G.R. No.

L-45839 June 1, 1988

RUFINO MATIENZO, GODOFREDO ESPIRITU, DIOSCORRO FRANCO, AND LA SUERTE

TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LEOPOLDO M. ABELLERA, ACTING CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF
TRANSPORTATION, HON. GODOFREDO Q. ASUNCION, MEMBER OF THE BOARD OF
TRANSPORTATION, ARTURO DELA CRUZ, MS TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., NEW FAMILIA
TRANSPORTATION CO., ROBERTO MOJARES, ET AL., respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with application for preliminary injunction, seeking the
annulment and inhibition of the grant or award of provisional permits or special authority by
the respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) to respondent taxicab operators, for the operation
and legalization of "excess taxicab units" under certain provisions of Presidential Decree No. 101
"despite the lapse of the power to do so thereunder," and "in violation of other provisions of the
Decree, Letter of Instructions No. 379 and other relevant rules of the BOT."

The petitioners and private respondents are all authorized taxicab operators in Metro Manila.
The respondents, however, admittedly operate "colorum" or "kabit" taxicab units. On or about
the second week of February, 1977, private respondents filed their petitions with the
respondent Board for the legalization of their unauthorized "excess" taxicab units citing
Presidential Decree No. 101, promulgated on January 17, 1973, "to eradicate the harmful and
unlawful trade of clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate
and responsible operators." Within a matter of days, the respondent Board promulgated its
orders setting the applications for hearing and granting applicants provisional authority to
operate their "excess taxicab units" for which legalization was sought. Thus, the present petition.

Opposing the applications and seeking to restrain the grant of provisional permits or
authority, as well as the annulment of permits already granted under PD 101, the petitioners
allege that the BOT acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petitions for legalization
and awarding special permits to the private respondents.

Presidential Decree No. 101 vested in the Board of Transportation the power, among others
"To grant special permits of limited term for the operation of public utility motor vehicles as
may, in the judgment of the Board, be necessary to replace or convert clandestine operators
into legitimate and responsible operators." (Section 1, PD 101)

Citing, however, Section 4 of the Decree which provides:

SEC. 4. Transitory Provision. — Six months after the promulgation of this Decree,
the Board of Transportation, the Bureau of Transportation, The Philippine
Constabulary, the city and municipal forces, and the provincial and city fiscals shall
wage a concerted and relentless drive towards the total elimination and
punishment of all clandestine and unlawful operators of public utility motor
vehicles."
the petitioners argue that neither the Board of Transportation chairman nor any member
thereof had the power, at the time the petitions were filed (i.e. in 1977), to legitimize clandestine
operations under PD 101 as such power had been limited to a period of six (6) months from
and after the promulgation of the Decree on January 17, 1973. They state that, thereafter, the
power lapses and becomes functus officio.

To reinforce their stand, the petitioners refer to certain provisions of the Rules and Regulations
implementing PD 101 issued by respondent Board, Letter of Instructions No. 379, and BOT
Memorandum Circular No. 76-25 (a). In summary, these rules provide inter alia that (1) only
applications for special permits for "colorum" or "kabit" operators filed before July 17, 1973
shall be accepted and processed (Secs. 3 and 16 (c), BOT-LTC-HPG Joint Regulations
Implementing PD 101, pp. 33 and 47, Rollo); (2) Every provisional authority given to any taxi
operator shall be cancelled immediately and no provisional authority shall thereafter be issued (par.
6, Letter of Instructions No. 379, issued March 10, 1976, p. 58, Rollo); (3) Effective immediately, no
provisional authorities on applications for certificates of public convenience shall be granted or
existing provisional authorities on new applications extended to, among others, taxi denominations in
Metro Manila (BOT Memorandum Circular No. 75-25 (a), August 30, 1976, p. 64, Rollo); (4) All taxis
authorized to operate within Metro Manila shall obtain new special permits from the BOT, which
permits shall be the only ones recognized within the area (par. 8, LOI No. 379, supra); and (5) No
bonafide applicant may apply for special permit to operate, among others, new taxicab services,
and, no application for such new service shall be accepted for filing or processed by any LTC
agency or granted under these regulations by any LTC Regional Office until after it shall have
announced its program of development for these types of public motor vehicles (Sec. 16d, BOT-
LTC-HPG Joint Regulations, p. 47, Rollo).

The petitioners raise the following issues:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION HAS THE POWER TO

GRANT PROVISIONAL PERMITS TO OPERATE DESPITE THE BAN THEREON
UNDER LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS NO. 379;

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION HAS THE POWER

TO LEGALIZE, AT THIS TIME, CLANDESTINE AND UNLAWFUL TAXICAB
OPERATIONS UNDER SECTION 1, P.D. 101; AND

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEDURE BEING FOLLOWED BY THE BOARD

IN THE CASES IN QUESTION SATISFIES THE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
REQUIREMENTS. (p. 119, Rollo)

We need not pass upon the first issue raised anent the grant of provisional authority to respondents.
Considering that the effectivity of the provisional permits issued to the respondents was
expressly limited to June 30, 1977, as evidenced by the BOT orders granting the same (Annexes
G, H, I and J among others) and Memorandum Circular No. 77-4 dated January 20, 1977 (p. 151,
Rollo), implementing paragraph 6 of LOI 379 (ordering immediate cancellation of all provisional
authorities issued to taxicab operators, supra), which provides:

5. After June 30, 1977, all provisional authorities are deemed cancelled, even if
hearings on the main application have not been terminated.

the issue is MOOT and ACADEMIC. Only the issue on legalization remains under consideration.
Justifying its action on private respondent's applications, the respondent Board emphasizes public
need as the overriding concern. It is argued that under PD 101, it is the fixed policy of the State "to
eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators by replacing or allowing
them to become legitimate and responsible ones" (Whereas clause, PD 101). In view thereof, it
is maintained that respondent Board may continue to grant to "colorum" operators the benefits of
legalization under PD 101, despite the lapse of its power, after six (6) months, to do so, without
taking punitive measures against the said operators.

Indeed, a reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to the respondent Board to
issue provisional permits as a step towards the legalization of colorum taxicab operations
without the alleged time limitation. There is nothing in Section 4, cited by the petitioners, to
suggest the expiration of such powers six (6) months after promulgation of the Decree.
Rather, it merely provides for the withdrawal of the State's waiver of its right to punish said colorum
operators for their illegal acts. In other words, the cited section declares when the period of
moratorium suspending the relentless drive to eliminate illegal operators shall end. Clearly, there is
no impediment to the Board's exercise of jurisdiction under its broad powers under the
Public Service Act to issue certificates of public convenience to achieve the avowed purpose
of PD 101 (Sec. 16a, Public Service Act, Nov. 7, 1936).

It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or commission has a certain
power, the authority given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which
it was created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a full implementation of the legislative
intent should be upheld as being germane to the law. Necessarily, too, where the end is required,
the appropriate means are deemed given (Martin, Administrative Law, 1979, p. 46). Thus, as
averred by the respondents:

... [A]ll things considered, the question is what is the best for the interest of the
public. Whether PD 101 has lost its effectiveness or not, will in no way prevent this
Board from resolving the question in the same candor and spirit that P.D. 101 and
LOI 379 were issued to cope with the multifarious ills that plague our transport
system. ... (Emphasis supplied) (pp. 91-92, Rollo)

This, the private respondents appreciate, as they make reference to PD 101, merely to cite the
compassion with which colorum operators were dealt with under the law. They state that it is "in the
same vein and spirit that this Honorable Board has extended the Decree of legalization to the
operatives of the various PUJ and PUB services along legislative methods," that respondents pray
for authorization of their colorum units in actual operation in Metro Manila (Petitions for Legalization,
Annexes E & F, par. 7, pp. 65-79, Rollo).

Anent the petitioners' reliance on the BOT Rules and Regulations Implementing PD 101 as well as
its Memorandum Circular No. 76-25(a), the BOT itself has declared:

In line with its duty to rationalize the transport industry, the Board shall. from time to
time, re- study the public need for public utilities in any area in the Philippines for the
purpose of re- evaluating the policies. (p. 64, Rollo)

Thus, the respondents correctly argue that "as the need of the public changes and oscillates with the
trends of modern life, so must the Memo Orders issued by respondent jibe with the dynamic and
flexible standards of public needs. ... Respondent Board is not supposed to 'tie its hands' on its
issued Memo Orders should public interest demand otherwise" (Answer of private respondents, p.
121, Rollo).
The fate of the private respondent's petitions is initially for the Board to determine. From the records
of the case, acceptance of the respondent's applications appears to be a question correctly within
the discretion of the respondent Board to decide. As a rule, where the jurisdiction of the BOT to take
cognizance of an application for legalization is settled, the Court enjoins the exercise thereof only
when there is fraud, abuse of discretion or error of law. Furthermore, the court does not interfere, as
a rule, with administrative action prior to its completion or finality . It is only after judicial review is no
longer premature that we ascertain in proper cases whether the administrative findings are not in
violation of law, whether they are free from fraud or imposition and whether they find substantial
support from the evidence.

Finally, with respect to the last issue raised by the petitioners alleging the denial of due process by
respondent Board in granting the provisional permits to the private respondents and in taking
cognizance of their applications for legalization without notice and hearing, suffice it to say that PD
101 does not require such notice or hearing for the grant of temporary authority . The provisional
nature of the authority and the fact that the primary application shall be given a full hearing are the
safeguards against its abuse. As to the applications for legalization themselves, the Public Service
Act does enjoin the Board to give notice and hearing before exercising any of its powers under Sec.
16 thereof. However, the allegations that due process has been denied are negated by the hearings
set by the Board on the applications as expressed in its orders resolving the petitions for special
permits (Annexes G, H, I, pp. 80-102, Rollo).

The Board stated:

The grounds involved in the petition are of first impression. It cannot resolve the
issue ex-parte. It needs to hear the views of other parties who may have an interest,
or whose interest may be affected by any decision that this Board may take.

The Board therefore, decides to set the petition for hearing.

xxx xxx xxx

As to the required notice, it is impossible for the respondent Board to give personal notice to all
parties who may be interested in the matter, which parties are unknown to it. Its aforementioned
order substantially complies with the requirement. The petitioners having been able to timely oppose
the petitions in question, any lack of notice is deemed cured.

WHEREFORE. the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned orders of
the then Board of Transportation are AFFIRMED.
OMICTIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS

Petitioner VINCENT OMICTIN, Operations Manager Ad Interim (Ad Interim meaning temporary
capacity) of Saag Phils., Inc., filed a complaint for two counts of ESTAFA with the
Prosecutor's Office of the City of Makati against private respondent GEORGE LAGOS. Take
note.. Lagos is the ex-Operations Manager. Omictin alleged in his criminal complaint that
Lagos, despite repeated demands, refused to return the two company vehicles entrusted
to him when he was still the president of Saag Phils., Inc..

Private respondent filed a motion to recuse praying that Presiding Judge REINATO
QUILALA inhibit himself from hearing the case, based on the order of the presiding judge
which 1. summarily denied respondent’s motion to defer issuance of the warrant of arrest and
that 2. immediately before the issuance of the above-mentioned order, the presiding judge and
Atty. Alex Y. Tan, SAAG Philippines, Inc.’s Ad Interim President, were seen together.

This is what seems to be happening:

Actually before the institution of the criminal action, there was a pending proceeding with an
administrative body. LAGOS earlier had filed with the SEC a petition for the declaration of nullity
of the respective appointments of ALEX Y. TAN and petitioner OMICTIN as President Ad
Interim and Operations Manager Ad Interim of Saag Phils., Inc., Lagos averred that SAAG (S)
PTE. LTD. is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of Singapore, and is
fully owned by SAAG CORPORATION (BHD). LAGOS filed a motion to suspend this
administrative body proceedings on the basis of a prejudicial question because of a pending
petition with the SEC involving the same parties.

Here's what really happened:

Previously LAGOS was appointed as Area Sales Manager in the Philippines by THIANG
SHIANG HIANG, manager of the Singaporean based SAAG (S) PTE. LTD. And pursuant to
his appointment, LAGOS was authorized to organize a local joint venture corporation to be
known as SAAG PHILIPPINES, INC. for the wholesale trade and service of industrial products
for oil, gas and power industries in the Philippines.

So clearly a joint venture agreement (JVA) between LAGOS and the Singaporean based SAAG
(S) PTE. LTD through Thiang Shiang Hiang started this whole thing.

SAAG PHILIPPINES, INC. was incorporated with SAAG (S) PTE. LTD. as the majority
stockholder. Private respondent LAGOS was appointed to the board of directors, along with
Rommel I. Lagos, Jose E. Geronimo, Gan Ching Lai and Thiang Shiang Hiang, (Take note: Gan
& Thiang are stockholders to the Malaysian corp and key men in the Singaporean corp Gan is
the director, and Thiang the Executive Director of SAAG (S) PTE. LTD.) and was elected
president of the domestic corporation.

Due to intra-corporate disputes, GAN and THIANG resigned and divested their shares in
SAAG CORPORATION (BHD), thereby resulting in a change in the controlling interest in SAAG
(S) PTE. LTD.

take note:

Barely 3 months after the Gan-Thiang incident, LAGOS resigned his post as president of
SAAG PHILS., INC. while still retaining his position as a director of the company.

And there lies the controversy.

LAGOS was retaining his position as a director of the company because According to him the
joint venture agreement (JVA) between him or SAAG PHILS., INC. and SAAG (S) PTE. LTD.
provided that should the controlling interest in the latter company, or its parent company SAAG
CORP. (BHD), be acquired by any other person or entity without his prior consent, he has the
option either to require the other stockholders to purchase his shares or to terminate the JVA
and dissolve SAAG PHILS., INC. altogether.

Thus, pursuant to this provision, since LAGOS did not give his consent as regards the transfer
of shares made by Gan and Thiang, he made several requests to NICHOLAS NG, who replaced
Gan as director, and JANIFER YEO, Executive Director of SAAG (S) PTE. LTD., to call for a
board meeting in order to discuss implementation of the board resolution declaring dividends
and the acquisition of his (LAGOS) shares by SAAG (S) PTE. LTD.; and the dissolution of
SAAG PHILS., INC.; and the termination of the JVA.

NG and YEO failed to appear in the scheduled board meetings. And instead, they issued a letter
appointing ALEX Y. TAN as President Ad Interim of SAAG PHILS., INC. Tan, in turn, appointed
petitioner OMICTIN as the company’s Operations Manager Ad Interim.

Citing as a reason the absence of a board resolution authorizing the continued

operations of SAAG PHILS., INC., LAGOS retained his possession of the office
equipment of the company in a fiduciary capacity as director of the corporation pending
its dissolution and/or the resolution of the intra-corporate dispute. He likewise changed the locks
of the offices of the company allegedly to prevent Tan and petitioner from seizing company
property.

LAGOS stressed that TAN’s appointment was invalid because it was in derogation of the
company by-laws requiring that the president must be chosen from among the directors,
and elected by the affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the board of directors. As
Tan’s appointment did not have the acquiescence of the board of directors, PETITIONER’S
APPOINTMENT BY THE FORMER IS LIKEWISE ALLEGEDLY INVALID. Thus, neither has
the power or the authority to represent or act for SAAG PHILS., Inc. in any transaction or action
before the SEC or any court of justice.

Here's the 2 main point argument of petitioner OMICTIN in this case:

1. The action before the SEC and the criminal case before the trial court do not involve any
prejudicial question.13 SEC Case No. 01-99-6185 mainly involves the dissolution of Saag (S)
Pte. Ltd., the appointment of a receiver, the distribution of profits, and the authority of petitioner
and Tan to represent Saag Phils., Inc. The entity which is being sued is Saag (S) Pte. Ltd., a
foreign corporation over which the SEC has yet to acquire jurisdiction. Hence, any decision that
may be rendered in the SEC case will neither be determinative of the innocence or guilt of the
accused nor bind Saag Phils., Inc. because the same was not made a party to the action even if
the former is its holding corporation;

2. Saag Phils., Inc. has a separate corporate existence and is to be treated as a separate entity
from its holding or parent company, Saag (S) Pte. Ltd. The mere fact that one or more
corporations are owned or controlled by the same or single stockholder is not a sufficient ground
for disregarding separate corporate personalities;

RTC denied LAGOS’ motion to suspend proceedings and motion to recuse.

LAGOS therefore filed with the CA a petition for certiorari assailing the aforesaid orders. CA
modified the RTC ruling and GRANTED LAGOS’ motion to suspend proceedings because A
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION EXISTS IN THE SEC CASE. BUT the denial of the motion to
recuse was AFFIRMED.

Petitioner OMICTIN question the CA decision alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction and elevates the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

1. WAS THERE REALLY A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION EXISTING IN THE SEC CASE FILED
BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT AGAINST SAAG (S) PTE. LTD., A FOREIGN CORPORATION,

2. ALTHOUGH THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IN THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR ESTAFA

(WHERE PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS THE ACCUSED THEREIN) IS ACTUALLY SAAG
PHILIPPINES, INC. A DOMESTIC CORPORATION WITH A SEPARATE JURIDICAL
PERSONALITY OF ITS OWN AND WHICH IS NOT EVEN A PARTY IN THE SEC CASE

HELD

A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal. Here, the case which was lodged originally before the SEC and which is now
pending before the RTC of Mandaluyong City by virtue of Republic Act No. 8799 involves facts
that are intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution is based.

Ultimately, the resolution of the issues raised in the intra-corporate dispute will determine
the guilt or innocence of private respondent in the crime of estafa filed against him by
petitioner before the RTC of Makati. As correctly stated by the CA, one of the elements of the
crime of estafa with abuse of confidence under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code
is a demand made by the offended party to the offender:

The elements of Estafa with abuse of confidence under subdivision No. 1, par. (b) of Art. 315
are as follows:
1. That money, goods, or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return the same;

2. That there be misrepresentation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or

denial on his part of such receipt;

3. That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and

4. That there is a demand made by the offended party to the offender.

Logically, under the circumstances, since the alleged offended party is Saag Phils., Inc., the
validity of the demand for the delivery of the subject vehicles rests upon the authority of the
person making such a demand on the company’s behalf. Private respondent is challenging
petitioner’s authority to act for Saag Phils., Inc. in the corporate case pending before the RTC of
Mandaluyong.

Taken in this light, if the supposed authority of petitioner is found to be defective, it is as if no

demand was ever made, hence, the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.

Moreover, the mere failure to return the thing received for safekeeping or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver or to return the same
or deliver the value thereof to the owner could only give rise to a civil action and does not
constitute the crime of estafa. This is because the crime is committed by misappropriating or
converting money or goods received by the offender under a lawful transaction.

As stated in the case of United States v. Bleibel:

The crime of estafa is not committed by the failure to return the things received for sale on
commission, or to deliver their value, but, as this class of crime is defined by law, by
misappropriating or converting the money or goods received on commission. Delay in the
fulfillment of a commission or in the delivery of the sum on such account received only involves
civil liability. So long as the money that a person is under obligation to deliver is not demanded
of him, and he fails to deliver it for having wrongfully disposed of it, there is no estafa, whatever
be the cause of the debt.

So in view of the foregoing, the Court finds no substantial basis in petitioner’s contention that
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

So the petition was DISMISSED. The CA decision and resolution was AFFIRMED.

Lagos wins this case.

VICENTE VILLAFLOR, substituted by his heirs, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and NASIPIT LUMBER CO., INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 95694 October 9, 1997

Facts:

The Petitioner bought a large tract of land containing one hundred forty (140) hectares to
four (4) different owners in 1940. The land was part of the public domain, but the petitioners
predecessor in interest over which he acquired the property, have been in open, exclusive and
notorious possession of the same for sometime. After acquisition, petitioner asserts exclusive
rights thereof for more than fifty (50) years.

In 1946, petitioner entered into a lease agreement with respondent Nasipit

Lumber Co.Inc. However, an “Agreement for the Relinquishment of Rights” was entered
into by both parties in 1950. The respondent having complied all the requirements agreed
upon, assumed ownership and possession of the property since then. Respondent
corporation likewise filed a sales application in 1950 over the property to bolster his
claim which the Bureau of Land otherwise granted on the same year as proof of an “Order of
Award” issued.

In 1974 or twenty four (24) years had passed, when petitioner, questioned and made several
collateral and extraneous claims against the respondent. However, the Bureau of Lands
dismissed the claim, arguing that petitioner no longer has any substantial rights to question
the validity of acquisition of the respondent and the subsequent issuance of free patent by the
Bureau of Lands. Unperturbed, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration at the Ministry of
Natural Resources which likewise dismissed the petition.

On July 6, 1978, petitioner filed a complaint in the trial court for “Declaration of Nullity of
Contract ( Deed of Relinquishment of Rights), Recovery of Possession (of two parcels of land
subject of the contract), and Damages” at about the same time that he appealed the decision of
the Minister of Natural Resources to the Office of the President. On January 28, 1983, petitioner
died. Petitioner’s heir substituted in his behalf to pursue the claim. The trial court in
Butuan City who initially take cognizance of the case ordered the case dismissed, on the
grounds that: (1) petitioner admitted the due execution and genuineness of the contract and
was estopped from proving its nullity, (2) the verbal lease agreements were unenforceable
under Article 1403 (2) (e) of the Civil Code, and (3) his causes of action were barred by
extinctive prescription and/or laches.

The heirs appealed to the CA which likewise rendered judgment of dismissal by upholding
the lower court’s ruling.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the sale is valid.

HELD:
No. The provision of the law is specific that public lands can only be acquired in the manner
provided for therein and not otherwise (Sec. 11, CA. No. 141, as amended). In his sales
application, petitioner expressly admitted that said property was public land. This is
formidable evidence as it amounts to an admission against interest. The records show that
Villaflor had applied for the purchase of lands in question with this Office (Sales Application V-
807) on 2 December 1948. There is a condition in the sales application to the effect that he
recognizes that the land covered by the same is of public domain and any and all rights he may
have with respect thereto by virtue of continuous occupation and cultivation are relinquished to
the Government of which Villaflor is very much aware. It also appears that Villaflor had paid for
the publication fees appurtenant to the sale of the land. He participated in the public auction
where he was declared the successful bidder. He had fully paid the purchase price thereof. It
would be a height of absurdity for Villaflor to be buying that which is owned by him if his claim of
private ownership thereof is to be believed. The area in dispute is not the private property of the
petitioner.

It is a basic assumption of public policy that lands of whatever classification belong to the state.
Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its rights over the same as dominus. No
public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied
from the government. It is indispensable then that there be showing of title from the state or
any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. Such sales applicant manifestly acknowledged
that he does not own the land and that the same is a public land under the administration of the
Bureau of Lands, to which the application was submitted, all of its acts prior thereof, including its
real estate tax declarations, characterized its possessions of the land as that of a “sales
applicant”. And consequently, as one who expects to buy it, but has not as yet done so, and is
not, therefore, its owner.

The rule on the interpretation of contracts (Article 1371) is used in affirming, not negating, their
validity. Article 1373,which is a conjunct of Article 1371, provides that, if the instrument is
susceptible of two or more interpretations, the interpretation which will make it valid and
effectual should be adopted. In this light, it is not difficult to understand that the legal basis
urged by petitioner does not support his allegation that the contracts to sell and the deed of
relinquishment are simulated and fictitious. Simulation occurs when an apparent contract is a
declaration of a fictitious will, deliberately made by agreement of the parties, in order to produce,
for the purpose of deception, the appearance of a juridical act which does not exist or is different
from that which was really executed. Such an intention is not apparent in the agreements. The
intent to sell, on the other hand, is as clear as daylight. The fact, that the agreement to sell
(7 December 1948) did not absolutely transfer ownership of the land to private respondent, does
not how that the agreement was simulated. Petitioner‟s delivery of the Certificate of Ownership
and execution of the deed of absolute sale were suspensive conditions, which gave rise to a
corresponding obligation on the part of the private respondent, i.e., the payment of the last
installment of the consideration mentioned in the Agreement. Such conditions did not affect the
perfection of the contract or prove simulation Nonpayment, at most, gives the vendor only the
right to sue for collection. Generally, in a contract of sale, payment of the price is a resolutory
condition and the remedy of the seller is to exact fulfillment or, in case of a substantial breach,
to rescind the contract under Article 1191 of the Civil Code. However, failure to pay is not even
a breach, but merely an event which prevents the vendor‟s obligation to convey title from
acquiring binding force.

The requirements for a sales application under the Public Land Act are: (1) the possession
of the qualifications required by said Act (under Section 29) and (2) the lack of the
disqualifications mentioned therein (under Sections 121, 122,and 123). Section 121 of the Act
pertains to acquisitions of public land by a corporation from a grantee: The private respondent,
not the petitioner, was the direct grantee of the disputed land. Sections 122 and 123 disqualify
corporations, which are not authorized by their charter, from acquiring public land; the records
do not show that private respondent was not so authorized under its charter.

JUNE PRILL BRETT v. IAC +

REGALADO, J.:
These two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seek to annul the
following decisions of respondent court, to wit: (1) In G.R. No. 74223, the decision[1] dated
January 15, 1986 in AC-G.R. SP No. 05589 dismissing therein petitioner's original action
for certiorari for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and (2) In G.R. No.
77098, the decision[2] dated October 24, 1986 in CA-G.R. SP No. 09349 dismissing therein
petitioners' petition for certiorari on the ground that there is a pending appeal by petitioners in
the Office of the President and another similar petition pending with this Court.
I. The antecedental facts which spawned the filing of the cases below are hereunder set forth as
synthesized by respondent court in the assailed decisions.[3]
1. G.R. No. 74223
On September 2, 1980, the Director of Mines and Geo-Sciences rendered a decision declaring
and recognizing the preferential right of therein petitioner June Prill Brett to explore, develop,
exploit and lease the area covered by her "MAMAKAR" mining claims situated
at Sitio Palasaan, Barrio Suyoc, Municipality of Mankayan, Benguet. This
decision was appealed by private respondents to the then Ministry of Natural Resources.
On October 6, 1982, respondent Minister of Natural Resources dismissed the appeal. From this
dismissal, private respondents heirs of John and Maria Guilles interposed an appeal
on November 4, 1982 to the Office of the President, docketed therein as MNR Case
No. 5096, but failed to prosecute the same. Private respondents later filed their respective
motions for reconsideration which, however, proved to be belated as the decision of respondent
Minister had already become final and executory.
The finality of the decision notwithstanding, respondent Minister of Natural Resources rendered
another decision in the same MNR Case No. 5096 on June 25, 1984, reversing and setting
aside the decision of October 6, 1982 and declaring petitioner's "MAMAKAR" claims as null and
void ab initio.
On July 25, 1984, petitioner sought the reconsideration of the decision and prayed for
a status quo order. The Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs of the Office of the Minister of
Natural Resources issued the status quo order on August 20, 1984 and directed the
respondents to answer the motion within five (5) days from receipt of the order. However, none
of the respondents complied therewith.
On February 19, 1985, with the motion for reconsideration still unresolved, petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for preliminary injunction, before this Court,
docketed as G.R. No. 69937, for the nullification of the decision of respondent Minister of
Natural Resources dated June 25, 1984 and to restrain public respondent from further
proceeding in said case. Petitioner contended that respondent Minister acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in rendering said decision.
On February 27, 1985, this Court resolved to refer the case to the Court of Appeals (then
Intermediate Appellate Court) for determination. On March 7, 1985, respondent court initially
dismissed the petition for being premature inasmuch as petitioner had an unresolved motion for
reconsideration pending in the Office of the Minister of Natural Resources.
On March 27, 1985, petitioner prayed for the reconsideration of the dismissal and informed
respondent court that her motion for reconsideration had been denied by the Minister of Natural
Resources on January 31, 1985, notice of which she received only on February 25,
1985. Petitioner also filed with this Court on March 1, 1985 an addendum to the petition giving
the same information, not knowing that said petition had been referred to respondent court.
On April 10, 1985, respondent court reconsidered its decision dismissing the
petition. Nevertheless, it thereafter ruled against petitioner, holding that petitioner failed to
exhaust administrative remedies and for which the petition must be dismissed. It cited Section
50, Presidential Decree No. 463, as authority for its ruling, as follows:
"Sec. 50. Appeals - Any party not satisfied with the decision or order of the Director may within
five (5) days from receipt thereof, appeal to the Secretary. Decisions of the Secretary are
likewise appealable within five (5) days from receipt thereof by the affected party to the
President of the Philippines whose decision shall be final and executory."
xxx
Corollarily, respondent court declared that it had no authority to grant petitioner's prayer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the implementation of the questioned
decision as it is precluded from doing so by Presidential Decree No. 605, thus:
"SECTION 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or growing out of
the issuance, approval or disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by
the proper administrative official or body on concessions, licenses, permits, patents or public
grants of any kind in connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization, exploration and/or
development of the natural resources of the Philippines."
Hence, the instant petition.
2. G.R. No. 77098
On March 24, 1986, after the Brett spouses filed the above-mentioned petition in this Court,
James Brett wrote a letter to the newly appointed Minister of Natural Resources
Ernesto Maceda praying that the former minister's decision of June 25, 1984 be rectified. In an
order dated June 10, 1986, respondent Minister Maceda did set aside
Minister Teodoro Peña's aforesaid decision and reinstated the ministry's original decision
of October 6, 1982 and that of the Director of Mines in favor of Brett.
Upon being notified of Minister Maceda's decision against them, on June 19, 1986 petitioners
filed with this Court in the pending case G.R. No. 74223 a petition to declare the order of June
10, 1986 issued by respondent Minister Maceda ineffectual, null, void and illegal for having
been issued without jurisdiction.
Four days later, or on June 23, 1986, they also filed before respondent court a petition
for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 09349, praying that respondents therein be enjoined
from enforcing the order and that the same be declared null and void.
Petitioners likewise sent an appeal to the Office of the President, docketed as O.P. Case No.
3360, praying for the reversal of the order of June 10, 1986. Acting thereon, said office, through
Assistant Executive Secretary Magdangal Elma, ordered the Ministry to elevate the records of
MNR Case No. 5096, the appellant to pay the appeal fee of P50.00, and the parties to file their
respectivememoranda.
Subsequently ruling on the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 09349 in a decision dated October 24,
1986, respondent court found merit in said petition but nonetheless dismissed the same, taking
note of the fact that there is an appeal by petitioners of respondent minister's decision pending
in the Office of the President. Furthermore, it cited Section 17 of the Interim Rules of Court
which provides that "no petition for certiorari may be filed in the Intermediate Appellate Court if
another similar petition has been filed or is still pending in the Supreme Court," a violation of the
rule being a ground for the dismissal of both petitions.
On these facts rests this second petition.
II. Shorn of unnecessary details, the issues formulated and raised by the parties in the aforesaid
two petitions, and their respective contentions thereon, are succinctly discussed
hereunder seriatim.
1. G.R. No. 74223
In her so-called assignment of errors, June Prill Brett faults respondent court for not holding that
respondent minister acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion
and asks us to resolve -
(a) Whether or not respondent court erred in dismissing petitioner's original action for certiorari
on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies; and
(b) Whether or not respondent court erred in invoking Presidential Decree No. 605 to deny
petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.[4]
In amplification of her plaint, June Prill Brett contends that the case at bar is an instance where
resort to administrative remedies was no longer necessary and advisable since it is one where
the recognized exceptions to the doctrine come into play. She manifestly refers to, among the
other exceptions, Minister Peña's alleged patent lack of jurisdiction in reversing his previous
decision which she claims had already become final and executory. Concerning respondent
court's invocation of Presidential Decree No. 605, she submits that the same does not authorize
the courts to shed or abdicate their inherent judicial authority.
On the other hand, all of the private respondents make the riposte that Section 50, Presidential
Decree No. 463 provides for and thereby constitutes a plain, speedy and adequate remedy to
contest and seek a review and reversal of the decision of Minister Peña. June Prill Brett having
failed to avail of the same, she cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the courts. As an offshoot,
private respondents point out that her failure to perfect a timely appeal to the Office of the
President rendered the June 25, 1984 decision of Minister Peña final
and executory. Minister Maceda, therefore, overstepped his authority in rendering the June 10,
1986 decision which should be declared null and void ab initio.
2. G.R. No. 77098
On their part, the heirs of John Guilles, Sr. desire a resolution on whether or not respondent
court erred in dismissing their original action for certiorari on the ground of the pendency of their
appeal in the Office of the President and a similar petition with this Court. [5]
Said heirs explain that what they did was only to write a personal letter to the President
complaining about the alleged unwarranted action by respondent Minister Maceda. The letter,
so it is alleged, was unsubscribed and unsworn and, therefore, should not be considered as "a
remedy in the course of law." With regard to the petition filed with this Court, these heirs of
John Guilles, Sr. claim that the same was intended only to be a manifestation but was
erroneously captioned as a "petition." In any event, they insist that their case falls under the
exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the order of June 10, 1986
having been issued without jurisdiction and without giving them an opportunity to be heard.
June Prill Brett, on the other hand, adheres to the findings of respondent court. She moreover
adopts the explanation made by Minister Maceda in his comment filed in G.R. No. 74223 to the
effect that the order of June 10, 1986 was issued in the exercise of his office's inherent power to
correct its orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice and under respondent
minister's authority as alter ego of the President pursuant to Section 2, Article IV of
Proclamation No. 3, otherwise known as the "Freedom Constitution of the Philippines," to review
all contracts, concessions, permits or other forms of privileges for the exploration, development,
exploitation or utilization of natural resources entered into, granted, issued or acquired before
the date of said proclamation, and when the national interest requires, to amend, modify or
revoke them.
III. We find merit in and consequently sustain the petition in G.R. No. 74223.
It is true that in our jurisdiction, unless otherwise provided by law or required by public interest,
before bringing an action in or resorting to the courts of justice, all remedies of administrative
character affecting or determinative of the controversy at that level should first be exhausted by
the aggrieved party.[6]
It is likewise true, however, that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a
hard and fast rule.[7] Foremost among the exceptions is when the assailed act, order or decision
is patently illegal or was performed or issued without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.[8]
In the case at bar, it is our considered opinion that the decision in question, dated June 25,
1984, is of such a defective nature. The decision, it superseded, dated October 6, 1982, was
already final and executory, the belated motions for reconsideration by all the private
respondents in G.R. No. 74223 being patently time-barred. Of course, the aforesaid heirs of
John and Maria Guilles did file a timely appeal but they likewise failed to prosecute the same. It
is obvious and indisputable, therefore, that respondent Minister Peña gravely abused his
discretion in reversing his original decision which precisely prompted June Prill Brett to forthwith
invoke the jurisdiction of the courts.
The circumstance that the June 25, 1984decision was rendered without jurisdiction is itself
confirmed by respondent court in CA-G.R. SP No. 09349 which is the subject of our review in
G.R. No. 77098, to wit:
"The decision dated October 6, 1982 of the Minister of Natural Resources in MNR Case No.
5096 which the Heirs of Guilles received on October 25, 1982, became final on October 30,
1982 since it was not appealed to the Office of the President pursuant to Section 50 of P.D. No.
463, which provides:
'Sec. 50. Any party not satisfied with the decision or order of the Director may, within five (5)
days from receipt thereof, appeal to the Secretary. Decisions of the Secretary are
likewise appealable within five (5) days from receipt thereof by the affected party to the
President of the Philippines whose decision shall be final and executory. (P.D. 463)'
"Instead of pursuing their appeal in the Office of the President, the petitioners filed a belated
motion for reconsideration in the Ministry after Minister Peña had lost jurisdiction to review,
revise, or reverse his decision because it had already become final. Consequently, his
amended decision of June 25, 1984 was void for lack of jurisdiction."[9]
Indeed, as therein petitioner June Prill Brett pointed out, the necessity of giving finality to
judgments that are not void is self-evident. The interests of society impose it. The opposing
view might make litigation more unendurable than the wrongs it is intended to redress. It would
create doubt, real or imaginary, and controversy would constantly arise as to what the judgment
or order was. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors,
judgments of courts should become final and executory at some definite time fixed by law;
[10]
and this rule holds true over decisions rendered by administrative bodies exercising quasi-
judicial powers.[11]
It is noteworthy that none of the private respondents in G.R. No. 74223 ever mentioned anything
in their pleadings filed with this Court nor squarely met June Prill Brett's allegation that
Minister Peña's decision of October 6, 1982 had become final and executory. They were
obviously avoiding the issue, mindful that the same would be detrimental to their case. That
allegation of the decision being final and executory was, however, established as a fact by
respondent court. We certainly cannot gloss over such finding which has
remained uncontroverted and undisputed by said private respondents.
Going back to the subject of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, June Prill Brett's failure
to appeal to the Office of the President from the decision of Minister Peña cannot also be
considered a violation of the rule as the latter is the alter ego of the President and, under the
doctrine of qualified political agency, his action is deemed to be that of the President.[12]
Parenthetically, while the original action for certiorari cannot be made a substitute for appeal,
[13]
Minister Peña's lack of jurisdiction to render the questioned decision,[14] as well as the nullity
of the decision itself,[15] constitute the exceptions which would justify June Prill Brett's resort to
the special civil action for certiorari in lieu of the appeal provided for by Section 50
of Presidential Decree No. 463. We may also add to these considerations the urgency for
judicial intervention[16] called for by the fact that, as specifically provided in said provision itself,
the decision of respondent Minister of Natural Resources becomes executory despite an appeal
to the Office of the President.
We shall not, for the nonce, pass judgment on respondent court's refusal to restrain the
execution of respondent Minister Peña's decision under the authority of Presidential Decree No.
605 since the resolution of the issue raised by June Prill Brett on the matter, i.e., that it does not
authorize the court to divest itself of its inherent judicial authority, would entail an inquiry into the
constitutional validity of the decree which we are not disposed to do in the present case since
the controversy can be resolved on grounds other than constitutional.[17] For that matter, under
our disposition of these cases there is no necessity for resolving this issue.
All told, we hold that respondent court erred in dismissing June Prill Brett's action
for certiorari for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
IV. We are, on the other hand, constrained to reject and deny the petition in G.R. No. 77098 for
being devoid of merit.
Even conceding that the pleading filed by the heirs of John Guilles, Sr. with this Court was only
a manifestation and not a petition to annul the order of Minister Maceda, it is of record that said
heirs have a perfected and pending appeal with the Office of the President. Whether the appeal
was perfected by filing a formal notice of appeal or a mere unsworn and unsubscribed personal
letter is of no moment. The fact is that the Office of the President has taken cognizance of the
case as one for its appellate review and has in fact ordered the parties to file their respective
memoranda therein.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot and will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical
and intricate matters of fact and where a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the
purposes of the regulatory statute administered.[18]
Applying the principle in the case at bar, respondent court correctly dismissed the petition
for certiorari of the heirs of John Guilles, Sr. on the ground that there is a pending appeal filed
by said heirs in the Office of the President. Indeed, the award of mining claims is more of an
executive, and less of a judicial, function. Also, the issue as to the validity of the authority under
which then respondent Minister Ernesto Maceda issued the order of June 10, 1986, which
reversed the void decision of June 25, 1984, can be competently determined by the executive
department at the initial stage of the quasi-judicial proceeding therein.
While it may plausibly be contended that the case for the heirs of John Guilles, Sr. could also
fall under the exceptions to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, just like that
of June Prill Brett in G.R. No. 74223 and thereby justify their immediate coming to court, there is
a marked difference in their respective positions. Petitioner June Prill Brett, in G.R. No. 74223,
never appealed to the Office of the President, unlike the heirs of John Guilles, Sr. in G.R. No.
77098. This spelled the difference.
In any event, the order of respondent Minister Maceda is only confirmatory of the decision
of October 6, 1982. It in fact reinstated the said decision and noted that it had become final
and executory for which reason the June 25, 1984 decision was void and of no force and effect.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the assailed decision of respondent
Court of Appeals in G.R. No. 77098 and ANNULLING its decision in G.R. No. 74223. The
decision of respondent Minister Teodoro Peña, dated October 6, 1982, is also
hereby REINSTATED without prejudice to the appeal in the Office of the President taking its
due course and the consequent adjudication thereof.
SO ORDERED.
 Machete et, al., vs CA GR No. 109093 November 20, 1995

Facts:

Private respondent filed a complaint for collection of back rentals and damages
before the RTC of Tagbilaran City against herein petitioners. The alleged facts are:

1) That parties entered into a leasehold agreement regarding private respondent’s

landholdings and herein petitioners shall pay a certain amount or percentage of their harvest.

2) That herein petitioners failed to pay their respective rental despite repeated demands of
private respondent.

3) That petitioner moved to the dismissal of the case on the ground, of lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, arguing that the instance case is an agrarian dispute and therefore
within the jurisdiction of Department of Agrarian and Reform Adjudication Board.

Issue:

1 Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over cases for collection of back rentals from leasehold
tenants.

Ruling:

1 The court held that collection of back rentals from leasehold tenants is within the
jurisdiction of DARAB and the SC defined “agrarian dispute” as any controversy relating to
tenural arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship, or otherwise, over lands
devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farm workers’ associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of such tenurial agreements. However, Sec. 56 of RA 6657 confers
special jurisdiction on Special Agrarian Courts which are RTC designated by the SC,
regarding petitions for the determination of just compensation and prosecution of criminal
offense under Act. 16.
The SC furthered averred that failure to pay back rentals pursuant to leasehold contract is
an issue which is clearly beyond the legal competence of the trial court to resolve. The
doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the
authority to resolve controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS v. JOSELITO DELA ROSA, GR Nos. 95122, 1991-05-31

Facts:

On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by
the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of his natural
mother, Marciana Gatchalian

Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has five (5) children with his wife Chu Gim Tee, namely: Jose
Gatchalian, Gloria Gatchalian, Francisco Gatchalian, Elena Gatchalian and Benjamin Gatchalian

After investigation, the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision dated July 6, 1961,
admitting William Gatchalian and his companions as Filipino citizens... then Secretary of
Justice issued Memorandum No. 9 setting aside all decisions purporting to have been
rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal or on review motu proprio of decisions of the
Board of Special Inquiry.

the new Board of Commissioners, after a review motu proprio of the proceedings had in the Board
of Special Inquiry, reversed the decision of the latter and ordered the exclusion of, among
others, respondent Gatchalian... the acting director of the National Bureau of Investigation wrote
the Secretary of Justice recommending that respondent Gatchalian along with the other applicants
covered by the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 be charged with violation of Sec. 37 (a),...
pars. 1 and 2, in relation to Secs. 45 (c), (d) and (e) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended,
also known as the Immigration Act of 1940... petitioner Commissioner Domingo of the Commission
of Immigration and Deportation[*] issued a mission order commanding the arrest of
respondent William Gatchalian

William Gatchalian filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br. 29, presided by respondent Judge dela Rosa,... petitioners
filed a... motion to dismiss Civil... that respondent judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of
Commissioners and/or the Board of Special Inquiry

Issues:

assuming that the evidence on record is not sufficient to declare him a Filipino citizen, petitioners
have no jurisdiction to proceed with the deportation case until the courts shall have finally... resolved
the question of his citizenship... the arrest of respondent follows as a matter of consequence based
on the warrant of exclusion issued on July 6, 1962

Ruling:

Sec. 37 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, otherwise known as the Immigration Act of
1940, reads:

"Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the
warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the

Board of Commissioner of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien.

the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by
the Board of Commissioners of the... existence of the ground for deportation as charged
against the alien... to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation.

, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional

A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest... issued by the Commissioner of Immigration,

clearly indicates that the same was issued only for purposes of investigation of the suspects

Hence, petitioners' argument that the arrest of respondent was based, ostensibly, on the July 6,
1962 warrant of exclusion has obviously no leg to stand on. The mission order/warrant of arrest
made no mention that the same was issued pursuant to a final order of... deportation or warrant of
exclusion.

Principles:

As We held in Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board (supra), "(t)he constitution does not distinguish
warrants between a criminal case and administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having
committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable... cause against him, by a judge,
why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee

It is not indispensable that the alleged alien be arrested for purposes of investigation. If the purpose
of the issuance of the... warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of probable cause, surely, it
cannot pass the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue the same

Custom is defined as 'a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced)
as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory.' The law requires that 'a custom must be proved as a
fact, according to the rules of evidence' (Article 12, Civil Code).

On this score the Court had occasion to state that 'a local custom as a source of right can not be
considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence
like any other fact'

The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.
G.R. No. 87437 May 29, 1991

JOAQUIN M. TEOTICO, petitioner, vs. DEMOCRITO O. AGDA, SR., and HON. JUDGE IGNACIO
M. CAPULONG, Regional Trial Court, Branch No. 134, Makati, Metro Manila, respondents.
Ramon M. Miranda for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p Doctrine: The Civil Service Decree, P.D. No. 807, allows transfer, detail and
reassignment. 47 If the employee concerned believes that there is no justification therefore, he "may
appeal his case to" the Civil Service Commission. Unless otherwise ordered by the Commission, the
decision to detail an employee shall be executory. Agda invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the
Commission when he filed his Urgent Petition To Stay Implementation and Nullify the Special Order
in question with the Civil Service Commission. 48 It does not, however, appear to Us that he exerted
genuine and sincere efforts to obtain an expeditious resolution thereof What appears to be clear is
that he used its pendency as an excuse for his refusal to comply with the memorandum of Teotico of
7 January 1988 and the routing slip request of 11 March 1988 for the key to the safety vault.

Facts:

On 2 January 1984, Honorable Cesar Lanuza, then Administrator of the Fiber Development
Authority (FIDA for short), an agency attached to the Department of Agriculture, appointed Agda as
CHIEF FIBER DEVELOPMENT OFFICER

This appointment does not indicate any specific station or place of assignment. Under Special Order
No. 29, series of 1984, dated 2 January 1984, which was to take effect immediately and to "remain
in force until revoked," Administrator Lanuza designated Agda as "Acting Regional Administrator for
FIDA Regions I and II." 4 In Special Order No. 219 dated 13 November 1987, series of 1987,
Administrator Lanuza "temporarily re-assigned" Agda, "in the interest of the service," at the main
office of the Administrator to perform special functions which may be assigned to him,

and one Mr. Epitacio Lanuza, Jr., Assistant Fiber Regional Administrator, was designated Officer in
Charge of FIDA Region I. 5 On 9 December 1987 Agda prepared for filing with the Civil Service
Commission, the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, and the Commission on Audit an
Urgent Petition To Stop Implementation and Nullify Special Order No. 219, s. '87, alleging therein
that the Special Order is (a) devoid of legal basis as it does not preserve and maintain a status quo
before the controversy, (b) against the interest of public service considering that Epitacio Lanuza has
been cited for two cases both involving dishonesty, abuse of privileges and character unbecoming a
government official, (c) improper, inappropriate and devoid of moral justification, and (d) a violation
of Civil Service rules and regulation considering that it violates the rule on nepotism since Epitacio
Lanuza and Administrator Lanuza are cousins. On 4 April 1988 Teotico placed Agda under
preventive suspension pursuant to his Special Order No. 74. It likewise appears that on 13 April
1988 Agda sent a letter to the Commission on Elections 23 inquiring if Special Order No. 219, series
of 1987, of Administrator Lanuza was referred and submitted to it for approval three days before its
implementation. In a letter dated 14 April 1988, Atty. Horacio SJ Apostol, Manager of the Law
Department of the Commission, informed private respondent that "as of this date, records of the
Department do not show that aforesaid Special Order was submitted or referred to this Commission
for approval." 24 On 18 April 1988 Agda filed with the court below in Civil Case No. 88-577 his
Amended Petition 25 for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction with preliminary injunction and
restraining order against Teotico and the three (3) members of the FIDA-AC alleging, in substance,
that Special Order No. 219 of 13 November 1987 issued by then Fida Administrator Lanuza is null
and void for having been issued in violation of Section 48 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Decree)
which prohibits the detail or re-assignment of civil service personnel within three months before an
election and Section 261(h) of Batas Pambansa Blg 881 (The Omnibus Election Code)

Issue:

Respondent Judge clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of Civil Case
No. 88-577, in deliberately failing to act on the motion to dismiss, in issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction, and in ordering the "reinstatement" of Agda, "as Fiber Regional Administrator, FIDA
Region I, with full back wages and allowances mandated by law."

Doctrine and Held:

Agda was not appointed as Fiber Regional Administrator, FIDA Region I, but as CHIEF FIBER
DEVELOPMENT OFFICER; he was not appointed to any specific station. 42 He was merely
designated as Acting Regional Administrator For FIDA Regions I and II. 43

Not having been appointed to any specific station, he could be tranferred or assigned to any other
place by the head of office where in the opinion of the latter his services may be utilized more
effectively. In the latest case of Department of Education, Culture and Sports, et al. vs. The
Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., 183 SCRA 555, 562, We held: The appointment of Navarro as
principal does not refer to any particular station or school. As such, she could be assigned to any
station and she is not entitled to stay permanently at any specific school. (Bongbong vs. Parado, 57
SCRA 623). When she was assigned to the Carlos Albert High School, it would not have been with
the intention to let her stay in said school permanently. Otherwise, her appointment would have so
stated. Consequently, she may be assigned to any station or school in Quezon City as the
exigencies of public service require even without her consent. Moreover, it should be borne in mind
that Special Order No. 29 of 2 January 1984 merely designated Agda as Acting Regional
Administrator for Regions I and II. Such being the case, the rule enunciated in Cuadra vs.Cordova
etc., 103 Phil. 391, on temporary appointments or appointments in an acting capacity that they are
terminable at the pleasure of the appointing authority, is applicable to Agda. He can neither claim a
vested right to the station to which he was assigned nor to security of tenure thereat. The Civil
Service Decree, P.D. No. 807, allows transfer, detail and re-assignment. 47 If the employee
concerned believes that there is no justification therefore, he "may appeal his case to" the Civil
Service Commission. Unless otherwise ordered by the Commission, the decision to detail an
employee shall be executory. Agda invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the Commission when he
filed his Urgent Petition To Stay Implementation and Nullify the Special Order in question with the
Civil Service Commission. 48 It does not, however, appear to Us that he exerted genuine and
sincere efforts to obtain an expeditious resolution thereof What appears to be clear is that he used
its pendency as an excuse for his refusal to comply with the memorandum of Teotico of 7 January
1988 and the routing slip request of 11 March 1988 for the key to the safety vault. Furthermore, even
in the cases of transfer or detail within the probihited period prior to an election, an aggrieved party is
provided an appropriate administrative remedy. Section 6 of Rule VI of the Civil Service Rules on
Personnel Actions and Policies provides: Sec. 6. Except when the exigencies of the service require,
an official or employee of the government may not be ordered detailed or reassigned during the
three-month period before any local or national election, and if he believes that the order for his
detail or reassignment is due to harassment, coercion, intimidation, or other personal reasons, he
may appeal the order to the Commission. Until this is proven, however, the order is presumed to be
in the interest of the service and notwithstanding the appeal, the decision to detail or reassign him
shall

be executory, but the Commission may order deferment of suspension of the detail or reassignment
ex parte." Agda made no attempt to avail of this remedy. In his Urgent Petition to Stay
Implementation and Nullify Special Order No. 219, nothing is mentioned about a violation of the ban
on transfer or detail. The reason seems too obvious. Until he filed the Amended Petition before the
court below he did not consider his re-assignment per Special Order No. 219 as a violation of the
ban on transfer or detail during the threemonth period before the election.

Even if the 16 December reinstatement order should be construed to be directed against the
preventive suspension order issued by Teotico on 4 April 1988, respondent Judge clearly
capriciously breached the limits of his discretion for nowhere in his amended petition has Agda
attacked its validity or legality on any other ground than its being issued to implement Special Order
No. 219, 55 which he claims was issued in violation of the pertinent provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code and the Civil Service Decree prohibiting transfer or reassignment of civil service
officials and employees within three months before the local election of January 18, 1988. He
assailed the suspension order not on the ground that Teotico does not have the authority to file the
formal charge and to preventively suspend him, but solely on the basis of his self-serving claim that
both were issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion because they
were meant to implement Special Order No. 219. Lastly, We hold that both the preliminary injunction
and the reinstatement order issued by respondent Judge practically granted the main relief prayed
for by Agda even before the hearing on the case on the merits. InObias, et al., vs. Hon. Borja, et al.,
136 SCRA 687, We ruled that respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing a writ
of preliminary injunction which in effect practically granted the principal relief sought in the
Mandamus case. The reason for this is that such issuance "would, in effect, be a prejudgment of the
main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of proof since it would assume the proposition
which the petitioner is inceptively bound to prove.