BOEING COMMERCIAL AIRPLANES

FLIGHT OPERATIONS TECHNICAL BULLETIN

NUMBER: 777-62

DATE: December 8, 2023

This bulletin provides information which may prove useful in airline operations or airline training. The
information provided in this bulletin is not critical to flight safety. The information may not apply to all
customers; specific effectivity can be determined by contacting The Boeing Company. This information will
remain in effect depending on production changes, customer-originated modifications, and Service Bulletin
incorporation. Information in this bulletin is supplied by The Boeing Company and may not be approved or
endorsed by the FAA at the time of writing. Appropriate formal documentation will be revised, as necessary,
to reflect the information contained in this bulletin. For further information, contact Boeing Commercial
Airplanes through the Service Requests Application (SR App) on the MyBoeingFleet home page.

SUBJECT: Global Positioning System (GPS) Signal Interference

ATA NO: 34-00

APPLIES TO: All 777-200, 777-200ER, 777-200LR, 777-200F, 777-300, and

777-300ER airplanes

REASON: To describe the flight deck effects associated with a loss of GPS signal
or GPS signal interference.

This bulletin replaces Flight Operations Technical Bulletin 777-47 Global Positioning
System (GPS) Signal Interference

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

Reports of GPS interference (jamming and spoofing) are increasing. These occurrences
are currently concentrated in specific regions; however, they can occur worldwide.
Interference with GPS signals can have an effect on multiple systems on the 777. This
bulletin aims to identify and provide guidance to operators and flight crew for mitigating
these effects.

GPS uses signals from satellites to determine an accurate position. GPS data is used in
many functions on the 777, including:
• Flight Management Computer (FMC)
• GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain
• ADS-B
• Time/clock
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Occurrences of GPS interference can result in missing or erroneous information. This
interference comes from many sources, including portable devices, GPS jammers, and
GPS repeaters.

Note: Flight control systems and functions are not affected by GPS interference.

Categories of Interference

Intentional Interference
Intentional interference includes jamming and spoofing. Occurrences can be due to:
• Geopolitical conflict
• Protection of sensitive areas or personnel such as military, government sites, or
VIP movements
• Personal privacy devices

Jamming causes a loss of measurement and therefore a degradation of the

position/velocity/time (PVT) solution.

Spoofing is a fake signal that causes the receiver to output misleading data, such as an
incorrect position or time.

Unintentional Interference
Unintentional interference can result from unregulated radio transmitters that infringe on
radio frequencies protected for aviation. It can also be caused by rare atmospheric
electromagnetic phenomena and potentially malfunctioning radio frequency transmitters.

Interference Flight Deck Effects (FDEs) and Recommended Crew Mitigations

There are several potential FDEs possible with GPS interference. The following list
contains examples and is not an exhaustive list. Some effects have aural or visual alerts,
others do not.

Flight Management Computer

• Jamming causes an increase in ANP which impacts navigation capability.
Enabling radio updating when there are sufficient radio navigation facilities will
help maintain a lower ANP. For certain Multi-Mode Receiver (MMR), loss of
GPS signal or GPS signal jamming for a period in excess of 12 minutes can result
in one or more of these EICAS messages:
o GPS
o GPS L
o GPS R
o RUNWAY SYS
o GND PROX SYS.

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 • Effects of spoofing on FMC:
o Inaccurate GPS position input to the FMC in the air or on the ground.
o An FMC-generated flight path can be affected, such as LNAV or VNAV.
o During spoofing the shown ANP value may momentarily change to a
much larger value (e.g., 20 nm), then it returns to the actual value. The
actual value will change based on the update sources being used. On the
ground if spoofing is encountered while the FMC is powering up, although
the system may show a small ANP. The position can be inaccurate and it
may not match the gate or stand location. Comparing the FMC position
with the actual location of the gate or stand location will reveal if the FMC
position is corrupted.
o NAV UNABLE RNP advisory message can show if ANP exceeds RNP.
This alert must be considered valid.
o GPS data can be deselected – Refer to the Mitigations for Consideration
section of this bulletin.
o FMC position update can change from GPS to radio if GPS update is not
available (GPS update turned off or GPS data is invalid) and the RAD
NAV INHIBIT is manually turned OFF. Refer to Appendix 1 and FCOM
Chapter 11 Flight Management, Navigation.
o The two GPS receivers may be affected differently due to spoofing. This
may result in FMC alerting message VERIFY POSITION when the
primary and secondary FMCs use independent navigation sources and the
two FMC position difference becomes greater than the current RNP value
and greater than 0.4 nm.
o FMC fuel predictions can be inaccurate.

GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain

• Jamming causes a loss of GPS position data. When the GPS signal is no longer
available, the GPWS uses IRS data as a backup and the TERR POS message
shows on EICAS and on the ND. When the IRS horizontal position uncertainty
exceeds limits, the terrain is removed from the ND, TERR FAIL shows on the
ND, and look-ahead alerting does not function.
• Effects of spoofing on GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain:
o Erroneous GPS position data to the GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain function
that can resolve or persist for the remainder of the flight.
o False GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain alerts including “PULL UP” on the
PFD can occur. A complete list of these are in the FCOM Chapter 15
Warning Systems.
o Terrain warnings can occur at any altitude.
o Terrain display on ND can be inaccurate.
o For a GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain warning at a cruise altitude that is
clearly above the highest known actual terrain in the area, pilot discretion
can be used in determining the alert, including persistent alerts, to be false.

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 o Further guidance on the GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain warning is available
in QRH: Maneuvers: Non-Normal Maneuvers: Ground Proximity
Warning System (GPWS) Response.
o The basic GPWS is still operational. Basic GPWS Alerts are valid. Refer
to the Appendix 1 and FCOM Chapter 15 Warning Systems.
o GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain can be disabled. Refer to FCOM Chapter 15
Warning Systems.

Note: Selecting GPS updating to OFF on the POS REF page does not inhibit GPS
data for GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain.

ADS-B
• Jamming causes a loss of ADS-B capability. Coordination with ATC is necessary.
• Effects of spoofing on ADS-B
o Erroneous position data to ADS-B. ADS-B IN traffic can disappear from
the ND, or be displayed in an erroneous position with or without the
ADS-B advisory message.
o If an ADS-B advisory message shows, it must be considered valid.
o All TCAS alerts must be considered valid.

Note: Selecting GPS updating to OFF on the POS REF page does not inhibit GPS for
ADS-B.

Time/Clock
• Jamming can result in the loss of GPS time source.
• Effects of spoofing on time/clock:
o Inaccurate time and date information.
o FMC ETA and RTA function can be affected.
o Aeronautical Telecommunications Network (ATN) communication
functions are impacted by date/time inaccuracy. Log-on and reporting
functions may not be available.
o The ATN ground system can disconnect from the aircraft due to the error
in which case the ATN connection will be terminated and indicated in the
message “ATC COMM TERMINATED”.

General Mitigations for Consideration

Loss of GPS information is usually temporary. GPS data, communication, and
surveillance functions are usually recovered as soon as the aircraft leaves the area
affected by interference. Some spoofing events can impact the user system for the
remainder of the flight.

When responding to alerts, signs, and symptoms of GPS interference, it is important to

advise ATC as soon as practical of any degraded navigation capability, advising them of
systems that have not recovered due to spoofing.

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 • If systems such as LNAV path or VNAV path experience degraded performance
or unsatisfactory performance due to interference, reduce the level of automation
(e.g., HDG/TRK, FLCH, VS). Once clear of the interference area and the position
of the GPS and FMC is verified, the level of automation can be increased.
• If GPS spoofing is suspected, revert to another update mode such as DME/DME
updating or use available ground-based navigation aid such as VOR and NDB.
These functions are described in FCOM Supplementary Procedures: Flight
Management, Navigation.
• Cross-check terrain altitude using enroute charts if terrain depiction on ND
appears unreasonable for the geographic location.
• Familiarize crew with the availability of arrival and approach procedures using
conventional navigation aids.

GPS updating in the FMC can be temporarily disabled as per the FCOM Supplementary
Procedures: Flight Management, Navigation as a preventative measure before entering
areas of known GPS interference and in the event of unexpected GPS interference. This
practice is at the discretion of the operator after a risk assessment with the following
considerations:

• The operator must provide the flight crew instructions on when to disable GPS
updating as a preventative measure against GPS interference and when to turn
GPS updating back on upon exiting areas of known interference.
• GPS updating should be turned back on, after the position accuracy is verified.
This can be accomplished by referring to the POS REF pages as described in
FCOM Chapter 11 Flight Management, Navigation. Boeing does not recommend
preventative disabling of GPS updating for the entire flight.

Operator Responsibilities

Operational Risk Assessment

Operations into areas of known GPS interference should be carefully risk assessed by the
operator. The conditions and effects on airplane systems vary depending on the type,
sophistication, and geographical area of the interference.

Consider avoidance of areas of known interference as one of the risk reduction measures.

Contingency procedures can be developed by the operator using this guidance. Ensure
crews are familiar with conventional navigation capabilities and operation. This
information is contained in FCOM Chapter 11 Flight Management, Navigation.
However, when doing so:
• Caution should be exercised when developing procedural steps if they involve
disabling or downgrading of navigation systems and GPWS Look Ahead Terrain.

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 Unintended consequences can occur in integrated systems. Boeing can review and
comment on operator developed procedures for technical accuracy and
consequences, but will not provide a “No Technical Objection” for these
procedures.
• Consideration must be given to the negative effect of desensitizing flight crew to
valid alerts due to frequency of occurrence.
• Flight crew workload must be considered in operator-developed procedural
mitigations, especially in critical phases of flight.
• Flight crews should only disable GPS updating when instructed to do so as part of
an established operator-created risk mitigation or if unexpected FDEs occur in-
flight.

Reporting Interference Anomalies

Data from interference events is being collected and analyzed. Communications from
Boeing will be updated as needed. Pilots are encouraged to submit detailed reports of
disruptions or interference events as soon as practical through an internal company
reporting system. Operators can submit reports and data to Boeing to assist in targeted
situational improvement.

Reference
See Appendix 1 of this bulletin for an in-depth technical description of the 777 GPS and
types of interference.

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 APPENDIX 1

This appendix provides engineering data to help operators further understand the flight
deck effects during GPS signal interference and to assess risks and mitigations to a level
that is satisfactory to operators and their regulatory authorities.

Below is a list of the appendix sections:

1. GPS Jamming (Basic)

2. GPS Spoofing
3. Navigation GPS Signal Available (Normal Operation)
4. System Overview
5. Flight Deck Indications
6. EICAS Messages and Non-Normal Checklists (NNC)
7. GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain
8. ADS-B During GPS Signal Interference
9. Electronic Flight Bag
10. Additional Information
11. Planned Changes

1. GPS Jamming (Basic)

GPS interference typically causes a loss of measurement data from one or more satellites
and a degradation or loss of the receiver’s position, velocity, and time (PVT) solution and
normally does not result in an output of misleading data from the GPS receiver.

2. GPS Spoofing
When interfering signals have a structure similar to the desired GPS signals, the effects can
be more severe. This is called spoofing, a fake signal pretending to be real. Spoofing can
cause the receiver to output misleading data. Spoofing is more difficult to produce than
basic interference; however, the means to produce such signals are becoming more
accessible and affordable due to advances in electronics capabilities such as software
defined radios (SDR). Spoofing can cause position errors of varying magnitude. Large
errors can be detected and mitigated by a cross check of the GPS position compared to the
position from an independent navigation aid. Smaller errors can be difficult to detect.
During spoofing, the flight deck indications of the impacted system can vary depending on
the sophistication of spoofing.
Navigation GPS signal available (Normal Operation)
The FMC navigation update mode source shows on the Navigation Display (ND). GPS is
the normal source of FMC navigation update mode and shows as "GPS". See Figure 1.

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OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

3. NAVIGATION GPS SIGNAL AVAILABLE (NORMAL OPERATION)

FMC position update status is shown on the Navigation Display (ND) in Figure 1. “GPS”
is normally the FMC position update status.

Figure 1 – ND with GPS as the FMC Position Update Status

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When radio updating is enabled and available, the FMC position update status changes in
the priority order shown in Table 1.

Table 1 - FMC Position Update Source

FMC Position Update Source POS REF Page 2 FMC Position Update
Status on ND
GPS valid GPS GPS
LOC and DME/DME valid; GPS LOC-RADIO LOC–DME–DME
invalid *
LOC and VOR/DME valid; GPS LOC-RADIO LOC–VOR–DME
invalid *
LOC valid; GPS, DME, and LOC- LOC
VOR invalid * INERTIAL
DME valid; GPS invalid RADIO DME–DME

VOR DME valid; GPS invalid RADIO VOR–DME

ADIRU valid; GPS, VOR, DME INERTIAL INERTIAL

invalid
GPS valid; ADIRU failed GPS GPS
GPS invalid, ADIRU failed blank map not available
Note that localizer updating is inhibited if GPS is the navigation update mode.

* The FMC changes to LOC updating when:

• the tuned localizer is associated with the destination runway
• the airplane is less than 6,000 feet above the localizer navaid elevation
• the airplane is less than 20 nm from the localizer navaid for a front course
approach or less than 12 nm from the localizer navaid for a back course
approach
• the airplane is within 25° sector of the inbound localizer course
• the difference between airplane track and the localizer course is less than 45°
intercept angle.

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EFIS Control Panel POS Button
When the "POS" button on the EFIS control panel is selected, the symbols for the GPS,
ADIRU, and radio positions, relative to the FMC position, are shown. See Figure 2.

GPS position

ADIRU position

Figure 2 - GPS and ADIRU Positions on ND

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Control Display Unit (CDU) POS REF Page 2/3
POS REF page 2 shows FMC, Inertial, GPS and radio positions. This page allows updating
of the FMC-computed position to match either the Inertial, GPS, or radio position. Figure
3 shows both GPS and radio positions available.

Figure 3 – GPS, Inertial, and radio Positions on CDU POS REF page 2

Line 1L shows the FMC position and, in the header line, the primary source of update
displays in parentheses above the FMC position (as described in Table 1).

Line 4L shows the radio position. When in range of a navigational radio, this line shows
the radio position even when radio updating is inhibited. If radio updating is inhibited, the
FMC does not use the shown radio position as an update source until radio updating is
enabled.

Line 5R shows the identifier(s) of the navigation station(s) currently being used to compute
the radio position regardless of whether radio updating is inhibited or enabled.

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Control Display Unit (CDU) POS REF Page 3 / 3
GPS L and R BRG / DIST from the FMC computed position should be 0.1 NM or less
under normal circumstances. See Figure 4.

Figure 4 – GPS Bearing and Distance on CDU POS REF page 3

Navaid Inhibit or Enable
The Navaid Inhibit or Enable Supplementary Procedure in Volume 1 of the Flight Crew
Operations Manual (FCOM) provides the steps to inhibit and enable navigation sources.
Selecting the RAD NAV INHIBIT to “OFF” enables radio navaids to be used for position
determination and navigation.
Figure 5 below shows the REF NAV DATA page. It shows that radio navaids are enabled
for position determination and navigation.
Lines 4L, 4R, 5L, 5R on the REF NAV DATA allow individual navaid stations to be
inhibited from the navigation computation. If RAD NAV INHIBIT is selected “ON”, all
four of these lines show “ALL” since all navaids are inhibited. When RAD NAV INHIBIT
is selected “OFF” or “VOR”, these lines show dashes, and individual navaid identifiers can
be entered.

Figure 5 - CDU NAV OPTIONS Page

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4. SYSTEM OVERVIEW

The 777 models are equipped with one fault-tolerant Air Data Inertial Reference Unit
(ADIRU) which provides aircraft position initialization. The ADIRU calculates airplane
position, acceleration, track, vertical speed, ground speed, true and magnetic heading, wind
speed and direction, and attitude data. This data is supplied to the displays, FMS, flight
controls, engine controls, and other systems.

777s have two GPS antennas and two GPS receivers to support navigation. The GPS
receivers receive satellite inputs and determine the aircraft position, velocity, date and time.

The GPS receivers on Boeing airplanes have receiver autonomous integrity monitoring
(RAIM) algorithms to detect and mitigate erroneous GPS signals. These algorithms offer
some protection against errors from interference. For example, RAIM detects spoofing
where the receiver tracks both real and fake satellite signals that cause inconsistent
measurement data. The RAIM horizontal integrity limit (HIL) must be valid before the
GPS output is used by airplane systems.

The GPS receivers provide a 95% horizontal position accuracy, Horizontal Figure of Merit
(HFOM), as well as a 99.99999% Horizontal Integrity Limit (HIL). The GPS data from
both receivers are transmitted to each Flight Management Computer (FMC). The FMCs
use the data as one of several sensor inputs. The FMC uses the onside GPS as the primary
and the offside GPS is only used if the onside becomes invalid.

The FMC determines airplane position and velocity using the best sensor data available
to compensate for inertial reference errors. The FMC then uses this data to compute the
95% horizontal position accuracy data and Actual Navigation Performance (ANP).
Normally, GPS data is the most accurate and the resulting navigation mode is GPS. When
GPS data is not valid or when GPS data is not available and radio update is inhibited, the
FMC determines position and velocity using only inertial reference data with the most
recent corrections. The FMC position update source becomes “INERTIAL”, and the
FMC ANP begins to increase based on inertial drift. In this same scenario, if radio
updating is available and not inhibited, the FMC uses inertial reference data with radio
navaids as the update source. The resulting navigation mode shown on the ND is either
DME-DME, VOR-DME, LOC, LOC-DME-DME, or LOC-VOR-DME.

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Figure 6 shows the path of the GPS data and its use by the airplane systems.

Figure 6 - Block Diagram of Airplane Systems using GPS

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5. FLIGHT DECK INDICATIONS

This section describes flight deck indications for the impacted systems during GPS signal
interference events.

Navigation when GPS Update is Not Available or during GPS Signal Interference
When a GPS signal is not available to update the ADIRU position and radio updating is
either not available or is inhibited, FMC position update status transitions from GPS to
INERTIAL, and the lateral ANP starts to increase.

Selecting RAD NAV INHIBIT “OFF” on the REF NAV DATA page enables radio
updating. Details are covered in the Navaid Inhibit or Enable Supplementary Procedure in
Volume 1 of the Flight Crew Operations Manual (FCOM). Selecting RAD NAV INHIBIT
“OFF” allows conventional navigation aids like DME-DME or VOR-DME to update the
FMC position provided they are in range with proper geometry. A change of the update
source from inertial to radio updating can cause a slight map shift.

When GPS or radio updating are not available, INERTIAL is displayed as the FMC
Position Update Status on the ND. See Figure 7 below.

Figure 7 - Loss of GPS Signal

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Due to inertial drift, the ANP continues to increase as shown in Figure 8 below.

Figure 8 – No Inertial Position Updating

For airplanes with Navigation Performance Scales (NPS), the PFD also shows the
increasing ANP value. See Figure 9.

Figure 9 – NPS Scale with increasing ANP value

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When ANP exceeds RNP, the NAV UNABLE RNP message shows as shown in Figure
10.

Figure 10 – NAV UNABLE RNP Caution Message

During a localizer-based approach, if the GPS signal is not available, the FMC uses the
localizer for position updating if all of the conditions described in Table 1 are satisfied.

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CDU POS REF Page 2/3
GPS position is shown on the POS REF 2/3 page and updates as the airplane moves. During
oceanic operations, when a GPS signal is not available and the airplane is out of range of
any radio navaid, both the GPS and RADIO position fields are blank. See Figure 11.

Figure 11 - Oceanic Out of Radio Range

When a GPS signal is not available but the airplane is in range of radio navaids, only the
GPS position field is blank. If radio updating is inhibited, the FMC uses inertial as the only
navigation source as shown in Figure 12 below.

Figure 12 - Domestic within Radio Range

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When radio updating is enabled, the FMC uses the radio navaids as the navigation source
as shown in Figure 13 below.

Figure 13 - FMC Radio Position Update

Line 5R shows the identifier(s) of the navigation station(s) being used to compute the radio
position.

CDU POS REF Page 3 / 3

Once exiting the GPS interference area, GPS distance of less than 0.1 NM on CDU POS
REF Page 3 / 3 is an indication of recovery of the GPS receiver.

If one GPS BRG / DIST is blank, then that GPS has not recovered from the interference,
and the FMC is using the other GPS sensor. This can indicate GPS interference is still
occurring or that lingering effects remain after the airplane has left the GPS interference
area.

If one GPS distance is greater than 0.1, this can be an indication that the GPS position is
still affected by GPS interference. Although that GPS is not being used by the FMC for
position determination, other systems can still use data from that GPS.

Figure 14 below is an example of a blank value for GPS R.

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 Figure 14 – GPS R Field Blank

6. EICAS Messages and Non-Normal Checklists (NNC)

GPS Receiver Failure

For AIMS BP17A or later, failure of a GPS receiver, a GPS antenna, or loss of the signal
between the antenna and the receiver results in the EICAS advisory message "GPS L" or
"GPS R".

The EICAS advisory message "GPS" shows when both GPSs fail.

On airplanes with the GLU-925 Multi-Mode Receiver (MMR), loss of GPS signal or GPS
signal jamming for a period in excess of 12 minutes can result in one or more of these
EICAS messages: GPS, GPS L, GPS R, RUNWAY SYS, and GND PROX SYS. On
airplanes with other MMRs, loss of the GPS signal or signal jamming does not result in
any EICAS message because there is no system failure.

On airplanes with AIMS v18 and later, the EICAS message ADIRU/GPS DISAGREE can
show.

When the GPS signal is lost or jammed, the navigation update mode changes to the next
available sensor. If the navigation position accuracy is reduced, the ANP increases. When
ANP exceeds RNP, the NAV UNABLE RNP message shows. The same non-normal
procedures apply whether the messages are caused by GPS signal jamming, loss of GPS
signal, or GPS receiver failure. If this occurs on the ground, all EICAS messages should
be addressed before take-off.

EXPORT CONTROLLED - This technology or software is subject to the U.S. Ex port Administration Regulations (EAR), (15
C.F.R. Parts 730-774). No authorization from the U.S. Department of Commerce is required for export, re-export, in-country transfer,
or access EXCEPT to country group E:1 or E:2 countries/persons per Supp.1 to Part 740 of the EAR. ECCN : 9E991
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Other Non-Normal Checklists NNCs

It is not possible to develop checklists for all situations. In all situations, the captain must
assess the situation and use good judgment to determine the safest course of action.

7. Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) Look-Ahead Terrain

The GPS is the primary source of position data for the GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain. When
the GPS signal is not available, the GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain uses inertial data as a
backup. When the inertial horizontal position uncertainty stays within limits, the terrain
continues to be shown on the ND and the look-ahead terrain alerting continues to function.
Once the inertial position uncertainty exceeds limits, the terrain is removed from the ND
and the “TERR POS” message shows. Ground proximity alerts that occur are valid.

The GPWS Look-Ahead Terrain function cannot detect a small or gradual changes in the GPS
position or altitude. If this occurs, depending on the landscape in the terrain database for the GPS
position, alerts associated with look-ahead terrain function can occur when alert thresholds are
exceeded. There have been several in-service cases where false GPWS look-ahead terrain alerts
occurred during GPS spoofing.

Ground Proximity Terrain Override (TERR OVRD)

If TERR OVRD is selected, it inhibits the GPWS look-ahead terrain and obstacle display
and the TERR OVRD message shows.

GPWS immediate alerts are based on radio altitude, barometric altitude, ADRS,
glideslope deviation, and airplane configuration. These alerts continue to function during
GPS jamming and if an alert occurs, it is valid. GPWS alerts occur for the following
conditions:
• altitude loss after takeoff or go-around
• excessive descent rate
• excessive terrain closing rate
• unsafe terrain clearance when not in the landing configuration
• excessive deviation below ILS glideslope

These functions also remain valid:

• reactive windshear
• altitude call outs
• bank angle callouts (as installed)

GPWS alerts that do occur are valid. Accomplish the maneuver associated with the alert
as described in the FCOM/QRH.

EXPORT CONTROLLED - This technology or software is subject to the U.S. Ex port Administration Regulations (EAR), (15
C.F.R. Parts 730-774). No authorization from the U.S. Department of Commerce is required for export, re-export, in-country transfer,
or access EXCEPT to country group E:1 or E:2 countries/persons per Supp.1 to Part 740 of the EAR. ECCN : 9E991
Page 21 of 23
Runway Awareness and Advisory System (RAAS)
On airplanes equipped with RAAS, when the GPS signal is lost, RAAS is unavailable
and either RUNWAY SYS or RUNWAY POS are shown on EICAS. RUNWAY SYS is
displayed for complete loss of GPS signal. RUNWAY SYS is only displayed if GPS is
not accurate enough to support the function (i.e. horizontal figure of merit exceeds
0.02nm). Jamming would most likely lead to the former. Spoofing could lead to the latter.
Ground proximity alerts that occur are valid.

Air Traffic Control (ATC) data link

Actual GPS interference events in service have revealed a change in time and/or date
shown on the flight deck. In most events, once the airplane has exited the GPS
interference area, the time shown returns to the correct value. However, in some
occasions the time and date shown can still be affected by the past GPS interference.

Airplane system time and date is shown on the flight deck clock (as installed) or by
selecting the STATUS display for airplanes without a flight deck clock. Operators can set
up Airline Modifiable Information (AMI) COMM pages to display the system clock and
track changes when time or date unreasonably change.

Air Traffic Control (ATC) data link functions use the airplane time and date and can
therefore be impacted by GPS interference.
• The Aeronautical Telecommunication Network (ATN) data link logon reports the
time and date. With an incorrect time or date, ATN data link logons can be
rejected by the ground system. If the aircraft is already logged on to ATN when
the time or date becomes incorrect, any subsequent uplinks show “INVALID
UPLINK” due to the difference in time and date between the aircraft and ground
system. The ground system can disconnect from the aircraft due to the error in
which case the ATN connection will be terminated and indicated in the message
“ATC COMM TERMINATED”.

• Future Air Navigation System (FANS) Controller-Pilot Data Link

Communication (CPDLC) does not compare date or time between the aircraft and
ground systems. Current airplane time is appended to any FANS CPDLC uplinks,
but all FANS CPDLC functionality remains the same if time and date are
incorrect. However, if a FANS CPDLC Uplink Delay Monitor is established
between ATC and the airplane, uplinks appear to be old due to the incorrect
airplane time or date. The resulting text “UPLINK DELAY EXCEEDED” is
shown on the uplink message header. However, the flight crew can still respond
to this message and utilize FANS CPDLC normally.

Once the airplane exits the GPS interference area, the airplane clock should return to
normal operations. If the time or date shown on the clock is not correct, the airplane is

EXPORT CONTROLLED - This technology or software is subject to the U.S. Ex port Administration Regulations (EAR), (15
C.F.R. Parts 730-774). No authorization from the U.S. Department of Commerce is required for export, re-export, in-country transfer,
or access EXCEPT to country group E:1 or E:2 countries/persons per Supp.1 to Part 740 of the EAR. ECCN : 9E991
Page 22 of 23
likely to be in the GPS interference area, but lingering effects can persist affecting the
time and date even after exiting the GPS interference area.

8. Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) during GPS signal

interference
During GPS interference or when the GPS signal is lost, the transponder ADS-B Out
function is inoperative.
• ADS-B OUT L or ADS-B OUT R messages show, as installed. Selecting the
opposite transponder causes the other message to show since the GPS signal
remains unavailable.
• Loss of ADS-B position reports by ATC. ATC may notify the pilot and request a
switch to the other transponder; however this does not restore the ADS-B function.
The transponder Mode C remains operational.
• ADS-B Out reporting of incorrect airplane position during a GPS spoofing event
is possible. In this case, ATC can observe a position difference between ADS-B
Out position and airplane position on primary and secondary radar.

9. Electronic Flight Bag (EFB)

Some EFB applications use GPS data, and GPS interference can affect those applications.

10. Additional Information

A full listing of FAA-issued flight prohibition and advisory NOTAMs, and flight
prohibition SFARs for areas in which the FAA does not provide air navigation services is
posted on the FAA website at:
http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publications/us_restrictions

Collins Aerospace GLU-925/GLU-2100 MMR can experience a date shift that persists
after exposure to extended GPS interference.

Maintenance tip 777 MT 34-051 provides recommended actions to correct GPS impacts
that have resulted from interference on previous flight legs. When the actions are
executed on the ground, effects of GPS interference can be corrected.

EXPORT CONTROLLED - This technology or software is subject to the U.S. Ex port Administration Regulations (EAR), (15
C.F.R. Parts 730-774). No authorization from the U.S. Department of Commerce is required for export, re-export, in-country transfer,
or access EXCEPT to country group E:1 or E:2 countries/persons per Supp.1 to Part 740 of the EAR. ECCN : 9E991
Page 23 of 23