University of California Press

Chapter Title: Reimagining Globalization: Plausible Futures

Chapter Author(s): James H. Mittelman

Book Title: Globalization

Book Subtitle: Past, Present, Future
Book Editor(s): Manfred B. Steger, Roland Benedikter, Harald Pechlaner, Ingrid Kofler
Published by: University of California Press. (2023)
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/jj.7794627.24

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms

This book is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-

NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). To view a copy of this license,
visit https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/.

University of California Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to Globalization

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Tue, 05 Mar 2024 02:35:23 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 20

Reimagining Globalization
Plausible Futures
James H. Mittelman

abstract
This chapter takes stock of the corpus of knowledge about reimagining
globalization. It also proposes an analytical framework for discerning
­future globalizations. The framework consists of a set of dyadic mark-
ers: globalization and deglobalizaton. Between these rival narratives are
four subnarratives: hyperglobalization, antiglobalization, alterglobaliza-
tion, and reglobalization. Each subnarrative has moments when its appeal
grows and then dips. In order to interrogate these powerful narratives, I
examine historical trends, what explains them, and the extent to which
they are objectified. This is a matter of who gets their story told. Whose
and which knowledge comes into play?
Empirical evidence reveals that the levels of global connectedness lie
somewhere between what the enthusiasts of hyperglobalization claim and
what the proponents of deglobalization seek, amid deep and shallow glo-
balization. The slowdown in the global economy in the 2020s does not
signify a retreat from globalization. The data rather show sustained in-
terconnectedness of nations and dependence on overseas suppliers. The
combined effects of the coronavirus pandemic, supply-chain disturbances,
Brexit, and the Ukraine War have brought both barriers to cross-border
flows and inefficiencies, but not a sizable withdrawal from globalization.
By all indications, the tides of globalization will continue to tack back and
wash forward.

keywords
deglobalization, future studies, globalization, global political economy,
neoliberal capitalism, reglobalization, scenarios

320

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Tue, 05 Mar 2024 02:35:23 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Reimagining Globalization    321

Coarsening political discourse, loss of civility within and among societies, dimin-
ishing confidence in political institutions, and unraveling of the social contract
characterize our fraught times. We are ensconced in a state of acute social malaise,
a pathological condition that began before the coronavirus pandemic. Its symp-
toms are morbidities of globalized capitalism in the twenty-first century. Wanting
is sufficient creative reflection on reimagining a form of globalization that would
serve human needs in a just and equitable manner.1 Thinking anew about tempo-
rality and achieving an ethical future are sorely needed.
Reimagining the future requires exploring origination. A central question is,
where does the past end, the present begin, and the future start? The answer lies
in reckoning with not a dead but a living past. To this point, the novelist William
Faulkner (1951: 92) famously commented, “The past is never dead. It is not even
past.” This relationship may be construed as a dialogue of how the past pushes into
the present. The simultaneity of the current moment and the past as it bears on the
future may kindle the power of imagination.
Toward this end, I want to take stock of the corpus of knowledge about reimag-
ining globalization. I also propose, in a preliminary way, an analytical framework
for discerning future globalizations. Certainly, entering the minefield of debates in
futurology is a hazardous venture. History takes unexpected twists and turns. The
unintended consequences of attempting to activate knowledge as a tool for shap-
ing the future can be dire. This is a matter of who gets their story told. Whose and
which knowledge comes into play? In my use of the term, knowledge is an instru-
ment of power. Extant knowledge about reimagining globalization and converting
possible alternatives into practice is contested, with evidence for enacting them
pointing in different directions.
Since the future of globalization is not foreordained, how can we know where
it is headed? Analysts disagree about ontology, epistemology, and methodology.
Some researchers, most of them in the positivist tradition, feed data into com-
puter models and use the results to try to calculate globalization’s prospects. Other
observers rely on intuition and turn to popular fiction to spark the imagination
and unlock creative impulses. Still others, dialecticians and evolutionary thinkers,
craft scenarios: extrapolations based on historical patterns and trend lines.
I adopt a combination of the second and third approaches, not linear or timeless
interpretations, because, to my mind, the latter options have the greatest potential
for deepening understanding. Scenarists offer plausible narratives, provoking the
imagination, whereas forecasters and model builders claim that their method for
planning the future is a science. In the conventional sense, the “scientific method”
is faith in hard-edge empirical techniques. The problem is that it can be mecha-
nistic: the peril lies in adopting a pseudo-scientific approach, one that employs
a slot-machine methodology, superimposing an overarching template on varied
conditions, making short shrift of the texture of historical and cultural conditions.

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Tue, 05 Mar 2024 02:35:23 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
322    Globalization: Future

In critical usage, the payoff of pursuing scenarios lies in deriving lessons from
the past, informing present-day policymaking, and propelling future responses
to global crises. Keeping with this tradition, I will stake out stories and sce-
narios about globalization. Each one is a permutation of the core concept of
globalization. The coming pages are organized around a set of dyadic mark-
ers, globalization and its counterpoint, deglobalization. They hover at opposite
ends of a spectrum. Between these rival narratives are four subnarratives: hyper-
globalization, antiglobalization, alterglobalization, and reglobalization. This
political and economic repertoire is remarkably capacious and, to varying
degrees, objectified.

MEANINGS

Globalization may be defined as a syndrome of transformative processes that

compress time and space (Mittelman, 2000, 2004, 2011).2 It is a historical trans-
formation, with a profound impact on social and power relations. Accelerated
by new technologies, globalization shrinks horizons and distances. Globalizing
forces slice across national borders and touch down differently in myriad con-
texts. These structures are not entirely external to a given country or region. They
are entwined with the domestic sphere. All locales and sundry institutions must
respond to a constellation of globalizing pressures rooted in capital accumulation
and the dynamics of competition.
From the early 1990s, scholar-activists created a competing narrative:
deglobalization. Two variants of deglobalization may be compared. First, in a
pioneering iteration, an avant-garde book titled Delinking (1990) by Samir Amin,
an Egyptian-French intellectual, laid the groundwork for careful research on
this path in multiple locales. A critic of culturalist understandings of capital-
ism and imperialism, Amin argues that Edward Said’s highly acclaimed book
Orientalism (1979) and postcolonial scholarship that followed in his tracks
lacked sufficient emphasis on the material dimensions of exploitation. Amin’s
lacerating critique of Eurocentrism distinguishes delinking from autarky and
withdrawal from the world industrial, trade, and financial systems. Delinking is
a refusal to subordinate a national development strategy to the imperatives of
globalization. It calls for a nation to steer its own course rather than adopt an
externally prescribed route. In other words, delinking is a strategy for capturing
control of a national economy—an autocentric program for reconstructing them.
The goal at the global level is to work with allies to shape a polycentric system
of power.
Amin and like-minded thinkers such as Walden Bello (2005), a Filipino pro-
fessor and former member of the House of Representatives of the Philippines,
advanced ideas for transforming a political economy with regard for the ­specificity

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Tue, 05 Mar 2024 02:35:23 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Reimagining Globalization    323

of individual countries. In Karl Polanyi’s sense (1957), the aim is to re-embed the
economy and institutions in society rather than to allow the economy to drive
society. In this iteration of deglobalization, the guiding principle is to disengage
from and then selectively redial into the global political economy.
To take one example: China has benefited from globalized capitalism by setting
the conditions of engagement, including placing capital controls on foreign direct
investment and targeting capital movements. Chinese authorities recognize the
potential and limitations of this strategy and recognize the importance of their
large domestic market and the far reaches of the territory. At this stage, China
seeks to gain greater autonomy and manage the flow of imports, especially finan-
cial services.
In another account of deglobalization, populists on the Right have formulated
nationalist economic agendas. Among them, protectionists like India’s prime min-
ister Narenda Modi favor restructuring terms of trade, levying tariffs, and safe-
guarding the domestic economy. These moves resemble similar developments in
the Global North, where diverse economic nationalists would use the national state
as a shield or barrier to constrain globalization. They are mindful that increased
globalization generates winners and losers.
Strikingly, some of those left behind support illiberal, authoritarian regimes
that champion deglobalization, promulgate official narratives, and construct imag-
inary futures. By and large, these groups yearn for a muscular leader who would
restore the putative strong nation and revive its pride. They call for restrictions
on immigration and are hard on minorities on the grounds that they are replac-
ing the dominant majority—in the West, white Christians. Their actions unleash
waves of violence against Muslims, Jews, Asians, the disabled, LBGTQ people, and
others. Many political officials and parents support clamping down on allegedly
misguided school curricula, such as teaching “critical race theory.” All these devel-
opments comport with a bevy of national protectionist measures imposed on glo-
balization. Taken together, this constellation of forces evokes images of Germany
in the 1930s, though there are major differences too, and the historical comparison
should not be overdrawn.
The deglobalization scenario is evolving in full view in the 2020s. Emblematic
of this scenario, the coronavirus led to pandemic lockdowns in Shanghai and other
locales, reducing global transactions. Meanwhile, the 2022 Ukraine War gener-
ated a new wave of protectionism. Governments sought to secure commodities for
their citizens, built barriers so as to harness exports, and incentivized businesses
to reshore their factories. Barriers cascaded from country to country and sanc-
tions on Russia further hampered supply chains. China added export restrictions
on fertilizers and food crops (Swanson, 2022), which compounded shortages of
supplies and amplified deglobalization. As indicated below, imaginaries and nar-
ratives are vital components of these developments.

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Tue, 05 Mar 2024 02:35:23 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
324    Globalization: Future

I M AG I NA R I E S A N D NA R R AT I V E S

Important insights derive from the idea that political communities are built by
imagining solidarities. Historically, they coincided with the emergence of print
capitalism. Benedict Anderson (1999) posited that this phenomenon is linked to
the rise of the nation-state. He tracked this trend and enriched understanding of
how the world is structured.
Subsequently, globalization researchers (e.g., Steger, 2008) have drawn on
Anderson’s and Charles Taylor’s (2003) influential works on imaginaries and
offered poignant criticism of what they call methodological nationalism, that is,
primarily focusing on the state system to the neglect of other levels of inquiry.
Closely related, methodological territorialism is a tendency to reify territorial
boundaries and national sovereignty without sufficiently taking account of the
ways in which globalizing forces penetrate national jurisdictions. For instance,
the Chinese authorities sought to shut down reports from outside sources
about the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre. In this episode, the state cracked
down on protests over economic and political reforms but could not block a siz-
able amount of information from entering the country. Similarly, the government
has limited ability to stop cultural influences brought by education, tourism,
music, and art. The point is that it is misguided to dwell on the state system with-
out grasping the surge in cross-border flows interlinking political, economic, and
cultural communities. At a level either ignored or downplayed by methodologi-
cal nationalists, global imaginaries merit more attention than they have received.
National and global imaginaries alike are representations. They are ways of per-
ceiving identities and bonds.
It cannot be stressed too strongly that the field of international studies is based
on the premise of territoriality. Yet, with the development of innovative technolo-
gies, especially in communications and transportation, the advent of “network
society” (Castells, 1996) and the emergence of a “nonterritorial region” (Ruggie,
1993), there is a shift toward a deterritorialized world. On these grounds, Jan Aart
Scholte challenged “methodological territorialism”—the ingrained practice of
­formulating questions, gathering data, and arriving at conclusions, all through the
prism of a territorial framework (1996; 1999: 17; 2005). Without swinging to
the opposite extreme of adopting a “globalist methodology” by totally reject-
ing territoriality, Scholte calls for a “full-scale methodological reorientation,”
and ­concludes: “that globalisation warrants a paradigm shift would seem to be
­incontrovertible” (1999: 21–22).
To probe further into prevalent ways of thinking and talking about how glo-
balization is unfolding, I will illuminate powerful narratives. By narrative power, I
mean the ability to spin stories about historical events and what accounts for them.
Narrators impart understanding of events and enable judgments.

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Tue, 05 Mar 2024 02:35:23 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Reimagining Globalization    325

In this vein, Robert Shiller, a Nobel Prize-winning economist, holds that

narratives are “major vectors of rapid change in culture, in zeitgeist, and in eco-
nomic behavior” (2019). He argues that narratives need to be incorporated into
economic theory, for the ideas they convey can spread by contagion and trans-
form economic behavior. But this begs the questions: which narratives should be
selected, and why?
There are different versions of each one. Multifaceted, they comprise
­subnarratives and are fluid rather than fixed. Established narratives encompass
clusters of stories, which may need to be elaborated. In other words, narratives
are divided and include several ingredients and branches. Moreover, narratives are
contested—for instance, social movements, philanthropies, and corporations
are forging their own social justice narratives—and beget dueling subnarratives.

F OU R K EY SU B NA R R AT I V E S
A N D G L O BA L I N D IC AT O R S

Emblematic of ways that globalization is being reimagined, I will interrogate the

four key subnarratives mentioned in the introduction to this chapter: hyperglo-
balization, antiglobalization, alterglobalization, and reglobalization. The discussion
then turns to global indicators and an illustration of how these stories are deployed
in global crises.

The Subnarratives
Contending subnarratives have emerged because the tides of globalization tack
back and wash forward. It is impossible to trace a neat progression. Yet analysts
can toggle between advances and retreats, tensions and challenges that spawn the
four subnarratives.
The first one is widely deployed by governance agencies as well as by schol-
ars and policy intellectuals. The subnarrative of hyperglobalization depicts accel-
eration in cross-border flows of capital, technology, population, and cultural
­products. Its purveyors call attention to the degree to which the speed and reach
of contemporary economic globalization differ significantly from the pace and
expanse of earlier phases of globalization. Hyperglobalists examine the costs
and benefits of trade integration, the consolidation of markets, and heightening
global competition, as well as their political implications, including the reduction
of national sovereignty and what deterritorialization means for national democ-
racy. The hyperglobaliztion subnarrative has its enthusiasts (Ohmae, 1990), critics
(Sassen, 1996), and revisionist commentators (Rodrik, 1997).
Hyperglobalist rhetoric is powerful because it has influenced many policymak-
ers and civil society groups. But it is a trope inasmuch as the trend that this world-
view purports to delineate cannot be proven to exist. In fact, it exaggerates certain

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Tue, 05 Mar 2024 02:35:23 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
326    Globalization: Future

tendencies without giving due weight to countertendencies such as heightened

divergence (e.g., in income inequality and cultural differentiation), disintegrative
processes, and resistance to global convergence.
Partly owing to the extent to which the scope and scale of neoliberal globaliza-
tion have disrupted ways of life and recalibrated who wins and loses in the global
political economy, pronounced backlashes have emerged. They materialized at the
World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial meeting in Seattle in 1999, followed
by protests at the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank in Washington, DC, in 2002, and several other global summits.
In the second subnarrative, these demonstrations are described as manifesta-
tions of antiglobalization, a trope that has become commonplace in the media
and popular writing. By slotting the wide range of stances on globalization in two
boxes—for and against—it obscures an assortment of complaints about globaliz-
ing trends that emanate from different locales and diverse positions on the political
continuum. What becomes obscure are the varied attempts to engage, not evade,
globalization. In fact, most of this resistance is against aspects of ­neoliberalism and
for globalization such that it should serve social ends. In this sense, the resistance
is neither antiglobalization nor proglobalization. Some social movement activists
on the Left and proponents of free trade, such as Milton Friedman, advocate abol-
ishing the international financial institutions themselves; others like billionaire
financier George Soros want to change the direction of policy; and still o ­ thers
seek to transform the underside of globalization—capitalism—specifically, the
relationship between market power and political authority.
Few objectors have donned an antiglobalization stance. They are not opposed
to globalization per se. Rather, they advocate some aspects of globalization—more
information, improved technology, productivity gains, and a cornucopia of con-
sumer goods—but not others, namely, its baneful effects, including an increase in
precarious employment and outsourcing jobs. The target of legions of protestors is
the coupling of globalization and a neoliberal policy framework.
The prevalent imagery of antiglobalization is problematic too, because it defines
a phenomenon solely as a negation. It impoverishes social criticism by mystify-
ing what may be learned from robust debates over globalization without regard
for what may be positive and affirmative about it. Pigeonholing social criticism as
antiglobalization hampers the creation of alternatives. At the venues where public
protests have taken place, mass movements have raised serious issues about the
drawbacks to neoliberal globalization and opportunities for altering it.
Third, many critics are etching possibilities for a just, inclusive, participatory,
and democratic globalization. It is upon these goals that the alterglobalization
movement—for which a common metonym is global social justice movement—is
based. Although the exact origins of the term alterglobalization are uncertain, its
usage in French (altermondialisation) dates from the late twentieth century and
has circulated throughout Europe and elsewhere. This social movement is for
alterglobalization when it means an attempt to reshape globalizing forces so as to

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Tue, 05 Mar 2024 02:35:23 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Reimagining Globalization    327

mitigate their harms and distribute their opportunities in a just manner. Activ-
ists serving as propellants of alterglobalization have forged points of articulation.
At the World Social Forum (WSF), in particular, networks built on earlier ini-
tiatives come together to share ideas about establishing alternatives to neoliberal
globalization (Falk, 1999; Gills, 2008; Mittelman, 2004; Patomäki & Teivainen,
2004; Teivainen, 2004). While the WSF has opened political space for civil society,
it remains small-scale and without appreciable forward momentum (Patomäki,
2022: 103–4).
The fourth permutation of the globalization narrative is known as reglobaliza-
tion. An umbrella term, it is a reaction to nationalist populism. For some of its
advocates, it is a pragmatic policy response starting at the national level and scaling
up. For other reformists, reglobalization is a call for higher degrees of liberal mul-
tilateral cooperation through strengthening international institutions (e.g., Payne,
2017; Bishop & Payne, 2021; Benedikter, Gruber, & Kofler, 2022). For still others, it
is a normative aspiration for transitioning to “post-neoliberal” globalization.
Reglobalization subsumes specific themes and steps. Emphases range from
the economy and environment (Habicher, 2020) to technology and cultural flows
(Jamet, 2020; Steger, 2021). The reglobalization subnarrative stresses ways that the
pandemic has both slowed certain transnational flows such as intercontinental
trade and spurred innovation, as with the globalization of services and digitaliza-
tion. The difficulty is that the term reglobalization is imprecise. This catchword
covers diverse developments and parks them under a single rubric. For reglobal-
ization to enter the common lexicon and become a galvanizing narrative, its pro-
moters need to sharpen this discourse and add nuance. To be credible and gain a
following, this supposedly late- or post-COVID-19 trend must track more than
a brief time span.

Evidence
In a 2020 paper, Daniel Esser and I sought to pin down which narrative and sub-
narratives are objectified (Esser & Mittelman, 2020). We juxtaposed two influen-
tial global indices, the KOF Globalization Index issued by the Swiss Economic
Institute (2018a) and the DHL Global Connectedness Index (Altman, Ghemawat,
& Bastian, 2018), compiled by New York University and the Barcelona-based IESE
business schools, respectively. In 2022, I revisited the KOF and DHL indices, which
incorporate data through 2019.
For the sake of brevity, I will focus on these two indices only, because from
one study to another, the data and conclusions drawn from indicators are highly
variable. Much depends on the indicator providers. Who are they? How are they
trained? To whom are they accountable? How and by whom are they paid? But I
digress.3 Returning to the KOF Index (KOF Swiss Economic Index, 2018b), world-
wide globalization increased between 1990 and 2007, but, as one would expect,
slowed during the 2008 financial crisis and the recession that followed.4 Despite
a slight uptick in 2016, aggregate economic globalization, including financial

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Tue, 05 Mar 2024 02:35:23 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
328    Globalization: Future

g­ lobalization, flat-lined between 2018 and 2019, and cross-border trade ebbed.
Financial globalization then mounted, and trade integration similarly advanced;
yet population flows, particularly in the tourism sector, declined.5
The DHL Index demonstrates that, for the world as a whole, the extent of global
connectedness crested at a record high in 2017. The DHL finds that a large por-
tion of flows of trade, capital, information, and people is domestic rather than
cross-border. Empirical evidence reveals that the levels of global connectedness
lie somewhere between what the enthusiasts of hyperglobalization claim and what
the proponents of deglobalization seek, amid deep and shallow globalization.
The 2022 indices do not deviate substantially from prior findings. Overall
global connectedness again varies considerably by both country and region, not
only for those on the low end of tallies of globalization indicators but also for those
at the top.
The downturn in the global economy and disruptions in supply chains due to the
coronavirus pandemic do not signify a retreat from globalization. These patterns
rather show sustained interconnectedness of nations and dependence on overseas
suppliers. The combined effects of the pandemic, supply-chain disturbances, and
Brexit have brought both blockages and inefficiencies. The contraction in global
trade and relocalizing production have boosted costs. Rethinking these issues and
taking into account the magnitude of the adverse consequences of adjustments
in global economic interdependence may give impetus to instituting reforms, the
scope of which is unforeseeable. Yet globalization continues apace; the rate varies
by type and dimension. Central to these developments will be the elaboration of
narratives, some of them grounded in false, others in accurate, information.
As heated controversies over disinformation illustrate, numbers—global indi-
cators, censuses, and vote counting—are decidedly politicized rather than scien-
tifically generated. Numerical indicators are statistical representations that can be
gamed by their authors and promoters. If they eclipse Indigenous ways of pro-
ducing knowledge in the Global South, datasets can become a form of epistemic
displacement and accretion.
That said, can a principal globalization narrative and subnarrative be identi-
fied? With the worldwide spread of neoliberalism over the last half-century, each
subnarrative has moments when its appeal grows and then dips, with uneven
evidence to sustain the stories they tell. They can be simultaneously deployed in
actual instances.

The Present
For illustrative purposes, let’s take the case of momentous upheavals in the 2020s.
Discourse brokers marshaled official and unofficial subnarratives, including many
falsehoods, during this period. Noting the coronavirus’s uncertain long-term
impact, Laurence Boone, the chief economist at the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, observed that the pandemic and the 2022 Russian

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Tue, 05 Mar 2024 02:35:23 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Reimagining Globalization    329

invasion of Ukraine unleashed “deglobalization forces” as a result of the imposi-

tion of new Western sanctions, the slowdown in growth and financial flows, delays
in delivering supplies of commodities, and the deterioration of the environment.
Blocking the Russian central bank’s transactions from SWIFT, a network for
financial transactions and payments between banks globally, is a major element in
delinking. In response to this measure, Russia took steps to wall off from pressures
and tried to make itself more self-sufficient.
At the same time, some policymakers and narrators are calling for more, not
less, global integration. Ngozi Okonjo-Iwaeala, director general of the WTO,
advocated reglobalization. In her words: “Deeper, more diversified international
markets remain our best bet for supply resilience” (quoted in Wong & Swanson,
2022). Adding to this contention over subnarratives, Harvard political economist
Dani Rodrik remarked: “Your interdependence can be weaponized against you.”
Elaborating, he asserted that the Ukraine War has “probably put a nail in the coffin
of hyperglobalization” (quoted in Wong & Swanson, 2022).6

T H E L O N G U E DU R É E

In sum: to order raging debates over the future of globalization and facilitate
­diagnosing strivings for a just order, this chapter offers a conceptual framework
for reimagining globalization. The conceptualization consists of a matrix of two
narratives, globalization and deglobalization, and four subnarratives: hyperglobal-
ization, antiglobalization, alterglobalization, and reglobalization.
The imagined beyond conspires against the pragmatic, the here and now. It
requires stretching time, seeing what is not entirely manifest, grasping what is
latent. The challenge is to create a shared vision of an ethically right and politically
wise world order. It requires gazing beyond the urgency of the present.
History is embarked in a liminal phase, entering an interim—a transition from
a near term—to the more distant future. That is to say, the longue durée is not
merely one undifferentiated, indeterminate period.
The path to the far term presents concrete challenges. Contingent conditions
must be assessed and addressed. They include:
1. COVID-19 is a perfect global transgressor in the sense that it prompted a
reassertion of borders and national efforts to check cross-border flows.
2. The coronavirus pandemic boosted innovations in digital communications
technologies that enabled delocalized work across time zones and borders.
3. Shortages in commodities emanating from disruptions in supply chains
exacerbated pressure brought by the Ukraine War. They also augmented
demands for local sourcing and domestic production.
4. The movement of populations caused by military and political conflicts
reveals the increasing importance of empathy, compassion, and toleration

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Tue, 05 Mar 2024 02:35:23 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
330    Globalization: Future

of ­differences—more so because climate change in Central America and

elsewhere continues to spawn migratory flows.
5. The specter of nuclear threat, whether deliberately or fortuitously invoked,
haunts the global future.
Following the near future, when these looming challenges must be faced, the
opportunity for actualizing far-reaching scenarios will be on the horizon. At that
time, reimagining globalization could spur efforts to establish counterhegemony:
a historical bloc that confronts the dominant form of globalization in what Anto-
nio Gramsci (1971) called a “war of position.” Strategically, it is to be waged by an
avant-garde movement that relies on persuasion through education, the media,
music, art, and writing devoted to opposing and eventually ousting the hegemon.
It presupposes participation in this political project by subaltern classes, which
endeavor to secure consent.
Organic intellectuals can play an integral role in this struggle by propagating
a common culture, enabling cohesion. This project is particularly important for
organic intellectuals engaged on the battleground of ideas. Those based in the
academy can contribute significantly by bolstering efforts to reimagine globaliza-
tion. A vibrant field of teaching and research, globalization studies is an extension
of the long history of civic education, which is intensely contested in the public
arena. An abundance of initiatives are underway, a lot has been accomplished, and
much more remains to be done.

NOTES
I owe a debt of gratitude to Allegra Hill for stellar research assistance, also to Manfred Steger and Linda
Yarr for comments on a preliminary draft of this chapter.
1. I am drawing on an incisive intervention by Robert W. Cox (1976) and want to acknowledge
Matthew Louis Bishop and Anthony Payne’s (2021) important contribution.
2. This succinct conceptualization is closely linked to the work of proto-globalization theorists
such as the philosopher and media specialist Marshall McLuhan (1964), who coined the expressions
“the media is the message” and “global village.” Pioneering formulations in globalization studies
followed: among them, Giddens (1990); Harvey (1990); Robertson (1992); Sassen (1996); Scholte
(2005), and Steger (2008). In parallel, Steger and James (2017) trace the genealogy of globalization
research.
3. I explore these issues elsewhere (Mittelman, 2022).
4. Gygli et al. (2019).
5. See Gygil et al. (2019). The KOF Swiss Economic Institute (2018c) defines political globalization
at two levels. De jure dimensions include the number of international, intergovernmental organiza-
tions of which a country is a member, the number of international treaties ratified since 1945, and
the number of treaty partners. The de facto dimensions are constituted by the number of embassies, the
personnel assigned to peacekeeping missions, and internationally oriented nongovernmental organi-
zations operating in a country.
6. For more on the weight of the present on the past and implications for the future, see Tabb
(2021).

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Tue, 05 Mar 2024 02:35:23 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 Reimagining Globalization    331

REFERENCES
Altman, S. A., P. Ghemawat, & P. Bastian (2018). “DHL Global Connectedness Index 2018: The State of
Globalization in a Fragile World.” Deutsche Post DHL Group. www.logistics.dhl/content/dam/dhl
/global/core/documents/pdf/glo-core-gci-2018-full-study.pdf.
Amin, S. (1990). Delinking: Towards a Polycentric World. London: Zed Books.
Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.
London: Verso.
Bello, W. (2005). Deglobalization: Ideas for a New World Economy. London: Zed Books. http://dx.doi.org
/10.5040/9781350219519.
Benedikter, R., M. Gruber, & I. Kofler (2022). Re-Globalization: New Frontiers of Political, Economic,
and Social Globalization. London: Routledge.
Bishop, M. L., & A. Payne (2021). “The Political Economies of Different Globalizations: Theorizing Re-
globalization.” Globalizations, 18 (1): 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2020.1779963.
Castells, M. (1996). The Rise of Network Society. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers. http://dx.doi.org
/10.1002/9781444319514.
Cox, R. W. (1976). “On Thinking about World Order.” World Politics 28 (2): 175–96. https://doi.org/10.2307
/2009889.
Esser, D. E., & J. H. Mittelman (2020). “Globalization Narratives and Industrial Policies.” In A. Oqubay,
C. Cramer, H. Chang, & R. Kozul-Wright, eds., Oxford Handbook of Industrial Policy, 284–310.
Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198862420.013.11.
Falk, R. A. (1999). Predatory Globalization: A Critique. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Faulkner, W. (1951). Requiem for a Nun. New York: Random House.
Giddens, A. (1990). The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Gills, B., ed. (2008). Globalization and the Global Politics of Justice. London: Routledge. http://dx.doi.org
/10.4324/9781315878508.
Gramsci, A. (1971). Selections from the Prison Notebooks. London: Lawrence and Wishart.
Gygli, S., F. Haelg, N. Potrafke, & J. Sturm (2019). “The KOF Globalisation Index–Revisited.” Review of
International Organizations. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-019-09344-2.
Habicher, D. (2020). “Revise Globalization from a Postgrowth Perspective.” Global-e 13 (40). www.21global
.ucsb.edu/global-e/june-2020/revise-globalization-postgrowth-perspective.
Harvey, D. (1990). The Condition of Postmodernity. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Jamet, R. (2020). “The Promises and Pitfalls of Algorithmic Governmentality.” Global-e 13 (67).
www.21global.ucsb.edu/global-e/october-2020/promises-and-pitfalls-algorithmic-governmentality.
KOF Swiss Economic Institute (2018a). “KOF Globalisation Index.” Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule
Zürich. www.kof.ethz.ch/en/forecasts-and-indicators/indicators/kof-globalisation-index.html.
———.(2018b). “KOF Globalisation Index: Globalisation Lull Continues.” www.kof.ethz.ch/en/news-and
-events/media/press-releases/2018/12/kof-globalisation-index-globalisation-lull-continues.html.
———. (2018c). “KOF Globalisation Index: Method of Calculation.” Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule
Zürich. https://ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/dual/kof-dam/documents/Globalization
/2018/Method_2018_2.pdf.
McLuhan, M. (1964). Understanding Media: An Inventory of Effects. New York: McGraw Hill.
Mittelman, J. H. (2000). The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/9781400823697.
———. (2004). Whither Globalization? The Vortex of Knowledge and Ideology. London: Routledge.
http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203480205.
———. (2011). Contesting Global Order: Development, Global Governance, and Globalization. Abingdon:
Routledge. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203836668.
———. (2022). “The Power of Algorithmic Capitalism.” International Critical Thought 12 (3): 448–69.

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Tue, 05 Mar 2024 02:35:23 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
332    Globalization: Future

Ohmae, K. (1990). The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy. New York:
HarperCollins.
Patomäki, H. (2022). The Three Fields of Global Political Economy. London: Routledge. http://dx.doi.org
/10.4324/9781003166795.
Patomäki, H., & T. Teivainen (2004). A Possible World: Democratic Transformation of Global Institu-
tions. London: Zed Books.
Payne, T. (2017). “‘De-globalisation,’ or ‘Re-globalisation’?” Huffington Post, January 24. https://www
.huffingtonpost.co.uk/anthony-payne/globalisation_b_14338592.html.
Polanyi, K. (1957). The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Times. Boston:
Beacon Press.
Robertson, R. (1992). Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. http://
dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446280447.
Rodrik, D. (1997). Has Globalization Gone Too Far? Washington, DC: Institute for International Eco-
nomics. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/41165897.
Ruggie, J. G. (1993). “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations.”
International Organization 47 (1): 139–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300004732.
Said, E. W. (1979). Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books / Random House.
Sassen, S. (1996). Losing Control? Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization. New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press.
Scholte, J. A. (1996). The Geographies of Collective identities in a Globalizing World. Review of Inter­
national Political Economy, 3 (4): 565–607. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09692299608434374.
———. (1999). “Global Civil Society: Changing the World?” CSGR Working Paper 31 (99).
———. (2005). Globalization: A Critical Introduction, 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. http://
dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-230-21207-7.
Shiller, R. J. (2019). Narrative Economics: How Stories Go Viral & Drive Major Economic Events. Princ-
eton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Steger, M. B. (2008). The Rise of the Global Imaginary: Political Ideologies from the French Revolution
to the Global War on Terror. Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:o
so/9780199286942.001.0001.
———. (2021). “The State of Globality in a (Post)-COVID World.” New Global Studies 15 (2–3): 117–43.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ngs-2021-0003.
Steger, M. B., & P. James, eds. (2017). Globalization: The Career of a Concept. New York: Routledge.
http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315714219.
Swanson, A. (2022). “Food Exports Are Blocked, Ripples Are Felt around Globe.” New York Times,
April 30.
Tabb, W. K. (2021). “The Present in History.” Monthly Review, 73 (6): 30–43. https://doi.org/10.14452/MR
-073-06-2021-10_3.
Taylor, C. (2003). Modern Social Imaginaries. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. http://dx.doi.org
/10.2307/j.ctv11hpgvt.
Teivainen, T. (2002). “The World Social Forum and Global Democratisation: Learning from Porto
Allegre.” Third World Quarterly 23 (4): 621–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/0143659022000005300.
Wong, E., & A. Swanson (2022). “Strands Break in Global War of Commerce.” New York Times, March 23.

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Tue, 05 Mar 2024 02:35:23 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms