CASE DIGEST

Case #16 People vs. Mabong

FACTS:

In 1955, in the barrio of Rizal, Mabong stab one Cipriano Tabel with a bolo. After
pursuing and attacking
his victim, Mabong faced Verano who told him to drop his bolo, and when he refused,
Verano clubbed
him on the face which caused him to stumble to the ground. Thereupon, Verano
grabbed the bolo of the
accused, tied him with a rope and brought him on a small boat to Lianga where he
delivered him to the
chief of police.
Mabong was charged with murder and pleaded guilty. However, accused filed a motion
to quash and a
petition for habeas corpus alleging as main ground that his detention by the local
authorities became
illegal upon the expiration of the period of eighteen (18) hours without having been
proceeded with in
accordance with law, and that the filing later on of the two criminal complaints against
him by the chief
of police did not have the effect of validating his detention. From the denial of said and
petition, the
accused took the present appeal
In 1955, in the barrio of Rizal, Mabong stab one Cipriano Tabel with a bolo. After
pursuing and attacking his victim, Mabong faced Verano who told him to drop his bolo,
and when he refused, Verano clubbed him on the face which caused him to stumble to
the ground. Thereupon, Verano grabbed the bolo of the accused, tied him with a rope
and brought him on a small boat to Lianga where he delivered him to the chief of
police. Mabong was charged with murder and pleaded guilty. However, accused filed a
motion to quash and a petition for habeas corpus alleging as main ground that his
detention by the local authorities became illegal upon the expiration of the period of
eighteen (18) hours without having been proceeded with in accordance with law, and
that the filing later on of the two criminal complaints against him by the chief of police
did not have the effect of validating his detention. From the denial of said and petition,
the accused took the present appeal

ISSUE:

Whether the charge for which the person has been detained and for which
he has been properly indicted is affected by the failure to deliver him to the proper
judicial authorities within the legal period.

HELD:

NO. While a public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal
ground and shall fail to deliver him to the proper judicial authorities within the legal
period, may be held amendable to criminal prosecution, however, the charge for which
the person has been detained and for which he has been properly indicted, remains
unaffected, for the two acts are distinct and separate. As a matter of fact, such an act
on the part of the public officer is not considered as one of the grounds on which one
can predicate a motion to quash the complaint or information under Rule 113, section
2, of the Rules of Court. The law on which the accused relies in claiming the illegality of
his detention is Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code which provides: Delay in the
delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. The penalties provided
in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver
such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours, for crimes
or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; nine hours, for crimes or
offenses punishable by correccional penalties, or their equivalent; and eighteen hours,
for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.
The law indeed provides that a public officer or employee who shall detain any person
for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver him to the proper judicial authorities
within the period of eighteen (18) hours if the crime for which he is detained
calls for an afflictive or capital penalty, may be held amendable to criminal
prosecution, but there is nothing said therein that the charge for which he has been
detained and for which he has been properly indicted, becomes invalid or nugatory.

CASE #17
MEDINA vs OROZCO GR No. L-26723
FACTS
Petitioner Arthur Medina y Yumul was arrested around 12:00 p.m. on November 7,
1965, and subsequently confined to the Caloocan City jail on charges related to the
death of Marcelo Sangalang y Diwa on October 31, 1965, in the same city. At
approximately 9:00 a.m. on the same day, the case against Medina and two others
regarding Sangalang's murder was referred to a fiscal, who immediately conducted a
preliminary investigation with Medina present. On November 10, 1965, at about 3:40
p.m., an information for murder was officially filed against Medina, along with Antonio
Olivar y Flores and Alexander Enriquez y Raginio, in the Caloocan branch of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, marked as Criminal Case No. C-1197. Following a court order,
they were promptly incarcerated. Medina and his co-accused were arraigned and began
their trial, which is still ongoing.
ISSUE
Whether the detention of Arthur Medina y Yumul for over 75 hours during holidays
constituted arbitrary detention.
RULING
The court ruled in favor of Marcelo F. Orozco, Jr., dismissing Arthur Medina's claims. It
justified Medina's 75-hour detention during holidays, citing the fiscal's challenges in
filing the case during non-working days. The court affirmed a preliminary investigation
conducted at Medina's request before trial. It clarified that the absence of preliminary
investigation concerns the regularity, not the jurisdiction, of proceedings. Delays in trial
were attributed to Medina's motions, ensuring his right to a speedy trial was not
violated. The court asserted that even if Medina's initial detention was arbitrary, his
habeas corpus petition was untimely, given his subsequent valid murder charge.
For the reasons given, the petition herein to set petitioner Arthur Medina y Yumul at
liberty is hereby denied. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

PRINCIPLE
The court's ruling is relevant to Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as it addresses
the duration of detention without trial. Article 125 stipulates that an accused person
must be released if not brought to trial within 15 days from the time of their detention,
except in cases where a longer period is authorized by the Supreme Court.

CASE 18: VILLAVICENCIO vs LUKBAN

Facts:
In the case of Villavicencio v. Lukban, the court ruled in favor of 170 women who were
forcibly deported from Manila to Davao without their consent. The case involved Justo
Lukban, the mayor of Manila, Philippines, who ordered the forced relocation of women
from houses of prostitution in Gardenia Street, Sampaloc, to Davao. The women were
taken against their will and without any legal authority. The lower court had previously
issued a writ of habeas corpus, ordering Lukban to present the women before the
court, but he failed to comply with the court's order.
Issue:
The main issue in this case is whether Mayor Lukban's actions in forcibly relocating
women from houses of prostitution were justified
Ruling
The court ruled against Mayor Lukban, stating that his actions were not authorized by
law, violating the women's rights. While recognizing the need to protect public health
and morality, the court deemed Lukban's actions excessive. Emphasizing the
importance of the privilege of domicile protected by constitutions, the court highlighted
the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy for unlawful restraint. The court clarified that
habeas corpus petitions can be submitted on behalf of someone unable to sign and
should be presented to the nearest judge of the Court of First Instance. The court held
that the forced deportation of women deprived them of freedom and constituted a
restraint of liberty.
Therefore, that instead of the fine of one hundred pesos (P100), there should be
imposed upon the respondent Justo Lukban a fine of five hundred pesos (P500), and all
the costs should be charged against him.

PRINCIPLE
The court's ruling underscores the significance of the writ of habeas corpus in
protecting individual freedoms, challenging unlawful restraints, and ensuring compliance
with court orders related to personal liberty.
Case 19: US vs PONTE
FACTS:
The case of U.S. v. Ponte involves the crime of malversation of public funds. Rufino Ponte,
Pedro Pedraza, Juan Alamida, Ignacio Narvades, Agapito Cada, Alejandro Metram, and
Esteban Verata were charged with this crime. The crime is defined in Act No. 1740. Ponte, as
the municipal treasurer, is accused of misappropriating public funds and failing to render an
account of it. The other defendants, who were municipal policemen, are accused of directly
aiding Ponte in the malversation by taking the safe containing the funds from the municipal
treasury and carrying it to another location.
 Rufino Ponte, Pedro Pedraza, Juan Alamida, Ignacio Narvades, Agapito Cada,
Alejandro Metram, and Esteban Verata were charged with the crime of malversation of
public funds.
 Rufino Ponte was the municipal treasurer of Calabanga and had in his possession a
sum of P3,795.93 and a safe valued at P50.
 Pedro Pedraza was the janitor or porter of the municipal treasury. Juan Alamida, Ignacio
Narvades, Agapito Cada, Alejandro Metram, and Esteban Verata were municipal
policemen who had the guardianship and custody of the municipal treasury.
 It was alleged that Rufino Ponte misappropriated the funds and refused to render an
account, and the other defendants directly aided him in this malversation by taking the
safe and the money from the municipal treasury and carrying it to another location.
 Defendants Juan Alamida, Ignacio Narvades, Agapito Cada, Alejandro Metram, and
Esteban Verata filed a demurrer. They argue that they should not be charged with
malversation as accomplices because Act No. 1740 only punishes the principals, who
are the public officials responsible for misappropriating the funds. They contend that
their actions constituted a different crime, such as robbery, rather than malversation.
 The trial court sustained the demurrer. The court stated that the accused policemen did
not have the funds in their charge by reason of their office. Therefore, they could not
commit the crime of malversation as defined in Act No. 1740. The court dismissed the
case against them and ordered the provincial fiscal to investigate the facts and file
charges against them for robbery or another offense against property.
ISSUE:
WON the defendants who directly aided Rufino Ponte in the malversation of public funds can be
considered as principals in the crime, even if they are not public officials?
HELD/RULING: YES. The Supreme Court disagreed with the trial court's ruling. The court ruled
that the defendants who directly aided Rufino Ponte in the malversation of public funds can be
considered as principals in the crime, even if they are not public officials. The court based its
decision on Act No. 1740, which defines and penalizes the crime of malversation of public
funds. The court held that those who take a direct part in the commission of the crime of
malversation by public officials, as defined in Act No. 1740, and those who cooperate in the
commission of the crime by acts without which it could not have been accomplished, are guilty
as principals, even if they themselves are not public officials.
The court rejected the argument that the defendants should be considered as accomplices, as
the information clearly charged them as coprincipals in the commission of the crime. The court
also cited legal commentaries that support the interpretation that those who participate or
intervene as coperpetrators, accomplices, or abettors in the crime of malversation of public
funds should be considered as principals and subject to the penalties prescribed by the law.
Therefore, the court overruled the lower court's decision and held that the defendants can be
held liable as principals in the crime of malversation of public funds.
PRINCIPLE: The crime of malversation as defined in ACT No. 1740, which penalizes not only
the public officials who misappropriate funds but also those who directly aid in the commission
of the crime. The court rejected the argument that the accused policemen should be considered
accomplices and not principals, as they played a direct role in the misappropriation of the funds.

1. MALVERSATION; PRINCIPALS IN CRIME. Those who take a direct part in the commission of the crime of
malversation of public funds by public officials, as defined in Act NO. 1740, and those who cooperate in
the commission of that crime by acts without which it could not have been accomplished, are guilty as
principals although they themselves may not be public officials.
Case #20 Galvante vs. Casimiro

FACTS:

Respondents had confiscated from the petitioner one colt pistol super .38 automatic
with serial no.67973, one short magazine, and nine super .38 live ammunitions on May
14, 2001 at Sitio Cahi-an,Kapatungan, Trento, Agusan del Sur, private respondents
confiscated, which are covered by expired memorandum receipt. The Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor charged him with Illegal Possession of Firearms and ammunitions
in Relation to Commission on Elections (Comelec) Resolution No.3258. Pending
resolution, Petitioner filed administrative case against respondents for Grave
Misconduct, before the Internal Affairs Service (IAS) of DILG and a criminal case for
Arbitrary Detention, Illegal Search and Grave Threats, before the Ombudsman. On June
21, 2001 petitioner filed an Affidavit-Complaint he filed in both cases, petitioner
narrated how, on May 14, 2001, private respondents aimed their long firearms at him,
arbitrarily searched his vehicle and put him in detention. Private Respondents conde
filed counter-affidavit that contradicts the counter-affidavit of private
respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot. Consequently, petitioner filed an
Affidavit of Desistance dated March 25, 2002 with both the IAS and Ombudsman,
absolving private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot, but maintaining
that private respondent Conde alone be prosecuted in both administrative and criminal
cases. IAS decided that private respondents be punished for suspension as they have
been found guilty of misconduct, but they are being just enthusiastic in their duty. The
RTC ruled that the action of the policemen who conducted the warrantless search in
spite of the absence of any circumstances justifying the same intruded into the privacy
of the accused and the security of his property. Unaware of the RTC decision,
Ombudsman Investigation & Prosecution Officer Dennis L. Garcia issued a
resolution that found the petition no probable cause and that the incident stemmed
from a valid warrantless arrest. Petitioner filed motion for reconsideration for the
contradicted decision of the RTC and Ombudsman. It was then denied on the ground
that the latter offered "no new evidence or errors of law which would warrant the
reversal or modification.
In 1955, in the barrio of Rizal, Mabong stab one Cipriano Tabel with a bolo. After
pursuing and attacking
his victim, Mabong faced Verano who told him to drop his bolo, and when he refused,
Verano clubbed
him on the face which caused him to stumble to the ground. Thereupon, Verano
grabbed the bolo of the
accused, tied him with a rope and brought him on a small boat to Lianga where he
delivered him to the
chief of police.
Mabong was charged with murder and pleaded guilty. However, accused filed a motion
to quash and a
petition for habeas corpus alleging as main ground that his detention by the local
authorities became
illegal upon the expiration of the period of eighteen (18) hours without having been
proceeded with in
accordance with law, and that the filing later on of the two criminal complaints against
him by the chief
of police did not have the effect of validating his detention. From the denial of said and
petition, the
accused took the present appeal

ISSUE:

1. Are the respondents liable for violation of Article 129 and 130 of the RPC for
warrantless searching the petitioner’s car?

2. Are the respondent’s liable for arbitrary detention?

1. Are the respondents liable for violation of Article 129 and 130 of the RPC for
warrantless
searching the petitioner’s car?
2. Are the respondent’s liable for arbitrary detention?

HELD: No, respondents are not liable for violation of Article 129 and 130 of the RPC for
warrantless searching the petitioner’s car because the act of searching the car of the
petitioner is not an offense under the RPC. It does not fall under Art. 129 and 130. The
SC ruled that the Court need not resolve the issue of whether or not public respondents
erred in their finding on the validity of the search for that issue is completely
hypothetical under the circumstance.

2. No, the respondents are not liable for arbitrary detention. The SC ruled that to
sustain a criminal charge for arbitrary detention, it must be shown that (a) the offender
is a public officer or employee, (b) the offender detained the complainant, and (c) the
detention is without legal grounds. The second element was not alleged by petitioner in
his Affidavit-Complaint. As pointed out by private respondent Conde in his
Comment and Memorandum, petitioner himself identified in his Affidavit-Complaint that
it was Police Chief Rocacorba who caused his detention. Nowhere in said affidavit did
petitioner allege that private respondents effected his detention, or were in any other
way involved in it. There was, therefore, no factual or legal basis to sustain
the criminal charge for arbitrary detention against private respondents.