Engineering and The Mind's Eye
Engineering and The Mind's Eye
org/1580
DETAILS
304 pages | 6 x 9 | PAPERBACK
ISBN 978-0-309-04747-0 | DOI 10.17226/1580
CONTRIBUTORS
Daniel Druckman and Robert A. Bjork, Editors; Committee on Techniques for the
Enhancement of Human Performance, National Research Council
BUY THIS BOOK
Visit the National Academies Press at nap.edu and login or register to get:
– Access to free PDF downloads of thousands of publications
– 10% off the price of print publications
– Email or social media notifications of new titles related to your interests
– Special offers and discounts
All downloadable National Academies titles are free to be used for personal and/or non-commercial
academic use. Users may also freely post links to our titles on this website; non-commercial academic
users are encouraged to link to the version on this website rather than distribute a downloaded PDF
to ensure that all users are accessing the latest authoritative version of the work. All other uses require
written permission. (Request Permission)
This PDF is protected by copyright and owned by the National Academy of Sciences; unless otherwise
indicated, the National Academy of Sciences retains copyright to all materials in this PDF with all rights
reserved.
In the Mind's Eye: Enhancing Human Performance
ii
NATIONAL ACADEMY PRESS 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20418
NOTICE: The project that is the subject of this report was approved by the Governing Board of the
National Research Council, whose members are drawn from the councils of the National Academy
of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine. The members of
the committee responsible for the report were chosen for their special competences and with regard
for appropriate balance.
This report has been reviewed by a group other than the authors according to procedures
approved by a Report Review Committee consisting of members of the National Academy of Sci-
ences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of Medicine.
Support for the project that is the subject of this report was provided by the Army Research
Institute.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
In the mind's eye : enhancing human performance / Daniel Druckman and Robert A. Bjork, editors.
p. cm.
“Committee on Techniques for the Enhancement of Human Performance, Commission
on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, National Research Council.”
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-309-04398-0 (cloth); ISBN 0-309-04747-1 (paper)
1. Performance—Psychological aspects. I. Druckman, Daniel, 1939- . II. Bjork, Robert
A. III. National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Techniques for the Enhance-
ment of Human Performance.
BF481.I5 1991
158—dc20
91-23941
CIP
Copyright © 1991 by the National Academy of Sciences
No part of this book may be reproduced by any mechanical, photographic, or electronic proce-
dure, or in the form of a phonographic recording, nor may it be stored in a retrieval system, transmit-
ted, or otherwise copied for public or private use, wihout written permission from the publisher
except for the purpose of official use by the United States government.
Printed in the United States of America
First Printing, September 1991
Second Printing, June 1992
iii
iv
www.national-academies.org
CONTENTS v
Contents
Preface vii
PART I OVERVIEW 1
1 Background 3
The Committee's First Phase 3
The Committee's Second Phase 4
The Report 6
References 11
2 Findings and Conclusions 12
Training 12
Altering Mental States 15
Performing 18
PART II TRAINING 21
3 Optimizing Long-Term Retention and Transfer 23
Long-Term Retention 25
Transfer of Training 37
Conclusions and Implications for Training 47
References 49
4 Modeling Expertise 57
Cognitive Apprenticeship 59
How Experts Excel 63
Eliciting Knowledge from Experts 70
Imparting Experts' Knowledge to Trainees 71
Summary and Conclusions 75
References 76
5 Developing Careers 80
A Framework for Career Development 81
Army Programs 89
An Appraisal of the MBTI 96
Conclusions 101
Notes 102
References 102
PART III ALTERING MENTAL STATES 105
6 Subliminal Self-Help 107
Subjectively Perceptible Versus Objectively Detectable Stim- 110
uli
Mobilization, Effort Justification, and Expectancy Effects 113
Conclusions 116
Notes 117
References 117
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
In the Mind's Eye: Enhancing Human Performance
CONTENTS vi
7 Meditation 120
Scientific Evaluations of Meditation 121
Critique of the Literature Review 127
A Cautionary Note on Epistemology 130
Conclusions 130
Note 131
References 132
8 Managing Pain 134
Aspects of Pain 134
Treating Acute Pain 138
Treating Chronic Pain 141
Conclusions 143
References 144
9 Hiding and Detecting Deception 148
Physical Indicators and Psychological States 149
Improving Detection 156
Context and Culture 160
Conclusions 164
Notes 166
References 167
10 A Broader Concept of Deception 171
Types of Deception 172
Theories, Taxonomies, and Frameworks 173
Interactive Settings 185
Conclusions 188
Notes 189
References 189
PART IV PERFORMING 191
11 Optimizing Individual Performance 193
The Mental Health Model of Sports Performance 193
Cognitive-Behavioral Interventions 203
Preperformance Routines, Sports Performance, and Physio- 215
logical Measures,
Exercise and Stress 225
Broader Views: Neuroscience and Peak Performance 227
Conclusions 233
Notes 234
References 235
12 Enhancing Team Performance 247
Research on Groups: In the Laboratory and on the Job 247
Individuals and Teams 249
Team Performance 251
Team Performance: From Laboratory to Field 257
Conclusions 265
Note 266
References 266
APPENDICES
A Committee Activities 273
B Biographical Sketches 276
Index 283
Copyright National Academy of Sciences. All rights reserved.
In the Mind's Eye: Enhancing Human Performance
PREFACE vii
Preface
PREFACE viii
not viewed favorably accused the committee of being biased or closed minded,
and others found certain of the committee's (relatively few) positive
recommendations to be less than tough minded. (For a summary of reactions to
the committee's first report, see J.A. Swets and R.A. Bjork [1990]: Enhancing
human performance: an evaluation of “new age” techniques considered by the
U.S. Army. Psychological Science 1(2):85-96.)
The committee's second agenda emerged in part as a consequence of its first
report. It became apparent that certain techniques that had not been on the
committee's initial agenda deserved attention, such as using a model of the expert
as a guide to training, and that other topics deserved more thorough analysis, such
as meditation and other methods of altering mental states. Other techniques for
committee study were suggested by virtue of their popular attention, particularly
subliminal self-help audio tapes, self-assessment techniques to aid career
development, and sports-psychology techniques to sustain performance under
pressure. Still other topics resulted from meetings with Army staff, who
encouraged the committee to explore possible innovations in training based on
academic research, particularly with respect to long-term retention of critical
skills and transfer of those skills to altered contexts; and who provided
information on career development in the Army, on the special problems of
maintaining high performance in high-stress/high-risk settings, and on the
problems of detecting—and avoiding the detection of—deception. The final
topics for the new agenda, managing pain and enhancing team performance, were
added after committee discussions at the beginning of its second phase. With its
mission fully in place, the committee embarked on the same mixture of activities
that characterized its first phase; the committee's activities are discussed in
Chapter 1 and detailed in Appendix A.
Looking back on a committee process that was efficient, productive, and
stimulating, it is now my pleasure as committee chair to acknowledge
contributors to that process. Various people within the Army were more than
helpful. Dr. Edgar M. Johnson, director of the Army Research Institute, has been a
steady source of support, encouragement, and wise advice during the entire life
of the committee. Our project monitors from the Army Research Institute, Dr.
Michael Drillings and Dr. Judith Orasanu, provided able administrative and
technical advice, and Major John H. Hagman of the Uniformed Health Services
University, Department of Military Medicine, was a valuable source of
information and advice in our work.
To General Maxwell Thurman (ret.), whose enthusiasm and vision played a
major role in initiating our work, the committee owes a special debt. In his
commitment to research—and to the belief that each of us
PREFACE ix
should be all that we can be—he has been a continuing source of inspiration and
support. His constructive reactions to the first report, his many ideas for follow-
on ARI projects, and his ability to convey the training and performance needs of
the Army did much to shape the agenda and orientation of the committee's second
phase. Similarly, General John Crosby (ret.), who assisted General Thurman and
the committee since its inception, has also been a valuable friend of the
committee.
Other key people in the Army made it possible for the committee to
complete various projects and site visits. Dr. Owen Jacobs of the Army Research
Institute provided invaluable advice and information relevant to career programs
in the Army, and Dr. Herbert Barber at the Army War College helped the
committee administer a career-instrument survey and provided advice. General
Stanley Hyman arranged for a subcommittee to visit Fort Belvoir in order to
discuss the Army's concerns surrounding the issue of deception, and Major
Robert Roland of the Special Operations Command made special arrangements
for committee members who went to Fort Bragg to talk with Army leaders about
group performance and training. The committee also profited from the Army
representatives who spoke at our meetings (see Appendix A).
Several individuals outside the Army were also critical in the committee's
activities. Vic Braden, founder and director of the Vic Braden Tennis College,
opened his training facilities to the committee and provided an instructive
overview of his teaching methods in tennis and other sports. Raymond Mulligan,
Curriculum Development Coordinator at the L.F. Sillin Nuclear Training Center
in Connecticut, arranged for members of several subcommittees to see the special
training and performance needs of operators and other personnel in nuclear
power environments.
The authors of the committee's commissioned papers, Laura Darke, Manuel
London, David Shannahoff-Khalsa, and Paul Thayer, deserve special appreciation
for their good work. We also wish to thank the panel of scientists who reviewed
our report on behalf of the Research Council; it profited greatly from their
criticisms and suggestions. Our report also profited from the gifted editorial hand
of Eugenia Grohman, CBASSE Associate Director for Reports; we appreciate her
understanding of the issues and her ability to make technical writing readable. We
also appreciate Elaine McGarraugh's thorough and organized job of proofing and
copy editing the entire manuscript. And we are grateful to Donna Reifsnider, the
committee's administrative assistant, who cheerfully handled innumerable details
across all stages of the committee process.
For John Swets, a treasured friend, I want to add a word of personal thanks.
As chair of the committee's first phase, he served as an expert, if impossible,
model. Throughout the committee's second phase he
PREFACE x
xi
xii
PART I
Overview
THE TWO CHAPTERS IN THIS PART PROVIDE the background for the committee's
study and a summary of its key findings and conclusions. Chapter 1 describes the
history of the project, summarizes the conclusions of the committee's first report,
describes tasks for the second phase of work, and presents overviews of each of
the chapters in this book.
The committee's key findings and conclusions are summarized in Chapter 2.
Three types of conclusions are presented: those that summarize implications from
completed research, those that call for needed research, and those that have
practical implications for organizational contexts. The committee's detailed
conclusions on each topic are presented in the final sections of each chapter.
BACKGROUND 3
1
Background
BACKGROUND 4
BACKGROUND 5
BACKGROUND 6
THE REPORT
This section gives readers an overview of the report, summarizing the key
themes for each chapter. The next chapter presents the committee's key findings
and conclusions. Though addressing the Army's concerns in particular, the
conclusions have a broad relevance to training and performance in educational
and industrial contexts as well, and they add to the research literature on
enhancing human performance.
BACKGROUND 7
Training
Modeling Expertise
The potential of modeling experts for enhancing performance was suggested
by the committee's prior review of neurolinguistic programming (NLP), by recent
research findings, and by developments in sports training. In its otherwise
pessimistic evaluation of NLP, the committee found promise in the importance
that NLP attributes to decoding an expert's behavior as a guide to training a
beginner. Research on the nature of expertise has flourished in recent years and
may provide a foundation for training programs. In this chapter the committee
addresses issues related to understanding the knowledge that experts possess and
how this knowledge is organized. This discussion draws on a large body of
contemporary research on the concept of expertise. Other issues concern the
nature of feedback in the context of apprenticeship learning and guided
participation as well as issues concerned with transfer of training and
generalization from a few training examples. The latter issue has special
relevance to the many Army training programs where a skill is learned in one
context and must be performed in another setting.
Developing Careers
Two broad issues on careers are addressed by the committee: long-term
career development in the military and the value of self-assessment techniques in
career counseling. An attempt is made in this chapter to develop a broad
perspective on career development. The perspective reflects insights from recent
literature on managerial development and
BACKGROUND 8
Subliminal Self-Help
A large market for subliminal audiotapes suggests that many people believe
that they contribute to self-improvement. Although many manufacturers claim
that their tapes can alter attitudes, enhance confidence, and reduce anxieties, they
do not provide references to studies demonstrating such effects. Despite the lack
of supporting scientific evidence for particular methods, however, psychological
research leaves little doubt that subliminal learning does occur. In its first report,
the committee recommended taking a second look at phenomena associated with
learning during sleep or without conscious awareness. A renewed interest by
researchers in subliminal learning is due to recent results showing that some
measures of memory seem sensitive to types of learning without awareness.
These research developments, together with the marketplace popularity of
various self-help techniques, led the committee to examine these phenomena
further. Two issues in particular are highlighted in this chapter: the difference
between subjectively perceptible and objectively detectable stimuli and reasons
for an apparent improvement in performance in the absence of detectable
subliminal suggestions. Although there are implications for these issues from the
basic research literature on the history and current status of subliminal
perception, no attempt is made to review that large literature.
Meditation
During its first phase the committee recommended investigations of methods
designed to alter mental states to ascertain whether they might suggest any
practical applications. Results obtained from a number of studies suggest that
altered states of consciousness may affect a variety of physiological processes
related to performance. Altered states can
BACKGROUND 9
occur through the use of such methods as meditation and related relaxation
therapies as well as through nonpharmacological ways of coping with physical
pain. Of particular relevance to the military is the use of psychological methods to
help people endure extremely stressful situations. This chapter considers what is
known about effects of meditation and discusses the problem of application of
meditation techniques in diverse situations. In this chapter the committee
considers such issues as the role of meditation in reducing stress and
hypertension, methodological problems in studies designed to evaluate effects on
arousal (e.g, whether the effects are due uniquely to the meditation technique),
and explanations of such well-known feats of endurance as “pit burials.” The
chapter includes a summary of a critique of an earlier report (prepared by Brener
and Connally [1986] for the Army Research Institute) that reviewed much of the
scientific literature on meditation.
Managing Pain
A topic of considerable importance to the military is the way people cope
with pain. A large literature on the psychology of pain and pain management
provides some insights into coping skills. This chapter focuses on both defining
the various types of pain and considering some treatments that have received
attention in research on acute and chronic pain; it describes four dimensions of
pain management and summarizes the seven psychological factors that influence
the experience of pain. Among the treatments for acute pain that have been
evaluated are providing sensory and procedural information to patients about
surgery, relaxation training, training in coping skills, stress inoculation training,
biofeedback, and hypnosis. With regard to chronic pain, the emphasis is on
controlling pain behaviors: for example, one approach uses operant conditioning
techniques to reward reduced reliance on medications and health care services.
BACKGROUND 10
Performing
BACKGROUND 11
REFERENCES
Brener, J., and S.R. Connally 1986 Meditation: Rationales, Experimental Effects, and
Methodological Issues. Paper prepared for the U.S. Army Research Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Sciences, European Division. Department of Psychology, University
of Hull, London, England.
Druckman, D., and J. Swets, eds. 1988 Enhancing Human Performance: Issues, Theories, and
Techniques. Committee on Techniques for the Enhancement of Human Performance,
Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, National Research Council.
Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
Swets, J.A., and R.A. Bjork 1990 Enhancing human performance: an evaluation of “new age”
techniques considered by the U.S. Army. Psychological Science 1(2):85-96.
2
Findings and Conclusions
In this chapter we present key findings and conclusions for each of the
topics investigated. Each conclusion derives from a review and evaluation of
literature on that topic. Together, the various lines of research covered in this
report reveal the complexity of the problems involved in enhancing human
performance. At the same time, the research also clearly indicates approaches
that can improve training and guide the preperformance preparation of teams and
individuals. The research also helps illuminate special performance issues, such
as changing one's mental states, detecting deception, and developing the careers
of individuals in large organizations.
Most of the committee's conclusions are summaries derived directly from
research findings; others however, are suggestions for research where we need to
know more or are recommendations for actions based on what we do know.
TRAINING
retrainees are also different in kind from those of new trainees; relatively
efficient, cost-effective techniques can be used to maintain a given level of
original learning in retrainees.
Transfer of Training In general, the similarity of goals and cognitive
processing between training and transfer tasks is a critical factor in enhancing
transfer. The learner, therefore, should be challenged by means of manipulation
of practice variables, such as feedback, contextual (or intratask) interference, and
number and variability of examples. These manipulations, which may impair
performance in the short term, not only help the learner to process the learning
task more deeply, but suggest appropriate processes for transfer, particularly to
related but distinct posttraining tasks.
Modeling Expertise
As an instructional method, the modeling of complex cognitive skills poses
special problems. The observable behavior of an expert reveals little of the
expert's underlying cognitive processes. By observing an expert, a student can
learn a set of executable actions that are linked to a corresponding set of specific
conditions. But such learning does not typically result in the ability to generalize
beyond those specific conditions or to understand the principles behind the
actions.
It is widely recognized that instruction should proceed by integrating new
knowledge with old knowledge, but eliciting and representing the knowledge of
the tutor and the student are difficult problems. However, improved methods of
eliciting knowledge from experts and characterizing the present state of a learner
may make a promising training approach for modeling expertise, especially in
contexts in which a computer can be used as an interactive tool. New learning
techniques that involve active participation by a learner, such as self-
explanations, self-questioning, and self-monitoring, are promising avenues for
further research and may even be candidates for experimental programs at this
time.
The use of computers to deliver instruction, as well as to diagnose student
progress, is an important technological advance in and out of the classroom. To
be maximally effective, however, a training program must include a sophisticated
model of the student, which permits a match between the computer's
“understanding” and the student's understanding. Such a match makes possible
the tailoring of the individualized branching, diagnosis, and correction of
misconceptions by each student.
Developing Careers
Career Planning Despite the widespread popularity of many career
Subliminal Self-Help
The committee's review of the available research literature leads to our
conclusion that, at this time, there is neither theoretical foundation nor
experimental evidence to support claims that subliminal self-help tapes enhance
human performance. Several key considerations underlie this conclusion.
Although recent research suggests that stimuli perceived in the absence of
conscious awareness may have short-term effects on the performance of relatively
simple tasks under controlled laboratory conditions (such as color naming or
lexical decision), this research cannot be construed as evidence that long-term
changes in complex actions, cognitions, or emotions—such as smoking, self-
confidence, or depression—can be effected through exposure to subliminal
suggestions under such varied real-life circumstances as reading, relaxing, or
even sleeping.
Meditation
In scientifically controlled studies, meditation does not reduce arousal any
more than does simply resting quietly. In many studies, the combined use of
various relaxation-training techniques precludes attributing positive effects to
meditation by itself. Lifestyle changes to reduce conflict are also apparently
instrumental, a sensible enough conclusion and one that is consistent with the
growing recognition that successful interventions must usually be multifaceted.
The philosophical context for most meditation practices is important. It may
be that meditation and relaxation—including perhaps relaxation achieved with
certain forms of biofeedback—effect cognitive change, such as an enhanced
sense of self-efficacy and a belief that one can control his or her stress reactions.
A particular challenge to those who advocate meditation is whether benefits
generalize to everyday situations or to conditions of special challenge. Does the
person take time out during the day to meditate, or is there some more enduring,
systemic reduction in arousal level that does not require conscious attention to
practice? Perhaps changes are brought about by the person's lowered reactivity to
challenge, and these positive social-environmental shifts present the individual
with a less stressful environment. We do not believe that data exist to answer this
question.
The highly publicized feats of some yogis who can remain buried for many
hours without suffocating are probably due to confidence in their ability to slow
their respiration rate, as well as faith that they can survive the ordeal if only they
do not panic. Consistent with findings from the committee's earlier report,
perceived control and predictability serve to reduce anxiety.
The assertion that the proper application of Kundalini Yoga can help develop
“the soldier-saint” in whom is instilled the desire and superhuman ability to excel
in the art of war is not supported by scientific evidence.
Managing Pain
Research on pain control suggests that people can be taught
nonpharmacological ways to cope with physical pain. Central to the current
understanding of pain is the role of cognitive factors. A person's understanding of
the physiological events that underlie pain can have a profound effect on whether
he or she actually experiences pain.
Procedures known to be useful for reducing stress—such as relaxation,
providing information about what to expect, and enhancing a person's sense of
control—also reduce pain because stress increases a person's experience of pain.
Distraction is also an effective strategy for coping with pain. And suggestions
given under hypnosis can help people cope with pain, for example, imagining
that an affected limb is not really a part of them. Chronic pain is best managed by
identifying and controlling psychological perpetuating factors. In most cases this
would involve combining pure behavior-learning approaches with other
cognitive-behavioral and relaxation interventions.
PERFORMING
person cannot physically practice, then the small effects due to mental practice
can be useful for facilitating performance and for better retention.
Cognitive-Behavioral Interventions The effects of cognitive-behavioral
interventions—such as relaxation, imagery, mental preparation strategies, skill
modeling, and direct attempts to alter cognition—are small to moderate. They
will be enhanced if the treatments emphasize: multiple components (e.g.,
relaxation, modeling, imagery, cognitive restructuring); direct administration by
an investigator or therapist (rather than a tape); many sessions; people who have
concentration problems; and tasks that can be objectively scored.
Preperformance Preparation In skills for which the environmental
conditions are constant (e.g., archery), an individually designed preperformance
routine with multiple components (i.e, preparation rituals) has been shown to
facilitate performance. In sports that involve aiming (e.g., rifle shooting), better
performers have a greater cardiac deceleration within 3-5 seconds of executing a
motor response, and better performances are associated with a moderate increase
above baseline in alpha activity in the left hemisphere of the brain with little or no
change in the right hemisphere. However, too great an increase in left hemisphere
alpha is associated with worse shots. Such electrophysiological patterns as heart
rate deceleration and EEG asymmetries, which are related to performance, can be
used during the preparatory period (3-5 seconds before response execution) to
assist in determining the efficacy of preperformance routines.
Exercise and Stress Evidence shows that aerobic exercise results in quicker
recovery from psychosocial stressors than the absence of such exercise.
Neuroscience and Peak Performance Further understanding of the bases
for performance is likely to come from ongoing research in neuroscience and on
“peak performance.” Recent neuroscientific studies using imaging techniques
have shown that even simple motor processes have complex neurophysiological
correlates. Research on high performance behavior has made progress in
identifying the affective, attentional, and cognitive states associated with such
behavior.
21
PART II
Training
22
3
Optimizing Long-Term Retention and
Transfer
enhance performance during training may or may not enhance long-term retention
and transfer to altered contexts; conversely, procedures that introduce difficulties
for the learner and impair performance during training may foster durable and
flexible posttraining skills (for some examples, see Schmidt and Bjork, 1992). In
short, the goal is to have training programs that optimize learning—some
relatively permanent change in the capacity for responding—but what is observed
during training is performance localized in a given place and time. At a later
time, in another place, the learner may perform quite differently and that
performance is often at an inadequate level. The performance observed during
training may be mediated by rote memory or cues specific to the training
procedure rather than being indicative of any substantial learning or
understanding.
This problem is aggravated in training settings in which those who are
responsible for training do not see the posttraining performance of the individuals
they have trained. In such a setting, the instructor's judgment as to the efficacy of
different training procedures may be governed entirely by the tacit assumption
that what yields high performance during training will yield high retention and
transfer after training. In any organization in which the people responsible for the
maintenance of critical skills and knowledge (refresher training, retraining, and so
forth) are not the same people who are responsible for initial training—the
military is such an organization—this inferential problem is going to be
particularly troublesome.
LONG-TERM RETENTION
When one assesses posttraining performance on some task, the time interval
from the end of training to the performance “test” can be varied, the task can be
the same or an altered version of the training task, and the situational context can
be similar to or different from the training context. Thus, someone trained to
repair a certain type of pump in a nuclear power plant might attempt the first such
actual repair many weeks or months after being trained, the pump may differ in
certain respects from those encountered in training, and the repair may need to be
executed under conditions of heat or other pressure that was not present during
training. It is common to speak of retention when performance on the actual
training task is assessed under posttraining conditions that are essentially the
same as the training conditions. The term transfer is used when the posttraining
task or setting differs from the training task or setting. For convenience, and to be
compatible with the literature, we tend to follow that usage, but it is important to
emphasize that retention so defined is a special case of transfer. That is, since the
posttraining context will never match exactly the training context—if for no other
reason than that the physical, emotional, and mental state of the learner will not
be exactly the same—a test of retention can be viewed as a test of the transfer of
training to contexts that appear to match the training context.
In attempting to make our review compatible with the literature, in which the
learning-performance distinction is often blurred or forgotten by researchers, we
often need to speak of the level of “learning” achieved during training when level
of performance would be the more correct expression. Terms such as “original
learning” and “overlearning” are too common for us to avoid. In the next section
particularly, when we discuss retention and transfer as a function of the level of
original learning, we have tried to restrict our coverage to research situations in
which it can be generally assumed that the performance levels measured as
evidence of differing levels of learning do, indeed, denote just that. In later
sections we deal with training situations in which performance during training is a
poor measure of the level of learning achieved.
Original Learning
There is considerable agreement that the long-term retention of a task can be
improved by increasing the level of original learning or mastery (e.g., Annett,
1979; Farr, 1987; Gardlin and Sitterley, 1972; Hagman and Rose, 1983; Hurlock
and Montague, 1982; Naylor and Briggs, 1961; Schendel et al., 1978; Prophet,
1976). Indeed, the level of original learning for a task is the best single predictor
of long-term retention for any given retention interval. Thus, any variable that can
help trainees achieve a higher level of original learning or mastery of a task is
capable of enhancing its retention (Hurlock and Montague, 1982).
Most often, the training variable manipulated is the amount of practice on a
task. Typically, this manipulation is accomplished by making the criterion of
mastery more difficult to achieve so that more practice is needed to achieve the
criterion. The additional practice needed to achieve the more difficult criterion
produces a higher level of original learning, which enhances retention. For
example, suppose a basketball coach is training young, novice players to shoot
free throws (foul shots). He or she decides that all of the players should be able to
make 25 out of 50 shots attempted by the end of 8 weeks of training, which is a
reasonable criterion of mastery. But the coach could also make the criterion of
mastery more difficult to achieve, requiring that the players be able to make 35
out of 50 shots, or, alternatively, that the players be able to make 25 out of 50
shots under more difficult conditions (after wind sprints, with simulated crowd
noise, at alternate baskets, and so forth).
In either case, more practice would be needed to achieve the more difficult
criterion, but the additional practice would produce a higher level of original
learning, which, in turn, should lead to greater retention.
Automaticity
The level of original learning can also be assessed in terms of the degree of
automaticity of performance by using a dual-task paradigm, in which a secondary
task is given to trainees to sample their spare cognitive capacity while they are
learning the primary task (Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977; Schneider and Shiffrin,
1977; Schneider et al., 1984). An acceptable degree of automaticity and, hence,
level of original learning, is the point at which neither the primary nor secondary
task causes a performance decrement on the other. Although the dual-task
paradigm is an acceptable method of assessing automaticity, it is not without its
problems (see, e.g., Fendrich et al., 1988; Jonides et al., 1985). Theoretically,
skills that require only a minimum of attention and cognitive capacity to perform
are either completely or partly automatic, whereas skills that require cognitive
resources and effort involve controlled processes. Schneider et al. (1984) define
an automatic process as one that does not make use of general cognitive
resources. In other words, capacity reductions do not influence automatic
processing. Moreover, an
automatic process is not subject to conscious control and, thus, can be executed in
response to relevant external stimuli to which little attention is paid.
Whether or not a skill is classified as automatic or controlled depends largely
on the level of original learning. Many skills require controlled processes early in
learning, but the processes become automatic with extensive practice and
especially so if that practice contains a high degree of consistency. Practice
consistency means that a trainee makes the same response each time a certain
stimulus or class of stimuli is presented. The assumed explanation for this
phenomena is that retention of a skill depends heavily on the extent to which a
skill is automatic: that is, it can be performed without conscious awareness. The
more automatic the skill, the greater the chance that the skill will be retained over
nonuse periods without refresher training or rehearsal. It is important to note,
however, that the automated parts of a skill that are acquired through practice
(e.g., speed in soldering a joint) are expected to deteriorate during nonuse
periods, while the automated parts of a skill that are less dependent on practice
(e.g., encoding of temporal or spatial information) are not. Thus, for designing a
skill maintenance program, more emphasis should be placed on the automated
parts of the skill that are acquired through practice.
Overlearning
Regardless of the criterion of mastery selected for original learning, one way
to enhance retention is to provide supplementary practice on a task after the
criterion is achieved. In the previous basketball example, for instance, the coach
could have the players continue to practice freethrow shooting even though they
have achieved the criterion of making 35 out of 50 shots. This method may be
interpreted as postmastery learning and is usually referred to in the literature as
overlearning. Level of overlearning is usually expressed as simply the number of
practice trials that trainees perform after the criterion of mastery has been
achieved, or it is expressed in percentage terms—50 percent overlearning, for
example, means that trainees receive half again the number of trials that they took
to achieve the mastery criterion. The arbitrary nature of mastery and overlearning
criteria can make it difficult to do certain comparisons across studies. A trial that
is part of mastery for one study can be part of overlearning for another study. It
depends on how one defines when original learning is complete, how one
quantifies the level of original learning or mastery, and how one defines the level
of overlearning.
Those complications notwithstanding, it is clear that retention is better for
overlearned tasks (e.g., Loftus, 1985; Schendel and Hagman,
1982; Slamecka and McElree, 1983). For enhancing retention, when to introduce
the supplementary trials does not appear to be a critical factor; the level of
overlearning is far more important than the time at which the supplementary trials
are introduced (Schendel and Hagman, 1982). The literature also reveals,
however, that providing overlearning trials reaches a point of diminishing returns
(e.g., Bell, 1950; McGeoch and Irion, 1952; Melnick, 1971). In other words,
increasing the number of overlearning trials may not produce proportionate
increases in retention. Thus, although 100 percent overlearning may result in
better retention than 50 percent, the additional gain that occurs may not be worth
the additional time and practice.
Enhancing Retention
Distribution of Practice
We have focused thus far on amount of practice during training, and have
assumed that the level of performance achieved during training is a reasonable
index of the level of learning achieved. For a fixed amount of practice, however,
learning (as measured by a later retention test) depends on the temporal
distribution of practice, and the nature of that dependency illustrates that
performance during training is an unreliable indicator of learning. In general,
massing of practice on some component of the to-be-learned task produces better
performance in the short term (e.g., during training) but much poorer
performance in the long term than does spacing of practice. In some cases,
massed practice yields long-term recall performance less than one-half the level
that results from spaced practice, and two massed practices are often not
appreciably better than a single study trial (see, e.g., Glenberg, 1979; Glenberg
and Lehmann, 1980; Melton, 1970; and Rothkopf and Coke, 1966).
The so-called spacing effect—that practice sessions spaced in time are
superior to massed practices in terms of long-term retention—is one of the most
reliable phenomena in human experimental psychology. The effect is robust and
appears to hold for verbal materials of all types and for motor skills (for reviews,
see Crowder, 1976; Dempster, 1990; Lee and Genovese, 1988). A recent
indication of how durable the advantages of spacing may be across truly long
posttraining intervals was reported by Bahrick and Phelps (1987). They tested
subjects' recall of English-Spanish word pairs 8 years after the original training
phase. During the training phase, successive practice sessions were separated by
30 days, 1 day, or 0 days. The level of retention was highest for the 30-day
spacing of study sessions, next highest for the 1-day spacing, and lowest for the
0-day spacing, with performance for those in the 30-day condition more than
twice that for those in the 0-day condition.
Given the benefits of spaced practice and the fact that those benefits have
been known to researchers since the beginning of controlled research on human
memory (Ebbinghaus, 1913), one would expect that spaced repetition would be a
major component of modern programs of training and instruction. The fact that
this not seem to be the case is
something of a puzzle (see Bjork, 1979; Dempster, 1990). Part of the solution to
that puzzle, of course, may be a point we have already stressed: during the
training process itself, spaced practice may appear inferior to massed practice.
Another factor in the apparent neglect of scientific findings on distribution
of practice by those responsible for the design of training programs is time
pressure: massed sessions take less total time than do spaced sessions. A study by
Baddeley and Longman (1978), carried out for the British Post Office, illustrates
the point. Given a new sorting system, which required postal workers to enter
postcodes into a sorting machine using a standard typewriter keyboard, a large
number of postal workers needed to be taught to type in a relatively short period
of time. Baddeley and Longman examined four different training schedules,
ranging from 1 hour of practice per day (spaced) to 4 hours of practice per day
(massed). In terms of the learning curve—a plot of mean keystrokes per minute
as a function of hours of practice—spaced practice was far more efficient than
massed practice. To reach any given level of performance, however, it took the
1-hour-per-day group many more days than it took the 4-hours-per-day group,
and the authors report that the former group was the least satisfied because the
members felt they were falling behind the groups that were getting more practice
per day. Thus, spaced practice produced much more efficient learning as a
function of time on task, but took more days, which could certainly be a negative
factor from a management standpoint.
Fostering Understanding
Just as the organization or cohesiveness of the components of a task makes
it easier to learn and remember, so too does the organizing influence of
understanding (Horton and Mills, 1984; Wertheim, 1985; Wetzel et al., 1983). In a
story, independent or vaguely related occurrences are similar to steps of a
procedural task that are not logically arranged and, hence, do not signal each
other. When relevant organizing information is provided before reading a
fragmented story, this information supplies a coherent structure within which to
interpret more effectively the exact meaning of the story (Owens et al., 1979).
Moreover, when this structure is also compatible with a trainee's general
knowledge of the world, recall is enhanced (Morris et al., 1979).
There is considerable evidence suggesting that long-term retention of
procedural tasks that are based on complex rules or principles can be enhanced by
augmenting instruction with explanations or information designed to increase a
learner's understanding of the to-be-learned tasks (Gentner, 1980, 1982; Smith
and Goodman, 1984; Tourangeau and Sternberg,
1982; Kieras, 1981; Sturges et al., 1981). Although researchers differ to some
extent on how they define explanations, it seems useful to categorize them as
linear, structural, and functional (Stevens and Steinberg, 1981; Smith and
Goodman, 1984). Linear explanations tell a trainee what to do—that is, what
steps to follow and in what order. Structural explanations clarify how or why
different task components belong together. Functional explanations inform the
trainee about the cause-and-effect relationships among task components. In
general, linear and structural explanations are used for static tasks, such as
assembling a piece of equipment; functional explanations are used for dynamic
tasks, such as operating a piece of equipment. In an examination of some of the
literature dealing with the long-term retention of conceptual information and
procedures inherent in expository prose as a function of structural explanations,
Konoske and Ellis (1985:13) conclude that effective structural explanations
“should include spatial and component-part information . . . as well as . . . goal
statements. In addition, structural information should be communicated using
text, schematics, graphs and illustrations, whenever possible.”
In another study, Kieras and Boviar (1984) provided subjects in an
experimental group with a “mental model” functional explanation of a new
device that they were required to learn to operate: a mental model is an internal
conceptual structure that corresponds to some aspect of the world (see, e.g.,
Gentner and Stevens, 1983). The subjects in the control group were not provided
with any explanation; they had to learn the procedures solely by memorizing
them. The researchers found that the functional model was more effective for
enhancing retention one week after original learning than was learning by rote.
They explained the superiority of the functional model by claiming that it was
more pertinent to the operation of the device and could be used to cue operational
procedures that might not otherwise have been retained. This finding and
explanation supports Farr's (1987) position that the long-term retention of
procedural knowledge and skills can be greatly enhanced if trainees understand
why tasks must be performed in a particular order and way; the relationship of the
parts to the whole task; and how new task information is related to what is already
known. Farr (1987:78) claims:
Understanding enables the trainee to (a) furnish himself with cues to help
retrieval; (b) recognize the relationship of externally provided or system-provided
cues to the sought-for-memory; and/or (c) rebuild or regenerate what was
apparently forgotten by capitalizing on the conceptual/ideational scaffolding
supplied by the understanding. Understanding also provides organizational
coherence, thereby chunking and integrating the information into fewer
knowledge-representation/retrieval structures, and decreasing the memory
burden.
fact, the performance of both the givers and receivers of such student instruction
appears to profit from the interaction, and the attitudes of students about the
instructional process become more positive as well. In sum, cooperative learning
techniques, peer-teaching techniques, and all other such programs in which
students take an active role in their own learning lead to improved performance
(see, e.g., Rothkopf, 1981).
Practice on Procedural Tasks Overall, it is probably an understatement to
say that most training programs involve too much in the way of talking,
presenting, and demonstrating on the part of a trainer and too little in the way of
answering, producing, and practicing on the part of the trainee. Especially in the
case of procedural tasks, listening and watching are ineffective compared with
doing—although, of course, doing requires some initial level of learning. For
example, watching someone demonstrate how to use an oxygen mask or
inflatable lifevest or how to give cardiopulmonary resuscitation is not good
preparation for executing those tasks when they are needed. Procedural skills
must be practiced and exercised (see, e.g., Schneider, 1985). With increasing
complexity of a task, a large amount of practice may be necessary to meet
criterion levels of skill, and, initially, components of the task may need to be
practiced separately.
The Effects of Generation The “generation effect” (Slamecka and Graf,
1978) refers to the fact that verbal information generated by subjects (learners) in
response to cues presented by an experimenter is better remembered at a later
time than is information presented for study. Generation effects have been
demonstrated with many types of verbal materials and with a variety of initial
cuing procedures. It has also been shown (e.g., Wittrock and Carter, 1975) that
subjects who generate their own organization of verbal materials (such as a
hierarchical grouping of related words) remember those materials better at a later
time than do subjects who are simply given such an organization. In general,
there is much to be said for the “Socratic method” of instruction, in which the
instructor's goal is to get the learner to produce answers and solutions.
Tests as Learning Events Related to the effects of generation is the finding
that the act of retrieving information presented earlier facilitates later retrieval of
that information (see, e.g., Bjork, 1975; Landauer and Bjork, 1978; Rea and
Modigliani, 1985). That is, an act of recall is itself a potent learning event—more
potent, in general, than is an opportunity to study the information in question.
From the standpoint of long-term retention, tests appear to play the important role
of reducing
the forgetting that would otherwise take place. Landauer and Ainslie (1975), for
example, found that in a college-style technical course, performance on a repeated
final examination 1 year later was greatly facilitated by an intervening test with
that exam at 6 months. The group with the 6-month test showed virtually no
memory loss across the year (from the end-of-course final exam to the repeated
final exam 1 year later), and they performed at a much higher level on the 1-year
test than did the group with no intervening test.
Another virtue of tests is that they appear to trigger subsequent study
opportunities (e.g., Izawa, 1970). That is, more learning appears to take place on
the basis of information presented after a test of a learner's memory for that
information than takes place without such a test. One interpretation of such
results is that tests provide feedback to the learner—clarifying to some extent
what has been learned and what remains to be learned—which puts the learner in a
better position to take advantage of subsequent information.
The advantage of tests embedded in the training process may grow as the
posttraining retention interval gets longer. In contrasting the effects of prior study
and test trials, Hogan and Kintsch (1971) found that study trials were superior to
test trials in terms of performance at the end of the experimental session, but that
test trials were superior to study trials on a test of recall 48 hours later. Once
again, then, a condition that may appear to produce better performance during
training (in this instance, study trials) may not be optimal in terms of long-term
retention.
Refresher Training
Since the focus of this chapter is on original training and what can be done
therein to enhance long-term retention and transfer, a thorough discussion of an
important related matter—the kinds of posttraining interventions that are useful in
maintaining performance at a high level over time—is beyond its scope. In this
section, however, we do want to make clear that in many cases posttraining
refresher programs are necessary, whatever the program of initial training.
As a retention interval (i.e., nonuse period) increases, the absolute amount of
forgetting increases at a negatively accelerated rate (Annett, 1979; Gardlin and
Sitterley, 1972; Hagman and Rose, 1983; Hurlock and Montague, 1982; Naylor
and Briggs, 1961; Prophet, 1976; Schendel et al., 1978). Refresher learning,
practice, or rehearsal is typically needed during such nonuse periods to maintain a
given level of knowledge or skill. An important practical consideration, however,
is whether a relearning program is even feasible. If it is not, as in emergency
situations in which the originally learned knowledge or skill must be at a
and Steinberg, 1981; Young, 1983). Lastly, brief or partial cuing conditions can
also be used as an effective technique: for example, procedural skills can often be
rapidly remembered by reminder information, written or oral.
TRANSFER OF TRAINING
As just noted, training performance (i.e., level of original learning) may or
may not be an effective predictor of posttraining performance when the training
and posttraining contexts are the same or quite similar. When the training and
posttraining contexts differ, however, many of the most effective procedures for
facilitating the kind of learning that supports transfer apparently impair
performance during training. In this section we first discuss the role of level of
original learning and perceived similarity between tasks as general factors in the
transfer of training; we then discuss some specific procedures during training that
enhance transfer to different posttraining contexts.
of the objective structural similarity. The greater the perceived similarity of the
situations, the greater the amount of transfer. No transfer takes place when two
situations are perceived as unrelated, regardless of the degree of response
similarity. If a learner does not perceive the similarity between training and
posttraining contexts, the level of performance achieved in training clearly will
not predict posttraining performance.
Enhancing Transfer
Some of the most promising methods of training for transfer to altered
contexts create difficulties for a learner during training. Some of the most
promising of those methods involve creating certain types of interference,
introducing variability, and reducing the frequency of external feedback.
suited to the specific task demands. Thus, item similarity in original learning of a
task should produce better retention or transfer when the task is the same in
posttraining as it was in original training. In summary, incorporating contextual
variety in training introduces functional interference that makes learning less
context dependent and involves trainees in processing activity that in turn
produces enhanced retrieval from memory and the ability to adapt their
performance to different contexts.
Several studies involving retention and comprehension of verbal materials
bear an interesting relationship to the idea of contextual interference. Mannes and
Kintsch (1987) had subjects study a brief technical article (on industrial uses of
microbes) after studying either an outline that was consistent with the
organizational structure of the article or one that was inconsistent (but contained
the same information). On tests of verbatim knowledge (e.g., verbatim recall of
statements from the article or true-false judgments of whether a given statement
did or did not appear in the article), the consistent outline produced better
performance, but on tests that required drawing inferences or proposing (or
ranking) possible solutions to potential problems, the inconsistent outline
produced better performance. The consistent outline apparently resulted in a
simpler, more coherent representation in memory, which served to guide verbatim
recall and recognition, but did not support processes of generalization and
inference. The inconsistent outline, in forcing subjects to resolve organizational
discrepancies, apparently resulted in a more embellished, abstracted
representation in memory, a representation that contained fewer literal details
from the article but that permitted more of the kind of extrapolation that underlies
generalization and inference.
Smith et al. (1978) demonstrate that simply varying the environmental
context across study sessions on a list of words improves later recall in a novel
setting. Smith and Rothkopf (1984) show that such environmental variation can
enhance retention of instructional content as well: they manipulated whether four
successive 2-hour lectures in a miniature statistics course were given in the same
location or in four different locations. They found that recall of key concepts a
week after the course was better for students in the varied-context condition. They
also found—consistent with the advantages of distributed practice and for both
the same-context or varied-context conditions—that presenting the four lectures
on four successive days resulted in better recall than presenting all the lectures on
one day.
It is of interest to note that training under high contextual interference
enhances task retention and transfer in a fashion analogous to supplementary
practice: that is, it increases the level of original learning or
overlearning. This retention and transfer outcome suggests that training under
high contextual interference may be conceptualized as being functionally
equivalent to training with additional practice (Farr, 1987). It also suggests that
the level of overlearning is being indirectly manipulated by varying the level of
contextual interference during training, and so could be viewed as similar to
directly manipulating the level of overlearning by varying the amount of
supplementary practice.
It can also be argued that even direct manipulations enhance retention and
transfer to some extent as a result of the quality of processing during original
learning and overlearning. Typically, the enhancement of retention that results
from giving supplementary practice to increase the level of overlearning is
attributed to the strengthening of connections due directly to the additional trials.
However, Mandler (1968) argues against this interpretation because he believes
that a retrievable trace is primarily the product of organization—that mere acts of
rehearsal or repetition associated with additional practice do not by themselves
produce a retrievable trace. Rehearsal or repetition simply allows a learner to
establish initial categories and place items into them or to reorganize the
categories. Of course, rehearsal or repetition may also provide a learner with the
opportunity for more elaborate, deeper processing of information, as Battig
(1979) originally proposed. Mandler's position is clearly too extreme in that
certain types of stimulus-driven learning take place as a product of mere exposure
and repetition, without intentionality on the part of the learner (see Roediger,
1990, for a review of such phenomena); in terms of subsequent purposeful recall
of information, however, it seems safe to say that the quality of processing is
clearly more important than the duration of processing. The large body of work
carried out within the “levels of processing” framework (Craik and Lockhart,
1972) supports this generalization, and that work also supports the generalization
that it is the nature of initial processing, not the subject's intent to learn or
remember, by itself, that determines later recall performance.
Reducing Feedback
Feedback is an integral part of most training programs. It can be defined as
information resulting from an action, and it can be intrinsic or augmented.
Intrinsic feedback is the information people receive as a natural consequence of
their actions and takes two forms: proprioceptive feedback is the sensing of
muscle, joint, or tendon activity, as in the
feeling from executing a golf swing; visual feedback comes from the outcome of
an activity, as in the flight path of a golf ball. Augmented feedback, which is the
focus of this section, is information performers would not ordinarily receive as a
result of their actions. It is provided by a source external to the performers, such
as an instructor, mirror, or videotape system. Augmented feedback can be verbal,
as when an instructor explains how to correct an error, or it can be nonverbal, as
when an instructor demonstrates how to make a correction or shows a videotape
replay of an individual's performance. Typically, augmented feedback comparing
the performance outcome with some goal outcome is referred to as knowledge of
results; augmented feedback that characterizes the movement pattern itself is
referred to as knowledge of performance. (For other descriptions of different
types of feedback, see e.g., Schmidt, 1988:423-426).
It has been known for some time that augmented feedback has a substantial
effect on learning and performance during training (e.g., Thorndike, 1927). The
focus here is on the influences that feedback has on retention and transfer during
training. Much of the recent relevant research has been carried out in the motor
domain (for reviews, see Newell, in press; Salmoni et al., 1984; Schmidt, in
press). That research has challenged a commonly accepted generalization about
augmented feedback that emerged from an abundance of prior research (see
Bilodeau, 1966, 1969). That generalization is that any increase in feedback in
training—in its immediacy, accuracy, or frequency—will improve learning and
performance. Over the years, that generalization served as a basis for
incorporating augmented feedback in the design of training programs and
simulators. However, evidence from some recent studies in the motor domain
(e.g., Schmidt et al., 1989; Winstein, 1988; Winstein and Schmidt, 1990) and
several earlier studies in the verbal domain (e.g., Landauer and Bjork, 1978;
Krumboltz and Weisman, 1962) raise questions about the validity of the
generalization.
Generally, these studies manipulated augmented feedback in training by
giving it less frequently, such as on every fifth trial instead of every trial; or by
giving it on every early trial but gradually eliminating it on later trials; or by
giving it in summary form over a set of trials. Essentially, these studies reveal
that training with augmented feedback that is given less frequently or in summary
form produces poorer performance in training than feedback administered after
every trial, but it produces better posttraining performance in retention and
transfer. These results can be interpreted as indicating that frequent augmented
feedback during training functions primarily to guide behavior toward the
criterion (i.e., training) performance but that it also may create a dependency in
which the feedback is relied on to guide behavior, and the learning
REFERENCES
Anderson, J.R., P.J. Kline, and C.M. Beasley 1979 A general learning theory and its application to
schema abstraction. In G.H. Bower, ed., The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Vol.
13. New York: Academic Press.
Annett, J. 1979 Memory for skill. In M.M. Gruneberg and P.E. Morris, eds., Applied Problems in
Memory. London: Academic Press.
Anzai, Y., and H.A. Simon 1979 The theory of learning by doing. Psychological Review 86:124-140.
Baddeley, A.H., and D.J.A. Longman 1978 The influence of length and frequency on training
sessions on the rate of learning to type. Ergonomics 21:627-635.
Bahrick, H.P. 1979 Maintenance of knowledge: questions about memory we forgot to ask. Journal of
Experimental Psychology, General 108:296-308.
1987 Retention of Spanish vocabulary over 8 years. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition 13:344-349.
Battig, W.F. 1956 Transfer from verbal pretraining to motor performance as a function of motor task
complexity. Journal of Experimental Psychology 51:371-378.
1966 Facilitation and interference. In E.A. Bilodeau, ed., Acquisition of Skill. New York: Academic
Press.
1972 Intratask interferences as a source of facilitation in transfer and retention. In R.F. Thompson and
J.F. Voss, eds., Topics in Learning and Performance. New York: Academic Press.
1979 The flexibility of human memory. In L.S. Cermark and F.I.M. Craik, eds., Levels of Processing
in Human Memory. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Bell, H.M. 1950 Retention of pursuit rotor task after one year. Journal of Experimental Psychology
40:648-649.
Bilodeau, I.M. 1966 Information feedback. In E.A. Bilodeau, ed., Acquisition of Skill. New York:
Academic Press.
1969 Information feedback. In E.A. Bilodeau, ed., Principles of Skill Acquisition. New York:
Academic Press.
Bjork, R.A. 1975 Retrieval as a memory modifier: an interpretation of negative recency and related
phenomena. In R.L. Solso, ed., Information Processing and Cognition. New York: Wiley.
1979 Information-processing analysis of college teaching. Educational Psychologist 14: 15-23.
1988 Retrieval practice and the maintenance of knowledge. Pp. 397-401 in M.M. Gruneberg, P.E.
Morris, and R.N. Sykes, eds., Practical Aspects of Memory II. London: Wiley.
Bransford, J.D., and J.J. Franks 1976 Toward a framework for understanding learning. In G.H.
Bower, ed., The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Vol. 10. New York: Academic
Press.
Bransford, J.D., J.J. Franks, C.D. Morris, and B.S. Stein 1979 Some general constraints on learning
and memory research. In L.S. Cermack and F.I.M. Craik, eds., Levels of Processing in
Human Memory. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Brooks, L. 1978 Nonanalytic concept formation and memory for instances. In E. Rosch and B. Lloyd,
eds., Cognition and Categorization. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Catalano, J.R., and B.M. Kleiner 1984 Distant transfer and practice variability. Perceptual and Motor
Skills 58:851-856.
Cheng, P.W., K.J. Holyoak, R.E. Nisbett, and L.M. Oliver 1986 Pragmatic versus syntactic
approaches to training deductive reasoning. Cognitive Psychology 18:293-328.
Chi, M., P. Feltovich, and R. Glaser 1981 Categorization and representation of physics problems by
experts and novices. Cognitive Science 5:121-152.
Craik, F.I.M., and R.S. Lockhart 1972 Levels of processing: a framework for memory research.
Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 11:671-684.
Crowder, R.G. 1976 Principles of Learning and Memory. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Dempster, F.N. 1990 The spacing effect: a case study in the failure to apply the results of
psychological research. American Psychologist 43:627-634.
Ebbinghaus, H. 1913 Memory (H.A. Ruger and C.E. Bussenius, trans.). New York: Teachers
College. (Original work published 1885; paperback ed., New York: Dover, 1964).
Elio, R., and J. Anderson 1984 The effects of information order and learning mode on schema
abstraction. Memory and Cognition 7:397-417.
Ellis, H.C. 1965 The Transfer of Learning. New York: Macmillan.
Farr, M.J. 1987 The Long-Term Retention of Knowledge and Skills: A Cognitive and Instructional
Perspective. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Fendrich, D.W., A.F. Healy, L. Meiskey, R.J. Crutcher, W. Little, and L.E. Bourne, Jr. 1988 Skill
Maintenance: Literature Review and Theoretical Analysis. Technical report AFHRL-
TP-87-73. Air Force Human Resources Laboratory, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas.
Fischman, M.G., R.W. Christina, and M.J. Vercruyssen 1982 Retention and transfer of motor skills: a
review for the practitioner. Quest 33:181-194.
Fong, G.T., D.H. Krantz, and R.E. Nisbett 1986 The effects of statistical training on thinking about
everyday problems. Cognitive Psychology 18:253-292.
Fried, L.S., and K.J. Holyoak 1984 Induction of category distributions: a framework for classification
learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
10:234-257.
Gardlin, G.R., and T.E. Sitterly 1972 Degradation of Learned Skills: A Review and Annotated
Bibliography. Boeing Company, Seattle, Washington.
Gentner, D. 1980 The Structure of Analogical Models in Science. Technical Report 4451. Bolt
Beranek and Newman, Inc., Cambridge, Massachusetts.
1982 Are scientific analogies metaphors? In D.S. Miall, ed., Metaphor: Problems and Perspectives.
Brighton, England: Harvester Press, Ltd.
Gentner, D., and A.L. Stevens 1983 Mental Models. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Gick, M.L., and K.J. Holyoak 1983 Schema induction and analogical transfer. Cognitive Psychology
15:1-38.
1987 The cognitive basis of knowledge transfer. In S.M. Cormier and J.D. Hagman, eds., Transfer of
Learning: Contemporary Research and Applications. San Diego, Calif.: Academic Press.
Glenberg, A.M. 1979 Component-levels theory of the effects of spacing of repetitions on recall and
recognition. Memory and Cognition 7:95-112.
Glenberg, A.M., and T.S. Lehmann 1980 Spacing repetitions over 1 week. Memory and Cognition
8:528-538.
Goldschmid, B., and M.L. Goldschmid 1976 Peer teaching in higher education: a review. Higher
Education 5:9-33.
Hagman, J.D., and A.M. Rose 1983 Retention of military skills: a review. Human Factors
25:199-213.
Hogan, R.M., and W. Kintsch 1971 Differential effects of study and test trials on long-term
recognition and recall. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 10:562-567.
Holyoak, K.J. 1985 The pragmatic of analogical transfer. In G.H. Bower, ed., The Psychology of
Learning and Motivation, Vol. 19. New York: Academic Press.
Homa, D., and J. Cultice 1984 Role of feedback, category size, and stimulus distortion on the
acquisition and utilization of ill-defined categories. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
Learning, Memory, and Cognition 10:83-94.
Horton, D.L., and C.B. Mills 1984 Human learning and memory. Annual Review of Psychology
35:361-394.
Hurlock, R.E., and W.E. Montague 1982 Skill Retention and Its Implications for Navy Tasks: An
Analytic Review. NPRDC SR 82-21. Navy Personnel Research and Development Center,
San Diego, Calif.
Hutchins, E.L., J.D. Hollan, and D.A. Norman 1985 Direct Manipulation Interfaces. ICS Report
8503. University of California, La Jolla.
Izawa, C. 1970 Optimal potentiating effects and forgetting-prevention effects of tests in paired-
associate learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology 83:340-344.
Johnson, D.W., G. Maruyama, R. Johnson, and D. Nelson 1981 Effects of cooperative, competitive,
and individualistic goal structures on achievement: a meta analysis. Psychological Bulletin
89:47-62.
Jones, M.B. 1985 Nonimposed Overpractice and Skill Retention. Technical report no. 86-55. Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Alexandria, Va.
Jonides, J., M. Naveh-Benjamin, and J. Palmer 1985 Assessing automaticity. Acta Psychological
60:157-171.
Kieras, D.E. 1981 Knowledge Representation in Cognitive Psychology. Technical report no. 7.
Personnel and Training Research Programs, Office of Naval Research, Arlington, Va.
Kieras, D.E., and S. Boviar 1984 The role of mental model in learning to operate a device. Cognitive
Science 8:255-273.
Konoske, P.J., and J.A. Ellis 1985 Cognitive Factors in Learning and Retention of Procedural Tasks.
Paper presented at the April meeting of the American Education Research Association,
Chicago, Illinois.
Kotovsky, K., J.R. Hayes, and H.A. Simon 1985 Why are some problems hard? Evidence from
Tower of Hanoi. Cognitive Psychology 17:248-294.
Krumboltz, J.D., and R.G. Weisman 1962 The effect of intermittent confirmation in programmed
instruction. Journal of Educational Psychology 53:250-253.
Kulik, J.A., C.C. Kulik, and P.A. Cohen 1980 Effectiveness of computer-based college teaching: a
meta-analysis of findings. Review of Educational Research 50:525-544.
Landauer, T.K., and K.I. Ainslie 1975 Exams and use as preservatives of course-acquired knowledge.
The Journal of Educational Research 69(3):99-105.
Landauer, T.K., and R.A. Bjork 1978 Optimum rehearsal patterns and name learning. In M.M.
Gruneberg, P.E. Morris, and R.N. Sykes, eds., Practical Aspects of Memory. London:
Academic Press.
Lee, T.D., and E.D. Genovese 1988 Distribution of practice in motor skill acquisition: learning and
performance effects reconsidered. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport 59:277-287.
Loftus, G.R. 1985 Evaluating forgetting curves. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning,
Memory, and Cognition 11:397-406.
Lung, C.T., and R. Dominowski 1985 Effects of strategy instructions and practice on nine-dot problem
solving. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
11:804-811.
Magill, R.A., and K.G. Hall 1990 A review of the contextual interference effect in motor skill
acquisition. Human Movement Science 9:241-289.
Mandler, G. 1968 Association and organization: facts, fancies, and theories. In T.R. Dixon and D.L.
Horton, eds., Verbal Behavior and General Behavior Theory. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall.
Mannes, S.M., and W. Kintsch 1987 Knowledge organization and text organization. Cognition and
Instruction 4:91-115.
Margolis, J., and R.W. Christina 1981 A test of Schmidt's schema theory of discrete motor skill
learning. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport 52:474-483.
Rea, C.P., and V. Modigliani 1985 The effect of expanded versus massed practice on the retention of
multiplication facts and spelling lists. Human Learning 4:11-18.
Rigg, K.E. 1983 Optimization of Skill Retention in the U.S. Army Through Initial Training and
Analysis and Design. McFann-Gray and Associates, Monterey, Calif.
Rigg, E.E., and B.B. Gray 1981 Estimating Skill Training and Retention Functions Through
Instructional Model Analysis. McFann-Gray and Associates, Monterey, Calif.
Roediger, H.L., III 1990 Implicit memory: retention without remembering. American Psychologist
45:1043-1056.
Rose, A.M., M.Y. Czarnolewski, F.E. Gragg, S.H. Austin, P. Ford, J. Doyle, and J.D. Hagman, Jr.
1984 Acquisition and Retention of Soldering Skills. Technical report no. 671. Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Alexandria, Va.
Rose, A.M., P.H. Radtke, H.H. Shettel, and J.D. Hagman 1985 User's Manual for Predicting Military
Task Retention. Report no. AIR FR37800. American Institutes for Research, Washington,
D.C.
Rothkopf, E.Z. 1981 A macroscopic model of instruction and purposeful learning. Instructional
Science 10:105-122.
Rothkopf, E.Z., and E.V. Coke 1966 Variations in phrasing and repetition interval and the recall of
sentence materials. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 5:86-91.
Salmoni, A.W., R.A. Schmidt, and C.B. Walter 1984 Knowledge of results and motor learning: a
review and critical reappraisal. Psychological Bulletin 95:355-386.
Schendel, J., J. Shields, and M. Katz 1978 Retention of Motor Skills: Review. Technical Paper 313.
U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Alexandria, Va.
Schendel, J.D., and J.D. Hagman 1982 On sustaining procedural skills over a prolonged retention
interval. Journal of Applied Psychology 67:605-610.
Schmidt, R.A. 1975 A schema theory of discrete motor skill learning. Psychological Review
82:225-260.
1982 The schema concept. Pp. 219-235 in J.A.S. Kelso, ed., Human Motor Behavior: An
Introduction. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
1988 Motor Control and Learning: A Behavioral Emphasis, 2nd ed. Champaign, Ill.: Human
Kinetics.
In press Frequent augmented feedback can degrade learning: evidence and interpretations. In G.E.
Stelmach and J. Requin, eds., Tutorials in Motor Neuroscience. Dordrecht, The
Netherlands: Kluwer.
Schmidt, R.A., and R.A. Bjork 1992 New conceptualizations of practice: common principles in three
research paradigms suggest important new concepts for practice. Psychological Science
(June).
Schmidt, R.A., and D.E. Young 1987 Transfer of movement control in motor skill learning. In S.M.
Cormier and J.D. Hagman, eds., Transfer of Learning: Contemporary Research and
Applications. San Diego, Calif.: Academic Press.
Schmidt, R.A., D.E. Young, S. Swinnen, and D.C. Shapiro 1989 Summary knowledge of results for
skill acquisition: support for the guidance by
rial. NPRDC Technical report no. 81-22). Navy Personnel Research and Development
Center, San Diego, Calif.
Sweller, J., R. Mawer, and W. Howe 1982 Consequences of history-cued and means-ends strategies in
problem solving. American Journal of Psychology 95:455-483.
Thorndike, E.L. 1927 The law of effect. American Journal of Psychology 39:212-222.
1903 Educational Psychology. New York: Lemcke and Buechner.
Tourangeau, R., and R. Sternberg 1982 Understanding and appreciating metaphors. Cognition
11:203-244.
Tulving, E., and D.M. Thomson 1973 Encoding specificity and retrieval processes in episodic
memory. Psychological Review 80:352-373.
Tulving, T. 1985 How many memory systems are there? American Psychologist 40:385-398.
Tversky, A., and I. Gati 1978 Studies in similarity. In E. Rosch and B.B. Lloyd, eds., Cognition and
Categorization. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Walberg, H.J. 1990 Productive teaching and instruction: assessing the knowledge base. Phi Delta
Kappa 71:470-478.
Weisberg, R., M. Di Camillo, and D. Phillips 1978 Transferring old associations to new situations: a
non-automatic process. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 17:219-228.
Wertheim, A.H. 1985 Some Remarks on the Retention of Learned Skills. Paper presented at NATO
Conference on Transfer of Training, September-October, Brussels, Belgium.
Wetzel, S.K., P.J. Konoske, and W.E. Montague 1983 Estimating Skill Degradation for Aviation and
Antisubmarine Warfare Operators (AWs): Loss of Skill and Knowledge Following
Training. Technical report NPRDC SR-83-31. Navy Personnel Research and Development
Center, San Diego, Calif.
Winograd, T.W. 1975 Frame representations and the declarative-procedural controversy. In D.G.
Bobrow and A.M. Collins, eds., Representation and Understanding: Studies in Cognitive
Science. New York: Academic Press.
Winstein, C.J. 1988 Relative Frequency of Information Feedback in Motor Performance and
Learning. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles.
Winstein, C.J., and R.A. Schmidt 1990 Reduced frequency of knowledge of results enhances motor
skill learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
16:677-691.
Wittrock, M.C., and J.F. Carter 1975 Generative processing of hierarchically organized words.
American Journal of Psychology 88:489-501.
Wrisberg, C.A., and B.J. Mead 1983 Developing coincident timing skill in children: a comparison in
training methods. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport 54:67-74.
Wulf, G., and R.A. Schmidt 1988 Variability in practice: facilitation in retention and transfer through
schema formation or context effects? Journal of Motor Behavior 20:133-149.
Young, R.M. 1983 Surrogates and mappings: two kinds of conceptual models for interactive devices.
In D. Gentner and A. Stevens, eds., Mental Models. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
MODELING EXPERTISE 57
4
Modeling Expertise
MODELING EXPERTISE 58
For example, suppose that a trainee is asked to learn to diagnose a fault when
the instrument panel shows three problems: warning light A is flashing (condition
A), dial B is off (condition B), and the sound system is generating a warning tone
(condition C). The expert arrives and on seeing the three conditions, takes the
following three actions: checks the power supply (action X), swaps the board
(action Y), and resets a gauge (action Z). By observing this sequence of actions,
what can the trainee learn? The trainee could learn a set of individual local rules,
such as: if condition A holds, then take action X; if condition B holds, take action
Y, and so forth. In order to learn this simple sequence of conditional action rules,
the trainee has to accomplish two processes. First, he or she must learn to identify
what the precise condition is for each action. Was it the flashing light that
mattered (condition A), or was it the yellow flashing light rather than a blue
flashing light that mattered? Second, the trainee has to link the condition with the
action. For example, dial B, saying “off,” initiates resetting a gauge. Inducing
these simple local rules are by no means trivial, but once learned, they can be
quite powerful in troubleshooting a number of problems.
It may be, however, that the expert's actions were not meant to be interpreted
as a sequence of local conditional rules, but that a conjunctive rule should have
been learned: if the pattern of A, B, and C conditions occurs, then take actions X,
Y, and Z. This means that if conditions A, B, and F occur, one would not take
action X, action Y, and some alternative third action that is an appropriate action
to condition F in isolation; instead, perhaps when the pattern of conditions A, B,
and F, occurs, some totally different action should be taken. Alternatively,
perhaps conditions A, B, and C lead the expert to realize that this is a special kind
of fault Q, which normally can be solved by taking actions X, Y, and Z. If this is
the case, then the trainee has to learn to identify what kind of conditions typically
can be considered to be a type Q kind of fault so that the sequence of actions X,
Y, and Z are appropriate. Direct modeling, in which a simple linking of actions to
conditions is induced, typically results in nontransferable skills: the trainee has
not understood and learned the reasons behind the actions, nor has the trainee
accumulated the knowledge necessary to recognize the conditions which then
generate the actions. (This simplistic example assumes that direct modeling is not
accompanied by verbal explanations. The nature of effective explanations is itself
an important and complex topic.)
In the first of this chapter's four sections, we consider direct modeling of
complex cognitive skills. We focus on a body of contemporary research on
cognitive apprenticeship. In the second section we review the ways in which
experts excel, considering their possession of a greater
MODELING EXPERTISE 59
knowledge base, the way that knowledge is organized, and processing strategies
to solve problems. Since expertise is based on knowledge, which in turn
generates the actions that experts take, we focus in the third section on the
difficult process of extracting an expert's knowledge. The last section focuses on
how knowledge extracted from experts can be imparted to novices.
COGNITIVE APPRENTICESHIP
There is one active body of research that promotes a technique for direct
modeling of complex cognitive tasks, called cognitive apprenticeship (Collins et
al., 1989). Cognitive apprenticeship borrows heavily from traditional
apprenticeship, which is quite successful in teaching physical skills. Traditional
apprenticeship involves three key components: observation, coaching, and
practice. Observation means the apprentice participates as a spectator, observing a
master or expert executing the target skill. Coaching refers to the guidance that
the expert provides while the apprentice attempts to perform the task. Coaching
physical skills involves two key features. First, the coaching or feedback is given
in a continuous, on-line fashion. For example, as an apprentice in weaving is
weaving the threads, the master might guide the apprentice's hands (Rogoff,
1986); it should be noted that the guidance provided in traditional apprenticeship
is often physical demonstration, not verbal instruction. Second, the master
provides conceptual “scaffolding,” that is the support, in the form of reminders
and help, necessary for the apprentice to perform an approximation of the
composite task. The degree of scaffolding provided depends on the extent of help
the apprentice needs. As the apprentice improves in his or her skill, the
scaffolding can be “faded.” The expert, therefore, must monitor the apprentice's
“zone of proximal development” (Vygotsky, 1978), or “region of sensitivity to
instruction” (Wood and Middleton, 1975). The zone of proximal development is
the distance between the developmental levels at which children can perform a
task alone and the level at which they can perform it with some assistance. Third,
the apprentice practices with the master present. In this fashion, the apprentice
begins by executing piecemeal aspects of the skill and yet enjoys the reward of
the entire skill. The entire learning situation is embedded in practice or guided
practice.
Cognitive apprenticeship consists of six key components: modeling,
coaching, scaffolding (and fading), articulation, reflection, and exploration
(Collins et al., 1989). The first three are provided mostly by the teacher (expert),
and the last three are exercised by the learner (novice).
MODELING EXPERTISE 60
Modeling
Modeling cognitive tasks requires that the expert explain (“externalize”) as
much of the process that underlies his or her actions as possible. For example, in
solving a mathematics problem, the expert should talk out loud for the novice
while coming up with the equation. This externalization is comparable to the
think-aloud protocols that cognitive psychologists have been collecting as their
data for analyzing the processes of problem solving (see Newell and Simon,
1972). Ideally, the train of thought should reveal all the knowledge that the
expert is using, not only the factual and conceptual knowledge that is relevant to
the substantive domain, but also such strategic knowledge as special heuristics
for solving problems (such as “decomposing” the problem into subproblems or
considering the problem as a “simplified or special case”); control strategies in
making decisions, such as knowing which path to search; and learning strategies,
such as scanning the table of contents before reading a book to get a general idea
of what the book is about. The basic idea is to expose the complete thought
processes of the expert, including searching the wrong paths, arriving at incorrect
solutions, and so forth. Externalizing thought processes in this way should allow a
novice to learn about heuristics that may be useful for solving problems.
There are two aspects to this procedure of externalizing one's thought
processes. One aspect, which can be made known readily, is to make overt the
solution trace that the expert is undertaking. That is, the expert simply articulates
the operations he or she is carrying out as they are executed. The other aspect is
more tacit and may not be exposed as readily: the expert explains the rationale
for his or her selection of operations. The first aspect, exposing the “solution
trace,” tends to reveal a strategy that the expert is following; the second aspect,
exposing the rationale, may reveal the expert's knowledge structure. This
procedure implies that modeling would be more effective in domains in which the
use of a few strategies can promote learning and would be less effective in
domains that require deep domain knowledge.
Schoenfeld's (1983) teaching of mathematics illustrates this distinction. An
excerpt of his protocol on finding the relationship between the roots of two
polynomials with “reversed” coefficients shows the application of a special
heuristic that he attempts to teach students to use. The heuristic is called “special
cases,” and the idea is to solve simpler cases, such as to find the roots of simpler
quadratic equations rather than complex polynomials and to look for relations
between the roots. If one fails to “see” any relationship among the roots, then the
next step is to further reduce the polynomials to linear cases and solve for their
roots. The expert thus reduces the complex polynomials to simpler equations:
MODELING EXPERTISE 61
first to quadratic, then to linear equations. The expert then observes a pattern in
the solution of linear cases—that the roots are reciprocals of each other.
The key strategy that Schoenfeld wants to get across is to generate and test
for a series of straightforward examples and then to see if some sort of pattern
emerges. The processes of doing so are exposed to the student by having the
expert talk out loud as he or she solves problems. Thus, basically, the expert is
modeling the strategies of generate-and-test and is reducing the problem to
simpler ones. What the expert is not modeling is the rationale for rejecting certain
roots after testing or how to select a set of roots to consider in the first place. For
example, the first pair of roots that Schoenfeld obtained from the quadratic
equation were
He then dismisses these by saying, “I don't really see anything that I can
push or that'll generalize.” How did Schoenfeld know that these roots are
uninteresting, without the potential for generalization? It is clear that by carefully
grading the exercise problems for the students, they will have learned the strategy
of reducing the problem to simple ones and of trying to look for patterns.
However, no pattern can be detected unless a student has recognizable patterns
already stored in memory. The point is that one can easily model the strategy that
an expert is undertaking, but it is more difficult to model and expose the tacit
knowledge that the expert might be using to carry out the strategy.
In sum, this kind of modeling (exposing the reasoning processes) is far
superior to traditional instruction in which a student is simply given a solution
(such as a worked-out example) and expected to induce the steps that were
undertaken to arrive at the solution; however, some aspects of the rationale of an
expert's reasoning processes may still remain tacit and not be easy for students to
follow.
MODELING EXPERTISE 62
difficulties. Interspersed with prompts were feedback (such as remarks about the
quality of the summary or definitions of terms) and modeling (used here more in
the sense of imitation rather than exposing the reasoning process). As mentioned
above, however, it is not clear how a teacher knows which prompts and
guidelines to give—or what feedback to provide—unless the teacher has an
accurate idea of the student's mental model.
Scaffolding refers to the support a teacher provides so that the student can
succeed in performing the task. This support can be suggestions, hints, actual
execution of parts of the task, or physical props such as providing cue cards
(Scardamalia et al., 1984). Scaffolding thus involves cooperative execution by an
expert and a student, in a way that allows the novice to take an increasingly
larger burden for performing the task. In both scaffolding and coaching, the
expert is required to monitor the student's progress and understanding. Such
monitoring processes are demanding and complex, and they are not well
understood by cognitive psychologists. It is not now clear which aspects of
cognitive apprenticeship are more effective in promoting learning—modeling or
scaffolding and coaching. It is likely that the advantage gained results from an
interactive effect. An excellent example of a successful apprenticeship learning
program is provided by Brown and Palincsar (1989), in which they used
modeling, coaching, and scaffolding to teach students four strategic skills for
reading comprehension: formulating questions about the text, summarizing,
making predictions about what will come next in the text, and clarifying
difficulties with the text. The students' acquisition and use of these skills
improved their comprehension tremendously.
MODELING EXPERTISE 63
of ambiguity, conflicts, and so forth, which will allow the student to modify his
or her own problem-solving or decision-making processes. Reflection seems to
involve complex processes: since it is known that confrontation by a teacher is
not necessarily an effective means of instruction, it is not clear why self-perceived
conflicts as obtained through reflection would be effective at promoting learning.
Exploration refers to the pursuing of new goals, formulating and testing new
hypotheses, conducting experiments, and so forth. Although it may not be clear
why each of these processes might work, the common characteristic of
articulation, reflection, and exploration is the pursuit of activities that can foster
an integration and synthesis of a student's newly acquired knowledge, so that
additional knowledge can be inferred and constructed.
It is important to emphasize that in cognitive apprenticeship one cannot
separate the role of the expert from the role of the learner. The expert's role
entails modeling the target skill, preferably accompanying it with explanation of
the rationales; modeling the use of learning and monitoring strategies; monitoring
the student's progress and understanding; and providing feedback. How all this is
accomplished in a social context is not yet understood. In fact, studies of tutoring
show that experts in a tutoring situation often do not formulate ideas of students'
mental models nor tailor feedback to the student's current level of understanding
(Putnam, 1987). Hence, an important aspect of cognitive apprenticeship lies in
the constructive activities in which the student or apprentice engages. We return
to this point below.
MODELING EXPERTISE 64
MODELING EXPERTISE 65
at the chessboard before they will remember the locations of all the chess pieces
(Chi, 1978).
An example from physics problem solving shows another dimension of
students' knowledge. Because experts can “see” beyond the surface description of
a problem, and “know” the solution procedure, they tend to solve a problem by
the appropriate method, such as using the force law. A student, however, might
solve a pulley problem the same way he or she solved a previous pulley problem,
simply because they both involve pulleys, without realizing that these two
problems may require two different solution methods.
In sum, experts excel on laboratory tasks in their domain of expertise (see
also Chi et al., 1988; Hoffman, 1991). There are two ways to explain why they
excel: in terms of their knowledge structures or in terms of the strategies and
heuristics they use. Each of these is discussed below.
MODELING EXPERTISE 66
playing. Chase and Simon (1973) showed that chess masters “see” patterns of
interrelated chess pieces on the chess board. It is these familiar patterns of pieces
that enable them to select the best move because these familiar patterns are
associated with optimal moves.
Experts know many more facts than do nonexperts. In a domain such as
physics, it is obvious that students must learn many facts—such as “A point mass
may be considered to be a body” in Newton's force law, or that g is the
gravitational constant. In another example of knowing more facts, of taxi drivers'
knowledge of routes, Chase (1983) found that expert drivers can generate a far
greater number of secondary routes (lesser known streets) than novice drivers;
furthermore, they can use this knowledge by generating short-cuts to reach a
target destination when there is an impasse on the main routes.
Again, the organization of facts is what facilitates their efficient use and
what distinguishes expertise. A commonly discussed representation for factual
knowledge is the schema or mental model, which is a knowledge structure that
captures the essential features of concepts, categories, situations, or events. Thus,
one way that factual knowledge about a category or an event is made coherent is
through the structure imposed by a schema. For example, a schema about the
concept of dog would contain prototypical instances, as well as key features that
are true of a generic dog. Each feature can be thought of as a dimension with a
range of acceptable values. Similarly, a complete coherent mental model of a city
permits expert cab drivers to take efficient secondary routes when they encounter
road blocks on the primary routes.
Mental models are analogous to a “structured analog of the
world” (Johnson-Laird, 1983:165). They represent not only the objects and
properties comprising a system or event, but, more importantly, they represent the
structural, functional, and causal relations among the components. Moreover, a
mental model can be “run” so that it can capture the dynamic aspects of a system.
In many ways, one can conceive of experts' superior skill as having more accurate
mental models.
Procedural knowledge generally refers to how one performs a task. There
are two kinds of procedural knowledge. Domain-specific procedural rules are
specific how-to rules that have actions attached to the conditions of application in
the domain. For instance, in the domain of electronic troubleshooting, seeing a
flashing light might trigger a rule of checking the power switch or some other
switch. Domain-specific procedural knowledge, as the name implies, is related to
a specific domain and cannot be used in a different domain; expert chemists, for
instance, cannot solve agriculture problems (Voss et al., 1983).
It is clear that experts possess a large quantity of procedural rules that enable
them to perform a task automatically and efficiently, as soon as
MODELING EXPERTISE 67
they “see” the conditions. It should be stressed that the conditions are visible for
all to see, but only the experts realize the import or meaningfulness of what is
seen. Experts can perform some tasks automatically because many of these
procedural rules, over time and with repeated use, become combined into one
larger rule. Thus, several rules would have all their conditions concatenated, and
upon seeing the conditions, a sequence of actions is automatically taken.
Procedural knowledge is generally represented by condition-action rules, and the
entire set of rules is called a production system.
Metaknowledge is knowledge about what one knows, as well as one's ability
to monitor one's own comprehension state. This kind of knowledge has been
tapped by tasks such as asking people to judge the difficulty of a problem and to
allocate time and resources efficiently, which necessitates being sensitive to their
capabilities and limitations. For example, experts are much more accurate than
novices at judging how difficult it is to solve a given physics problem (Chi et al.,
1982); good students are better at allocating their time for studying; and good
students also are better at knowing when they understand the material and when
they do not (Chi et al., 1989b).
MODELING EXPERTISE 68
the cases are drawn from other dinosaurs, in fact, dinosaurs from the same
family; in contrast, novices use other animals as comparative cases from which to
reason analogically. Similarly, Schauble et al. (1989) looked at how good and
poor solvers predict the outcome of a simple circuit and found that the solvers'
understanding of the circuit exhibited the use of analogies. Both the good and the
poor solvers showed the same frequency of analogy usage. The success of the
good solvers, however, seemed to depend on their ability to pick the right
analogy, one that shows deep understanding of both the analogy and the target
domain. Thus, it appears that the availability of general strategies per se is not the
deciding factor in determining an expert's superior performance; rather, it is the
application of a general strategy to a well-organized knowledge domain that is
critical.
One type of a general “divide-and-conquer” strategy is simplification, or
decomposition. The strategy involves breaking down a problem into its subparts,
solving each subproblem, and, finally, putting all the subproblem solutions
together. Jeffries et al. (1981) found that the way expert software designers solve a
complex problem is by decomposing it into simpler problems for which they
already know the solutions. Another variant of the divide-and-conquer strategy is
“subgoaling,” which is simply picking out an intermediate state on the solution
path as the temporary goal. In effect, subgoaling also divides a problem into two
or more subproblems, thus reducing the entire search space into a smaller one
after the subgoal is reached.
One common interpretation of these results is that experts' performance is
far superior to that of novices because they use these strategies. One could
equally argue, however, that the use of these strategies is a manifestation of the
content knowledge that the experts have, and that these general strategies are
available to everyone, novices and experts alike. The strategies are not used
efficiently by the novices because their inadequate knowledge base does not
permit such use. Thus, adopting strategies alone is not adequate for guiding a
novice's execution of a solution, even though the trace of an expert's execution of
the solution reflects the use of such a strategy.
A domain-specific reasoning strategy could either be a specific procedural
rule that an expert knows in a given domain (e.g., if light A flashes, push switch
X) or the application of a general strategy to a specific piece of knowledge. For
instance, when an expert radiologist reads an X-ray efficiently and correctly, it
need not imply that he or she used a more sophisticated scanning strategy, but,
rather, that the radiologist recognized one shaded area as malignant, which
suggested that another area might also be malignant (Lesgold et al., 1988). That
is, the scanning path was dictated by the knowledge of what related areas may
MODELING EXPERTISE 69
be malignant. This declarative knowledge would lead an expert to scan the two
targeted area consecutively. Similarly, chess masters scan the chessboard very
efficiently, in that they focus on the key important pieces on the board, such as
the locations of the queen, king, rook, etc. (Simon and Barenfeld, 1969).
Although much research has been devoted to showing how efficiently experts use
specific strategies, the committee concludes that such use of efficient strategies is
often a manifestation of an underlying coherent and rich knowledge base. This
conclusion suggests that direct instruction of general strategies for novices may
not always be helpful.
MODELING EXPERTISE 70
MODELING EXPERTISE 71
MODELING EXPERTISE 72
skills in a way to ensure transfer and learning with understanding. This section
discusses three approaches: direct instruction, computer-aided support systems,
and cognitive apprenticeship.
Direct Instruction
The most traditional way of instructing skills is through a formal classroom,
using textbooks and teachers' lectures. We need not recount here the failures that
have been encountered by this approach. The most serious problem is that
knowledge learned in a training setting or classroom does not transfer to the
criterion setting—the real world. The appropriate conditions under which such a
skill needs to be accessed and executed are not attached to the actions during
training. For instance, the first thing fire fighters are typically taught to do is
search and rescue. However, they are not usually taught the conditions under
which such a routine should be disregarded, such as when a fire is getting started,
and there could be a good chance of extinguishing it (Klein, 1990). Skill
instruction typically focuses on a set of executable actions, and the relation
between the actions and the conditions are usually not specified in the classroom.
If instruction takes place in the targeted context, however, actions can be
associated with the proper conditions.
One approach to textbook learning in the classroom that may meet with
more success is to focus attention on the worked-out solutions or examples in the
textbook. Zhu and Simon (1987) have even shown a clear advantage if students
are given only examples and problems to solve, as opposed to standard instruction
with a textbook and instructor's presentations: a 3-year mathematics course can be
reduced to 2 years. In laboratory studies, there is evidence showing that students
prefer to rely on examples. Pirolli and Anderson (1985) found that novices rely
heavily on analogies to examples in the early stages of learning: 18 of their 19
students used the example presented in the text as a template for solving their
first programming problem. Futhermore, Chi et al. (1989b) further showed that
not only are there quantitative differences in how frequently examples are used as a
function of the students' skill at solving problems, but also that there is a
qualitative difference in how examples are used. Successful solvers of physics
problems used the examples about 2½ times per problem solution; less successful
solvers used the examples 6½ times per problem solution. Successful solvers used
the example only as a reference; less successful solvers reread virtually all of the
example each time it was consulted, which suggests that they were searching
aimlessly for a solution. Thus, beginning students rely on examples for learning
to solve problems, even though there are differences among students in the extent
of their reliance.
MODELING EXPERTISE 73
LeFevre and Dixon (1986) found that subjects actually prefer to use the example
information and ignore the written instruction when learning a procedural task.
One of the reasons that examples are so popular and useful, even though they are
often inadequate in explaining the rationale behind each action taken in the
solution, is that the examples contain many of the procedural actions that are not
explicated in texts (Chi and VanLehn, 1991): the text usually presents concepts
and principles; the examples contain the actions that are executed to solve the
problem.
Although, in general, classroom instruction has not been very successful,
there is room for improvement. As suggested above, two promising directions are
to link the actions with the appropriate conditions and to focus more attention on
examples in a text. A third approach is group discussion, which has been shown
recently to improve learning in the classroom (Brown and Palincsar, 1989;
Lampert, 1986; Minstrell, 1989).
MODELING EXPERTISE 74
system such as SHERLOCK (Lajoie and Lesgold, 1989) can solve a specified set
of problems, and a system such as the Intelligent Maintenance Training System
(Towne and Monroe, 1988) can troubleshoot any problem that the student poses
to it. Thus, the effect of having a built-in expert system is that it can provide
feedback (the solution) to the student. A drawback, however, is that the feedback
is not sensitive to the student's understanding.
A full-fledged intelligent tutoring system has four components: a practice
environment for solving problems, an expert system that knows how to solve all
the problems, a model of the student (in terms of understanding how the student
solves a problem, rather than whether the student's solution approximates the
expert's solution), and a system for pedagogy. At the present time, there is no
system that completely incorporates all these components. The best
approximations are Burton and Brown's (1982) “How the West Was Won”
system, and Clancey's (1983) Guidon system. Burton and Brown's system is
designed to teach children basic arithmetic operations in the context of a game
that is a variant of Chutes and Ladders. The system observes students as they play
the game and gives them hints or advice at critical moments. Since it is a very
simple game, the essence of the system is based on an analysis of the task, which
divides it into subskills. The subskills are arranged in an hierarchy and each
player's move is analyzed to determine the subskill to which it corresponds.
Erroneous moves are compared with the subskills to see which one has been
overlooked. Thus, the computer coach delivers feedback as a function of the
match or mismatch between the student's moves and the subskill hierarchy. The
coach also has heuristics for how to deliver instruction. Such pedagogical
heuristics include rules of thumb, such as only give unsolicited advice when the
player has made three or four moves without asking for advice. Hence, the system
contains a practice environment; an expert system, in that the system knows how
to play the game; a simple student model; and a pedagogy system, in its ability to
monitor students' “understanding” of the game and deliver feedback selectively
on the basis of the student's moves.
MODELING EXPERTISE 75
MODELING EXPERTISE 76
REFERENCES
Abelson, H., and A.A. diSessa 1980 Turtle Geometry: The Computer as a Medium for Exploring
Mathematics. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Anderson, J.R. 1974 Retrieval of propositional information from long-term memory. Cognitive
Psychology 6:451-474.
Azmitia, M. 1988 Peer interaction and problem solving: when are two heads better than one? Child
Development 59:87-96.
MODELING EXPERTISE 77
Brown, A.L., and A.S. Palincsar 1989 Guided, cooperative learning and individual knowledge
acquisition. Pp. 393-452 in L.B. Resnick, ed., Knowing, Learning, and Instruction: Essays in
Honor of Robert Glaser. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Burton, R.R., and J.S. Brown 1982 An investigation of computer coaching for informal learning
activities. Pp. 79-98 in D. Sleeman and J.S. Brown, eds., Intelligent Tutoring Systems. New
York: Academic Press.
Charness, N. 1979 Components of skill in bridge. Canadian Journal of Psychology 33:1-16.
Chase, W.G. 1983 Spatial representation of taxi drivers. Pp. 391-411 in D.R. Rogers and J.A.
Sloboda, eds., The Acquisition of Symbolic Skills. New York: Plenum Press.
Chase, W.G., and K.A. Ericsson 1981 Skilled memory. In J.R. Anderson, ed. Cognitive Skills and
Their Acquisition. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Chase, W.G., and H.A. Simon 1973 Perception in chess. Cognitive Psychology 5:55-81.
Chi, M.T.H. 1978 Knowledge structures and memory development. In R.S. Siegler, ed., Children's
Thinking: What Develops? Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Chi, M.T.H., and R. Koeske 1983 Network representation of a child's dinosaur knowledge.
Developmental Psychology 19:29-39.
Chi, M.T.H., and K.A. VanLehn 1991 The content of self-explanations. Journal of the Learning
Sciences. In press.
Chi, M.T.H., R. Glaser, and E. Rees 1982 Expertise in problem solving. Pp. 7-76 in R. Sternberg, ed.,
Advances in the Psychology of Human Intelligence. Vol. 1. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Chi, M.T.H., R. Glaser, and M.J. Farr, eds. 1988 The Nature of Expertise. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Chi, M.T.H., J. Hutchinson, and A.F. Robin 1989a How inferences about novel domain-related
concepts can be constrained by structured knowledge. Merrill-Palmer Quarterly 25:27-62.
Chi, M.T.H., M. Bassok, M. Lewis, Reimann, and R. Glaser 1989b Self-explanations: how students
study and use examples in learning to solve problems. Cognitive Science 13:145-182.
Chiesi, H.L., G.J. Spilich, and J.F. Voss 1979 Acquisition of domain-related information in relation to
high and low domain knowledge. Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior
18:257-273.
Clancey, W. 1983 Guidon. Journal of Computer-Based Instruction 10:8-14.
Collins, A., and A.L. Stevens 1983 A cognitive theory of interactive teaching. In C.M. Reigeluth, ed.,
Instructional Design Theories and Models: An Overview. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Collins, A., Brown, J.S., and S.E Newman 1989 Cognitive apprenticeship: Teaching the crafts of
reading, writing, and mathematics. L. Resnick, ed., Knowing, Learning, and Instruction:
Essays in Honor of Robert Glaser. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Cooke, N.M., and J.E. McDonald 1987 The application of psychological scaling techniques to
knowledge elicitation for
MODELING EXPERTISE 78
MODELING EXPERTISE 79
Reitman, J. 1976 Skilled perception in GO: deducing memory structures from inter-response times.
Cognitive Psychology 8:336-356.
Rogoff, B. 1986 Adult assistance of children's learning. In T.E. Raphael, ed. The Contexts of School-
Based Literacy. New York: Random House.
Rosch, E., C.B. Mervis, W.D. Gray, D.M. Johnsen, and P. Boyes-Graem 1976 Basic objects in
natural categories. Cognitive Psychology 8:382-440.
Scardamalia, M., C. Bereiter, and R. Steinbach 1984 Teachability of reflective processes in written
composition. Cognitive Science 8:173-190.
Schauble, L., K. Raghavan, R. Glaser, and M. Reiner 1989 Causal Models and Processes of
Discovery. Technical Report. Learning Research and Development Center, University of
Pittsburgh.
Schoenfeld, A.H. 1983 Problem Solving in the Mathematics Curriculum: A Report,
Recommendations and an Annotated Bibliography. The Mathematical Association of
America, MAA Notes, No. 1.
Schuell, T.J. 1991 Designing instructional computing systems for meaningful learning. In P.H. Winne
and M. Jones, eds., Foundations and Frontiers in Instructional Computing Systems. New
York: Springer-Verlag.
Sharpies, M. 1980 A Computer Written Language Lab. DAI Working Paper No. 134. Artificial
Intelligence Department, University of Edinburgh, Scotland.
Simon, H.A., and M. Barenfeld 1969 Information-processing analysis of perceptual processes in
problem solving. Psychological Review 76:473-483.
Towne, D.M., and A. Monroe 1988 The intelligent maintenance training system. Pp. 479-530 in J.
Psotka, L.D. Massey, and S.A. Mutter, eds.,Intelligent Tutoring Systems: Lessons Learned.
Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Voss, J.F., J.R. Greene, T.A. Post, and B.C. Penner 1983 Problem solving skill in the social sciences.
Pp. 165-213 in G.H. Bower, ed., The Psychology of Learning and Motivation: Advances in
Research and Theory, Vol. 17. New York: Academic Press.
Vygotsky, L.S. 1978 Mind in Society: The Development of Higher Psychological Processes.
Collected writings by Vygotsky. Edited and transcribed by M. Cole, V. John-Steiner, S.
Scribner, and E. Souberman. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Williams, M., J. Hollan, and A. Stevens 1981 An overview of STEAMER: an advanced computer
assisted instructional system for propulsion engineering. Behavior Research Methods and
Instrumentation 13:85-90.
Wood, D., and D. Middleton 1975 A study of assisted problem-solving. British Journal of
Psychology 66:181-191.
Zhu, X., and H.A. Simon 1987 Learning mathematics from examples and by doing. Cognition and
Instruction 4:137-166.
DEVELOPING CAREERS 80
5
Developing Careers
DEVELOPING CAREERS 81
Propositions
The research literature points to seven basic propositions that should
undergird any set of programs aimed at strengthening career development
processes.
1. Each successively higher organizational level imposes new and broadened
demands on knowledge and skills. It has long been known that upper-
level executives formulate broad strategies, middle-level managers
translate those strategies into operational goals, and lower-level managers
or supervisors implement methods to achieve those goals. A recent IBM
study, for example, found that top-level executives spend a great
DEVELOPING CAREERS 82
DEVELOPING CAREERS 83
DEVELOPING CAREERS 84
these critical junctures can best be used for career development that will
benefit both the individual and the organization.
5. Individuals need at least some information about the requirements of
positions at least two levels above their current position in addition to
information about their current and next-level positions. This proposition
argues that if individuals are to formulate realistic plans for their career
development they need to receive information not only about their current
jobs and those immediately ahead at the next level, but also about jobs and
positions at least one level beyond that. In this way, they should have an
improved perspective about how their current activities relate to the kinds
of demands and requirements that will have to be met if they are to be
promoted. Thus, ideally, both current and future job performance are
enhanced.
The Army, like many organizations, already provides considerable training
for positions at the current level in the organization and, often, the immediate
next level. This proposition suggests that additional information on the types of
capabilities, knowledge, and skills that may be required in the future be provided
at relatively early stages in a person's Army career. This would permit the
individual to engage in more long-range and effective planning for his or her
career. While obviously not all officers will advance two levels from their current
level, such information would help all officers better understand the organization
of which they are a part and how their current assignment relates to it. Research
on career motivation indicates that such motivation is higher in organizations that
treat individuals as resources for the future as well as for the present (Bray et al.,
1974; Hall, 1976; London, 1985).
6. When individuals plan ahead in making career decisions, they make better
decisions. The more thought individuals give to making future career
decisions, the better will be the quality of those decisions. This
proposition implies obtaining as much relevant information as possible in
advance of a career decision about one's self in relation to future job and
organizational requirements. It also implies that it will be necessary to
analyze and interpret such information so that it can be used effectively.
Clearly, therefore, in the Army context there is a joint role for both an
individual officer and the Army: both parties need to understand their
complementary obligations to be as thoughtful as possible in career
decisions. Uninformed or ill-informed career aspirations and decisions
help neither an individual nor the organization.
7. Self-assessment is a potentially valuable aid in making informed career
decisions. Self-assessment (in the context of this chapter) can be thought
of as the systematic process of generating data about oneself
DEVELOPING CAREERS 85
Objectives
In this section we outline five major objectives, or action steps, for a
systematic approach to career development programs. These action steps are
based on the seven propositions identified in the preceding pages and current
scientific knowledge about career development in organizations. They form a
logical sequence, starting with an analysis of current skill requirements and
career programs and ending with on-going and future evaluation of the entire
process. (These steps in turn lead to the section on research priorities.)
Objective 1. Analyze current skill requirements and career programs. In the
Army, a comprehensive review of current skill requirements and career programs
would involve the following kinds of actions: an analysis of key technical skills
required of officers at different levels and in different functional areas; an
analysis of the current levels of skill of officers; and an inventory of existing
career planning programs, assessment procedures, and career paths. The intent of
this
DEVELOPING CAREERS 86
first objective is to determine how well current needs are being met and to
provide benchmarks for evaluating gaps between current and future required
skills. Meeting this first objective would clarify the extent of integration among
current approaches to skill development and career planning in the Army and,
likewise, the extent to which there are gaps and discontinuities.
Objective 2. Identify skills and leadership styles that will be needed to a
greater extent in the future in the Army. This objective is designed specifically to
take into account the changing political, economic, and social conditions that will
exist in the 1990s and beyond. Expected and desired skills and leadership styles
appropriate to the future need to be identified and then compared with existing
skills and requirements so that they can be incorporated into career development
programs. Some skills and styles that may be relatively more emphasized in the
future might include, for example: understanding world economic and political
conditions; analyzing ambiguous situations that have no “right” or “wrong”
answers; empowering subordinates; negotiating; resolving conflicts; building
intergroup relations; and making complex resource allocation decisions. The
relevance of each of these (and other similar skills and approaches to leadership)
to positions at different organizational levels and functional areas need to be
analyzed as a basis for communicating and incorporating them into career
planning and development programs, as well as used as a basis for training,
appraisal, and reward systems.
Objective 3. Design a systematic and continuous career planning and
development process. On the basis of the results of achieving the first two
objectives, the Army should proceed to design a set of career planning and
development programs that are both systematic and continuous. This process
assumes that officers themselves should have the central role and responsibility
for their own career planning and development while the institution, the Army,
provides the enabling resources. Guidelines for designing such a comprehensive
and continuous process might include the following: assessment and self-
assessment methods that cover a wide range of individual characteristics;
information that is available to the officer concerning a range of specific career
opportunities in the Army and the leadership and management skills requirements
associated with each opportunity; the encouragement and expectation that
officers will use that information to set their own educational and top experience
goals; an explicit career planning process that can be applied to each major
function and level of the Army; and reasonable opportunity for officers to
determine their career directions within the limits of Army needs and
requirements.
DEVELOPING CAREERS 87
DEVELOPING CAREERS 88
DEVELOPING CAREERS 89
ARMY PROGRAMS
Like many institutions, the Army has recognized the importance of
considering the development of careers as a part of its approach to training.
Although there is no system-wide program, a number of Army training facilities
and bases have developed programs that include goal setting and self-reflection
for career guidance. While sharing the overall objective of facilitating career
planning, the programs vary in emphasis placed on particular techniques or
procedures. These programs have been developed at the initiative of the local
commanding officer; they offer alternatives to the traditional one-on-one
counseling conducted between a soldier and his or her immediate supervisor.
Four centers have established programs: the Army War College (AWC) at
Carlisle, Pennsylvania; the National Defense University (NDU) in Washington,
D.C.; Fort Bliss near El Paso, Texas; and Fort Leavenworth in Leavenworth,
Kansas. Participation at all the locations is intended only to help students expand
their own self-awareness; the evaluations are not retained by the organization for
administrative use.
Self-Assessment Instruments
Career counseling programs use several instruments intended to provide
students with a variety of ways to view themselves on certain dimensions of
intrapersonal and interpersonal styles. Five instruments are used in many of these
programs: the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, the Kirton Adaption-Innovation
Inventory, the Leader Effectiveness and Adaptability Description, the Terminal
and Instrumental Values Surveys, and the Organizational Values Survey.
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) The MBTI uses four indices, which
are said to represent personality tendencies: “extraversion-introversion” (E-I),
which is the distinction between whether a person prefers the external world of
people and things or the internal world of ideas; “sensing-intuition” (S-N), which
distinguishes between whether a person pays more attention to realistic, practical
data or to one's imagination and the possibilities of a situation; “thinking-
feeling” (T-F), which is the difference between valuing impersonal logic or
personal values and emotions when processing information or making decisions;
“judging-perceiving” (J-P), which distinguishes between analyzing and
categorizing the external environment and responding to it flexibly and
spontaneously. The questions used to develop the four indices take the following
form: “When you go somewhere for the day, would you rather (A) plan what you
will do and when, or (B) just go?” The combination
DEVELOPING CAREERS 90
of the four indices is a type or representation of how one operates in the world
(e.g., ENTJ or ISFP). The type indices serve as a basis for guided discussions
that usually take place in small groups.
Kirton Adaption-Innovation Inventory (KAI) This instrument is
designed to measure different approaches to creativity, problem solving, and
decision making. It provides a score on a continuum ranging from highly adaptive
to highly innovative. “Adaptors” are regarded as those who produce ideas based
on stretching existing agreed parameters, that is, improving and doing better.
“Innovators” are assumed to be more likely to reconstruct the problem, expanding
beyond current paradigms, that is, doing things differently. The questions take the
following form: “How easy or difficult do you find it to present yourself,
consistently, over a long period as a person who is patient?”
Leader Effectiveness and Adaptability Description (LEAD-Self) This
instrument is designed to measure self-perception of three aspects of leadership
behavior: style, style range, and style adaptability or effectiveness. It is based on
the Hersey-Blanchard (1977) situational theory of leadership that distinguishes
between the amount of task direction and the amount of socio-emotional support a
leader provides, given the situation and the responsiveness of the followers or
group. A companion to the LEAD-Self is the LEAD-Other instrument, which
asks a respondent to describe the leadership behavior of another person.
Terminal and Instrumental Values Surveys Designed by Rokeach (1973,
1979), these surveys present students with lists of terminal values (states of
existence, e.g., a comfortable or exciting life) and instrumental values (modes of
conduct, e.g., active, ambitious, broadminded). The instruments are designed to
identify the guiding values in a student's life. Respondents are asked to compare
the values, arranged alphabetically, in terms of importance to them as guiding
principles in their lives.
Organizational Values Survey This survey presents students with a list of
values that might exist in an organization and form the climate of that
organization, e.g., achieving, balanced, caring. Students are asked to put the
alphabetically arranged values in priority order, in terms of whether they are
reflected in the organization in which they work and whether the organization
orders them in the same way.
DEVELOPING CAREERS 91
DEVELOPING CAREERS 92
Fort Bliss
At Fort Bliss two general training courses, officer basic training and officer
advanced training, are preceded by several self-assessment inventories. A nurse
administers a health risk assessment survey and a chaplain administers a life
expectancy stress test and the MBTI. Results are discussed on a one-on-one basis
with each student, who also takes diagnostic tests for skills in such technical
areas as computer literacy and map reading.
Fort Leavenworth
The Fort Leavenworth approach to career development is based on
performance assessments that are part of a Leadership Assessment and
Development Program (LADP). The LADP combines self-assessment with the
assessments made by peers and trained assessors in nine areas: technical and
tactical proficiency, communications, professional ethics, planning, management
technology, decision making, teaching and counseling, supervision, and soldier
team development. The assessor ratings are based on actual task performances
(identified with various types of leadership positions), repeated for diverse tasks
performed by students throughout the duration of the course, and also are made
by different assessors. Some assessments are made quickly, for example,
reactions to situations can be assessed in 10 minutes; other assessments are made
over a longer period of time, for example, performing as a platoon leader on a
tactical mission. The information gathered from these assessments are
consolidated by senior assessors who prepare final assessment reports that serve
as a plan for self-development. Like students at the AWC program, students at
Fort Leavenworth engage in goal-setting exercises after a data-gathering phase.
Unlike the students at the AWC, these students are provided with performance-
based information that they can take into account in setting their goals. They are
also given an opportunity to consider performance requirements for tasks at
higher levels in the organizational hierarchy. (The issue of anticipating possible
future performance requirements is discussed above in conjunction
DEVELOPING CAREERS 93
Survey of Effects
The four programs are similar in some respects, but they also differ.
Although they all use self-assessment and goal-setting exercises, a key difference
is between the programs that rely exclusively on self-assessment information for
counseling (AWC, NDU) and the programs that use this information as part of a
comprehensive performance evaluation that provides the basis for goal setting
and planning (Fort Leavenworth).
The committee did not undertake an evaluation of these programs. It did,
however, develop an approach to program evaluation that could serve as a model
for systematic appraisal of effects. The approach entailed a questionnaire
designed to assess several types of impacts: memory of feedback from
instruments, relative value of various parts of the program or instruments,
insights about self and others, follow-up actions in the short and long term, and
overall impact on behavior and decisions. The questionnaire was divided into
several parts, including questions about the program in general and about each of
the self-assessment instruments used in the program in particular.
A pilot study was conducted with a sample of students in the 1989-1990
class at the AWC. These students participated in the AWC career development
program during the latter part of August 1989. The questionnaires were
administered in early February 1990, permitting sufficient time for assessments
of memory and impact. The six parts consisted of questions about the overall
program and memory and impact questions about each of the instruments used in
that program and described above: the MBTI (Myers and McCaulley, 1985);
LEAD-Self (Hersey and Blanchard, 1977); KAI (Kirton, 1984); terminal and
instrumental values surveys (Rokeach, 1973, 1979); and values sought in the
organization. The set of questions asked about each instrument was roughly
parallel and concluded with a rating on a five-step scale of its impact on behavior
and decisions, ranging from “very much” to “none.” Results are summarized in
terms of percentages of responses in each of the areas assessed, followed by
concluding observations.
On Memory Virtually all respondents (97 percent) remembered having
taken the MBTI, as well as the letter symbols (97 percent) and where they
“scored” on each type scale as defined by the instrument (87 percent).
DEVELOPING CAREERS 94
This contrasts with 61, 68, and 68 percent recall for having taken the LEAD-Self,
the KAI, and the Rokeach inventories, respectively.2 The contrast between these
instruments in recall is more evident with regard to specific results, with only 26,
13, and 13 percent of the respondents recalling their specific leadership style,
style range, and style effectiveness, respectively. Of the respondents, 65 percent
did not remember the values they listed on either the instrumental or terminal
values survey, while very few recalled the values listed on the instrument “values I
seek in my organization” (87 percent had no recall for any of the values listed).
Specific memory for scores obtained on the KAI was better, with 65 percent of
the respondents remembering where they fell on a continuum between “highly
adaptive” and “highly innovative.”
On New Insights A large number of the respondents indicated that the
results confirmed what they already knew about themselves: 84 percent on the
MBTI feedback; 55 percent on LEAD (48 percent indicated that the results were
consistent with what supervisors or peers said about them); 65 percent on the
KAI (58 percent indicated that these results were consistent with what
supervisors and/or peers said about them); 26 percent for the Rokeach inventories
(74 percent had no answer to this question) and 48 percent for organizational
values. Few respondents indicated how any of the instruments, other than the
MBTI, were of value to them; about half of the respondents had no answer to
each of the questions asked about the specific instruments.
On Impact Eighty percent of the respondents indicated that the MBTI had
either “very much” or “some” impact on their behavior. This contrasts to 33, 29,
33, and 39 percent for the other instruments. Equally compelling are the
differences between the instruments on answers indicating “very little” or no
impact: 12 percent for the MBTI compared with 28, 36, 36, and 35 percent for
each of the other instruments. Virtually all the respondents indicated that the
MBTI made them more aware of themselves and others, with 74 percent
indicating that it caused them to change their behavior in relating to others,
although they did not indicate what changes occurred. Few respondents indicated
that any of the other instruments would lead them to make changes in their
behavior: 16 percent on the LEAD, 16 percent on the KAI, 23 percent for the
Rokeach values, and 23 percent for organizational values.
On the MBTI Clearly, this instrument had the strongest impact, with 61
percent of the respondents indicating that it was the aspect of the overall program
that they found to be most helpful. While 71 percent found the follow-up
discussion to be the most valuable part of the
DEVELOPING CAREERS 95
process, 23 percent thought that it was this part in particular that needed to be
improved. Interestingly, however, the MBTI made more respondents
uncomfortable (26 percent) than the other instruments (3, 3, 13, and 6 percent).
Yet this did not prevent a large number of the respondents from indicating that
they plan to take specific actions in the future based on the MBTI information (61
percent). However, further probes did not reveal what these actions were, despite
the 42 percent of respondents who indicated that they actually did take some
actions in the period between participation in the program and administration of
the questionnaire. (It is noted that this may be an inflated figure, since many of
the respondents may have been motivated by social desirability or a need for
self-justification.)
On the Program Practically all respondents (97 percent) indicated that the
program should be continued, with few specific suggestions about how it might
be improved (23 percent said that an MBTI “follow-up” should be undertaken).
While seeming to be satisfied with the program, few respondents indicated
specific actions that they plan to take as a result of participation. With regard to
aspects of the program that they viewed as being least helpful, about half had no
answer; 16 percent said the Rokeach surveys, 13 percent said the LEAD survey,
and 9 percent said that the KAI was least helpful.
These results suggest several conclusions. First, the MBTI had a very
different effect on respondents than all the other instruments: on memory, on
self-insights, and on short- and long-term planning and actions (although the
specific behavior changes were not identified). So influential was this instrument
that a number of respondents indicated that some kind of follow-up (or periodic
discussions) would be the best way of improving the program. Although probes
on the meaning of “follow-up” were not made, it would appear that it refers to
guidance on ways to use the feedback.
Second, an inconsistency in responses about the MBTI is its apparent
impact on the one hand and the indication by most respondents that it confirmed
what they already knew on the other. Perhaps it is that very confirmation that
leads to action. Dissonant or inconsistent information may have the effect of
producing either inaction or no change from previous behavior.
Third, the other instruments seemed to have little impact and unimpressive
recall. It would be interesting to probe further for explanations: for example, are
the results due to a lack of saliency of the content and topics addressed by the
instruments or due to the way they are administered and discussed in class?
Fourth, while almost all respondents found the overall AWC program
DEVELOPING CAREERS 96
Reliability
A number of reliability studies of the MBTI have been conducted. Corrected
split-half and alpha reliability coefficients for continuous scores on each of the
attitudes and functions typically range from .75 to .85, with some variation on the
different scales (Bittle, 1987; Carlson, 1985; Myers and McCaulley, 1985;
DeVito, 1985; Carlyn, 1977). While these results are acceptable, they do not
address the key theoretical issue of the MBTI, which is stability of type. Test-
retest reliabilities of type designations are more relevant. Myers and McCaulley
(1985) report
DEVELOPING CAREERS 97
Validity
A number of different types of studies address the issue of validity:
correspondences with self-typing, correlations with other instruments, behavior in
experimental situations, and differences in MBTI profiles by occupation. The
evidence from these studies is particularly relevant to the type of validity referred
to as “construct validity.”
One approach to validation consists of comparing judgments made by
analysts who are familiar with the Jungian philosophy underlying the instrument
with analysts who are unfamiliar with that philosophy. Bradway's (1964) study
showed differential correspondences between the self-typing and MBTI-typing
for a sample of Jungian analysts: 100 percent agreement for the I-E comparisons,
68 percent for the S-N comparisons, 61 percent for the T-F comparisons, and 43
percent on all three dimensions in one study; 96, 75, 72, and 43 percent,
respectively, in another study. Similar results were obtained in the correlational
study reported by Stricker and Ross (1964). Less impressive results were obtained
in studies using subjects who were less familiar with Jungian theory. Low
correlations between self-typing and MBTI-typing were reported in the studies
reviewed by Cohen et al. (1981). Subjects
DEVELOPING CAREERS 98
in these studies were graduate students trained to use the Jungian typology for
conducting interviews with other students.
Myers and McCaulley (1985) present correlational data from 20 studies
showing relationships between MBTI scales and a wide variety of other
instruments. They concluded that the I-E scale has good construct validity: it has
high correlations with comparable scales of other instruments and low
correlations with instruments designed to represent other constructs. In contrast,
the S-N and T-F scales show relatively weak validity, with only moderate
correlations with other instruments designed to measure similar constructs. Since
these findings are based largely on high school and college student samples,
however, caution is advised in attempting to generalize from them.
Several studies examined relationships between the I-E scale and observed
behavior in experimental situations. The Carskadon (1979) study found
differences between extraverts and introverts on some aspects of self-presentation
during a “political talk,” but these findings were not replicated in another study
that was done more carefully by the same author and colleagues (Vargo et al.,
1986). Two other behavioral studies show partial support for the I-E scale: Moore
and Carskadon (1984) found that their extraverts were more likely than introverts
to observe people in the environment but not things. And Shapiro and Alexander
(1969) found that extraverts preferred to wait with others for the occurrence of a
fearful situation while the introverts preferred being alone.
Large data sets have been developed by Van Velsor (1988) and Myers and
McCaulley (1985) on type preferences for people in different occupations. In
general, sales people, entertainers, counselors, and managers and administrators
have higher percentages of extraverts, while librarians, archivists, computer
specialists, and medical doctors have higher percentages of introverts; farmers,
clerical workers, and military personnel have higher proportions of sensors while
social scientists, artists, counselors, and lawyers have higher proportions of
intuitors. Some of the comparisons are presented as combinations of types: for
example, INFPs have higher than expected proportions of counselors, clinical
psychologists, writers, and journalists, or ENTJs will attract attorneys, managers,
sales personnel, and engineers.
The temptation to use these data for vocational counseling should be
tempered by three methodological problems. First, there is weak discrimination
among occupations due to an overlap between the types and preferred
occupations. Second, there is a lack of attention to normative data: for example,
12.4 percent of elementary teachers are ESFJs, but the same percentage of a
random sample of U.S. women are also ESFJs. Third, no evidence has been
presented on relationships to performance in those occupations. Given these
problems, the types may simply be an
DEVELOPING CAREERS 99
Effectiveness of Applications
On the basis of a review of the published literature, Thayer (1988) concludes
that most studies of the MBTI are inadequate and that, overall, there is a lack of
systematic research on the many applications of the MBTI in organizations. His
review covers studies on educational applications, training and development
applications, and team-building applications. He notes three methodological
criticisms of the research: the reporting of data is inconsistent and incomplete;
statistical analyses are often incompletely described and may violate convention
(e.g., no overall test of significance is calculated before detailed comparisons are
made and no attention is given to appropriate baseline data in the analyses); and
subjects or judges are often made aware of the hypotheses being tested. These
problems prevent drawing conclusions from the studies, many of which are
published in the Journals of the Center for the Applications of Psychological
Type, Inc. (Journal of Psychological Type and Research in Psychological Type);
we also note that, to date, few studies appear in mainstream research journals.
It may well be the case, however, that a more complete picture would be
presented by taking into account the unpublished literature, such as technical
reports, presentations, and dissertations. While such a review may indeed present
a more complete assessment of the instrument, it is unlikely to offer a more
optimistic appraisal. Thayer concluded that the relatively small community of
MBTI researchers visible in the published literature are likely to have been also
involved in the unpublished work. In most cases, a carefully designed and
executed dissertation study or technical report would become a published article
or be cited in the literature. Rather than search for more literature, it would seem
more prudent to encourage better research on these issues.
Despite this overall appraisal, there are a few promising lines of research on
the MBTI that could be further developed. Studies by Hoffman et al. (1981) and
by Eggins (cited in Lawrence, 1984) suggest that the MBTI might be regarded as a
measure of “learning style”: the Hoffman et al. (1981) study shows that the
dropout rate of extraverted students in a computer-assisted military course could
be reduced by adding more group discussion sessions and providing
minilectures; the Eggins' study shows that different types performed better when
concepts were structured according to one or another approach referred to as
inductive, deductive, or concrete. Studies by Blaylock (1983) and Brocato and
Seaberg (1987) show that teams composed of mixed or complementary types
performed better on various simulated tasks than teams of the same type. Since no
attempt has been made to replicate these studies, the results must be regarded as
only suggestive. Another line of investigation, developed by Yeakley (1982,
1983), indicates that similar styles communicate more effectively than dissimilar
styles. More recent work by the same investigator (Yeakley, 1985) failed to
replicate the earlier results, leading him to suggest that further tests of this
hypothesis await reconciliation of the different results.
The lack of a supportive research foundation for the MBTI leads the
committee to recommend that the instrument not be used in career counseling
programs until its validity is supported by research. A positive recommendation
would thus depend on the accumulation of evidence from studies designed
according to rigorous methodological standards and conducted by a broad base of
researchers from psychology, organizational behavior, and education. And even
if the evidence is negative, the instrument could serve useful purposes: for
example, it might be used to teach about the uncertainty of the category
assignments and other deficits uncovered by the research.
Finally, it would seem appropriate to address the troublesome discrepancy
between research results (a lack of proven worth) and popularity. What accounts
for the popularity of an instrument that is not yet supported by research? Several
reasons can be suggested. From the respondents' perspective, the MBTI provides
generally positive feedback: the descriptors do not have clinical implications, they
are presented as unique positive attributes, and they are sufficiently vague to
apply to a large number of people in a wide variety of situations. Moreover, the
opportunity to learn more about oneself and others in a nonthreatening
environment (or to believe one is doing so) is an incentive for participation. It is
not difficult to understand how such positive experiences can be a basis for
popularity. From the perspective of organizational development, the instrument is
a vehicle for addressing problems that can be resolved through guided
discussion. Many professionals
assume that the changes they observe during the sessions will transfer to the job
setting and persist over time. And from the perspective of the instrument's
developers, the profits from an audience eager for self-improvement encourages
them to market the instrument aggressively; aggressive marketing—complete
with type coffee mugs, t-shirts, pins, license plates—has apparently increased the
number of consumers worldwide.
This phenomenon is not new to the committee and has been discussed in
some detail with regard to other techniques that purport to enhance performance
(see Druckman and Swets, 1988). Nonetheless, the popularity of this instrument
in the absence of proven scientific worth is troublesome. As with the other
techniques considered, career counselors are advised to take into account the
reservations discussed in this section when considering the MBTI as part of a
counseling package.
CONCLUSIONS
Career Planning Decisions on the use and value of specific career
counseling and self-assessment instruments in organizational settings should be
made within the context of a planned and systematic, organization-wide approach
to career development. This applies to the Army as well as any other large,
complex organization. The framework outlined in this chapter should be
developed further in conjunction with relevant research: the longitudinal and
cross-sectional studies suggested in the chapter are recommended with special
attention to the structure of military organizations. Evaluations should be made of
the cost-effectiveness of alternative career intervention activities with regard to
the timing of the intervention and the methods used by the intervenors.
The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator At this time, there is not sufficient,
well-designed research to justify the use of the MBTI in career counseling
programs. Much of the current evidence is based on inadequate methodologies.
Better evaluation studies, conducted according to rigorous methodological
standards, are recommended. One type of useful evaluation would be to compare
“successful” and “unsuccessful” careers. Positive results obtained from these
studies, if replicated with different samples, could justify the use of the MBTI
instrument in career counseling programs. Other self-assessment instruments
currently in use or contemplated for use in counseling programs should also be
subjected to the same rigorous evaluation.
Research on the effects of guided discussion, such as the discussions held on
feedback from the MBTI or other self-assessment instruments is recommended.
Such research should distinguish between subjective reactions
NOTES
1. Substantial portions of this section are based on a commissioned paper by London (1990).
2. Respondents' actual scores could not be obtained. The remembered scores, used in the analysis,
may not be the same as the actual scores.
REFERENCES
Bittle, S.Y. 1987 Psychometric Properties of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Unpublished
manuscript, Psychology Department, North Carolina State University.
Berlew, D.E., and D.T. Hall 1966 The socialization of managers: effects of expectations on
performance. Administrative Science Quarterly 11:207-223.
Blaylock, B.K. 1983 Teamwork in a simulated production environment. Journal of Psychological
Type 6:58-67.
Bradway, K. 1964 Jung's psychological types: classification by test versus classification by self.
Journal of Analytical Psychology 9:129-135.
Bray, D.W., R.J. Campbell, and D.L. Grant 1974 Formative Years in Business: A Long-Term AT&T
Study of Managerial Lives. New York: Wiley.
Bray, D.W., and A. Howard 1980 Career success and life satisfaction of middle-aged managers. In
L.A. Bond and J.C. Rosen, eds., Competence and Coping During Adulthood. Hanover,
N.H.: University Press of New England.
Brocato, F.C., and J.J. Seaberg, Jr. 1987 Psychological Type and Task Accomplishment in the Public
School Management Team. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American
Education Research Association, Washington, D.C.
Carlson, J.G. 1985 Recent assessments of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Journal of Personality
Assessment 49:356-365.
London, M., and S.A. Stumpf 1982 Managing Careers. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
McCall, M.W., Jr., M.M. Lombardo, and A.M. Morrison 1988 The Lessons of Experience: How
Successful Executives Develop on Job. Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books.
McCarley, N., and T.G. Carskadon 1983 Test-retest reliabilities of scales and subscales of the
Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and of criteria for clinical interpretive hypotheses involving
them. Research in Psychological Type 6:24-36.
McCaulley, M.H. 1988 The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and Leadership: Working Paper. Paper
prepared for the Conference on Psychological Measures and Leadership, San Antonio, Tex.
Moore, M.D., and T.G. Carskadon 1984 Observing people, observing things: does the MBTI E-I scale
measure what we assume it does? Journal of Psychological Type 7:41-45.
Moore, T., and W. Woods 1987 Personality tests are back. Fortune (March 30):74-82.
Myers, I.B., and M.H. McCaulley 1985 Manual: A Guide to the Development and Use of the Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator. Palo Alto, Calif.: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Rokeach, M. 1973 The Nature of Human Values. New York: Free Press.
1979 Understanding Human Values. New York: Free Press.
Shapiro, K.J., and I.E. Alexander 1969 Extraversion-introversion, affiliation, and anxiety. Journal of
Personality 37:387-406.
Striker, L.J., and J. Ross 1964 Some correlates of a Jungian personality inventory. Psychological
Reports 14:623-643.
Sundberg, N.D. 1977 Assessment of Persons. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Stumpf, S.A., and S.M. Colarelli 1980 Career exploration: development of dimensions and some
preliminary findings. Psychological Reports 47:979-988.
Thayer, P.W. 1988 The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and Enhancing Human Performance.
Unpublished manuscript, Department of Psychology, North Carolina State University.
Van Velsor, E. 1988 Database Analysis: Leadership Development Program, Center for Creative
Leadership. Paper prepared for the Conference on Psychological Measures and Leadership,
San Antonio, Tex.
Vargo, C., N. McCarley, and T.G. Carskadon 1986 Extraverts and introverts: where are the
differences? Journal of Psychological Type 12:46-49.
Yeakley, F.R. 1982 Communication style preferences and adjustments as an approach to studying
effects of similarity in psychological type. Research in Psychological Type 5:30-48.
1983 Implications of communication style research for psychological type theory. Research in
Psychological Type 6:5-23.
1985 Use of the communication style similarity scales: a cautionary note. Journal of Psychological
Type 10:40.
105
PART III
Altering Mental States
106
6
Subliminal Self-Help
Simply play the tapes while you work, play, drive, read, exercise, relax, watch
TV, or even as you sleep. No concentration is required for the tapes to be
effective. They work whether you pay attention to them or not.” The brochure
also notes:
A script is provided with each tape so you know the exact recorded
subliminal message. It is not necessary to read the script while listening to the
tape, although to enhance effectiveness, we suggest you use statements on the
script as positive affirmations, repeating them to yourself from time to time.
Many have found it very helpful to read the script aloud once each day just before
going to bed at night.
To maximize results, play your subliminal tape at least once a day. The more
often the tape is played, the faster and greater the effect. Because each person is
unique, individual results will vary from person to person. Results are sometimes
experienced within the first few playings, while in other cases it may take a few
days or several weeks to see changes. Be assured that if you faithfully use the
tape on a regular, daily basis, results will come.
Building Self-Confidence is but one of many subliminal self-help products
sold by Gateways Institute, and Gateways is but one of many sources of such
merchandise. According to one estimate (Oldenburg, 1990a), about 2,000
individuals or companies in America and Canada now produce subliminal self-
help products for retail sale. That there is money to be made selling such products
is suggested by a second estimate (Natale, 1988) that in 1987 American
consumers purchased $50,000,000 worth of subliminal tapes intended for their
personal improvement, a 10 percent increase over 1986 sales. Thus the
subliminal industry is big and, by most accounts, getting bigger (see McGarvey,
1989; Moore, 1982; Natale, 1988; Oldenburg, 1990a).
It is easy to see why, for several reasons. First, the premise underlying
subliminal suggestion—that a person can effortlessly accomplish in a matter of
months or even weeks what others struggle but fail to do in a lifetime—is nearly
irresistible (see Oldenburg, 1990a).
Second, as Oldenburg (1990a) has also pointed out, the promise of
subliminal suggestion seems as inviting as its premise. To clarify, consider the
catalog of products produced by Potentials Unlimited of Grand Rapids,
Michigan. This catalog cites more than 100 subliminal programs that are claimed
to aid people lose weight, stop smoking, quit drinking, think creatively, make
friends, reduce pain (whether due to arthritis, migraines, or premenstrual
syndrome), improve vision, restore hearing (a particularly difficult goal to attain
through subliminal auditory suggestions, or so it would seem), cure acne,
conquer fears (of death, driving, or flying, among others), read faster, speak
effectively, handle criticism, alleviate depression, assuage guilt, project astrally,
heal psychically, mentally travel through space or time or both (e.g., imagine
visiting Atlantis or searching for hidden treasure in the Sphinx), and become a
better bowler. Though this partial listing provides a sense of the remarkably broad
range of problems and issues that are allegedly amenable to hidden messages, it
does not capture the subtle yet seemingly crucial differences that exist among the
various subliminal programs· For example, Potentials Unlimited offers two
programs, Divorce—Yes (“If you seek the divorce, this tape can free you from the
other person.”) and Divorce—No (“If you don't want a divorce, yet have no
choice, quiet your fears and regain confidence to live and love again·”): one can
only hope that the company exercises as much care and caution in filling
customer orders as they presumably do in producing their subliminal tapes, for
the consequences of a mix-up might be catastrophic.
Yet a third reason for the rapid growth of the subliminal industry is tied to
both the proliferation of new products and the development of new technologies.
Though “pure” subliminal audiotapes—those containing virtually no audible
messages—remain a fixture in the marketplace, “mixed” tapes, featuring
subliminal messages on one side and supraliminal suggestions for guided
relaxation and visualization on the other, are becoming increasingly popular. In
both cases subliminality is achieved either by the traditional method of masking
suggestions with the sound of music or waves or by the newer technique of
speech compression, whereby the voice track bearing the suggestions (as many as
100,000 per hour) is accelerated until it becomes an unintelligible high-pitched
whine. Although speech-compression technology is disavowed by some
companies, including Gateways Institute, it is endorsed by others, including the
Psychodynamics Research Institute in Zephyr Cove, Nevada, a firm that is also
notable for being among the first to sell subliminal programs for children,
including a potty-training tape for toddlers (see Oldenburg, 1990a).
To complement their line of subliminal audio programs, many companies
now also offer an array of subliminal video tapes, in which suggestions are shown
so briefly that they cannot be consciously seen. This procedure is part of the
latest high-tech subliminal innovation, called MindVision, that was introduced in
November 1989 by Gateways Institute. As described by Oldenburg (1990b:C5):
. . . this “inconspicuous box” hooks into the television and VCR to flash
visual subliminal messages “hundreds of thousands of times each hour” on the TV
screen while repeating auditory subliminal affirmations all during regular TV
shows. “The lazy man's answer to a better life,” Gateways boasts.
But is it really? More to the point, what evidence is there that mass-marketed
subliminal self-help products are effective in practice? Even more fundamental, is
there any scientific evidence that such products, in principle, could be effective?
The critical difference among the conditions was the duration of the interval
separating onset of the prime from onset of the mask: a constant 300 milliseconds
(msec) in the suprathreshold condition, an average of 56 msec in the subjective-
threshold condition, and an average of 30 msec in the objective-threshold
condition. Cheesman and Merikle settled on these intervals, or stimulus onset
asynchronies (SOAs), by pretesting the subjects on the ability to detect which one
of four color-word primes had been presented on a particular trial.
Results of this pretesting revealed that at the SOA corresponding to the
suprathreshold condition, subjects stated that they could see the primes clearly,
and they therefore estimated their performance on the test of four-alternative
forced-choice target detectability would be perfect (100 percent)—which it was.
At the SOA corresponding to the objective threshold, subjects indicated that they
could not see the primes, and they therefore anticipated scoring at chance (25
percent)—which they did—on the test of target detectability. At the SOA
corresponding to the subjective threshold, subjects again claimed that they could
not consciously perceive the primes, and they therefore again anticipated scoring
at chance as to which particular target color word had been presented on a
particular trial. In actuality, however, their random “guesses” were, on average,
66 percent correct—a level of detection performance that plainly exceeds chance.
As the detectability of the primes varied across threshold conditions, so too
did the size of the priming effect observed in the color-naming task. In the
suprathreshold condition, a substantial priming effect was found (on average,
target colors were named about 95 msec faster when primed by congruent than by
incongruent color words); in the subjective-threshold condition, the effect was
smaller but remained significant (mean difference of roughly 40 msec); and in the
objective-threshold condition, the effect was virtually nonexistent (mean
difference of less than 10 msec).2 These results, in addition to those relating to
tasks other than color naming (see Eriksen, 1960, 1986; Merikle, 1988), suggest
that subjectively imperceptible but objectively detectable stimuli can affect
certain actions. As such, these results are consistent with Merikle's (1988:360)
conception of subliminal perception as “perception in the absence of subjective
confidence.”
There is one advantage of viewing subliminal perception this way (Merikle,
1988:360):
It eliminates much of the mysticism previously associated with the concept.
No longer is it necessary to consider subliminal perception as implying the
existence of some “supersensitive” unconscious perceptual system. Rather, the
evidence simply suggests that we can sometimes discriminate among stimulus
states, as indicated by our verbal responses, even when, based on our subjective
phenomenal experiences,
indicating that these cassettes do not contain any embedded signals whatsoever
that can be detected under controlled conditions. Given that consistent empirical
support for subliminal perception has only been found under conditions that allow
stimulus detection, these subliminal audio cassettes do not satisfy the most
minimal conditions for demonstrating subliminal perception.
An ardent advocate of subliminal self-help might challenge this conclusion
on two grounds: (1) some, perhaps many, of the vast number of the audiotapes
(or any or all video tapes) that Merikle did not test do meet his minimum
condition for demonstrating subliminal perception and thus could conceivably
affect behavior as advertised; (2) some, perhaps many, of the people who buy and
use these tapes say that “silent treatments” do them good (see McGarvey, 1989;
VandenBoogert, 1984). We first consider in detail the second point and then
discuss the implications of the first point.
therapy, the commitment expressed through the purchase and use of a subliminal
product is obviously much less. After all, such products are designed to work “so
you don't have to,” and its therapeutic potential is correspondingly much more
modest in principle. Indeed, the commitment entailed in employing subliminal
suggestions to, say, enhance one's popularity and make new friends seems
comparable to the commitment involved in spending an hour every day for a
month at the beach to accomplish these same goals. After visiting the beach on a
regular basis, or following the steady use of a “be more popular” subliminal tape,
one might in fact acquire some new friends. But surely this outcome is no more
attributable to the properties of the beach than it is to the contents of the
subliminal tape. Rather, responsibility rests with the person's decision to do
something—go to the beach or play the subliminal tape—that might help him or
her win friends. Consequently, the imaginary “beach therapy” might be every bit
as effective, or ineffective, as the real “subliminal programs” that are purported to
improve one's popularity.
A second, related reason that subliminal tapes, even those containing no
detectable embedded messages, may seem salutary has to do with the social
psychological phenomenon of effort justification: the finding that the harder we
work at something, the more we like it (see Penrod, 1983). After buying a
subliminal tape and using it daily for several weeks, as most manufacturers
advise, many people would be reluctant to admit to themselves or others that they
had wasted their time and money. Instead, they would be motivated to detect
some sort of change in some aspect of their lives, in order to rationalize their
investment (see Conway and Ross, 1984).
Yet a third reason for the possible effect of tapes without detectable
messages, perhaps the most important, relates to expectancy effects. By way of
background, most readers are familiar with the story of how, in 1957, an
advertising expert named James Vicary subliminally presented the statements
“Eat Popcorn and Drink Coke” to unsuspecting viewers of the film Picnic,
resulting in an impulsive rush to the refreshment stand. Many readers may not
know, however, that years later Vicary admitted that his study was a hoax
intended to increase revenues for his foundering advertising firm (see Weir,
1984). Vicary's “demonstration” sparked a storm of controversy (see Moore,
1982, 1988; Pratkanis and Greenwald, 1988) and stimulated many investigations
of subliminal advertising. One of these was a study, brought to our attention by
Pratkanis et al. (1990), that was conducted by the Canadian Broadcast
Corporation in 1958. As described by Pratkanis et al. (1990:5):
During a popular Sunday night television show viewers were told about the
Vicary EAT POPCORN/DRINK COKE STUDY and were informed that the
station would
do a test of subliminal persuasion (although the content of the message was not
revealed). The message “Phone Now” was then flashed subliminally on screen
352 times. Telephone company records indicated that phone usage did not
increase nor did local television stations report an increase in calls. However,
almost half of the nearly 500 letters sent in by viewers indicated that they felt
compelled to “do something” and many felt an urge to eat or drink. It appears
that expectations created by the Vicary study influenced what people believed had
happened.
That subliminal methods of personal improvement, like those involved in
public advertising, are susceptible to strong expectancy effects is a point made
plain in a recent study by Pratkanis et al. (1990).3 Through ads placed in local
newspapers, these researchers recruited volunteers who were especially interested
in the potential value of subliminal self-help tapes and who would probably be
similar to those most likely to purchase such products.
On the first day of the study, the subjects completed a battery of tests to
measure self-esteem and memory ability. Every participant was then given one or
two commercially produced subliminal audiotapes: one claimed by the
manufacturer to contain suggestions for improving self esteem (e.g., “I radiate an
inner sense of confidence”), the other claimed to contain suggestions for
improving memory (e.g., “My ability to remember and recall is increasing
daily”). On both tapes, the suggestions were recorded behind background
classical music, so as to render them subliminal. The intriguing aspect of this
study was that only a randomly selected one-half of the subjects actually got the
tape they thought they were getting, one-quarter received the memory
enhancement tape mislabeled as one to improve their self-esteem, and one-
quarter received a self-esteem tape mislabeled “memory improvement.”
The subjects took their tapes home and listened to them every day for 5
weeks, the period recommended by the manufacturer for achieving maximum
benefit. After 5 weeks, the subjects were asked to indicate whether they believed
the tapes had been effective, and they also completed a second battery of self-
esteem and memory tests.
The tests showed that the tapes had no appreciable effect, positive or
negative, on any measure of either self-esteem or memory, but many of the
subjects believed otherwise. Approximately one-half of those who thought they
had received the self-esteem tape—regardless of whether they had actually
received it or the memory tape—stated that their self-esteem had risen; similarly,
about one-half of those who presumed, correctly or not, that they had received the
memory tape maintained that their memory had improved as a result of listening
to the tape. In light of those results, the title selected by Pratkanis and his
associates to describe their study—“What you expect is what you believe, but not
necessarily what you get”—seems most appropriate.
CONCLUSIONS
There are some well-documented psychological reasons that subliminal
self-help products may appear to work, even if they contain no detectable
embedded messages and thus fail to satisfy the “minimum stimulus condition”
set by Merikle (1988) for demonstrating subliminal perception. It is possible, of
course, that products now available in the marketplace do meet the criterion of
detectability (after all, Merikle tested no video displays and only a handful of
audio cassettes) or that such products could be engineered in the future. Suppose,
for the sake of argument, that one were to identify or invent a subliminal self-
help-product that complies with the minimum prerequisite. What then?
Clearly, the mere presence of objectively detectable messages would by no
means ensure the product's effectiveness. Recent research does suggest that
subjectively imperceptible stimuli may have short-term effects on the
performance of such relatively simple tasks as color naming or lexical decision
under controlled laboratory conditions. But one cannot and should not infer from
this research that long-term changes in complex actions, cognitions, or emotions
—such as smoking, self-confidence, or depression—can be effected by exposure
to subliminal suggestions under such varied real-life circumstances as reading,
relaxing, or even sleeping. Such effects, if any, remain to be conclusively
established and rigorously explored.
Rather, as Merikle (1988) has remarked, the presence of detectable
messages would only imply that it may be worthwhile to carry out carefully
controlled studies of the possible effects of such messages. Such studies would
need to address a very long list of questions, some of which have been raised in
prior research on subliminal perception. For instance, are there significant
individual differences in peoples' sensitivity to the embedded but detectable
messages (e.g., Sackeim et al., 1977)? Might one's receptivity to such messages
be enhanced by the adoption of a passive attitude or frame of mind (e.g., Dixon,
1971)? Do subliminal messages serve only to amplify preexisting tendencies or
can they induce novel ways of acting, feeling, or thinking (e.g., Kihlstrom,
1987)? Are there demonstrable qualitative differences between the effects of
presenting one and the same message above as opposed to below the subjective
threshold of awareness (e.g., Cheesman and Merikle, 1986; Dixon, 1986)?
Finding answers to these and many related questions will doubtless prove to be a
difficult and demanding task, but perhaps a rewarding one as well. At this time,
however, on the basis of the committee's review of the available research
literature, we conclude that there is neither theoretical foundation nor
experimental evidence to support claims that subliminal self-help audiotapes
enhance human performance.
NOTES
1. In the interests of brevity and in keeping with our current focus on subliminal perception as a
commercial means of promoting self-improvement, neither the history nor the current status of
subliminal perception as a scientific concept is discussed in detail here. Readers interested in these
issues should consult Adams (1957), Cheesman and Merikle (1984, 1986), Dixon (1971, 1981),
Eriksen (1960), Goldiamond (1958), Greenwald et al. (1989), Holender (1986), and accompanying
peer commentaries, Marcel (1983), Merikle and Cheesman (1987), Reingold and Merikle (1988), and
Swets et al. (1961).
2. In addition to manipulating the prime-mask SOA, Cheesman and Merikle (1984) varied the prime-
target color SOA, either 50, 550, or 1,050 msec. Because this latter variable did not significantly
influence the size of the observed priming effects, the results for each prime-target color SOA have
been averaged to yield the above priming data.
3. This study is also described in Greenwald et al. (1990), together with two successful replications.
REFERENCES
Adams, J.K. 1957 Laboratory studies of behavior without awareness. Psychological Bulletin
54:383-405.
Bargh, J.A., and P. Pietromonaco. 1982 Automatic information processing and social perception: the
influence of trait information presented outside of conscious awareness on impression
formation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 43:437-449.
Bordon, G., and K.S. Harris 1984 Speech Science Primer: Physiology, Acoustics, and Perception of
Speech, 2nd ed. Baltimore, Md.: Williams & Wilkins.
Cheesman, J., and P.M. Merikle 1984 Priming with and without awareness. Perception and
Psychophysics 36:387-395.
1986 Distinguishing conscious from unconscious perceptual processes. Canadian Journal of
Psychology 40:343-367.
Conway, M., and M. Ross 1984 Getting what you want by revising what you had. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 47:738-748.
Dixon, N.F. 1971 Subliminal Perception: The Nature of a Controversy. London, England: McGraw-
Hill.
1981 Preconscious Processing. Chichester, England: John Wiley.
1986 On private events and brain events. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9:29-30.
Dyer, F.N., and L.J. Severance 1973 Stroop interference with successive presentations of separate
incongruent words and colors. Journal of Experimental Psychology 98:438-439.
Eriksen, C.W. 1960 Discrimination and learning without awareness: methodological survey and
evaluation. Psychological Review 67:279-300.
Goldiamond, I. 1958 Indicators of perception: subliminal perception, subception, unconscious
perception: an analysis in terms of psychophysical indicator methodology. Psychological
Bulletin 55:373-411.
Greenwald, A.G., M.R. Klinger, and T.J. Lui 1989 Unconscious processing of dichotically masked
words. Memory and Cognition 17:35-47.
Greenwald, A.G., E.R. Spangenberg, A.R. Pratkanis, and J. Eskenazi 1990 Double-Blind Tests of
Subliminal Self-Help Tapes. Paper presented at the American Psychological Association
Convention, Boston, August 1990. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Psychology,
University of Washington, Seattle.
Groeger, J.A. 1984 Evidence of unconscious semantic processing from a forced error situation. British
Journal of Psychology 75:305-314.
Holender, D. 1986 Semantic activation without conscious identification in dichotic listening,
parafoveal vision, and visual masking: a survey and appraisal. Behavioral and Brain
Sciences 9:1-66.
Jacoby, L.L., and K. Whitehouse 1989 An illusion of memory: false recognition influenced by
unconscious perception. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 118:126-135.
Kihlstrom, J.F. 1987 The cognitive unconscious. Science 237:1445-1452.
Mandler, G., Y. Nakamura, and B.J.S. Van Zandt 1987 Nonspecific effects of exposure to stimuli that
cannot be recognized. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and
Cognition 13:646-648.
Marcel, A.J. 1983 Conscious and unconscious perception: experiments on visual masking and word
recognition. Cognitive Psychology 15:197-237.
McGarvey, R. 1989 Recording success. USAir Magazine February:94-102.
Merikle, P.M. 1988 Subliminal auditory messages: an evaluation. Psychology and Marketing
5:355-372.
Merikle, P.M., and J. Cheesman 1987 Current status of research on subliminal perception. Pp.
298-302 in M. Wallendorf and P. Anderson, eds., Advances in Consumer Research, Vol.
14. Provo, Utah: Association for Consumer Research.
Moore, T.E. 1982 Subliminal advertising: what you see is what you get. Journal of Marketing 46
(2):38-47.
1988 The case against subliminal manipulation. Psychology and Marketing 5:297-316.
Natale, J.A. 1988 Are you open to suggestion? Psychology Today 22:28-30.
Oldenburg, D. 1990a Hidden messages. The Washington Post. April 3:C5.
1990b Silent treatments. The Washington Post. April 5:C5,.
Penrod, S. 1983 Social Psychology. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Pratkanis, A.R., and A.G. Greenwald 1988 Recent perspectives on unconscious processing: still no
marketing applications. Psychology and Marketing 5:337-353.
Pratkanis, A.R., J. Eskenazi, and A.G. Greenwald 1990 What You Expect Is What You Believe, But
Not Necessarily What You Get: On the Effectiveness of Subliminal Self-Help Audiotapes.
Paper presented at the annual convention of the Western Psychological Association, Los
Angeles, California.
Rachman, S.J., and G.T. Wilson 1980 Using direct and indirect measures to study perception without
awareness. Perception and Psychophysics 44:563-575.
Reingold, E.M., and P.M. Merikle 1988 Using direct and indirect measures to study perception
without awareness. Perception and Psychophysics 44:563-575.
Sackeim, H.A., I.K. Packer, and R.C. Gur 1977 Hemisphericity, cognitive set, and susceptibility to
subliminal perception. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 86:624-630.
Swets, J.A., W. Tanner, and T.G. Birdsall 1961 Decision processes in perception. Psychological
Review 68:301-340.
VandenBoogert, C. 1984 A Study of Potential Unlimited, Inc. Subliminal Persuasion/Self-Hypnosis
Tapes. Potentials, Inc., Grand Rapids, Michigan.
Weir, W. 1984 Another look at subliminal “facts.” Advertising Age October:46.
MEDITATION 120
7
Meditation
MEDITATION 121
the central principle of which is that God is knowable through proper meditation.
An insight unknowable except to the faithful can also lead to greater physical
strength, long life, and a general contentment (“Nirvana”). The proper practice of
meditation, however, is said to require a withdrawal from the everyday world,
although the dramatic experience of Buddhist Vietnamese monks immolating
themselves with fire as a political protest in the early 1970s indicates that such
priestly withdrawal is not incompatible with deep concern for everyday realities.
Second, in the late 1950s a wise man from India known as the Maharishi
Mahesh Yogi introduced transcendental meditation to the West, especially the
United States. The Maharishi stated that transcendental meditation was a method
based on scientific principles that could be studied systematically, and that its
conscientious practice could lead to a deep and complete understanding of nature
and to general benefits for humankind (Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, 1966). Unlike
Buddhist meditation, transcendental meditation did not require radical life-style
changes or extended practice, and it placed greater emphasis on “destressing”
people than it did on spiritual enlightenment or contact with a Supreme Being.
The 1960s was conducive to the spread of transcendental meditation among both
lay people and scientists; the work of the latter group is reviewed below.
A third stream in humankind's long-standing interest in meditation can be
found in some Western mystical traditions, both Christian and Jewish. Among
Hasidic Jews, for example, there is a tradition of dancing and chanting for long
periods of time in order to achieve an altered state in which the teachings of God
can be more readily received.
Thus, people in many parts of the world have for centuries been drawn to
practices that, without drugs or other direct physical manipulations, are believed
to lead to altered states of consciousness. These practices are also believed by
some to put one in contact with higher truths or with God, and sometimes to bring
more earthly benefits, such as better physical and emotional well-being.
MEDITATION 122
MEDITATION 123
MEDITATION 124
management method must include the conditions of its application. For example,
if a person's task is to lie still in a confined space and “just” control his anxieties
so that he does not panic after hours or days, then meditation, relaxation, or
prayer can be useful. We have seen from the pit burial studies that enough oxygen
is available even in an airtight space for a person to survive for hours—provided
the person maintains a low respiration rate—and this goal is achieved more
readily if the person does not panic. But if the situation calls for performing a
complex sensorimotor task, such as firing a rifle or reading a radar screen,
engaging in meditation would seem impossible if not counterproductive, and
there are no data suggesting otherwise.
The most supportive data come from relaxation/meditation/biofeedback
studies that show lasting reductions in blood pressure following proper training
(DiTomasso, 1987). However, the issue here is what accounts for this
generalization of effects: Does the person take time out during the day to relax or
meditate, or is there some more enduring, systemic reduction in arousal level that
does not require conscious attention and practice? Other explanations of lasting
reductions would consider changes brought about by the person's lowered
reactivity or anger and the positive social-environmental effects that such internal
changes might cause. In addition, any consideration of meditation would have to
include the religious component, at least insofar as it would seem to provide a
strong motivation to practice and apply the techniques.
We conclude that data do not exist to answer the generalization question.
The laboratory findings that do exist fail to demonstrate that meditation itself
enhances a person's ability to reduce arousal from a stressor (Holmes, 1984).
Similar criticisms can be made of the effects of relaxation alone, that is, training
and encouraging people to relax their muscles and calm their minds. Although
there is overlap with some meditation techniques, relaxation training is readily
distinguishable insofar as it does not try to teach a person to gain philosophical-
religious insights or to get close to a supreme being. But as with meditation, the
interesting and still unanswered question is how generalization is achieved—
perhaps a person must be taught to relax differentially in actual stressful
situations (see Goldfried and Davison, 1976:98). Or, as with meditation, an
answer might be found in the establishment of a more supportive environment
and life-style. For example, learning to relax and to enjoy good feelings may
prompt a person to make positive changes in his or her work and personal
situation, thereby reducing the general stressfulness of the social environment.
Another possibility for most meditation practices relates to the philosophical
context. It may be that meditation and relaxation, including
MEDITATION 125
Key Conclusions
The Brener-Connally review concentrates primarily on the role of meditation
in reducing stress and hypertension. They find that research to date supports
claims that meditation produces relaxation or stress reduction. The effects of
meditation are unlikely to be due to “exotic” factors: subjective effects (e.g.,
relaxed feelings) may be the result of alterations in blood chemistry brought
about naturally through normal bodily processes. They find it is difficult to
separate the “unique” effects of meditative procedures from more general
“atmosphere” effects including the patient's (meditator's) beliefs and the
therapist's (instructor's) confidence. Overall, there are few cases in which
meditation is shown to be more effective than other treatments for stress and
anxiety.
Brener and Connally conclude that reported feats of endurance such as pit
burials are likely to be due to the effect of meditation or deep relaxation on
metabolism. A lowered metabolism may allow for survival under conditions of
restricted oxygen availability. Effects on metabolism can be produced by
controlling respiration in the manner practiced by yogis.
Many promoters of meditation are more concerned with demonstrations of
the experience than with experimental evaluations of the procedure. Little
progress has been made in attempts to understand the underlying mechanisms for
observed effects of meditation. Experimental
MEDITATION 126
Needed Research
Like the research literature on various forms of psychotherapy, the study of
meditation would benefit from better experimental designs with proper controls
and baselines for judging change. A promising area of investigation is an
examination of the pathways through which psychological manifestations of
meditation are produced. The better resolutions provided by new brain-scanning
technologies may elucidate what happens in the brain during meditation.
Further work is needed on the psychological or institutional context for the
practice of meditation. Particular attention should be paid to the Army context in
relation to adoption of nontraditional training techniques. More attention should
also be paid to the medically-relevant claims for the treatment of anxiety, pain,
and disease as well as the medical implications of sustained attention. Finally,
linkage between the documented effects of meditation and performance remains
an uncharted topic: are there “unique” effects of meditation on performance that
differ from those shown to result from other (nonmeditative) procedures that
reduce stress?
MEDITATION 127
Overall Assessment
Great emphasis is placed by Shannahoff-Khalsa on a book by Murphy and
Donovan (1988) that reviews more than 1,200 meditation studies, many more
than those covered by Brener and Connally. Furthermore, the authors are self-
labelled meditation devotees, while Brener and Connally avowedly are not. He
goes on to say that another meditation expert, Deane Shapiro, asserts that the
Murphy-Donovan book “gives a fair analysis of this literature.”
Although Shannahoff-Khalsa says that Brener and Connally are fair in their
appraisal, he asserts that they have overgeneralized from a limited source base,
although he admits that no one can assimilate all the
MEDITATION 128
Kundalini Yoga
According to Shannahoff-Khalsa, the biggest omission of Brener and
Connally has to do with yogic techniques from India and the Chi-gong (life-
force) techniques from China. While there is no clear division between meditation
and yoga, the former requires less motor activity. He says that the parent of all
yogic practices is Kundalini Yoga as taught by Yogi Bhajan. Much of
Shannahoff-Khalsa's paper contains excerpts from his other writings that detail
Kundalini techniques and physiological rationale and provide recommendations
for their use by the military. In his paper on stress technology medicine, he
argues that the nasal cycle is a simple parameter for assessing autonomic-central
nervous system interrelationships as well as a means of determining left- and
right-brain dominance. Stress, he asserts, results from how long and how
frequently a swing in homeostatic imbalance is maintained. Moreover, nasal
obstruction in the left or right nostril can be related to psychopathology and
stress.
On the basis of these neurophysiological speculations, Shannahoff-
MEDITATION 129
MEDITATION 130
CONCLUSIONS
The scientific literature on meditation indicates that controls for distraction
or for just sitting or lying quietly and undisturbed are seldom to be found in the
many studies that demonstrate positive benefits from meditation. When
appropriate controls are present, no evidence supports the notion either that
meditation reduces arousal any more than does simply resting quietly or that
meditation permits a person to better cope with a stressor. When meditation has
been found to be effective for such
MEDITATION 131
NOTE
1. Block et al. (1989) found that unilateral forced nostril breathing influences spatial and verbal
performance, but with opposite results for males and females. Werntz and his colleagues (Werntz et
al., 1983; Werntz, 1987) employed the unusual assumption that greater integrated
electroencephalogram amplitude over a particular hemisphere indicates that it is dominant at the time.
(The traditional interpretation is that fast, low voltage activity reflects decreased cortical activation.)
Furthermore, in the Werntz et al. study, there were five subjects, only one of which showed shifts in
EEG symmetry. Klein et al. (1986) found that free breathing subjects showed a small correlation
between nostril dominance and cognitive performance and that unilateral nostril breathing does not
influence cognitive performance. Based on this evidence it would seem premature to suggest that this
approach be used for stress reduction.
MEDITATION 132
REFERENCES
Beatty, J., and J.F. O'Hanlon 1979 Operant control of posterior theta rhythm and vigilance
performance: repeated treatments and transfer of training. In N. Birbaumer and H.D.
Kimmel, eds., Biofeedback and Self-Regulation. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Beatty, J., A. Greensberg, W.P. Diebler, and J.F. O'Hanlon 1974 Operant control of occipital theta
rhythm affects performance in a radar monitoring task. Science 183:871-874.
Benson, H. 1975 The Relaxation Response. New York: Morrow.
Block, R., D. Arnott, B. Quigley, and W. Lynch 1989 Unilateral nostril breathing influences
lateralized cognitive performance. Brain and Cognition 9:181-190.
Brener, J., and S.R. Connally 1986 Meditation: Rationales, Experimental Effects, and
Methodological Issues. Paper prepared for the U.S. Army Research Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Sciences, European Division. Department of Psychology, University
of Hull, London, England.
Cheaper, D.M., and D. Giber 1978 Meditation and psychotherapeutic effects. Archives of General
Psychiatry 35:294-302.
Davison, G.C., and J.M. Neale 1990 Abnormal Psychology, 5th ed. New York: Wiley.
Davison, G.C., M.E. Williams, E. Nezami, T. Bice, and V. DeQuattro In press Relaxation, reduction
in angry articulated thoughts and improvements in borderline hypertension and heart rate.
Journal of Behavioral Medicine.
Delmonte, M.M. 1985 Meditation and anxiety reduction. Clinical Psychology Review , 5:1-12.
DiTomasso, R.A. 1987 Essential hypertension: a methodological review. In L. Michelson and L.M.
Ascher, eds., Anxiety and Stress Disorders. New York: Guilford.
Druckman, D., and J. Swets 1988 Enhancing Human Performance: Issues, Theories, and
Techniques. Committee on Techniques for the Enhancement of Human Performance,
Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, National Research Council.
Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
Goldfried, M.R., and G.C. Davison 1976 Clinical Behavior Therapy. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston.
Holmes, D.S. 1984 Meditation and somatic arousal reduction: a review of the experimental evidence.
American Psychologist 39:1-10.
Klein, R., D. Pieton, S. Prossner, and D. Shannahoff-Khalsa 1986 Hemispheric performance
efficiency varies with nasal airflow. Biological Psychology 23:127-137.
Lazarus, R.S. 1966 Psychological Stress and the Coping Process. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Maharishi Mahesh Yogi 1966 The Science of Being and Art of Living. London: International SRM
Publications.
Murphy, M., and S. Donovan 1988 The Physical and Psychological Effects of Meditation: A Review
of Contemporary
MEDITATION 133
8
Managing Pain
ASPECTS OF PAIN
To place pain management in context, it is useful to distinguish among four
dimensions of pain (Loeser, 1980): nociception, pain, suffering, and pain
behavior. It will quickly become evident that pain does not arise from a direct
linkage between nerve stimulation and the cortex.
themselves exacerbate pain over the long term or can contribute to chronic pain.
Of course pain from a traumatic event like a serious injury often leads to
depression that both causes and is itself caused by loss of occupational function,
decreases in cognitive and sexual functioning, and changes in physical
appearance.
Perceived Control Over Noxious Stimuli As with fear and anxiety, pain
perception seems to increase if a person does not believe he or she has some
degree of control over the nociceptive stimulation (Averill, 1973; Geer et al.,
1970; Glass et al., 1973). In addition, extended periods of helplessness can also
contribute to depression.
Attention/Distraction Distraction from a painful stimulus can decrease the
perception of pain, and attention to it can increase pain (Blitz and Dinnerstein,
1971; Turk, 1978; Turk et al., 1983).
Cognitive Appraisal Along the lines of Lazarus's (1966) classic work on
appraisal and fear, the way a person construes his nociceptive pain can affect
subsequent pain experience and behavior. A literary example is in Stephen
Crane's Red Badge of Courage, in which a soldier during a Civil War battle
wishes to be wounded so that his courage will not be questioned. Nonfictional
wartime examples were reported by Beecher (1956), who found during World
War II that soldiers about to be sent home because of their wounds reported far
less pain than civilians with comparable wounds created by surgery. In general,
the meaning of a nociceptive stimulus can affect how one reacts to it, whether one
can continue to function and how much discomfort will be experienced;
certainly, commitment and strong belief in a cause is a time-honored factor in
coping with all sorts of ordeals, whether painful or not.
Coping Style A person's cognitive coping style, in terms of avoiding or
seeking information, has been shown to interact with the benefits of information
provided prior to a painful or threatening event. Byrne (1964) originally classified
styles of coping along a “repression-sensitization” continuum: repressors are said
to prefer to cope by denial and avoidance; sensitizers prefer confrontation with
the stressor. Some studies have found that sensitizers do better when information
is provided than when it is not, while repressors show the opposite pattern. For
example, Andrew (1970) found that repressors used more medication
postoperatively. Shipley et al. (1978, 1979) similarly found repressors to have
higher heart rates during a medical procedure and to require more tranquilizers
than sensitizers when they had been given information about the procedure.
Learning Factors Responses to nociceptive stimuli can be greatly
because of lessened anxiety that comes from knowing that certain sensations are
normal. Having been told that a certain kind and degree of pain is to be expected, a
patient may be less concerned about the pain being experienced because it is not
construed as a sign that something is wrong. When procedural information helps,
it may be due to the opportunity it allows a patient to rehearse the upcoming
event in his or her imagination and thus become desensitized to the anxiety
associated with the event (Wolpe, 1958).
Relaxation Training Relaxation training is a powerful treatment for
increasing pain tolerance in some situations. For example, patients instructed in
breathing and relaxation prior to their first attempt to get out of bed after surgery
reported less incisional pain and used fewer analgesics than control patients
(Flaherty and Fitzpatrick, 1978). In the laboratory, relaxation has been effective
for reducing cold pressor pain (pain produced by immersing the hand in ice
water) and also for decreasing pain ratings (e.g., Stevens and Heide, 1977; Stone
et al., 1977). This effect is likely due to reducing anxiety and increasing a sense
of control (Peck, 1986).
Enhancement of Personal Control As already mentioned, people generally
experience less pain and stress if they can exercise a degree of control. An
intriguing and promising medico-psychological procedure is a patient-controlled
analgesia (PCA) machine that allows a patient to administer his or her own pain
killers with a preset upper limit. Such a device and procedure would be expected
to impart a sense of greater control, and it has been found that patients achieve
better relief from pain with the PCA and even use less analgesic medication
(White, 1986). A recent study with labor pain showed that satisfaction was very
high: patients preferred the PCA to techniques that actually reduce pain intensity
more completely, such as epidural morphine. In general, being active rather than
passive is better because activity can be distracting in itself (see Gal and Lazarus,
1975).
Many empirical findings support the notion that if patients do not believe
that they can control or terminate an aversive event, it is perceived as more
painful (e.g., Averill, 1973). A PCA machine allows a patient an increased degree
of control over a noxious event, which theoretically should decrease both anxiety
and perceived pain. Of course, having a PCA machine means a patient's attention
must be engaged to administer the analgesia, and so must be focusing on pain.
But this would be true in any case. In traditional nurse-administered analgesia, a
patient is often very focused on the pain because the system requires that a
patient wait until the pain is substantial before requesting medications. And even
after a patient requests the medication, he or she must wait
until the nurse has the time to fulfill the request. This alternative obviously does
not allow the patient to be distracted from the pain. In fact, quite the opposite.
Under certain conditions, distraction can be pain reducing, as discussed in the
next section.
Cognitive Coping Skills Training There are two main cognitive strategies
proposed for pain relief (Turk et al., 1983), and they are more useful for mild to
moderate pain than for extreme pain: to alter a person's appraisal of pain and to
direct attention away from pain.
One strategy of cognitive coping involves providing information about
painful medical procedures (Janis, 1958). Such information may lead to enhanced
self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977) because a person acquires information that can be
used to take effective coping action (Anderson and Masur, 1983). For example, a
person about to have a dye injected for assessment purposes could be told that
“When the dye is injected (procedural), you will feel a hot flash
(sensory)” (Anderson and Masur, 1983:10).
Six types of diversion strategies can be distinguished:
• imagination-inattention: pleasant imagery incompatible with feeling pain,
such as imagining something very positive during dental treatment (Horan et
al., 1976);
• imaginative transformation of pain: reinterpreting pain into a sensation like
numbness, something that is a part of Lamaze “natural childbirth” training, in
which women are encouraged to substitute “pressure” for pain;
• imaginative transfer of context: reframing the pain in some other context so
as to interrupt the flow of negative thinking and facilitate the generation of
coping strategies;
• external attention-diversion: focusing on external aspects of the environment,
such as counting ceiling tiles (Barber and Cooper, 1972);
• internal attention-diversion: focusing attention on other self-generated
thoughts, such as doing complex mathematical operations; and
• dissociation from pain: thinking that a painful bodily part, e.g. an arm,
belongs to someone else.
The first, second, and sixth of these strategies were found by Tan (1982) to
be the most helpful. We note that many of these strategies are sometimes
embedded in hypnotic inductions.
All of these techniques for diverting attention from painful stimulation are
consistent with cognitive research, which shows a limited supply of attentional
resources: attention to one channel of input blocks the processing of input on
other channels (Kahneman, 1973).
Stress Inoculation Training “Stress inoculation training” refers to the kinds
of strategies just described (Turk et al., 1983). The approach
basically entails three interrelated steps: educating a person about the nature of
pain; describing in detail the techniques available for coping with pain; and
encouraging practice in and application of techniques that make sense to the
patient. (The other usage of the term refers to training techniques, as in sports,
whereby a person is presented with a challenge beyond the level that is likely to
be encountered in game conditions, such as setting a pitching machine to hurl a
baseball at 110 miles per hour.)
Biofeedback Biofeedback refers in general to the use of sophisticated
instrumentation that provides a person immediate information on minute changes
in such functions as muscle activity, heart rate, and blood pressure. This
knowledge can be used by the person to control such somatic and autonomic
activity to some extent.
Some fairly controlled studies (reviewed by Chapman, 1986) show that
biofeedback from tension of muscles in the forehead is significantly better than
no treatment or a placebo in reducing subjective ratings of chronic headache
pain. There is no evidence, however, that biofeedback is superior to relaxation
training alone in reducing acute pain; its effectiveness is most likely mediated by
reducing anxiety (Gatchel et al., 1989), perhaps by enhancing sense of control.
Hypnosis The history of anesthesia is closely connected with hypnosis, for
hypnosis was used widely in the middle and late nineteenth century by physicians
like Bernheim and Charcot to reduce pain. The introduction of ether and other
anesthetic drugs diminished the use of hypnosis, although it has been enjoying a
resurgence of interest in childbirth, dentistry, and in treating the pain brought on
by a variety of assessment and medical procedures (Hilgard and Hilgard, 1975).
Except for its relaxation components, it is doubtful that putting someone into a
hypnotic trance by itself reduces pain. Rather it is the suggestions that are given
that are operative, such as intimating that a limb has become numb or that it is
not one's own, or that “strong sensations” will “not matter.” It is believed that
cognitive strategies of diversion or dissociation can be strengthened by
encouraging their use under hypnosis. A limiting factor, of course, is that people
vary widely on how susceptible they are to hypnosis.
CONCLUSIONS
There is encouraging evidence in the pain-control literature that people can
be taught nonpharmacological ways to cope with physical pain. Many of the
procedures known to be useful for reducing anxiety also favorably influence pain
because alleviating stress is known to decrease a person's experience of pain.
Central to current understanding of pain is the role of cognitive factors, that
is, a person's construals of nociceptive input can have a profound effect on
whether and how severely he or she actually experiences pain. Of particular
importance are perceived control and the meaning attached to a painful
experience. Procedures that enhance a person's control or sense of control appear
to reduce pain because of the often demonstrated reduction of anxiety associated
with increased control.
For many individuals, information about what to expect from painful
experiences, such as surgery, reduces the experience of pain. Distraction is an
effective strategy for coping with pain. Relaxation training is also useful for
controlling pain, perhaps due in part to distraction as well as to the reduction of
worry and anxiety. Suggestions given under hypnosis to susceptible individuals
can also help them cope with pain, for example, imagining that an affected limb
is not really a part of them.
Chronic pain can be managed by identifying and controlling psychological
REFERENCES
Anderson, K.O., and F.F. Masur 1983 Psychological preparation for invasive medical and dental
procedures. Journal of Behavioral Medicine 6:1-40.
Andrew, J.M. 1970 Recovery from surgery with and without preparatory instruction, for three coping
styles. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 15:223-227.
Averill, J.R. 1973 Personal control over aversive stimuli and its relationship to stress. Psychological
Bulletin 80:286-303.
Bakan, D. 1968 Disease, Pain, and Sacrifice: Toward a Psychology of Suffering. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Bandura, A. 1977 Self-efficacy: toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. Psychological
Review 84:191-215.
Barber, T.X., and B.J. Cooper 1972 The effects on pain of experimentally induced and spontaneous
distraction. Psychological Reports 31:647-651.
Barnett, J. 1986 The Comparative Effectiveness of the Millon Behavioral Health Inventory and the
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory as Predictors of Treatment Outcome in a
Rehabilitation Program for Chronic Low Back Pain. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Texas Health Sciences Center, Dallas.
Beecher, H.K. 1956 Relationship of significance of wound to the pain experienced. Journal of the
American Medical Association 161:1609-1613.
Blitz, B., and A.J. Dinnerstein 1971 Role of attentional focus in pain perception: manipulation of
response to noxious stimulation by instructions. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 77:42-45.
Byrne, D. 1964 Repression-sensitization as a dimension of personality. In B.A. Maher, ed., Progress
in Experimental Personality Research, Vol. 1. New York: Academic Press.
Chapman, S.L. 1986 A review and clinical perspective on the use of EMG and thermal biofeedback
for chronic headaches. Pain 27:1-43.
Cohen, F., and R.S. Lazarus 1973 Active coping processes, coping dispositions, and recovery from
surgery. Psychosomatic Medicine 35:375-389.
Craig, K.D., and S.M. Weiss 1975 Vicarious influences on pain threshold determinations. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 19:53-59.
Darke, L. 1990 Psychological Factors in the Management of Pain. Unpublished manuscript, Pain
Management Center, University of California, Los Angeles.
Druckman, D., and J. Swets, eds. 1988 Enhancing Human Performance: Issues, Theories, and
Techniques. Committee on Techniques for the Enhancement of Human Performance,
Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, National Research Council.
Washington, D.C.,: National Academy Press.
Egbert, L.D, G.E. Battit, and H. Turndorf 1963 The value of the preoperative visit by an anesthetist.
Journal of the American Medical Association 185:553-556.
Egbert, L.D., G.E. Battit, C.E. Welch, and M.K. Bartlett 1964 Reduction in postoperative pain by
encouragement and instruction of patients. New England Journal of Medicine 270:825-827.
Ellis, A. 1962 Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy. New York: Lyle Stuart.
Flaherty, G.G., and J.J. Fitzpatrick 1978 Relaxation techniques to increase comfort levels of
postoperative patients: a preliminary study. Nursing Research 27(6):352-355.
Fordyce, W.E. 1976 Behavioral Methods for Chronic Pain and Illness. St. Louis: C.V. Mosby.
1978 Learning processes in pain. In R.A. Sternbach, ed., The Psychology of Pain. New York: Raven
Press.
1988 Pain and suffering: a reappraisal. American Psychologist 48:276-283.
Fordyce, W.E., R. Fowler, J. Lehmann, and B. DeLateur 1973 Operant conditioning in the treatment
of chronic pain. Archives of Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation 54:399-408.
Gal, R., and R.S. Lazarus 1975 The role of activity in anticipating and confronting stressful
situations. Journal of Human Stress 1:4-20.
Gatchel, R.J., A. Baum, and D.S. Krantz 1989 An Introduction to Health Psychology, 2nd ed. New
York: Random House.
Geer, J.H., G.C. Davison, and R. Gatchel 1970 Reduction of stress in humans through nonveridical
perceived control of aversive situations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
16:731-738.
Gendlin, E.T. 1962 Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning: A Philosophical and Psychological
Approach to the Subject. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.
Glass, D.C., J.E. Singer, H.S. Leonard, D.S. Krantz, S. Cohen, and H. Cummings 1973 Perceived
control of aversive stimulation and the reduction of stress responses. Journal of
Personality 41:577-595.
Halpern, C. 1978 Substitution-detoxification and its role in the management of chronic benign
pain.Journal of Clinical Psychiatry 43:10-15.
Hilgard, E.R., and J.R. Hilgard 1975 Hypnosis in the Relief of Pain. Los Altos, Calif.: William
Kaufmann.
Horan, J.J., F.C. Layng, and C.H. Pursell 1976 Preliminary study of the effects of “in vivo” emotive
imagery on dental discomfort. Perceptual and Motor Skills 42:105-106.
Janis, I.L. 1958 Psychological Stress: Psychoanalytic and Behavioral Studies of Surgical Patients.
New York: Wiley.
Johnson, J.E. 1983 Psychological interventions and coping with surgery. In A. Baum, S.E. Taylor, and
J.E. Singer, eds., Handbook of Psychology and Health, Vol. 4. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Wilson, J.F. 1981 Behavioral preparation for surgery: benefit or harm? Journal of Behavioral
Medicine 4:79-102.
Wolpe, J. 1958 Psychotherapy by Reciprocal Inhibition. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
9
Hiding and Detecting Deception
or honesty. Observers are also asked to indicate the extent to which they are
confident in making these judgments. A variety of other impressions of
communicators have been assessed in experiments, including, for example, liking
for the product, anxiety, confidence, suspicion, aggressiveness, and comfort. The
ratings of deception are analyzed for accuracy and related to expressed
confidence. They are also correlated with particular nonverbal channels or
behaviors used in the enactment and with the other impressions rated by the
observer. The results obtained from both types of experiments are reviewed in the
following sections, focusing first on the nonverbal behaviors displayed by
subjects and then on the accuracy of observers who attempt to detect the
deception portrayed by others.
Leakage
The relevance of nonverbal behaviors as clues to deception derives from the
assumption that these behaviors, in particular, will leak information that a person
is trying to hide. The rationale for this assumption is provided by Ekman and
Friesen (1969) in terms of the variables of automaticity and controllability.
These variables refer to the relationship between emotions and behavior.
According to Ekman (1981:271): “When emotion is aroused certain changes
occur in the face, body, and voice which can be considered automatic.” Such
automatic links present a problem for deceivers who attempt to control their
nonverbal behavior during deception: they must override these links in order to
avoid leakage. Some nonverbal cues are more likely to be controlled than others.
Words and facial expressions have been found to be easier to control than body
and tone of voice cues (Ekman, 1981; Zuckerman et al., 1981). Thus, deceivers
should be most successful when using words, next most successful when using
facial expressions, and least successful when using body movements and tone of
voice cues. Indeed, according to the DePaulo et al. (1985) review of the evidence
on detection, both body cues and tone of voice cues were found to be more
revealing than facial cues. Less clear, however, are the results on verbal cues:
these cues were found to be informative and revealing (see DePaulo et al., 1985,
for an explanation).
Nonverbal cues that reveal deception to observers should also distinguish
between the actual enactments of deceivers and truth tellers. In their early
experiment on leakage, Ekman and Friesen's (1969) deceivers claimed that they
attempted to disguise the face more than the body while perpetrating the
deception. The discriminating cues provided by the body included decreasing use
of hand illustrators (movements used for emphasis), increased use of self-
adapters (movements directed toward
one part of the body by another), and more postural position shifts for deceivers.
More illustrator movements also were used by the deceivers (compared to truth
tellers) in Mehrabian's (1972) study, while increased self-adapters and postural
shifts were also found for the deceiving subjects in the McClintock and Hunt
(1975) interview study. Further confirmative evidence was obtained by the
Druckman et al. (1982) finding of coordinated body movements for deceivers:
rocking, headshaking, trunk swivels, and nodding movements varied together.
That study also found more fidgeting with objects for deceivers and more leg
movements for evaders (indirect deception). Two studies reported differences in
vocal cues: Mehrabian (1971) showed more speech errors as deviations from
baseline data; DePaulo et al. (1980) found tone of voice differences between
deceivers and truth tellers. Taken together, these findings suggest where to look
for clues to deceptive intentions. They do not, however, provide evidence for the
specific role played by psychological states or emotions.
The concept of leakage is based on a model that construes psychological
states or emotions as variables that mediate the relationship between nonverbal
behaviors and intentions (see Druckman et al., 1982: Figure 1.1). While
demonstrating the importance of these intervening variables, the results reported
by Druckman et al. (1982) also illustrate the complexity of the relationships.
Subjects (interviewees playing the role of the Soviet ambassador to the United
States) in each of three experimental conditions (honesty, evasion, and deception)
indicated their feelings on a postinterview questionnaire consisting of 26 bipolar
adjective scales. The ratings were analyzed for condition differences and for
correlations with each of 25 nonverbal behaviors coded for all subjects. Three
types of states seemed to capture the diverse relationships obtained among these
variables: involvement, stress, and confidence. Honest and evasive subjects
displayed behaviors whose meaning indicated involvement. Evasive and
deceptive subjects displayed behaviors that correlated with feelings of stress or
tension. Subjects in all three conditions showed behaviors related to feelings of
confidence or effectiveness. This evidence suggests which emotions reflect
primarily honesty (feelings of involvement), direct and indirect deception
(stress), and role-playing, which is characteristic of all three conditions
(confidence). Interestingly, evasive subjects showed relations between nonverbal
behaviors and two emotions, one found primarily for honest subjects
(involvement), the other found primarily for deceivers (stress). This result is
consistent with the definitions of evaders as being neither completely honest nor
completely deceptive.
The results also identified a subset of nonverbal behaviors that indicate
either high or low involvement, stress, or confidence: for example,
looking at versus looking away from the interviewer as an indicator of high or low
involvement for honest subjects or as an indicator of stress for evaders, shoulder
shrugs versus trunk swivels as an indicator of high and low stress experienced by
deceivers (see Druckman et al., 1982:Table 4.10). Supporting the concept of
leakage, these findings highlight the role played by emotions or feelings in the
process of making inferences from nonverbal behaviors to intentions. However,
they also make evident some of the difficulties involved in the task of diagnosing
deception or other intentions. In some cases, different nonverbal behaviors have
similar meanings for different intentions, that is, they are functionally equivalent
behaviors. In other cases, different nonverbal behaviors reflect different feelings
for the same intention, as well as for different intentions. The challenge for
researchers is to isolate the unique relationships between particular nonverbal
behaviors and underlying feelings for particular intentions. These would be cues
that diagnosticians could use with confidence; they have not yet been identified.
Motivated Liars
There seems to be a relationship between motivation to deceive and success
at deceiving (DePaulo et al., 1985). The question asked is whether highly
motivated deceivers are easier or harder to detect than their less well-motivated
counterparts, that is, when the stakes for successful deception are either high or
low. This question has implications for differences between professionals (higher
stakes) and the amateurs used in most laboratory experiments (lower stakes).
Results obtained from two experiments (summarized in DePaulo et al., 1985) are
quite intriguing. When motivation to lie was high (e.g., deceivers were being
monitored by a panel of their peers), nonverbal cues were more revealing than
verbal clues; when motivation was low (e.g., deceivers were to play a “little”
game), verbal cues were more revealing. The highly motivated deceivers were
accurately detected by observers more often than the less highly motivated
deceivers if the observers could see the nonverbal behaviors. When judges only
had access to verbal statements, the highly motivated deceivers were quite
successful (and more successful than their less motivated counterparts) in their
deception. According to DePaulo et al. (1985:334): “the harder senders try to get
away with their lies, the less successful they will be (when their nonverbal
behaviors are showing).”
An explanation for these findings is that when emotionality is high, as it
would be for high-stakes' performances, nonverbal leaks are more likely to occur.
The highly motivated deceivers in the experiments of DePaulo and her colleagues
showed more behavioral inhibition and rigidity,
as well as more negativity, than the deceivers who were less motivated. The
motivated deceivers may think that they are using a safe strategy by not moving,
which they equate with not revealing, but this strategy backfired for reasons
understandable in terms of the concept of leakage. Based on an hydraulic model
analogy, attempts to control one channel of communication (e.g., facial
expressions) leads to excessive activity in another channel (e.g., body
movements). A more direct test of this hypothesis would be a comparison of
conditions in which subjects are told to control their faces or their bodies while
deceiving; more body activity in the former condition and more facial activity in
the latter (in comparison with a baseline control condition) would support this
hypothesis. This experiment has been done, and analyses are in progress.2
An implication of this research is that people are betrayed by their
nonverbal behaviors in situations in which they are most motivated not to be
detected. This implication is especially relevant for the challenges confronting
professional deceivers (such as spies). From the standpoint of detectors, it would
seem appropriate to monitor the unattended channels, that is, either those
channels under less control by the deceiver or those that he or she believes are
not being observed. For nonprofessionals, whether or not the challenge for
successful deception is high, nonverbal deception cues are likely to be derived
from different emotions: insecurity and concern about the managed impressions
being conveyed (due in part to a lack of practice), guilt or anxiety about a morally
dubious act, tension caused by the complexity inherent in a deceptive
performance. The nonverbal behaviors that derive from these feelings may well
differ from those that are the result of leakage. However, deceptive contexts vary
considerably on a number of dimensions, and these dimensions of the situation
affect both the displays shown by senders and impressions made by observers.
Faulty Detection
It is clear from the research on detecting deception that people have trouble
distinguishing between lies and truthful statements. For samples of college
students, there is a discernible bias in favor of judging messages as truthful when
the frequency of lies and truth is about 50-50 (DePaulo et al., 1985). People who
are professional lie detectors, on the other hand, evince a “deception bias,” that
is, they judge most (truthful and deceptive) messages as being deceptive
(O'Sullivan et al., 1988); also see Kraut and Poe's (1980) study of customs
inspectors, Hendershot and Hess' (1982) study of police detectives, and the
Druckman et al. (1982) study of oil company executives. Both types of samples
usually
distinction between negative and positive emotions with lying versus telling the
truth; some types of lies are easier to detect than others; and some liars may be
better at lying than others. Each of these explanations is an empirical issue that
can eventually be resolved by research; until then, it should be possible on the
basis of what is known to improve accuracy even for detecting the lies of
strangers in fleeting situations, for uncovering subtle lies, and for recognizing
skilled liars.
IMPROVING DETECTION
Training
Detecting another person's intentions is a learned skill. As with other skills,
it has been shown to improve with age and training. A number of studies
(summarized in DePaulo et al., 1985) have shown that during adolescence,
perceivers become increasingly sensitive to issues of sincerity and deceit (e.g.,
Flavell, 1977). The studies also indicate that children do progressively better as
they get older at distinguishing between direct deception, on the one hand, and
exaggerations, omissions, or slight distortions on the other.
Sensitivity to nonverbal deception clues contribute to detection accuracy.
Such sensitivity may be related to the nature of one's job experience. A recent
experiment assessed the detection accuracy of 509 professionals from agencies
and occupations in which lie detection is part of the job: the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Security Agency,
police, and judges (Ekman and O'Sullivan, 1991). Their results show that
accuracy was not related to occupation and actually decreased with age and
experience for some occupational groups. Closer examination of the accurate
detectors revealed, however, that the critical variable may be job function. People
in jobs in which they must interact with others on a regular basis were better
detectors than those in administrative positions; the former tended to be younger
than the latter due at least in part to promotions of relatively older workers to
administrative positions. In addition to job tasks, frequent social interaction helps
people detect deceivers. Knowing what to look for—in the sense of distinguishing
critical from noncritical cues—and how to process those cues helps more.
Improvement can be accelerated further by training that is designed
specifically to take advantage of relevant information. Lie-detection success
improves when subjects are prompted to pay special attention to tone of voice
cues (DePaulo et al., 1982; see also Zuckerman et al., 1985). Success also
improved for subjects who are given a technical briefing intended to separate the
nonverbal signals from the nonverbal
Display Rules
Defined originally with regard to facial expressions, display rules are
culturally learned “rules” for managing expressions. They serve to modify
expressions in keeping with the demands of the social situation and may also
reflect the cognitive processing that precedes the observed expression. Whether
display rules are the primary determinant of observed nonverbal behaviors is an
empirical issue that is captured in terms of the debate between universal and
culturally specific bases for expressions. This debate has been the basis for a
large number of cross-cultural experiments on facial expressions by Ekman and
his colleagues. While not resolving the debate clearly in favor of the one or other
explanation, their interpretation of the findings suggests that while the distinctive
appearance of the face may be universal—that is, unique muscle movements are
made for each primary emotion—the particular expression that appears in certain
circumstances varies with culture (see below). However, these experiments have
not investigated the role of culture in other channels of nonverbal expression. Nor
did they focus specifically on cues to deception.
differences between Arabs and Americans in their space behavior and body
orientations (see also Sommer, 1959; Little, 1968; Shuter, 1976; Baxter, 1970). In
addition, studies have shown cultural differences in touching behavior (Watson
and Graves, 1966; Jourard, 1966; Shuter, 1976).
The issue of universal nonverbal expressions versus culturally determined
expressions has been probed in a series of studies on facial expressions. Defining
the issue in terms of “relative importance,” Ekman developed an approach that
allows for both universal and culturally specific sources for expressions of
emotion (see, e.g., Ekman and O'Sullivan, 1988). According to this “theory,”
eliciting events vary from culture to culture but the particular facial muscle
movements triggered when a given emotion is elicited are universal. (Blends of
emotions may be subject to more cultural variability than the primary emotions.)
That is, although the underlying physiology for the primary emotions may be
universal, the actual expression elicited is subject to cultural and situation-
determined display rules. Display rules serve to control an expression or to
modify or mask certain expressions that would be socially inappropriate or would
reveal deception. Evidence relevant to this theory is presented in a series of
experiments reported by Ekman and his colleagues.
One series of experiments explored the extent to which respondents from
different cultures agreed on the facial configuration signifying contempt as
opposed to anger or disgust (Ekman and Friesen, 1986; Ekman and Heider,
1988). They found that the expression is widely recognized as contempt (75
percent agreement across cultures) just as the “anger expression” was seen as
signifying anger (74 percent agreement) and the “disgust picture” showed disgust
(73 percent agreement). Less clear, however, is the explanation for such
universality: agreement could be the result of either species-specific learning or
biological evolution. If the result of learning, the expressions would be
characteristic only of humans; if the result of evolution, they should also be
observed in other species, such as primates. A resolution of this issue depends on
demonstrations of cross-species similarities in the underlying physiology. Such a
demonstration has not yet been presented.
In a particularly ambitious cross-cultural study (Ekman et al., 1987),
respondents from ten cultures were asked to identify facial expressions as
indicators of one or more of six emotions—happiness, surprise, sadness, fear,
disgust, anger. Three pictures were selected for each of the six emotions. High
levels of agreement were found for judgments of the strongest emotion, the
second strongest emotion, and the relative strength of two different expressions
of the same emotion in each set of pictures. The majority of the observers in
every culture judge the emotions as
predicted. The authors claim that these results are strong support for the view of
universal facial expressions (although not for the species-specific learning versus
evolutionary explanations of such agreement). However, several aspects of their
research design may have biased the results in favor of high agreement: their
procedures serve to take the expressions out of a social context, eliminate
simultaneous speech and body cues, freeze the expression in a photograph, force
special attention to it, and ask for judgments from detached uninvolved
observers. Further studies are needed to observe how facial expressions change in
different social contexts. Following Doob's (1975) advice, these studies should
embed the expression in textual material in order to capture the content as well as
the tone of the emotion. Of interest, then, is the question: Would similar levels of
agreement be obtained for expressions viewed as part of a cultural context?
The issue of universality versus cultural specificity has not been addressed
systematically in relation to other nonverbal channels. However, there is
indication of considerable variation in the display of emblems—physical acts that
can fully take the place of words. Ekman et al. (1984) report regional, national,
and intranational (urban versus rural) variation among respondents in their survey
of emblems and indicate that a geographical dictionary of emblems would be a
useful compilation for researchers as well as travelers. Such work would raise a
question of interest: Does the source of emblems differ from facial expressions
with regard to the issue of universality versus cultural specificity?
Finally, in terms of the central theme of this chapter, we located only two
teams of investigators who have been recently exploring cultural influences on
deceptive enactments. Comparing Chinese experimental liars with truth tellers,
Cody et al. (1989) report some similarities and some differences to findings
reported in earlier studies with American subjects (see also Yi Chao, 1987). Like
their American counterparts, Chinese liars found lying to be a more difficult
challenge than telling the truth: they experienced difficulties in communicating
detailed and thorough answers to the questions that required effort. (See DePaulo
et al., 1985, for a review of the research with American subjects.) Overall,
however, few nonverbal behavioral cues distinguished the Chinese liars from
truth tellers: no differences were found in either arousal or visual cues, although
some discrimination was found in the auditory channel. These findings may be
explained in part by culturally learned constraints against the display of negative
feelings. Both the liars and truth tellers were brief in communicating negative
feelings; they smiled frequently and suppressed body and hand movements.
While speech errors were related to deceit, many other paralinguistic variables
related more strongly to question difficulty.
The researchers suggest that future cross-cultural research assess the more
subtle cues to arousal and anxiety that are more sensitive to cultural influences,
such as types of smiling, symmetry of expressions, and tone of voice. Another
study shows that vocal stress may be a sensitive indicator of emotions associated
with deception, at least for the male Chinese subjects in their sample (O'Hair et
al., 1989). One implication of these findings is that different display rules operate
in different societies, resulting in culturally specific expressions, some of which
are manifest as deception cues. The mode of expression of nonverbal behaviors in
various channels differs even if the same type of behavior is displayed. When
stated as an hypothesis, this issue provides a basis for further research that would
elucidate the cultural dimensions of deception clues.
Bond and his colleagues (1990) videotaped Americans and Jordanians while
telling lies and truths about persons they liked or disliked. Similarities and
differences in nonverbal displays between the cultures indicate some support for
both culturally specific expressions and for universal expressions. They found
similarities between the cultures on such nonverbal behaviors as smiling, head
movements, blinking, and hand gestures. Differences were found on eye contact,
movements per minute, and filled pauses: Jordanians displayed more of each of
these behaviors. However, only one behavior, filled pauses, distinguished
between the liars and truth tellers among the Jordanian subjects only: Jordanians
displayed more filled pauses when lying than when telling the truth. It is little
wonder then that the detectors from both cultures were inaccurate: very few
nonverbal behaviors could be used as reliable cues to deception.
CONCLUSIONS
Three kinds of conclusions are suggested by this review of research related
to deception. The evidence underscores the relevance of nonverbal behaviors as
indicators of emotions and intentions, although it raises additional issues that can
only be resolved by further research. It also suggests some strategies that can be
used to detect intentions in real-world environments.
It is clear that a number of nonverbal behaviors are associated with
deception. Particularly revealing are body movements and tone of voice changes,
although a number of other behaviors also indicate deception in certain
situations. Nonverbal behaviors reflect feelings or emotions more directly than
specific intentions to deceive. Emotions—psychological states—can be
considered as intervening variables, relating to observed behaviors and to inferred
intentions. Nonverbal expressions
Techniques developed for laboratory research may also be useful. They provide a
structured and systematic approach to analysis for detecting deception in a variety
of situations. The techniques are especially useful to an analyst who has access to
videotaped interactions or who can interact with a subject over long periods of
time. It is important not to rely solely on the judgments of “experts” even if they
claim to be highly confident in those judgments. Expert-based judgments should
be verified with other data gathered and processed in a systematic manner.
It should be possible to learn to distinguish between the universal and
culturally specific expressions of emotions. The primary emotions may evoke
similar expressions from one culture to another, and combinations of emotions
seem to be subject to display rules, with which detectors can become familiar.
Leakage cues are likely to be evident in a highly motivated liar. A
professional may be more likely to show signs of deception in unattended
channels than an experimental subject, who operates in an environment in which
the stakes for getting caught are relatively low.
NOTES
1. Comprehensive reviews of this evidence can be found in a number of sources. Harper et al. (1978)
provide an ambitious summary of the literature organized by channel of communication, that is,
paralanguage, facial expression, kinesics or body language, visual behavior, and proxemics or the
study of space. An edited volume by Siegman and Feldstein (1978) reviews the evidence on
specialized topics by the key researchers in those fields, for example, Dittmann on the role of bodily
communication, Ekman on facial expression, Exline on visual interaction, Hess on pupillary
behavior, and Patterson on the role of space. Druckman et al. (1982) present a channel-by-channel
review of studies organized in terms of the functions of information processing and impression
management; the same authors provided a more recent review appearing in Hargie's (1986) Handbook
of Communication Skills. Influential frameworks for conceptualizing the diverse functions served by
nonverbal behavior are those devised by Ekman and Friesen (1969), Birdwhistle (1970), Dittmann
(1972), Mehrabian (1972), and Argyle (1975). To keep abreast of current developments in the field,
readers can consult recent issues of the Journal of Nonverbal Behavior.
2. Results obtained from a preliminary analysis are instructive. Subjects participated in a main
interview and a postinterview session; in the later, they were told to “fool the interviewer by
controlling their facial expressions.” In both segments, the same issue was discussed. Fifteen
nonverbal behaviors (facial expressions and body movements) were coded for both the main interview
and the postinterview sessions. Contrary to the leakage hypothesis, the difference scores indicated
less movement on most indicators in the postinterview session. Following the experimenter's
instructions, subjects spent considerably more time looking at the interviewer and less time looking
elsewhere during the postinterview session. They also showed less activity on other indicators, the
only exceptions being head movements and frowns, where they showed somewhat more movement
during the postinterview session. Although this finding contradicts the idea of leakage, it does
suggest a deception clue for deceivers who consciously control their facial expressions. The clue is
less overall animation, which has also
been found to discriminate among deceivers, evaders, and truth tellers (Druckman et al., 1982:137)
and to distinguish between deceivers sensitive to detector's possible suspicions about their deception
and those not sensitive to suspicions in the Buller et al. (1989) study. It also replicates the DePaulo et
al. (1985) finding of behavioral inhibition for motivated liars discussed above. More definitive results
await the analyses of data which have been obtained from a larger sample of subjects, some of whom
were told to “control their face,” while others were told to “control their body.”
3. Another problem for detectors is posed by skillful deceivers. Skill at deceiving may be developed
through on-the-job experience or by specific training programs. Studies by Ekman and Friesen (1974)
and Alker (1976) suggest that experience in a profession (nursing, politics) may enhance a person's
skill at deceiving. DePaulo et al. (1985) discuss training with regard to both effective and ineffective
procedures. Appropriate training for would-be deceivers may be games where feedback is direct,
unambiguous, and immediate. Inappropriate preparation may be repeated rehearsals of the future
enactment. Careful planning may make a person appear less spontaneous and more tense, leading the
observer to conclude that he or she is being deceptive. These suggestions apply more generally to the
art of impression management, including those forms of impressions that are less morally dubious
than deception.
4. The laboratory research addresses the question of what to look for and how to measure it. While
contributing analytical strategies as discussed in this section, it would be facile to suggest that the
findings from laboratory studies also contribute to the meaning of displays observed in other settings.
The meaning of measured displays must be established in the setting of interest.
REFERENCES
Alker, H.A. 1976 Mystification and Deception in Presidential Press Conferences. Paper presented at
the meeting of the American Psychological Association, Washington, D.C.
Argyle, M. 1975 Bodily Communication. New York: International Universities Press.
Badler, N.I., and S.W. Smoliar 1979 Digital representations of human movement. Computing Surveys
11:19-38.
Baxter, J.C. 1970 Interpersonal spacing in natural settings. Sociometry 33:444-456.
Ben-Shakhar, G., I. Lieblich, and M. Bar-Hillel 1982 An evaluation of polygraphers' judgments: a
review from a decision theoretic perspective. Journal of Applied Psychology 67:701-713.
Birdwhistle, R.L. 1970 Kinesics and Context. Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Bond, C.F., Jr., A. Omar, A. Mahmoud, and R.N. Bonser 1990 Lie detection across cultures. Journal
of Nonverbal Behavior 14:189-204.
Buller, D.B., and R.K. Aune 1987 Nonverbal cues to deception among intimates, friends, and
strangers. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 11:269-290.
Buller, D.B., J. Comstock, R.K. Aune, and K.D. Strzyzewski 1989 The effect of probing on deceivers
and truthtellers. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 13:155-169.
Cody, M.J., W. Lee, and E. Yi Chao 1989 Telling lies: correlates of deception among Chinese. In J.P.
Forgas and J.M. Innes, eds., Recent Advances in Social Psychology: An International
Perspective. New York: Elsevier Science Publishers.
DePaulo, B.M., M. Zuckerman, and R. Rosenthal 1980 Detecting deception: modality effects. In L.
Wheeler, ed., Review of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 1. Beverly Hills, Calif.:
Sage Publications.
DePaulo, B.M., R. Rosenthal, C.R. Green, and J. Rosenkrantz 1982 Diagnosing deceptive and mixed
messages from verbal and nonverbal clues. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology
18:433-446.
DePaulo, B.M., J.I. Stone, and G.D. Lassiter 1985 Deceiving and detecting deceit. In B.R. Schlenker,
ed., The Self and Social Life. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Dittmann, A.T. 1972 Interpersonal Messages of Emotion. New York: Springer.
Doob, L.W. 1975 Pathways to People. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Druckman, D., R.M. Rozelle, and J.C. Baxter 1982 Nonverbal Communication: Survey, Theory, and
Research. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.
Ekman, P. 1978 Facial expression. In A.W. Siegman and S. Feldstein, eds., Nonverbal Behavior and
Communication. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
1981 Mistakes when deceiving.Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 364:269-278.
Ekman, P., and W.V. Friesen 1969 Nonverbal leakage and clues to deception. Psychiatry 32:88-106.
1974 Detecting deception from the body or face. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
29:288-298.
1986 A new pan-cultural facial expression of emotion. Motivation and Emotion 10:159-168.
Ekman, P., and K.G. Heider 1988 The universality of a contempt expression: a replication. Motivation
and Emotion 12:303-308.
Ekman, P., and M. O'Sullivan 1988 The role of context on interpreting facial expression: comment on
Russell and Fehr (1987). Journal of Experimental Psychology, General 117:86-88.
1991 Who can catch a liar? Unpublished manuscript, Human Interaction Laboratory, University of
California, San Francisco.
Ekman, P., W.V. Friesen, and J. Bear 1984 The international language of gestures. Psychology
Today May:64-69.
Ekman, P., W.V. Friesen, M. O'Sullivan, A. Chan, I. Diacoyanni-Tarlatzis, K. Heider, R. Krause, W.
Ayhrans LeCompte, T. Pitcairn, P.E. Ricci-Bitti, K. Scherer, M. Tomita, and A. Tzavards
1987 Universals and cultural differences in the judgments of facial expressions of emotion.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 53:712-717.
Flavell, J.H. 1977 Cognitive Development. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Getty, D.J., R.M. Pickett, C.J. D'Orsi, and J.A. Swets 1988 Enhanced interpretation of diagnostic
images. Investigative Radiology 23:240-252.
Hall, E.T. 1966 The Hidden Dimension. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.
Hargie, O. 1986 A Handbook of Communication Skills. Dover, N.H.: Croom Helm, Ltd.
Harper, R.G., A.N. Wiens, and J.D. Metarazzo 1978 Nonverbal Communication: The State of the
Art. New York: John Wiley.
Hendershot, J., and A.K. Hess 1982 Detecting Deception: The Effects of Training and Socialization
Levels on Verbal and Nonverbal Cue Utilization and Detection Accuracy. Unpublished
manuscript, Department of Psychology, Auburn University.
Jourard, S.M. 1966 An exploratory study of body-accessibility. British Journal of Social and Clinical
Psychology 5:221-231.
Knapp, M.L., and M.E. Comadena 1979 Telling it like it isn't: a review of theory and research on
deceptive communications. Human Communication Research 5:270-285.
Kraut, R.E., and D. Poe 1980 Behavioral roots of person perception: the deception judgments of
customs inspectors and laymen. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 39:784-798.
Little, K.B. 1968 Cultural variations in social schemata. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 7:63-72.
Lykken, D.T. 1981 A Tremor in the Blood: Uses and Abuses of the Lie Detector. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
1985 The probity of the polygraph. In S.M. Kassin and L.S. Wrightsman, eds., The Psychology of
Evidence and Trial Procedure. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.
Mahoney, R., and D. Druckman 1975 Simulation, experimentation, and context: dimensions of design
and inference. Simulation and Games 6:235-270.
McClintock, C.C., and R.G. Hunt 1975 Nonverbal indicators of affect and deception. Journal of
Applied Social Psychology 1:54-67.
Mehrabian, A. 1971 Nonverbal betrayal of feeling. Journal of Experimental Research in Personality
5:64-73.
1972 Nonverbal Communication. Chicago: Aldine.
Nisbett, R., and L. Ross 1980 Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
O'Hair, D., M.J. Cody, X. Wang, and E. Yi Chao 1989 Vocal Stress and Deception Detection Among
Chinese. Paper presented at the annual meetings of the Western Speech Communication
Association, Spokane, Wash.
O'Sullivan, M., P. Ekman, and W.V. Friesen 1988 The effect of comparisons on detecting deceit.
Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 12:203-215.
Raskin, D.C. 1987 Does science support polygraph testing? In A. Gale, ed., The Polygraph Test:
Lies, Truth, and Science. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.
Rozelle, R.M., D. Druckman, and J.C. Baxter 1986 Nonverbal communication. In O. Hargie, ed., A
Handbook of Communication Skills. Dover, N.H.: Croom Helm, Ltd.
Shuter, P. 1976 Proxemics and tactility in Latin America. Journal of Communication 26:46-52.
Siegman, A.W., and S. Feldstein, eds. 1978 Nonverbal Behavior and Communication. Hillsdale,
N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum.
10
A Broader Concept of Deception
TYPES OF DECEPTION
Lying in the real world covers more than lying studied in the laboratory:
lying is often done for personal or ideological gain; it can harm the victim, and it
is often carried out over a considerable span of time. More broadly, deception
includes more than lying. In fact, deception can be carried out without explicit
lying.
Deception can be defined broadly as the manipulation of appearances such
that they convey a false reality. However, when one tries to list a variety of
deceptions and their contexts, it becomes difficult to find a common set of
features that characterizes all of them. At best, the various types of deception
bear what Wittgenstein (1953) calls a family resemblance to one another.
Deception includes both dissimulation (hiding or withholding information) and
simulation (putting out wrong or misleading information). Both deception and
lying can be accomplished by omission as well as by commission. Interestingly,
folk theories of deception are more likely to attach moral significance to
deceptions accomplished by commission than to those accomplished by
omission.
The first psychologists to study deception looked upon conjuring or sleight-
of-hand magic as the paradigm (Hyman, 1989). Certainly, conjuring is one of the
few occupations in which success depends entirely on the ability to deceive.
Although deception is the essence of conjuring, such deception differs from the
deception of the confidence man or that of the spy. A conjuror engages in
“sanctioned deception”: he or she has an implicit contract with the audience that
doing a good job means fooling the onlookers. A magician would not be a good
magician if he or she failed to deceive the audience. A conjuror's “victims”
know, even before the tricks have been done, that the magician intends to fool
them.
Deception, unlike conjuring, generally depends for its success on keeping
intended victims unaware that deception is taking place. And many deceptions,
unlike magic tricks, are definitely not sanctioned by society. Although most lying
and deceiving are considered immoral by almost all cultures, some forms are
sanctioned, or at least tolerated, by social customs. In the United States, such
tolerated untruths include “social lies” and “white lies.” Jokes, fantasies, teasing,
and fibbing are other examples of untruths that carry little or no social
disapproval. These considerations suggest that one way deceptions vary is in the
perceived harm that they can do to other people or society.
There are many examples of the varied types and contexts of deception.
Many adolescent children have successfully “fooled” adults; some have gained
notoriety as psychics or individuals around whom poltergeist phenomena occur.
Both children and adults have succeeded in fooling doctors into giving them
unneeded prescriptions and even unnecessary operations. Consumer and health
fraud has always been a huge industry in civilized countries. Military and
strategic deception have been practiced since countries or even tribes have
existed. Feints and ploys are highly valued and important forms of deception in
games and sports. Fraudulent psychics, gambling cheats, and impersonators are
everywhere. Confidence games and swindles continually take their toll of
seemingly willing victims. Forgery is a criminal case of deception. In recent
years, more and more articles and books have been devoted to plagiarism and
other deception in science (e.g., National Academy of Sciences, 1989). Self-
deception has also recently been gaining much attention among philosophers,
psychologists, and sociobiologists.
All these forms of deception are interesting and worthy of study, but the
focus of this chapter is more limited: two individuals in face-to-face
communication. Under these circumstances, the questions of hiding and detecting
deception are about leakage and the extent to which one of the parties can detect
whether the other is talking or acting deceptively. One focus is how to generalize
the existing findings from laboratory research to more realistic settings and to
wider contexts of deception.
Although the focus is on two individuals in face-to-face communication, it is
important to remember that most important informational exchanges occur within
a more complicated organizational setting in which structural and psychological
factors interact and help to determine, in important ways, the consequences of the
exchanges. These added complexities are briefly addressed.
position is that folk psychology should play no role since many folk beliefs about
human behavior have been wrong. Trying to build a scientific psychology on the
basis of folk psychology, according to this position, would hamper progress by
starting with vague, contradictory, and almost certainly wrong beliefs. People
who advocate this position argue that the science of psychology should begin
with those concepts and laws that have already been shown to be useful in
biology, physiology, and neuroscience.
The contrary view maintains that any complete science of psychology must
take into account people's beliefs about their own and others' mentality and
behavior. This is the view accepted in this chapter. We believe that any attempt to
understand and explain deception must somehow take account of how ordinary
people conceptualize deception.
One obvious way in which a folk psychology of deception can matter is
related to the leakage hypothesis, which assumes that people enter a particular
psychological state when they believe they are violating a social norm. The
experience or state of guilt is accompanied by hormonal and muscular changes
that can potentially be detected by an observer. Perhaps the best use of this
hypothesis is to predict or detect deception on the basis of beliefs and acts that
constitute deceptions and transgressions for a given individual. What a person
believes about lying and deception is part of that individual's folk psychology.
Two empirical studies have attempted to describe the way ordinary people
conceptualize lying and deception. Although both studies were psychological
investigations, the investigators were communication scientists (Hopper and Bell,
1984) and linguists (Coleman and Kay, 1981). Subsequently, another linguist
carried out a provocative analysis of the Coleman and Kay study (Sweetser,
1987). These studies are important because they show that the paradigm
laboratory experiment might be supplemented by approaches that better elicit
leakage cues from members of various groups.
A Prototype Theory
Another way to uncover the psychological space with respect to deception
was illustrated by Coleman and Kay (1981). These authors carried out their
empirical study of the word lie as an assault on the previously dominant checklist
theories of meaning. The checklist view assumes that the meaning of a word
consists of a set of features: any object that contains these features belongs to the
category defined by that word. For example, bachelor refers to any object that is
human, adult, male, unmarried. According to the checklist theory, any person
who possesses all four of these defining features is a bachelor, and a person who
lacks one or more of these features is not a bachelor. The classic theory of
meaning asserts that the possession of these defining features is both necessary
and sufficient for being a bachelor. Such a definition establishes what is called an
equivalence class—every person who satisfies the definition is as much a
bachelor as every other bachelor. Even before this classical theory began to be
challenged in the 1970s, some scholars had pointed to problems with the classical
definition. For example, is the Pope a bachelor? What about a widower?
The alternative view of meaning, which became popular during the 1970s, is
known as the prototype theory. Prototype theories recognize
the intuitive notion that some members of a category are better exemplars than
others. Much of the early work supporting this theory had been done with colors
(Rosch, 1975). Not all examples of the color red, say, are equal. People in
different cultures agree that some examples are better reds than others.
Additional experimental work dealing with directly perceptible objects such as
plants, animals, utensils, and furniture supported the prototype theory. Coleman
and Kay wanted to show that the prototype phenomenon can also be found in
words referring to less concrete things, such as the speech-act word lie.
They first used standard linguistic analysis to devise a definition of a
“good” (true) lie. A good lie is one for which the speaker (S) asserts some
proposition (P) to addressee (A) such that:
(1) P is false (false in fact);
(2) S believes P to be false (believe false); and
(3) in uttering P, S intends to deceive A (intent to deceive).
In the checklist or classical theory these three properties would be necessary
and sufficient for a statement to be a lie. The prototype theory asserts that a
concept such as lie is a “fuzzy set” in which different members vary in their
degree of goodness or closeness to the prototype. Statements that possess all three
properties would be the best examples of a lie. Statements that possessed only
two of the three defining properties might still be considered lies, but not very
good examples. Statements that had only one of the properties would be
considered even poorer examples of lies. Finally, statements that possessed none
of these three properties would not be considered as lies.
Coleman and Kay (1981) conducted an empirical test of the theory by
constructing brief stories to correspond with each of the eight possible
combinations of possessing or not possessing the property. The story
corresponding to the possession of all three properties was as follows (p. 31):
(1) Moe has eaten the cake Juliet was intending to serve to company. Juliet
asks Moe, “Did you eat the cake?” Moe says, “No.” Did Moe lie?
The story corresponding to the possession of none of three defining
properties was (p. 31):
(2) Dick, John, and H.R. are playing golf. H.R. steps on Dick's ball. When
Dick arrives and sees his ball mashed into the turf, he says, “John, did you
step on my ball?” John replies, “No, H.R. did it.” Did John lie?
As expected, all 67 of Coleman and Kay's American subject's agreed
that (1) was a lie and that (2) was not a lie. What they were interested in
was how these respondents would react to the other stories, which
possessed either one or two of the defining characteristics. Story (3), for
example, had two defining characteristics: false in fact and intent to
deceive. It lacked the property that S believes P to be false. This story was
as follows (p. 31):
(3) Pigfat believes he has to pass the candy store to get to the pool hall, but he
is wrong about this because the candy store has moved. Pigfat's mother
doesn't approve of pool. As he is going out the door intending to go to the
pool hall, Pigfat's mother asks him where is going. He says, “I am going
by the candy store.” Did Pigfat lie?
Pigfat's statement was considered to be a lie by 58 percent of the judges; 37
percent judged it not to be a lie; and 5 percent could not make a decision.1 In
general, he results supported the prototype model. The more defining properties a
story contained, the more likely it was to be judged a lie. The authors noted some
minor departures from the ordering that their theory would have predicted. In
part, these departures could be attributed to the fact that each story differed in
content. Coleman and Kay also obtained comments from their subjects. In
agreement with their theory, the comments referred to the three prototypical
properties to justify why a statement was judged as a lie. But the subjects also
referred to other properties, such as the reprehensibility of the acts and the
motives of the person making the statement.
The authors discuss their reasons for not including some of these additional
properties in the prototype for lie. They distinguish between prototypical and
typical properties of a concept. Lies, in their view, are prototypically statements
that the speaker believes to be false, intends the hearer to believe, and are, in fact,
false. Lies are also typically reprehensible, but not prototypically so. They
conclude (Coleman and Kay, 1981:38):
Although this is not the only plausible way to do so, we summarize our
observations by saying that reprehensibleness, although characteristic of typical
acts of lying, is not a prototypical property of such acts, and as such does not play a
role in the semantic prototype (or in the meaning) of lie.
This distinction between prototypical and typical properties of a concept is
controversial. We do not take a side in this controversy; we discuss the issue here
because, regardless of whether reprehensibility is a prototypical or typical
property of lying, it may matter for the leakage hypothesis. Only acts that are
reprehensible or otherwise morally unacceptable to a given individual would be
expected to lead to those states that generate nonverbal leakage. To gain an
understanding of how different cultural groups construe various types of lying
and deception, the Coleman and Kay approach should be extended by adding
stories that also vary on such properties as perceived social acceptability,
potential harmfulness, and the like.
A Linguistic Approach
Sweetser (1987) uses the data from Coleman and Kay's investigation to
provide an alternative interpretation. Like Hopper and Bell, Sweetser wants to
describe the folk theory or conception of lying; unlike Hopper and Bell, her
method is linguistic rather than psychological. Sweetser notes the view of
concepts as fuzzy sets rather than classical equivalence classes, but she argues for a
different account.
She suggests that within folk psychology, the classical view may actually
hold. She claims that the folk definition of lying holds for a prototypical,
simplified model of the world. This prototypical world contains maxims such as:
(1) be helpful; (2) correct information is helpful; (3) speakers only talk about
information they have good reasons to know is correct; (4) listeners can correctly
assume that speakers know what they are talking about. In this prototypical
context, if the speaker's statement is false, then it is clearly a lie.
When subjects are not completely sure whether a speaker is lying, Sweetser
argues that this is not because the specific act differs from the prototypical lie,
but rather the act occurs in a context that differs from the prototypical one. A joke
is a false statement deliberately uttered by the speaker. It is not clearly a lie,
according to Sweetser, because the context in which the joke is made differs from
the prototypical one. In the prototypical context for defining a lie, conveying true
information is paramount. But in the context of a joke, playing is paramount, and
conveying true information is irrelevant. Subjects are unsure about whether a joke
is a lie because they are not sure that a lie can occur in a context in which the
truth is irrelevant.
Sweetser's analysis of lying highlights the need to keep context in mind
when devising a taxonomy of deception. Indeed, we believe that an adequate
taxonomy of deception will include a taxonomy of the contexts in which each
kind of deceptive act can occur.
Sweetser's analysis points to a further issue that may be important for a good
taxonomy. She states that a speaker feels less immoral if he or she manages to
deceive the target without directly lying. She suggests that deceivers feel less
guilt about deceiving by implication rather than by deceiving by an explicitly
false claim. (In contrast, she also suggests that a victim feels more resentment by
having been deceived by implication than by a direct lie.) If Sweetser is correct,
then it could be hypothesized that a deceiver is less likely to leak deceptive
signals when engaging in indirect deception than in direct deception.
Implications for this hypothesis are derived from the Druckman et al. (1982)
experiments reviewed above. These investigators found both similarities and
differences in displayed nonverbal behaviors between
Socialization
Our focus has been on a folk psychology of deception because it seems to
offer the best way to achieve a general theory of deception. The leakage
hypothesis assumes that a given individual will display potentially detectable
signs when he or she is in a certain psychological state. As we have noted, a key
issue is the extent to which these diagnostic cues are universal—that is, to what
extent they show the same pattern across cultures and situations—and the
evidence to date suggests the possibility that there may be both universal and
culturally specific aspects to leakage displays.
INTERACTIVE SETTINGS
The discussion in this chapter (and in Chapter 9) deals with the simplest
situation in which deception occurs, a face-to-face confrontation between two
individuals, in part because this situation has been the context of most of the
research. Another reason is that such a situation
enough true information, along with disinformation, to ensure that the case
officer is rewarded and promoted. In this way the case officer becomes even more
dependent on the trustworthiness of the informant.
Once a case officer and his or her superiors have decided that an informant
is trustworthy, the dynamics of the situation are tilted toward maintaining the
belief in the reliability of the informant. Careers can be made, or broken, if the
agency ultimately decides that an informant was a true defector or a plant. A
variety of institutional and psychological factors come into play to maintain the
belief, even in the face of subsequently strong information to the contrary, in the
trustworthiness of the agent. Striking cases of such institutional self-deception
have been documented by Epstein (1989), Handel (1976), Watzlawick (1976),
and Whaley (1973).
Such institutional self-deception typically involves accepting or rejecting the
content of information. At the level of face-to-face communication, we have been
focusing on the nonverbal cues rather than the content of what is being
communicated. The two bases for judging the credibility of information obviously
interact. When the content of the information is consistent with the beliefs and
desires of the receiver, then the tendency to accept the information as accurate is
strong. As noted above, the relationship between suspicion and detection
accuracy—how much a tendency to believe or disbelieve can override the ability
to pick up deception cues—is important for research.
CONCLUSIONS
From the discussion in the chapter we draw four conclusions. The first
conclusion is based on the assumption that leaked cues to deception occur when
an individual's psychological state reflects the experience of guilt. However, the
situations that produce guilt may vary with an individual's cultural background
and experience. Therefore, detection of deception would be improved if one could
anticipate the sorts of settings that constitute social transgression or a guilt-
producing state for particular individuals.
The research on the folk psychology of deception and on the prototypical
structure of lying are examples of methods for assessing perceptions of socially
unacceptable deceptions within subcultural groups. With suitable refinements,
those methods can be used to discover what stories and deceptive acts might
induce leakage for particular individuals.
Once discovered, the stories could be varied systematically to determine
whether leakage occurs (or is enhanced) when an individual deceives under
conditions that violate his or her cultural norms. The analysis would compare the
reactions of various cultural groups to the
NOTES
1. Coleman and Kay obtained confidence ratings along with the judgments of whether a statement
was a lie. They were able to use these ratings to construct a more refined rating scale. For the sake of
simplicity, only the simple judgments of lying are discussed here.
2. Robin-Ann Cogburn, a doctoral student at the University of Oregon, is currently conducting
research with antisocial persons who are in the state prison system. She is using a variation of the
classic laboratory paradigm to test the leakage hypothesis with them.
REFERENCES
Chisholm, R.M., and T.D. Feehan 1977 The intent to deceive. The Journal of Philosophy
74:143-159.
Coleman, L., and P. Kay 1981 Prototype semantics: the English verb lie. Language 57:(1)26-44.
Daniel, D.C., and K.L. Herbig 1982 Propositions on military deception. In D.C. Daniel and K.L.
Herbig, eds., Strategic Military Deception. New York: Pergamon Press.
Druckman, D., R.M. Rozelle, and J.C. Baxter 1982 Nonverbal Communication: Survey, Theory, and
Research. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications.
Epstein, E.J. 1989 Deception: The Invisible War Between the KGB and the CIA. New York: Simon
and Schuster.
Goffman, E. 1969 Strategic Interaction. Philadelphia, Pa.: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Handel, M.I. 1976 Perception, Deception, and Surprise: The Case of the Yom Kippur War. Jerusalem
Papers on Peace Problems, No. 19. Jerusalem, Israel: The Hebrew University.
Heuer, R.J. 1982 Cognitive factors in deception and counterdeception. Pp. 31-69 in D.C. Daniel and
K.L. Herbig, eds., Strategic Military Deception. New York: Pergamon Press.
Hopper, R., and R.A. Bell 1984 Broadening the deception construct. Quarterly Journal of Speech
70:288-302.
Hyman, R. 1989 The psychology of deception. Annual Review of Psychology 40:133-154.
Mauer, A.C., M.D. Tunstall, and J.M. Eagle, eds. 1985 Intelligence: Policy and Process. Boulder,
Colo.: Westview Press.
National Academy of Sciences 1989 On Being a Scientist. Committee on the Conduct of Science.
Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
Rosch, E. 1975 Human categorization. Pp. 1-72 in N. Warren, ed., Advances in Cross-Cultural
Psychology. London: Academic Press.
Sweetser, E.E. 1987 The definition of lie: examination of folk models underlying a semantic
prototype. In D. Holland and N. Quinn, eds., Cultural Models in Language and Thought.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Watzlawick, P. 1976 How Real is Real? Confusion—Disinformation—Communication. New York:
Random House.
Whaley, B. 1973 Codeword Barbarossa. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
1982 Toward a general theory of deception. The Journal of Strategic Studies 5:178-192.
Wittgenstein, L. 1953 Philosophical Investigations. New York: Macmillan.
191
PART IV
Performing
192
11
Optimizing Individual Performance
speaking, Morgan's model may not seem very provocative, but its common sense
and intuitive appeal has advantages in its gaining acceptance among the public
(see Morgan, 1980).
Morgan maintains that his model has an intermediate level of complexity:
that is, that the model can specify relationships [e.g., y = f(x)]. Morgan implies
that the flow of causality is from psychological states to success in sports, not the
other way around. However, he does not provide evidence for this flow, and it
could be argued that the flow is in the opposite direction: that self-protective
mechanisms may operate for athletes believing that they will not make a team or
place first, which subsequently affects psychological states.
Morgan (1985:71) further maintains that this type of model “also predicts
specific responses will be dependent upon specific stimulus conditions.”
Although the model does not clearly spell out all of the stimulus conditions, its
empirical basis suggests that it may be limited to certain types of sports. With few
exceptions (LeUnes et al., 1986; Morgan, 1981), most of the evidence has come
from sports that emphasize muscular or cardiorespiratory endurance—body
building, cycling, karate, wrestling, speedskating, soccer, rowing, distance
running, and swimming. The model has been applied to other types of
performance tasks. (In considering the use of this model for military settings, it
seems most appropriate for dynamic, large-muscle activities or cardiorespiratory
endurance tasks that involve intense aerobic/anaerobic training over a period of
months.)
The basic model is a between-subjects static model, consisting of predictions
of desirable psychological states for optimal performance. It has also been
extended to a within-subjects dynamic model consisting of monitoring athletes
throughout different stimulus conditions associated with intense training. Morgan
(1985) believes the evolving dynamic model will ultimately prove to be superior
to the static model in understanding changes in athletic performance. We first
present the static model to better understand its features, which are also
incorporated into the dynamic model.
a control group. Instead, these studies simply plotted the means of a single group
of athletes and contrasted them to the normative sample reported in the POMS
test manual (McNair et al., 1971/1981). The unusually consistent findings relative
to the test norms are likely due to an inappropriate comparison group; the norms
were obtained from participants in psychological tests and students in psychology
courses and “should be considered as very tentative” (McNair et al.,
1971/1981:19). More recent studies of undergraduate college nonathletes (Boyle,
1987; Dyer and Crouch, 1987) demonstrate that the mean scores for tension,
depression, and vigor have decreased over the past 20 years. This instability over
time, which represents from 2-7 points on the various POMS subscales, and the
current controversy surrounding the factor structure of the POMS (Boyle, 1987;
Norcross et al., 1984; Reddon et al., 1985), suggests that the normative sample
reported in the POMS manual is an inappropriate comparison group. Thus,
studies of this type offer no convincing support for the iceberg profile and the
mental health model.
A better test of the replicability of Morgan's findings for the mental health
model are studies that provide comparison groups similar to those reported by
Morgan (1985). We found 14 such studies that compared the POMS scores of two
groups of athletes representing two levels of performance outcome (13 in LeUnes
et al., 1988; Morgan et al., 1987b). Of the 148 total comparisons made with the
six scales, only 27 (18 percent) were statistically significant and 24 (16 percent)
in the predicted direction. The pattern predicted by the mental health model may
have been present in these studies, but the power of the statistical tests may not
have been sufficient to detect differences because of the small number of
subjects. To examine this possibility, the directions of the 148 comparisons were
examined relative to the predictions of the mental health model. As shown in
Table 1, the percentage of supportive versus nonsupportive findings was
calculated for each study. Compared to chance expectations of 50 percent
supportive, these 14 studies yield an unimpressive overall average percentage of
53 percent supportive findings. As a whole, the findings from other investigators,
as well as Morgan's studies (Morgan and Pollock, 1977; Morgan et al., 1987b),
fail to clearly support the predictions of the mental health model.
In the face of these more recent findings, it is highly questionable that the
POMS instrument, which is primarily used to test the mental health model, is
sensitive enough to reliably differentiate among athletes who are already highly
proficient. In addition to small samples and performance measures that have been
indirect and often distally linked in time with psychological measures, the
susceptibility of the POMS to distorting influences may also contribute to the lack
of sensitivity in differentiating among athletes. For instance, Boyle (1987) has
noted that
social desirability and other response sets, inadequate self-insight, and item
transparency affect POMS scores. Miller and Edgington (1984) have
demonstrated the susceptibility of the POMS to response distortion or “faking
good” when physical education students were led to believe the test results might
influence team selection. The resulting extreme iceberg profile prompts
considerable concern that the strong situational demands of team selection and
placement in athletic competition may produce distorting influences that override
instructions to subjects to answer the POMS as honestly as they can and that may
be unique to the POMS and, thus, not detectable by the conformity scale of the
EPI. Overall in fact, the static model has had limited success in predicting levels
of athletic performance.
period of increased training. The fact that tension remained elevated following
the taper period may have been due to anxiety associated with an impending
conference championship. The differences in salivary cortisol levels during the
baseline are also problematic. This difference may have been due to limitations
associated with only collecting one cortisol sample for each training phase and
the time frame in relation to training in which these samples were obtained
(O'Connor et al., 1989). Although no subjects in this study possessed negative
affective states of clinical significance (i.e., one standard deviation of the
population average of college females), three subjects had prolonged performance
decrements that resulted in their being diagnosed as stale.
Global mood disturbance has recently been shown to be related to athletes'
running economy (Williams and Krahenbuhl, in press) and mood state following a
rapid 6 percent weight loss (Horswill et al., 1990). For example, it has been noted
for some time that even in elite runners there is considerable day-to-day
variability in ventilation measures, which exercise physiologists use to infer how
economically one runs at a constant workload. Comparing the POMS to daily
ventilation measures showed a surprisingly high association, r = .80. It appears
that these within-subject comparisons of mood state over days or months can
detect when athletes may feel undue pressure in their lives that can slightly (e.g.,
running economy, weight loss) or dramatically (e.g., staleness) affect their
performance. The implications of the dynamic model are far-reaching.
Summary
There are a number of shortcomings in the studies testing the static and
dynamic mental health models. These shortcomings include the use of a single-
group design in several studies, which greatly limits their internal validity; most
of these studies were cross-sectional, exploratory, descriptive, or retrospective in
nature. Many of the studies only used comparisons to college norms established
more than 20 years ago, and it is possible that these norms are not stable over
time and are no longer still representative of college students today. Most of the
studies had very small numbers of subjects, which greatly restricted the use of
multivariate statistics for testing the predictions of the model and for determining
the strength of the predicted relationships. The studies were limited in scope to
endurance sports for which the training stimulus was easily quantifiable. Finally,
there is meager physiological validation for the predictions of the mental health
model.
In addition to these shortcomings, another major problem in the series of
studies testing the static model has been in the quantification of
COGNITIVE-BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTIONS
Sports psychologists have studied cognitive-behavioral interventions as a
means of facilitating sports performance since the late 1970s. The general
assumption is that cognitive-behavioral interventions can help performers achieve
greater control of their precompetitive arousal states and maintain attentional
focus on the task at hand. The studies reported in this section do not measure
arousal/attentional processes directly; rather, they infer these processes from
performance changes. Improvements in arousal and attention, which can be
achieved by practice in cognitive-behavioral intervention techniques, is believed
to result in higher levels of motor performance. As defined by Greenspan and
Feltz (1989), “interventions” consist of actions, initiated by someone other than
the performer, that focus on psychological skills in an attempt to improve
performance.
For this review, the interventions typically reported in the sports psychology
literature have been put into five categories: (1) relaxation with no attempt to
alter cognitions (e.g., progressive muscle relaxation, autogenic training,
biofeedback, and hypnotherapy); (2) imagery (including “mental practice”); (3)
mental preparation strategies (e.g., association-disassociation strategies and goal
setting); (4) skill development
al. (1988) found otherwise. For pretest-posttest change scores, it showed effect
sizes of 0.79 for physical practice, 0.62 for the 50:50 combined practice, 0.47 for
mental practice, and 0.22 for no practice (control group).
In the committee's first report (Druckman and Swets, 1988:65), the
possibility was raised that a combination of mental and physical practice might
approach or exceed improvement of the 100 percent physical practice group if the
ratio included a majority of physical practice trials, for example, 70:30. With
tasks like pursuit rotor (a spinning disc with a quarter-sized target that a person
tries to track and that records “time on target” [Oxendine, 1969]), standing broad
jump and hand dynamometer (a device used to measure grip strength [Wills,
1966]), combined practice groups (75:25 and 50:50) have not been found to be
significantly different from physical practice groups. However, the results of
these studies are far from conclusive. Not only were these effects not found for
other tasks examined in these studies—soccer kick, modified free-throw, and
hand dynamometer—but these studies also lacked necessary control groups to
clearly interpret the influence of physical and mental practice on motor
performance.
A more complete test of the hypothesis that combinations of physical and
mental practice can affect motor performance as much as physical practice alone
was recently conducted (Hird et al., 1991). This study compared different ratios
of physical to mental practice for performance on a cognitive task (peg board),
which requires perceptual and symbolic task elements, and on a motor task
(pursuit rotor). Subjects (36 males and 36 females) were randomly assigned to
one of six groups: control (practice on a lateral balancing task); physical practice;
mental practice; or one of three combined physical and mental practice groups,
75:25, 50:50, and 25:75. There were seven practice sessions, consisting of four
trials per session for the peg board and eight trials per session for the pursuit
rotor. The results showed that all treatment conditions significantly improved
performance from pre- to posttest, except for the control group for the peg board
task. Consistent with the Feltz and Landers (1983) meta-analysis, effect size
calculations indicate that mental practice was more effective for the peg board
than for the pursuit rotor. Also, effect sizes and significant linear trends for the
posttest scores for both tasks show that as the relative proportion of physical
practice increased, performance was enhanced (see Table 2). These findings
indicate that reducing or replacing physical practice with mental practice would
be counterproductive if performance enhancement was the only consideration.
However, for conditions under which physical practice may be expensive, time
consuming, fatiguing, or injurious, combined mental and physical practice or
mental practice alone is clearly more effective than no practice.
Although physical practice was better than combined mental and physical
practice and mental practice alone in these studies, in real-life settings mental
practice is not always used as a replacement or trade-off for physical practice.
Rather, mental practice is often used as a supplement to physical practice. There
has been a paucity of motor performance research that has examined the
performance effects that occur when varying amounts or types of mental practice
are systematically added to a constant amount of physical practice. This question
has been addressed in sports, when the regular training and competitive schedule
of athletes is supplemented (although not systematically) with cognitive-
behavioral techniques. These field experimental studies are presented in the next
section.
Sports Performance
The generalizability of the motor performance findings has been questioned,
primarily because athletes' participating in real-world sports tasks were not the
central focus of the studies. Recently, the emphasis in sports psychology studies
has been to broaden the scope to include a number of strategies that emphasize
cognitions, thoughts, or mental activities as mediational processes and/or as the
central change mechanisms (Whelan et al., 1989). Collectively these strategies
have been called cognitive-behavioral interventions and include such
“psychological skills” as imagery, relaxation, biofeedback, hypnotherapy,
cognitive restructuring, systematic desensitization, self-monitoring,
performance-contingent rewards, and goal-setting. At the same time, reviewers
have narrowed their focus to the sports context. Thus, they selected for their
reviews only those studies that used athletes who competed on a regular and
preparation of Olympic athletes, it later became clear that Morgan's remarks were
being addressed to the dearth of intervention studies on elite athletes. But of four
studies with elite athletes, 75 percent show positive effects of cognitive-
behavioral interventions on sports performance. For example, semiprofessional
baseball players improved batting efficiency average as a result of performance
that was contingent on monetary rewards (Heward, 1978) and an Olympic
pommel-horse athlete, who received stress-inoculation training, improved
performance in a number of meets more than other gymnasts (Mace et al., 1987).
In studies with comparison groups, the results are mixed. For instance,
Mumford and Hall (1985) found that sectional and national level figure skaters
given four 50-minute sessions of various kinds of imagery were not rated any
differently by judges than figure skaters who watched films related to, but not of,
skating figures. In another study involving elite athletes, Kim (1989) obtained the
complete cooperation of Korean sports administrators to randomly assign
Olympic rifle shooters to treatment conditions. The 48 subjects (aged 18-30) were
assigned in equal numbers to four groups: a relaxation/imagery group, a
meditation/imagery group, a combined relaxation/imagery/meditation group, and
a no-treatment control group. The subjects in the first two groups listened to
either a relaxation/imagery or a meditation/imagery audio-cassette tape in a
private room two times a day over a 6-week period for a total of 13 hours of
treatment. Subjects in the combined group listened to the meditation/imagery tape
for 3 weeks and then listened to the relaxation/ imagery tape for 3 weeks. The
subjects in the control group listened to a tape that contained classical music
without any instruction.
The results of Kim's (1989) study showed no pretest differences among
groups, but there were significant pretest-posttest differences for anxiety and
performance. Although no differences were found for the relaxation/imagery and
control groups, the meditation/imagery and combined meditation/relaxation/
imagery groups showed both significant posttest reductions in self-reported
anxiety and better shooting performance. Analysis of posttest scores only
revealed a significant difference among groups for shooting performance (p
< .05), and Scheffe post hoc tests showed this was due to the combined group
performing better than the control group. 9 Kim (1989) concluded that his
findings support Suinn's (1983) and Smith's (1980) contention that combining
treatment components is an effective clinical technique for enhancing
performance.
These studies suggest that the effects of interventions used with elite athletes
may be more beneficial if multiple component treatments are used. This finding
is consistent with Greenspan and Feltz's (1989) review: where using a multiple
component treatment (e.g., relaxation
combined with imagery or modeling), three of the five studies (Hall and
Erffmeyer, 1983; Lee and Hewitt, 1987; Weinberg et al., 1981) showed better
performance in competitive conditions than studies using a single component
treatment (e.g., only imagery). In comparison to Mumford and Hall's (1985)
findings, Kim's results are consistent with Whelan et al.'s (1989) observations
that greater intervention effects are found with tasks that are more objectively
scored than those by judges' ratings. Moreover, they are in accord with the
general progressive relaxation literature (reviewed by Borkovec and Sides,
1979), in which more treatment sessions were shown to produce changes in
physiological measures of arousal than fewer sessions.
There are also data from some single-subject design studies in which the
interventions were remedial in nature (reviewed by Greenspan and Feltz, 1989).
Six cognitive restructuring studies involved an athlete or coach seeking help for
an anxiety or concentration problem, and the author of the study then evaluated
the problem, developed an intervention, applied it, and then assessed it (Hamilton
and Fremouw, 1985; Heward, 1978; Heyman, 1987; Kirschenbaum and Bale,
1980:Study 2; Komaki and Barnett, 1977; Meyers et al., 1982).10 Five of the
studies showed significant improvements in performance. This success rate was
higher than the control-group studies reviewed by Greenspan and Feltz (1989).
These findings are also consistent with the general clinical literature that shows
patients who are given progressive muscle relaxation by a therapist have stronger
effects than nonpatients. In addition, subjects receiving instructions directly from
a therapist showed a greater relaxation response than did subjects receiving
standardized taped instructions with no opportunity to control their training
progress (Borkovec and Sides, 1979). Thus, the reviews of the sports literature
generally support Borkovec and Sides' (1979:119) conclusion:
The likelihood of producing significant physiological reductions via
progressive relaxation appears to be greater when multi-session, subject-
controlled training is conducted with subjects for whom physiological activity
contributes to a presenting, clinical problem.
At first glance the reviews of the sports literature appear to show rather
consistent findings; however, Greenspan and Feltz (1989) also acknowledge
several cautions in interpreting this literature. Most of this literature is based on
collegiate samples, with very few studies examining cognitive-behavioral
interventions with elite or young athletes. According to Greenspan and Feltz
(1989), future research needs to emphasize: the use of appropriate single-subject
or treatment group designs sufficient to infer causality; comparison of different
interventions; the development of more treatment manuals so that future research
Modeling
Although there is an extensive amount of research on modeling of social
skills, modeling or observational learning of motor or sports skills has not
received prolonged and systematic study. A recent review (McCullagh et al.,
1989) proposed an integrative model that attempts to consolidate several aspects
of various motor behavior disciplines—motor learning and control, sports
psychology, motor development, etc. It is clear from this review that there are
many factors associated with the observer, the observer's perception of the
action, the demonstration, rehearsal strategies, behavioral responses, and
feedback that are influential in how modeling can affect skill acquisition and
performance. In general, studies examining attentional, retentional, and
motivational aspects of modeling have shown enhanced performance of people
who are exposed in comparison with control groups that are not exposed to such
demonstrations. This section covers research that examined modeling through the
use of commercially available videotapes (theoretical and practical issues dealing
with modeling are presented in Chapter 4).
In two studies supported by the United States Tennis Association,
McCullagh et al. (1990b) examined the effectiveness of using Sybervision sports
training videotapes as a learning tool for the tennis serve. College
from the error recognition data since, with the measure used, even the judges had
trouble identifying errors.) Finally, no one group had significantly better form
than any other group, although the effect sizes for the Sybervision plus imagery
group (1.48) and Sybervision plus verbal cues group (1.30) were considerably
higher than the Sybervision only group (0.66) and the Sybervision plus physical
practice group (0.64). Compared to the earlier study (McCullagh et al., 1990b),
the larger effect sizes for the Sybervision group were likely due to subjects' in the
second study (McCullagh et al., 1990a) seeing the videotape twice as many times
within the same time and number of sessions.
Two modeling studies—one of diving and one of basketball foul shooting
(cited in Whelan et al., 1989)—showed statistically significant group effects
(Feltz et al., 1979; Hall and Erffmeyer, 1983). These studies did not examine
Sybervision, but both contained a videotape of a model that was combined with
other treatments: for example, relaxation/imagery, focus on sensory cues,
physical practice, informational feedback, or repetition of important steps (cues)
in the model's demonstration. These conditions yielded a 20 percent
improvement in number of correct dives (Feltz et al., 1979) and a 9 percent
improvement in basketball foul shooting (Hall and Erffmeyer, 1983).
The subjects in Hall and Erffmeyer's (1983) study were highly experienced
female basketball players. This study also had more pretest and posttest
performance trials (100 each) than the Sybervision studies. These factors may
have helped to produce more stable performance scores. In addition, due to
greater experience on the task, the subjects may have been able to gain more
information from the model. In a study of bowling, Rothstein and Arnold (1976)
concluded that experienced subjects benefited more from videotapes of bowlers
than did novice performers. This finding suggests that having a background in the
sport may be an important prerequisite for deriving knowledge from a videotape
of an expert model.
An important differentiating factor in the Feltz et al. (1979) study of diving,
but not in the McCullagh et al. studies of tennis serving, was the provision of
informational feedback following each trial. Feedback on the correctness of the
subject's performance, combined with having the subjects verbally repeat the
steps in the dive that the model demonstrated, may have been important in the
videotape group's achievement of a 20 percent increase in correct dives.
McCullagh et al. (1990b:16) recognized the importance of knowledge of results
or knowledge of performance and suggested that the Sybervision program would
“never really be effective unless it is supplemented with personalized
instruction.”
The potency of providing feedback for motor skill acquisition is well
Summary
The sports psychology literature convincingly shows that cognitive-
behavioral techniques can produce small to moderate improvements in various
types of motor performance. Most of the studies illustrating these effects have
used novice or proficient performers, and there are a few studies that have even
shown these effects in elite athletes. Although few individual studies have been
designed to examine variables that may moderate these small to moderate
improvements, the narrative and meta-analytic reviews suggest that the
performance gains accruing from cognitive-behavioral interventions and their
measurement can be enhanced if they include: multiple components, imagery,
relaxation, feedback, modeling, cognitive restructuring, etc.; direct administration
of the treatment rather than indirect administration by audiotape, particularly in
the case of progressive muscle relaxation; the use of many sessions, particularly
for tasks with more motor and fewer cognitive components; and behavioral, self-
report, or physiological performance measures rather than judges' ratings. In
addition, the interventions show stronger results for subjects who have problems
with precompetitive anxiety or concentration. Even if some of these factors are
not present, cognitive-behavioral interventions can still improve performance.
However, the effects may be less or they may take longer to achieve. In
operational environments in which intact groups are typically used and strict
adherence to methodological procedures are often not possible, the effectiveness
of cognitive-behavioral interventions may be difficult to discern. Recently,
investigators have attempted to tie cognitive-behavioral techniques more closely
to actual sports performance by building these techniques into the
preperformance routines of the athletes. The popular and scientific literature
dealing with the use of cognitive-behavioral techniques in the preperformance
routines of athletes are presented in the next section.
few seconds preceding the execution of a motor skill are critical for successful
performance (Gould et al., 1980; Mahoney and Avener, 1977; Suinn, 1977).
Whether athletes have good mental control the day before or an hour before
competition may have little to do with the control they exhibit immediately prior
to performance. By training athletes to incorporate cognitive-behavioral
techniques at the time of actual performance, it is believed that their levels of
concentration will be enhanced and thus their performance will be improved. The
varied literature on preperformance routines is presented in this section in two
parts: performance effects of preperformance routines and electrophysiological
correlates associated with these routines.
The positive physical response stage begins immediately following the scoring of
a point and lasts 3-5 seconds. According to Loehr, mentally tough athletes
maintain their composure and display a strong, fighting, positive physical image.
They may clap for opponents, clinch their fists for a good shot, or simply walk
away from a mistake. They typically place the racquet in their opposite hand,
carried by the throat at the balance point, as they walk briskly back to the
baseline. Their eyes are forward and down and the shoulders are back.
The second stage, the relaxation response, lasts 6-15 seconds, depending on
the stress associated with the previous point and the amount of preparation
needed for the next point. During this stage, a player's eyes are directed toward
the racquet strings and the physical image they present continues to be strong and
competitive. The high energy walk back to the baseline continues as athletes walk
back and forth until breathing and heart rate stabilize. It is also common for
expert tennis players to relax the arms and hands, do stretches, or take deep
breaths during this stage.
The third stage is the preparation response, which begins as players move
toward the baseline to serve or receive the serve, and also lasts about 6-15
seconds. Players typically lift and direct their eyes to the opposite side of the
court and make a strong statement with their bodies: for example, “I will win this
point.” Following this there may be a momentary pause while the players covertly
go over the score and their intentions for the next point.
The last stage is the ritual response, which lasts 5-8 seconds and begins as
soon as a player steps to the baseline. The purpose of this stage is to adjust
arousal levels and deepen concentration. The two components characterizing this
stage are bouncing the ball two or more times and pausing after the last bounce to
help slow the service motion under the pressure of competition. When returning a
serve, players' rituals typically consist of stimulation of the feet or making a
physical gesture (such as jumping up and down on their toes or swaying back and
forth). During this stage, top tennis players only think about the serve (if they are
serving) or the return (if they are returning the serve). They do not think about
technical aspects of tennis, such as the grip, strokes, or stance: this type of
cognitive elaboration in the moments prior to response execution is believed to
interfere with athletes' ability to play instinctively and automatically.
Although this is a preset routine, Loehr suggests that after it is taught,
athletes can individualize the content making up the various stages of the
preperformance routine. The observations that led to Loehr's model of the
between-point behavioral and mental routines of expert tennis players was not
experimental research. Although Loehr's preperformance
routine has been used, there are no scientific studies that have examined its
effectiveness. The crucial question is whether those using structured
preperformance routines perform better than those who do not use them.
Fortunately, there is an emerging sports science literature that has addressed this
question.
Observational analyses of professional golfers also reveal the use of well-
defined, consistent routines for both putts and full swings (Crews and Boutcher,
1986a). The cognitive-behavioral strategies incorporate such mental functions as
choosing a target, visualizing the flight of the ball to the target, kinesthetically
feeling a perfect shot, and using cue words. Juxtaposed with the mental routine,
the preshot routine incorporates taking a practice swing that simulates the desired
swing, aligning the feet in relation to the target, “waggling” the club, and
glancing at the hole.
Using cognitive and behavioral elements like these, Crews and Boutcher
(1986b) assigned 15 golfers from a beginning golf class to an experimental,
preshot routine group and 15 to a control group (no preshot routine). Following
an 8-week preshot routine training program, Crews and Boutcher found that the
performance of the preshot routine group improved only for the better male
golfers, and they concluded that preshot routine training improved performance
when physical skills were well learned. In another study of 12 collegiate golfers
(Boutcher and Crews, 1987), both males and females improved the consistency
of the preshot routine behaviors following a 6-week training period, but only the
females improved in task performance.
Preshot routines have also been effective in improving basketball free-throw
shooting performance (Lobmeyer and Wasserman, 1986) and novel motor task
performance (Singer et al., 1989). Following a preshot training program, subjects
improved 7 percent in performance when using their preshot routine than when
not using the routine (Lobmeyer and Wasserman, 1986). In a laboratory
environment, ten subjects were taught a five-step learning strategy that
sequentially consisted of readying, imaging, focusing, executing, and evaluating.
Following four practice trials, subjects in the “learning strategy group” performed
significantly faster—and not at the expense of greater number of errors—than did
a control group and the group that previewed the location of the six targets.
Preperformance routines have generally been effective in improving motor
or sports performance of beginning level performers, but their effects have yet to
be demonstrated in elite performers. Although the introduction of a preshot
routine resulted in a more consistent preperformance routine and led golfers to
report that the intervention had a positive effect on their concentration, Cohn et
al. (1990) failed to find immediate
improvements in performance for three subjects. This study, however, used very
few observations (2-8 rounds of nine-hole play) following the introduction of the
preshot routine. With elite performers, it is possible that much more practice in
using a preshot routine is necessary to improve par-level golf performance.
Interview data from athletes and the general assumptions of investigators
support the idea that a preperformance routine increases a performer's
concentration and facilitates performance. Although athletes given training in a
preperformance routine report better concentration, retrospective reports of
cognitive processes are known to be unreliable (Nisbett and Wilson, 1977);
retrospective reports are often based on implicit, a priori assumptions of the cause
of subsequent behavior. Furthermore, athletes' inability to describe their
preperformance state is consistent with descriptions of the cognitive state
associated with “peak performance” as being characterized by (Gallwey, 1981):
body/brain integration; allowing things to happen rather than trying to force a
particular performance outcome; total absorption in the activity while maintaining
unconscious awareness of process cues (relevant feelings, balance and weight
distribution, etc.); lack of recall due to the mind being “blank” immediately prior
to the response; and obvious difficulty in putting the cognitive and behavioral
actions of the preperformance period into words. Trying to obtain self-reports
during the preperformance routine is counter-productive since it will interfere
with the desired state of automatic processing in the moments before response
execution. Thus, several investigators have examined electrophysiological
indicators of attention while athletes are in a preperformance routine prior to the
performance of a discrete, closed skill that involves minimal movement. This
literature, which has dealt with measures of heart rate and
electroencephalographic (EEG) activity, is reviewed in the next section.
the ones that have produced the most consistent results during athletes'
preperformance routines in the sports of archery, rifle shooting, and golf putting
have been measures of cardiac deceleration and spontaneous EEG activity.
Cardiac Deceleration
Stimuli of various types produce a pattern of beat-by-beat cardiac
acceleration or deceleration in the 3-5 seconds prior to a response. The direction
and magnitude of change has been related to performance and is suggested to be
an indicator of an individual's attentive state. This cardiac pattern prior to
initiating a response has been subject to varying explanations (see Coles, 1984;
Graham, 1979; Jennings et al., 1978; Kahneman, 1973; Lacey et al., 1963; Obrist
et al., 1970; van der Molen et al., 1985).
Lacey's intake-rejection hypothesis (Lacey, 1967; Lacey et al., 1963) is one
hypothesis that attempts to explain the cardiac pattern that occurs prior to a
response. According to this hypothesis, as a person focuses on the external
environment and attempts to take in external stimuli, the heart decelerates; then,
as the person focuses internally and rejects external stimuli, the heart accelerates.
Tasks requiring internal cognitive elaboration of a problem-solving sort (e.g.,
mental arithmetic, reversed spelling, sentence structure) produce cardiac
acceleration (Lacey et al., 1963). Cardiac deceleration has typically been found in
a motor response paradigm, a reaction-time (RT) task (Lacey and Lacey, 1964,
1966, 1970). Using a 4-second RT foreperiod, Lacey and Lacey found a pattern
of deceleration three or four beats prior to the stimulus; this pattern terminated
with the onset of the stimulus light.13 Performance on the RT task was associated
with greater cardiac deceleration, although the correlations were low (Lacey and
Lacey, 1964, 1966, 1970).
The intake-rejection hypothesis has been criticized for being too general.
Several investigators have suggested that task specificity might be responsible for
disagreements in interpreting cardiac patterning associated with information
processing (Bohlin and Kjellberg, 1979; Carroll and Anastasiades, 1978; Coles,
1984; Elliott, 1972; Graham, 1979; Hahn, 1973; Jennings et al., 1978). The
original work by Lacey et al. (1963) stated that cardiac deceleration was an
indication of the intention to note and detect external events. In examining the
nature of the tasks, it is apparent that there are actually two components occurring
simultaneously that comprise the intake-rejection hypothesis. One is the intake of
the external stimuli (warning and imperative stimulus) created in the foreperiod
of the RT task and the rejection of the external environment to solve the problems
in the math task. The second component is the type of cognitive
task used to create the intake-rejection situation. In 1963, Lacey et al. referred to
the RT task as one that increases sensory awareness, while the math task
increases cognitive elaboration and processing within the brain. The name of the
hypothesis stresses the intake and rejection component; however, it is possible
that it is the processing component required that determines cardiac pattern.
Other investigators have questioned that cardiac deceleration is simply an
indication to note and detect external events. The Laceys (1974), for example,
suggested that anticipatory deceleration may also be associated with intention to
respond. Coles (1984) has argued that these two intentions are confounded and
that cardiac deceleration primarily reflects motor readiness, not anticipatory
sensory input. Contrary to Coles (1984), Graham (1979) believes that stimulus
input is reflected by cardiac deceleration and preparation for output produces
cardiac acceleration.
Regardless of whether cardiac deceleration is indicative of intake of sensory
information, preparation for output, or sensory awareness, it is hypothesized that
experienced athletes with a consistent preperformance routine have better
attentional skills and would thus show a pattern of cardiac deceleration prior to
performance. Several studies have investigated the relationship between cardiac
deceleration and attention in the few seconds before response execution in sports
(with minimal potential for movement artifact in the cardiac measure). For
example, Stern (1976) used the sequence of “get set,” 5 seconds, “go” commands
and found that subjects preparing for either a sprint up a flight of stairs or a
bicycle sprint showed a phasic cardiac change of acceleration until 1 second
before the “go” signal and then showed a deceleration from 1 second to the “go”
command. Hatfield et al. (1987) found a trend for cardiac deceleration in elite
rifle marksmen in the 2.5 seconds prior to the execution of the shot. Among
highly skilled golfers, significant cardiac decelerations of 4-11 beats per minute
have been found within 3-7 seconds of a putt (Boutcher and Zinsser, 1990;
Crews, 1989; Molander and Backman, 1989). Only Salazar et al. (1990) reported
cardiac acceleration in elite archers immediately prior to arrow release. This may
have been due to the physical demands of overcoming the 31-50 pound bowstring
tension. When archers have used lower bowstring tensions (20-25 pounds)
(Landers et al., 1991a) or shot at shorter distances (Schmid, 1989), cardiac
deceleration has been clearly evident.
There is also evidence in these cross-sectional studies that cardiac
acceleration is associated with poorer performance (Molander and Backman,
1989) with novice performers (Schmid, 1989) and that greater degrees of cardiac
deceleration are associated with better performance (Boutcher and Zinsser, 1990;
Crews, 1989). Schmid (1989) found that “subconscious
shooters” had greater cardiac deceleration than “cognitive shooters”14 The degree
to which cardiac deceleration differences noted between novice and experienced
performers are associated with learning the task has been investigated in archers.
The archers experienced a 62 percent increase in performance over a 12-week
period in which they had received 27 sessions of archery training (35 hours total)
from the 1988 Olympic coach of the U.S. National Archery Team (Landers et al.,
1991a).15 In contrast to studies conducted with laboratory RT tasks (Hahn, 1973)
or sports tasks with novice performers (Stern, 1976), the studies investigating
sports tasks with experienced athletes have generally shown greater deceleration.
the shot, cardiac deceleration was associated with increased alpha activity in the
left hemisphere while right alpha remained constant. Hatfield et al. interpreted
these findings as indicative of cognitive changes (reducing the covert
verbalizations of the left hemisphere and increasing the visual-spatial processes
dominant in the right hemisphere), which allow dominance of the right
hemisphere at the time of the shot.
In subsequent EEG studies with archers and golfers, second-to-second
changes in EEGs prior to the response and multiple EEG bands have been
examined. During the preparatory period (3-5 seconds), which is characterized by
intense concentration, experienced athletes have shown greater increases in left
hemisphere alpha activity than in right hemisphere activity (Crews, 1989;
Landers et al., 1991a; Salazar et al., 1990). The asymmetry was greatest at 1
second before the response (shot or putt) and was not evident earlier (up to 5
seconds) or immediately following the response (Wang and Landers, 1987). This
effect was independent of minor bodily movements (e.g., eye blinks) (Crews,
1989; Landers et al., 1991a; Salazar et al., 1990). Furthermore, Salazar et al.
(1990) have shown that even when the physical exertion of drawing a 40-50
pound bow was controlled, the hemispheric differences were still evident.
Although left hemispheric activity increases more than right hemispheric
activity (particularly in the alpha range), better performance has been found to be
associated with a moderate increase in left hemisphere EEG activity at the time
of the shot or putt (Crews, 1989; Landers et al., 1991a; Salazar et al., 1990).
Comparisons of best and worst shots revealed no significant right hemisphere
spectral power differences, but there were significant left hemisphere differences
(Landers et al., 1991a; Salazar et al., 1990). (The muscular forces and handedness
were the same for best and worst shots, so the differences in EEG activity could
not be attributed to muscular contaminants.) Although reliable EEG asymmetries
have been observed in highly experienced performers, the above-mentioned
studies do not provide information on whether these EEG patterns are developed
through training in the skill. Recent studies by Landers et al. (1991a) and Landers
et al. (1991b) suggest that these EEG patterns are trainable. For example, in rank
beginners, the EEG asymmetries were not evident 2 weeks into training, but were
evident at a time (14th week) when archery performance had improved 62
percent (Landers et al., 1991a). In Landers et al.'s study (1991b), the moderate
increase in left hemispheric EEG activity immediately before the motor response
was used as a model of “correct performance” in a biofeedback training study. A
group of 24 pre-elite archers were randomly assigned in equal numbers to three
groups: a correct feedback group (i.e., greater left hemisphere low-frequency
activity), an incorrect feedback group
Summary
The studies examining preperformance routines show that they are used by
better performers, and people trained in the use of these routines generally show
better performance. Preperformance routines teach athletes to habitually use
cognitive-behavioral techniques at strategic times in their sports performances.
Most of the sports studies have been conducted in practice settings, and more
research is needed to compare the benefits of preperformance routines in practice
with their benefits in competitive settings. The consistent patterns in EEG
hemispheric asymmetries and cardiac deceleration during the latter stages of the
preperformance routine suggest that they are learned responses that are indicative
of better attentional focus and that result in overall better performance. These
psychophysiological measures can assist in determining the efficiency of
preperformance routines.
From questionnaire responses of best and worst performers (Crews and
Landers, 1991), it appears that those patterns may be indexing a state of
automatic processing: best performers are focused on overall bodily awareness
and relevant external cues (e.g., hole or target); worst performers, who failed to
consistently display the asymmetric EEG pattern, were more often focused on
what might be called cognitive elaboration of specific cues (e.g., backswing, club
head, etc.). Crews and Landers (1991) have noted that by increasing total
awareness, the best golfers were perhaps adopting a “let it happen,” automatic
approach, while the worst performers were perhaps trying to “make it happen”
and cognitively control the putt (Gallwey, 1981). Further research is necessary to
substantiate the value of a preperformance routine in fostering a state of
automatic processing.
in these studies included systolic and diastolic blood pressure, skin response,
hormonal, muscle activity, and psychological self-report.
For the 1,449 subjects, the meta-analytic results showed an overall effect
size of 0.48 (Crews and Landers, 1987). This result indicates that, regardless of
the type of physiological or psychological measure used, aerobically fit subjects
had a reduced stress response. (The magnitude of the effect represented nearly a
one-half standard deviation gain in stress reactivity relative to control
conditions.) The underlying assumption of this laboratory paradigm is that
reduced physiological response to stress or faster physiological recovery results in
less total time spent in stress at perhaps a lower level of stress. In other words,
“exercise either acts as a coping strategy or serves as an ‘inoculator' to more
effectively respond to the intrusion of psychosocial stress” (Crews and Landers,
1987:S118).
The moderator variables examined in the Crews and Landers meta-analysis
included: study and subject characteristics, such as published or unpublished
studies, acute or chronic exercise, and male or female subjects; methodological
characteristics, such as initial or baseline values of stress, whether statistically
controlled, and correlational versus training designs; and stressor characteristics,
such as low or high stress response, stress reactivity versus recovery from stress,
and types of stress measures. A meta-analytic procedure (described by Hedges
and Olkin, 1985) was used to determine if the measures were homogeneous
across studies. The chi-square test did not reject the hypothesis of homogeneity
of effect sizes: that is, the effect-sizes were not related to specific moderating
variables, and so no further breakdown into moderating variables was warranted
(Hedges and Olkin, 1985). Thus, the results suggest that all of the studies could
be represented by the mean effect size, 0.48.16
Although some investigators (Abbott and Peters, 1989) have argued that the
Crews and Landers' (1987) meta-analytic review has precluded conducting
further studies in this area, Blumenthal (1989) has pointed out that there is a need
for more experimental (i.e., training) studies. There is also a need for more
studies that examine: whether anaerobic exercise produces the same buffer to
psychosocial stressors as is found with aerobic exercise, and whether individuals
experiencing more long-term, chronic levels of high stress (e.g., air traffic
controllers) derive psychological benefits from exercise training (Crews and
Landers, 1987).
Many authors have suggested various mechanisms to explain the effects of
exercise on the psychosocial stress response. Earlier explanations focused on
physical activity rather than aerobic exercise. For example, Gal and Lazarus
(1975) suggested that physical activity can reduce stress reactions in four ways:
(1) heightening feelings of control
and mastery; (2) serving as a defense mechanism to help people forget about their
distress so as to decrease anxiety; (3) providing an attention diversion; and (4)
producing a means of energy discharge allowing for reasonably rapid body
mobilization or arousal. Recently, other investigators (Light, 1982; Shulhan et
al., 1986) have focused more on mechanisms that are directly tied to changes in
aerobic fitness, such as changes in the release of endogenous opiates,
baroreceptor function, release of insulin, sensitivity to beta-adrenergic
stimulation, and stimulation of brain metabolism or levels of serotonin. As
emphasized by Crews and Landers (1987), more research that examines these
underlying mechanisms is necessary to determine how these changes in fitness
actually reduce stress response or time spent in stress. In military settings, with
the exception of orthostatic intolerance for those undergoing high “g” forces
(e.g., fighter pilots) (Bedford and Tipton, 1987; Raven et al., 1984), aerobic
conditioning may help alleviate psychological reactions in most operational
conditions. As physical training is compatible with military training, it should not
be too difficult to design studies in military settings to explore both the
psychological and physiological effects of aerobic exercise.
In summary, several research studies have shown that aerobic exercise can
help people to cope better with psychosocial stressors. The measures of coping
ability used in the studies included physiological and psychological measures of
reactivity to the laboratory stressor and of recovery to baseline levels following
termination of the stressor. These effects are of a moderate size and are
consistent across many studies, but the mechanisms for the effects are unknown.
CONCLUSIONS
Mental Health and Athletic Success The mental health model has
produced inconsistent results in differentiating successful athletes from less
successful athletes in terms of individual mood scales. However, measures of
global mood have been effective in identifying when individual athletes are
experiencing a psychologically unhealthy, overtrained state. Thus, the use of
global mood measures may be useful for monitoring the potential
psychopathology associated with intense physical training.
Physical Versus Mental Practice If the goal is to maximize performance in
the shortest possible amount of time, physical practice is superior to mental
practice. However, if nonphysical practice time is available or if a person cannot
physically practice, then the small effects due to mental practice can be useful for
facilitating performance and for better retention.
Cognitive-Behavioral Interventions The overall effects of cognitive-
behavioral interventions are small to moderate. These effects will be enhanced if
treatments emphasize: multiple components, (relaxation, modeling, imagery,
cognitive restructuring, etc.); direct administration of the treatment by an
investigator, rather than an audiotape); many sessions; people who have problems
with precompetitive anxiety or concentration; and tasks that are objectively
scored.
Preperformance Preparation In closed skills (the environment is
unchanging), an individually designed preperformance routine, “preparation
ritual” with multiple components has been shown to facilitate performance. In
closed skill sports that involve aiming (e.g., rifle shooting), better performers
have a greater cardiac deceleration within 3.5 seconds of executing a motor
response. In addition, better performances are associated with a moderate
increase (above baseline rates) alpha activity in the left hemisphere of the brain
and little or no change in activity in the right hemisphere. However, too great an
increase in left hemispheric alpha activity is associated with worse shots.
Electrophysiological patterns like heart-rate deceleration and EEG asymmetries
that are related to performance can be used during the preparatory period (i.e., 3-5
seconds before response execution) to assist in determining the efficacy of
preperformance routines.
NOTES
1. The iceberg profile does not convey a relationship in a true scientific sense; it is more an artifact
resulting from connecting unrelated points with lines rather than representing mean values with a bar
graph.
2. The 70-80 percent prediction accuracy may be inflated since in at least one study (Study 4) 7 of the
16 athletes did not have profiles that were “sufficiently remarkable to permit application of the
clinical prediction model” (Morgan, 1985:74). Thus, they were eliminated and the prediction analysis
was only carried out on the remaining nine athletes, and all nine predictions (100 percent) proved to
be correct (Morgan, 1985). It is unclear why the seven athletes were “sufficiently remarkable” in this
study. In other studies, it appears that all were included in the clinical prediction analysis, even though
approximately 10 percent of the nonhospitalized population would have mental health problems of
clinical significance (Morgan et al., 1987b).
3. The study of 40 members of the University of Wisconsin wrestling team did not show significant
changes in their mood states over a 5-month period. Although 10 percent of the wrestlers developed
mood disturbance, the failure of the group data to show significant changes in mood disturbance as a
function of training stimulus may be due to the greater difficulty in calculating peak work loads in
wrestling in comparison with swimming.
4. The only phase in which salivary cortisol was correlated with depressed mood was in the
overtraining phase ( r = .50; p < .05).
5. To provide a common metric and thereby equate times for various swimming distances, T scores
can be calculated in much the same way as in the decathlon competition in track and field.
6. Most of the studies covered in these reviews were published between 1970 and 1989. The narrative
review by Greenspan and Feltz (1989) dealt with 19 published articles (23 interventions) and the
Whelan et al. (1989) meta-analytic review contained 49 published articles (121 comparisons across
333 outcome measures). The differences in the numbers of studies is because Whelan et al. included
studies with a greater variety of interventions (e.g., goal setting, modeling, association/disassociation
strategies, and hypnotherapy). In neither review were there unpublished studies (e.g., dissertations,
government reports, papers presented at meetings). This led Greenspan and Feltz (1989) and Whelan
et al. (1989) to suggest the possibility of a “file drawer” problem or publication bias. For example,
either researchers obtaining nonsignificant results are not submitting their research for publication or
journal reviewers are less likely to publish articles showing nonsignificant results than those showing
significant results. This is certainly possible since Feltz and Landers' (1983) review of the motor
performance literature showed that the effect size for unpublished studies was significantly smaller
(0.32) than the effect size for published studies (0.74).
7. Although these findings could be overestimated without unpublished studies, the likelihood of
unpublished studies substantially reducing an effect size of 0.62 is not great. According to Orwin's
(1983) fail-safe formula, it would take nearly 120 studies showing very small effect sizes (e.g., 0.20)
to reduce this moderate effect size to a small one. Since previous reviewers (Greenspan and Feltz,
1989) could not find many unpublished studies, it does not appear that missing studies would greatly
influence the strength of this relationship. Thus, the effects appear to be real and are very robust in
that they generalize across studies using very diverse interventions, research designs, subject
characteristics, and sports.
8. “Open” skills, like those in basketball, football, and soccer, involve constantly changing
environmental conditions such as blocking and faking. “Closed” skills, like those in bowling,
archery, and free-throw shooting in basketball, involve stable environmental conditions.
9. Using the data in Kim's (1989) Table 1, we calculated pretest-posttest effect sizes for each group
with the same formula used by Feltz et al. (1988). This secondary analysis revealed that the combined
relaxation/meditation/imagery group was more effective in reducing anxiety (ES = 0.93) and
improving performance (ES = 0.80) than the meditation/imagery group (ESs = 0.48 and 0.24,
respectively), the relaxation/imagery group (ESs = 0.30 and `0.14, respectively), and the control
group (ESs = `0.04 and 0.04, respectively).
10. These studies used an appropriate A-B-A-B single-subject design.
11. Although the mental practice group performed at an initially higher level than the control
subjects, they made smaller pretest-posttest gains than did the control subjects. For example, the
effect sizes for the pretest-posttest gains for the mental practice and control groups were 0.35 and
0.75, respectively, for firing rate; 0.76 and 1.26 for hit probability; and 0.66 and 1.04 for hit rate.
12. A challenge attitude is described by Loehr (1989) as involving 100 percent effort without fear. A
player with this attitude feels free and aggressive and won't give up or become angry. Although a
person can substantially improve the amount of time he or she displays a challenge attitude, one can
never really master it.
13. As in the Lacey and Lacey (1980) laboratory research, cardiac deceleration patterns observed in
sports are unrelated to sinus arrhythmia since decelerations have occurred with a variety of respiratory
patterns (Boutcher and Zinsser, 1990; Crews, 1989).
14. In addition to a greater amount of cardiac deceleration prior to a shot, Schmid (1989) noted that
elite archers exhibited a postshot delay in cardiac acceleration.
15. A planned comparison t test between epoch 1 (0.5 second before arrow release) and epoch 5 (2.5
seconds before arrow release) during the pre- and posttest revealed that cardiac deceleration was
significant only during the posttest. The means for the posttest were 85.1 beats per minute at epoch 1
and 91.5 beats per minute at epoch 5. The heart rates for pre- and posttest at epoch 1 were not
significantly different.
16. There is debate as to whether the Hedges and Olkin (1985) meta-analytic procedures are
appropriate for studies like Crews and Landers (1987) in which a whole population of studies is
considered. Hedges and Olkin's analysis of variance (ANOVA) analogue involves statistical
assumptions of a sample derived from a population. When dealing with the entire population, the
rather stringent procedures of the ANOVA analogue may not be necessary or even recommended. For
example, they may conceal real differences between moderator variables. In the case of the Crews and
Landers (1987) meta-analysis, subsequent investigation may reveal that effect sizes are greater for
published studies that use chronic exercise and that use random assignment.
REFERENCES
Abbott, A.V., and R.K. Peters 1989 Letter to the editor. Psychosomatic Medicine 51:218-219.
Annett, J. 1979 Memory for skill. Pp. 233-247 in M.M. Gruneberg and P.E. Morris, eds., Applied
Problems in Memory. New York: Academic Press.
Anshel, M.H. 1988 The effect of mood and pleasant versus unpleasant information feedback on
performing a motor skill. Journal of General Psychology 115:117-129.
Bandura, A. 1982 Self-efficacy mechanism in human agency. American Psychologist 37:122-147.
Bedford, T.G., and C.M. Tipton 1987 Exercise training and arterial baroreflex. Journal of Applied
Physiology 63:1926-1932.
Bettelheim, B. 1960 The Informed Heart. New York: Free Press.
Bloom, B. 1985 Developing Talent in Young People. New York: Ballentine Books.
Blumenthal, J.A. 1989 Letter to the editor: response to Abbott and Peters. Psychosomatic Medicine
51:219-221.
Bohlin, G., and A. Kjellberg 1979 Orienting activity in two stimulus paradigms as reflected in heart
rate. Pp. 169-197 in H.D. Kimmel, E.H. van Olst, and E.F. Orlebeke, eds., The Orienting
Reflex in Humans. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum.
Borkovec, T.D., and J.K. Sides 1979 Critical procedural variables related to the physiological effects
of progressive relaxation: a review. Behavioral Research and Therapy 17:119-125.
Boutcher, S.H., and D.J. Crews 1987 The effect of a preshot attentional routine on a well-learned
skill. International Journal of Sport Psychology 18:30-39.
Boutcher, S.H., and N.W. Zinsser 1990 Cardiac deceleration of elite and beginning golfers during
putting. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology 12:37-47.
Boyle, G.P. 1987 A cross-validation of the factor structure of the profile of mood states: were the
factors correctly identified in the first instance? Psychological Reports 60:343-354.
Campbell, D.T., and J.C. Stanley 1963 Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for
Research. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Carroll, D., and P. Anastasiades 1978 The behavioral significance of heart rate: the Laceys'
hypothesis. Biological Psychology 7:249-275.
Chollet, F., V. DiPiero, R. Wise, D. Brooks, R. Dolan, and R. Frackowiak 1991 The functional
anatomy of recovery after stroke in humans: a study with positron emission tomography.
Annals of Neurology 29:63-71.
Christina, R.W. 1987 Motor learning: future lines of research. The Academy Papers 20:26-41.
Cohn, P.J., R.J. Rotella, and J.W. Lloyd 1990 Effects of a cognitive-behavioral intervention on the
preshot routine and performance in golf. The Sport Psychologist 4:33-47.
Coles, M.G.H. 1984 Heart rate and attention: the intake-rejection hypothesis and beyond. Pp. 276-294
in M.G.H. Coles, J.R. Jennings, and J.A. Stern, eds., Psychophysiological Perspectives:
Festschrift for Beatrice and John Lacey. Stroudburg, Pa.: Hutchinson and Ross.
Craighead, D.J., G. Privette, F. Vallianos, and D. Byrkit 1986 Personality characteristics of basketball
players, starters and non-starters. International Journal of Sport Psychology 17:110-119.
Crews, D.J. 1989 The Influence of Attentive States on Golf Putting as Indicated by Cardiac and
Electrocortical Activity. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Arizona State University.
Crews, D.J., and S.H. Boutcher 1986a An exploratory observational analysis of professional golfers
during competition. Journal of Sport Behavior 9:51-58.
1986b Effects of structured preshot behaviors on beginning golf performance. Perceptual and Motor
Skills 62:291-294.
Crews, D.J., and D.M. Landers 1987 A meta-analytic review of aerobic fitness and reactivity to
psychosocial stressors. Medicine and Science in Sport and Exercise 19(5):114-120.
1991 Cardiac Pattern as an Indicator of Attention: A Test of Two Hypotheses. Unpublished
manuscript, Department of Exercise Science and Physical Education, Arizona State
University, Tempe.
Csikszentmihalyi, M. 1990 Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience. New York: Harper and
Row.
Csikszentmihalyi, M., and R. Larson 1987 Validity and reliability of the Experience Sampling
Method. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 175:526-536.
Daiss, S., A. LeUnes, and J. Nation 1986 Mood and locus of control of a sample of college and
professional football players. Perceptual and Motor Skills 63:733-734.
Davidson, R.J., G.E. Schwartz, and L. Rothman 1976 Attentional style and self-regulation of mode
specific attention: an EEG study. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 85:611-621.
Deijen, J., M. Heemstra, and J. Orlebeke 1989 Dietary effects on mood and performance. Journal of
Psychiatric Research 23:275-283.
DeMers, G.E. 1983 Emotional states of high-caliber divers. Swimming Technique May-July:33-35.
Diamond, M., E. Greer, A. York, D. Lewis, T. Barton, and J. Lin 1987 Rat cortical morphology
following crowded-enriched living conditions. Experimental Neurology 96:241-247.
Dishman, R.K. 1982 Contemporary sport psychology. Exercise and Sport Sciences Reviews
10:120-143.
Druckman, D., and J. Lacey, eds. 1989 Brain and Cognition: Some New Technologies. Committee on
New Techniques in Cognitive Psychophysiology, Commission on Behavioral and Social
Sciences and Education, National Research Council. Washington, D.C.: National Academy
Press.
Druckman, D., and J.A. Swets, eds. 1988 Enhancing Human Performance: Issues, Theories, and
Techniques. Committee on Techniques for the Enhancement of Human Performance,
Commission on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, National Research Council.
Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press.
Dyer, J.B., III, and J.G. Crouch 1987 Effects of running on moods: a time series study. Perceptual
and Motor Skills 64:783-789.
Elliott, R. 1972 The significance of heart rate for behavior: a critique of Lacey's hypothesis. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology 22:398-409.
Eysenck, H.J., and S.B.G. Eysenck 1968 Manual for the Eysenck Personality Inventory. San Diego,
Calif.: Educational and Industrial Testing Service.
Eysenck, H.J., D.K.B. Nias, and D.N. Cox 1982 Sport and personality. Advances in Behavior
Research and Therapy 4(2):1-56.
Feltz, D.L., and D.M. Landers 1983 The effects of mental practice on motor skill learning and
performance: a metaanalysis. Journal of Sport Psychology 5:25-57.
Feltz, D.L., and C.A. Riessinger 1990 Effects of in vivo emotive imagery and performance feedback
on self-efficacy and muscular endurance. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology
12:132-143.
Feltz, D.L., D.M. Landers, and U. Raeder 1979 Enhancing self-efficacy in high-avoidance motor
tasks: a comparison of modeling techniques. Journal of Sport Psychology 1:112-122.
Feltz, D.L., D.M. Landers, and B.J. Becker 1988 A revised meta-analysis of the mental practice
literature on motor skill learning. Pp. 1-65 in D. Druckman and J.A. Swets, eds., Enhancing
Human Performance: Issues, Theories and Techniques. Background Papers. Committee on
Techniques for the Enhancement of Human Performance, Commission on Behavioral and
Social Sciences and Education, National Research Council. Washington, D.C.: National
Academy Press.
Frankl, V. 1963 From Death Camp to Existentialism. Boston: Beacon Press.
Gal, R., and R.S. Lazarus 1975 The role of activity in anticipating and confronting stressful
situations. Journal of Human Stress December:4-20.
Gale, A., and J.A. Edwards 1983 The EEG and human behavior. Pp. 99-127 in A. Gale and J.A.
Edwards, eds., Psychological Correlates of Human Behavior. New York: Academic Press.
Gallwey, W.T. 1981 The Inner Game of Golf. New York: Random House.
Garfield, C. 1978 Peak Performance. Los Angeles, Calif.: Tarcher Press.
Gasser, T., P. Bacher, and H. Steinberg 1985 Test-retest reliability of spectral parameters of the EEG.
Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology 60:312-319.
Gevins, A.S., N.H. Morgan, S.L. Bressler, B.A. Cutillo, R.M. White, J. Illes, D.S. Greer, J.C. Doyle,
and G.M. Zeitlin 1987 Human neuroelectric patterns predict performance accuracy.
Science 235:580-585.
Gevins, A.S., B.A. Cutillo, S.L. Bressler, N.H. Morgan, R.M. White, J. Illes, and D.S. Greer 1989
Event-related covariances during a dimanual visuomotor task. II. Preparation and feedback.
Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology 74:147-160.
Gould, D., R. Weinberg, and A. Jackson 1980 Mental preparation strategies, cognitions and strength
performance. Journal of Sport Psychology 2:329-339.
Graham, F.K. 1979 Distinguishing among orienting, defense and startle reflexes. Pp. 137-167 in H.D.
Kimmel, E.H. van Olst, and J.F. Orlebeke, eds., The Orienting Reflex in Humans. Hillsdale,
N.J.: Erlbaum.
Greenspan, M.J., and D.L. Feltz 1989 Psychological interventions with athletes in competitive
situations: a review. The Sport Psychologist 3(3):219-236.
Guttman, M.C., M.L. Pollack, C. Foster, and D. Schmidt 1984 Training stress in Olympic speed
skaters: a psychological perspective. The Physician and Sports Medicine 12:45-57.
Hahn, W.W. 1973 Attention and heart rate: a critical appraisal of the hypothesis of Lacey and Lacey.
Psychological Bulletin 79:59-70.
Hall, E., and E. Erffmeyer 1983 The effect of visuo-motor behavior rehearsal with video-taped
modeling on free-throw accuracy of intercollegiate female basketball players. Journal of
Sport Psychology 5:343-346.
Hamilton, S., and W. Fremouw 1985 Cognitive-behavioral training for college free-throw
performance. Cognitive Therapy and Research 9:479-483.
Hatfield, B.D., and D.M. Landers 1987 Psychophysiology in exercise and sport research: an
overview. Exercise and Sport Sciences Reviews 15:351-387.
Hatfield, B.D., D.M. Landers, and W.J. Ray 1984 Cognitive processes during self-paced motor
performance: an electro-encephalographic profile of skilled marksmen. Journal of Sport
Psychology 6:42-59.
1987 Cardiovascular-CNS interactions during a self-paced, intentional attentive state: elite
marksmanship performance. Psychophysiology 24:542-549.
Hatze, H. 1976 Biomechanical aspects of a successful motion optimization. Pp. 5-12 in P.V. Komi,
ed., Biomechanics V-B. Baltimore, Md.: University Park Press.
Hedges, L.V., and I. Olkin 1985 Statistical Methods for Meta-Analysis. Orlando, Fla.: Academic
Press.
Heward, W. 1978 The effects of reinforcement on the offensive efficiency of a barn-storming
baseball team. Behavior Modification 2(1):25-59.
Heyman, S.R. 1987 Research and interventions in sport psychology: issues encountered in working
with an amateur boxer. The Sport Psychologist 1:208-223.
Hird, J.S., D.M. Landers, J.R. Thomas, and J.J. Horan 1991 Physical practice is superior to mental
practice in enhancing cognitive and motor performance. Journal of Sports Exercise
Psychology. In press.
Horswill, C.A., R.C. Hickner, J.R. Scott, D.L. Costill, and D. Gould 1990 Weight loss, dietary
carbohydrate modifications, and high intensity physical performance. Medicine and Science
in Sports and Exercise 22:470-476.
Howell, M.L. 1956 Use of force-time graphs for performance analysis in facilitating motor learning.
Research Quarterly 27:12-22.
Jennings, J.R., B.E. Lawrence, and P. Kasper 1978 Changes in alertness and processing capacity in a
serial learning task. Psychophysiology 17:37-46.
Kahneman, D. 1973 Attention and Effort. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Kendall, G., D. Hrycaiko, G.L. Martin, and T. Kendall 1990 The effects of imagery rehearsal,
relaxation, and self-talk package on basketball game performance. Journal of Sport and
Exercise Psychology 12:157-166.
Kim, G.B. 1989 Relative effectiveness of anxiety reduction techniques on levels of competitive
anxiety and shooting performance. Pp. 61-74 in Commemorative Volume Dedicated to
Professor Hong-Dae Kim, Young-Nam University. Dae-Ku, Republic of Korea: Hong-ik
Publishing Co.
Kirschenbaum, D., and R. Bale 1980 Cognitive-behavioral skills in golf: brain power golf. Pp.
275-287 in R. Suinn, ed., Psychology in Sports: Methods and Applications. Minneapolis.
Minn.: Burgess.
Komaki, J., and F. Barnett 1977 A behavioral approach to coaching football: improving the play
execution of the offensive backfield on a youth football team. Journal of Applied Behavior
Analysis 10:657-664.
Kubitz, K.A., D.M. Landers, W. Salazar, and S.J. Petruzzello 1991 A Meta-Analytic Review of the
Effects of Acute Exercise on Selected Aspects of Sleep. Unpublished manuscript,
Department of Exercise Science and Physical Education, Arizona State University.
Lacey, B.C., and J.I. Lacey 1964 Cardiac Deceleration and Simple Visual Reaction Time in a Fixed
Foreperiod Experiment. Paper presented at the October meeting of the Society for
Psychophysiological Research, Washington, D.C.
1966 Change in Cardiac Response and Reaction Time as a Function of Motivation. Paper presented
at the October meeting of the Society for Psychophysiological Research, Denver, Colo.
1970 Some autonomic-central nervous system interrelationships. Pp. 205-261 in P. Black, ed.,
Physiological Correlates of Emotion. New York: Academic Press.
1974 Studies of heart rate and other bodily processes in sensorimotor behavior. Pp. 538-564 in P.A.
Obrist, A.H. Lack, J. Brener, and L.V. DiCara, eds., Cardiovascular Psychophysiology.
Chicago: Aldine.
1980 Sensorimotor behavior and cardiac activity. Pp. 170-179 in I. Martin and P.H. Venables, eds.,
Techniques in Psychophysiology. New York: Wiley.
Lacey, J.I. 1967 Somatic response patterning and stress: some revisions of activation theory. Pp.
14-37 in M.H. Appley and R. Trumbull, eds., Psychological Stress: Issues in Research. New
York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Lacey, J.I., J. Kagan, B.C. Lacey, and H.A. Moss 1963 The visceral level: situational determinants
and behavioral correlates of autonomic response patterns. Pp. 161-196 in P.H. Knapp, ed.,
Expression of the Emotions in Man. New York: International Universities Press.
Landers, D.M. 1985 Psychophysiological assessment and biofeedback: applications for athletes in
closed skill sports. Pp. 63-105 in J.H. Sandweis and S. Wolf, eds., Biofeedback and Sports
Science. New York: Plenum Press.
Landers, D.M., M.Q. Wang, and P. Courtet 1985 Peripheral narrowing among experienced and
inexperienced rifle shooters under low-and high-time stress conditions. Research Quarterly
for Exercise and Sport 56:122-130.
Landers, D.M., M.W. Han, W. Salazar, S.H. Petruzzello, K.A. Kubitz, and T.L. Gannon 1991a The
effects of learning on electroencephalographic and electrocardiographic patterns in novice
archers. International Journal of Sport Psychology. In press.
Landers, D.M., S.H. Petruzzello, W. Salazar, D.J. Crews, K.A. Kubitz, T.L. Gannon, and M.W. Han
1991b The influence of electrocortical biofeedback on performance in pre-elite archers.
Medicine and Science in Sports and Exercise 23:123-129.
Landy, F.J., and R.M. Stern 1971 Factor analysis of a somatic perception questionnaire. Journal of
Psychosomatic Research 15:179-181.
Larson, R., and M. Csikszentmihalyi 1983 The experience sampling method. In H. Reis, ed.,
Naturalistic Approaches to Studying Social Interactions. San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey
Bass.
Lawrence, G., D. Druckman, and D.M. Landers 1990 Mental practice for solderers. Unpublished
manuscript, U.S. Army Research Institute, Alexandria, Va.
Lee, A.B., and J. Hewitt 1987 Using visual imagery in a flotation tank to improve gymnastic
performance and reduce physical symptoms. International Journal of Sport Psychology
18:223-230.
LeUnes, A., and J.R. Nation 1982 Saturday's heroes: a psychological portrait of college football
players. Journal of Sport Behavior 5:139-149.
LeUnes, A., S. Daiss, and J.R. Nation 1986 Some psychological predictors of continuation in a
collegiate football program. Journal of Applied Research in Coaching and Athletics 1:1-8.
LeUnes, A., S.A. Hayward, and S. Daiss 1988 Annotated bibliography on the profile of mood states in
sport, 1975-1988. Journal of Sport Behavior 11(4):213-240.
Light, K.C. 1982 Cardiovascular responses to effortful active coping. Psychophysiology 18:216-225.
Lobmeyer, D.L., and E.A. Wasserman 1986 Preliminaries to free throw shooting: superstitious
behavior? Journal of Sport Behavior 9:70-78 .
Loehr, J. 1989 Mental Toughness. Videotape. Available from Grand Slam Communications, 5150
Linton Blvd., Suite 420, Delray Beach, Florida 33484.
Lubin, B. 1967 Manual for the Depression Adjective Checklist. San Diego, Calif.: Educational and
Industrial Testing Service.
Mace, R., C. Eastman, and D. Carroll 1987 The effects of stress-inoculation training on gymnastics
performance on the pommelled horse: a case study. Behavioral Psychotherapy 15:272-279.
Maddi, S. 1965 Motivational aspects of creativity. Journal of Personality 33:330-347.
Mahoney, M.J., and M. Avener 1977 Psychology of the elite athlete: an exploratory study. Cognitive
Therapy and Research 1:135-141.
Maslow, A. 1971 The Farther Reaches of Human Nature. New York: Viking Press.
Massimini, F., and P. Inghilleri 1987 L'esperienza Quotidiana. Milano: Franco Angeli Libri.
Massimini, F., M. Csikszentmihalyi, and M. Carli 1987 The monitoring of optimal experience: a tool
for psychiatric rehabilitation. Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 175:545-549.
Mazziotta, J., and M. Phelps 1984 Positron computed tomography studies of cerebral metabolic
responses to complex motor tasks. Neurology 34:116.
McCullagh, P., M.R. Weiss, and D. Ross 1989 Modeling considerations in motor skill acquisition and
performance: an integrated approach. Exercise and Sport Science Reviews 17:475-513.
McCullagh, P., K.J. Evans, K.M. Morrison, and K.M. Petersen 1990a The Use of Videotapes and
Imagery to Enhance Skilled Performance. Unpublished manuscript, Department of
Kinesiology, University of Colorado, Boulder.
McCullagh, P., A. Meriweather, and D.I. Siegel 1990b The Effectiveness of Sybervision as an
Observational Learning Tool for the Tennis Serve. Unpublished manuscript, Department of
Kinesiology, University of Colorado, Boulder.
McNair, D.M., M. Lorr, and L.F. Droppleman 1971/81 Profile of Mood States Manual. San Diego,
Calif.: Educational and Industrial Testing Service.
Meyers, A., R. Schleser, and T. Okwumabua 1982 A cognitive behavioral intervention for improving
basketball performance. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport 53(4):344-347.
Miller, B.P., and G.P. Edgington 1984 Psychological mood state distortion in a sporting context.
Journal of Sport Behavior 7(3):91-94.
Miller, B.P., and A.J. Miller 1985 Psychological correlates of success in elite sportswomen.
International Journal of Sport Psychology 16:289-295.
Molander, B., and L. Backman 1989 Age differences in heart rate patterns during concentration in a
precision sport: implications for attentional functioning. Journal of Gerontology:
Psychological Sciences 44:80-87.
Morgan, W.P. 1979 Anxiety reduction following acute physical activity. Psychiatric Annals
9:141-147.
1980 Test of champions. Psychology Today July:92-99.
1981 Psychophysiology of self-awareness during vigorous physical activity. Research Quarterly for
Exercise and Sport 52:385-427.
1985 Selected psychological factors limiting performance: a mental health model. Pp. 70-80 in D.H.
Clarke and H.M. Eckert, eds., Limits of Human Performance. Champaign, Ill.: Human
Kinetics.
Morgan, W.P., and R.W. Johnson 1978 Personality characteristics of successful and unsuccessful
oarsmen. International Journal of Sport Psychology 9:119-133.
Morgan, W.P., and M.L. Pollock 1977 Psychologic characterization of the elite distance runner.
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 301:383-403.
Morgan, W.P., D.R. Brown, J.S. Raglin, P.J. O'Connor, and K.A. Ellickson 1987a Psychological
monitoring of overtraining and staleness. British Journal of Sports Medicine 21:107-114.
Morgan, W.P., P.J. O'Connor, P.B. Sparling, and R.R. Pate 1987b Psychological characterization of
the elite female distance runner. International Journal of Sports Medicine 8
(Supplement):124-131.
Morgan, W.P., D.L. Costill, M.G. Flynn, J.S. Raglin, and P.J. O'Connor 1988 Mood disturbance
following increased training in swimmers. Medicine and Science in Sports and Exercise
20:408-414.
Morrison, J.E., and S.A. Walker 1990 Effects of Mental Practice on Tank Gunnery Performance.
Technical report no. 873. U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social
Sciences, Alexandria, Va.
Mumford, B., and C. Hall 1985 The effects of internal and external imagery on performing figures in
figure skating. Canadian Journal of Applied Sport Sciences 10(4):171-177.
Neiss, R. 1990 Expectancy in motor behavior: a crucial element of the psychobiological states that
affect performance. Human Performance 2:273-300.
Newell, K.M., J.T. Quinn, Jr., W.A. Sparrow, and C.B. Walter 1983 Kinematic information feedback
for learning a rapid arm movement. Human Movement Science 2:255-269.
Newell, K.M., W.A. Sparrow, and J.T. Quinn, Jr. 1985 Kinetic information feedback for learning
isometric skills. Journal of Human Movement Studies 11:113-123.
Nisbett, R.E., and T.D. Wilson 1977 Telling more than we can know: verbal reports on mental
processes. Psychological Review 84:231-259.
Norcross, J.C., E. Guadagnoli, and J.O. Prochaska 1984 Factor structure of the profile of mood states
(POMS): two partial replications. Journal of Clinical Psychology 40:1270-1277.
North, T.C., P. McCullagh, and Z.V. Tran 1990 Effect of exercise on depression. Exercise and Sport
Sciences Reviews 18:379-415.
Obrist, P.A. 1981 Cardiovascular Psychophysiology: A Perspective. New York: Plenum
Obrist, P.A., R.A. Webb, J.R. Sutterer, and J.L. Howard 1970 Cardiac deceleration and reaction time:
an evolution of two hypotheses. Psychophysiology 6:695-706.
O'Connor, K.P. 1981 The intentional paradigm and cognitive psychophysiology. Psychophysiology
18:121-128.
O'Connor, P.J., W.P. Morgan, J,S. Raglin, C.M. Barksdale, and N.H. Kalin 1989 Mood state and
salivary cortisol levels following overtraining in female swimmers.
Psychoneuroendocrinology 14:303-310.
Orwin, R.G. 1983 A fail-safe N for effect size. Journal of Educational Statistics 8:157-159.
Oxendine, J.B. 1969 Effect of mental and physical practice on the learning of three motor skills.
Research Quarterly 40(4):744-763.
Pahl, J. 1990 Positron emission tomography in the study of higher cognitive functions. In A. Schiebel
and A. Wechsler, eds., Neurobiology of Higher Cognitive Function. New York: Guilford.
Petruzzello, S.J., D.M. Landers, B.D. Hatfield, K.A. Kubitz, and W. Salazar 1991 A meta-analysis on
the anxiety reducing effects of acute and chronic exercise: outcomes and mechanisms.
Sports Medicine 11:143-182.
Pirozzolo, F.J. 1991 A developmental neuropsychological model of human performance.
Developmental Neuropsychology 7:377-391.
Pirozzolo, F.J., and M. Csikszentmihalyi 1991 Preparation to Perform Under Pressure. Unpublished
manuscript, Department of Neurology, Baylor College of Medicine.
Raven, P.B., D. Rohm-Young, and C.G. Blomquist 1984 Physical fitness and cardiovascular response
to lower body negative pressure. Journal of Applied Physiology 56:138-144.
Ray, W.J., and H.W. Cole 1985 EEG alpha activity reflects attentional demands, and beta activity
reflects emotional and cognitive processes. Science 228:750-752.
Ray, R.L., and H.D. Kimmel 1979 Utilization of psychophysiological indices in behavioral
assessment: some methodological issues. Journal of Behavioral Assessment 1:107-122.
Reddon, J.R., R. Marceau, and R.R. Holden 1985 A confirmatory evaluation of the Profile of Mood
States: convergent and discriminant item validity. Journal of Psychopathology and
Behavioral Assessment 7:243-259.
Richardson, A. 1967 Mental practice: a review and discussion. Part 1. Research Quarterly 38
(1):95-107.
Riddick, C.C. 1984 Comparative psychological profiles of three groups of female collegians:
competitive swimmers, recreational swimmers, and inactive swimmers. Journal of Sport
Behavior 7:160-174.
Robinson, R. 1990 The Iron Horse. New York: Harper and Row.
Roland, P., E. Meyer, T. Shibasaki, Y. Yamamoto, and C. Thompson 1982 Regional cerebral blood
flow changes in cortex and basal ganglia during voluntary movements in normal human
volunteers. Journal of Neurophysiology 48:467-480.
Roland, P., L. Eriksson, S. Stone-Elander, and L. Widen 1987 Does mental activity change the
oxidative metabolism of the brain? Journal of Neuroscience 1:2373-2389.
Rose, D., and R.W. Christina 1990 Attentional demands of precision pistol-shooting as a function of
skill level. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport 61:111-113.
Rothstein, A.L., and R.K. Arnold 1976 Bridging the gap: application of research on videotape
feedback and bowling. Motor Skills: Theory Into Practice 1:35-62.
Ryan, A.J. 1983 Exercise is medicine. The Physician and Sports Medicine 11:10.
Salazar, W., D.M. Landers, S.J. Petruzzello, D.J. Crews, K.A. Kubitz, and M.W. Han 1990
Hemispheric asymmetry, cardiac response, and performance in elite archers. Research
Quarterly for Exercise and Sport 61:351-359.
Sandman, C.A., and B.B. Walker 1985 Cardiovascular relationship to attention and thinking. Pp.
95-122 in V.M. Rental, S.A. Corson, and B.R. Dunn, eds., Psychophysiological Aspects of
Reading and Learning. New York: Gordon & Breach.
Schmid, W.D. 1989 Heart rate patterns of archers while shooting. Fiziologiya Cheloveka 15:64-68.
Shulhan, D., H. Scher, and J. Furedy 1986 Phasic cardiac reactivity to psychological stress as a
function of aerobic fitness level. Psychophysiology 23:562-566.
Silva, J.M., III, B.B. Schultz, R.W. Haslam, and D. Murray 1981 A psychophysiological assessment
of elite wrestlers. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport 52:348-358.
Silva, J.M., III, B.B. Shultz, R.W. Haslam, T.P. Martin, and D.F. Murray 1985 Discriminating
characteristics of contestants at the United States Olympic wrestling trials. International
Journal of Sport Psychology 16:79-102.
Singer, R.N., L.A. Flora, and T.L. Abpirezl 1989 The effect of a five-step cognitive learning strategy
on the acquisition of a complex motor task. Journal of Applied Sport Psychology 1:98-108.
Singer, R.S. 1972 The Psychomotor Domain: Movement Behavior. Philadelphia, Pa.: Lea & Febiger.
Smith, R.E. 1980 A cognitive-affective approach to stress management training for athletes. Pp. 54-72
in C.H. Nadeau, W.R. Halliwell, K.M. Newell, and G.C. Roberts, eds., Psychology of Motor
Behavior and Sport—1979. Champaign, Ill.: Human Kinetics.
Spielberger, C.D., R.L. Gorsuch, and R.E. Lushene 1970 Manual for the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory. Palo Alto, Calif.: Consulting Psychologists Press.
Stern, R.M. 1976 Reaction time and heart rate between the GET SET and GO of simulated races.
Psychophysiology 13:149-154.
Suinn, R.M. 1977 Behavioral methods at the winter games. Behavioral Therapy 8:283-284.
1983 Imagery and sports. Pp. 507-534 in A.A. Sheikh, ed., Imagery: Current Theory, Research, and
Application. New York: Wiley.
Tharion, W.J., S.R. Strowman, and T.M. Rauch 1988 Profile and changes in moods of
ultramarathoners. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology 10:229-235.
van der Molen, M.W., R.J.M. Somsen, and J.F. Orlebeke 1985 The rhythm of the heart beat in
information processing. Pp. 1-88 in P.K. Ackles, J.R. Jennings, and M.G.H. Coles, eds.,
Advances in Psychophysiology. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press.
Walker, B.B., and C.A. Sandman 1979 Human visual evoked responses are related to heart rate.
Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 93:717-729.
1982 Visual evoked potentials change as heart rate and carotid pressure change. Psychophysiology
19:520-527.
Wang, M.Q., and D.M. Landers 1987 A psychophysiological investigation of attention during archery
performance. Psychophysiology 23:449.
Weinberg, R.S. 1982 The relationship between mental preparation strategies and motor performance: a
review and critique. Quest 33(2):195-213.
Weinberg, R., T. Seabourne, and A. Jackson 1981 Effects of visuo-motor behavior rehearsal,
relaxation, and imagery on karate performance. Journal of Sport Psychology 3:228-238.
Wheeler, R.E., A.J. Tomarken, L.M. Kinney, A.M. Straus, R.C. Doss, and R.J. Davidson 1989 EEG
Activation Asymmetries Are Stable Over Time. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the
Society for Psychophysiological Research, New Orleans, October.
Whelan, J.P., A.W. Meyers, and J.S. Berman 1989 Cognitive-behavioral interventions for athletic
performance enhancement. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American
Psychological Association, New Orleans.
Williams, T., and G. Krahenbuhl 1991 Mood state and running economy in moderately trained male
runners. Medicine and Science in Sports and Exercise 23(6):727-731.
Wills, B.J. 1966 Mental Practice as a Factor in the Performance of Two Motor Tasks. Unpublished
doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison.
Wilson, V.E., N.C. Morley, and E.I. Bird 1980 Mood profiles of marathon runners, joggers and non-
exercisers. Perceptual and Motor Skills 50:117-118.
Wurtman, R. 1982 Nutrients that modify brain function. Scientific American 246:42-51.
12
Enhancing Team Performance
have focused on decision making, and the prototype question has been the study
of how groups arrive at a consensus. The major model has been a jury, which is
an unorganized group whose members possess similar information and who must
arrive at a consensus. The variables most often investigated are group size, rules
of procedure, and other structural features.
The field of human factors has dealt primarily with teams or crews, that is,
the types of groups found in the workplace. The studies are often addressed to the
task of optimizing performance in a particular setting or set of circumstances. The
crews and teams under investigation are often studied on the job, and quite
commonly, the teams are stratified and functionally differentiated. Such studies
often focus on the division of labor among people working in a particular
equipment design environment, as, for example, the layout of instruments and
controls in an airplane cockpit occupied by several people.
These two traditions tend to parallel an important distinction in group
research: the difference between laboratory and field research. Studies in the
laboratory, favored by social psychologists, permit researchers to gain a greater
amount of control over the factors under investigation. They allow random
assignment of people to different experimental conditions and also permit the
standardization, minimization, or the measurement of factors not currently under
investigation but capable of spuriously affecting outcomes. But because
laboratory studies examine “hot-house” variables under usually idealized
circumstances, it is often difficult to apply them in any particular case.
Field studies, in contrast, examine groups in their natural environments.
While some control of the factors affecting a crew is possible, field studies often
must contend with many complex factors. Because randomization of team
members is not usually an option, many of the factors are covaried (i.e., related to
each other) and often not even identified. Field studies often give good answers
about specific questions concerning the composition and work of particular
teams, but because of the specific circumstances under which they are conducted,
they are difficult to cumulate into general principles for group performance.
It seems clear that the perspective of both traditions—experimental social
psychology and human factors—are necessary for addressing the problems faced
by those who must design efficient and comprehensive training programs for
activities involving group tasks. General principles and applicable specifics are
both needed. This chapter attempts such an integration by examining two aspects
of the missions of groups or teams: decision making and performance. Both of
these aspects can be studied in the laboratory and in the field, but they pose
different sets of problems for researchers.
TEAM PERFORMANCE
Individual input can vary as a function of a variety of intra-individual
variables, but here we are more concerned with extra-individual factors,
especially those originating with other members of a team. The interpersonal
processing of such input ultimately produces the team action: the aggregation,
concatenation, combination, assembly, or other treatment of information (or other
kinds of individual contributions) underlies the team output. We consider first
individual input issues.
Member Contributions
Audiences and coactors have been observed to influence strongly and
systematically the quality and quantity of individual performances before them
(see summaries by Geen, 1980, 1989; Zajonc, 1980; Borden, 1980). Even passive
audiences can be responsible for arousal in a performer, which in turn generally
facilitates performance of well-learned, routine behaviors and inhibits
performance of poorly learned responses, including tasks that require processing
of substantial information (Zajonc, 1965; Cohen and Davis, 1973). The latter
finding does not encourage optimism for performance environments that require
problem solving or the processing of information generally—especially those
that might be necessary for coordinated team performance in emergencies and
high-stress environments typical of the military, law enforcement, and many
commercial settings.
how particular techniques would work over a protracted period of time remains
unstudied.
above, best-member baseline (e.g., Davis et al., 1971), but so little research has
addressed groups organized and trained to the task that little can be said about
actually engineering group efficiency in the various contexts in which teams
must perform.
Not all suboptimal performance can be attributed to lowered input at the
level of the individual member, and Steiner (1972), among others, has outlined
the nature of the losses due to faulty interpersonal processes required for pooling
or otherwise combining information and responses into a group product (see
recent summaries by McGrath, 1984; Brown, 1988). Efforts to engineer
improvements in group performance have typically emphasized procedural
mechanisms that both promote discussion and efficient structuring of effort and
enhance personal productivity (see summary by Hackman and Morris, 1975).
Brainstorming (Osborn, 1957) has been among the most popular of the
widely publicized devices to further group productivity—especially teams
engaged in tasks requiring “creative” problem solving. Brainstorming, which is
essentially a set of guidelines for managing discussion, has proved highly popular
with organizations as a procedural corrective and as a solution and idea-
stimulating technique, despite critical research evaluations from shortly after its
introduction. Early empirical evaluations found that, relative to a “best-member”
baseline, brainstorming did not successfully enhance performance; rather, isolated
individuals were relatively more productive (quality and quantity of ideas,
solutions, etc.) (Taylor et al., 1958; Dunnette et al., 1963). However,
brainstorming has survived and continues to be a popular means for organizations
of various kinds to use to attempt to enhance performance of their task-oriented
teams. Recent empirical studies have confirmed earlier research showing that
brainstorming techniques, despite their continuing popularity, do not alter the
suboptimal performance of problem-solving groups (Diehl and Stroebe, 1987;
1990; see also meta-analyses by Mullen and Johnson, 1991). After exploring a
variety of procedural manipulations, Diehl and Stroebe attribute the productivity
loss to “blocking”—an inability of a member to produce ideas while others are
talking, a kind of distraction notion.
It is easy to understand why organizations pursue techniques for the
enhancement of suboptimal performance. It is less easy to understand the
continued popularity of brainstorming, which has been shown to have no
demonstrable value.
Special Forces
The Special Forces branch of the Army uses a squad as its basic operating
unit; the typical squad consists of 12 soldiers. Within each squad, two members
are trained in each of six specialties, for example, medic, weapons, combat
engineering. The squads are trained to work together as a unit, either functioning
independently or in collaboration with other squads as part of a larger operation.
As an example of the first case, a squad with minimal or no support facilities
might be assigned as military advisers to the armed forces of an allied country.
Special Forces squads differ in their particular missions: they may have a squad-
wide special mission or capability, such as underwater specialists or airborne
units. There are further gradations within mission specialties: some of the
airborne squads are HALO—high altitude low opening—units.
HALO is a specific type of parachuting operation which differs from the
mass low-altitude operations of the regular infantry airborne units. A HALO
squad is expected to jump from a high-flying, and, hence, relatively quiet plane,
free fall for some distance, and then open its parachutes at a low altitude. Practice
is needed not only in the individual skills, but also in coordinating the squad
members' ability to land close to each other at the target.
A HALO squad has two distinct training needs: each of its members must be
trained in his subspecialty, such as weapons, and the squad as a whole must
practice in HALO team operations. In theory, these two training aspects, one
splitting the squad into at least six subgroups and the other assembling the squad
for joint training, could be scheduled so that the squad rotated between periods
when all members were together with periods when all members were at their
specialty training. In practice, however, this cannot be done because the
individual specialties have different lengths of training, different needs for
updating and re-certification, and attend training at different sites. Thus, there are
several important issues raised by the special forces training needs.
First, what is the optimal balance between individual training and squad
training? When does a medic forgo more medical training in order to practice
HALO skills? Conversely, when is a HALO squad coordinated enough to allow
its members to disperse for specialty training? How can the plan be adjusted for
the different training needs of the different specialties?
Second, what is to be done when a squad is not complete? For instance, a
squad may have to be deployed when some of its members
are absent for individual training. What are the best solutions to having
incomplete squads: secondary training in other subspecialties for each member to
serve as back-up for absent members or the assignment of specialists who are new
to the squad to fill in for the missing soldiers?
Third, should squads be kept together throughout their term of service to
induce better team coordination and performance or should component members
be rotated through several squads to facilitate interchangeability and minimize the
disruption of substitute members?
Ranger Training
The Army has a special program of Ranger training for selected soldiers.
Troops from all of the Army's units are eligible for the Ranger program on the
basis of superior performance in their basic and general training and nomination
from their supervising officers. Nominees are subjected to a rigorous series of
selection procedures. If accepted into the Ranger program, the soldiers undergo
several weeks of extensive training in a variety of habitats, such as mountains,
swamps, deserts, and the like. The training procedures are physically gruelling
and are characterized by extreme deprivation of sleep and food and extraordinary
physical demands. Upon successful completion of the Ranger course, a soldier is
given a Ranger patch and other identifying insignia. Although some Rangers are
assigned to serve in all-Ranger battalions, most are rotated back to their original
units in which they serve as ordinary soldiers, but are identified as role models by
their Ranger accomplishments.
There is probably no question that the Rangers are a superior group of
soldiers. But there is a major issue raised by the training and assignment
procedures, that of formal and informal leadership within the unit. A squad with a
noncommissioned officer (NCO) in charge and a Ranger among its members has
two leaders, one explicit and one implicit. It is not known to what extent there is a
possibility for conflict or discrepant messages from these two sources. What
happens if the NCO in charge changes? Does the Ranger assume a bigger
leadership role? Does the presence of a Ranger facilitate or hinder the ability of
the new NCO to assume leadership?
there is a simulated control room for each reactor. The simulated control rooms
duplicate the instrumentation of their particular reactors, and, through computer
models, interact with the instrumentation to produce the effects on the gauges and
information displays that would be shown in the actual control room of the
modeled reactor.
The simulation control rooms are used for initial training of operators as
well as for retraining, certification, and general assessment of operational skills.
They are extremely complex: some of the later model reactors may have more
than 10,000 individual displays and a similar number of input controls. Personnel
differ for each reactor, but a typical control room is staffed by a group of four
people—two operators, a foreman, and a shift supervisor.
At a training session a reactor crew will be placed in the simulation control
room with a reactor simulation in progress. Trainers situated behind one-way
glass simulate a malfunction of the reactor through appropriate manipulation of
the simulation computer. The control room crew are monitored on their ability to
recognize that a malfunction is occurring, to work through the requisite
diagnostics, and to take the necessary corrective actions, shutting down the
reactor if needed. Many of the procedures are algorithmic in nature: when a
certain dial shows an abnormal reading, for example, the shift supervisor may
locate a manual that has step-by-step rules for isolating the underlying fault. The
foreman then reads each step as the two operators carry out the foreman's
commands, reporting back information and outcomes as requested. The
procedures are not rigid: the team must make a series of operational decisions as
well come to agreement on the nature of the problem, its seriousness, and the
steps needed to rectify the situation. Each member of the team has a different
function, but the members are interdependent with respect to the larger problem.
The shift supervisor's choice of diagnostic algorithm depends on information from
the operators; the foreman‘s instructions to the operators depend on the shift
supervisor's choice of diagnostic procedure manuals; the operators' choice of dial
readings to report and of switches to set depend on the foreman's instructions.
The control of a reactor involves periods of quiescence punctuated with
anomalous events that may or may not represent serious malfunctions or
emergencies. Successful operation of a reactor depends on the control room's crew
to work its way to a correct set of decisions about what is wrong, if anything, and
what needs to be done.
Observation of a control room simulation reveals some issues that are
generic to team training, decision making, and performance. First, not all group
decision making involves the type of consensus setting usually studied in free
discussion groups such as juries. In a control room, the group's decision is arrived
at only after a set of sequential decisions are
Challenges to Training
These illustrations suggest a series of questions of both immediate concern
to the organizations involved—the Special Forces, the Rangers, and nuclear
power plant control rooms—and to many other military and industrial settings.
Should work groups be trained together as a unit or should members be
trained separately and assembled into units? The advantages of maintaining
groups through both training and performance are coordination and the
elimination of the duplicative effort of retraining. However, separate training with
subsequent assembly of a group minimizes disruption when a team member
needs to be replaced and gives practice in adapting to changed groups.
Challenges to Research
Most of the questions from the three work examples are not covered by
existing research. In the social psychological work, the experimental groups are
most often not comparable to the ones that exist in the military and in industry.
First, most working groups are faced with problems that are mixed in nature.
They are neither pure decision making nor pure performance problems. The
group's task is usually a variety of activities, involving some decision or
consensus, some performance, some information gathering, and moving back and
forth between these activities in the performance of their mission. The group's
task could be broken down into smaller, typologically purer, subunits, in an effort
to make research applicable to each component of the complex task, but then
linking the subunits back together would immediately reinstate the problems the
disassembly was designed to eliminate. Few, if any, social psychological studies
use the complex problems that are present in any practical situation. It is difficult
to predict how simple tasks combine in a group's attack on complex problems
without research directed to that very issue.
Second, groups in social psychological research tend to be homogeneous.
Although the early literature on group dynamics (cf., Festinger and Thibaut,
1951) examined some aspects of stratification, differences in rank, authority,
prestige, and knowledge are generally missing variables in the research groups.
For example, in an early line of work, Torrence (1954) studied B-26 combat
crews in decision making situations. He compared existing crews consisting of an
officer pilot, an officer navigator, and an enlisted gunner with crews consisting of
the same personnel but who had never worked together. Torrence was able to
show that rank, status, and previous experience influenced how the crews came to
agreement. For example, when given problems with objective solutions, the
gunners had difficulty getting their correct answers accepted by the officers, and
the pilots were able to impose their incorrect answers on the other crew
members. The distortions from optimal performance were greater in the
permanent than in the temporary crews. Important as are these considerations for
real-life team and group activities, investigation of factors such as these is now
virtually nonexistent.
Third, most group studies are single-session experiments, or, at most,
several-session experiments. These temporary groups, together for a short period
of time, are hardly comparable to the extended, long-term
interactions of actual groups in the workplace. The reasons for this lack are
understandable: the financial and logistic difficulties of conducting longitudinal
research with experimental groups are so formidable as to preclude it from the
consideration of most investigators.
If the community studying the social psychology of groups is not doing the
research needed to answer the questions raised by the observations illustrated
above, does the field of applied psychology and human factors do so? Our
answer is a qualified “no.” Foushee's (1984) examination of small groups in the
cockpits of airplanes is an excellent example of solutions to particular problems.
Foushee's method was to intensively review hours of video tapes of groups in
cockpits; it will undoubtedly provide improvements in procedures and benefit
both crews and airlines using that cockpit configuration. Yet it is difficult to
imagine how to generalize these findings to other tasks for which the specific
items of job performance are very different and the size and nature of the group
does not resemble those in the cockpits.
The tradeoffs between abstract, basic group research, generalizable in
principle but of little help in specific situations, and applied, mission-oriented
research, of use in a specified situation but not generalizable to other situations,
has long been recognized (see, e.g., Mahoney and Druckman, 1975). One of the
early explications of group research in social psychology—Festinger's (1953)
description of laboratory research in social psychology—articulated the issues
clearly. Unfortunately, little progress has been made in the almost four decades
since these problems were presented. The problem is that neither stream of
research by itself gives satisfactory solutions to the problems raised by some of
the complex training needs of the military or of industry. If both approaches could
focus on the same problem and combine their results, much could be gained.
There are several ways such an amalgam could be obtained. One way would
be an attempt to generalize from a series of applied studies in particular settings.
There is useful information in such reviews, but the usual problems of
interpreting results when so much is going on at the same time make application
of the generalizations difficult. Typically, such results work fairly well when
applied to situations similar to those from which the data were gathered; they are
not as applicable to somewhat different or to novel situations.
A better way would be to conduct parallel studies in field and laboratory
settings. One could examine the abstract proposition in laboratory studies and
simultaneously explore ecological validity of the propositions by testing them in
naturalistic, field settings. Examples of this type of coordinated research are rare.
One example is the study of some relationships between employee satisfaction
and job performance during
CONCLUSIONS
Many problems and issues in team performance are potentially answerable
by research, but research on group structure and function, once a mainstay in
social psychology, is now not a major focus of the work. Moreover, most of these
studies are of unstratified groups, making them less relevant for real-world
problems involving stratified groups and command structures.
NOTE
1. The difference between a “risky” and “cautious” shift refers to the choice made by experimental
subjects on the lowest acceptable probability for the risky play in question to be attempted. The
probabilities range from “1 in 10 that the play would succeed” (risky) to “9 in 10 that it would
succeed” (cautious).
REFERENCES
Borden, R.J. 1980 Audience influence. In P. Paulus, ed., Psychology of Group Influence. Hillsdale,
N.J.: Erlbaum.
Brown, R. 1988 Group Processes: Dynamics Within and Between Groups. Oxford, England: Basil
Blackwell.
Cohen, J.L., and J.H. Davis 1973 Effects of audience status, evaluation and time of action on
performance with hidden word problems. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
37:822-832.
Dalkey, N.C. 1969 Analyses from a group opinion study. Futures 1:541-551.
1970 Use of self-ratings to improve group estimates. Technological Forecasting and Social Change
1(3):283-291.
Davis, J.H. 1969 Individual-group problem solving, subject preferences, and problem type. Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology 13:362-374.
Davis, J.H., P.A. Bates, and S.M. Nealey 1971 Long-term groups and complex problem solving.
Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 6:28-35.
Davis, J.H., T. Kameda, and M. Stasson 1991 Group risk taking: selected topics. In J.F. Yates, ed.,
Risk Taking Behavior. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Delbecq, A.L., A.H. Van de Ven, and D.H. Gustafson 1975 Group Techniques for Program
Planning: A Guide to Nominal Group and Delphi Processes. Glenview, Ill.: Scott,
Foresman.
Diehl, M., and W. Stroebe 1987 Productivity loss in brainstorming groups: toward the solution of a
riddle. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 53:497-509.
1990 Productivity Loss in Idea-Generating Groups: Tracking Down the Blocking-Effect. Paper
presented at the biennial meeting of the European Association of Experimental Social
Psychology, Budapest, Hungary.
Dion, D.L., R.S. Baron, and N. Miller 1970 Why do groups make riskier decisions than individuals?
In L. Berkowitz, ed., Advances in Experimental Social Psychology. New York: Academic
Press.
Druckman, D., and P.T. Hopmann 1989 Behavioral aspects of negotiations on mutual security. In
P.E. Tetlock et al., eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Druckman, D., D. Solomon, and K. Zechmeister 1972 Effects of representational role obligations on
the process of children's distribution of resources. Sociometry 35:387-410.
Druckman, D., A.A. Benton, F. Ali, and J.S. Bagur 1976 Cultural differences in bargaining behavior:
India, Argentina, and the United States. Journal of Conflict Resolution 20:413-452.
Dunnette, M.D., J. Campbell, and K. Jaastad 1963 The effect of group participation on brainstorming
effectiveness for two industrial samples. Journal of Applied Psychology 47:30-37.
Festinger, L. 1953 Laboratory experiments. In L. Festinger and D. Katz, eds., Research Methods in
the Behavioral Sciences. New York: The Dryden Press.
Festinger, L., and J. Thibaut 1951 Interpersonal communication in small groups. Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology 46:92-99.
Fischer, G. 1981 When oracles fail—a comparison of four procedures for aggregating subjective
probability forecasts. Organization Behavior and Human Performance 28:96-110,
133-145.
Foushee, H.C. 1984 Dyads and triads at 35,000 feet: factors affecting group process and aircrew
performance. American Psychologist 39:885-893.
Geen, R.G. 1980 The effects of being observed on performance. In P.B. Paulus, ed., Psychology of
Group Influence. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
1989 Alternative conceptions of social facilitation. In P.B. Paulus, ed., Group Influence, 2nd ed.
Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Gough, R. 1975 The effect of group format on aggregate subjective probability distributions. In D.
Wendt and C.J. Vlek, eds., Utility, Probability, and Human Decision-Making. Dordrecht,
The Netherlands: Reidel.
Hackman, J.R., and C.G. Morris 1975 Group tasks, group interaction process, and group performance
effectiveness: a review and proposed integration. In L. Berkowitz, ed., Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 8. New York: Academic Press.
Harkins, S.G., and J.M. Jackson 1985 The role of evaluation in eliminating social loafing. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin 11:457-465.
Harkins, S.G., and K. Szymanski 1989 Social loafing and group evaluation. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology 56:934-941.
Hastie, R. 1986 Review essay: experimental evidence on group accuracy. In B. Grofman and G.
Guillermo, eds., Information Pooling and Group Decision-Making. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI
Press.
Janis, I.L. 1972 Victims of Groupthink. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin.
1982 Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascos. Boston, Mass.: Houghton
Mifflin.
Kahneman, D., P. Slovic, and A. Tversky, eds. 1982 Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Kerr, N. 1983 Motivation losses in small groups: a social dilemma analysis. Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology 45:819-828.
Latané, B., and A.J. Arrowood 1963 Emotional arousal and task performance. Journal of Applied
Psychology 47:324-327.
Latané, B., K. Williams, and S. Harkins 1977 Many hands make light the work: the causes and
consequences of social loafing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37:822-832.
Linstone, H.A., and M. Turoff 1975 The Delphi Method: Techniques and Applications. Reading,
Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
Lorge, I., and H. Solomon 1955 Two models of group behavior in the solution of Eureka-type
problems. Psychometrika 20:139-148.
Mahoney, R., and D. Druckman 1975 Simulation, experimentation, and context: dimensions of design
and inference. Simulation and Games 6:235-270.
Marquart, D.I. 1955 Group problem-solving. Journal of Social Psychology 41:103-113.
McGrath, J.E. 1984 Groups: Interaction and Performance. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Mullen, B., and C. Johnson 1991 Productivity loss in brainstorming groups: a meta-analytic
integration. Basic and Applied Social Psychology. In press.
Murphy, G., and L. Murphy 1931 Experimental Social Psychology. New York: Harper.
Myers, D.B., and H. Lamm 1976 The group polarization phenomenon. Psychological Bulletin
83:602-627.
Osborn, A.F. 1957 Applied Imagination. New York: Scribners.
Rohrbaugh, J. 1979 Improving the quality of group judgment: social judgment analysis and the
Delphi technique. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance 24:73-92.
Schachter, S. 1959 The Psychology of Affiliation. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Schachter, S., B. Willerman, L. Festinger, and R. Hyman 1961 Emotional disruption and industrial
productivity. Journal of Applied Psychology 45:201-213.
Shaw, M.E. 1932 Comparison of individuals and small groups in the rational solution of complex
problems. American Journal of Psychology 44:491-504.
Steiner, I.D. 1972 Group Process and Productivity. New York: Academic Press.
Stoner, J.A.F. 1961 A comparison of individuals and group decisions involving risk taking. Journal
of Abnormal and Social Psychology 65:77-86.
Taylor, D.W. 1954 Problem solving by groups. In Proceedings XIV, International Congress of
Psychology. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: North Holland Publishing.
Taylor, D.W., P.C. Berry, and C.H. Block 1958 Does group participation when using brain storming
facilitate or inhibit creative thinking. Administrative Science Quarterly 3:23-47.
Torrence, E.P. 1954 Some consequences of power differences on decision-making in permanent and
temporary three-man groups. Research Studies of the State College of Washington
22:130-140.
Tversky, A., and D. Kahneman 1974 Judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases. Science
185:1124-1131.
1981 The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science 211:453-458.
Wallach, M.A., N. Kogan, and D.J. Bem 1962 Group influence on individual risk taking. Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology 65:75-86.
Wrightsman, L.S. 1959 The Effects of Small-Group Membership on Level of Concern. Unpublished
doctoral dissertation, University of Minnesota.
Zajonc, R.B. 1965 Social facilitation. Science 149:269-274.
1980 Compresence. In P.B. Paulus, ed., Psychology of Group Influence. Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
271
APPENDICES
272
A
Committee Activities
In order to cover the disparate topics of our charge, the committee undertook a
wide range of activities—including commissioned papers, site visits to relevant
field settings, and briefings by experts—in addition to full committee meetings
and reviews of the available literature.
The committee met four times during 1989-1990, three of them at National
Research Council facilities in Washington, D.C., and Irvine, California, and once
at the Training Doctrine Command (TRADOC) headquarters at Fort Monroe in
Norfolk, Virginia. Those meetings included presentations by Army experts to
acquaint us with both specific Army interest in particular topics and Army
experience and practice:
Dr. Herbert Barber, Army War College
Dr. Gordon H. Barland, Fort McClellan
General John Crosby, TRADOC
Colonel Louis Csoka, West Point
Dr. Schlomo Dover, Army Research Institute
Dr. Michael Drillings, Army Research Institute
Dr. William Fedor, Office of the Secretary of Defense
Dr. Robert Frank, Center for Army Leadership
Dr. Stephen Goldberg, TRADOC
Dr. Jack Hiller, Army Research Institute
Dr. Owen Jacobs, Army Research Institute
Dr. Edgar Johnson, Army Research Institute
Colonel Keith Knightingale, Fort Benning
Dr. George Lawrence, Army Research Institute
Dr. Judith Orasanu, Army Research Institute
Lt. Col. Keith Skiles, Fort Leavenworth
Most of the rest of the committee's work was carried out through
subcommittees on specific topics. Our subcommittee organization tracks almost
directly to the chapter organization of this report, and members wrote the initial
draft chapters. In one case the work of one subcommittee (hiding and detecting
deception) resulted in two chapters.
Long-Term Retention Robert W. Christina and Robert A. Bjork
constituted this subcommittee. It carried out site visits to Fort Bragg, North
Carolina (September 1989), to the Sillin Nuclear Training Center in Connecticut
(January 1990), and to Vic Braden's Tennis Academy in Trabuco Canyon,
California (July 1990).
Modeling Expertise Michelene T.H. Chi and Robert A. Bjork constituted
this subcommittee. It also visited Fort Bragg, North Carolina (September 1989),
and Vic Braden's Tennis Academy in Trabuco Canyon, California (July 1990).
Developing Careers Daniel Druckman and Lyman W. Porter constituted
this subcommittee. In addition to a site visit to Fort Bragg (September 1989), the
members also received briefings on career development by Dr. Owen Jacobs of
the Army Research Institute and Dr. Herb Barber of the Army War College. The
subcommittee also designed a questionnaire administered to students at the Army
War College and surveyed the Army's self-assessment programs.
Two papers were commissioned for this subcommittee: “The Myers-Briggs
Type Indicators and Enhancing Human Performance,” by Paul Thayer,
Department of Psychology, North Carolina State University; “Army Officer
Career Development: Opportunity for Assessment, Planning, and Professional
Growth,” by Manuel London, Harriman School for Management and Policy,
State University of New York, Stony Brook.
Subliminal Self-Help Eric Eich and Ray Hyman constituted this
subcommittee. It surveyed the market of available subliminal tape packages.
Meditation Gerald C. Davison and Francis J. Pirozzolo constituted this
subcommittee. It was briefed by David Shannahoff-Khalsa, of the Khalsa
Foundation for Medical Science, and Schlomo Dover of the Army Research
Institute. Mr. Shannahoff-Khalsa also prepared a commissioned paper for the
subcommittee, “A Commentary on the Jasper Brener and Samuel R. Connally
Report: Meditation, Rationales, Experimental Effects and Methodological
Issues.”
Managing Pain Gerald C. Davison and Laura Darke, a consultant to the
committee, constituted this subcommittee. Dr. Darke of the University
B
Biographical Sketches
INDEX 283
Index
INDEX 284
INDEX 285
psychopathology and athletic perfor- Expert systems, 14, 70, 71, 73–74
mance, 193–203 wounds, 137 Exploratory behavior, 63, 75
Dissociation, pain, 140 Extraversion, 97–98, 100 see also Myers-
Distraction, see Attention and distrac- Briggs Type Indicator
tion Extroversion, 195
Drugs, pain control, 139, 142 Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI), 194–
E 195, 196
Eating habits, subliminal suggestion, 113, F
114–115 Facial expressions, 151, 154, 158, 159,
Electrophysiology, 19, 142, 193, 219, 160, 161–164, 165, 186–187
220, 222–224, 23 Fear, 136 see also Anxiety
Epistemology, 130 Feedback, 61–62, 75 athletic perfor-
Error analysis, 74 mance enhancement, 212–213, 223–
Evaluation brainstorming, 254 career 224 biofeedback, 9, 124, 125, 141,
development techniques, 8, 15, 81, 206 career development, 91 coach-
87, 95–99 deception detection, 153– ing, 59, 61–62, 87, 88 deception
160, 188–189 enhancement detection, 17, 155, 165, 187 pain
approaches, previously studied, 4, 6 and, 9, 141 and transfer of training,
exercise and stress, 225–227 exper- 40, 45–47 video techniques, 46, 212–
tise, self-evaluation, 64–65 group 213
performance, 247–257, 263–265 Field tests group performance, 20, 248,
individual vs group, 250 meditation, 257–265, 265 pit burial studies, 9,
12, 121–127, 130–131 pain control, 122–123, 125 sports events as, 193
138–144 reflection and problem solv- Fort Bliss, 92
ing, 62–63 sports performance Fort Knox, 4
enhancement, 202–203, 208–212, Fort Leavenworth, 92–93
218–219, 231–232 subliminal self- Frame breaking, 83–84
help, 110–113, 116 see also Field G
tests; Laboratory tasks; Gateways Institute, 107–108, 109, 113
Self-assessment techniques; Generation effects, 34
Testing and measurement Group processes, 3, 5, 10–11, 19–20, 192,
Examples, as training method, 44, 72–73 247–266, 275 audience behavior,
Exercise anxiety and, 225, 227 stress 251–252, 253 combat effectiveness,
and, 19, 193, 225–227, 234 see also 20, 257, 258–259 consensus, 254–
Sports and athletics 257 cooperative learning, 33–34
Expectancy effects, 114, 115 placebo decision making, 248, 249, 254–257,
effects, 16, 113–114, 138, 141 260–261 evaluation of techniques,
Experience sampling method, 231 247–257, 263–265
INDEX 286
field tests, 20, 248, 257–265, 265 individ- Interpersonal processes, 185–188 bargain-
ual performance and, 11, 249–251, ing, gender differences, 252 compe-
253–254, 258–259, 262 laboratory tence, 3 decision making, 5, 20, 249
studies, 247–249, 257 leadership, generation effects, 34 leadership, 80,
80, 82, 86, 87–88, 90–94 longitudi- 82, 86, 87–88, 90–94 mentors,
nal studies, 192 military applica- career development, 82, 87, 88 peer
tions, 20, 257, 258–259, 262, 266 influence, teaching and, 33–34
motivation and, 252–253 organiza- Interviewing, experts, 71
tional factors, 4, 20 problem solving, Introversion, 97–98, 100 see also
5, 20, 253–254, 266 psychological Myers-Briggs Type Indicator
factors, general, 247–266 research J
recommendations, 192, 263–265 Jokes, 183
time factors, 10–11, 20, 252, 262, Justification effects, 114
266 training of groups, 20, 261–263 K
H Kirton Adaptation-Innovation Inventory,
Hemispheric lateralization, brain, 4, 19, 90, 91, 94
129, 222–224, 228 Knowledge career planning, 84, 85–86
Hypertension, 122, 124, 125, 131 expert, 65–67, 69, 70–71, 75–76 see
Hypnosis, 9, 141, 143, 206 also Understanding
I Knowledge-based systems, see
Images and image processing athletic Expert systems
performance, 203, 204, 206, 208– Kundalini yoga, 17, 127, 128–130
209, 211–212, 216–217 brain, 228– L
229 individual performance, 213– Laboratory tasks, 63–65 deception, 18,
215 military applications, 213–215 149–153, 155–160, 164, 166, 171,
pain control, 140 subliminal, 109 172, 177–178, 189 expertise, 63–65,
visualization, 109 70–71 group, 247–249, 257 motor
India, 122–123, 128 function performance, 204–206 sub-
Industrial College of the Aimed Forces, 92 liminal perception, 110–111
Insight, 94 Leadership, 86, 90–94 decision making,
Isolation, 130 80 longitudinal studies, 87–88 men-
Instruction, direct, 72–73 tors, 82, 87, 88
Intelligence agencies, deception and, 176, Leadership Assessment and Development
187–188 Program, 92–93, 94
Interference during training, 40–43 Leadership Effectiveness and Adaptability
frame breaking, careers, 83–84 Description, 90, 91
INDEX 287
INDEX 288
INDEX 289
mental, 10, 18–19, 203, 204–206, 233 Reasoning, expertise and, 67–69
motor skill schema, 44–45 physical Red Badge of Courage, 137
18, 204, 205, 206, 233 timing fac- Reflection, 62–63, 75 insight, 94 see
tors, 18–19, 30–31, 199 also Self-assessment techniques
Preperformance preparation, 19, 191, 193, Refresher training, 35–37, 48
215–219, 224, 232 Relaxation techniques, 9, 16, 122, 124–
Problem solving 125 athletic performance, 203, 206,
career development, 90 error analysis, 74 208, 209, 212, 216, 217 pain and,
evaluation of techniques, 62–63 17, 139, 143
examples, as training method, 44, 72– Religious experience, 120–122, 123, 124
73 expertise and, 60–61, 65, 67–69, Buddhism, 120–121, 127, 128 God,
70, 73–74, 75 group, 5, 20, 253– 121, 124
254, 266 Repetition, 19 feedback, 46–47 see also
Procedural tasks, general, 13, 23–24, 29, Practice
34, 36 examples, as training method, Retention of training, 7, 12, 13–14, 21, 24–
44, 72–73 expertise and, 66–67, 68, 37, 48, 274 defined, 23 motor skills,
69, 70–71 meditation, 120 pain and, 23, 24 organizational factors, 25, 29–
138–139 retention and transfer of 30, 31–32, 36, 38–43, 44, 48 origi-
training, 23 nal learning and, 26–29 practice, 18–
Profile of Mood States (POMS), 104, 195, 19, 30–31 see also Transfer of train-
196, 197–198, 200, 202 ing
Psychodymanics Research Institute, 109 Retraining, 13–14, 35–37, 48
Psychological factors deception, 148– Rokeach inventories, 90, 91, 94
156, 157, 165, 171–185 (passim), S
188 expertise, 69 group, 247–266 Scaffolding, 59, 62
justification, 114 meditation, 126 Schema knowledge structures, 65–67, 70
motivation, 17, 82–83, 88, 90, 124, motor skills, 44–45
153–154, 165, 172, 252–253 pain, 5, Self-assessment techniques career devel-
9, 17, 135–138, 142, 143–144 opment, 14–15, 80, 83, 84–85, 88, 89–
sports, 5, 10, 18, 191, 193–219, 230– 92, 96 expertise, 64–65
233 see also Moods; Personality Self-concept and self-control athlet-
traits; Stress, human environ- ics and, 232 career development, 8,
ments 84–85, 89–90 commercial products,
Psychological tests, false answers, 198 107–108, 109, 112, 113 deception,
R 151, 152, 165 exercise and, 226–
Rangers, U.S. Army, 257, 259 227 meditation, 131 pain, control
Reaction time, 220–221 over, 137, 139–140, 142
INDEX 290
INDEX 291
Testing and measurement anxiety, 194 45 see also specific training methods
career development and, 15, 81, 85– and instruments see also Retention
86, 87–90, 93–95, 96–101 learning of training
and performance, general, 13, 34–35, Transfer of training, 12, 13, 14, 21, 24–
47–48 mastery learning, criteria, 13, 25, 37–47, 49 defined, 23 feedback
26–27, 28, 47, 48 MBTI, 7, 15, 22, and, 40, 45–47
81, 89–90, 91, 92, 93–102 medita- meditation techniques, generalization, 123–
tion effects, 121–130 psychological 125
tests, false answers, 198 sports per- motor functions, 23, 24
formance, 18, 194–203 subliminal negative, 38
perception, 110–113, 116 see also organizational factors, 25, 29–30, 31–32,
Evaluation; Field tests; Labora- 36, 38–43, 44, 48 original learning
tory tasks and, 37–38 similarity of tasks, 37, 38–
Think-aloud protocols, 71 40
Time factors career development, 82, 84, Transition, career frame breaking, 83–84
86, 87–88 deception, 172 experts' U
time on task, 69 generation effects, Understanding, 31–33 of novice, 57–58
34 group behavior, 10–11, 20, 252, see also Knowledge
262, 266 peak experiences, 230, V
231 practice, 18–19, 30–31, 199 Variety in careers, 83–84 in training, 40–
reaction time, 220–221 sports and 45
athletics, 199, 220–221 subliminal Video techniques of deceptive behavior,
perception, 111 tests as learning 18, 149–151, 158, 159–160, 164,
events, 34–35 see also Retention of 166, 189 feedback via, 46, 212–213
training; Transfer of training sports performance enhancement,
Training cues used in, 34, 37 deception, 211–213 subliminal, 109, 114–115
detection of, 156–158, 189 exam- Visualization, 109
ples, use of, 44, 72–73 group, 20, Visual training exercises, 4 see
261–263 inoculation training, stress, Voice, Speech patterns
9, 17, 140–141, 208 interference of, W
40–43 original learning, 26–29, 37–
Wounds, 137
38 overlearning, 26, 28–29 over-
training, sports, 199, 201 posttrain-
Y
ing interventions, 35–37 retraining, Yoga, 16–17, 121, 122–123, 127, 128–130
13–14, 35–37, 48 variety and, 40–