BENGZON vs. DRILON

BENGZON vs.
DRILON
G.R. No. 103524/ April 15, 1992
GUTIERREZ
Facts –
Republic Act No, 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions of Justices
of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals who have rendered at least twenty (20)
years service either in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government or in both,
having attained the age of seventy (70) years or who resign by reason of incapacity to
discharge the duties of the office. The retired Justice shall receive during the residue of
his natural life the salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or
resignation. However, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 644 repealing Section
3-A of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595 which authorized the
adjustment of the pension of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions and the officers and enlisted
members of the Armed Forces to the prevailing rates of salaries. Consequently, the
adjustment of the retirement pensions for members of the Armed Forces who number in
the tens of thousands was restored, but that of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals who are only a handful and fairly advanced in years, was not.
Realizing the unfairness of the discrimination against the members of the

Judiciary and the Constitutional Commissions, Congress approved in 1990 a bill for the
reenactment of the repealed provisions of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No.
3595. President Aquino, however vetoed House Bill No. 16297 on July 11, 1990 on the
ground that according to her "it would erode the very foundation of the Government's
collective effort to adhere faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy on standardization
of compensation as articulated in Republic Act No. 6758 known as Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989." She further said that "the Government should not
grant distinct privileges to select group of officials whose retirement benefits under
existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment over those of the vast majority of our
civil service servants."
Issue –
1) Whether or not the subject veto is not an item veto;
2) Whether or not the questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed by
the Constitution.
Ruling –
1st issue:
“The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does
not object." (Section 27(2), Article VI, Constitution)
The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly
different. An item in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable
parts of the bill. It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose. An
examination of the entire sections and the underlined portions of the law which were
vetoed will readily show that portions of the item have been chopped up into vetoed and
unvetoed parts. Less than all of an item has been vetoed. Moreover, the vetoed portions
are not items. They are provisions. From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that
when the President vetoed certain provisions of the 1992 General Appropriations Act, she
was actually vetoing Republic Act No. 1797 which, of course, is beyond her power to
accomplish. The Supreme Court need no lengthy justifications or citations of authorities
to declare that no President may veto the provisions of a law enacted thirty-five (35)
years before his or her term of office. Neither may the President set aside or reverse a
final and executory judgment of this Court through the exercise of the veto power since it
will violate separation of powers.
2nd issue:
Sec. 3, Art. VIII of the Constitution mandates that:
“The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be
reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after
approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.”
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. In the case at bar, the veto
of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating
to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal
autonomy. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in
the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. For as long as these
retired Justices are entitled under laws which continue to be effective, the government
cannot deprive them of their vested right to the payment of their pensions.
Thus, the questioned veto is SET ASIDE as illegal and unconstitutional. The
respondents Drilon, et. al are ordered to automatically and regularly release pursuant to
the grant of fiscal autonomy the funds appropriated for the subject pensions as well as the
other appropriations for the Judiciary.

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BENGZON vs. DRILON

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BENGZON vs.

Realizing the unfairness of the discrimination against the members of the

1) Whether or not the subject veto is not an item veto;

Sec. 3, Art. VIII of the Constitution mandates that:

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