Section Summary

Title Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974

Definition of Terms
All bodies of water within Philippine jurisdiction, including territorial seas and
Philippine Waters submarine areas.
Vessel Any watercraft used for transport, including fishing boats.
Philippine Highway Roads, streets, railways, and bridges in the Philippines for transportation.
Attack, seizure, or theft on vessels in Philippine waters, punishable by reclusion
Piracy temporal to death.
Highway Seizure of individuals or property on Philippine highways, punishable by reclusion
Robbery/Brigandage temporal to death.
Penalties
Reclusion temporal to death depending on the severity, including additional
Piracy penalties for related crimes.
Highway Reclusion temporal to death depending on the severity, including additional
Robbery/Brigandage penalties for related crimes.
Aiding or protecting pirates or highway robbers/brigands is considered an
Aiding or Abetting accomplice and punished accordingly.
Repealing Clause Repeals or modifies inconsistent laws, decrees, or orders.
PD 532

ASTORGA v PEOPLE
Facts: The case centers around an incident that occurred on September 1, 1997, involving Benito
Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, Samar, and a team from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). The DENR team, led by Elpidio Simon, was dispatched to Daram to
conduct operations against illegal logging. While on their mission, they encountered Mayor
Astorga and engaged in a conversation regarding their purpose. However, the situation
escalated when Mayor Astorga, accompanied by armed individuals, detained the DENR team.
Despite the team's pleas to leave, Mayor Astorga refused and called for reinforcements, leading
to the team being surrounded by armed men. The team was held against their will for several
hours until they were finally allowed to leave around 2:00 a.m. the following day. Subsequently,
Mayor Astorga faced charges of Arbitrary Detention, as it was alleged that he unlawfully
restrained the DENR team's freedom without legal justification.

During the trial, witnesses testified to the events that unfolded, including Mayor Astorga's
actions and the presence of armed men. The prosecution argued that Mayor Astorga's conduct
constituted Arbitrary Detention, as he, being a public officer, detained the DENR team without
legal grounds, instilling fear in them through his actions and the presence of armed individuals.
Despite attempts by Mayor Astorga's defense to discredit the witnesses and the Joint Affidavit
of Desistance filed by the complainants, the court found sufficient evidence to convict Mayor
Astorga of Arbitrary Detention

Major Issue on Arbitrary Detention: The major issue revolves around whether the actions of
Mayor Astorga and his associates constitute Arbitrary Detention, which involves detaining a
person without legal grounds.

Court's Ruling and Reasoning with Principle: The Sandiganbayan found Mayor Astorga guilty of
Arbitrary Detention based on the evidence presented. The court applied the elements of
Arbitrary Detention, including that the offender is a public officer, that there is detention of a
person, and that the detention is without legal grounds.

 The court found that Mayor Astorga's actions constituted Arbitrary Detention as he was
a public officer, the detention was without legal grounds, and the team was effectively
detained due to fear instilled by Mayor Astorga and his armed associates.
 The court rejected the Joint Affidavit of Desistance by the complainants, stating that it
did not clear Mayor Astorga of the charges and was merely an expression of lack of
interest in pursuing the case.
 The court affirmed the Sandiganbayan's decision, emphasizing the importance of
prosecuting public officials who commit Arbitrary Detention to uphold personal freedom
and rights.

In conclusion, the court upheld the conviction of Mayor Astorga for Arbitrary Detention,
emphasizing the need for accountability of public officials and the protection of individual
liberties.

Only by an earnest enforcement of the provisions of articles 124 and 125 of the Revised Penal
Code will it be possible to reduce to its minimum such wanton trampling of personal freedom as
depicted in this case. The responsible officials should be prosecuted, without prejudice to the
detainees’ right to the indemnity to which they may be entitled for the unjustified violation of
their fundamental rights.53

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO
ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentencing
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one
(1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

Sanchez v Demetriou
Facts: The case centers on Antonio L. Sanchez, the Mayor of Calauan, Laguna, who faces
accusations related to the rape and murder of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan
Gomez. Despite public condemnation, Sanchez is constitutionally presumed innocent until
proven guilty. The legal proceedings began with a request from the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission on July 28, 1993, prompting a preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993, where
Sanchez was represented by counsel but not present. Subsequently, he was "invited" for
investigation by the PNP Commander on August 12, 1993, leading to his arrest after positive
identifications from witnesses. Following an inquest at the Department of Justice, Sanchez was
issued a warrant of arrest on August 13, 1993, and detained at the CIS Detention Center, Camp
Crame. Charges were filed against Sanchez and others on August 16, 1993, with warrants issued
for their arrest on August 26, 1993. Due to concerns about a fair trial, the venue of the cases was
transferred to Pasig, Metro Manila. On September 10, 1993, the charges were amended to
include additional circumstances. Sanchez filed a motion to quash the charges, arguing various
grounds, which was denied on September 13, 1993. Consequently, he petitioned the Supreme
Court for certiorari and prohibition. Despite a procedural lapse in filing his reply, the court
decided to proceed with the case.

Antonio L. Sanchez sought to quash the charges against him on multiple grounds. Firstly, he
argued that he was denied the opportunity to present evidence during the preliminary
investigation. Secondly, he contended that only the Ombudsman had the authority to conduct
the investigation, questioning the competence of other authorities. Thirdly, he claimed that his
warrantless arrest rendered the court's jurisdiction over him invalid. Additionally, Sanchez raised
concerns regarding the number of charges against him, arguing that being charged with seven
homicides for the deaths of two individuals was excessive. He also alleged discrimination in the
charges, noting the omission of certain individuals. Lastly, he asserted that as a public officer, he
should be tried exclusively by the Sandiganbayan.

The Preliminary Investigation:

During the preliminary investigation, Antonio L. Sanchez claimed that he was denied the
opportunity to present counter-affidavits. However, records indicate that his counsel waived the
submission of counter-affidavits during the hearings on August 9 and 13, 1993. Despite being
given the chance to submit counter-affidavits until August 27, 1993, none were filed.
Additionally, there was no evidence to support Sanchez's claim that his counsel was not notified
of the proceedings or furnished with relevant affidavits. The absence of a preliminary
investigation does not invalidate the information or impair the jurisdiction of the court over the
case. While flawed investigations may prompt the trial court to order reinvestigations, in this
case, the judge found no need for such action.

Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman:

Sanchez argued that the Department of Justice had no jurisdiction over the case, asserting that
only the Office of the Ombudsman could investigate cases involving public officials like him.
While the Ombudsman indeed has authority to investigate and prosecute illegal acts of public
officials, this authority is not exclusive. Other investigatory agencies, including the Department
of Justice, can also conduct investigations into such cases. The non-involvement of the
Ombudsman in this case does not invalidate the authority of the panel of prosecutors to file and
prosecute the charges against Sanchez.

The Arrest:

Antonio L. Sanchez was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, by a letter-invitation
from PNP Commander Rex Piad on August 13, 1993. While labeled as an invitation, the
circumstances, including the military setting and the high-ranking official's request, made it
effectively an authoritative command. Sanchez went with the officers without protest, indicating
submission under duress. Even though the arrest lacked the formalities prescribed by law, such
as a warrant, it was deemed legal due to Sanchez's compliance. Additionally, the subsequent
issuance of a warrant by the Regional Trial Court further validated his detention, regardless of
the initial irregularity.

The Informations:

Sanchez argued that the seven informations charging him with seven separate homicides were
absurd because the victims could not have died seven times. However, the Solicitor General
countered that each rape committed in concert with the homicide constituted a separate
offense, justifying the multiple charges. The prosecution alleged that each of the accused,
including Sanchez, individually raped the victim, resulting in successive rapes and ultimately her
death. This interpretation aligned with the legal definition of complex crimes, justifying the
separate charges. The claim of discrimination due to the exclusion of certain individuals from the
charges was dismissed, as the decision to prosecute is within the discretion of the prosecutor,
absent clear evidence of abuse of discretion. Furthermore, the absence of charges against other
individuals did not invalidate the charges against Sanchez and his co-accused.

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:

was contested by the petitioner, who argued that the cases involving public officials should fall
under its jurisdiction rather than the regular courts. However, the crimes charged against the
petitioner, particularly rape with homicide, did not meet the criteria for Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. The offenses were not related to graft and corruption nor were they committed in
direct connection with the petitioner's office. The charges were independent of the petitioner's
official capacity, and there was no allegation of an intimate connection between the offenses
and his position as municipal mayor. Therefore, the regular courts, not the Sandiganbayan, had
jurisdiction over the case.

In conclusion, the grounds invoked by the petitioner lacked support from the facts and relevant
laws. The petition was dismissed, allowing the trial to proceed in the regular courts. It was
emphasized that the decision did not determine the merits of the criminal cases but left them to
be decided based on the evidence presented during the trial. Any speculation on the outcomes
was cautioned against, as they could only be based on incomplete information or ignorance.
The trial court was directed to proceed with the cases and decide them promptly.

David v GMA
The issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No.
5) by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in response to perceived threats to national security.
These executive orders declared a state of national emergency and directed the armed forces
and police to maintain law and order. The justification for these actions was based on alleged
plots to overthrow or assassinate the President. Petitioners argued that these orders violated
constitutional rights and were unconstitutional. They pointed out instances of suppression of
protests and assembly rights following the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.

Issue: A. PROCEDURAL:

1) Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic.

2) Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos.

171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.), and 171424 (Legarda) have
legal standing.

B. SUBSTANTIVE:

1) Whetherthe Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017.

2) Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional.

Moot and academic: Yes, but needs to be decided. The concept of mootness, which suggests
that a case is no longer relevant due to changed circumstances, is contested in the context of
the petitions challenging Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5
(G.O. No. 5). While the government argues that the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions
moot, the court holds that the alleged unconstitutional acts committed under PP 1017 require
resolution. The exceptions to mootness apply here: grave violation of the Constitution,
paramount public interest, need for guiding principles, and potential for repetition. Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban's perspective supports this, noting that a seemingly moot case may still
be decided if the party raising it has suffered or continues to suffer harm. Therefore, the
petitions remain justiciable despite the issuance of PP 1021.

Locus standi: Yes. Case law allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions, with
the requirement of demonstrating direct injury becoming more stringent. However, the court
may waive this requirement in cases of "transcendental importance." The court has established
various criteria for standing, including involvement in constitutional issues, showing of direct
injury, and assertion of legislative prerogatives. Recent decisions indicate a stricter stance on
legal standing. Despite this, the court ultimately holds that all petitioners in the present cases
have legal standing. Additionally, it's deemed improper to implead President Arroyo as a
respondent due to presidential immunity, as the President cannot be sued during tenure except
through impeachment, ensuring the unimpeded performance of presidential duties.

Review: Yes. Previous cases like Barcelon v. Baker and Montenegro v. Castaneda emphasized the
President's final authority in determining exigencies, while Lansang v. Garcia shifted focus to
judicial scrutiny, asserting the court's authority to review the sufficiency of factual bases. Aquino
v. Enrile showed division within the court on the justiciability of Martial Law. Garcia-Padilla v.
Enrile diluted Lansang's stance, emphasizing the President's absolute control during
emergencies. Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora echoed Lansang's principle, allowing
examination of the President's exercise of discretion. The court's authority to review
governmental acts, including those of the executive branch, was fortified by the 1987
Constitution, broadening judicial power to include the review of political department discretion.
The standard set by Lansang and reiterated in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora is not
correctness but arbitrariness; the President's decision must not be arbitrary. In the case of PP
1017, petitioners failed to demonstrate that President Arroyo's decision lacked factual basis, as
evidenced by detailed reports supporting the proclamation, including incidents of threats and
alliances that the President believed justified military intervention. Thus, the Court concludes
that President Arroyo was justified in issuing PP 1017 to address perceived threats, while
ensuring that such actions do not unduly infringe on liberties.

Facial challenge: The petitioners argue that Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP 1017) is void due
to its alleged overbreadth and vagueness, which they claim encroach upon both protected and
unprotected rights under the Constitution, causing a "chilling effect" on citizens. However, a
facial review of PP 1017 using the overbreadth doctrine is deemed unnecessary for several
reasons.

Firstly, the overbreadth doctrine is primarily applied in cases concerning free speech under the
First Amendment in American law. PP 1017, aimed at preventing or suppressing lawless violence,
does not primarily target speech or speech-related conduct. The US Supreme Court has held
that the overbreadth doctrine is not applicable outside the context of the First Amendment.

Secondly, facial invalidation of laws is considered a drastic measure and is generally disfavored.
It is typically used as a last resort, and courts are hesitant to invalidate entire statutes unless
absolutely necessary. Challenges to laws are usually limited to the specific situation of the
litigant, and courts do not entertain claims based on potential unconstitutional applications to
others not involved in the case.

Lastly, mounting a successful facial challenge based on overbreadth is difficult, as the challenger
must demonstrate that there is no instance where the law may be valid. Petitioners did not
attempt to show such a scenario. Similarly, their claim of vagueness in PP 1017 is unwarranted,
as they failed to establish that the law is vague in all its possible applications or that individuals
of common intelligence cannot understand its meaning and application. Thus, a facial review of
PP 1017 based on overbreadth or vagueness is not justified according to the arguments
presented.

B. Consitutional basis. The constitutional basis of Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP 1017) can
be analyzed through its three important provisions:

1. Calling-out Power: The first provision of PP 1017 pertains to the President's calling-out
power, which is derived from Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. This power allows
the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to summon the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. The only criterion for its exercise is
necessity. In this case, President Arroyo invoked PP 1017 based on her assessment of the
prevailing circumstances in the country.
2. "Take Care" Power: The second provision concerns the President's duty to ensure the
faithful execution of laws, as stated in Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution. However,
PP 1017 extends beyond this by authorizing the enforcement of decrees, orders, and
regulations promulgated by the President personally or upon her direction. This
provision is deemed unconstitutional because it grants President Arroyo the authority to
promulgate decrees, which is a legislative power reserved for Congress.
3. Power to Take Over: The third provision of PP 1017 refers to the President's authority to
take over or direct the operation of privately-owned public utilities or businesses
affected with public interest during a state of national emergency. This power is based
on Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution. However, the exercise of emergency
powers, including the taking over of private businesses, generally requires a delegation
from Congress. While the President can declare a state of national emergency, Congress
is the repository of emergency powers and may delegate such powers to the President
under certain conditions.

In summary, while the President has the authority to declare a state of national emergency, the
exercise of emergency powers, including the promulgation of decrees and the taking over of
private businesses, typically requires delegation from Congress. PP 1017 overstepped
constitutional boundaries by granting the President powers beyond her authority, rendering
certain provisions unconstitutional.

PRACTICAL:
The passage delves into legal challenges against Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP 1017) and
General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5) during a state of emergency in the Philippines. It narrates
instances where individuals and media entities were allegedly unlawfully arrested, searched, or
dispersed by authorities under the guise of maintaining security. It debates whether illegal
actions by law enforcers render the laws themselves unconstitutional. The court scrutinizes the
legality of the laws, arguing that while they aimed to address lawlessness, their application
violated citizens' rights. Ultimately, the court rules against the government, deeming certain
provisions of G.O. No. 5 unconstitutional due to their arbitrary and oppressive implementation,
which encroached upon freedoms of speech, assembly, and the press. General Order No. 5 (G.O.
No. 5) is an executive order issued by the President of the Philippines during a state of
emergency. It outlines directives for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine
National Police (PNP) to take necessary and appropriate actions to suppress and prevent acts of
terrorism and lawless violence. It was implemented in conjunction with Presidential Proclamation
1017 (PP 1017), which declared a state of national emergency in the Philippines.

Ruling: The text summarizes a legal decision regarding Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP
1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5) in the Philippines. It acknowledges that PP 1017 was
lifted by a subsequent proclamation, but illegal acts were committed under its authority. The
court rules PP 1017 constitutional in its call to prevent lawless violence but unconstitutional for
granting excessive powers to the President beyond this scope. G.O. No. 5 is deemed
constitutional but with a portion regarding "acts of terrorism" declared unconstitutional due to
lack of legislative definition. Specific instances of illegal actions, such as warrantless arrests and
searches, are also ruled unconstitutional. The ruling emphasizes the importance of balancing
governmental power with protecting individual rights during emergencies.