

nt
But both of them lean towards the brahmananda.

3*5«5 M.Hiriyanna’s observations between aesthetic

experience and religion is noteworthy here. He says,

"since rasa or aesthetic experience also, link like

this final one of jlvanmukti, is characterised by

V
complete detachment and is accompanied by a unique form

of delight, the two are described as similar. But there

is one vital difference between them. It is the lack in

the former of the knowledge of ultimate reality, wtiich is

 323

essential to the latter (a deficiency which is made good

here by assuming grades of aesthetic intuition that

progressively reveal reality). To this, they trace the

lapse from art experience which takes place sooner or

later >dien, to speak generally, all the tensions of

ordinary life return. There is a reversion to common

life from the experience of jlvanmukti also; but it can

by no means, be regarded as a *lapse % since the

philosophic conviction endures then with all its

expected influence upon life’s conduct. In other words,

there is according to the Indian view, no direct

connection between aesthetic and absolute experience,

as seems to be supposed here. The discipline of the

fine az*ts, particularly of music, is not however,

excluded from religion; but it is explained as only a

142
useful aid to success in meditation upon the highest.”

Hiri^a^a demarcates between the az*t experience

and the religious expeiQience from the standpoint

of their influence on the reality of life. The yogins

comeback to the imperfect reality of the world, when

their trance is over. Similarly the connoisseurs see

the reality of the worldly life when the momentai^^ relish

of rasa comes to an end. But this difference alluded,

do not affect the conclusion that the relish of rasa is

 324

different frcmi the idealisation of brahman. One»s

feasibility can be deduced from the other. The art /

experience Is not a temporary luxury. A momentary

relish of rasa infuses the desire for its further

realisation and pleasxire. In latter days Pt. Jagannatha / ^

has critically analysed the pleasurable aspect of rasa Vd

and b r a h m a n T h u s it is clear that the monistic

concept of rasa ii«hich is hinted in the Dhvanyaloka Nf

has been saturated into a philosophical doctrine at the

hands of Abhinavagupta aid Panditraja Jagannatha.

 3 25

3.6 Speaker*3 intention and vyanjana

Anandavardhana has stated in many places that

s p e a k e r ’s Intention is vyanjana ’suggestion*. While

refuting the views of N a i y ay ik as. he states that suggestion

144
depends on speaker’s intention. He does not consider

the speaker’s Intention as a separate function like the

mlmamsakas . He does not use the term tatparya ’i m p o r t ’

to denote it, rather he uses the maxim of ’words and

- - - - 145
sentence m e an in g’ vakyartha-padartha-nyaya to connote

the idea of ta tp ar ya.

The poetic language is regulated and modelled by

the intention of the poet. It communicates the sentiments

to the readers by the suggestive power of language.

If a poet attempts to communicate the aesthetic relish

through denotative power of the language, the effect is

less powerful* The rasa can be communicated by the

147
dhvani language. The poetry is flourished and the

particular rasas are displayed by the intention of the

14« -
poet. Anandavardhana has repeatedly remax^ced that the

suggestion is based on denotation {DL.I.10-11). The

denotative elements of speech are constant whereas the

suggestive elements are accidental. The suggestion

cannot be considered as a variety of denotation because

of its adventitiousness. The M i m ^ s a k a s admit the

 326

adventitiousness as a criterion to make distinction

between human utterance and vedic utterance. By this

attribute, they establish the eternal relation between

words and senses. Thus they indirectly admit suggestion,

so far as adventitiousness is concerned* The adventitious

149
power of suggestion is very common in human speech.

A problem crops up at this stage that if the adventitiousnel^

is the common attribute, both in ordinary language and in

dhvani language then what should be the basis to identify

a particular language? Anandavardhana meets with the

above objection. According to him the suggestive element

remains not only in the dhvani language but also it exists

in ordinary speech to reveal the desire of the speaker.

The suggestive elements which remain in ordinary speech,

are of different nature. These are not different from

denotative elements. They remain inside the denotative

meaning. The suggestive elements are not mainly

expressed here. They exist in a subordinate position in

150 .
common speech. Anandavardhana states that suggestion

is a special type of intention of the speaker. Any

ordinary intention cannot be suggestion. The special

type of intention is that in which suggestive elements

«
are predominant. It is revealed by the function of
151
suggestion. as the speaker^s intentions are limitless,

the dhvani language, whose life is suggestion, is also

 327

limitless. The speaker’s intention brings about the

suggestive meaning in different ways and in many varieties.

The suggestive elements and denotative elements are

organically associated on the basis of speaker's intention.

Because of this nature of suggestion Mimasamkaa cannot

152
abandon it.

3.6.1 Import of the sentence and suggestion

The tatparyavadins hold that the denotative function

expresses the primary sense of the sentence. After that

the special meaning is conveyed by the intention of the

speaker. In other vords, to know the speaker's intention

a function like suggestion is not essential. The denotative

function in its wider capacity reveals the speaker's intention

Thus according to tatparyavadins . the speaker's intention

is denoted and not suggested. On the contrary Inandavardhana

claims that the speaker's intenticn is suggested* It can

never be denoted. In order to Justiiy his propositions,

he analyses the semantic problems of poetic language.

Anandavardhana' states that a sentence is built of words.

153
and the sentence meaning is built of word meanings. The

words and word meaning help in the cognition of the

sentence and sentence-meaning. But they are fictitious.

The relation between the parts (words and word-meanings)

and whole (sentence and sentence-meaning) may be similar

 3 28

to the relation which e x is t s between jghata *a p it c h e r '

and its primary cause, i.e. clay. The clay is essential as long

as the ghata is not built. Once it-is built the raw clay

loses its significance. Similarly until the sentence-

meaning is understood wholly, the word-meanings continue

to raise it. But when the sentence-meaning is cognised

as an indivisible whole, then the word-meanings az*e no more

required. If one attempts to know the sentence-meaning

by separately analysing the word-meanings, then the

154
import of the sentence is lost. But this analogy cannot

be applicable to determine the relation between vacya

♦denotation* and vyangya ’suggestion’. Anandavardhana

explains it with the analogy of ghata »a pitcher* and

light. The denotative meaning helps the cognition of

suggested meaning. But the former is not useless when the ^

latter is revealed. The denotative meaning is organically

linked with the suggested meaning. Just as the l i ^ t

f'
helps the perception of a jar and it continues its

manifestation still further, similarly the expressed

sense continiies to reveal the suggested sense even though

155
it is manifested.

The role of the parts in the cognition of the

whole sentence has already been discussed. Liandavardhana

further analyses whether parts denote or suggest the

meaning of the whole. Stating the view of Mimamsakas.

 329

he says that the words and meaning of words are cognised

first in their individual capacity, and latter they

give rise to the understanding of the sentence and

meaning of the sentence. According to them the meaning

of the words are cognised by the denotative power of the

word whereas the meaning of the sentence is understood

156
by tatparya« But Anandavardhana is of different opinion.

According to him, the meaning of the words are known by

the power of denotation. But the meaning of the sentence

157
is not the siim total of the meanings of words. It is

different. Its meaning is cognised by the intention of

the speaker. Its comprehension is possible throu^

suggestive power of language and not t h r o u ^ the denotative

power. This suggestive power remains more or less in all

speech acts in the form of speaker’s intention. But all

Intentions are not suggestions. Mhen the intentions.are

pre-dominant and special, they are suggested. When they

15«
are subordinate and minor, they are denoted. According

to Anandavardhana, the special intention of the speaker

is suggestion. This suggestive function is not an extension

of denotative function. T h o u ^ the reality of the dhvani

language is the sentence whose meaning is brought about

by the speaker's intention, yet the parts are not absolutely

without any purpose. The speaker's intention is also

manifested by parts. That is why Anandavardhana accepts

the working of dhvani in phonemss, words, suffix, prefix.

 330

p article , stem and roots e t c . But according to the

Mimamsakas the Intention of the speaker Is conveyed not

by the parts, but by the whole sentence. It has been

stated earlier that both denotative and suggestive

elements of speech remain organically associated with

each other. When one element Is primary, the other

15«
element Is secondary and vice-versa.

*
In the poetic language, sometimes peculiarities

and beauty, lie in the parts and at other times they

remain in the whole. The speaker’s Intention which reveal

the beauty of the expressions, does its work for the part

as well as for the whole. Thus the concept of tatparya

of the Mimamsakas is to explain the linguistic peculiarities

of the whole which is insufficient to explain the beauty

of the parts. Anandavardhana in the third flash of the

Dhvanyaloka has shown a number of minute parts . of

the sentence which on the basis of speaker’s intention

can reveal wonderful poetic meanings. At the seme time

he never forgets the role of the whole expression. The

whole is the reality of any language may it be common

or poetic. Both whole and parts convey their meanings

by speaker’s intention through suggestion. Both in the

ordinary and the poetic speech, the suggestive elements

remain in the form of speaker’s intentions. Its

different ratios give particular status to particular

 3 31

language. When the suggestive elements are more, the

language is callea dhvani language ; when it is le s s,

the language may either be ’ subordinate dhvani language’

159
gunibhutavyangya or ordinary language. ^

3 .6 .2 while arguing against the views of the

Naiyakikas, Anandavardhana claims that suggestion exists

in our human experience. Sometimes it is expressed by

sounds (in music) and sometimes it is manifested b y .

gestures and other acrobatics. It is seen both in words

160
and senses whereas denotation is found only in words.

By vivaksa the Naiyayikas mean speaker’ s intention which

is nothing but suggestion. He states that the speaker’ s

^ 161
intention can be vyanjaka. The vyanjakatva of the word

is anumapaka of the speaker’ s intention. Therefore the

speaker’ s intention is lingatva. Since the speaker’ s

intention is brought by suggestive power, the vyan.1akatva

is nothing but lingatva. I t does not harm the

162
fundamental concept of dhvani.

Anandavardhana further states that there are two

types of speaker’ s intentions ( vivaksa) which are treated

by the Naiyayikas as subjects of inference. The first

type of speaker’ s intention is the desire to manifest the

 ■i. '"|i|■lI, ' I, '•!"" ' m
l,,”-
M” II"I u - I" I , " * 'r^'’ I' ' ' ' '
■
-'"'-
■'i;' ...-IJ.. ."1,1 ,'4/ ..... ... „ l|i„r,
332

nature of the word, and the second type is, the desire

to convey the meaning through the words. ^

The desire to manifest the nature of the word is

the intention to use or to utter the word. For instance,

when there is desire of uttering the term Harah, the

nature of the term is manifested. By this, the intention

to convey special meaning does not arise. The import of

the use of the word is this : The listener knows the

163 f
utterer is an animal’.

The second type of speaker*s intention is necessary

for creative sentence meaning. The speaker here wants

to use particular word for particular meaning. If a speaker

wants to communicate the meaning of a sentence, and if the

ideas of the sentence-meaning are expressed by a particular,

expression then that expression is generative of sentence-

meaning. Though temporary gap is created here by the word

itself, yet the meaning is comprehended in a flash.

In this case, the speaker*s intention is cognised by the

164
instiniment of the word.

The implication of Anandavardhana’s discussion is

that the language which is comprehended by speaker’s

intention has not only the scope of inference, but also

 333

it has the scope of suggestion. In admitting Inference

for the comprehension of language, one faces difficulties.

On the basis of speaker*s intention the denotative

scope of language is divided into expressive and suggestive

Various shades of meanings of suggestion cannot be

165
-explained by inference. The suggestion cannot be brought

under the rules of inference. Logic is careful of its

method and precision whereas suggestion is always fleeting

and variable. In the Nyaya terminology, the vyanjakatva

is not similar to lingatva. The nature of suggestiveness

is not co-extensive with the nature of an inferential

process since the former exists in objects like light

166
where the latter is absent. Thus the element of

suggestion which poets use frequently is nothing but

speaker’s intention. Its comparative discussion follows

in the fourth chapter of this dissertation.

The dhvani theory of Anandavardhana is studied

in this chapter from a completely new angle. As it has

been mentioned earlier that the evaluations of sphota,

pratibha and dhvani are made to discover a common

undercurrent between them, therefore, only some

remarkable features are analysed. In this chapter the

evolution of dhvani meaning shows that it is not a sudden

phenomenon in the history of sanskrit poetics. The pre-

dhvani rhetoricians, namely, Bharata, Bhamaha, Vamana,

 3 34

Dandln, Udbhata and Rudrata were well aware of it.

They utilised the suggestive elements differently because

of their bias to respective dogmas, Anandavardhana has

developed and given completeness to this theory of dhvani.

Anandavardhana has proved that the dhvani language

is not a self styled fabrication without guarantee of

facts. It is not extra linguistic.' It is based on

concrete language and expressed by solid language structures.

$
It is purely linguistic in nature. It is a developed form

of ordinaiT^ language preferably used by the great poets.

It has special qualities which separates it from ordinary

language. The ordinary language has limitations which

is restricted to fixed structures whereas the dhvani

language is elastic in nature. It can be manipulated in

many ways by skilled persons. It is more generative than

the ordinary language. The s p ea ke r’s intention plays

a major role in the dhvani language. But the difficulty

with the dhvani language is that it has no direct medium

of expression. It is expressed through the denotative ■

and the indicative functions of language.

The realisation of rasa 2^^ explained by ^ a n d a - ^ (

vardhana has some metaphysical traits. Abhinavagupta ~

elaborates them. The dhvani language is the only means

to delineate the metaphysical poetic experiences.

 335

This most elastic, most reflective and most

generative dhvani language of Inandavardhana was

? originally discovered by the great grammarian - philo­

sopher Bhartrhari in his Vakyapadiya» Both Bhartrhari

and Anandavardhana have many common ideas on the

philosophy of language and tho metaphysics. They are

discussed in the preceding chapters separately. It

seems that Anandavardhana has borrowed the philosophy

of language and metaphysics directly from Bhartrhari

and refashioned them for dhvani language. Thus the

dhvani theory of Anandavardhana which is the meeting

167
point of all disciplines of poetics owes its

inspiration from the philosophy of grammar. This will

be analysed elaborately as we proceed.

V
 3 36

FOOTNOTES TO TTiE CHAPTER III

1. Kavyalamkara of Bhaniaha, Patna, 1962, s

gato*3tam arko bhatlndu

yatl vasaya pakslnah.

jT
Ity evam adi klm kavyam

yartam eaam pracaksate.

2. I b i d ., 6.23 ;

vakra vacam kavinam ye

prayogam pratl sadhavah,

prayokturn ye na yuktas ca

tad vlveko ^yam ucyate .

3. I b i d .. 2.^5 :
i >
salsa sarvalva vakroktir
✓
anayartho vibhavyate

yatno^syam kavlna karyah

ko *lamkaro *naya vina .

£ '

4. Mathuranath on Tattvaclntamani. Calcutta,1^92-1901,p.4^1 :

' saktigraham vyakaran opamana

kosapta vakyad vyavaharatas ca

vakvasya sesad vivrter vadanti

aamnidhvatah siddhapadasya vrddhah ;

also Tattvaclntamani . p . 649 ;

Siddhantamiiktavali. p.266.
 337

5. VP. 1 1 .3 1 7 .

6. D L » X •4■
\
V

7. Raghuvamsa. ed. K.M.Trigathj, Varanasi, 1979 :

iv.73» kicaka dhvanl hetavah ;

1y.56, abhyabhuyata vana dhvanl ;

vi.$6, mandra dhvanl tya.iitayam aturya ;

vli.41| rathanga dhvanlna vi.ian.1e ;

ix. 9 7 , patupataha dhvanlbhi vinitanidrah ;

X .3 5 , svareno vaca bhagvan

paribhutarnava dhvanih ;

xvi. 1 3 i mrdanga~dhlra dhvanim anvagacchat ;

xvi. 3 2 , prabhu prayana dhvanl iiksra turyah ;

xvi.S?, divyas turya dhvanl .

S. (1) klratarjunlyam, x i v .46 ;

vlbhidyajnana iva dadhvanidis ca ; .

(li) ^Isupalavadham. vi.49 :

sruta tad irita komala gitaka dh v a n i h .

9* Uttararamacarltam. vi.17 :

dhvanl na iva baddha pu lakam.

 338

10. Vol.I, GOS, p.2^3-90 ;

katham asvadyate' rasah yatha hi nana

vyan.lana samskrtam annam etc. ;

For English translation see ^ Vol. I,

ed. Manmohan Ghose, pp .105-106.

11. Ib i d ., P.34S ;

tatrastau bhavah sthayinah . . . evam ete

kavyarasabhivyaktihetavah ekonapancasatbhavah

pratyavagantavyah ebhyas ca samanya guna

yogena rasa nispadyante ... yo^rtho hrdaya

samvadi tasya bhavo rasodbhavah sariram

vyapyate tena suskakastham ivagnlna ;

For english translation see I^. Vol.I,

ed. M.M. Ghose, pp. 120-121.

12. Ib id. . p.349 :

. /
atraha yadi kavyartha samsritai etc.

For english translation Vol.I, pp. 121-122.

13. on id. Vol.I, GOS, p.290 ;

suddha tat svarupa etc.

14. Ibid. . p.2^9 :

tathabhinaya vy an j i t e , etc.
 339

15. DL. I, ed. K.KrishnaMoorthy, 1974, p . 12, 9-10 :

vlvldha vacyaTacakaraoanaprapanca

carunah kavyaaya sa evarthah sarabhutah*

16. I b i d .. III. p.Ids, 12-15; also see pp. 13^,140,142,162.

17. I b i d .. III. p.1d«, 9-13.

18. Vol.II.9, OOS, p.297 : .

iha kavyarthg rase ityuktam ... e t e :

also Ibid., pp.297-29^ :

evam arthasyapl ;

also see Bhamaha and Bhat'^aiiayaka *s view

on laksana. Ibid.. p.29^

19* See footnote No.4, Ch. III.

20. S.Mukhogadhya^a. /
.wphvanl 0 * tadiya virodhi sampradaya” Bengali,

Our Heritage. Vol.IV, parti, 1956, p . 137-

, t

21. Prahallad Kumar,

Rgvede >l a ^ a r a h ,

Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi, 1977.

 340

22. la. 11.34 ;

samana vastu nyasena

pratlvaatupamocyate.

yatheva nabhldhane^pi

guna aamya pr at it lt ah.

23. Ib id. . 11.79 :

yatrokte gamyate*nyo *rthas

tat samana visesanah , ^

sa samasokti iniddlsta

samkhiptartha taya ya th a.

24. 111.8-9.

25. DL.III.p.22ft, 5-15. ^

26. S.K.De, History of Sanskrit po et ic s. Vol.II,i960, p.53'

27. jffi., ed. D.Gugta, 1.76-7^.

2d. ]O.II.303.

29. 0.1.193; 11.205.

30. 1CD.III.330, 11.46.

31. 11.214.

32. Iffi. 11.295.

 341

33. KD* 11*340.

34. 1.100.

35. KL 3V. NtrnayaSagar edition,1926, i,2.6-g ;

ritir atma kavyasya . visista pada racana

ritih . viaeso gu n a t m a .

36. KL3S., ed. N.D.Banhatti, Poona, 1925, IV.6 :

sssassssaacB
paryayoktam yadanyena prakarenabhldhiyate ;

also see Laghuvrtti of Induraja below it, p . 55.

37. DL. II, p.90, 4-7.

3^. Kavyanusasanam of Hemacandra, Kavyamala

0
edition, 1901, p.263 :

vyangyasyoktih paryayoktam ;

also Kavyanusasanam of Bagbhatta ii,

NirnayaSagar press, 1915* iii ch, p.36 :

dhvanitabhidhanam paryayoktih.

39. KLSS 1.11, cf. KD.1.65, 11.254.

40. Ib i d .. iv,2.

41. I b i d .. iv.3-4.

42. Alamka rasa rvasva of Ruyyaka,

ed. Rewaprasad Dwivedi, 1971, p.6 :

iha hi tavat ..• etc.

 342

43« S.K.De, History of Sanskrit p o e t i c s ,I960, p.5^.

/
44. lOR , Delhi, I965 , XII.2

taamat kartavyam yatnena

mahlyasa raaer yutajn

udvejanam et esam sastravad

evanyatha hi syat ;

also SV.21 ;

ete rasa rasavato ramayantl p u m s a h ,samyug

vibha.iya racltas caturena ca r u ; yasmadim

ananadhigamya na sarva ramyam , kavyam

vidhatum alam atra tad adriyeta ;

.also cf. 1.21.

]a. V.3.
]^. I .i e .

45. 1 .5 1 , 1.60.

46. vll.3d*

47 . Ibid. , vii,40 ;

cf. ^ . I . p . S , 7-9 :

sarvesu ca tesu prakaresu tasya vacyad anyatvam

... iii kadacit vacye vidhlrupe pratisedharupah.

4^. KLR. v i l .1 4 ; cf. I. p .d , 15-16.

 3 43

49. Ib i d .. vii.42.

50 . Alamkarasarvasvaci of Ruyyaka,

ed. Rewaprasad Dwivedi, 1971, p . 11 :

evam apl •.. etc. ;

Also Ibid., p .12 : yad va dvldheti ... e t c .

$1. Ibid., pp. 1 7 -Id.

52 . Ib id.. p.6 2

rudra tenapi b h a v a l a ^ a r o ... etc.

53. S.K.gg, History of Sanskrit po e t i c s , pp.60-61, Fti.No.34.

t
54 . I. p . 14, 1 0 - 1 4 .

55 . DL. 1 .1 3 .

$6. p.Id, 9-10 {Meaning of upasarjana) j

Also DL. p. 296 , 22-23 ;

’When a theme, even though it follows one already

existing is utilised by a good poet with *stylistic

b e au ty’ bandhacchaya which consists in using words

«
capable of conveying the desired literal and suggested

sense, he does not become blameworthy’. ;

 344

Also DL. p» 202, 3-5 :

♦For sometimes the suggested meaning is predominate

and the literal meaning is subordinate and sometimes

the literal meaning is predominate and the suggested

meaning is subordinate. When the suggested meaning is

predominate then we have dhvani. When the literal

meaning is predominate, then we have another variety

(of poetry viz. gunibhutavyangya)«*

57. DL. II. 33 :

'The complete definition of dhvani involves the

clear perception in all varieties (of d h va ni) of

the predominately sxiggested sense';

Also, DL. p.1^, 6 :

Jhatitye vavabhasate ;

DL. p . 114, 19 :

rasamatvena sphutam eva vabhasate ;

DL. p . 146 16 i
sphutam eva vyanjakatvam d rsyate ;

D L . p . 262 .2 : sphutatvenavabhasanam ;

p. 2 7 6 . 1 2 :

sphutam eva vabhasate.

 345

5d. DL. p.20, 13 !

vyangya pradhanye hi olhvanih ;

D L « p . 2d, I6.1d ;

vacya vyatirlktasyarthasyg vacya vacakabhyam

tatparyena prakasanaxn yatra vyangya

pradhanye sa dhvanlh ;

D L « p.40.12 j amkhyataya prakasamano vy a n g y o *rtho

__
r^d^aner atma ^ ^

p.40, 16-17 :
"1
aa cangitvenavabhasamano dhvaner atma ; ^
-- ----- \ 1)
p.4d, 10-11 :

yah punar angiraso bhavo va sarvakaram

alamkaryah sa dhvaner atmeti ;

D L » p.206, 16 : tatra vyan.lakatve yada vyangya

pradhanyam tada dhvanlh.

p .244,19 :
vyangya syarthasya pradhanye dhvani

3an.1itah kavyaprakarah*

DL. p .250, 20 :

kavyadhvanl dhvanir vyangya

pradhanyaika nibandhanah.
 346

59. DL. II. p.42, 3-5 :

♦The word dhvanl is used when in a poem figures

of speech related to meaning and figures of speech

related to words as well as qualities which are

mutually separate and distinct from d h v a n i . and

where they subordinate themselves to the main

suggested sense, consisting of r a s a , b h a v a , rasabhasa.

'bhavabhasa and bhavasanti.

60. 1.9 :

’Just as a man interested in seeing (some object

in the dark) concemj|^im3elf with the flame of a / <>

lamp, because it is a means to his seeing, in just

this manner does a man (really only) interested in

the (suggested) sense, none the less turn his

attention to the explicit se ns e’.

61. DL. 1.10-11 ;

62. For details see K.K.Raja,

Indian Theories of M e a n i n g . Madras, 1977,p. 2^9-303.

63 . Locana on DL, ed. J.Pathak, 1965 , p p . 104-5 :

sa iti artho va sabdo va, vyaparo va ar th o’pi

vacyo va dh v a n a t l t i . sabdo ’p y e v a m . vyangyo va

dhvanyata iti vyaparo va sabdartha yor dhvananam i t i .

karikaya tu pradhanyena samudaya eva kavyarupo

mukhyataya dhvanir iti pratipaditam. x

 347

♦Either the meaning or the function ( i s d h v a n i) .

If it is meaning it can be the literal meaning

because it suggests. Ihe (denotative) word too

(is dh va ni) for the same reason, (i.e. because it

suggests) (dh va na ti), or the suggested meaning

(is dhvani) because it is suggested (dhvanyate). or

the suggestive function-(d h v a n a n a ) of both words

and meaning (is d h v a n i ). In the k a r i k a . however,

the collection (of woi^i and literal meaning,

suggested meaning and suggestive function) in the

form of poetry characterised by its prime importance,

has been put forth as dhvani in the strict

(conventional) sense of the term». \.^

64. 1.12.

65._ 1.6-

66. DL. III.232, 3-5 :

'There is by no means any form of poetry which

will entrance the sensitive critic where the beauty

is not caused by association with a suggested sense.

This is the highest secret of poetry which should be

meditated on by the wise*. .

 348

67. III. M - 3 7 ;

’This beauty resulting from a suggested sense is

the main ornament of the speech of great poets even

when that speech comprises figures of speech, just

as bashfulness is the highest ornament of a women

even otherwise ad or ne d’.

6S. (i) III. p.262, 11-12 ; ^

vaikatika eva hi r a t n a t a ^ a v i d a h ,

sahrdaya eva hi kavyanem rasajna i t i .

»For only jewellers really know the (true) value

of gems, and only sensitive critics really

appreciate the rasa of poems *•

(ii) III. p . 250, 18-19.

69. A. AmalaDass, Philosophical Implications of Dhvani,

Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Department of Sanskrit,

Madras University, August, 19^0| p.66.

70. (i) I. pp.26-2d, 16-17, 1-2 ;

also see Chapter IV. Fn.No. 6.

(iil DL. III. p.214, 15-16.

(iii) DL. IV, p . 278, 8 :

n i m l t a s c a y a m arthah

sabdatatvavidbhir eva.
 349

71. DL. III. ^ - 2.

72. 1.2.2

73. DL. Ill . ^ . 3 - 4

74* Locana on DL.III. ed. J.Pathak, pp.329-330»7-13» 1 i

* Although the cause of aesthetic enjoyment is the

richness of apprehension of the vibhavas, anubhavas

and vyabhicaribhavas. none the less, it is self evident

that the vibhavas etc. bring about such apprehension

since only if they are conveyed by specific phonetic

sounds. Therefore even the peculiar character of

letters which are soft, harsh, etc. and which is

%
grasped by the ear the msaaent they are heard, ’whether

or not their meaning has been understood, is only

helpful to aesthetic appreciation. In fact, it was

just in order to convey the fact that letters are

helpful, that the locative of cause was used in the

expression. It is not that rasa is suggested just

by letters, for we have said many times that aesthetic

experience arises from the presentation of the vibhavas

etc. But (letters) which aire grasped only by the

ear, quite on their own, can give rise to a flow of

aesthetic experience just like music without words

(which can also give rise to aesthetic pleasure),

or like the imitation of the sounds of particular

 350

Jatls, »postures* Icarana and fanciful gestures,

all of which are regulated by a musical instzniment

such as a drum etc.'

75» DL.III.^.16 and its vrtti pp.146-14^.

76. Locana on DL, p . 379, 2-5*

77. DL.II.^.-6 :

tamartham avalambante ye'nginam te

gunah smrtah.

78. venisamhara of BhattaNarayana 1.21.

79. Ib i d .. III.32.

do. ^ .II.^ .9 .

81. ed. Ch. viii, V.Jhalakikara, 1965, pp. 463-465.

82. G.N.^hg, english translation of I^, 1967,pp.299-300.

«

83. DL, III p . 156, 11-16 ;

♦It was said that rasas etc. are suggested through

the power of the meaning (of whole sentence). It is

therefore unreasonable to show in a varied manner

how declensional makers etc. can be suggestive.

We have already replied to this objection when we

 351

explained how words can be suggestive. Moreover,

even if we admit that rasas etc. are suggested ^

through the force of the meaning of a sentence,

the knowledge of the nature of suggestivity as already-

shown in a detailed manner, is (of course useful),

because sentence meanings cannot exist without

suggestive words. The beauty of particular word

that has been explained in a detailed manner

elsewhere {i.e. in other works on poetics) should

also be understood to be dependant on the suggestive-

ness of words alone (inspite of what has been

written on this subject)^.

^4. See 2.2.5*

55. DL.I.13.

66. Nyayaratnamala of Parthasarathi Misra,

ed. K.S.Rajnaswamy Shastri, GOS, Baroda,1937t p . 106 :

sssssasssasa: ssmmmmnm
nanu evam abhidhayakatvam padanam na s y a t .

padartha svarupagateh smaranat avasigtatvat

smarakatvam e v a s t U t nabhidhayakatvam.

«7. p . 110, 19-20.

 352

dS. DL. Ill, p.112, 15-20 :

’You said earlier that dhvani was a type of

poetry. How then can it be revealed by (isolated)

words? For any type of poetry is a particular

collection of words that gives rise to a particular

meaning. This cannot be the case for suggestion

through words, for words do not directly express

meanings, but only serve to remind us of them

(nor do individual isolated words convey the sense

of an entire sentence, which is essential for poetry).

Our reply to this objection is as follows :

This would indeed be a serious objection were

the force of direct expression a deciding factor in

conferring the name of dhvani (on a poem). But this

is hardly the case, for dhvani is determined through

the power of suggestion. Moreover, though actually

beauty is achieved through the sum total ( of the

different parts of the body) characterised by

particular configurations, we admit it in individual

parts, becaiise the beauty of the whole, or its

absence, depends on the presence or absence of the

%
individual parts. Since the seme is true of poetry,

it is not unreasonable to say that certain words

fora part of the process of dhvani- by means of

their suggestive power.♦

 353

d9. DL.I.11.

90. 19-20, -See Fn No.«7 Chapter III.

91. DL.III.,p.1l4, 1-4 ;

»Therefore there is beauty in all the varieties

of dhvani, which is revealed by mere words, even though

words do in fact serve only as r e m i n d e r s » J u s t

as a woman appears lovely through a single ornament

beautifully arranged so also the speech of a good

poet appears lovely through dhvani revealed in a

single w o r d . *

92. See Foot Note No.$7,90 of Chapter III.

93. DL.III, p . 170, 3-5 ;

* (nor is it possible to say that the principle

of subject and predicate is not valid in the case of

rasas ) , because it is admitted that ra s a s are the

ultimate sense of a sentence. If the subject and

the predicate are found in the literal sentence

meaning, why should they not be found in rasas, which

ere suggested by the (force) of the (literal)

sentence meaning as a whole? ♦

 354

94. D L .lII, p . 116, H-15 I

’ Since this sentence shows how their mutual love

has grown, the entire sentence conveys the highest

ra s a ’ ;
I-

Also. of. Locana on p.334*

95. DL.III. p.10d, 3-4 ;

’During what is night for all other creatures,

the controlled man is wide awake, l/^'hen all other

creatures remain awake this is the night of the

visionary sa g e ’•

In this sentence, surely the usual meanings of

’n i g h t ’ and of ’a w a k e ’ are not intended. T^hat is

then? The s a g e ’s deep concern for the final truth

and a corresponding aversion to whatever is not the

«
final truth. Thus the sentence is suggestive of

the variety of dhvani where the literal meaning

completely disappears.

Also see DL.III, p . 10^, 11-14 :

In this example the literal meaning of the sentence

attracts suggested meaning. For some, time seems made

of poison. For some it seems made of nectar. For

others, time seems a combination of both ; and for

still others it seems made of neither prison nor

 355

nectar. Here the sentence poison and nectar

stand for pain and pleasure;

Aiso see DL »I I I » p«112|

96. ^ . I I I . p . 2 0 0 , 4- 1 3 .

97. See 2.2.3, 2.2.4, 2.2.5, 2.2.6, 2.2.?.

9S. S.K.De, Some problems of Sanskrit poetics.

Calcutta, 1959 , p . 1^9.

99. p.l^S, lfi-20 ;

*For the vrttis. if they are introduced with

rasas as their major object, will impart a most

wondrous beauty to poetry. For rasas etc. are the

life breath of both of them* The plot, etc. is

merely the body*.

10 0 . DL.III.p. 190 , 192, 1 5 - 1 6 , 1-2 ;

'Iftliat is the point in imagining a sequence,

since words alone, as determined by context ; etc.

give rise to the apprehension of both the literal

meaning and the suggested meaning at one and the same

time? It is not tz*ue that only an understanding of

the literal meaning of a word gives rise to suggestiveness.

For we find that rasa is manifested from the (mere)

 356

sounds of singing even when the sounds (have no

meaning) or even when their meaning is not

understood.»

101. DL.III. p.idd, 9-11.

I
102. ^- 33'

103. id. GOS. Vol.I, Second edition,1956,Ch.VI, 15-16.

104. V.Raghvan, Number of Ra sa s. Adyer Library,xxvi,1967-

105. K.A.S.Iyer, Bhartrhari, p.99.

mmmsi ' ' *

106. see 1.3.6, 2.1.

107. VP.1.1-4.

108. S.N.Ghosal, Elements of Indian hesthetic s .

Vol.I, 197 ^, 9 p . 59 s

also see sections of »Non-dualism in sound and

sense', 'The concept of dual entity and the dual

world in Indian Aesthetics and Esoterics',

'Mono-sentimentalism and Multi-sentimentalism'

p p . 59- 64 ♦

109. Srngaraprakasa, 1.7 :

batayaksa iva vi bhati.

/

110. S.N.Ghosal, op.cit., p.63

Ksvseaa
 3 57

111. ^ .I I .k a - 2 « .

112. See Foot Note No. 110,

113. For details see S.N.Ghosal,

szmmmwcrn
Studies in Divine Aesthetics,

part II, Santiniketan, 1974.

114. Uttarar^acaritam III.47 :

eko rasa karuna eva nimitta bhedat.

115. Sahitya Darpana of Visvanathakaviraja,

ed. Satyabrata Singha, Varanasi, 1976, p . 106 ;

tasmad adbhutain evaha krti Narayano r a sa m.

11 6 . For details see V . ^ g h v a n , Niimber of Ra sa s.

Tenth Chapter, Rasa-Synthesis.

117. S.KuppuswamiSastri,

Introduction to Ascarya cudamani ; A drama

by i^aktibhadra. pp. 13.14,Madras, 1926.

lid. n £. Vrttl on VI .31 :

na hi rasad rte kascid arthah pravartate.

119. A^. on id. Vol.I, GOS, p.2?2 ; ^

purvatra vahuvacanam atra ... etc.

120. Ibid., p.267 :

I S M la sA s x a ni$LXsm yaaya Y m E a f e t i h ... etc.

 358

121. W .1 .1 .

122. Pt. Yogendranath TarkaSamkhyaVedanta Tirtha,

ssaKSBaassaesss SKsBBaB«aiaBBB8sat«aisBSs sssaB»aB
Bharatiya darsanasastrer samanvaya (Bengali),

Adhar chandra Mukherji lecturers,

Calcutta University, 1952, pp. SO-^9.

In this book he has shown how vedantic monism

passes and developed through arambhavadat

samghatavada, parlnamavada. vivartavada.

123. 1 ^ .1 1 .^ .7 ; I I I .p .2 5 0 , 3-4; I I I .k a .2^-29.

124. ^ . I V . pp.272 , 274, 276, 27 d ;

Ib id ., P.27S, 10-12.

125. I ^ .I I I .i ^ .2 1 , 22, 24, 29.

126. Ibid. . II.ka.7-9; I I I . p . 176, «-11 ;

iv.p.272-27S; 2d0 , S.

127. Ib id., ii.ka. 7-9.

j
12«. Ibid. . iii.p .1 7 6 , d-11.

129. Ibid.. iv. pp.272-27S.

130* Singular use of the term rasa :

*

DL. i i .k a .17

i i i .k i . 21, 22, 24, 29, p . 250 , 3.

iv. pp. 272 , 27 .

%
 359

Plural use of the term rasa :

p. 40 , 16 :rasadirartho ,

p. 42.2 !raaadi parata y a t r a ,

p. 42.9 ;rasadayaa t e ,

p.44*15 :rasadayo vakyarthlbhuta.

p. 46.1 ;rasadlbhls carutva nlspattlh.

p. 4 ^ . 1 0 :rasadinam alamkarata.

p . 52.6 :yattu sarvaraaan prati ; *

^.iii.p.l64«1 :sukavlnam rasadayah,

p. 1 5 5 * 1 1 :rasadaya Ityuktam,

p . 1 7 0. 3 : ca rasesu ,

« p . 1 7 0 .5 :tadaksiptanam rasanam,

P. 1 7 6 .S :nanu y e 3 am ra sanam,

p .174 .15 :nanu rasantaresu bahusu ^

p . 1^2 . 2 7 :nivartate hi rasayo ,

P.IS 6 . 1 9 :vljnayeftha rasadinam,

p . 18^. 4 :evam rasadisu,

p.lSd.7 : rasadi visayenaitat,

p.1.12 ; etac ca rasadi tatparyena,

p,1^S. 14 ;rasadyanugunatvena.

p. 1^8.1^ :rasadi tatparyena.

p . 1 ^^, 1 9 ;rasadayo hi,

p . 190*2 ;rasadi mayam hi vacyam.

p . 190.3 ;yadi rasadinayam e v a .

p. 1 9 0 .5 :rasadayo ^pi.
 360

p.190»S : rasadl rupatvam i t i ,

p.190.13 : rasadlnam p r a t l t i ,

p. 1 9 0 . 1 4 ; ra sadayah.

p. 192.9 : rasadi pratltih.

p. 1 9 2 . 1 5 : rasadau na pr atlyate,

p. 246 .11 ; clttavrtti viseso hi ra sa da ya h^

p. 256 .7 : ii. vyaparavati rasan rasay 1 turn.

DL»lv. p. 272 .12 : rasadimaya ek a s m i n .

131. W.I.73; DL.i.^.1G-11 ; 2.2.5, 2.2.6, 4*3, 4.3.1.

132. (i) on Vol.I, GOS, p.333 :

iha tavat dharmadi ... etc.

(ii) Ibid. . p.339 ;

tasmad astl santo ra aa h.

133. p.1d2, 5-6 :

’The pleasure of love, as well as the great

pleasures of heaven, do not equal even the sixteenth

part of the h&ppiness that succeeds the destruction

of desire*.

cf, Lo ca na. DL.p.431 :

iti Bharata vakyam drstavantah sarvarasa

samanya svabhavam santam acaksana anupajata

visesantara cittavrtti rupam santasya

sthayibhavam manyante.
 361

* Having taken their stand on the Bharatas aphorism

(that various feelings, because of their particular

respective causes, arise from santa (a state of mental

calm) but when these causes disappear, they melt back

into Santa) Others claim that santa is common to all

rasas and consider the permanent of santa to be that

State of mind which has not been particularised into any

other m o o d . ’

134. Taittiriya upanisa d , i i .7 »

135. Bhattanayaka’ s lost work Hrdayadarpana quoted

in the Vyaktiviveka of MahimaBhatt,

ed. Rewaprasad Dvivedi, 1964, Varanasi, p . 100 :

ziaesaK—cv
pathyad atha dhruvaganat

tatah sampurite ra se.

tada svada bharaikagro

hrsyatyantar mukha ksanam,

tato n ir v isayasyasya

svarupa vasthitau n i j a h ,

vya.jyate hladanigyandau

yena trpyanti yoginah

136. Abh. on id. GOS, Ch.vi.

 362

137. BHU, V o l .1 ,1963, p . 120 ;

ivam ca parabrahmaavadat samadher

vllakaana vibhavadlvisaya samvallta

cIdanandalambanatvat bhavya ca

kavya vyapara m a t r a t .

13^» BhattaNayaka quoted in Locana, D L . p . 93 s

vag dhenur dugdha etam hi . . . etc.

139. Locana on D L . ill.p. 543 :

evam prathamam feva paramesvara

bhakti bhajah kutuhala ... etc.

’This stanza is the utterance as the author

(Anandavardhana), who began by first being a devotee

of god, and then, simply out of curiosity, adopted

both the view points of the poet ana the philosopher

(but foxmd them ultimately unsatisfying) and once

again came to believe that rest in devotion to God

was inevitable. For we have already explained that

the happiness which results from (conceptual

understanding of) b o t h ^ u ^ a n d unseen objects which

r—
are ascertained by all the means of valid cognition

(i.e. philosophy) or even that transcendent joy which

consists in relishing an aesthetic experience . . .

to both of these the bliss that comes from finding

rest in God is far superi^or; and that aesthetic

 363

pleasure is only the reflection of a drop of that

mystic bliss. But ordinary worldly happiness is

for the most part inferior to even that aesthetic

delight, because it is mixed with abundant suffering

as well. This is the essence of viiat he m e a n s . ’

140. Kumarasvamin on Prataparudriya yasobhusana of

vidyanath, ed. V. Raghvan, The Sanskrit Education

Society, Madras, % l a p o r e , 1970, p . 196 :

ata evayam brahmananda e v a ^ iams tu

visesah brahmanando yoga ga my ah. ayam tu

vibhavady anusamdhana gamya i t i . idam api

tenaivoktam - *sarvatraikaivananda vyaktlr

laukikam sukham iti vyavahriyate. alaukika

vibhavady abhivyaktya kavi samaya matra

prasiddhy anusarad alaukiko rasa iti kathyate

nanavidha vimala k a m a nirmalantahkaranesu

sama damadi sadhana san^pannesu sravana manana

nididhyasanaparesu paramayogisu nirvikalpaka

samadhy abhivyaktya brahmeti paramatmeti

isvara iti sabdyate iti uktam ca svatmayoga

pradipe,

ya sthayi bhava ratir eva

nimitta bhedah.
 364

/ . -
srngara mukhya nava natya rasi bhavantl ,

sama.jlkan sahrdayan

nata nayakadin.

ananda yet 3aha.1a p u m a

raso *smi s o ’h a m .

»So it is (rasananda) is similar with (brahma-

na nd a). The difference between them is, the

brahmananda is attained by y o g a , whereas it

(rasananda) is realised by excitants etc. It is

rasananda one and characterised by uncommon

happiness. Poetic tradition proclaims that rasa is

an unworldly experience as it is manifested by

unearthly causes viz. excitants etc. (on the other

hand) the supreme brahman who is called Isvara

is revealed in the nirvikalpaka samadhi of y o g i n s ,

whose hearts are pure because of many auspicious

actions, and who practise hard penance, viz.

sa ma, dama, etc. and occult practices such as

sravana manana and nidhidyasana.

In my Yoga pradlpa it has been mentioned, »that

which is manifested as srngara etc. by permanent

moods rati etc., and to which the audience, connoisseurs,

actors, heroes etc. relish in the form of enjoyment,

and that which is absolute bliss is known as r a s a .

This rasa is the (supreme br ah ma n) .’

 365

141. Pancadasl. NirnayaSagsr e d .1 9 4 9 . x i , :

also for the concept of ananda (b liss) in % e d a n t a

see Pancadasl Ch.xi- xiv; also see the Pancadasl

of Bharat! Tirtha Vidyaranya p p .175-266,

ed. by T.M.P.Mahadevan, Centre of Advance Study

SKSSBISSaSS
in Philosophy, University of Madras, 1969.

142. M.Hiriyanna, Art Ex pe ri en ce, First and Final,

Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore, 1954, p.S6 ;

For details see chapters i.e. Art Experience-

i, ii, pp.25-42 of this book.

14>. BHU, 1969, pp. 117-121 j

also see K.KrishnaMoorthy, Studies in Indian

ass«saBs«KssaBBss
Aesthetics and C r i t i c i s m , "vedantic idea of

aesthetic experience” , Mysore, 1979, p. 206.

For the nature of ananda of vedanta and its

interpretation as neuro-psychological instinctual

urges, see An an da. and ex pe ri en ce. by M.Sivaram,

Vikas Publishing House, 1976 ;

also by the same author, Ananda and the three

great acaryas, 1976.

144. ^ .i i i .p .2 l 6 , 12-13.

145. Ib id .. p. 200, 4 .
 366

146. I b i d . . P .2 4 S , 1-3.

147. I b id . . p .2 4 « , 7-S.

c f . I b i d , , p . 250, 1-6.

14S. Ib ld « . p . 2 5 0 , 7-11.

149. I b i d . , p p .210-212, ^-16, 1-9.

"Moreover, nobody shoxild entertain any doubt

but that the property of words and meanings in the

form of auggestiveness conforas to a wellknown

relationship that exists between words and their

meanings known as vacyavacaka b h a v a , (but) it is

contingent upon the various factors that lead to the

suggestive function, (i.e. the speaker, the context,

the audience, intonation etc.). And this is why it

is distinct from denotation. For denotation is the

fixed nature of a particular word, and it is well

known that it remains invariably associated with

this word right from the moment we learn its lexical

meaning. But suggestiveness is not fixed, because

of the fact that it is contingent (upon other

factors). For the suggested sense is apprehended as

conditioned by context, etc. In their absence it

will not arise. If it is really not fixed then

what point is there in examining its nature ?

 367

This is no fault. For it is not fixed so far as

the form of the word is concerned, but it is fixed

with regard to its own sphere, namely the suggested

sense. One can apply the analogy of the middle

term (linga) to suggestiveness. Because the state of

being an (operative) logical reason (li ng a) is

uncertain in its appearance, but it does Invariably

lead to the conclusion (e.g. the presence of fire)

in its own province,(e.g. the mountain), provided

the desire to construct a proper syllogism is present.

The same is case with this suggestiveness that

we have explained already (i.e. it can become

operative only if there is desire and capacity to

appreciate it). And because it is uncertain with

regard to words, it is not possible to consider it

as denotation. For if it were same as denotation,

then it would be fixed with regard to the form of

the words, the way denotation is.

Now this contingent property (of words, viz.

suggestiveness) must of necessarily be accepted by

the Mlmamsakas (vakyatatvavit) who claims that there

is a primordial connection between words and their

meanings, when he asserts that there is a difference

(with regard to validity) between human and divine

utterances. For if it is not accepted, although

 368

the relationship between words and their meanings is

eternal (in the case of both human and divine

utterances), there would be no difference (between

the two kinds of utterances) so far as the conveyance

of sense is concerned. But if that property (i.e.

suggestiveness) is accepted, then since human

utterances have a contingent function, ( i.e. >

suggestiveness} conferred on them (i.e. since human

utterances acquire such a conditioned function),

as they are always in keeping with their desire,

human utterances can be imtrue (for the Mimamsakas ) .

although the relation between words and meanings is

et er na l.»

150. Ib i d ., iii, pp.212-214, 16, 1-6 ;

•Human utterances principally reveal only the

intention of the speaker. And th is (intention) is

suggested, and not directly stated, because the

words actually used are not connected with it

( i .e . the intention of the speaker) by the relation

of the expressed sense and the expressive word.

If we follow this reasoning all worldly utterances

will have to be designated as d h v a n i . for all worldly

utterances, if we follow this reasoning, will carry

suggestion. That is true but the suggestiveness

 369

in the fonn of revelation of the intention of a

speaker is equally conunon to all worldly utterances.

Nor does it differ from denotation, for a

suggested meaning is invariably present (in such

utterance). But (the difference is that in such

cases) it is not especially intended.*

151. DL.iii.p.214, 7-8.

152. Ib i d . . p . 214, ^-14.

153. See 3.4.3, 2.2.4, 2.2.5, 2.2.6.

154. DL.iii.p.200, 4-8.

155. Ib i d . . p.200, 8-12.

156. See 1.4.2, 1.4.2.1.

157. See 2.2.6.

158. ^.iii.p.202, 1-6.

159. Ibid.. p.214, 4-6.

160. Ib i d . . p.216, 1-2.

161. By this Prabhakar’s opinion is admitted.

162. DL.iii. 218, 1-6.

163. Ibid., iii, 218, 9-12.

 370

164. I b i d .. 12-14.

165. Ibid. . iii,21^-220, 15, 1-2.

166. Ib id.. iii, 220 , 12-13*

167. K.KriahnaMoorthy, Studies in Indian Aesthetics

and Criticism. "Dhvani as the basic principle

of Sanskrit criticism", Mysore, p.12S ff. :

"Dhvani as the meeting point of all ,/

V
principles of Sanskrit literary theory” in

Principles of literary criticism in Sa ns kr it,

ed. R.C.Diifivedi, Motilal Banarasidass,

Delhi, 1969 , 201 ff.