The Reform of Penal Law in Italy - E Ferri
The Reform of Penal Law in Italy - E Ferri
The Reform of Penal Law in Italy - E Ferri
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Northwestern University is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of the
American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology.
http://www.jstor.org
Italy has always been to the fore in the "sad and severe discipline
of crimes and punishments." From the "Libri Terribiles" of the
RonmanDigest to the "Parvus Libellus (le Maleficiis" of Rolandino dei
Rolandi, published in the thirteenth century, from Cesare Beccaria to
Cesare Lombroso, in criminal science Italy has undoubtedly always
been in the front rank.
Through the initiative of the Keeper of the Seals, Ludovico
Mortarq, an illustrious jurisconsult and formerly First President of
the "Corte di Cassazione," the new Italy can place herself in the
vanguard also in the realm of practical penal legislation, especially
since, in many European and American countries during the last
twenty years, laws have been promulgated or proposed for social
defense against criminality, which although fragmentary, inorganic
and sometimes contradictory, are the expression of an ever increasing
powerful confirmation of that current of ideas about crimes and
criminals which, for about forty years, the Italian school of criminal
anthropology has maintained in the scientific lists.
The Decree of September 14th, 1919, which institutes the Royal
Commission for the reform of penal laws, indicates as cardinal points
in the reform of penal justice in Italy, the two fundamental concep-
tions which for forty years the positive criminal school has been affirm-
ing in the field of thought. These two cardinal points are the defense
of society and the perilousness of the criminal.
The defense of society is un(lerstood to mean the daily practical
duty of the functions of the state outside and above philosophical
doctrines, religious beliefs and scholastic polemics. The state, admin-
istering penal justice, cannot pretend to work out a philosophical
system, a religious belief or an academic doctrine. The state has a
positive function of preserving and defending the community from
crime, which is one of the many social diseases that endanger and
offend the binding ties of civil society.
This then is the first fundamental conception wvith which this
decree is inspired. And the inaugural speech on the work of the
'Professor of Criminal Law in the University of Rome, Commission for the
Reform of the Italian Penal Code.
again, as it seems to me, explains why, for example, when some years
ago the Anglican clergyman Morrison asked my consent to publish
in English my "Criminal Sociology," he published it leaving out the
first chapter on the "Theory of Imputabilty," because for him, holding
as he did spiritual doctrines, and a clergyman by profession, it was
too heterodox; but in the preface he approves enthusiastically of my
conclusions on criminal anthropology and on criminal statistics, and
especially of my practical proposals for penal justice in the defense
against criminals. And it is for the same reason, that, a few months
ago, some universities of the United States decided to adopt, as schol-
astic text for the teaching of criminology, the recent North American
translation of my "Criminal Sociology," but they made explicit reserva-
tions on the premises of positive philosophy which are in my book, be-
cause these premises do not agree with the idealistic spirituality which
dominates in the North American people. But these same universities
approve "toto corde" and unreservedly, the practical proposals of
penal justice which that book contains.
Religious belief in the moral sin of man is foreign to the func-
tion of penal justice, because both Catholic and Protestant believers
know that there is a word and a precept of great wisdom in the
Bible which says "Judge not." And there is the word of Jesus, too,
that no man can judge another. And this belief is perfectly logical.
To measure and weigh the offense of a human being, nothing less than
the omniscience of God is needed. To know through what hereditary
vices of past generations arise in the soul of a living creature the
instinct of blood, or of arson, or of violation, to know by what changes
of his Ife, intro-uterine and extra-uterine, by what conditions, family
or social, that man has brought himself to commit homicide, arson,
violation is not a question that the limited mind of a judge, born of
woman, can decide. To claim this, is to claim omniscience. It needed
not to be repeated that the problem of proportioning the punishment
to the crime has never been solved and several criminalists, such as
Ellero, Conforti, Tissot, frankly declare it insolvable. And hence it
is that the Christian says: "The moral offense of the sinner is judged
only by the Divinity." The word of the Bible and the word of Jesus
tell us that one man cannot judge another, but a man face to face
with another man can but defend himself and take measures for his
own security.
A reform of penal justice carrying out the ideas of the positive
criminal school-social defense and perilousness of the criminal, wholly
apart from all research and measure of moral offense of the accused-
does not therefore oppose, nay is in full accordance with these religious
beliefs, which as to the moral offense of the criminal have doctrines of
their own, which we have here neither opportunity nor means of
judging.
And these criteria of the criminal anthropological school do not
contradict philosophical doctrines either, for they are on two different
planes.
During the first twenty years of the present century there has
appeared in contemporary philosophical thought an evident recourse to
spiritualism opposed to the triumphal and torrential affirmation of
positive thought from 1860 to the end of the nineteenth century. It
is, then, easy to understand how this revival of spiritualistic thought
in philosophy seems at first sight in irreconcilable antagonism with the
data and conclusions of the anthropological criminal school.
Nevertheless this is not the case, as it would not be just to con-
ceive of an antagonism between criminal anthropology and religious
beliefs. And I have a clear and notable proof of this in the critique
which Professor Gentile, an illustrious representative of this current
of spiritualistic revival, wrote in 1909 in the "Critica" of Benedetto
Croce with a monographical study of philosophy in Italy since 1850,
when speaking, in a certain chapter, of the Italian school of criminal
anthropology. Professor Gentile in his criticisms of the school of
criminal anthropology makes two remarks: The first is that the
anthropological criminal school has studied and seen only the body
of the criminal and knows nothing of his soul, "the interior world"
from which, nevertheless, the crime comes forth.
To this criticism of Professor Gentile's I might answer by point-
ing to the fact that the crim'inalist anthropologists have studied not
only the body of the criminal in its anatomical and physiological forms
but have made much more extensive and intensive studies on crim-
inals with regard to the psychological element of their nature-sen-
timents, ideas, will. But Professor Gentile might justly reply that even
studying criminal psychology with our Galileo method, we are, to say
the least, agnostics, if not deniers of that premise of an "inner world"
in the absolute spiritual sense.
But what is important in the criticism of Professor Gentile is
this: That after having pointed out this, according to him, theoretical
defect, he studies and examines the school of criminal anthropology
on practical grounds, that is on the ground of its proposals for social
and that is why his voice had such a formidable echo in all Europa,
from the encyclopedists of Paris to the Empress Catherine of Russia,
from Joseph II of Austria to Leopold of Tuscany. Cesare Beccaria
died thirty years later in 1794 almost forgotten. And fifty years more
had to pass after his death before many of his proposals were realized
in the penal laws of civilized countries.
But while on the one hand, these penal laws, brought to the high
level to which Cesare Beccaria raised them borne on the wings of his
genius, were being theoretically and technically perfected, on the other
hand this phenomenon became clear: that crime increased and is
increasing in all civilized countries of the world. In other words, we
have on the one hand the (I might say) academic perfection of
penal laws and hence of the regulations of penal justice, and on the
other hand complete bankruptcy of the practical function which these
regulations should exercise in defending the majority of honest people
from the minority of criminals.
This means, then, that the foundation on which the traditional doc-
trines were place(d is wrong. They have strayed from positive ideas
and the throb of daily life which still vibrate and make us shudder
when reading the pages of Beccaria, hut are completely forgotten in
the arid manifestation of that dogmatic criminal theory which I men-
tioned above and which was an unfortunate imitation of the doctrinal
constructions of Germans, more or less unknown. So that, when in
1911 we were able at last to hold an international congress of criminal
anthropology in Germany (at Cologne), whereas formerly this had
always been opposed because a victorious affirmation was refused to
Italian science, Professor Lintz, the well-known criminalist of Ber-
lin Uniiversity who died a few, months ago, on this occasion asked me
in surprise why in the world young Italian criminalists should trouble
to translate, to examine and to criticise publications of Germans whom
they, in Germany, had never heard the names of!
But, this first step taken, we must also have a second clear con-
ception of the task which awaits this commission. It is called to re-
form penal laws; therefore it is not called to solve the whole prob-
lem of crime.
Crime has causes which produce it and effects which it produces.
To eliminate the causes of crime, penal laws deal in only, or in part,
with the effects of crime, are not competent.
For forty years I have affirmed, and I am never tired of re-
peating, the remedies for the causes which spur men on to commit
crime are nine-tenths of them outside the penal law-they are in the
civil code, in economic legislation, in the better regulation of family,
in the systematization of the school and of education, in all those
precautions of social life which eliminate or attenuate the causes
which make men commit crime.
If we wish to have a complete idea of the problem of crime, we
can make a kind of guiding plan of what the action of the state
against crime should be.
The first part of this guilding plan, which demands very power-
ful and watchful agents, concerns what might be called the social
prevention of crime: indirect and remote prevention which finds out
and studies the causes of crime and indicates remedies to eliminate it
if possible or to weaken its malignant power.
All these are laws which concern the conditions of the physical
and moral existence of the individual in society, beginning from his
birth and going on to the hygiene of infancy, to scholastic and edu-
cative rules, to the conditions of labor, to family life, material and
moral.
A municipality which builds houses cheaply for the people does
much more to prevent crimes against good morals than one which
doubles the penalties for these crimes, while continuing to allow
parents, children, brothers and sisters to sleep in the same room in
a cramped confusion of human organisms.
Besides this function of social and indirect prevention of crime,
there is also that of direct prevention, which is generally called
police prevention, in other words, immediate, prompt upon the mani-
festation of the crime. And here also I think that radical reforms,
which experience has been calling for decades, should be made in
our country.
The abolition, for instance, of the old police methods, which are
inefficacious and harmful, such as admonition, surveillance, compul-
sory confinement, will, in my opinion need no long consideration on
the part of our commission, for these methods when opposed to the
modern methods of crime are like so many flint muskets. But for
these we shall have to substitute disciplinary measures of preventive
defense for minors, beginning for instance with the elementary schools.
Imagine what power the modern state has in the regulation of the
instruction of the people to get to know all the individuals who
make up the nation. Every citizen, of whatever sex, must pass
through the elementary school, then the state could make its own
anthropological census of the population.
In some countries, especially in North America (for the Anglo-
Saxon countries are those where practical applications are most easily
made without being lost sight of amid academic discussions), this has
already been partly done. In Italy we have a partial application of
the system of school doctors.
We believe that in the elementary schools of the future every
pupil will have his anthropological chart on which the doctor will
mark the characteristics of his body and of his psychology, of his
hereditary precedents and of his school conduct, and this will serve as
a preventive scrutiny for all those pupils who, morally deficient, are
candidates for crimes.
I had an opportunity to bring this out clearly when at the Court
of Assizes in Rome I defended.Antonio D'Alba, the regicide, and
showed that if there had been these institutions for scholastic pre-
vention this crime might have been avoided, as this unfortunate youth
from the first years of his interrupted and forcedly incompleted school
life had manifested an abnormal personality.
Besides all this, there remain the provisions for habitual drunk-
ards, idlers by profession, vagabonds, the criminal classes, etc., all
those who are either candidates for or reduced to crime; and all the
precautions against dangerous industries and sales, such as arms, of
poisons, etc., and the measures against gambling houses, etc.
And all this mass of rules for polite action is exercised by the
State without any consideration of moral guilt, with the sole criterion
of perilousness.
But when in a state all the rules are applied in every branch of
legislation for the social and'direct prevention of crime, crimes will
still be committed. Even when the greatest source of crime-i. e.,
misery-is dried up, there will always be crimes, if from no other
cause than an explosion of mental alienation or through an impulse
of erring passion. It is necessary, then, for the state to exert a re-
pressive action on crimes committed.
But for crimes committed, too, various are the branches of that
plan for social defense which I mentioned a while ago.
Before all there is, especially for our country, the problem of
judicial circumscriptions, and there is the problem of the personnel,
for the laws are what the functionaries are who apply them. As to
the personnel, it is necessary to modernize above all the recruiting,
technical instruction, guaranties and responsibility in the judicial
wounds and kills President Carnot, or Felice Orsini throws the homi-
cidal bomb at Napoleon III, we have, it is true, political criminals of
different types certainly, but they act not for a selfish purpose but
through the aberration of an altruistic idea.
I think, then, that in a penal code, in order to give the sentences
of the magistrates the moral and suggestive force of the consent of
the public conscience, this first fundamental distinction should be
made: rules for common crime, rules for political-social crime.
I say political-social because, as is well known, especially on ac-
count of the great competition of an economical social order that the
second half of the nineteenth century has left as a heritage to the
twentieth, the altruistic motives for which a man may infringe the
law are not only those of strictly political character which prevailed
until the middle of the nineteenth century, but they may also have a
reforming purpose and a social and economic development.
In a preliminary and partial scheme of a penal code which I had
the honor to present to the commission, I have proposed two forms
of punishment for political-social criminals: exile and simple impris-
onment. Exile from the state for the less dangerous political-social
criminals, those, for instance, who have not committed an act of vio-
lence on persons or things; for the less dangerous criminals repeat;
otherwise foreign states naturally would not accept the gift of its
criminals that another state might make to them.
It must be remembered that a political criminal may be danger-
ous in one state and not in another. A republican who in Italy makes
a conspiracy to overthrow the monarchy and found a republic becomes
an orthodox citizen if we send him to Switzerland or to France. Just
as a French monarchist would become if he came to Italy.
If, on the other hand, the manifestation of the political-social
crime is of the more dangerous type, because it is accompanied by acts
of violence against persons or against things, it seems to me, there
should be a punishment of prison segregation, but with a different
discipline from that used for common criminals. It may be a simple
detention, such as we have now in France, where those condemned for
less serious political crimes undergo a simple confinement with the
right to receive visits from persons of their family and with the right
to read books, newspapers and so on.
This particular regime, in my judgment quite distinct from the
methods of defense against common crimes (and the decree which
institutes our commission calls particular attention to this)--should,
in my opinion, be applied also to those who are condemned for press
crimes, when this press crime is caused by zeal for the public interest,
though obviously when the press crime is on the other hand com-
mitted from an egoistic motive, revenge or hatred, spite or avarice, it
can no longer be considered as a political-social crime.
The second preliminary distinction that should be made in the
general rules of the code is that for criminals over 18 years of age
and criminals under age. For those over 18 years of age the cri-
terion of the greater or less perilousness of the criminal is of the
greatest importance; for minors, on the other hand, the action of
penal justice should aim above all at aid and moral and professional
improved training, besides, of course, special provision for minors
abnormal and defective.
Besides all this there are the rules for common criminals who
are the most numerous and a small minority of whom constitute a
real social danger.
For this purpose the new penal legislation, and therefore the
reform of penal justice in Italy, should be inspired by a fundamental
rule logically based on the two leading principles of social defense
and of perilousness. The principle, namely, that when a human being
has committed a crime he should always legally answer for it, no
matter what his personal circumstances are, no matter what his age
or sex, his mental alienation or habitual drunkenness, and so on.
The present judicial problem, according to traditional ideas, has
these different phases: The judge has first of all to collect, discuss
and decide on the proofs that the act has been committed; secondly,
to establish that the act has the character of a crime legally defined
in the penal laws; thirdly, and lastly, the judge has to prove that the
accused has really committed or participated in the execution of the
criminal act.
This judicial problem will evidently remain unaltered, even when
our commission has made its proposals for the reform of penal
justice in Italy, because it is the preliminary and constant work of
every penal process.
But once the judge has ascertained by probatory tests that the
accused is the actual author of a criminal act, the consequence will be
that the accused must legally answer for it, except in cases where the
act is apparently criminal, but substantially justifiable; in other words,
only apparently "contra jus," as in the case of legitimate defense,
state of necessity, and so on.
If I kill my unjust aggressor, apparently I am a homicide; but
my act is only the exercise of my right of self-preservation. "Feci
sed jure feci." Except in these cases of justification of the act, who-
ever commits a crime must legally answer for it, whether he is
of age or under age, man or woman, drunk at the moment of the
crime or not; no matter in what condition he was, he must legally
answer for it.
This seems a profoundly radical innovation, which the positive
school has affirmed for 40 years and which it will now introduce into
the reform of penal justice; but really it is not so far from the actual
lines of contemporary penal justice as at first sight it may appear.
Our penal code, which had its birth on January 1st, 1890, came
too soon to systematize the proposals of the criminal anthropological
school, which was then at its dawn, came too late to be a rigid system-
atization of the rules of the traditional classic school, which was al-
ready at its setting, and so it stands midway between the old and the
new. When in the first line of Article 45 of the Italian penal code it
is laid down that the man who has been acquitted because he has
committed a crime in a state of mental infirmity may be shut up in a
ltnatic asylum for an indefinite period if the judge thinks him dan-
gerous, we have here a method for security against an individual who
is declared morally irresponsible for the crime committed, but who,
being dangerous to society, is isolated by the judge, in an institution
which will have a different name, it will be called an asylum instead
of a prison, but it will have chains and bolts as the latter has.
So that this idea that whoever commits a crime must legally
answer for it, is not an innovation so different from the present state
of things as to constitute an absolute novelty; it will be, on the other
hand, a systematic application to all criminals of laws already ex-
istent.
The question will simply be, once the accused has been declared
the author of the crlime by the judge, to decide what is the best
method adapted to his personality, according to his personal prece-
dents, his preceding honest or dishonest life, his physical and psy-
chical conditions, according to the material circumstances of the act,
according to the family and social conditions of the criminal, accord-
ing to the mode of committing the crime, in so far as this is a revela-
tion of the greater or less moral insensibility of the criminal, and so
on. It will be a question of adapting one form of punishment or an-
other within the limits laid down by the law. But the criminal must.
always answer before the law, apart from every philosophical doc-
trine or religious belief, not because of the moral sin in the criminal
act committed by him, but because of the perilousness that he has
classes of criminals, can and should be the result of the work of the
judge, who has living individuals before him. But, on the other hand,
this increased power of the judge cannot and should not constitute
a danger to that individual liberty which is the irrevocable conquest
of modern civilization.
When in, France, the name of Magnaud, the "good judge," was
becoming celebrated, I ventured (it often happens in my life that I
think differently from the majority) to say: "But I am against the
good judge, because a good judge connotes the possibility of a bad
judge. You admire Magnaud, my personal friend, who came to the
Criminal Anthropological Congress at Turin in 1906 to bring the
assurance of his scientific solidarity; I admire him as much as you
do. But if we admit that he, to acquit an accused man, can violate the
law and therefore create a new law in favor of those who were really
under unfortunate and pitiful conditions, in so doing we admit the
possibility that another judge may modify the existing law in the
sense of a savage severity towards the accused and so suppress the
guarantees of individual right. The judge should apply the law as
it is and nothing more. It is the law which constitutes the guarantee
of individual right, and it is the genuine application of the erroneous
law which, by bringing its defects into relief, further facilitates and
accelerates its reform.
It is indeed certain that in this reform of penal justice, in which
the personality of the criminal is made the first consideration and is
not left in the shade as up to now, the judge will have increased pow-
ers to adapt the form of punishment to the personality of the criminal.
But, as proposed in its first Congress in Rome in April, 1914,
by the Italian Society of Anthropology and Criminal Law, we shall
put side by side with such wide and necessary powers of the judge,
greater guarantees for individual right. Penal justice should progress
but we cannot allow the progress of penal justice to coincide with the
diminution of individual guarantees and rights which modern civiliza-
tion has irrevocably recognized and established.
Such guarantees may be found above all in the choice of judges, in
their technical capacity, in their conditions of independence and cor-
relative responsibility.
In the second place, we have the rules which will be fixed in the
penal code to decide the conditions according to which the judge
may exercise his powers for the judicial individualization of the re-
pressive sanction.
My proposal, then, and my idea is this: While the criminalists
think that the provisions, for example, against criminals who are
insane or habitual drunkards, are administrative provisions, measures
of security, as they are called, different from the penalty, which,
according to them, is moral retribution for the crime by means of
punishment, my view is that there is no substantial difference between
the penalty and tlie measure of security, and that the latter, instead of
being administrative provisions should be jurisdictional provisions.
If my view prevails, when the criminal is not dangerous, the form
of punishment will not be prison confinement. To put in prison for
five, ten or fifteen days a criminal who has committed slight and not
dangerous offenses, means putting him in a Pasteur stove for the
culture of criminal microbes. And this is why we are against short
prison penalties. There are other forms of punishment which will
be enough and which I cannot now enumerate to you, but which, as
the positive school has always held, will always be accompanied by the
obligation to compensate for the damage caused by the crime. Such
compensation every condemned person will make even in prison with
his own labor, organized not only for an educational and hygienic
purpose, but also for economic profit, with hours and salary equal to
those in the open market.
Of this salary, half is to be destined to compensate the party
injured by the crime, and half for the family of the condemned, and
as a sum put by for himself; while the economic profit of prison work
will go as indemnity to the public treasury. At Buenos Aires I saw
the penitentiary, which is under the the superintendence of the Posit-
ivist Ballue, and which was not costing the state a single penny, nay,
often yielding it a sum to the good as the residue of profit of the
industrial business after having paid all the expenses of the inmates.
But when prison confinement is necessary we hold that the con-
demned and his family have the right, after, say, the half of the
penalty, to ask the judge who pronounced the first sentence, to exon-
erate him from the rest of the penalty if in prison he has shown
himself improved and has learned a trade which puts him in a position
to live honestly in a life of liberty. And for this there should be a
real and proper legal act. The judge should hear from him the man-
agement of the prisons about the conduct of that prisoner, for in the
places of imprisonment, the anthropological chart should be organized,
filled in with methodical observations by the prison doctor, who should
be a criminal anthropologist, as the Minister Cruppi proposed in
France eight or ten years ago, though I have not been told whether his
proposal was accepted.