People vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), 630 SCRA 489, G.R. No.

169004 September 15,

Criminal Procedure; Sandiganbayan; Jurisdiction; What applies in the present case is the
general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the
time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.—Like
in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b) where other offenses and
felonies committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved where
the said provision, contains no exception. Therefore, what applies in the present case is the
general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the
institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The present case
having been instituted on March 25, 2004, the provisions of R.A. 8249 shall govern.

Same; Same; Same; Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
enumerated by the same law; Section 4(b) of the same law provides that other offenses or
felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation
to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. —The above law is clear
as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4 (a), the
following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A.
No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the
Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by,
among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below
may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions
thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial
governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members
of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department
heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine
army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief
superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
and presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. In connection
therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses or felonies committed by
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall
under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Same; Same; Same; The Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or
confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is
either a violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Republic Act No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code.—As to the inapplicability of the Inding case wherein it
was ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as
amended, are included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary
grade and which the Sandiganbayan relied upon in its assailed Resolution, this Court enunciated,
still in the earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante, 597 SCRA 49 (2009), that the
Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the
enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases
where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division).

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

For this Court’s resolution is a petition1 dated September 2, 2005 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court that seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division),
dated July 20, 2005, dismissing Criminal Case No. 27988, entitled People of the Philippines v.
Rolando Plaza for lack of jurisdiction.

The facts follow.

Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, at
the time relevant to this case, with salary grade 25, had been charged in the Sandiganbayan with
violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, or The Auditing Code of the
Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he received on December 19, 1995 in
the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00). The Information reads:
“That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo
City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused ROLANDO PLAZA, a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the offense, in relation to office,
having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount of
THIRTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P33,000.00), Philippine Currency, which he received
by reason of his office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate the same within the period
required by law, with deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully
and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of P33,000.00, Philippine Currency, despite
demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.”

Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss3 dated April 7, 2005 with the
Sandiganbayan, to which the latter issued an Order4 dated April 12, 2005 directing petitioner to
submit its comment. Petitioner filed its Opposition5 to the Motion to Dismiss on April 19, 2005.
Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Resolution6 on July 20, 2005 dismissing the case
for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before the proper court. The dispositive
portion of the said Resolution provides:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing in the proper court.

SO ORDERED.”

Thus, the present petition.

Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal jurisdiction over cases involving public
officials and employees enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, (as amended by
Republic Act [R.A.] Nos. 7975 and 8249), whether or not occupying a position classified under
salary grade 27 and above, who are charged not only for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or
any of the felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, but also for crimes committed in relation to office. Furthermore, petitioner questioned the
Sandiganbayan’s appreciation of this Court’s decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan,7 claiming
that the Inding case did not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the
enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases
where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) of
P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249, which was made applicable to cases
concerning violations of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, equally applies to offenses committed in relation to public office.

In his Comment8 dated November 30, 2005, respondent Plaza argued that, as phrased in Section
4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined
first, while the exceptions to the general rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-
paragraphs of Section 4; hence, the Sandiganbayan was right in ruling that it has original
jurisdiction only over the following cases: (a) where the accused is a public official with salary
grade 27 and higher; (b) in cases where the accused is a public official below grade 27 but his
position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) (a) to (g) of P. D. 1606,
as amended and his offense involves a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section
2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) if the indictment involves offenses or felonies
other than the three aforementioned statutes, the general rule that a public official must occupy a
position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the Sandiganbayan could exercise
jurisdiction over him must apply.

In a nutshell, the core issue raised in the petition is whether or not the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and
charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.

This Court has already resolved the above issue in the affirmative. People v. Sandiganbayan and
Amante9 is a case with uncanny similarities to the present one. In fact, the respondent in the
earlier case, Victoria Amante and herein respondent Plaza were both members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at the time pertinent to this case. The only
difference is that, respondent Amante failed to liquidate the amount of Seventy-One Thousand
Ninety-Five Pesos (P71,095.00) while respondent Plaza failed to liquidate the amount of Thirty-
Three Thousand Pesos (P33,000.00).

In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines, this Court cited the case of Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.10 as a background on the
conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus:
“x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official
conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the concept that public officers and
employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency
and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.11

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10,
1978. P.D. No. 1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.12

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding
amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No.
8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x.”

Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 7975 which took effect on May 16,
1995, which was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. 8249, is the law that should be
applied in the present case, the offense having been allegedly committed on or about December
19, 1995 and the Information having been filed on March 25, 2004. As extensively explained in
the earlier mentioned case,

“The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution
of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.13 The exception contained in
R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan in cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379,
and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present
case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines.

The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense: x x x.”14

Like in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b) where other offenses
and felonies committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved
where the said provision, contains no exception. Therefore, what applies in the present case is the
general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the
institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the offense. The present case
having been instituted on March 25, 2004, the provisions of R.A. 8249 shall govern. P.D. 1606,
as amended by R.A. 8249 states that:

“Sec. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the
time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade “27” and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and

(b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade “27” and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions
of the Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade “27” and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their
office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A.

Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus:

“The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Under Section 4 (a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No.
3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the latter
must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those
that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus enumerated by the same law.
Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; officials of the
diplomatic service occupying the position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force
colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP
officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law
provides that other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned
in subsection (a) in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.”15

Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application of the pertinent provisions of the
law, respondent Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged commission
of an offense in relation to his office, necessarily falls within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

Finally, as to the inapplicability of the Inding16 case wherein it was ruled that the officials
enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, are included within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade and which the
Sandiganbayan relied upon in its assailed Resolution, this Court enunciated, still in the earlier
case of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,17 that the Inding case did not categorically nor
implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a)
(1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation
of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. As
thoroughly discussed:

“x x x In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling
that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public official, this Court concentrated its
disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, where
the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4 (b) where offenses or
felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials’ office. Section 4 (b) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended, provides that:

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in

A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials
enumerated in Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the
Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office.
The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to those that are
committed in relation to the public official or employee’s office. This Court had ruled that as
long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is
alleged to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or
irregular, of his official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had
the accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to
have been indicted for “an offense committed in relation” to his office.18 Thus, in the case of
Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al..,19 where the crime involved was murder, this Court held
that:

The phrase “other offenses or felonies” is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided
it was committed in relation to the accused’s official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b,
what determines the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender
—that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of
Section 4. x x x

Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,20 where the public official was charged with grave
threats, this Court ruled:

x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused,
petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan,
Bulacan when he committed the crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised
Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to kill Legaspi during
a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioner’s
administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected
with the discharge of petitioner’s official functions. This was elaborated upon by public
respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein it held that the “accused was performing his
official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing” and that “accused’s
violent act was precipitated by complainant’s criticism of his administration as the mayor or
chief executive of the municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech. It was his response to
private complainant’s attack to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been
irritated or angered by whatever private complainant might have said during said privilege
speech.” Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed
jurisdiction over the case.

Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against
respondent Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said
offense was committed in relation to her office, making her fall under Section 4 (b) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended.

According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been
to extend the application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan
could assert jurisdiction, then there would have been no need to distinguish between violations of
R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on
the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in
relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction
apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4 (a), it is not disputed that public office is
essential as an element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies
involved in Section 4 (b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in
relation to the public officials or employees’ office. In expounding the meaning of offenses
deemed to have been committed in relation to office, this Court held:

In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of
the term “offense committed in relation to [an accused’s] office” by referring to the principle laid
down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil. 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was
recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montilla v.
Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accused’s office if
“the offense cannot exist without the office” such that “the office [is] a constituent element of the
crime x x x.” In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that
“although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract,” the facts in a
particular case may show that

x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accused’s] respective offices
and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their
official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and they
would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. x x x”21
Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provisions of Section 4 (b) does not mention any
qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with
Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of
legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary
acceptation and signification,22 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or
special legal meaning to those words.23 The intention of the lawmakers—who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers—to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is
always presumed.” (Italics supplied.)24

With the resolution of the present case and the earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan and
Amante,25 the issue as to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has now attained clarity.

WHEREFORE, the Petition dated September 2, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution
of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated July 20, 2005 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,** Bersamin** and Abad, JJ., concur.

Petition granted, resolution nullified and set aside.

Note.—It is basic that the jurisdiction of a court is determined both by the law in force at the
time of the commencement of the action and by the allegations in the Complaint or Information.
(People vs. Court of Appeals (12th Division), 545 SCRA 52 [2008]) People vs. Sandiganbayan
(Third Division), 630 SCRA 489, G.R. No. 169004 September 15, 2010