Opinion 2022-3301

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
_____________________________
No. 1D2022-3301
_____________________________
FREDERICK LEONARD SHAW,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
_____________________________
On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.

William E. Davis, Judge.
February 21, 2024
ROWE, J.
Frederick Leonard Shaw appeals his convictions for home

invasion robbery, burglary with a battery, battery on a person
sixty-five years or older, and petit theft. Shaw raises multiple
issues. We write only to address the trial court’s rulings on Shaw’s
request to discharge counsel and the motion for judgment of
acquittal. We affirm all other issues without further comment.
Pretrial
The circuit court appointed attorney Deborah Hunt to

represent Shaw at trial. Before trial, Shaw wrote a letter to the
court expressing dissatisfaction with counsel’s performance. Shaw
complained that he had been detained for over a year without
progress on a pending criminal case. 1 He also complained that the
victim had given contradicting descriptions of the assailant and
that his case had experienced unnecessary and excessive delays.
Because of the issues raised in Shaw’s letter, the circuit court
ordered a Nelson 2 hearing to determine whether counsel was
performing deficiently.
At the hearing, the court found Shaw’s claims of his counsel’s

ineffectiveness unpersuasive. The court observed that Hunt had
deposed multiple witnesses and filed the depositions with the
court. Hunt informed the court that she was originally appointed
to represent Shaw for violating his probation and a charge of
aggravated battery. She and Shaw had established a defense
strategy for the probation violation when the State added the home
invasion robbery charges. The addition of the new allegations
forced Hunt to adapt her trial strategy and schedule new
depositions. The State informed the court that it had initiated plea
discussions for all of Shaw’s pending cases, but Shaw had
expressed a desire to go to trial.
The trial court told Shaw that his counsel’s actions were
appropriate because the trial court had instructed counsel for the
defense and the State to focus on the case with the highest charges.
And that any discrepancies in victim testimony were questions of
fact that would be answered by the jury and were not grounds to
discharge appointed counsel. The court then denied Shaw’s
request to discharge counsel. The case went to trial.
Trial
A pre-recorded video of the ninety-seven-year-old victim’s

testimony was presented at trial. He testified that, on the day of
the attack, he saw a red pickup truck parked in his driveway as he
was about to leave the house. The victim did not recognize the
truck nor the man standing by it—even though the man called the
1 Shaw had an unrelated pending case for aggravated battery

with a deadly weapon.
2 Nelson v. State, 274 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).
2
victim by name. The man approached the victim and asked to use
the phone. The victim tried to kick the intruder, but the assailant
grabbed the victim’s foot and pulled the victim to the ground. The
intruder then dragged the victim through his home by his foot. The
intruder stopped to take two envelopes containing cash from the
kitchen before dragging the victim to the master bedroom and
leaving him there. The victim called the police as soon as he knew
the intruder had left the home. He then discovered other missing
items: a jar of change, a jewelry box, and his wallet.
During his recorded testimony, the victim described the

intruder as a stocky white male with short, brownish hair. But in
the recording of the 911 call made immediately after the home
invasion, the victim described the intruder as a black male with
dreadlocks, weighing around 250 pounds, driving a red pickup
truck. He also reported that the intruder was dressed in black.
Other witnesses testified at trial establishing a link between

Shaw and the home invasion. Shaw’s neighbor, an off-duty police
officer, testified that he had seen a red truck in Shaw’s driveway
the same day as the home invasion and had heard the victim
yelling “get out” from his home. The neighbor positively identified
Shaw’s truck as the one he saw in the victim’s driveway through a
photo taken by investigators.
The victim’s stepdaughter testified that the family had once

hired a nurse to care for her ailing mother, but that when her
mother passed they had let the caregiver go. The stepdaughter had
seen a red truck picking the nurse up from their home.
The police linked a red truck to Shaw because his debit card
was found under the truck’s seat cushions. Surveillance video from
a nearby hospital showed Shaw’s truck driving away from the area
of the victim’s home around the time of the offense.
Along with the evidence linking Shaw to the truck driven by

the assailant, the police discovered physical evidence from the
crime scene linking Shaw directly to the victim: a laboratory
analyst found Shaw’s DNA on the victim’s sock worn during the
home invasion.
3
Shaw moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the
State’s arguments. Shaw argued that the State failed to prove that
he had committed the crimes and that the State’s case was based
on an impermissible stacking of inferences. The trial court denied
the motion. The jury found Shaw guilty on all counts. This appeal
follows.
Analysis
Shaw argues that the trial court abused its discretion during
the Nelson hearing when it failed to inform him of his right to self-
representation. See Johnson v. State, 301 So. 3d 443, 446 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2020) (holding that a trial court’s actions during a Nelson
hearing are reviewed for an abuse of discretion). He also argues
that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment
of acquittal because the State failed to present a prima facie case
that Shaw was the person who attacked the victim and burglarized
his home. See Cameron v. State, 290 So. 3d 632, 633 (Fla. 1st DCA
2020) (“Where the State has produced competent evidence to
support every element of a crime, the denial of a judgment of
acquittal must be affirmed.”). Both arguments lack merit.
Nelson Hearing
We first address Shaw’s claim that his Nelson hearing was

inadequate. When an indigent defendant asks a trial court to
discharge court-appointed counsel before trial, the court must
inquire into the reason for the request. Johnson, 301 So. 3d at 446.
If the reason given is ineffectiveness of counsel, the court must
make a sufficient inquiry to determine whether there is reasonable
cause to believe that counsel is not providing effective assistance.
Id. at 446–47. Shaw does not challenge the trial court’s
determination that counsel was effective. Rather, he argues that
the court erred by failing to advise him that he had a right to
represent himself. But the trial court was not required to do so.
When a defendant moves to discharge counsel, a trial court is

not automatically required to inform the defendant about his right
of self-representation. Blake v. State, 972 So. 2d 839, 845-46 (Fla.
2007); see also State v. Craft, 685 So. 2d 1292, 1295 (Fla. 1996)
(holding that Nelson does not require trial courts to inform
4
defendants of the right of self-representation after the denial of a
motion to discharge counsel based on ineffective assistance).
Rather, the trial court must inform the defendant of this right only
when the defendant makes an unequivocal request to represent
himself. Blake, 972 So. 2d at 846. Shaw never made such a request.
Thus, the trial court did not err by not informing Shaw of his right
of self-representation.
Judgment of Acquittal
Next, Shaw argues that the trial court erred when it denied
his motion for judgment of acquittal because the State failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Shaw was the person who
committed the charged offenses. This argument fails, too.
A trial court should deny a motion for judgment of acquittal if

the State has presented competent, substantial evidence to
support the verdict. Bush v. State, 295 So. 3d 179, 200 (Fla. 2020).
In evaluating a trial court’s ruling on a motion for judgment of
acquittal, “an appellate court must ‘view[ ] the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State’ and, maintaining this perspective, ask
whether ‘a rational trier of fact could have found the existence of
the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting
Rogers v. State, 285 So. 3d 872, 891 (Fla. 2019)).
The ninety-seven-year-old victim testified that an intruder

dragged him through his home by his foot while looking for
valuables. The victim was wearing socks and shoes, but the
dragging caused one of his shoes to fall off. Shaw was directly
linked to the crime scene and to the victim when the laboratory
analyst testified that Shaw’s DNA was present on the victim’s sock
taken from the crime scene. The victim’s shirt was torn from his
left shoulder to the tail of his shirt. Police documented multiple
injuries to the victim, including abrasions to his left cheek, left
elbow, left arm, left shoulder, and back.
Even without DNA evidence, other evidence and testimony

linked Shaw to the crimes. In the 911 call, the victim’s description
of the intruder matched Shaw. The victim also stated that the
intruder was driving a red truck. A neighbor saw a red truck in the
victim’s driveway at the time of the offense. The victim’s
5
stepdaughter testified that she saw a red truck picking up the
nurse hired to care for her dying mother. And a detective spotted
a red truck on surveillance video taken from a hospital near the
victim’s home. Shaw’s debit card was found under the seat of a red
Nissan pickup truck. The victim’s neighbor positively identified
the truck where Shaw’s debit card was found as the one he saw in
the driveway the day of the invasion.
When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the trial
court properly concluded there was sufficient evidence that Shaw
committed the charged offenses. We, therefore, AFFIRM Shaw’s
convictions and sentences.
B.L. THOMAS and BILBREY, JJ., concur.
_____________________________
Not final until disposition of any timely and

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
_____________________________
Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Justin Foster Karpf,

Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross,

Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

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FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

FREDERICK LEONARD SHAW,

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Alachua County.

February 21, 2024

Frederick Leonard Shaw appeals his convictions for home

The circuit court appointed attorney Deborah Hunt to

At the hearing, the court found Shaw’s claims of his counsel’s

A pre-recorded video of the ninety-seven-year-old victim’s

1 Shaw had an unrelated pending case for aggravated battery

During his recorded testimony, the victim described the

Other witnesses testified at trial establishing a link between

The victim’s stepdaughter testified that the family had once

Along with the evidence linking Shaw to the truck driven by

We first address Shaw’s claim that his Nelson hearing was

When a defendant moves to discharge counsel, a trial court is

A trial court should deny a motion for judgment of acquittal if

The ninety-seven-year-old victim testified that an intruder

Even without DNA evidence, other evidence and testimony

B.L. THOMAS and BILBREY, JJ., concur.

Not final until disposition of any timely and

Jessica J. Yeary, Public Defender, and Justin Foster Karpf,

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Heather Flanagan Ross,

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