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The Korean War 101: Causes, Course, and Conclusion of the ‹ BACK TO SEARCH RESULTS
Conflict

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North Korea attacked South Korea on June 25, 1950, igniting the
Korean War. Cold War assumptions governed the immediate reaction of
US leaders, who instantly concluded that Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin
had ordered the invasion as the first step in his plan for world conquest.
“Communism,” President Harry S. Truman argued later in his memoirs,
“was acting in Korea just as [Adolf] Hitler, [Benito] Mussolini, and the

two South Korean Army officers observing Japanese had acted ten, fifteen, and twenty years earlier.” If North
activities in Communist territory just Korea’s aggression went “unchallenged, the world was certain to be
across the thirty-eighth parallel. this
AUTHORS picture was made just at the outbreak of plunged into another world war.” This 1930s history lesson prevented
the Korean War. Source: the uS Army
James I. Matray Korean War Flickr page at
Truman from recognizing that the origins of this conflict dated to at least
http://tiny.cc/18tfmw. the start of World War II, when Korea was a colony of Japan. Liberation
PUBLISHED
Winter 2012 in August 1945 led to division and a predictable war because the US and

VOLUME
the Soviet Union would not allow the Korean people to decide their own future.
Volume 17:3 (Winter 2012): US, Asia,
and the World: 1914–2012
Before 1941, the US had no vital interests in Korea and was largely
CATEGORY
indifferent to its fate.
Feature Article

ACADEMIC FIELD(S) Before 1941, the US had no vital interests in Korea and was largely in-
American History, International
Relations, Political Science, World different to its fate. But after Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D.
History
Roosevelt and his advisors acknowledged at once the importance of this
COUNTRY strategic peninsula for peace in Asia, advocating a postwar trusteeship
North Korea, Russia, South Korea,
United States
to achieve Korea’s independence. Late in 1943, Roosevelt joined British
Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Chinese Generalissimo Chiang
REGION
Northeast Asia
Kaishek in signing the Cairo Declaration, stating that the Allies “are
determined that in due course Korea shall become free and Prime Minister Winston Churchill,
President Roosevelt, and Stalin at the yalta
Share this:    1 independent.” At the Yalta Conference in early 1945, Stalin endorsed a Conference,
February 1945. Source:
four-power trusteeship in Korea. When Harry S. Truman became
http://tiny.cc/3d7dmw.
president after Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, however, Soviet
expansion in Eastern Europe had begun to alarm US leaders. An atomic attack on Japan, Truman thought, would
preempt Soviet entry into the Pacific War and allow unilateral American occupation of Korea. His gamble failed.
On August 8, Stalin declared war on Japan and sent the Red Army into Korea. Only Stalin’s acceptance of Truman’s
eleventh-hour proposal to divide the peninsula into So- viet and American zones of military occupation at the
thirty-eighth parallel saved Korea from unification under Communist rule.

Deterioration of Soviet-American relations in Europe meant that

neither side was willing to acquiesce in any agreement in Korea that
might strengthen its adversary.
US military occupation of southern Korea began on September 8, 1945.
With very little preparation, Washing- ton redeployed the XXIV Corps
under the command of Lieutenant General John R. Hodge from Okinawa
to Korea. US occupation officials, ignorant of Korea’s history and culture,
quickly had trouble maintaining order because al- most all Koreans
wanted immediate in- dependence. It did not help that they followed the
Kim il-sung (R) with visiting Soviet military Japanese model in establishing an authoritarian US military
officials in Pyongyang, 1947. Source: Korea
Times at http://tinyurl.com/bh64gwn. government. Also, American occupation officials relied on wealthy land-
lords and businessmen who could speak English for advice. Many of
these citizens were former Japanese collaborators and had little interest in ordinary Koreans’ reform demands.
Meanwhile, Soviet military forces in northern Korea, after initial acts of rape, looting, and petty crime,
implemented policies to win popular support. Working with local people’s committees and indigenous
Communists, Soviet officials enacted sweeping political, social, and economic changes. They also expropriated and
punished landlords and collaborators, who fled southward and added to rising distress in the US zone.
Simultaneously, the Soviets ignored US requests to coordinate occupation policies and allow free traffic across the
parallel.

Deterioration of Soviet-American relations in Europe meant that

neither side was willing to acquiesce in any agreement in Korea that
might strengthen its adversary. This became clear when the US and
the Soviet Union tried to implement a revived trusteeship plan after
the Moscow Conference in December 1945. Eighteen months of
intermittent bilateral negotiations in Korea failed to reach
agreement on a representative group of Koreans to form a
provisional government, primarily because Moscow refused to
consult with anti-Communist politicians opposed to trustee- ship. South Korea’s President Syngman Rhee (R),
general Douglas MacArthur (C), and Lieutenant
Meanwhile, political instability and economic deterioration in general John R. Hodge (L) attending ceremonies
on August 15, 1948, to mark the founding of the
southern Korea persisted, causing Hodge to urge withdrawal.
Republic of Korea. Source: Korea Times.
Postwar US demobilization that brought steady reductions in
defense spending fueled pressure for disengagement. In September 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) added
weight to the withdrawal argument when they advised that Korea held no strategic significance. With Communist
power growing in China, however, the Truman administration was unwilling to abandon southern Korea
precipitously, fearing domestic criticism from Republicans and damage to US credibility abroad.

Seeking an answer to its dilemma, the US referred the Korean dispute to the United Nations, which passed a
resolution late in 1947 calling for internationally supervised elections for a government to rule a united Korea.
Truman and his advisors knew the Soviets would refuse to cooper- ate. Discarding all hope for early reunification,
US policy by then had shifted to creating a separate South Korea, able to defend itself. Bowing to US pressure, the
United Nations supervised and certified as valid obviously undemocratic elections in the south alone in May 1948,
which resulted in formation of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in August. The Soviet Union responded in kind,
sponsoring the creation of the Democratic People’s Re- public of Korea (DPRK) in September. There now were two
Koreas, with President Syngman Rhee installing a repressive, dictatorial, and anti-Communist regime in the south,
while wartime guerrilla leader Kim Il Sung imposed the totalitarian Stalinist model for political, economic, and
social development on the north. A UN resolution then called for Soviet-American withdrawal. In December 1948,
the Soviet Union, in response to the DPRK’s request, removed its forces from North Korea.

South Korea’s new government immediately faced violent opposition, climaxing in October 1948 with the Yosu-
Sunchon Rebellion. Despite plans to leave the south by the end of 1948, Truman delayed military withdrawal until
June 29, 1949. By then, he had approved National Security Council (NSC) Paper 8/2, undertaking a commitment to
train, equip, and supply an ROK security force capable of maintaining internal order and deterring a DPRK attack.
In spring 1949, US military advisors supervised a dramatic improvement in ROK army fighting abilities. They were
so successful that militant South Korean officers began to initiate assaults northward across the thirty-eighth
parallel that summer. These attacks ignited major border clashes with North Korean forces. A kind of war was
already underway on the peninsula when the conventional phase of Korea’s conflict began on June 25, 1950. Fears
that Rhee might initiate an offensive to achieve reunification explain why the Truman administration limited ROK
military capabilities, withholding tanks, heavy artillery, and warplanes.

Pursuing qualified containment in Korea, Truman asked Congress for

three-year funding of economic aid to the ROK in June 1949. To build
sup- port for its approval, on January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean
G. Ache- son’s speech to the National Press Club depicted an optimistic
future for South Korea. Six months later, critics charged that his
exclusion of the ROK from the US “defensive perimeter” gave the
Communists a “green light” to launch an invasion. However, Soviet
documents have established that Acheson’s words had almost no impact
Kim il Sung in China with Mao, early 1950s.
Source: Screen capture from a North on Communist invasion planning. Moreover, by June 1950, the US policy
Korean video, “Kim ilsung de-wons man-
of containment in Korea through economic means appeared to be
manse,” on youtube at
http://tiny.cc/pe9dmw. experiencing marked success. The ROK had acted vigorously to control
spiraling inflation, and Rhee’s opponents won legislative control in May
elections. As important, the ROK army virtually eliminated guerrilla activities, threatening internal order in South
Korea, causing the Truman administration to propose a sizeable military aid increase. Now optimistic about the
ROK’s prospects for survival, Washington wanted to deter a conventional attack from the north.

Stalin worried about South Korea’s threat to North Korea’s survival. Throughout 1949, he consistently refused to
approve Kim Il Sung’s persistent requests to authorize an attack on the ROK. Communist victory in China in fall
1949 pressured Stalin to show his support for a similar Korean outcome. In January 1950, he and Kim discussed
plans for an invasion in Moscow, but the Soviet dictator was not ready to give final consent. How- ever, he did
authorize a major expansion of the DPRK’s military capabilities. At an April meeting, Kim Il Sung persuaded Stalin
that a military victory would be quick and easy because of southern guerilla support and an anticipated popular
uprising against Rhee’s regime. Still fearing US military intervention, Stalin informed Kim that he could invade only
if Mao Zedong approved. During May, Kim Il Sung went to Beijing to gain the consent of the People’s Republic of
China (PRC). Significantly, Mao also voiced concern that the Americans would defend the ROK but gave his
reluctant approval as well. Kim Il Sung’s patrons had joined in approving his reckless decision for war.

On the morning of June 25, 1950, the Korean People’s Army (KPA) launched
its military offensive to conquer South Korea. Rather than immediately
committing ground troops, Truman’s first action was to approve referral of the
matter to the UN Security Council because he hoped the ROK military could
defend itself with primarily indirect US assistance. The UN Security Council’s
first resolution called on North Korea to accept a cease- fire and withdraw, but
the KPA continued its advance. On June 27, a second resolution requested
that member nations provide support for the ROK’s defense. Two days later,
Truman, still optimistic that a total commitment was avoidable, agreed in a
press conference with a newsman’s description of the conflict as a “police
action.” His actions reflected an existing policy that sought to block
President Harry S. truman getting
Communist expansion in Asia without using US military power, thereby ready to address the nation on the
Korean situation from the White
avoiding increases in defense spending. But early on June 30, he reluctantly
House on July 19, 1950. Source: the
sent US ground troops to Korea after General Douglas MacArthur, US truman Library at
http://tiny.cc/ifqfmw. An audio file of
Occupation commander in Japan, advised that failure to do so meant certain his address to the nation is available
Communist destruction of the ROK. at http://tiny.cc/4qrfmw.

Kim Il Sung’s patrons [Stalin and Mao] had joined in approving his
reckless decision for war.
On July 7, 1950, the UN Security Council created the United Nations Command (UNC) and called on Truman to
appoint a UNC commander. The president immediately named MacArthur, who was required to submit periodic
reports to the United Nations on war developments. The ad- ministration blocked formation of a UN committee
that would have direct access to the UNC commander, instead adopting a procedure whereby MacArthur received
instructions from and reported to the JCS. Fifteen members joined the US in defending the ROK, but 90 percent of
forces were South Korean and American with the US providing weapons, equipment, and logistical support.
Despite these American commitments, UNC forces initially suffered a string of defeats. By July 20, the KPA
shattered five US battalions as it advanced one hundred miles south of Seoul, the ROK capital. Soon, UNC forces
finally stopped the KPA at the Pusan Perimeter, a rectangular area in the southeast corner of the peninsula.

On September 11, 1950, Truman had approved NSC-81, a plan to

cross the thirty-eighth parallel and forcibly reunify Korea

Despite the UNC’s desperate situation during July, MacArthur developed plans for a counteroffensive in
coordination with an amphibious landing behind enemy lines allowing him to “compose and unite” Korea. State
Department officials began to lobby for forcible reunification once the UNC assumed the offensive, arguing that
the US should destroy the KPA and hold free elections for a government to rule a united Korea. The JCS had grave
doubts about the wisdom of landing at the port of Inchon, twenty miles west of Seoul, because of narrow access,
high tides, and sea- walls, but the September 15 operation was a spectacular success. It allowed the US Eighth
Army to break out of the Pusan Perimeter and advance north to unite with the X Corps, liberating Seoul two weeks
later and sending the KPA scurrying back into North Korea. A month earlier, the administration had abandoned its
initial war aim of merely restoring the status quo. On September 11, 1950, Truman had approved NSC-81, a plan to
cross the thirty-eighth parallel and forcibly reunify Korea.

Invading the DPRK was an incredible blunder that transformed a three-month war into one lasting three years. US
leaders had realized that extension of hostilities risked Soviet or Chinese entry, and therefore, NSC- 81 included
the precaution that only Korean units would move into the most northern provinces. On October 2, PRC Foreign
Minister Zhou Enlai warned the Indian ambassador that China would intervene in Korea if US forces crossed the
parallel, but US officials thought he was bluffing. The UNC offensive began on October 7, after UN passage of a
resolution authorizing MacArthur to “ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea.” At a meeting at Wake
Island on October 15, MacArthur assured Truman that China would not enter the war, but Mao already had
decided to intervene after concluding that Beijing could not tolerate US challenges to its regional credibility. He
also wanted to repay the DPRK for sending thou- sands of soldiers to fight in the Chinese civil war. On August 5,
Mao instructed his northeastern military district commander to prepare for operations in Korea in the first ten
days of September. China’s dictator then muted those associates opposing intervention.

On October 19, units of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) under

the command of General Peng Dehuai crossed the Yalu River. Five days
later, MacArthur ordered an offensive to China’s border with US forces
in the vanguard. When the JCS questioned this violation of NSC-81,
MacArthur replied that he had discussed this action with Truman on
Wake Island. Having been wrong in doubting Inchon, the JCS remained
silent this time. Nor did MacArthur’s superiors object when he chose to
retain a divided command. Even after the first clash between UNC and
Brigadier general Courtney Whitney (L),
general Douglas MacArthur, Commander CPV troops on October 26, the general remained supremely confident.
in Chief of
uN Forces (C); and Major general edward One week later, the Chinese sharply attacked advancing UNC and ROK
M. Almond (R) observe the shelling of forces. In response, MacArthur ordered air strikes on Yalu bridges
inchon from
the USS Mount McKinley, September 15, without seeking Washing- ton’s approval. Upon learning this, the JCS
1950. Source: the Army Signal Corps
Collection in the US National Archives at prohibited the assaults, pending Truman’s approval. MacArthur then
http://tiny.cc/19pfmw. asked that US pilots receive permission for “hot pursuit” of enemy
aircraft fleeing into Manchuria. He was infuriated upon learning that the
British were advancing a UN proposal to halt the UNC offensive well short of the Yalu to avert war with China,
viewing the measure as appeasement.

On November 24, MacArthur launched his “Home-by-Christmas

Offensive.” The next day, the CPV counterattacked en masse, sending UNC
forces into a chaotic retreat southward and causing the Truman
administration immediately to consider pursuing a Korean cease-fire. In
several public pronouncements, MacArthur blamed setbacks not on himself
but on unwise command limitations. In response, Truman approved a
directive to US officials that State Department approval was required for
any comments about the war. Later that month, MacArthur submitted a
four- step “Plan for Victory” to defeat the Communists—a naval blockade of
China’s coast, authorization to bombard military installations in Manchuria,
general MacArthur and President
deployment of Chiang Kai-shek Nationalist forces in Korea, and launching
truman at Wake island, October, 15,
of an attack on mainland China from Taiwan. The JCS, despite later denials, 1950.
Source: the truman Library at
considered implementing these actions before receiving favorable http://tiny.cc/99ofmw.
battlefield reports.

Early in 1951, Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, new commander of the US Eighth Army, halted the
Communist southern advance. Soon, UNC counterattacks restored battle lines north of the thirty-eighth parallel.
In March, MacArthur, frustrated by Washington’s refusal to escalate the war, issued a demand for immediate
surrender to the Communists that sabotaged a planned cease-fire initiative. Truman reprimanded but did not
recall the general. On April 5, House Republican Minority Leader Joseph W. Martin Jr. read MacArthur’s letter in
Congress, once again criticizing the administration’s efforts to limit the war. Truman later argued that this was the
“last straw.” On April 11, with the unanimous support of top advisors, the president fired MacArthur, justifying his
action as a defense of the constitutional principle of civilian control over the military, but another consideration
may have exerted even greater influence on Truman. The JCS had been monitoring a Communist military buildup
in East Asia and thought a trusted UNC commander should have standing authority to retaliate against Soviet or
Chinese escalation, including the use of nuclear weapons that they had deployed to forward Pacific bases. Truman
and his advisors, as well as US allies, distrusted MacArthur, fearing that he might provoke an incident to widen the
war.

MacArthur’s recall ignited a firestorm of public criticism against both Truman and the war. The general returned to
tickertape parades and, on April 19, 1951, he delivered a televised address before a joint session of Congress,
defending his actions and making this now-famous assertion: “In war there is no substitute for victory.” During
Senate joint committee hearings on his firing in May, MacArthur denied that he was guilty of in- subordination.
General Omar N. Bradley, the JCS chair, made the administration’s case, arguing that enacting MacArthur’s
proposals would lead to “the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy.”
Meanwhile, in April, the Communists launched the first of two major offensives in a final effort to force the UNC
off the peninsula. When May ended, the CPV and KPA had suffered huge losses, and a UNC counteroffensive then
restored the front north of the parallel, persuading Beijing and Pyongyang, as was already the case in Washington,
that pursuit of a cease-fire was necessary. The belligerents agreed to open truce negotiations on July 10 at
Kaesong, a neutral site that the Communists deceitfully occupied on the eve of the first session.

North Korea and China created an acrimonious atmosphere with at- tempts at the outset to score propaganda
points, but the UNC raised the first major roadblock with its proposal for a demilitarized zone extending deep into
North Korea. More important, after the talks moved to Panmunjom in October, there was rapid progress in
resolving almost all is- sues, including establishment of a demilitarized zone along the battle lines, truce
enforcement inspection procedures, and a postwar political conference to discuss withdrawal of foreign troops
and reunification. An armistice could have been concluded ten months after talks began had the negotiators not
deadlocked over the disposition of prisoners of war (POWs). Rejecting the UNC proposal for non-forcible
repatriation, the Communists demanded adherence to the Geneva Convention that required return of all POWs.
Beijing and Pyongyang were guilty of hypocrisy regarding this matter because they were subjecting UNC prisoners
to unspeakable mistreatment and indoctrination.

On April 11, with the unanimous support of top advisors, the presi-
dent fired MacArthur.

Truman ordered that the UNC delegation assume an inflexible stand against
returning Communist prisoners to China and North Korea against their will. “We
will not buy an armistice,” he insisted, “by turning over human beings for slaughter
or slavery.” Although Truman unquestionably believed in the moral rightness of his
position, he was not unaware of the propaganda value derived from Communist
prisoners defecting to the “free world.” His advisors, however, withheld evidence
from him that contradicted this assessment. A vast majority of North Korean
POWs were actually South Koreans who either joined voluntarily or were
impressed into the KPA. Thousands of Chinese POWs were Nationalist soldiers
trapped in China at the end of the civil war, who now had the chance to escape to
the news that truman fired
Taiwan. Chinese Nationalist guards at UNC POW camps used terrorist “re-
general MacArthur hits the
streets. Source: the website of education” tactics to compel prisoners to refuse repatriation; resisters risked
the Authentic History Center:
Primary Sources from American beatings or death, and repatriates were even tattooed with anti- Communist
Popular Culture at slogans.
http://tiny.cc/7mufmw.

In November 1952, angry Americans elected Dwight D. Eisenhower president, in

large part because they expected him to end what had be- come the very unpopular “Mr. Truman’s War.” Fulfilling a
campaign pledge, the former general visited Korea early in December, concluding that further ground attacks
would be futile. Simultaneously, the UN General Assembly called for a neutral commission to resolve the dispute
over POW repatriation. Instead of embracing the plan, Eisenhower, after taking office in January 1953, seriously
considered threatening a nuclear attack on China to force a settlement. Signaling his new resolve, Eisenhower
announced on February 2 that he was ordering removal of the US Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Strait, implying
endorsement for a Nationalist assault on the mainland. What influenced China more was the devastating impact of
the war. By summer 1952, the PRC faced huge domestic economic problems and likely decided to make peace once
Truman left office. Major food shortages and physical devastation persuaded Pyongyang to favor an armistice even
earlier.

An armistice ended fighting in Korea on July 27, 1953.

Early in 1953, China and North Korea were prepared to resume the
truce negotiations, but the Communists preferred that the Americans
make the first move. That came on February 22 when the UNC,
repeating a Red Cross proposal, suggested exchanging sick and
wounded prisoners. At this key moment, Stalin died on March 5. Rather
than dissuading the PRC and the DPRK as Stalin had done, his
successors encouraged them to act on their desire for peace. On March
28, the Communist side accepted the UNC proposal. Two days later, the Chinese general, Peng Dehuai, signs
the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement.
Zhou Enlai publicly proposed transfer of prisoners rejecting repatriation Source: http://tiny.cc/hkxfmw.
to a neutral state. On April 20, Operation Little Switch, the exchange of
sick and wounded prisoners, began, and six days later, negotiations resumed at Panmunjom. Sharp disagreement
followed over the final details of the truce agreement. Eisenhower insisted later that the PRC accepted US terms
after Secretary of State John Foster Dulles informed India’s prime minister in May that without progress toward a
truce, the US would terminate the existing limitations on its conduct of the war. No documentary evidence has of
yet surfaced to support his assertion.

Also, by early 1953, both Washington and Beijing clearly wanted an

armistice, having tired of the economic burdens, military losses, political
and military constraints, worries about an expanded war, and pressure
from allies and the world community to end the stalemated conflict. A
steady stream of wartime issues threatened to inflict irrevocable
damage on US relations with its allies in Western Europe and nonaligned

Premier Kim il Sung endorses the July 27, members of the United Nations. Indeed, in May 1953, US bombing of
1953, Korean Armistice Agreement North Korea’s dams and irrigation system ignited an outburst of world
(Courtesy, eastphoto.)
criticism. Later that month and early in June, the CPV staged powerful
attacks against ROK defensive positions. Far from being intimidated,
Beijing thus displayed its continuing resolve, using military means to persuade its adversary to make concessions
on the final terms. Before the belligerents could sign the agreement, Rhee tried to torpedo the impending truce
when he released 27,000 North Korean POWs. Eisenhower bought Rhee’s acceptance of a cease-fire with pledges
of financial aid and a mutual security pact.

An armistice ended fighting in Korea on July 27, 1953. Since then, Koreans have seen the war as the second-
greatest tragedy in their recent history after Japanese colonial rule. Not only did it cause devastation and three
million deaths, it also confirmed the division of a homogeneous society after thirteen centuries of unity, while
permanently separating millions of families. Meanwhile, US wartime spending jump-started Japan’s economy,
which led to its emergence as a global power. Koreans instead had to endure the living tragedy of yearning for
reunification, as diplomatic tension and military clashes along the demilitarized zone continued into the twenty-
first century.

Korea’s war also dramatically reshaped world affairs. In response, US leaders vastly increased defense spending,
strengthened the North Atlantic Treaty Organization militarily, and pressed for rearming West Germany. In Asia,
the conflict saved Chiang’s regime on Taiwan, while making South Korea a long-term client of the US. US relations
with China were poisoned for twenty years, especially after Washington persuaded the United Nations to
condemn the PRC for aggression in Korea. Ironically, the war helped Mao’s regime consolidate its control in China,
while elevating its regional prestige. In response, US leaders, acting on what they saw as Korea’s primary lesson,
relied on military means to meet the challenge, with disastrous results in Việt Nam.

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SUGGESTED RESOURCES

Kaufman, Burton I. The Korean Conflict. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1999.

“Korea: Lessons of the Forgotten War.” YouTube video, 2:20, posted by KRT Productions Inc., 2000. http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=fi31OoQfD7U.

Lee, Steven Hugh. The Korean War. New York: Longman, 2001.

Matray, James I. “Korea’s War at Sixty: A Survey of the Literature.” Cold War History 11, no. 1 (February 2011): 99–129.

US Department of Defense. Korea 1950–1953, accessed July 9, 2012, http://koreanwar.defense.gov/index.html.

JAMES I. MATRAY joined the faculty of California State University, Chico, in 2002 as Department Chair and
Professor of History. Author or editor of seven books, he also has published over fifty articles, book
chapters, and essays on US-Korean relations since World War II. His most recent publications are Northeast
Asia and the Legacy of Harry S. Truman: Japan, China, and the Two Koreas (Kirksville, MO: Truman State
University Press, 2012); “Mixed Message: The Korean Armistice Talks at Kaesong,” in Pacific Historical
Review (2012), and “Needless Quarrel: President George W. Bush Confronts North Korea,” International
Journal of Korean Studies (spring/summer 2013).

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