De 77 2023 02 23 (Fuller) 1st Amd Complaint

Case 1:23-cv-24251-FAM Document 77 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/23/2024 Page 1 of 124
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
Case No.: 1:23-cv-24251-FAM
WILLIAM O. FULLER,
MARTIN PINILLA, II,
THE BARLINGTON GROUP, LLC,
CALLE OCHO MARKETPLACE, LLC,
YO AMO CALLE SIETE, LLC,
LITTLE HAVANA ARTS BUILDING, LLC,
LITTLE HAVANA ARTS BUILDING TOO, LLC,
TOWER HOTEL, LLC,
BRICKELL STATION, LLC,
PIEDRA VILLAS, LLC,
FUTURAMA, LLC,
EL SHOPPING, LLC,
BEATSTIK, LLC,
VIERNES CULTURALES/CULTURAL FRIDAYS, INC.,
LITTLE HAVANA BUNGALOWS, LLC,
LHAB TRES, LLC,
LA GRAN FIESTA, LLC.
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE CITY OF MIAMI,

JOE CAROLLO, in his individual capacity,
ARTHUR NORIEGA, in his individual capacity,
VICTORIA MENDEZ, in her individual capacity,
RACHEL DOOLEY, in her individual capacity,
ASAEL MARRERO, in his individual capacity,
DANIEL S. GOLDBERG, in his individual capacity,
WILLIAM ORTIZ, in his individual capacity,
LUIS TORRES, in his individual capacity,
ADRIAN PLASENCIA, in his individual capacity,
RENE DIAZ, in his individual capacity,
YVONNE BAYONA, in her individual capacity.
Defendants.
___________________________________/
AXS Law Group PLLC 1|Page

PLAINITFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
During the trial of Joe Carollo, a large number of current and former City of Miami
employees – including a former City Manager and two former Police Chiefs – testified that, at the
direction of Joe Carollo, the City of Miami adopted formal policies and informal customs aimed
at targeting Plaintiffs, their businesses, and business associates, and that the City and its employees
engaged in a well-known, widespread and pervasive custom of weaponizing City resources to
harass Plaintiffs, their businesses, and business associates, with the aim of shutting down
Plaintiffs’ businesses, tearing down Plaintiffs’ properties, and destroying Plaintiffs’ reputations
and their personal wellbeing. The testimony also revealed that the City of Miami demoted or fired
those who opposed Carollo’s targeting of Plaintiffs, and promoted those who agreed to carry out
the targeting.
These Defendants – a government machine mobilized by Carollo – have used untold
resources derived from taxpayer funds to corrupt City staff members as part of their yearslong
effort to drive Plaintiffs and their businesses into bankruptcy. In addition, the City at the direction
of Carollo, Mendez and Noriega, has spent more than $15 million in taxpayer money in an endless
effort to exhaust and destroy plaintiffs through a legal minefield by filing bogus and frivolous
claims. The businesses owned by Plaintiff Fuller and Pinilla that have been subject to raids, false
and unjustified fines, and attempts to demolish and destroy include: 1) The Barlington Group,
LLC; 2) Calle Ocho Marketplace, LLC; 3) Yo Amo Calle Siete, LLC; 4) Little Havana Arts
Building, LLC; 5) Little Havana Arts Building Too, LLC; 5) Tower Hotel, LLC; 6) Brickell
Station, LLC; 7) Piedra Villas, LLC; 8) Futurama, LLC; 9) El Shopping, LLC; 10) Beatstik, LLC;
11) Viernes Culturales/Cultural Fridays, Inc.; 12) Little Havana Bungalows, LLC; 13) LHAB
TRES, LLC; and 14) La Gran Fiesta LLC.

In addition to the City’s shared responsibility for causing the $63.5 million in reputational,
emotional, and punitive damages awarded by the jury against Carollo, the City of Miami and the
individual Defendants have additionally caused extensive economic damages to Plaintiffs and their
companies, well in excess of $60 million. Both the City of Miami and the individuals that
knowingly carried out the targeting on Carollo’s behalf – all while trying to protect Carollo – are
liable to Plaintiffs for these acts and for punitive damages in their individual capacities. This
includes, without limitation, Defendants Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, Dooley, Marrero, Goldberg,
Ortiz, Torres, Plasencia, Diaz, and Bayona.
PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE
1. Plaintiff William O. Fuller is a resident of Miami-Dade County, Florida.
2. Plaintiff Martin Pinilla, II is a resident of Miami-Dade County, Florida.
3. Plaintiff Barlington Group, LLC is a Florida Limited Liability Company owned by
Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla, and is headquartered in the City of Miami.
4. Plaintiff Calle Ocho Marketplace, LLC is a Florida Limited Liability Company
owned by Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla and is headquartered in the City of Miami.
5. Plaintiff Yo Amo Calle Siete, LLC is a Florida Limited Liability Company owned
by Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla, and is headquartered in the City of Miami.
6. Plaintiff Little Havana Arts Building, LLC is a Florida Limited Liability Company
owned by Fuller and is headquartered in the City of Miami.
7. Plaintiff Piedra Villas, LLC is a Florida Limited Liability Company owned by
Fuller, and is headquartered in the City of Miami.
8. Plaintiff Little Havana Arts Building Too, LLC is a Florida Limited Liability
Company owned by Fuller and is headquartered in the City of Miami.

9. Plaintiff Brickell Station, LLC is a Florida Limited Liability Company owned by
10. Plaintiff Tower Hotel, LLC is a Florida Limited Liability Company owned by
11. Plaintiff Futurama, LLC is a Florida Limited Liability Company owned by
12. Plaintiff El Shopping, LLC is a Florida Limited Liability Company owned by
13. Plaintiff Beatstik, LLC is a Florida Limited Liability Company owned by Plaintiffs
Fuller and Pinilla, and is headquartered in the City of Miami.
14. Plaintiff Viernes Culturales/Cultural Fridays, Inc. is a Florida Corporation
comprised of community stakeholders who committed thousands of hours for a great community
benefit over 20 years, and whose former chairman was Plaintiff Bill Fuller.
15. Plaintiff Little Havana Bungalows, LLC is a Florida Limited Liability Company
owned by Fuller and is headquartered in the City of Miami.
16. Plaintiff LHAB Tres, LLC is a Florida Limited Liability Company owned by
Plaintiff Fuller and is headquartered in the City of Miami.
17. Plaintiff La Gran Fiesta, LLC is a Florida Limited Liability Company owned by
Plaintiff Fuller and is headquartered in the City of Miami.
18. Defendant City of Miami is the municipal governing body for the City of Miami.
19. Defendant Joe Carollo is and at all relevant times was the City Commissioner for
District 3 of the City of Miami.

20. Defendant Arthur Noriega, in his individual capacity, is and at all relevant times
was the City Manager for the City of Miami.
21. Defendant Victoria Mendez, in her individual capacity, is and at all relevant times
was the City Attorney for the City of Miami.
22. Defendant Rachel Dooley, in her individual capacity, is and at all relevant times
was the Assistant City Attorney for the City of Miami.
23. Defendant Asael Marrero, in his individual capacity, is and at all relevant times was
the Building Director for the City of Miami.
24. Defendant Daniel S. Goldberg, in his individual capacity, is and at all relevant times
was the Zoning Director for the City of Miami.
25. Defendant William Ortiz, in his individual capacity, is and at all relevant times was
a key staffer of Joe Carollo carrying out his political targeting of Plaintiffs.
26. Defendant Luis Torres, in his individual capacity, is the Assistant Director of
Building.
27. Defendant Torres is a prime example of how supporters of Carollo earned
promotions as a reward for helping the retaliatory campaign against Plaintiffs that they otherwise
would not have obtained and did not deserve. Torres, for example, was a strong supporter and
active campaigner for Carollo, reflected in the following photographs of Torres wearing a Carollo
campaign T-Shirt, actively campaigning for Carollo, and sitting at a polling station on behalf of
Carollo, before ultimately becoming the building official who closed Plaintiffs’ businesses,
including Taquerias and Ball & Chain, and caused extensive damage to Plaintiffs’ other
businesses:

28. Defendant Adrien Plasencia, in his individual capacity, is the Assistant Fire Chief
and at relevant times was the City of Miami Fire Marshall.
29. Defendant Rene Diaz, in his individual capacity, is and at all relevant times was the
Senior Chief of the Unsafe Structures department.
30. Defendant Yvonne Bayona, in her individual capacity, is and all relevant times was
a member of the City of Miami Code Enforcement Board.
31. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28
U.S.C. § 1331.
32. Venue lies in the Southern District of Florida because the cause of action accrued
and the parties are located within this district.

33. All conditions precedent to the filing of this lawsuit have been performed, satisfied
and/or waived.
FACTS
34. Plaintiffs William Fuller (“Fuller”) and Martin Pinilla (“Pinilla”) are local
entrepreneurs operating out of Calle Ocho in Little Havana, who have built a diverse real estate
investment business from the ground up, one building at a time, providing hundreds of jobs for
local residents and producing hundreds of thousands of dollars in tax revenue for the City of
Miami, Miami-Dade County, and the State of Florida.
35. Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla have dedicated their professional careers to revitalizing
the neighborhood of Little Havana, where they have helped to generate economic activity and
breathe new life into the area, while at the same time preserving its historical significance and
cultural identity.
36. Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla have been recognized as “a galvanizing force behind
the area’s cultural resurgence,” and renowned Miami historian Dr. Paul George has likewise noted
that Fuller and Pinilla “are both very history-minded and are also very civic-minded . . . [They]
understand that the neighborhood has a multilayered history.”
37. Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla consider their work to be that of curators and caretakers
of the neighborhood and, accordingly, they seek out development partners and tenants “who share
a similar vision of preserving and protecting the heritage, the culture, and the history” of Little
Havana. 1
1
Carmen Sesin and Marissa Armas, Miami’s Little Havana: From Working Class Neighborhood
to Global Tourist Hot Spot, NBC NEWS, Mar. 27, 2017, http://tinyurl.com/4usny6y4 (last
accessed Feb. 22, 2024).
38. For example, in 2014, Fuller and two of his childhood friends reopened the famous
Ball & Chain nightclub. For decades during the 1930’s to 1950’s, Ball & Chain was an important
music venue, presenting titans of the era such as Billie Holiday and Count Basie. With the vision
of restoring the venue to its past glory days, Fuller and his partners made Ball & Chain once again
a premier entertainment destination for people of all ages, races, and nationalities.
39. Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla are also currently working on Little Havana’s first
boutique hotel through a redevelopment and restoration of the historic Tower Hotel. The Tower
Hotel served as a World War II hospital and famously hosted African-American jazz greats during
the era of segregation. 2
40. Preserving that history, where the legacies of various cultures converged on Calle
Ocho, is central to Plaintiffs’ vision for the project. Through these and many other projects in the
area, Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla have sought to reestablish Little Havana as a healthy, dynamic
neighborhood, showcasing new cultural life while celebrating its important place in Miami’s
history.
41. Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla’s efforts in the neighborhood have borne significant
fruit—Little Havana offers visitors many new options of sights to see, places to seek entertainment
and a vibrant arts scene to enjoy, much of which retains or reflects the cultural distinction, rich
history and atmosphere that make Little Havana special. Little Havana is now a major Miami
destination for tourists and locals alike, sought after as one of the few authentic Cuban legacy
neighborhoods left in Miami. In 2017, the National Trust for Historic Preservation declared Little
Havana a national treasure.
2
Chabeli Herrera, This Little Havana hotel once housed Billie Holiday. Soon you could stay there,
too, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 13, 2018, http://tinyurl.com/yc5jxpma (last accessed Feb. 22, 2024).
42. Throughout all of this, Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla have nurtured genuine and
productive relationships with City Commissioners, including Joe Carollo’s two predecessors, his
brother Frank Carollo and Joe Sanchez, both of whom appointed Fuller and Pinilla to participate
in various City boards or trusts, such as the Stars of Calle Ocho and Viernes Culturales.
THE RACE FOR CITY COMMISSIONER AND THE STARTING GUN OF

DEFENDANTS’ RETALIAITON AGAINST PLAINTIFFS
43. In the summer of 2017, Joe Carollo (“Carollo”) announced his campaign for
Commissioner for the City of Miami’s for District 3, which includes Little Havana, prompting the
Miami Herald to write a story noting Carollo’s history of “abusing power, profiting from
taxpayers and using government resources to intimidate his political opponents.” 3
44. Because of Carollo’s reputation for political vengeance, Plaintiffs sought to keep
their support for Carollo’s opponent clandestine, becoming key members of the ABC– Anyone
But Carollo – group.
45. Carollo’s five-year campaign of retaliation against Plaintiffs stemmed from:
a) Plaintiffs hosting rallies for his opponent Alfie Leon and supporting social media advertising
for Leon, b) Carollo’s false belief that Plaintiffs were financing a lawsuit that Alfie Leon filed
against Carollo challenging his right to run for District 3 Commissioner, c) Carollo’s false belief
that Plaintiffs were organizing or participating in efforts to recall Carollo, d) Plaintiffs filing an
ethics complaint against Carollo, e) Plaintiffs filing a federal lawsuit against Carollo, f) Plaintiffs
hosting a press conference to expose Carollo’s history of code violations at his home in Coconut
Grove, g) Plaintiffs promoting African American and Afro Cuban murals in Calle Ocho that
3
David Smiley, Lies, Chavista ties and red light cameras: A Miami election so ugly the parents
jumped in, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 19, 2017 http://tinyurl.com/bdeb7k99 (last accessed Feb. 22,
2024).
Carollo disliked, and h) Plaintiffs generally having a different vision for Calle Ocho and Little
Havana that threatened Carollo’s desire to dominate the District for his own power and corruption.
CITY OF MIAMI CHARTER
46. The City of Miami Charter delineates the powers vested in the various arms of city
government including the Mayor, City Manager and the Commissioners. Section 4(g)(6) gives
the Mayor the power to appoint the City Manager and Section 15 of the Charter establishes that
the City Manager shall be the head of the administrative branch of the city government.
47. Section 4(d) of the Charter delineates the division of power between the Mayor,
City Manager and Commissioners as follows:
Except for the purpose of inquiry and as may be necessary as provided in

section 14, the mayor, the city commission, any committees and members
thereof shall deal with the administrative service solely through the city
manager, and neither the mayor nor the city commission, nor any
committees nor members thereof shall give orders to any of the
subordinates of the city manager, city attorney, city clerk and
independent auditor general, either publicly or privately.
Any such dictation, prevention, orders or other interference or violation of

this section on the part of the mayor or a member of the city commission or
committees shall be deemed to be violation of the Charter, and upon
conviction before a court of competent jurisdiction any individual so
convicted shall be subject to a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars
($500.00) or imprisonment for a term of not exceeding sixty days or
both, and in the discretion of the court shall forfeit his or her office.
Any willful violation of the provisions to this section by the mayor or any
city commissioner shall be grounds for his or her removal from office by
an action brought in the Circuit Court by the state attorney of this
county.
48. The Charter makes clear that neither the Mayor nor the Commissioners can give
direct orders to any department that is subordinate to the City Manager. Instead, they are required
to direct all orders to the City Manager who then has the authority to direct the various departments
of the City to take action.
AXS Law Group PLLC 10 | P a g e

49. Carollo, believing that he was above the law, balked at this requirement to issue
orders only through the City Manager, and instead used his position as a Commissioner to convince
the City and its individual employees to help carry out his egregious targeting and punishment of
Plaintiffs.
THE CABAL FORMS AND FINDS ITS FAVORITE TOOL FOR

TARGETING PLANTIFFS BY CRAFTING SELECTIVE ORDINANCES AND
UNIQUELY ENFORCING THEM AGAINST PLAINTIFFS
50. Upon taking office, Carollo drew up a list of all Plaintiffs’ properties and associated
businesses for purposes of targeting those businesses for fines and shutting them down.
51. Carollo found his first allies in City Attorney Mendez and her Assistant City
Attorney, Dooley, both of whom worked willingly to assist Carollo in shutting down the Sanguich
business, a tenant of Plaintiff Futurama, LLC, by revoking prior permits, refusing to grant new
permits, and changing existing ordinances and passing new ordinances to prohibit the business’
operation, thereby costing the owners the hundreds of thousands of dollars they had invested and
destroying their dreams, all to retaliate against Plaintiffs. As a result of Defendants’ actions,
Sanguich was forced to end its tenancy with Plaintiff, resulting in economic damages.
52. At one point in his scheme, Carollo elevated a complaint on Plaintiff La Gran
Fiesta’s, LLC, property named Taquerias to Florida’s Department of Alcohol Beverage and
Tobacco (“ABT”) and had ABT repeatedly inspect Taquerias in the hopes of revoking its liquor
license. When after each inspection, ABT accompanied by Miami Police failed to find any
violations and revoke the liquor license—Carollo became enraged, enraged but not discouraged.
53. Carollo began issuing voluminous public records requests (“PRRs”) for Taquerias
and demanded that the police officers who had inspected Taquerias appear before him at the next
City of Miami Commission Hearing on February 14, 2019 to explain why they had not issued

citations. He also requested the attendance of other City employees to explain why no code
violations or other citations had been issued to Plaintiff’s Taquerias.
VALENTINE’S DAY MASSACRE
54. On Thursday, February 14, 2019, Carollo launched a full-scale defamatory assault
on both the Plaintiffs and various City employees, calling for the Commission to pass a resolution
asking the Governor to appoint a special prosecutor to criminally investigate the City employees
that did not cite Plaintiffs’ properties with violations.
55. Both then-City Manager Emilio Gonzalez and the Chief of Police Jorge Colina
(“Colina”) stood before the Commission and told Carollo that they would not bring their
employees to be publicly ridiculed by Carollo as part of Carollo’s efforts to intimidate the
employees into doing Carollo’s bidding to target Plaintiffs.
56. While the Commission rejected Carollo’s call for criminal prosecution, it did pass
a resolution establishing a task force involving the Code Compliance, Fire, Police, and Building
Departments, to be headed not by the City Manager, but by City Attorney Mendez, aimed at
investigating all aspects of Plaintiffs’ properties.
57. Resolution [4-1] stated: “A resolution of the Miami City Commission Directing the
City Attorney to Research Properties Described at the February 14, 2019 City Commission
Meeting During Discussion item ‘D3.1 – Code Enforcement’ regarding violations relating to no
certificate of use, certificate of use obtained under false pretenses and/or properties with violations
that pose life-safety issues, and initiate injunctive proceedings against said properties until the
properties are brought into compliance.”

58. The only properties described at the February 14, 2019 Commission Meeting were
Plaintiffs’ properties, so Resolution [4.1] was passed for the purpose of targeting Plaintiffs’
properties.
59. Commissioner Carollo himself confirmed that Resolution [4.1] became official
City policy:
Q. At this point, Commissioner Carollo, this become city policy, correct?

A. What becomes city policy?
Q. This resolution.
…
A. Any resolution that is passed by the commission is city policy.
60. Despite the passage of Resolution [4.1], many of the City’s senior staff (most of
which would be replaced within a year) objected to this official policy of targeting Plaintiffs’
businesses.
61. Miami’s Chief of Police Colina sent a letter to the City Manager regarding Carollo
and Mendez’s unlawful targeting of Plaintiffs:
[T]he item on the agenda was a discussion item, however, the main focus
of the discussion was aimed at one particular business owner in the city.
The resolution that the city attorney prepared pertains to ‘properties
describe[d] at the 2/14/2019 city commission meeting.’ However, the
addresses forwarded in her email targets the particular business owner
[Plaintiffs] which gives the impression that the city is selectively targeting
his business for new investigations. The concern is that this request,
through the city attorney, may amount to an unsanctioned and
unlawful exercise of powers beyond the limits of his [Carollo’s]
legislative power as a city commissioner to intentionally cause harm to
a business owner. As such my departments actions under the resolution
may be in violation of the code of ethics ordinance.
Furthermore this is selective enforcement against the business owner’s

properties using city ordinance.

62. Deputy City Manager Joe Napoli sent the City Manager an email stating: “I am
concerned that what the City Attorney is directing our staff to do is beyond what was directed by
the Commission and can be interpreted as targeting businesses.”
63. Zerry Ihekwaba, another assistant City Manager, echoed Napoli in another email:
“We ought to be enforcing the Code citywide and not just targets,” he wrote.
64. City of Miami Mayor Francis Suarez stated Carollo was “selectively enforcing or
weaponizing code enforcement against particular property owners.”
65. As former City Manager Gonzalez explained in court: “my deputy city manager,
my assistant city manager, the police chief, in writing objected that this was tantamount to targeting
a business … It’s just wrong. There's just no way that this is right. [W]e're being asked to look at
these properties, we’re being asked to look at them with the intention of essentially finding a way
to shut them down and it's wrong … We need to run a city. We don't need to ruin a business and
my staff was adamant that this was going way, way too far.”
66. The fact that the Commission appointed the City Attorney to head the task force,
instead of the City Manager, not only violated the City Charter, but it also officially put Carollo’s
ally, Mendez, in charge of targeting Plaintiffs.
67. Mendez was not only Carollo’s ally in the targeting, but Carollo had assisted
Mendez and her husband Carlos Morales’ (“Morales”) corrupt scheme to cheat the City of
permitting fees and fines on remodeling old houses that they fraudulently acquired from
unsuspecting, incapacitated and sometimes deceased individuals and their families through the
Miami-Dade Guardianship Program.
68. In fact, when Mendez’s husband needed special treatment by the City, he emailed
not only Assistant City Attorney Dooley, but also Carollo himself, as well as Carollo’s Chief of

Staff Blom and his Deputy Chief of Staff Anthony Barcena, despite the fact that the property at
issue was not in Carollo’s district.
69. While the rest of the City may not have known about this conspiracy between
Carollo and Mendez, once Mendez emailed several top city administrators about the new
resolution, those officials immediately protested that Mendez leading this task force violated the
City Charter and targeted Plaintiffs’ businesses illegally.
70. After the new City policy was put in place in February 2019, Carollo unleashed a
flurry of new PRRs for every single city record on all of Plaintiffs’ properties (and no other
property owner) and then forced his Chief of Staff Blom to devote the entire weekend of April 19,
2019 to flyspecking these records. Two months later, this incident was cited in Blom’s resignation
letter, protesting that he had to examine “various applications, permits and licenses associated with
[Plaintiffs] over the weekend … I’m not comfortable doing this type of research for a variety of
reasons but find I am being assigned more and more of this type of work focusing on this one
individual [Fuller].”
71. A few short months after Blom resigned, in part due to the targeting of Plaintiffs,
Carollo managed to force City Manager Gonzalez out of his position as well. As Mr. Gonzalez
wrote at the time, and later testified to in court, Carollo “was trying to terminate [him] because
[he] would not weaponize city government against Mr. Fuller.”
DEFENDANTS THE CITY OF MIAMI, CAROLLO, MARRERO AND DIAZ

ROUTINELY CREATED LISTS OF PLAITNIFFS’ PROPERTIES
TO DIRECT THEIR RETALIATION
72. Multiple times throughout Carollo’s reign of terror, which continues today,
Defendants created hit lists of Plaintiffs’ properties for the sole purpose of their retaliation.

73. For example, on December 19, 2017, Carollo and his office compiled and circulated
a list of Properties belonging to Plaintiff Fuller, his sister, and his mother. This list included
informational fuel for Defendants’ harassment including: the address, building size, lot size, folio
number, zoning, sale price, and date acquired. The list promulgated by Defendants the City of
Miami and Carollo can be seen in the image below.
74. This list eventually transformed as Carollo relied upon it. A picture of one of the
final lists directly promulgated can be seen in the image below.

75. On February 20, 2019, City Attorney Victoria Mendez circulated her own list of
Properties instructing employees to carry out the “Valentine’s Day Massacre’s” harassment, with
seven of the eleven properties associated with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla. This list can be seen in
in the image below.

76. In another email exchange from Carollo’s then Chief of Staff, who retired because
of ethical concerns with Carollo’s campaign of retaliation, Blom sent Joe Napoli a list of eleven
properties with six properties owned by Plaintiffs.
77. And yet another list targeting Plaintiffs emerged in on May 28, 2020, in an email
from Rene Diaz to Asael Marrero targeting Plaintiffs Little Havana Bungalows LLC, Fuller,
“Futurama c/o William Fuller,” Tower Hotel LLC, Little Havana Arts Building, Little Havana
Arts Too, Calle Ocho Marketplace LLC, La Gran Fiesta LLC, and Beatstik LLC. This list can be
seen in the image below.
78. These emails and their continuous circulations served as a map or rather a hit list
for Defendants’ harassment.
DEFENDANTS THE CITY OF MIAMI, NORIEGA, MENDEZ, DOOLEY, MARRERO,

AND DIAZ MEET TO STRATEGIZE CRAFTING POLICIES AGAINST PLAINTIFFS
79. In February 2020, Defendants Noriega and Marrero were elevated to positions of
power, giving the syndicate additional power and influence over the City Manager’s Office and
Building Department, respectively.

80. Once City Manager Gonzalez was forced out and replaced by Noriega, who as
director of the Miami Parking Authority had both supported Carollo’s election campaign and
donated millions of dollars to Carollo’s Little Havana Fridays, the City policy Carollo had created
in 2019 was finally implemented without obstruction by ethical public servants.
81. Noriega admitted that shortly after he assumed office in February 2020, he met with
Carollo, Carollo’s staff, and Mendez dozens of times concerning Fuller with no email trail.
82. For example, on May 27, 2020, just two months after Noriega took office, the
Director of the City of Miami Building Department, Asael Marrero wrote: “Just had a lengthy
meeting with the manager and almost the entire City Attorney office plus Adele [Valencia]
talking about Bill Fuller. The Manager wants us to revise and update our policies to be more
stringent when it comes to work without permit, clearly define what are unsafe conditions, and
shut down all structures that don't comply. . . . I just had a conversation with Rene [Diaz] and
asked him to stop by the office tomorrow.” (Emphases added).
83. And, the group would continue to meet to revise policies so that they specifically
target Plaintiffs. Marrero continued: “I would like for us to spend the day tomorrow brainstorming
about these issues. We need to circle back with Rachel [Dooley] if we need to update any of our
ordinances as well as I have a follow up meeting with the manager next week to provide an update
on these issues.” (Emphases added).
84. The next day, on May 28, 2020, City staff circulated an email with a subject line of
“Copy of Fuller Properties” containing an attachment that had all of Plaintiffs’ properties listed
along with whether each property had any code violations and the status of any such violations.
This list of Plaintiffs’ properties then continued to be updated and circulated throughout the

summer of 2020, culminating in an email on October 19, 2020, with the City Staff providing
updates on the “progress of Carollo Investigation” which was limited to Plaintiffs’ properties.
85. On Oct. 22, 2020, Carollo sponsored a new Ordinance that provided “for inclusion
of building violations as a reason for revocation of certificates of use.” That morning, at 8 am, the
City Manager sent an email to the Building Director and the City Attorney stating: “let’s get this
done today before noon today.” Of course, what the City Manager wanted done before noon was
the issuance of a building violation at Ball & Chain, resulting in Ball & Chain being the first
ever business to have its Certificate of Use (“CU”) revoked in the history of Miami. Carollo
also sponsored a second ordinance on Oct. 22, 2020, which banned outdoor music in any
restaurants that did not have a CU as of October 22, 2020, which of course applied only to Ball &
Chain, since Ball & Chain was the only restaurant to have its CU revoked that day.
86. Thus, less than five months after the May 27, 2020 meeting, Carollo, Noriega,
Mendez, Dooley, Marrero, and Diaz had accomplished their goal of passing new ordinances to
shut down one of Fuller’s most prominent properties. Examples of some of these Ordinances are
below:
Ordinances 11-19- Amending Section 36-4 Prohibiting outdoor

13941 20 (Noise) music b/w hours of
10:00 pm to 8:00 am.
Ordinance 10-22- Amending Section 2-211 Mandatory revocation of
13936 20 (Certificate of Use) CU for violations of
Chapter 10 (Building
Code).
Ordinance 3-10-22 Amending Section 2- Capping the amount the
14057 817(d) (Mitigation) code enforcement board
could mitigate fines
after compliance.

Ordinance 10-13- Amending Chapter 31 Establishing Section

14115 22 by adopting Section 31.51, Food Trucks,
31.51(Food Trucks) prohibiting District 3
from Ordinance.
Ordinance 10-27- Amending (Historic Providing further
14118 22 Preservation) penalties and
enforcement options
for property owners
that allow historically
designated structures
to decay requiring
demolition.
Policy Compliance Agreements Revoked policy
permitting unsafe
structures to enter into
compliance agreements
with property owners.
Policy Dual Occupancies Revoked policy
permitting dual
occupancies within one
venue.
DEFENDANTS USED THESE SPECIFICALLY TAILORED POLICIES AND

SELECTIVELY ENFORCED THEM AGAINST PLAINTIFFS
87. Defendants would selectively enforce these policies against Plaintiffs merely
because Plaintiffs were related to Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla who were “Carollo’s political
enemies.”
88. Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla are in the business of buying existing properties and
restoring them.
89. Some properties Plaintiffs purchase are older buildings that are not built to the
current Miami Building Code. In addition, many of these properties are purchased with existing
code violations from work done by prior owners that in many instances was unpermitted.

90. Until Carollo and the City came together to target the Plaintiffs, the longstanding
City of Miami policy was to issue citations and work with the property owners, including Plaintiffs,
to bring the property into compliance—in an agreement coined a “Compliance Agreement.”
91. And originally, the City worked with property owners to bring buildings into
compliance. However, Defendants changed this policy to effectuate the retaliation against
Plaintiffs for their association with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla.
92. First, the City changed its administrative policy on how property owners can enter
into a Compliance Agreement. Previously, either a Building Department Official or the Unsafe
Structure Panel could create a Compliance Agreement. The City changed this to allow only the
Unsafe Structure Panel to enter into compliance agreements, limiting Plaintiffs’ ability to negotiate
these Agreements that were commonplace before the commencement of the retaliation campaign
against them.
93. This change was used as a pretext for the City to create arbitrary and infeasible
compliance deadlines. And the City did just that for Plaintiffs Piedra Villas, Calle Siete, Beatstik,
El Shopping, Tower Hotel, and LHAB TOO.
94. Historically, the Compliance Agreements term “deadlines” was a misnomer as it
was routinely subject to change. And, as long as the property owner was making progress and
actively communicating with the City on their progress, the City policy was not to strictly enforce
deadlines.
95. Plaintiffs made good faith efforts to comply with the compliance agreements by
their original deadlines. But when Defendants realized Plaintiffs were meeting their deadlines they
imposed another administrative policy change and to further eliminate any leniency in order to
target Plaintiffs.

96. For example, Defendants the City, Diaz, Torres, and Marrero would, in bad faith,
obstruct Plaintiffs’ ability to meet the compliance agreement deadlines, either by searching out
new violations on the property requiring Plaintiffs pull a different permit; arbitrarily requiring
Plaintiffs to pull an obscure permit; or wasting Plaintiffs’ time and resources by insisting—only
after Plaintiffs’ performed substantial work aligned with prior permits and agreements—that the
end product would not satisfy certain Code requirements.
97. And, when Defendants, including Defendants Marrero and Diaz, were dismayed
that Plaintiffs moved mountains and worked in good faith to meet their compliance agreements,
the City, on February 22, 2022, unilaterally collapsed all of Plaintiffs’ compliance agreements and
began threatening to demolish Plaintiffs’ properties.
98. The City collapsed the agreements, directly without regard to the Agreement’s
Section 5, which provided extensions of the timelines were allowed with the express written
consent of the Building Official.
99. Equally appalling, the City even “by mistake” upended Plaintiffs’ businesses by
baselessly claiming Plaintiffs “failed” to meet the compliance agreement. For example, Plaintiff
Calle Siete had no violation, but that did not stop the City from targeting the property and citing it
and issuing a hold—forcing Plaintiff to take the City to court—before the City, after all the
disruption and expense, “review[ed] all of the internal filings that occurred, along with that
Compliance Agreement, and . . . determined that [Calle Siete] was in compliance.”
100. Another showcase of the selectiveness of the City’s enforcement occurred when
Plaintiff Piedra Villas—alongside others non-affiliated with Fuller or Pinilla but also at risk of
demolition—challenged the City’s demolition attempts. Ultimately, every person who
challenged the demolition received a path to avoid demolition without seeking judicial

assistance—except for businesses associated with Fuller and Pinilla, including Plaintiff Piedra
Villas.
101. The weaponization of policy was also exemplified when Defendants the City,
Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, Dooley, and Marrero changed existing City policy so any building with
an Unsafe Structure violation automatically had its Certificate of Use (“CU”) revoked, without
which a business could not operate. This policy was devised by Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, Dooley,
and Marrero and favored in their retaliation campaign because it would allow Defendants to
arbitrarily issue Unsafe Structure Violations that in turn would cause the businesses associated
with Plaintiffs to have their CU revoked and prevent them from operating.
102. Accordingly, this policy was specifically used to selectively revoke the CU for the
tenants of Plaintiffs LHAB, Gran Fiesta, and El Shopping. Moreover, this policy was specifically
used so the City can justify it not issuing CU’s to Plaintiffs Piedra Villas and Beatstik’s tenants.
In both instances, it was Plaintiffs that suffered.
103. Yet another example of Defendants’ weaponization and selective enforcement
related to the capping of the amount that code enforcement was permitted to mitigate fines, under
Ordinance 14057. This policy change was directly enacted by Defendants because of Carollo’s
frustration that Plaintiffs Beatstik and Fuller were able to mitigate any fines the City imposed.
104. Therefore, not only did Defendants’ change the policy regarding mitigation of fines
but they also changed the procedure so as to try to force Plaintiffs Fuller and Beatstik to appear
before the Commission so they can be directly harassed by Carollo.
DEFENDANTS ROUTINELY DISREGARDED THE CORPORATE FORM OF

ENTITIES AFFILIATED WITH PLAINTIFFS FULLER AND PINILLA

105. Florida law provides business entities rights which serve to legally separate them
from their owners or managers. In order to collapse the distinction, a court must find facts which
justify piercing the corporate veil.
106. Here, Defendants unilaterally and without authority pierced the corporate veil of
Plaintiffs because of their association to Fuller and Pinilla and the City on numerous occasions
completely disregarded the Plaintiffs’ corporate form and labeled the many Plaintiffs as “repeat
violators” without justification.
107. For instance, the City on September 9, 2022, continuously disregarded Plaintiff
Beatstik and Plaintiff Futurama’s corporate structures, instead labeling them as “repeat violators”
based solely on their association with Plaintiff Fuller.
108. And in an email which included Noriega, and Dooley, Assistant Attorney Dooley
ratified the disregard of the corporate form and labelling of Fuller as a repeat violator.
109. The significance of this label, not only defamatory and damaging to Plaintiffs’
reputations, but emboldened Defendants to impose escalating fines and punishments to
Plaintiffs—regardless of property ownership.
DEFENDANTS THE CITY OF MIAMI, CAROLLO, NORIEGA, DOOLEY, AND

MENDEZ ATTEMPTED TO ARBITRARILY DERAIL HISTORIC DESIGNATIONS
110. Plaintiffs Piedras Villas, Beatstik, and Tower Hotel all filed applications with the
City’s Historic Preservation Division seeking to have their properties deemed historic.
111. But Defendants the City of Miami, Dooley, Noriega, Mendez, and Carollo sought
to change the legal protections afforded to historic properties because their focus on retaliating
against Plaintiffs led them to seek the demolition of Plaintiffs’ properties.
112. Therefore, Defendants worked to derail, improperly influence, and disrupt the

historic designation process.
113. The historic designation process involves properties creating a prima facie case and
when met, the City—not the property seeking the designation—applies for historic designation
from the City’s Historic and Environmental Board. The Board votes twice on whether to extend
the designation and the typical process takes 3-5 months.
114. By email dated May 6, 2022, Plaintiff Piedras Villas was advised by the City’s
Historic Preservation Division that it was “waiting on a determination from the City Attorney if
we can move the applications forward with the open code violations. As soon as we get that
clarification, we can send you the quick review with the noticing requirements and invoice.”
115. And on May 10, the legal department confirmed that the evaluations could move
forward.
116. Plaintiffs’ properties passed the Board’s first vote, which immediately put a stay on
the Defendants’ efforts to demolish Plaintiffs’ properties.
117. The second vote was scheduled for September. And, a mere two hours before the
vote—with absolutely no justification—Defendants Dooley, Mendez, and Noriega tried to
postpone and cancel the final and most important hearing of the process. Specifically, Mendez and
Noriega spoke with one of the board members trying to force them to delay their ruling.
118. And, at the hearing, the City Attorney’s office, at the direction of Mendez and
Noriega, lied to the Board claiming that the judge in the state court action had recommended that
the Board not make any decision on the properties.
119. The Board members responded by stating it appeared the City was acting
fraudulently and corruptly and abusing its powers and approved the designation over the City’s
objection.

120. Even with the historic designation, Mendez threatened ominously that it would only
delay, not prevent, the demolition. Indeed, Mendez was foreshadowing that the syndicate will
change City policy to allow demolitions of even historic properties.
121. And on October 27, 2022, Defendants the City of Miami, Carollo, Noriega,
Mendez, Dooley, Marrero and Diaz did in fact pass an ordinance to allow for demolition of historic
buildings, Ordinance 14118.
122. Currently, Plaintiffs Piedra Villas, Beatstik, and Tower Hotel’s properties are at
risk of demolition because of Defendants’ intent of harming Plaintiffs because of their association
to Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla.
THE CITY AND ITS ATTORNEYS TARGET WITNESSES FOR PLAINTIFFS
123. The City’s targeting of Plaintiffs for exercising their First Amendment rights
continued through the trial of Joe Carollo.
124. After the former Police Chief, Art Acevedo, testified truthfully about Carollo and
Noriega, the City (at the direction of an as-yet unknown individual defendant) sent an investigator
to follow Acevedo. Acevedo reported the harassment to the police, as reported by the Miami
Herald:
According to the incident report, Donald Blair and Bryan Austin Blair, both
licensed investigators, were interviewed by police. When police initially
questioned them, according to the report, they said they were investigators
with the Miami-Dade State Attorney's Office. They later retracted that, the
report said, saying they do work for 22 South Florida cities. 4
4
Charles Rabin, After testifying against Carollo, fired Miami police chief says private eyes tailed
him, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 20, 2023, http://tinyurl.com/k9vth3y9 (last accessed Feb. 22, 2024).
125. And the same investigators who were not honest with police in reporting whom
they work for then began leaving voice mail messages with Plaintiffs’ former employees, in which
they indicate that they were hired by the City of Miami and its law firm:
“Hi Victor, this is Brian Blair, private investigator represented by City of

Miami. I am a private investigator once again and what I am doing is that
we are trying to gather all of the former employees who worked for
[Plaintiff LHAB’s] Ball and Chain, at [Plaintiff Gran Fiesta’s] Taquitos
Mexicanos and Los Altos, on a case that is going to Court, Federal Court
– Umm- ..and we wanted to see if you would cooperate we have the
recorded statements- is not going to take longer than 10 minutes -if you can
meet with me at some time that would be great, again My name is Brian
Blair my phone number is 786 447 74 27, that’s 786 447 74 27 and you can
call me at any time. Thank you and you have a great day.
126. The fact that the City has its private investigators following a Police Chief after his
testimony is just the tip of the iceberg of the deception and intimidation Defendants are employing
against City Staff and City Residents in their efforts to destroy Plaintiffs mentally, psychologically,
and financially.
THE ROLES OF THE MEMBERS OF THE CABAL
127. Starting as early as December 2017, and throughout 2018, City personnel were
repeatedly made aware that Carollo was targeting Plaintiffs for political payback. For instance, the
City Manager at the time, as well as the Director of Code compliance, told Plaintiffs that Code
officers were being sent to their properties because they had supported Carollo’s opponent. And,
in December 2017, Carollo himself told Plaintiffs’ business partners that they could lease
anywhere else in Little Havana, but that if they leased from Plaintiffs, their businesses would never
be allowed to open.
128. Throughout 2018, Carollo himself made his targeting of Plaintiffs clear, not
only to the entire City staff but also to the residents of the City at large, by repeatedly going
on radio shows and maliciously defaming Plaintiffs by falsely stating they were criminals
with ties to corrupt South American politicians, mafiosos, leasing to pimps and prostitutes,
among other falsehoods.
129. During the Valentine’s Day Massacre in February 2019, the City’s most senior
policy makers – including Mayor Suarez, City Manager Gonzalez and Police Chief Colina –
publicly stated Carollo was targeting Plaintiffs and seeking to close their businesses as
political payback.
130. City employees also knew as early as 2018 and 2019 that if they did not carry
out Carollo’s political vendetta that they would be fired, demoted, or chased out of office
(like Diez, Gonzalez and others), and that they would be rewarded and promoted if they
helped Carollo (like Noriega and Torrez).
131. As Police Chief Art Acevedo testified, City Manager Noriega “talked very openly
about Mr. Fuller” and the fact that the City itself was targeting “Mr. Fuller and any Fuller related
business at the direction of [Carollo] retaliation for Mr. Fuller’s simple exercising his
Constitutional rights to have a fundraiser.” Chief Acevedo stated: “It’s not speculation, it is well
known, spoken about openly in the city government about how Joe Carollo has absolutely disdain
for Mr. Fuller.” Acevedo further testified that this “was openly known throughout the city, I mean,
down in the park people talk about it, the community talks about it, it was in wide open knowledge
in Miami that he was being targeted.”
132. The City Manager’s Office, the city’s executive branch, which “oversees various
departments and functions, including 4,381 employees and The City’s operating budget of $1.165
billion,” became complicit in this corruption under Defendant and co-conspirator Noriega.
133. Defendant Arthur Noriega is liable in his individual capacity because, among other
things, he is one of the prime architects behind the City’s political retaliation for Carollo. Noriega,

the City’s CEO, was out with a measuring tape measuring the distance between Plaintiffs’
properties and religious institutions while Carollo hid on the corner, looking for ways to shut down
that business. Noriega was stalking Plaintiffs’ businesses at night with the City’s police
department, hiding around the corner, explaining to Acevedo they were targeting Plaintiffs.
Noriega led the attack on Viernes Culturales. Noriega organized an all-day meeting during COVID
in May 2020, with City Department Heads and the entire City Attorney’s Office, for the sole
purpose of pursuing policies aimed at shutting down Plaintiffs’ businesses. He then monitored the
timing of those efforts and gave the final orders as to when the City was to act to shut Plaintiffs’
properties. He then lectured the City Staff that when they witnessed wrongdoing by Commissioner
Carollo, they should “Be a Goldfish” – meaning they should have a 10 second memory – and
thereby be the happiest animal on earth. He even bought them all t-shirts that said “Be a Goldfish.”
134. The Office of the City Attorney, which “provides legal advice and serves as
counsel” to the City, “recognized for their excellent knowledge in the area of local government . . .
and ethics . . . [with] unparalleled opportunities to take a leadership role in promoting honesty and
integrity in the City[,]" took on an unparalleled leadership role in Carollo’s corruption and
scheme against Plaintiffs under the direction of Defendants, and co-conspirators, City Attorney
Victoria Mendez and Assistant City Attorney Rachel Dooley.
135. City Attorney Victoria Mendez operates as the Black Widow for Carollo, in much
the same manner as Griselda Blanco Restrepo operated as the Black Widow for the Medellin
Cartel. Under the guise of attorney-client privilege, Mendez develops the City codes, ordinances,
resolutions, tasks forces, and policies aimed at accomplishing Carollo’s goal of bankrupting
Plaintiffs and Plaintiffs’ business partners; advises City personnel to conceal their wrongdoing
from Florida’s Sunshine laws by not reducing anything to writing; overrules any director of any

City department that rules in favor of Plaintiffs; and has spent over $15 million in City and taxpayer
money for legal fees seeking to bankrupt Plaintiffs—including most recently, by authorizing the
filing of a frivolous CIVIL RICO claim against Plaintiffs at 11:54 PM on the very night the jury
awarded Plaintiffs an award of $63.5 million based upon Carollo and the City’s targeting.
136. Defendant Rachel Dooley is Vic Mendez’s personal assassin, carrying out all of the
City’s targeting, making sure Plaintiffs pay the maximum fees without any reduction or waiver,
and spearheading the demolition of properties.
137. The City’s Building Department, established to “enforce[ ] codes and
regulations . . . governing the construction, alteration, and maintenance of buildings and structures
within the City of Miami” became complicit under the direction of Director Asael Marrero.
138. Defendant Asael Marrero, the Building Director for the City of Miami, carried out
the orders of Carollo, Noriega and Dooley to draft and revise City policies and ordinances in order
to shut down Plaintiffs’ business and, as a final policy maker, changed the City’s policy regarding
compliance agreement to prevent Plaintiffs from ever being able to comply with the City code,
and applied that new policy in a discriminatory manner so that it mainly impacted Plaintiffs while
sparing others.
139. Defendant Rene Diaz, the Senior Chief of the Unsafe Structures department, was
knowingly involved in the use of all of the unsafe structure violations aimed at shutting down
Plaintiffs’ business, and was the City employee circulating the Excel spreadsheet containing the
list of Plaintiffs’ properties to target. He was a key part of the plan to demolish Plaintiffs’
properties, to destroy Plaintiffs’ reputation, send Plaintiffs to default on all bank loans, and
financially ruin Plaintiffs.

140. Defendant Luis Torres, the Assistant Director of Building, was promoted
specifically because he campaigned for Carollo and agreed to do Carollo’s targeting, replacing the
demoted Maurice Pons, who Carollo viewed as not hard enough on Plaintiffs. Torres proceeded to
delay or derail the completion and opening of many properties and businesses, including, but not
limited to, the Tower Hotel.
141. The Zoning Department, which “provides policy guidance for the development of
the City of Miami by interpreting and administering the Zoning Ordinance and other relevant
governmental regulations” became complicit in this scheme—not only providing policy guidance
for development of policy against Plaintiffs but also discriminately implemented these policies
against Plaintiffs—under the direction of Daniel S. Goldberg.
142. Defendant Daniel S. Goldberg, the Zoning Director for the City of Miami, is the
mentee of Carollo’s lawyer, Marc Sarnoff, and was put in place to do the bidding of Carollo and
Mendez, his former boss with whom he spends Christmas Eve. Despite reporting directly to the
City Manager Art Noriega, Noriega never even bothered to interview Goldberg prior to Carollo
and Mendez hiring him for Noriega.
143. Goldberg created a new City policy holding that a citation for work without a permit
results in a revocation of the certificate of use (“CU”) and the property and business will be shut
down for not having a CU. Dan Goldberg went out of his way to use this new policy against El
Shopping, shutting down parking garage that had been operating for more than 35 years in the
same condition. Then, with the parking closed, Goldberg, asserting there was not enough parking
for the 30 tenants, revoked the CU’s for each of those tenants, costing Plaintiffs $15,000 per month.
Remarkably, one tenant was a Miami Charter School with political connections who immediately

complained to Joe Carollo, resulting in Goldberg restoring the CU for the one politically connected
tenant and continuing to block all others.
144. Defendant William Ortiz, in his individual capacity, is and at all relevant times was
a key staffer of Joe Carollo carrying out his political targeting of Plaintiffs. Among many other
things, Ortiz would call the Code Enforcement Board members and demand that they a) vote
against any request made by Plaintiffs, and b) apply the maximum penalty for maximum amount
of harm to Plaintiffs, resulting in one board member, Bayona, voting to impose fines of more than
$400,000 on a property that was worth less than $200,000.
145. The Code Enforcement Board, a group created to assist “to bring a Code violation
into compliance” became involved in the corruption through Board Member Yvonne Bayona.
146. Defendant Yvonne Bayona was at all relevant times a member of the City of Miami
Code Enforcement Board taking direction from Carollo and Ortiz to vote against Plaintiffs, and
propose disproportionate, draconian action against Plaintiffs merely because of Carollo’s vendetta.
147. Even the City's Fire Department, a department typically honored and respected
which “serves the community with the highest level of professionalism, customer service, and
responsiveness[,]” became involved in Carollo’s corruption through Adrien Plasencia.
148. Defendant Adrien Plasencia, the Assistant Fire Chief and City of Miami Fire
Marshall, would send fire inspectors with the instruction to manufacture violations at Plaintiffs’
properties.
149. The individual Defendants are liable because they knew they were using their
positions as City personnel to target Plaintiffs on Carollo’s behalf to retaliate against them for their
protected political activity and chill their political opposition of Carollo, in violation of their First
Amendment rights.

150. Defendants worked together to effectuate the harassment campaign against
Plaintiffs.
151. Defendants the City of Miami, Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, Dooley, Marrero, and
Diaz worked to craft policies that can be selectively enforced against Plaintiffs, proceeded to
selectively enforce those policies against Plaintiffs, worked extensively to cause the maximum
amount of disruption for Plaintiffs, and worked to corrupt other City employees and personnel
against Plaintiffs.
152. Defendants the City of Miami, Marrero, Goldberg, Torres, Diaz, and Plasencia
knowingly worked in furtherance of the retaliation, to find, manufacture, or falsely claim violations
on Plaintiffs’ properties, intentionally cause delays and hardships, and selectively implemented
and enforced City Policies against Plaintiffs.
153. Defendants the City of Miami, Dooley, Ortiz, and Bayona knowingly worked in
furtherance of the retaliation by tainting and undermining Plaintiffs’ abilities to appeal, and used
their positions to intentionally target and discriminate against Plaintiffs.
154. All Defendants worked to target and attack Plaintiffs solely because of Plaintiffs’
association and relation to Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla, who were Joe Carollo’s enemies.
155. All Defendants would have, and did, act differently to persons, entities, and
properties not related to Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla.
156. An organization chart of the syndicate can be found on the next page, showing the
cabal of corrupt City officials, their network and commanding positions, and documenting the
channels of inappropriate communications and unauthorized sending of orders between them.


ALL DEFENDANTS VIOLATED PLAINTIFFS’ RIGHTS TO FREE SPEECH,

ASSOCIATION AND ASSEMBLY, AND TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR
REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES UNDER 42 USC § 1983
157. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.
158. The First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association protects not only
the affirmative rights to free speech and association, but also the right to be free from retaliation
perpetrated by the government upon the exercise of that right.
159. Section 1983 provides a private cause of action with respect to the violation of
federal constitutional rights. The Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress ***.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
160. The aim of Section 1983 is to deter state actors from using the badge of their
authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims
if such deterrence fails.
161. The United States Constitution’s First Amendment guarantee to free speech and
free association applies to local and state governments through decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, as well as through the Fourteenth Amendment.

162. Plaintiffs exercised their right to free speech and free association by, among other
things, supporting Mr. Leon in the run-off election through advertisements and hosting a rally for
Mr. Leon on Plaintiffs’ property, by filing an ethics complaint against Carollo, by filing a Section
1983 action against Carollo, and by exposing Carollo’s hypocrisy with his own unpermitted work
and code violations. In addition, Carollo also believed that Plaintiffs had exercised their First
Amendment rights to finance a lawsuit challenging his election and participating in efforts to recall
him from office. Once the other Defendants became involved, Plaintiffs continued to exercise their
First Amendment rights by filing lawsuits, including to stop the demolition of their buildings.
163. Carollo, upon winning office, worked with Mendez and Dooley to immediately
retaliate against Plaintiffs. And, after each of Plaintiffs’ exercise of their First Amendment rights
that were contrary to Defendants, Defendants continued to retaliate.
164. Plaintiffs were targeted for their affiliation to Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla.
165. In addition, causation is also established by the testimony of multiple of Carollo’s
own former staffers, including Steven Miro, Richard Blom, Tanja Quintana, as well as by the
former City Manager and two former Police Chiefs, and the current Mayor.
THE CITY’S CREATION OF OFFICIAL POLICY TO

HARASS PLAINTIFFS TOOK ON MANY FORMS
166. Carollo, City Attorney Mendez, and Assistant City Attorney Dooley began creating
an official policy of targeting Plaintiffs on Carollo’s behalf for political retaliation. The
February 14, 2019 resolution that created a task force to target Plaintiffs’ businesses on behalf of
Carollo, which Carollo himself admitted was official policy.

167. The Mayor stated Carollo was “selectively enforcing or weaponizing code
enforcement against particular property owners” and that “we as a government are being used
as an instrument for political vengeance.”
168. The architects of the corruption of City policy grew to include, not only Defendants
Carollo, Mendez, and Dooley, but also Defendants Noriega, Marrero, and Diaz.
169. The May 27, 2020 meeting between Noriega, the City Manager; Victoria Mendez,
the City Attorney; Rachel Dooley and almost the entire City Attorney’s Office; the Director of
Code Enforcement; Asael Marrero, the Director of the Building Department; and Rene Diaz, a
Building Department Official, at which the City manager, “talking about Bill Fuller” instructed
the City to “revise and update our policies to be more stringent when it comes to work without
permit, clearly define what are unsafe conditions, and shut down all structures that don't comply”;
170. In sum, the City’s official policies targeting Plaintiffs took the forms of
a) administrative policy changes; b) The City’s emails that referred to the “Carollo Investigation”
of Plaintiffs’ properties; and c) the ordinances sponsored by Carollo directly targeting Plaintiffs
properties.
171. The policy changes were narrowly and selectively crafted so as to arm Defendants
to attack Plaintiffs.
172. Carollo, City Attorney Mendez, and City Manager Noriega also created a pervasive
custom of targeting Plaintiffs on Carollo’s behalf for political retaliation.
173. A longstanding and widespread practice is deemed authorized by the policymaking
officials because they must have known about it but failed to stop it.
174. The targeting of Plaintiffs began in December 2017 and grew throughout 2018 with
the support of the City Attorney, becoming official City policy through the City Attorney in

February 2019, and becoming widespread and well known through the new City Manager in May
2020. Not only did the City know about it and failed to stop it, the City executed it on behalf of
Carollo from 2020 on.
175. As Police Chief Art Acevedo testified at trial, City Manager Noriega and the Police
Chief who would succeed him, Manny Morales, “talked very openly about Mr. Fuller . . . very
openly talked about the disdain [Carollo] had for Bill Fuller.”
176. Police Chief Acevedo further testified that the City itself was targeting “Mr. Fuller
and any Fuller related business at the direction of [Carollo] retaliation for Mr. Fuller’s simple
exercising his Constitutional rights to have a fundraiser. It’s not speculation, it is well known,
spoken about openly in the city government about how Joe Carollo has absolutely disdain for Mr.
Fuller.”
177. Acevedo further testified that he would “be very busy and my department will be
very busy dealing with Mr. Carollo and his obsession with Mr. Fuller, and it will be basically
required to inspect and to be going into his businesses on a regular basis and be ready for that.”
178. Acevedo further testified that this “was openly known throughout the city, I mean,
down in the park people talk about it, the community talks about it, it was in wide open knowledge
in Miami that he was being targeted.
179. Given that everyone in the City knew that Carollo’s actions against Plaintiffs were
political retaliation, and that Mendez and Noriega’s actions were also political retaliation, each of
the Defendants named here in their individual capacities are liable in their individual capacities for
carrying out this vicious and malicious scheme to destroy Plaintiffs and drive all of their businesses
and tenants into bankruptcy.

180. Defendants’ actions would “chill a person of ordinary firmness” from continuing
to engage in the protected activity.
181. As a result of Defendants’ retaliation, Plaintiffs are reluctant to participate in the
political process by supporting candidates for office.
182. In addition, as a result of Defendants’ retaliation, Plaintiffs have suffered out of
pocket losses and other monetary harms associated with disruption to their various businesses in
an amount to be proven at trial.
183. A single decision by an official policymaker can establish the existence of an
unconstitutional municipal policy.
184. Here, there were three individuals targeting Plaintiffs with final policymaking
authority: Carollo, Noriega, and Mendez.
185. The City Manager, Art Noriega, had final policymaking authority with respect to
the actions he took because, while he was acting at the direction of Carollo, his actions were
completely insulated from review by the City Commission.
186. The same with City Attorney Mendez. Her actions in targeting Plaintiffs were
completely insulated from review by the City Commission.
187. Carollo could not be reviewed or controlled by anyone, nor were his office meeting
and phone calls with Noriega and Mendez reviewed by the Commission or even traceable by the
Commission, as Carollo, Noriega and Mendez made sure not to leave any email correspondence
or other evidence.
188. In total, Plaintiffs suffered economic damages in excess of $107,115,655.00
because of Defendants’ retaliation and conspiracy.

COUNT I
PLAINTIFF LITTLE HAVANA ARTS BUILDING’S 42 USC § 1983 CLAIM AGAINST
DEFENDANTS THE CAROLLO, NORIEGA, MENDEZ, DOOLEY, DIAZ, TORRES,
MARRERO AND PLASENCIA
189. Plaintiff Little Havana Arts Building, LLC, (“LHAB”) realleges paragraphs 1
through 188 as if fully set forth herein.
190. LHAB was targeted for its association with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla, by which
Defendants violated its rights to free speech, association and assembly, and to petition the
government for redress of grievances.
191. Defendants the City of Miami, Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, Marrero, and Diaz are
liable for violating Plaintiff LHAB’s First Amendment rights by architecting City policies to target
Plaintiff, influencing other departments to selectively enforce policies against Plaintiff, and
mobilizing City resources intentionally against Plaintiff simply because of Plaintiff’s relationship
to Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla.
192. Defendants the City of Miami, Diaz, Marrero, and Plasencia are liable for violating
Plaintiff LHAB’s First Amendment rights for knowingly and willingly participating in the scheme
of harassment and selective enforcement; seeking, manufacturing, or fabricating violations against
Plaintiff; and dealing in bad faith to intentionally disrupt Plaintiff’s business and permits.
193. Together, Defendants the City of Miami, Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, Dooley, Diaz,
Torres, Plasencia, and Goldberg corruptly attacked and selectively enforced city policies against
Plaintiff LHAB.
194. LHAB owns the property at 1513 SW 8th Street with three buildings—Ball &
Chain, Azucar, and a Cigar Shop.

195. The syndicate’s retaliation against LHAB began on February 18, 2018, when
Carollo and City personnel harassed the Valet and took photographs of parked cars. Defendants,
the City of Miami and Carollo used their official positions and Carollo told the operator that he,
Carollo, was “the law” and that he found LHAB and its Valet Operator’s relationship with
Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla unacceptable.
196. Carollo then lied to the Ethics Commission about his involvement and use of his
position. Despite being caught lying to the ethics commission, and being caught abusing his
official position, the City did not hold Carollo or its personnel accountable.
197. Defendants’ attacks continued until the City improperly shut the business down.
198. On March 14, 2018, Defendants handed out cell-phone numbers to residents near
Ball & Chain and instructed them to call them should they hear any loud music. On July 6, 2018,
the Fire Department issued an erroneous Notice of Violation despite Plaintiff having been
instructed by the City to black out “exit” signs. On August 28, 2018, another City Fire inspection
found no violation. On August 31, 2018 a Code inspection found no violation. On September 14,
2018 another Code inspection found no violation.
199. Yet, on September 15, 2018, Defendants attacked again, when three City of Miami
Code Enforcement Officers and a police officer went to Ball & Chain to improperly shut its parking
operation down. Code Enforcement issued a citation and then, with assistance of the police officer,
forced all employees to remedy the violation, which is a gross overstep of Code Enforcement’s
power and procedure. Code enforcement is only empowered to issue citations, which can be
contested. However, Code is not empowered to force an action to remedy or remove an alleged
violation without a hearing.

200. Plaintiff contacted Code Enforcement to inquire as to the September 15th citation
as its parking was legal and the Code Enforcement Officer stated Code must have made a
mistake because the lot was zoned commercial meaning it could be used for parking and no
violation should have been issued.
201. Upon further investigation, it was revealed Carollo fabricated the complaint which
sent Code and Police to harass Plaintiff.
202. The attacks continued. On September 27, 2018, another Code Enforcement and
Police inspection but found no violation. And on October 2, 2018, Carollo and a Member of Code
Enforcement Board knocked on doors to search for people to file complaints.
203. It was on this October 2nd attack that Carollo’s infamous photo was taken, depicting
Carollo lurking in back of Ball & Chain at 9 pm on a Tuesday night. Pictured below:
204. On October 17, 2018, Code Enforcement issued an unwarranted noise violation.
On October 18, 2018, Carollo repeatedly circled Ball & Chain in a City vehicle. Again, on
November 16, 2018, Carollo was spotted loitering Ball & Chain, with Police Officers.
205. On February 20, 2019, the City sent Department of Solid Waste to inspect Ball &
Chain and they found no wrongdoing. On March 26, 2019, Code issued a violation for structure
repairs and Plaintiff immediately began hiring contractors and initiated a new permit. On

March 27, 2019, Code issued a citation for failure to obtain a building permit and Plaintiff began
working to pull an after-the-fact permit but the City intentionally delayed and did not issue the
permit until March 11, 2020—a year after their application was filed.
206. On September 12, 2019, another City investigation of Ball & Chain finding no
violation.
207. On October 15, 2019, Plaintiff filed a warrant application for Outdoor Dining,
meeting all requirements. The City delayed a year then informed Plaintiff it would need to file
for a separate alcohol warrant application and continued its harassment by stating the Outdoor
Dining Warrant cannot be approved separately from the warrant for outdoor liquor consumption—
despite being at odds with its own City Code.
208. On January 7, 2020, Police entered Ball & Chain but found no violation. On
January 8, 2020, Code conducted a health inspection and found no violation. On March 7, 2020,
the Fire Department inspected but found no violation. On April 21, 2020, City Police found no
violation for Covid restrictions. And on May 16, 2020, Police found no violation with the
Certificate of Use.
209. On May 27, 2020, Governor DeSantis was set to pass Executive Order 20-11
Section 3(b) to open restaurants and Ball & Chain spent over $30,000 on food products, labor costs
and safety precaution in preparation. But at 9 pm on May 26, Noriega enacted Amendment No. 1
to Order 20-11 which specifically excluded a “tavern” from being able to open, with the sole
purpose of signaling out Ball & Chain.
210. It is not a coincidence that Plaintiff LHAB was subjected to constant raids and
inspections and that Defendants wanted to harass Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla. Defendants were
targeting LHAB because of its association with Plaintiffs.

211. During these raids, Plascencia, and Diaz, directly or indirectly by ordering
subordinates, would arbitrarily search for, create, or manufacture violations for LHAB’s property.
212. Unsatisfied with the level of harassment achieved against Plaintiff thus far,
Defendants the City of Miami, Carollo, Mendez, Dooley, and Marrero prepared for the “end game”
to shut down Plaintiff.
Background Information
213. As stated above, on March 27, 2019, Ball & Chain was cited for failing to
“pull/obtain building permit for the construction work performed (overhang attached to structure,
floor windows, interior remodeling, stage/band shell).” Despite disagreeing with the merits
underlying the supposed violation, Plaintiffs nevertheless worked diligently with the City to
develop and submit a plan to cure the purported “issues.” Ball & Chain’s only goal was to work
with the City to alleviate all of its concerns and keep Ball & Chain’s doors open, so it filed for a
new building permit on April 15, 2019.
214. Going the extra mile, on or about May 2019, Plaintiff hired Ortus to assist in curing
the four alleged issues regarding the construction work performed and assisting with the new
permit process.
215. Under Florida’s private provider statute, Section 553.791, companies like Ortus
offer services to the public to “stand in” for the local building and code enforcement division. In
essence, a company like Ball & Chain pays Ortus to review plans and applications, and other
documents, and certify that those documents comply with the applicable codes, rules, and
regulations of the municipality. Despite the fact that the private provider charges the customer—
here, Ball & Chain—a fee for providing these services, at all times the private provider is acting
as an agent of and extension of the municipality in reviewing the documents for approval. Ortus

then submits the documents and their approval directly to the City, which issues the appropriate
permits, etc., based upon Ortus’—and only Ortus’—representations.
216. Plaintiff worked tirelessly with the City and Ortus for almost a full year to finalize
a very specific scope of work included in the plans and the building permit, which the City
eventually approved on March 11, 2020.
217. Ball & Chain then hired licensed professionals to complete work in accordance with
the approved building permit plans. The work was conducted during the City’s forced shut down.
From around June 10, 2020 to August 28, 2020, Ortus, on behalf of Ball & Chain, filed all required
affidavits (i.e. plumbing, electric, storm shutters) mandated by the City and Section 553.791.
218. Plaintiff employed counsel to work with the City to have an all-department
inspection of Ball & Chain, ensuring compliance with all applicable regulations. The City was
aware of the work being done and approved the completion of all the improvements completed. In
fact, the City identified for Ball & Chain the improvements that needed to be completed to bring
Ball & Chain into compliance with the City Building Code. At no point did the City object to the
work that was done at the request of the City – after many meetings and pertinent analysis – in
order to ensure compliance with the City and Florida Building Code.
219. Based on these submissions and after a thorough walkthrough with the appropriate
City departments, on or about September 11, 2020, the City’s Building Department had no choice
but to issue Ball & Chain its CO, as required under the law.
220. Yet, upon learning that a CO had to be issued under the Code, the City had to find
another way to try to shut Ball & Chain down.

Defendants’ Endgame: An Unprecedented Audit and Weaponized Policies
221. At 8 am, the syndicate’s architects including Noriega, Mendez, and Marrero
corresponded via email. Noriega emailed Marrero and Mendez stating: “let’s get this done today
before noon today.” And on October 22, 2020, Defendants Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, Dooley,
Marrero, and Diaz passed Ordinance 13936 “to provide for the inclusion of building code
violations as a reason for revocation of certificates of use.” Defendants also sponsored a second
ordinance on Oct. 22, 2020, which banned outdoor music in any restaurants that did not have a CU
as of October 22, 2020, which of course applied only to Ball & Chain, since Ball & Chain was
the only restaurant that would have its CU revoked that day.
222. Unsurprisingly, that very same October 22nd day, Defendant Marrero, the head of
Building, notified Ball & Chain that its CO was suspended because as the City claimed, the CO
was “provided based on incomplete, misleading, and/or erroneous information as it relates to the
requirements for fire safety and the American with Disabilities Act.”
223. But when Plaintiff inquired further, it was apparent that the City made this arbitrary
decision without having any calculations to justify the revocation.
224. Ultimately, to justify Marrero’s suspension, the City contrived an unprecedented
“audit” of its Private Provider Ortus, pursuant to Florida Statutes § 553.791(18)—even though it
had worked with Ortus for more than a year in the process and had reviewed its plans and issued
the CO according to those plans. Indeed, the City’s Unsafe Structures Department approved of
all of the work prior to the City issuing Ball & Chain its new CO and CU. Under City Code,
the only actions that the City could take in such audit was to confirm that the required affidavits

by the Private Provider were filed and that inspections were completed. Yet, despite this limited
scope, the City illegally maneuvered a way to shut down Ball & Chain.
225. During the relevant period, by the City’s approximation, there were between 15 and
20 private providers operating within the City of Miami. Of those, Ortus is one of the most
prominent by volume of projects, having reviewed more than 316 projects in the City in the past
five years. The other top private providers in the City during the relevant period are: MDCI,
Universal/Pacifica, ARC, NV5 and NTCI. Every private provider operating within the City must,
and did, complete a set of intake application documents and registration. Every private provider
operating within the City is thus identically confirmed by the City to have all relevant
qualifications, licensure, insurance, and otherwise be able to operate within the City. The City’s
Quality Control Manager is responsible for conducting private provider audits in the City. The
City has never audited any of the top private providers in the City aside from Ortus, and even then,
it was solely in connection with the Ball & Chain audit and not in connection with Ortus’ work for
the City or any other project.
226. Of all of the private providers in the City during the relevant period, the Quality
Control Manager has never audited any, except for the audit of Ortus in connection with the Ball
& Chain audit. Of the hundreds of projects for which Ortus was the private provider, the City has
never audited any other project except for the Ball & Chain audit. For all other private providers
in the City, the City initiated an audit only after first having had cause—i.e., notice to suspect a
substantial problem with the private provider’s work—identified by the City during routine plan
review; by contrast, the City audited Ortus/Ball & Chain with no cause whatsoever.
227. There were only two businesses for which the City chose to “audit” any private
provider’s work and submission to the City: Ball & Chain and the Tower Hotel, both of which

are associated with Plaintiff Fuller—and notwithstanding that the City had already approved
and issued Ball & Chain’s certificate of occupancy approximately one month prior. Indeed, as the
City concedes, in its five years of doing business with the City, even dealing with complex,
high-rise properties, Ortus had never been audited. It was only after Ortus began working on the
Fuller-owned businesses, and after pressure from Commissioner Carollo, that the City saw the
need to do so. Even then, the City did not audit Ortus, as the statute provides. Instead, the City
audited only Ortus’ work in connection with Fuller-affiliated businesses, in violation of the private
provider statute.
228. On October 22, 2020, Ball & Chain received a letter from the City informing Ball
& Chain that based on the City’s “review of permitting by private providers,” the City was “hereby
suspending the Certificate of Occupancy No. BD19005508CO pursuant to Florida Building Code
Section 111.4.” This provision of the Code states, in relevant part, that a “building official is
authorized to, in writing, suspend [ ] a certificate of occupancy [ ] issued under the provisions of
this code whenever the certificate is issued in error or on the basis of incorrect information
supplied, or where it is determined that the building or structure or portion thereof is in violation
of any ordinance or regulation or any of the provisions of this code.”
229. According to the City, the City’s audit revealed that the “Certificate of Occupancy
was based on incomplete, misleading, and/or erroneous information as it relates to the
requirements for fire safety and the Americans with Disabilities Act [‘ADA’].” The suspension
took place immediately and the City ordered Ball & Chain closed.
230. In the end, the Defendants shut down the property because of a fire safety issue,
stating the property needed a sprinkler system installed. However, Defendant Plasencia, who made

the determination of the necessity, relied on plans which either “mysteriously disappeared” or
never existed.
231. When most property owners are instructed to install a sprinkler system, they are
given the option to pay for a “fire watcher.” A fire watcher is essentially a fireman that serve as an
on-duty risk manager while the property owner renovates. However, Defendants Plasencia and
Mendez determined that, because Plaintiff LHAB was associated with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla,
Plaintiff LHAB was not entitled to the benefit of a firewatcher.
232. Contemporaneously with the suspension of the CO, and as a result of the City’s
pretextual audit of Ortus, the City informed Ball & Chain that its CUs “Nos. 2010-000808 and
1405-001154 [were being] revoked pursuant to Section 2-211(b) of the Code of the City of Miami”
because “[t]he Building Certificate of Occupancy, issued on September 11, 2020, [had] been
suspended resulting in the revocation” of the CU.
233. The Zoning Administrator who revoked Ball & Chain’s CU testified that the only
CU he had ever revoked was Ball & Chain’s and that no imminent life safety issue existed at the
time justifying the revocation. Rather, he testified, the only reason he revoked the CU is because
he was informed by the Building Department that the CO was being suspended, and that a business
cannot have a CU if it does not have a CO. That Zoning Administrator further testified this was
the first and only time he was ever informed by Building, or any other department at the City, that
a CO was being suspended and the first and only time he ever revoked a CU.
234. The City’s unwarranted revocation of Ball & Chain’s CU was the key to shutting
down the business, as Ball & Chain could not operate without it. Defendants the City, Carollo,
Noriega, Mendez, Dooley, Marrero, and Diaz implemented their malicious plan not only by
manufacturing a baseless audit but also by taking the extreme measure of passing a law—

Ordinance No. 13936, which was (not coincidentally) passed on the same day that the City
suspended Ball & Chain’s CO and revoked its CU—in order to purportedly justify its ability to
strip Plaintiffs of both of its certificates without any warning or ability to remedy the ruthless
measure.
235. Defendants’ audit constituted another baseless and frivolous retaliatory attack for
three reasons.
236. First, under the private provider statute, Florida Statutes Section 553.791, the City
is only allowed to investigate whether Ortus acted according to its responsibilities pursuant to the
statute and the scope of work for which it was hired. 5 Yet, Ortus was only tasked with reviewing
plans and applications related to the specific cited violations from March 27, 2019: for Ball &
Chain’s failure to “pull/obtain building permit for the construction work performed (overhang
attached to structure, floor windows, interior remodeling, and stage/band shell).” Ortus’ work had
absolutely nothing to do with Ball & Chain’s requirement for fire safety or the ADA. This makes
sense, because fire safety is strictly under the purview of the City and its Fire Department and
cannot be delegated to a private provider. Thus, the City could never have conducted an audit and
then suspend Plaintiffs’ CO and in turn revoke its CU for improper paperwork submitted by the
private provider, which had nothing to do with fire safety or ADA issues. Moreover, the remedies
under the statute as set forth in Section 553.791(13) do not contemplate suspension of the issued
CO. The only remedies contemplated are: (i) a meeting by the parties to resolve the issues (which
never occurred in this matter); (ii) review by the Enforcement Agency Board of Appeal (which in
this matter as to the CO is the County Board of Rules and Appeals (“BORA”), explained further
5
Section 553.791(1)(B) specifically states “Local Building Officials may not replicate the plan
review or inspections performed by the Private Provider.”
below); (iii) a stop work order which is allowed only if a condition of the Building site constitutes
an immediate threat to the Public Safety and Welfare (and cannot possibly be the case here where
the City approved all building plans, participated in the final inspections and issued the CU and
CO based on the completion of the Improvements). Importantly, the private provider did not
submit any documents related to fire safety.
237. Also, any issues related to a necessary Automatic Sprinkler System as part of the
Fire Provision of the Building Code could not have emanated from the Ortus audit or scope of
work. The question of whether “the Automatic Sprinkler System was necessary” was outside of
the scope of the Ortus work and the plans submitted to the City and approved by the City on March
11, 2020. Thus, the City could never have used the Ortus audit as a legitimate reason for
suspending Plaintiffs’ CO and revoking their CU.
238. Second, if the City actually had a legitimate “fire safety” concern, it had two
options—neither of which permitted it to strip Ball & Chain of its CO. (1) Under Code Section
19-26, upon finding “evidence . . . establishing a violation” of the Fire Prevention Code, “the city’s
chief fire code enforcement official . . . may issue . . . a notice to correct the violation or a citation
to cease the violation” with an opportunity to be heard and to cure said violation; or (2) Under
Code Section 19-27, and only upon a finding of a “reasonable likelihood of imminent
endangerment to life, health or property because of a threatened violation” of the Fire Prevention
Code, can the “city’s chief fire code enforcement official . . . [t]ake any action necessary to prevent
such a violation.” The City cites “fire safety” concerns as the purported reason for its decision, but
does not rely on either Section 19-26 nor 19-27. Either way, the City has violated its own processes.
Under Section 19-26, the City failed to notice the violation and give Ball & Chain an opportunity
to cure and be heard. Under Section 19-27, the City failed to find any conditions at Ball & Chain

causing “reasonable likelihood of imminent endangerment to life, health or property,” nor could
they, as there were no “fire safety” concerns at the establishment due to the fire sprinkler issue.
Without any of these explicit findings, the City could have never legally shut down the
establishment indiscriminately.
239. Lastly, the section cited by the Zoning Director as the reason for the City’s decision
to revoke Ball & Chain’s CU – Section 2-211(b) of the City Code – provides that a zoning
administrator “shall revoke a certificate of use” if a business commits any of a list of numbered
violations. While the City does not specify, the City could only be relying on Section 2-211(b)(1)
or 2-211(b)(7). However, Ball & Chain is not the “applicant” under these sections subject to
penalties – Ortus is. Thus, Ball & Chain could not be penalized because it was Ortus, the City’s
own private provider (stepping in the shoes of the City), who submitted the application and the
statements contained therein, not Ball & Chain. In addition, even if Ortus’ applications could have
any bearing on this decision, the applications were only submitted in relation to Ball & Chain’s
CO – not the CU. In fact, the CUs in this case, were issued in 2010 and 2014, prior to any
involvement by Ortus. Thus, Ortus’ application could have in no way ever affected Ball & Chain’s
CU. Lastly, there were no uncured violations at the time that the City revoked the CU pursuant to
2-211(b)(7). Simply put, there is no connection between the building permit and the applications
for the CO and Ball & Chain’s CU, or any inspections regarding fire safety done in relation to the
CU.
240. Defendants’ attacks on Little Havana Arts Building have caused Plaintiff to suffer
monetary damages in excess of $4.36 million. The damage calculation can be seen below.

241. Plaintiff is also entitled to punitive damages to punish, penalize, and deter the future
recurrence of Defendants’ reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence in an amount
to be proven at trial. Defendants’ acts are reprehensible in that it repeatedly violated the City of
Miami Charter and the United States Constitution. Defendants were reckless in their disregard for
Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. And Defendants were, and still are, motivated by an evil intent
to drive Plaintiff out of business and deprive them of their constitutional rights.
242. Plaintiff is also entitled to and hereby demand an award of attorneys’ fees pursuant
to the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Award Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)).
COUNT II
PLAINTIFF LA GRAN FIESTA’S 42 USC § 1983 CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS
CAROLLO, NORIEGA, MENDEZ, DOOLEY, MARRERO, TORRES, MARRERO,
DIAZ, BAYONA, AND ORTIZ
243. Plaintiff La Gran Fiesta, LLC (“Gran Fiesta”) realleges paragraphs 1 through 188
as if fully set forth herein.

244. Gran Fiesta was targeted for its association with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla, by
which Defendants violated its rights to free speech, association and assembly, and to petition the
245. Defendants Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, Dooley Marrero, and Diaz are liable for
violating Plaintiff Gran Fiesta’s First Amendment Rights by architecting City policies specifically
against Plaintiff, influencing other departments to selectively enforce policies against Plaintiff, and
mobilizing City resources intentionally against Plaintiff for the purpose of causing Plaintiff
financial and reputational harm because of its association with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla.
246. Defendant Torres is complicit in the harassment of Plaintiff Gran Fiesta, knowingly
and willingly participating in the harassment, seeking, manufacturing, or fabricating violations
against Plaintiff and by dealing in bad faith to intentionally disrupt Plaintiff’s permits and ability
to bring the property into compliance.
247. Plaintiff Gran Fiesta owns a two-story property located at 521 SW 8th Street with a
Mexican restaurant on the bottom named Taquerias El Mexicano and a lounge upstairs known as
Los Altos (hereinafter referenced together as “Taquerias.”).
248. The property is a hub in Calle Ocho, a meeting place for locals, tourists,
international personalities and dignitaries who are looking for a true Mexican Experience.
249. For 36 years, Taquerias has been operating as a cherished addition to the
neighborhood and without any City harassment or interference. However, this changed when
Carollo and his syndicate took power, after which Taquerias became subject to severe harassment.
250. Taquerias became collateral in the City’s retaliation, subjected to constant
inspections and “walk-throughs,” usually consisting of 10 or more armed officers wearing
bulletproof vests, and multiple code enforcement raids, consisting of dozens of code enforcement,

police, fire department officers and inspectors with Florida’s Department of Alcohol Beverage and
Tobacco (“ABT”). These raids were deliberately conducted on Friday and Saturday nights with
the sole purpose of causing substantial business disruption and monetary harm to Plaintiff during
peak business hours.
251. In another episode of Defendants’ retaliation, the City placed a hold on Taquerias’
Outdoor Dining Warrant—which pursuant to Article 6.3 of Miami 21 allowed Taquerias to operate
as an Alcohol Service establishment because of restraint use and exemptions. Defendants claimed
that because Taquerias was allegedly within 300-feet of an alleged “religious” facility (Ministerio
de Juan) Taquerias’ pursuance of the Outdoor Dining Warrant was placed on hold.
252. Showcasing Defendants’ selective enforcement of policies against Plaintiff,
Ministerio de Juan actually shares a wall with and is in the same building as a local liquor store
“El Gato Tuerto,” located at 476 SW 8th Street. As with Taquerias, the CU for Ministerio de Juan
predates El Gato Tuerto’s CU and permit to operate as a liquor store. This is also the case for
thirteen (13) other 4COP licensed establishments operating within 300 ft. of a “religious facility.”
In other words, the City had no issue in allowing a liquor store to operate next to other “religious
facilities,” but revoked Taquerias’ liquor reservation on the arbitrary basis it needed to review its
“compliance with the 300’ distance separation from a Religious Facility.”
253. Outrageously but not surprising, as pictured below, Carollo and Noriega were
spotted on April 2, 2021, on Good Friday, measuring the distance between Taquerias and
Ministerio de Juan, notwithstanding a) that there is no requirement for distance of separation, and
b) that the City Manager is not tasked with conducting such measurements.

254. And in an email correspondence, Noriega confirmed that it was in fact him, in this
photo, on that day measuring the distance between Plaintiff’s property and the alleged religious
facility.
255. In targeting Taquerias, Carollo sought to have the City or ABT to repeatedly inspect
Taquerias in the hopes of revoking its liquor license.
256. Importantly, the incessant and damaging raids have not resulted in a single liquor
license violation by Taquerias. Indeed, ABT confirmed Taquerias fully complied with its alcohol
license. However, that did not deter the City from further attacking Plaintiff.
257. When the inspections by the ABT, accompanied by Miami Police, did not result in
any violations or revocations of the liquor license, Carollo became enraged.
258. He began issuing voluminous public records requests (“PRRs”) for Taquerias and
demanded that the police officers who had inspected Taquerias appear before him at the next City
of Miami Commission Hearing on February 14, 2019 to explain why they had not issued citations.

He also requested the attendance of other City employees to explain why no code violations or
other citations had been issued to Plaintiffs’ Taquerias.
259. The City undertook numerous but warrantless Dry Hour raids of Taquerias,
occurring on multiple days. For instance, on April 3, 2021 (a day after Taquerias staff identified
Commissioner Carollo, Noriega and other personnel lurking outside Taquerias), multiple Police
and Code Officers were dispatched to Taquerias.
260. Again, on May 1, the City including Police, Code, ABT officers and Building
Inspectors entered Taquerias without a warrant and gave a written warning for an alleged violation
who sought to inspect the upstairs venue without a warrant.
261. Again, on May 5, 2021, the City raided Taquerias knowing that it was Cinco De
Mayo. In fact, Taquerias was one of the only two Mexican restaurants raided in the City on Cinco
De Mayo—both were associated with Plaintiff Fuller.
262. Again, on June 19, 2021, Police, Fire and Code Officers raided Taquerias without
reason—in violation of Florida Statute § 933.29.
263. Again, on August 20, 2021.
264. When Defendants realized that the liquor license was not a fruitful avenue to cause
Plaintiff the ultimate harm—a shutdown—Defendants turned to its tried-and-true playbook
strategy of manipulating City code, issuing violations for work performed many years ago, and
relying on a technicality about an outdoor staircase despite the City’s previous approval.
265. The City began repeatedly citing Plaintiff for “violations” for work previously
approved by the City and then moved the goalpost on improvements every time Plaintiff fixed the
most recent “violation.”

266. A glaring example of how the City’s malfeasance hurts Taquerias’ business, on
May 6-12, 2021, a production company wanted to rent Taquerias for the cite of a music video.
Because of the City’s fabricated violations, the City Attorneys’ Office, under Mendez, in an
unprecedented move, called the Event Director to have them refuse to issue a film permit to
the production company, causing Plaintiff yet another lost business opportunity, profit, and
goodwill. Defendants had no legal basis to deny a film permit due to outstanding violations, much
less fabricated violations, particularly given that Taquerias was working with the City to correct
them.
267. On September 15, 2021 (the eve of Yom Kippur, the holiest Jewish Holiday, which
Plaintiff’s principals and employees observe), three Building Department inspectors barged into
Taquerias, unannounced, to conduct an inspection directed by the “City Administration” of a
demolition permit which was closed for four years. When the Plaintiff requested they return later
due to the holiday, they refused and the City said it was not an option to refuse entry to the
inspectors—despite not citing any law or authority.
268. Plaintiff, for the year prior, was participating in weekly calls with the Building
Department but not once did the City raise the demolition permit issue and instead showed up
unannounced on the September 15th religious holiday to disrupt the business.
269. When questioned about the conduct, the City Attorneys’ Office prohibited
Plaintiff from exercising their constitutional rights to speak with City staff to remedy these issues.
270. Six Days later, on September 21, 2021, without prior notice, the City revoked
Taquerias’ CU under Sections 2-211(b)(5) and (7) of the Code and deployed City Police to shut
down the property. In the past five years, the City has revoked the CUs for more than 300

businesses but never without prior notice and a hearing unless for entities associated with Plaintiff
Fuller and Pinilla.
271. Taquerias’ CU was revoked based on a mere technicality regarding an outdoor
staircase. The City’s sole basis for shutting Taquerias down was that the outdoor, second staircase
for the property was within 10 feet of the neighboring lot line, thereby allegedly violating Florida
Building Code § 1027.5.
272. This mere technicality resulted in the automatic revocation of Taquerias’ CU solely
due to Defendants Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, Dooley, Marrero, and Diaz’s passing City Ordinance
13936, which was tailored at targeting Plaintiff.
273. However, the staircase at issue was part of a 2019 building permit (BD19-05503-
001) on which Taquerias had been working with the City for years to ensure it met all applicable
Codes, up until the City abruptly shut down Taquerias. Indeed, Taquerias spent the last two years
and many tens of thousands of dollars making changes to the staircase at the behest of the City,
including replacing the concrete landing at the bottom of the stairs and closing the risers. During
the entire period in which Taquerias was working with the City on the staircase, the City never
once raised the issue of the location of the stairs. Moreover, at no point did the City ever mention
that Taquerias could or would be shut down for this technical violation.
274. Taquerias never received a Notice of Violation regarding its outside staircase.
Instead, on July 21, 2021, after Taquerias had finished spending considerable time and money
improving the stairs in accordance with the City’s comments, a Building Department inspector
noted in his comments to a field check that the staircase was less than 10 feet from the adjacent lot
line.

275. Attorneys for Plaintiff reached out to the Defendants regarding its closure of
Taquerias and how the staircase at issue possessed no imminent risk to life or safety which would
permit closure of the business.
276. In response to Taquerias’ counsel’s requests that the City explain why it was shut
down, the City Attorney brazenly admitted the City’s unlawful retaliation, stating “If your
clients would have ... treated City staff with respect, they would not be in the precarious
situations they find themselves in today.” (Emphasis added).
277. Defendants continued to conspire to keep Plaintiff’s property shut down while
seeking to increase Plaintiffs’ costs. For instance, Defendant Torres during the eleventh hour of
Plaintiff’s repairs decided Plaintiff would have to replace the staircase as the previous staircase
plan was no longer up to code.
278. And when Plaintiff Gran Fiesta appeared before the Code Enforcement Board, not
only did Defendant Bayona vote according to Carollo and Ortiz’s instructions—but Bayona even
recited to the Board Ortiz’s exact words, that “Carollo’s enemy is here today and that we have to
vote against them.”
279. Defendants’ attacks on Gran Fiesta have caused Plaintiff to suffer monetary
damages in excess of $778,344.00. A breakdown of these damages can be seen in the image below.

COUNT III
PLAINTIFF BRICKELL STATION PARTNERS’ 42 USC § 1983 CLAIM AGAINST
DEFENDANTS CITY OF MIAMI, CAROLLO, NORIEGA, MENDEZ, DOOLEY,
MARRERO, AND DIAZ
282. Plaintiff Brickell Station, LLC, (“Brickell Station”) realleges paragraphs 1 through
188 as if fully set forth herein.

283. Brickell Station was targeted for its association with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla,
by which Defendants violated its rights to free speech, association and assembly, and to petition
the government for redress of grievances.
284. Defendants City of Miami, Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, Dooley, Marrero, and Diaz,
colluded to conjure fictitious building violations on Plaintiff Brickell Station’s property; and
additionally, to immediately altered longstanding City practices and policies in the building and
legal departments specifically to adversely impact the sale of Brickell Station.
285. The effective City policy allowed the task of bringing properties into compliance
to be placed on the property buyers in a trilateral agreement between the City, the buyer, and the
seller. However, Defendants refused to extend this policy to Plaintiff Brickell Station because of
its association with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla .
286. Plaintiff Brickell Station was under contract to sell the property. However,
Defendants the City, Diaz, and Marrero baselessly accused Plaintiff of having done work without
a permit, when the City’s own microfilm department knew that all the work they accused Plaintiffs
of doing without a permit had been done years ago with a permit.
287. And, Defendants’ meritless violation attached to Plaintiff Brickell Station’s
property.
288. Plaintiff asked the City to utilize the existing City policy to allow the buyer to enter
into a trilateral agreement to bring the building into compliance. And, as little as one week before
Plaintiff’s would-be-sale of Brickell Station—another property owner utilized this very type of
agreement.

289. But, because of Plaintiff’s relation to Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla, Defendants
Dooley, Diaz, and Marrero each refused to extend this policy to Plaintiff Brickell Station—
stating such a favorable policy “was not available to them.”
290. Then, Defendants conspired to not extend this policy to Plaintiff—not create
hurdles—but to completely upend Plaintiff’s ability to sell the property.
291. Defendants’ attacks on Brickell Station have caused Brickell Station, LLC to suffer
monetary damages in excess of $3.8 million. A breakdown of this amount can be seen in the image
below.

COUNT IV
PLAINITIFF PIEDRA VILLAS 42 USC § 1983 CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS THE
CITY OF MIAMI, CAROLLO, NORIEGA, MENDEZ, DOOLEY, MARRERO, DIAZ
AND PLASENCIA
294. Plaintiff Piedra Villas, LLC, (“Piedra Villas”) realleges paragraphs 1 through 188
as if fully set forth herein.
295. Piedra Villas was targeted for its association with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla, by
296. Defendants the City of Miami, Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, and Marrero are liable
for violating Plaintiff Piedra Villas’ First Amendment rights by crafting City policies specifically
against Plaintiff, influencing other departments to selectively enforce policies against Plaintiff, and
financial and reputational harm because of its association with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla.
297. Defendants the City of Miami, Marrero, Diaz, and Plasencia are liable for the undue
harassment of Plaintiff Piedra Villas, intentionally seeking, manufacturing, or fabricating
violations against Piedra Villas and by dealing in bad faith to intentionally disrupt Piedra Villas’
permits and ability to bring the property into compliance.
298. Plaintiff Piedra Villas owns property located at 2614 SW 8th Street (the “Piedra
Villas Property”), which was originally erected in 1930. It is comprised of an approximately
17,000 square foot building with twenty-four (24) residential apartments and four (4) retail spaces.

299. The City prevented Plaintiff from renting a retail space and two apartments at the
Piedra Villas Property and is currently attempting to demolish the structure.
300. After Carollo was elected, on May 9, 2019, the City issued the first of two Unsafe
Structure Notices relating to the Piedra Villas Property.
301. On December 2, 2020, Defendants, including Marrero and Diaz entered a third
Unsafe Structure Notice (BB20200220082614) for failure to obtain the required 40-50-Year
Recertification Process.
302. Thereafter, Plaintiff hired: (a) JCD Architect, Inc. to prepare the plans, (b) Roman
Engineering & Associates as the structural engineer, and (c) Fritz Masson as the permit expeditor.
303. On August 6, 2021, Masson submitted the 40 Year Recertification.
304. On September 1, 2021, JCD Architect attempted to submit plans to address the
issues identified in the 40 Year Certification.
305. At that time, the Unsafe Structures department, stated that it would not be possible
for Fuller to submit plans until his mother, Miriam Fuller, who is a partner in the Piedra Villas
Property, entered into a Compliance Agreement.
306. The Compliance Agreement was a contract of adhesion and the City prevented
Fuller from having it reviewed by an attorney.
307. The City would not allow Plaintiff to repair any work or submit any plans until the
property had a compliance agreement. And, faced with the potential demolition of the property
and left with no other choice, Miriam Fuller signed the Compliance Agreement. Of course, this is
the same Compliance Agreement that the Defendants, including the City, Marrero, and Diaz,
would later in eventually in bad faith, intentionally work to collapse.
308. Shortly after signing the Compliance Agreement and realizing that Piedra Villas

was operating responsibly to meet those deadlines, the City, in bad faith, sought to interfere with
Plaintiff’s ability to comply.
309. For example, Defendant Plascencia, the Assistant Fire Chief, instructed his
subordinates to go out and find, or rather manufacture, violations on the Piedra Villas property to
derail its ability to comply with the compliance agreement.
310. And, on October 7, 2021, Alberto Diaz from the City Fire Department requested all
of the dimensions for the back staircases of the Piedra Villas Property.
311. The subject staircases had existed on the Piedra Villas Property for more than 80
years and had been reviewed and approved by the City Fire Department during the Fire
Department’s annual review.
312. They had never been deemed unsafe or not in compliance. Moreover, due to the
passage of time, the staircases had been grandfathered in.
313. Plascencia’s request for the dimensions of the staircases was not unintentional
given that he likely knew (or did actually know) that the dimensions of the staircases would not
meet the current fire code standards, despite the fact that the dimensions would not need to meet
the current fire code standards given that they were grandfathered in.
314. Not surprisingly, thereafter, Piedra Villas received new comments related to the
back staircases on the building, which were not part of the scope of the Unsafe Structure Notice.
315. Plaintiff requested that the City provide him with the citation to the City Building
Code that required the requested reparation to the staircases. Again, not surprisingly, the City did
not provide the citation because there was none.
316. In addition, at the meeting that proceeded to occur that week between City Fire
Department officials and Plaintiff, neither of the Fire Department officials in attendance at the

meeting, Enrique Arango and Plascencia, could identify any section of the Code that would
require the requested work on the back staircases.
317. This type of gamesmanship has resulted in the Fire Department being one of the
few departments that has not approved the reparation, which has caused Piedras Villas to incur a
substantial amount of time and money related to the design work on the project.
318. From late 2021 until February 2022, Fuller and the team continued to engage in
good faith and substantial efforts to proceed with the approval process and to resolve the City’s
issued violations.
319. All the while, Piedra Villas incurred excessive expenses related to the project
delays. Given the amount of time the City had delayed, Plaintiff had to enter into a second
Compliance Agreement. Over the next two months Plaintiff continued working when the City
inexplicably cancelled the permit process.
320. Specifically, on April 20, 2022, recognizing that Public Works for some reason was
not showing as approved despite the permit having been closed, Fuller reached out to the reviewer
on the file to confirm that he had updated the file to show that Public Works had also signed off
on the plans.
321. During this call, the reviewer, Owen Karickhoff (“Karickhoff”) informed Fuller
that he was unable to update the Public Works status to “approved” because the EPlan was showing
the plan status had been changed to “cancelled.”
322. Karickhoff took a screenshot of the EPlan and sent it to Fuller.
323. As Karickhoff had explained, the screenshot stated the following: “Manual Plan
Status Changed to Cancelled- Process has been canceled by Administration: PROPERTY IS IN
DEFAULT OF THE COMPLIANCE AGREEMENT ISSUED BY THE UNSAFE

STRUCTURES PANEL.”
324. As of April 27, 2022, aside from Public Works (which had been approved) there
were only two remaining departments that needed to sign off: Fire and Building.
325. And of course, because of Defendants the City, Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, Dooley,
and Marrero’s passing of Ordinance 11936 which calls for a mandatory revocation of CU’s for
building violations—this policy has been used to justify the City’s non-issuance of a CU, resulting
in damages to Plaintiff.
326. However, because the City had canceled the permitting process, Piedras Villas
could not proceed and faces the imminent demolition of its unique, historical, and valuable
Property.
327. Defendants’ attacks on Piedra Villas have caused Piedra Villas to suffer monetary
damages in excess of $4.7 million. A breakdown of this damage amount can be seen in the image
below.

COUNT V
PLAINTIFF YO AMO CALLE SIETE’S 42 USC § 1983 CLAIM AGAINST
DEFENDANTS THE CITY OF MIAMI, CAROLLO, NORIEGA, MENDEZ, DOOLEY,
MARRERO, AND DIAZ
330. Plaintiff Yo Amo Calle Siete, LLC, (“Calle Siete”) realleges paragraphs 1 through
194 as if fully set forth herein.
331. Calle Siete was targeted for its association with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla, by
which Defendants violated its rights to free speech, association and assembly, and petition the
liable for violating Plaintiff Calle Siete’s First Amendment rights by crafting City policies
specifically against Plaintiff, influencing other departments to selectively enforce policies against
Plaintiff, and mobilizing City resources intentionally against Plaintiff for the purpose of causing
Plaintiff financial and reputational harm because of its association with Plaintiffs Fuller and
Pinilla.

333. Defendants the City of Miami, Diaz, and Marrero are liable for the harassment of
Plaintiff Calle Siete, intentionally seeking, manufacturing, or fabricating violations against
Plaintiff and by dealing in bad faith to intentionally disrupt Plaintiff’s permits and ability to bring
the property into compliance.
334. Plaintiff owns a property at 1568 SW 7th street, which the City had issued permits,
and Plaintiffs were in the process of selling the property with the permits – with an executed
purchase and sale agreement for $2.7 million when: (1) the City revoked the building permit it had
issued thereby scuttling the sale at a price of $2.7 million; (2) causing a reappraisal of the value of
the property at a lower value; and (3) causing Plaintiffs to lose their construction loan due to the
lower value and the City’s actions.
335. Defendant Noriega instructed the building department, including Marrero, and
Diaz to improperly impose an unsafe structure violation on Calle Siete. The building department
willingly complied.
336. Defendants imposed a violation and Plaintiff pulled a permit to fix the alleged
violation—however the City, Dooley, Marrero, and Diaz then improperly withdrew Plaintiff’s
permit alleging the property was not in compliance with the permit.
337. And, only after the City was taken to Court and despite the negative impact such
alleged violations had, the City admitted violations should have never been imposed on Calle Siete.
338. Eight months later, however, after the City succeeded in preventing the sale at $2.7
million, Dooley admitted in open court that the City had been wrong to revoke the permits as “the
City had a chance to review all of the internal filings that occurred, along with that Compliance
Agreement, [ ] it was determined that [Calle Siete was] in compliance.” However, at the time

Dooley admitted the City was wrong, she believed the sale of the property had gone through and
that the City had failed to scuttle the sale.
339. As a result of this erroneously issued violation as part of Defendants’ conspiracy
against Plaintiffs, the bank collapsed Plaintiffs’ construction loan facility, forcing Plaintiffs to pay
down the existing loan by $400,000.
340. And, as a result of Dooley’s admission of the property’s compliance, the permit
was reinstated. The property is now being actively marketed for sale for $2.3 million, causing an
additional loss of at least $400,000 on the sale price alone, plus all of the money the City caused
Plaintiffs to expend on the permits and impact fees and the litigation with the City.
341. However, even after Defendant Dooley’s admission of the property’s compliance,
the City has continued to harass Plaintiff. For instance, as pictured below, Defendant Diaz recently
instructed their personnel to trespass onto Calle Siete, ignoring not one but two property fences, to
search for violations.
342. Defendants’ attacks on Yo Amo Calle Siete have caused Plaintiff to suffer
monetary damages in excess of $7.97 million. A breakdown of the damages can be seen in the
image below.
COUNT VI
PLAINITIFF BEATSIK’S 42 USC § 1983 CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS THE CITY
OF MIAMI, CAROLLO, NORIEGA, MENDEZ, DOOLEY, MARRERO AND DIAZ
345. Plaintiff Beatstik, LLC, (“Beatstik”) realleges paragraphs 1 through 188 as if fully
set forth herein.
346. Beatstik was targeted for its association with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla, by which

347. Defendants the City of Miami, Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, and Marrero are liable
for the harassment of Plaintiff Beatstik by crafting City policies specifically against Plaintiff,
influencing other departments to selectively enforce policies against Plaintiff, and mobilizing City
resources intentionally against Plaintiff for the purpose of causing Plaintiff financial and
reputational harm because of its relationship with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla.
348. Defendants the City of Miami, Diaz, and Marrero are complicit in the harassment
of Plaintiff Beatstik by intentionally seeking, manufacturing, or fabricating violations against
Plaintiff and by dealing in bad faith and intentionally disrupting Plaintiff’s permits.
349. Plaintiff Beatstik owns the real property located at located at 439 NW 4th Avenue.
350. This property, which dates back to 1946, is a culturally and historically significant
structure measuring over 15,000 square feet.
351. Its historical significance to the Overtown community is immeasurable and, from
an architectural perspective, it both meets and exceeds the criteria required for historical
designation.
352. The property was purchased by Plaintiff Beatstik from Carl “Moon” Mullins, the
owner of Moon Enterprises since 1962. Mr. Mullins was distinguished as one of the first Black
Metro Transit Authority Bus Drivers to be assigned a route on Miami Beach
353. The property originally included a grocery store, hotel, liquor store, lounge, pool
hall, restaurant, laundry mat, and a rental property.
354. In 2019, the property was leased by Plaintiffs to Copper Door Properties for the use
of a bed and breakfast that was featured in Vogue magazine and was praised by Mayor Francis
Suarez.

355. Because Plaintiffs had established another culturally significant property, this time
in Overtown, the City issued several violations to the property seeking to shut down the business
to intentionally harm Plaintiffs without regard to the negative consequences to Copper Door
Properties or the Overtown community.
356. As the City has done with the other Plaintiffs, the City again made special rules for
Plaintiff, making it impossible to resolve the citations. This eventually led to the loss of the tenant
and the bed and breakfast.
357. This includes the property being subjected to Defendants the City, Carollo,
Noriega, Mendez, Dooley, Marrero, and Diaz’s passing of the targeted Ordinance 13936 mandating
the automatic revocation of CU’s for businesses with building violations, which Defendants have
used to justify non-issuance of CU.
358. The property is currently leased to Adrian Sotolongo (“Sotolongo”) to continue the
hotel operations.
359. Sotolongo intended to build-out the ground floor of the property for a
restaurant/bar. To that end, Sotolongo first submitted a set of plans for review on December 17, 2021.
360. These plans were sent to Paola Rodriguez and Taylor Reid (“Reid”) at the Unsafe
Structure Department with a carbon copy to Defendant Diaz also at the Unsafe Structure
Department.
361. On or about December 20, 2021, Reid responded to Sotolongo, via an email,
indicating that the permit application required a scope of work that more specifically addressed the
violation for prior work performed without a permit and the closing of an open electrical and
remodeling permit, as well as the submission of an approved 40/50 recertification process.

362. On or about January 12, 2022, the Property received an Unsafe Structure Notice
(BB2016017191) for Buildings Or Structures That Are Unsafe, Unsanitary Or Deficient, Constitute
A Fire Or Windstorm Hazard.
363. On February 8, 2022, Sotolongo sent Reid a follow-up email re-submitting the
plans with the corrected scope of work as requested by the City.
364. Reid responded to Sotolongo on the same day requesting further modifications to
the plans to include the area the City was requesting be legalized.
365. On February 16, 2022, per the City’s request, Sotolongo uploaded the revised set
of plans removing the previously cited areas that were incorrect and making all requested changes.
366. Under a typical scenario, once a party receives an Unsafe Structure Violation, that
party is provided a hearing date.
367. At the hearing, that party appears before the City’s Unsafe Structures Panel and an
Order is then issued.
368. On February 18, 2022, the City’s Order of the Unsafe Structures Panel was issued
(the “Beatstik Order”) without a hearing.
369. Inherent in the Beatstik Order is the City’s obligation to ensure that it is not delaying
the reparation efforts and that it is performing those tasks that are within its control and which
Beatstik is dependent on in order to meet the deadlines, such as granting timely approval to the
plans that have been submitted. Otherwise, the City would be permitted to refuse to respond to
Beatstik’s timely-submitted plans and then argue that it has a right to demolish Beatstik’s property.
370. Upon receiving the Beatstik Order, immediate efforts were made to comply by
Plaintiff.

371. Indeed, the day after the hearing before the Unsafe Structures Panel, Sotolongo sent
an email to the City stating “we are ready to submit for permit if you think this plan is good to
continue. . .” and requested an opportunity to meet at the City’s office.
372. The City failed to respond to Sotolongo’s email for a period of 10 days, and no
resolution on the pending issues was reached.
373. When it became clear that Beatstik would not be able to meet the deadlines in the
Order given the City’s delays in responding, Sotolongo went to visit the City and specifically
discussed the delays.
374. In that meeting, Sotolongo requested an extension of the deadlines in the Beatstik
Order (which the City possesses the ability to grant pursuant to the language of the Order).
375. At that meeting, the City told Sotolongo that he could not grant an extension
until Beatstik’s plans were submitted.
376. This response essentially placed Beatstik in a catch-22 scenario because the City
refused to accept the plans and yet, at the same time, was stated that it would not grant
extensions to the Beatstik Order until the plans were submitted and accepted.
377. By the time that the City communicated this to Sotolongo, the deadline for
Beatstik’s opportunity to appeal the Beatstik Order had expired, thereby leaving Beatstik with no
administrative remedy.
378. Separately, in an email dated February 28, 2022, the City informed Sotolongo that
while the plans now included everything requested in the prior communications with the City,
Sotolongo now needed to submit documents and drawings in order for the City to release the permit
application package.

379. Specifically, the City, for the first time since December 17, 2021, informed
Sotolongo that he would need to submit all of the following: a) plans for the second level of the
building; b) separate drawings for applicable trade work such as electrical, mechanical and
structural, if work under those trades were to be performed; c) permit applications and owner
affidavits authorizing the aforementioned work to occur at the property; and d) other required
documentation specific to the work proposed- which the City provided no specificity for.
380. Throughout all of the foregoing communications, despite being copied on each one
by Sotolongo, Defendant Diaz did not informed Sotolongo of the additional requirements included
in the February 28, 2022 email.
381. This was intentional because the City knew it would not be possible for Sotolongo
to meet these requirements by the March 3, 2022 “deadline.”
382. Indeed, that was exactly what played out. On April 21, 2022 Sotolongo went to the
Unsafe Structure Department at the City to submit the exhaustive list of items that he was able to
accumulate in such a small period of time, where he was told by Reid that he had missed the March
3, 2022 deadline and, as a result, was no longer in compliance with the Notice and could not be
issued a permit.
383. More specifically, he was told by Reid that the property would be subject to
demolition.
384. To be clear, the City indicated that it preferred to demolish a 76-year-old historical
structure with deep ties to the Overtown community rather than allow a small business owner
working in earnest to meet the City requirements to operate a business.
385. And, even the Historic Designation on the property is no longer enough to stop the
City’s vengeance since Defendants the City of Miami, Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, Dooley, and

Marrero’s passing of Ordinance 14118 allowing for its demolition.
386. Regarding fines imposed on the property by the City, Defendants the City of Miami,
Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, Dooley, and Marrero have also targeted Plaintiff Beatstik through the
passage of Ordinance 14057 limiting mitigation of fines, passed for the reason of furthering the
syndicates’ retaliatory agenda.
387. Defendants’ attacks on Beatstik have caused Beatstik, LLC to suffer monetary
damages in excess of $8.34 million. A breakdown of these damages can be seen in the image
below.

COUNT VII
PLAINITIFF EL SHOPPING’S 42 USC § 1983 CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS THE
CITY OF MIAMI, CAROLLO, NORIEGA, MENDEZ, DOOLEY, MARRERO, DIAZ,
BAYONA, AND GOLDBERG
390. Plaintiff El Shopping, LLC, (“El Shopping”) realleges paragraphs 1 through 188 as
if fully set forth herein.
391. El Shopping was targeted for its association with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla, by
liable for violating Plaintiff’s First Amendment Rights by crafting City policies specifically against
financial and reputational harm so as to cause harm to Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla.
393. Defendants the City of Miami, Diaz, Marrero, Goldberg, and Bayona are complicit
in the harassment of Plaintiff, knowingly and willingly participating in the harassment, seeking,
manufacturing, or fabricating violations against Plaintiff and by dealing in bad faith to
intentionally disrupt Plaintiff’s permits and ability to bring the property into compliance.
Plaintiff El Shopping, LLC owns the building located at 300 SW 12th Avenue and its adjacent
parking garage (“the El Shopping Property”).
395. After Joe Carollo’s retaliation and manipulations to shut down parking at Ball &
Chain, Plaintiff LHAB began using El Shopping’s parking facility for Ball & Chain valet
operations. Carollo, enraged that Plaintiffs withstood his attack followed Plaintiffs movements

and, alongside Defendants, began targeting El Shopping.
396. At Carollo’s insistence, Code issued violations which were quickly resolved by
Plaintiff.
397. In September of 2020, Defendants the City, Marrero, and Diaz issued an Unsafe
Structure Notice (Process No. BB2020017697) on the property. The adjacent parking garage was
built in the 1980s with rebar intentionally exposed to allow for future construction. This building
style was common trade practice and Plaintiff confirmed with engineers that it had had no
detrimental affect on the building’s safety and structural integrity. Yet Defendants still issued this
citation.
398. The building violation, despite not imposing any danger, caused El Shopping’s
parking garage to have its CU automatically revoked because of Defendants the City, Carollo,
Noriega, Mendez, Dooley, Marrero and Diaz’s policy change, Ordinance 13936.
399. This did not automatically revoke the CU for the other building on Plaintiff’s
property.
400. On or about May 21, 2021, a hearing was held before the Unsafe Structures Panel
and the Final Order was issued.
401. On October 13, 2021, as a result of the threats made by the City to demolish the El
Shopping Property, El Shopping was left with no alternative but to sign a Compliance Agreement,
which set forth the same conditions as those imposed in the Compliance Agreement signed by
Tower Hotel and Piedra Villas.
402. The Compliance Agreement required the following: a) All plans within 30 Calendar
days of signing agreement; b) permits obtained and paid for within 60 days of the approval of the
Plans; and c) repairs completed within 90 days of the issuance of the Permit.

403. On October 19, 2021, El Shopping submitted the plans.
404. On March 2, 2022, the Plans were approved by the City.
405. On March 3, 2022, the City issued the Permit (Permit #BD21-024430-001-B001),
thereby giving El Shopping until at least June 1, 2022 to complete the repairs pursuant to the terms
of the Compliance Agreement.
406. On March 7, 2022, the City issued a Stop Work Order because it requested that El
Shopping obtain a Shoring Permit. The Shoring Permit involve nor affect any of the work Plaintiff
needed to perform to bring the property into compliance. However, Defendants issued the
requirement to cause Plaintiff costs and delays.
407. On March 28, 2022, the City lifted the Stop Work Order and reinstated the Permit.
408. On April 14, 2022, El Shopping submitted its latest set of corrections based on the
City’s comments to the work dated March 30, 2022.
409. By letter dated April 22, 2022, but not received by El Shopping until May 9, 2022,
Defendant Dooley advised that both the Unsafe Structure Panel Order and Compliance Agreement
were in default and that “failure to comply [with the Compliance Agreement] or seek timely
extension form [sic] the Building Official shall result in the City demolishing the structures(a) at
issue.”
410. On May 2, 2022, the City issued a second Stop Work Order on the El Shopping
Property, thereby precluding El Shopping from engaging in any further reparation work.
411. At the time, El Shopping had until June 1, 2022 to complete the repairs.
412. Rather than allow that to happen, the City, including Defendants Marrero and Diaz,
collapsed the compliance agreement, revoked the permit, and prevented Plaintiff from completing
the work that the City was demanding be performed.

413. Also in 2022, the Code Department participated in the harassment by during the
same interaction, issuing the same exact violation three different times for Plaintiff’s property.
414. As a technicality, El Shopping’s parking garage sits on top of “three different,”
contiguous parcels of land. All owned by El Shopping. Even so, the parking garage only extends
onto the two additional parcels a minute amount.
415. However, because of this technicality, Defendants, on the same day and for the
same reason, issued three different citations for each parcel.
416. Plaintiff went before Defendant Bayona and the Code Compliance Board to address
and resolve the issue. And the issue was addressed but the Board, with Bayona’s influence, only
resolved one of the citation—leaving the other two citations open and accruing fines daily.
417. After El Shopping’s parking garage had its CU automatically revoked, Plaintiff was
further harassed by Defendant Goldberg, who, at Carollo's behest and with the intention of causing
Plaintiff the most amount of harm, revoked the CU of every tenant for El Shopping simply because
“there was not enough parking” to accommodate all the tenants of El Shopping.
418. Goldberg revoked every certificate of use for El Shopping’s tenants—including
a Miami Dade Sanctioned Charter School.
419. Showcasing the collusion between Carollo and Goldberg, El Shopping's tenant, the
Charter School, went directly to Carollo and informed him that the reconvocation of their
Certificate of Use not only constituted a political firestorm but was also in violation of the
requirements that the Miami Dade County Public Schools must be informed before any revocation
of a school. Carollo then had Goldberg to issue a temporary permit to the school.
420. Thereafter, Goldberg acting in furtherance of Carollo’s scheme, bottlenecked
Plaintiff’s tenants by having the tenants come one by one to apply for temporary permits.

421. However, the City refuses to this day to issue any certificates of use for the property,
thereby depriving Plaintiffs of the ability to rent the property to generate income, causing losses
well in excess of $200,000 in rental income, and preventing Plaintiffs from selling the property for
$2.5 million.
Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, Dooley, Marrero, and Diaz have also targeted Plaintiff El Shopping
through the passage of Ordinance 14057 limiting mitigation of fines, passed for the reason of
furthering the syndicates’ retaliatory agenda.
423. Defendants’ attacks on El Shopping have caused El Shopping, LLC to suffer
monetary damages in excess of $8.19 million. A breakdown of these damages can be seen in the
picture below.

COUNT VIII
PLAINITIFF TOWER HOTEL’S 42 USC § 1983 CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS THE
CITY OF MIAMI, CAROLLO, NORIEGA, MENDEZ, DOOLEY, MARREROR, DIAZ,
AND TORRES
426. Plaintiff Tower Hotel, LLC (“Tower Hotel”) realleges paragraphs 1 through 188 as
427. Plaintiff Tower Hotel was targeted for its association with Plaintiffs Fuller and
Pinilla, by which Defendants violated its rights to free speech, association and assembly, and to
petition the government for redress of grievances.
liable for violating Plaintiff Tower Hotel’s First Amendment rights by crafting City policies
specifically against Plaintiff, influencing other departments to selectively enforce policies against
Plaintiff, and mobilizing City resources intentionally against Plaintiff for the purpose of causing
Plaintiff financial and reputational harm because of its relationship with Plaintiffs Fuller and
Pinilla.
of Plaintiff Tower Hotel for knowingly and willingly participating in the harassment, seeking,
manufacturing, or fabricating violations against Plaintiff and by dealing in bad faith to
intentionally disrupt Plaintiff’s permits and ability to bring the property into compliance.

430. And, Defendant Torres specifically worked to intentionally delay Plaintiff’s
ability to meet its compliance agreements. For example, for three years, Plaintiff Tower Hotel tried
to get permits and Defendant Torres imposed arbitrary and atypical requirements for permits. On
one occasion, Defendant Torres unilaterally sought to require Plaintiff to provide a “shop drawing”
for an oven hood—which is usually resolved later under a sub permit. On another occasion, Torres
repeatedly forestalled the procedure to obtain a pool permit stating the permit needed processing.
432. The Tower Hotel (the “Tower Hotel Property”), built in 1920, has served as a World
War II hospital and famously hosted African-American jazz greats during the era of segregation. 6
433. In 2012, the Tower Hotel Property was acquired by Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla,
through Plaintiff Tower Hotel, LLC.
434. The Tower Hotel Property consists of 3 structures.
435. Plaintiff’s master plan included: (a) a 3-story, 50 room hotel, (b) a working space,
and (c) an area known as “La Botanica,” which includes the pool and restaurant facilities.
436. After acquiring the Tower Hotel Property, Fuller and Pinilla hired McKenzie
Design as the architect to prepare the plans, RCI as the structural engineer, Ortus Engineering
(“Ortus”) as the private provider, and Globe Services as the permit expediter.
437. On August 28, 2018, Tower Hotel submitted demolition plans to demolish the
interior of La Botanica.
438. All plans were reviewed, approved, and accepted by Ortus and the City and, upon
completion of each stage, were inspected and passed by Ortus at all stages.
6
Chabeli Herrera, This Little Havana hotel once housed Billie Holiday. Soon you could stay there,
too, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 13, 2018, http://tinyurl.com/yc5jxpma (last accessed Feb. 22, 2024).
439. On or about December 19, 2018, Tower Hotel submitted plans for addition and
remodeling of La Botanica (“2018 Remodeling Plans”).
440. On June 12, 2019, Tower Hotel received comments and submitted corrections for
the 2018 Remodeling Plans.
441. On September 10, 2019, the demolition permit was issued (“Demolition Permit”).
442. On September 26, 2019, Tower Hotel submit free-standing plans for pool permit at
La Botanica. (BD19-019681-001) (“Pool Plans”).
443. On October 15, 2019 and on March 16, 2020, Tower Hotel received further
comments and submitted corrections for the 2018 Remodeling Plans.
444. In March 2020, the Covid-19 related shutdown occurred, and the City offices were
closed to the public.
445. This caused obvious delays to the Tower Hotel project.
446. Despite this, on July 2, 2020 (at the height of the pandemic), Tower Hotel received
a Notice of Unsafe Structure (BB2020012200) as a result of work performed without a permit.
447. The Unsafe Structure Notice references the work done on the pool and the internal
demolition of the La Botanica building, which was lawful pursuant to the Demolition Permit.
448. Tower Hotel requested a hearing before the Unsafe Structure Board and, in the
interim, Tower Hotel continued to engage in substantial efforts to get the Pool Plans processed.
449. On or about November 20, 2020, Tower Hotel received a final Order of the Unsafe
Structure Panel (BB2020012200).
450. The Order required the following:
a. Structure A – which is the La Botanica building:
1. Repair or demolish within 135 days;

2. within 30 days from November 20, 2020, plans must be developed

and submitted to Unsafe Structures for approval and then submitted
to City of Miami Building Department; and
1. obtain permits within 45 days from November 20, 2020 (which

Tower Hotel already possessed a demolition permit that was issued
on September 10, 2019).
b. Structure B – Pool:
1. Repair or demolish within 120 days;
2. within 30 days from November 20, 2020 plans must be developed

and submitted to Unsafe Structures for approval and then submitted
to City of Miami Building Department; and
2. obtain permits within 30 days from November 20, 2020 (which is

essentially impossible given one cannot submit plans and obtain
permits on the same day).
451. On December 14, 2020, DERM and other departments began their respective
review of the Pool Plans.
452. On two separate occasions, the City stated that certain reviews were not necessary
and then abruptly, and without explanation, reversed its position.
453. Upon reversing its position, the City then required the reviews and refused to close
the disciplines out at the time of inspection.
454. The first discipline where this occurred was in relation to Plumbing.
455. Namely, on January 14, 2021, subsequent to the November 20, 2020 Order of the
Unsafe Structure Panel, the City determined that a plumbing review would not be necessary.
456. Nevertheless, on April 12, 2022, 10 days before Tower Hotel received the Notice
of Default of the Compliance Agreement and Notice of Demolition, the City reversed its decision
and indicated that Plumbing was Denied.
457. The second discipline where this occurred was in relation to Gas.

458. Identical to what transpired with respect to Plumbing, Tower Hotel was advised on
January 14, 2021 that a gas review was not necessary, only to then be told on April 12, 2022 that
Gas was Denied.
459. On May 7, 2021, the issuance of the permit related to the Pool Plans by the City
was held-up by DERM, despite all other trade approvals having been obtained.
460. Specifically, as a result of the fact that the Pool Plans reference the 2018
Remodeling Plans, DERM stated that it would not sign off on the pool permit until the 2018
Remodeling Plans were approved by the City.
461. Given the situation with DERM, Tower Hotel focused its efforts on obtaining the
permit on the 2018 Remodeling Plans despite the City dragging its feet to grant the necessary
approvals.
462. By way of example, on September 8, 2021, Tower Hotel’s contractor, Moises
Castillo, wrote to the City and stated:
I wanted to follow up on my email from last week. I am wondering

if you had a chance to review my responses to your concerns
regarding La Botanica Pool. If so, when would the address be
unlocked in order to submit the new pool plans. With all due respect
Mr. Ramos, I have been trying to submit the pool plan over 4
weeks now. Can you please advise my client if you need anything
else from me or my client?
463. Those types of delays (such as waiting four weeks to simply submit pool plans)
plagued Tower Hotel’s ability to timely proceed with the project.
464. In or about early October 2021, the Building Department, under Defendant
Marrero, contacted Fuller and Pinilla and advised them that they had to enter into a new
Compliance Agreement for La Botanica or face demolition of both the structure and the pool.

465. As a result of the threats made by the City to demolish the Tower Hotel, on October
12, 2021, Tower Hotel was left with no alternative but to sign a Compliance Agreement, which set
forth the same conditions as those imposed in the Compliance Agreement signed by Piedra Villas.
466. The Compliance Agreement required the following:
a. All plans within 30 Calendar days of signing agreement;
b. 60 Calendar days after plans submitted for permits; and
c. all repairs must be completed within 180 days of issuance of the permits.
467. Given the delay by the City with the 2018 Remodeling Plans and the fact that
DERM was not willing to close out and approve the Pool Plans, the only solution was for Tower
Hotel to resubmit a new pool permit that did not reference the 2018 Remodeling Plans.
468. Accordingly, on October 15, 2021, Tower Hotel submitted the new pool plans (the
“Second Pool Plans”).
469. After submitting the Second Pool Plans, Tower Hotel has engaged in substantial
efforts to finalize all of the required plan approvals and the City has continually thwarted those
efforts by not timely acting in response to Tower Hotel’s requests for assistance and approval.
470. For example, on December 7, 2021, Castillo emailed City officials to inquire as to
the status of the City’s efforts to approve the Tower Hotel plans and stated:
I am following up on the email below. Do we have a schedule

meeting time for this week? We’re in dire need to get a response to
this Zoning comment so we move forward. Please advise.
471. Presently, the only disciplines that are outstanding for the Second Pool Plans are
Public Works, Flood Plain, Structural, and DERM.
472. Nevertheless, on April 15, 2022, Tower Hotel received a letter from the Florida
Department of Health that would have allowed for DERM and Flood Plain to sign off.

473. Despite Tower Hotel’s continuous efforts to engage in the necessary reparations to
the building, on April 22, 2022, the City sent a letter to Tower Hotel advising that it was in default
of the Compliance Agreement and that the City “shall be moving forward to demolish the
structure(s) at issue.”
474. Faced with no other choice, Plaintiffs filed for an Emergency Injunction to stop the
demolition.
475. On May 5, 2022, the day that the parties appeared before the Court for a hearing on
Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Temporary Injunction, wherein the City represented that no
demolition of the properties that are the subject of the action would occur until the Court ruled on
Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for Temporary Injunction, the City pulled a Demolition Permit for
the Tower Hotel Property.
476. And, even the Historic Designation on the property is no longer enough to stop the
City’s vengeance since Defendants the City of Miami, Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, Dooley, and
Marrero’s passing of Ordinance 14118 allowing for its demolition.
Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, Dooley, Marrero, and Diaz also targeted Plaintiff Tower Hotel through
the passage of Ordinance 14057 limiting mitigation of fines, passed for the reason of furthering the
syndicates’ retaliatory agenda.
478. The City’s actions destroyed the long-term lease Plaintiff had on the property for
$6 million for 10 years, caused an additional $800,000 in damages related thereto, and has
destroyed Plaintiff’s ability to monetize and sell the property.
479. Defendants’ attacks on Tower Hotel have caused Plaintiff Tower Hotel, LLC to
suffer monetary damages in excess of $18.29 million. A breakdown of these damages can be seen

in the image below.
COUNT VII
PLAINTIFF VIERNES CULTURALES’ 42 USC § 1983 CLAIM AGAINST
DEFENDANTS THE CITY OF MIAMI, JOE CAROLLO, NORIEGA, DOOLEY,
MENDEZ, ORTIZ AND BAYONA
482. Plaintiff Viernes Culturales/Cultural Fridays, Inc., (“Viernes Culturales”) realleges
paragraphs 1 through 188 as if fully set forth herein.

483. Plaintiff Viernes Culturales was targeted for its association with Plaintiffs Fuller
and Pinilla, by which Defendants violated its rights to free speech, association and assembly, and
to petition the government for redress of grievances.
484. Defendants the City of Miami, Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, and Dooley are liable for
in the harassment of Viernes Culturales by way of crafting City policies specifically against
financial and reputational harm so as to cause harm to Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla.
485. Defendants the City of Miami, Ortiz, and Bayona are complicit in the harassment
of Plaintiff Viernes Culturales for knowingly and willingly participating in the harassment,
seeking, manufacturing, or fabricating violations against Plaintiff, imposing erroneous fines and
violations, and by dealing in bad faith to attack Plaintiff .
486. Simply because Fuller was President, Defendants—the City of Miami, Carollo,
Noriega, Dooley, Mendez, Ortiz, and Bayona targeted Plaintiff Viernes Culturales/Cultural
Fridays, Inc. (“Viernes Culturales”), a nonprofit organization which coordinates the popular
Viernes Culturales/Cultural Fridays art, music and culture festival, which was held on the last
Friday of every month on Calle Ocho since 2000.
487. Defendants the City of Miami, Carollo, Mendez, and Dooley began orchestrating
the usurpation and intentional damaging of Viernes Culturales. Carollo began by having the City
Attorneys Mendez and Dooley investigate Viernes Culturales and Fuller’s role in it. Specifically,
Carollo wanted to learn whether he could use the City of Miami permitting process to steal the last
Friday of every month for his own festival and, with it, the goodwill the organization had created
over its18 years of operation. Mendez and Dooley dutifully complied.

488. During the 18-year history of the Viernes Culturales festival, and right up until
October 2018, Viernes Culturales had never applied for or obtained a special events permit in
relation to Domino Plaza, where a key part of the festival occurred. And, prior to October 2018,
despite its heavy involvement in and support of the festival, the City had never requested or
required Viernes Culturales in its 18 years of existence to pull any type of events permit.
489. Defendants Carollo and the City of Miami started Little Havana Fridays on or about
October 2018 to compete with Viernes Culturales. In fact, Defendants Carollo and the City
promulgated false advertisement about the event to gain support.
490. Defendants Carollo and the City of Miami sought and received a permit for the last
Friday of the month for an entire year for Little Havana Fridays in order to prevent Viernes
Culturales from being able to continue on its normal schedule on the last Friday of each month.
491. At the time that Carollo started Little Havana Fridays, Noriega was still in his role
as head of the Miami Parking Authority. Noriega provided millions of dollars of sponsorship funds
from the Miami Parking Authority to Little Havana Fridays and other events sponsored by
Carollo.Those funds were received via checks, which were personally collected by Richie Blom,
(“Blom”) Carollo’s then Chief of Staff, at Noriega’s office on a monthly basis to allegedly pay the
performers for Little Havana Fridays.
492. After Carollo determined Noriega would dutifully harass Plaintiffs Fuller and
Pinilla, and Plaintiffs affiliated with them—including Plaintiff Viernes Culturales—in February
2020, Carollo pushed the City to appoint Noriega as City Manager.
493. Once appointed, Carollo and Noriega immediately colluded to utilize the City of
Miami to bleed Viernes Culturales.

494. For instance, both Carollo and Noriega were aware that Bacardi and the Miami
Marlins were sponsors that Fuller helped bring to Viernes Culturales. Carollo and Noriega were
also aware that part of the Bacardi sponsorship involved alcohol sampling for patrons of Viernes
Culturales that met the proper age and ID requirements.
495. Carollo was not happy about these sponsorships and the goodwill Viernes
Culturales attained from such sponsors.
496. And so, Carollo and Noriega worked to ensure that Bacardi could not provide
samples at Viernes Culturales on May 21, 2021 by having Noriega prohibit the sampling under the
false premise that an alcohol permit was required.
497. Specifically, Noriega sent Viernes Culturales an email on May 21, 2021 revoking
its right to serve alcohol that evening specifically because Fuller was involved with Viernes
Culturales and it “hadn’t earned” Noriega’s trust.
498. Noriega sent the email despite the fact that it is illegal under Section 54-6.3 of the
City of Miami Code that an “applicant of a permit be given less favorable treatment … on account
of the identity or associational relationships of the applicant.”
499. As if targeting Viernes Culturales because Fuller was its President was not enough,
on February 7, 2022, Noriega, at Carollo’s behest, discontinued any future permits for Viernes
Culturales “indefinitely.”
500. This discontinuance was based on a fabricated narrative that people were walking
outside the limits of the festival with alcohol.
501. After the City successfully shut down Viernes Culturales’ access to Domino Park,
Viernes Culturales moved to Futurama, a building owned by Plaintiff Futurama LLC and affiliated
with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla.

502. Carollo didn’t like this either because his true goal was to use the City to shut down
Viernes Culturales permanently and completely.
503. On October 21, 2022, Defendants Carollo sent Code Enforcement out to Futurama
to cite the Viernes Culturales event with a violation for playing live music without a permit.
504. Defendants the City and Carollo had Code Enforcement issue the citation on
Plaintiff Futurama despite the fact that no law requires private art galleries to get a permit to play
live music at their events.
505. On January 25, 2023 the Board Members of Viernes Culturales and Fuller went
before the Code Enforcement Board to appeal the citation.
506. Carollo knew that the appeal was coming up at the January 25, 2023 meeting and
wanted to be sure that it was denied.
507. To make sure it was denied, Carollo, as he did on other occasions described herein,
had his Chief of Staff, Will Ortiz, reach out to all the members of the Code Enforcement Board
to tell them that Carollo’s political enemy, Fuller, was on the agenda and to vote against him.
Carollo and Ortiz did this despite knowing it was wrong because Carollo testified as much before
a sitting jury on May 1, 2023, that “it would be absolutely wrong to do. It would certainly be
wrong for it to be done.”
508. Defendants Carollo and Ortiz instructed Defendant Bayona on how to vote and
Bayona dutifully followed Carollo’s improper instructions and upheld a baseless and improper
violation on Futurama—improperly damaging and interfering with Viernes Culturales’ ability to
host events there.
509. Carollo targeted Viernes Culturales merely because of its association with Plaintiff
Fuller. In fact, another City Commissioner stated explicitly that Carollo targeted the festival to

“fuck with Fuller.” And, in a sworn statement from Steven Miro, Miro explained Carollo hired
Ben Kuehne to take over Viernes Culturales just because of its relationship with Fuller.
510. As a result of the destruction of Viernes Culturales, Plaintiff Viernes
Culturales/Cultural Fridays, Inc. has sustained extensive economic damages in excess of $10
million, which continue to this day.
511. Defendants’ attacks on Viernes Culturales have caused Viernes Culturales/Cultural
Fridays, Inc. to suffer monetary damages in excess of $9.39 million. A breakdown of these
damages can be seen in the image below.

COUNT X
PLAINTIFF FUTURAMA’S AGAINST DEFENDANTS CITY OF MIAMI, CAROLLO,
NORIEGA, MENDEZ, DOOLEY, DIAZ, ORTIZ, BAYONA
514. Plaintiff Futurama, LLC, (“Futurama”) realleges paragraphs 1 through 188 and
515. Futurama was targeted for its association with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla, by which
516. Defendants the City of Miami, Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, and Dooley are complicit
in the harassment of Plaintiff Futurama by way of mobilizing the City’s resources against Plaintiff,
and stemming from their harassment of Viernes Culturales.
517. Defendants the City of Miami, Ortiz, and Bayona are complicit in the harassment
of Plaintiff Futurama, effectuating the harassment, by dealing in bad faith, intentionally and
baselessly citing Futurama for issues which did not exist and upholding these violations.
518. The City, Carollo, Noriega, Mendez and Dooley have regularly targeted Plaintiff
Futurama’s property.
519. For starters, Defendants worked to harass Futurama’s tenant—Sanguich de Miami
(“Sanguich”)—to the point that it left Futurama’s property to escape the City’s undue harassment.
520. Sanguich was an innovative restaurant aimed to bring remodeled shipping
container, an architectural concept recognized around the world, to create further retail activation
on a part of the street that was a non-descript parking lot.

521. The success of shipping containers for retail activation is not only worldwide but is
also hugely popular in sections of Miami, including Wynwood Yard and the Wharf—established
pursuant to TUPs under City Code.
522. Even former District 3 Commissioner Frank Carollo (Joe Carollo’s brother) was a
“huge proponent” of the business and its location in the refurbished shipping container. In fact,
Frank Carollo even suggested Sanguich partner with the Barlington Group, the management
company for Plaintiff Futurama.
523. Sanguich obtained a business license from the city and state license for preparing
and selling food—working with a City of Miami Assistant Attorney for City approvals. And
Sanguich became a huge success.
524. That is until one week after Carollo discovered Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla
supported his competitor and five days after Carollo won the run off election, when Sanguich was
“radided” by 25-30 City personnel including police, fire, building and code enforcement officers.
525. Just minutes before the raid, Plaintiff called City Manager Daniel Alfonso and
asked if the Sanguich raid was Carollo’s retaliation. The City Manager responded with “si.”
526. The Sanguich owners, Rosa Romero and Daniel Figueredo also contacted Alfonso,
who confirmed the raid was at the direction of Carollo. When Romero and Figueredo went to
discuss with Carollo—Carollo specifically said “I love it [the business,” just “maybe not where
you are” at Futurama.
527. So as to harm Plaintiff Futurama, Carollo, Mendez, and Dooley managed to remove
TUPs solely for District 3, in violation of proper procedure and with no first hearing or public
notice on the issue—depriving Plaintiff’s right to due process and to destroy Plaintiff’s business.

528. Sanguich reopened with a Temporary Events Permit (“TEP”) on January 6, 2018
and that same day, City Code Enforcement showed up to shut them down. Code Officer Yacmany
Salvatierra stating “I’m sorry, this came from above, just know people are watching.” Those
people being Carollo, Mendez, and Dooley.
529. In a testimony to the Ethics Commission Parjus confirmed Carollo and people at
Carollo’s direction were calling to close down Sanguich.
530. When Sanguich asked Carollo why he was so bent on harassing them, Carollo told
Figueredo, “my problem is not as much with you as it is with your landlord[,]” Plaintiff
Futurama .
531. While Sanguich still rented from Plaintiff, the City, Mendez and Carollo’s
retaliation followed Sanguich even outside of their store, at the Gay 8 Festival. While Sanguich
was still a tenant, Carollo orchestrated for the City’s Fire Department, Police Department, and the
Special Events Department to investigate and harass Sanguich.
532. One of the Fire Department Inspectors, admitted, in their 27 year career—"he nor
any of the inspectors had ever received such [orders] from a Commissioner.”
533. Steven Miro, who Carollo ordered to target Sanguich at the Gay 8 Festival,
confirmed Carollo was in constant contact with City Attorney Mendez during the retaliation and
the City and Mendez had further knowledge of the retaliation and failed to properly advise against
the activity.
534. Sanguich relocated and since relocating off of Plaintiff’s property, Sanguich has
not received any retaliation from Carollo or the City.
535. Carollo, Mendez and Dooley worked together to shut down the Sanguich business,
a tenant of Plaintiff, by revoking prior permits, refusing to grant new permits, and changing

existing ordinances and passing new ordinances to prohibit the business’ operation, thereby costing
the owners the hundreds of thousands of dollars they had invested and destroying their dreams, all
to retaliate against Plaintiffs. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Sanguich was forced to end its
tenancy with Plaintiff Barlington Group, resulting in economic damage to Plaintiff Barlington
Group.
536. Plaintiff has suffered monetary damages as a result of Carollo, Mendez, and
Dooley, forcing Sanguich to relocate off of Plaintiff’s property including the loss of rental income
in excess of $12,000 per year.
537. Overall, Defendants have driven away tenants who were celebrated in the
community and cost Plaintiffs hundreds of thousands in lost rent.
538. Long before Carollo took office, Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla were celebrated as
prominent and impactful property owners, developers, and community activists in Little Havana,
recognized and praised for their commitment to the heritage, culture, and history.
539. Along the lines of celebrating Little Havana, Plaintiff Futurama formed a
partnership with History Miami, and The Smithsonian Institute to develop “El Museo,” a first of
a kind museum in Little Havana to celebrate the community’s culture and history.
540. As the Miami New Times wrote in 2017 in an article headlined “Little Havana’s
First Museum, El Museo de Little Havana, Is Coming to Calle Ocho[,]”
El Museo de Little Havana wants people to know there is more to Calle

Ocho . . .
Little Havana’s first-ever museum, El Museo de Little Havana, is set to

open and tell the rich story of the area, through its Cuban history and
Beyond.
Located next to the popular Ball and Chain bar, El Museo de Little Havana
will be a permanent time capsule on the alle, preserving tales and artifacts

of the three-square-mile-neighborhood, which is home not only to Cuban

exiles but also immigrants from Central and South America. The museum
will aim to showcase the social, cultural, and political importance that the
area brings to South Florida. . . .
Resident historian of HistoryMiami Museum Dr. Paul George credits Fuller

and Pinilla for bringing the museum to life. 7
541. However, because of Defendants’ relentless retaliatory, harassment, and
defamation campaigns, the project was never realized, solely because Futurama’s partners were
deterred by Defendants egregious conduct.
542. And, when Defendants erroneously issued the code violation for Viernes
Culturales, they issued the citation to Futurama.
543. At the Code Board meeting on that violation, Ortiz improperly instructed Bayona
on how to rule regarding Plaintiff Futurama’s appeal.
544. The group’s targeting of the Futurama property continues to this day. At the last
commission meeting, Carollo was trying to make sure that an ordinance for a shared workspace
would not allow artists to display their work for show or sale in a shared space or dancers to dance
in a shared space, both aimed at Plaintiffs’ businesses, including Futurama.
545. Defendants’ various attacks on Plaintiffs’ businesses and tenants in the Futurama
building have caused Futurama, LLC to suffer monetary damages in excess of $7.87 million. A
breakdown of these damages can be seen in the image below.
7
Nicole Lopez-Alvar, Little Havana’s First Museum, El Museo de Little Havana, Is Coming to
Calle Ocho, Miami New Times, May 16, 2017 http://tinyurl.com/4k4ph547 (last accessed Feb. 22,
2024).
COUNT XI
PLAINITIFF LITTLE HAVANA BUNGALOWS’ 42 USC § 1983 CLAIM AGAINST
ORTIZ, BAYONA, MARRERO AND DIAZ
548. Plaintiff Little Havana Bungalows, LLC, (“Bungalows”) realleges paragraphs 1

549. Plaintiff Bungalows was targeted for its association with Plaintiffs Fuller and
Pinilla, by which Defendants violated its rights to free speech, association and assembly, and to
petition the government for redress of grievances.
in the harassment of Plaintiff Bungalows by way of corrupting other departments and boards to
selectively enforcing policies against Plaintiff Bungalows; and attempting change city policies to
reroute Plaintiff’s appeal to Carollo.
551. Defendants the City of Miami, Ortiz, Dooley, and Bayona are liable for dealing in
bad faith and knowingly and intentionally using their positions to participate in the scheme of
harassment, improperly influencing the board so as to justify imposition of a cruel fine and
punishment.
552. Plaintiff Little Havana Bungalows, LLC was the owner of the property located at
28 NW 10 Avenue.
553. The property consisted of an older home with citations and fines already accrued
under the prior owner.
554. Plaintiff worked to bring the property into compliance and, due to an impending
sale, sought to mitigate the accrued fines.
555. Plaintiff’s mitigation hearing was set in front of the Code Enforcement Board.
556. And Fuller, who personally appeared on behalf of Plaintiff before the Board, was
able to reduce the accrued fines. However, due to an oversight, there remained an outstanding
citation that was not addressed during the meeting.
557. Because one of the violations on Little Havana Bungalows remained open, Plaintiff
had to bifurcate the property for the sale and seek a second mitigation hearing.

558. Plaintiff’s ability to mitigate fines at the first hearing infuriated Carollo and so
Carollo, Dooley, Mendez, Noriega, Marrero, and Diaz attempted to derail Plaintiff’s ability to
mitigate fines by passing Ordinance 14057 to eliminate the ability of property owners on non-
homesteaded properties (such as Plaintiff) to mitigate fines; and moreover, to forcefully reroute
Fuller on behalf of Plaintiff to appeal an outstanding fine before the Commission instead of the
Code Enforcement Board.
559. The latter policy change was to empower Carollo to directly attack Plaintiffs
Bungalows and Fuller. However, luckily, the policy was not yet in effect.
560. Plaintiff managed to make the last hearing before the syndicate’s policy change
took effect.
561. Even so, two days prior to the Mitigation Hearing, Defendant Ortiz, as he had
done before, called at least two Code Enforcement officers to tell them that “Carollo’s enemy was
going to be before the Board and that they needed to vote against him.”
562. And, moreover, at the hearing, Dooley improperly sought to influence the Code
Enforcement Board’s vote.
563. Dooley was not the assigned city attorney yet spoke to the Board to justify imposing
the greatest possible harm on Plaintiff.
564. Shockingly, Defendant Dooley spoke on a matter she had no knowledge of—
unaware of the date of the compliance agreement or Plaintiff’s closing on the property—with the
sole intention of attempting to justify a ludicrous fine suggested by Defendant Bayona against
Plaintiff because of its association with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla.
565. Defendant Dooley interjected to baselessly allege Plaintiff was in violation of the
Compliance agreement, Stating she “wanted to clarify” the “mitigation is from April 2018” that

the City pulled the demolition permit in “July 2019, more than a year after the conditional
mitigation which allowed for six months . . . after the order.”
566. However, Plaintiff informed Defendant Dooley the agreement clearly stated the
property needed to be “demolished six months from the closing.”
567. To which, Defendant Dooley—despite her call for exponential fines against
Plaintiff—asked “when was the closing . . . what date, that is what we don’t know . . .”
568. Similarly, the City also tried to influence the Code Board by attempting to impose
the new policy—which was not in effect—solely upon Plaintiff. Further, the City attempted to
breach the corporate veil by opposing any mitigation by claiming Fuller as a “repeat offender”
despite the property’s ownership by Bungalow.
569. Pictured below, Defendants Dooley and Bayona making eye contact while speaking
during that April 27 hearing. Defendant Bayona sitting on the far left. And Defendant Dooley
sitting on the far right.
570. As a result of Carollo, Ortiz, Dooley’s influence, Defendant Bayona, Carollo’s
appointee to the Code Enforcement Board, followed the prior board member’s motion to impose
a $7,500 dollar fine proposing Plaintiff pay more than $400,000 in fines on the property, despite

the fact that it was only worth approximately $250,000. In the end, Fuller was ordered to pay a
fine of $85,000, which at the time, was unheard of.
571. An important comparison is that during this appeal, Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s attorney
were interrogated by Defendants for nearly fifteen minutes and forced to justify mitigation
against Defendants’ gross hostility.
572. This is in direct contrast to the Code Enforcement Board’s treatment of an average
appellant as described by Defendant Victoria Mendez and her husband, where it is routine that
Mendez’s husband, who spoke to the Code Enforcement Board for a mere minute was able to
wipe away more than $300,000 in fines to zero – without having properly permitted any of the
work.
573. Defendants’ attacks on Little Havana Bungalows have caused Little Havana
Bungalows, LLC to suffer monetary damages in excess of $376,595.00. A breakdown of this
damage can be seen in the image below.

COUNT XII
PLAINTIFF LITTLE HAVANA ARTS TOO’S 42 USC § 1983 CLAIM AGAINST
DIAZ, AND MARRERO
576. Plaintiff Little Havana Arts Building Too, LLC, (“LHAB TOO”) realleges
577. LHAB TOO was targeted for its association with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla, by
578. Defendants the City of Miami, Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, and Marrero are
complicit in the harassment of Plaintiff LHAB TOO by way of crafting, and influencing other
departments to selectively enforce, selective policies against Plaintiff LHAB TOO.
of Plaintiff LHAB TOO, effectuating the harassment, by dealing in bad faith, intentionally
disrupting LHAB TOO’s permits and ability to bring the property into compliance.
580. Plaintiff LHAB TOO owns the property known as Little Havana Arts Too, located
at 1521 SW 8th Street, adjacent to Ball & Chain, had a Compliance Agreement in place with clear

instruction from Defendants Marrero and Diaz to open a permit that had expired in order to
complete the work to comply with City’s requirements.
581. Once the permit was open, however, Marrero and Diaz reversed their position,
refused to allow the work for the open permit to comply with the City’s requirements, and are
currently seeking to demolish the property.
582. And so, Marrero and Diaz collapsed the compliance agreement, discriminating
against Plaintiff because of its association with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla.
583. This is causing damage to Plaintiffs in excess of $200,000 per year, plus destroying
the $4.5 million value of the building.
584. Defendants’ attacks on Little Havana Arts Building Too have caused Plaintiff to
suffer monetary damages in excess of $12.72 million. A breakdown of these damages can be seen
in the image below.

COUNT XIII
PLAINTIFF CALLE OCHO MARKETPLACE’S 42 USC § 1983 CLAIM AGAINST
DEFENDANTS THE CITY OF MIAMI, CAROLLO, MENDEZ, DOOLEY, AND DIAZ
587. Plaintiff Calle Ocho Marketplace, LLC, (“Ocho Market”) realleges paragraphs 1
588. Ocho Market was targeted for its association with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla, by
589. Defendants the City of Miami, Carollo, Mendez, and Dooley are complicit in the
harassment of Plaintiff Ocho Market by way of crafting, and influencing other departments to
selectively enforcing policies against Plaintiff Ocho Market.
590. Defendants the City of Miami and Diaz are complicit in the harassment of Plaintiff
Ocho Market, effectuating the harassment, by dealing in bad faith, intentionally disrupting Ocho
Market’ permits.
591. In fact, as pictured below, Defendants Carollo and Diaz can be seen at Plaintiff’s
property, looking for violations.

592. Ocho Market owned was the property which suffered the undue harassment and
eventual demolition by the corrupt apparatus.
593. Another target on Carollo’s hit list was Plaintiff Calle Ocho Marketplace, LLC’s
property located at 1380 SW 8th Street, known as “Calle Ocho Marketplace.” Calle Ocho
Marketplace consists of two (contiguous parcels of land. The first has an existing Mexican
restaurant on it and the second consists of an open-air lot where Plaintiff intended to put a kiosk
marketplace.
594. Plaintiff had a lawful Farmer’s Market Temporary Use Permit (“TUP”) and a
Building Permit for the kiosks on the property.
595. In response to the Kiosks, on August 20, 2018, Plaintiff received a letter from the
City which included notice of a code violation of Section 3.63(g) which applied to “[i]noperable
vehicles and other inoperable Recreational Watercraft or equipment.”
596. The City contended the kiosks somehow constituted equipment and the
marketplace was somehow a parking facility and gave Plaintiff less than two days to fasten down
or remove the kiosks.

597. While Plaintiff was consulting its attorney who reached out to the Assistant City
Attorney, on August 31, 2018, City Attorney Mendez filed an Emergency Motion for Injunctive
Relief (“Injunction Motion”) asking the Court to either force Plaintiff to remove the kiosks or grant
the City the authority to remove and destroy every kiosk from the property. The Injunction Motion
was denied.
598. Undeterred, on September 4, 2018, the City (at the direction of Carollo and
Mendez) revoked the Farmer’s Market TUP.
599. On September 6, 2018, representatives of Plaintiff appeared at a Code Enforcement
Board Hearing to discuss citations issued by the City at Calle Ocho Marketplace. During this
hearing, Mendez lied to the Code Enforcement board, claiming the property was less than the
5,000 feet needed for a farmer’s market, when the property was over 8,300 square feet. Mendez
further claimed that the kiosks were a hurricane risk.
600. Carollo also personally appeared before the board and lied, claiming Plaintiffs were
planning a “flea market” and not a “farmers market.” At the conclusion of the hearing and as a
result of Mendez and Carollo’s intentional misrepresentations, the Code Enforcement Board
ordered the kiosks to be immediately removed or they would be destroyed by the City. On
September 11, 2018, the City revoked the building permit for the kiosks. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
removed the kiosks.
601. As a result of the combined efforts of Carollo, Mendez, Dooley, and Diaz,
Plaintiff suffered extensive economic damages, which continue to this day and will continue into
the future as long as Defendants’ retaliatory campaign persists.

602. Defendants’ attacks on Calle Ocho Marketplace have caused Plaintiff Calle Ocho
Marketplace, LLC to suffer monetary damages in excess of $14.48 million. A breakdown of these
damages can be seen in the image below.
COUNT XIV
PLAINTIFF LHAB TRES’ 42 USC § 1983 CLAIM AGAINST DEFENDANTS THE CITY
OF MIAMI, CAROLLO, NORIEGA, MENDEZ, AND DOOLEY
605. Plaintiff LHAB Tres, LLC, (“LHAB Tres”) realleges paragraphs 1 through 188 as

606. Lhab Tres was targeted for its association with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla, by
in the harassment of Plaintiff Lhab Tres by way of usurping the City’s budget and functions in
order to intentionally compete and harm against Plaintiff.
608. Plaintiff LHAB Tres, LLC is a business Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla established to
acquire property adjacent to their Ball & Chain property.
609. Plaintiff LHAP Tres entered into a contract to acquire the property located at 1510
SW 7th St – immediately adjacent to Ball & Chain on the rear side.
610. Plaintiffs were negotiating an extension of time on the contract due to entitlements
that were necessary to improve the property on acquisition.
611. In the middle of these negotiations, however, the seller refused to grant the
extension because the City of Miami was seeking to buy the property, which it did for $1 million.
612. The building is now demolished and the lot is empty, bringing no income to the
City but depriving Plaintiffs of their ability to generate income from this property.
613. Defendants’ attacks on Lhab Tres have caused it to suffer monetary damages in
excess of $5.79 million. A breakdown of these damages can be seen in the image below.

COUNT XV
PLAINTIFF THE BARLINGTON GROUP’S 42 USC § 1983 CLAIM AGAINST ALL
DEFENDANTS
616. Plaintiff The Barlington Group, LLC, (“Barlington Group”) realleges paragraphs 1
617. Barlington Group was targeted for its association with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla,
by which Defendants violated its rights to free speech, association and assembly, and to petition
the government for redress of grievances.

618. Plaintiff Barlington Group, LLC is the master head and umbrella company
responsible in managing all Plaintiff companies.
619. All Defendants through their knowing and willing actions, have improperly caused
Plaintiffs reputational damages.
COUNT XVI
PLAINTIFFS FULLER AND PINILLA’S 42 USC § 1983 CLAIM AGAINST ALL
DEFENDANTS
622. Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla realleges paragraphs 1 through 621 as if fully set forth
herein.
623. Defendants the City of Miami, Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, Marrero and Diaz are
complicit in the harassment of Plaintiff Piedra Villas by way of crafting, and influencing other
departments to selectively enforcing policies against Plaintiff Piedra Villas specifically because of
its association with Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla.

of Plaintiff Piedra Villas, effectuating the harassment, by dealing in bad faith, intentionally
disrupting Piedra Villas’ permits and ability to bring the property into compliance.
625. Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla had rights protected by the first amendment of the
United States Constitution, including the rights to free speech, association, and to redress the
government from grievances.
626. All Defendants willingly and knowingly, under the color of law, deprived Plaintiffs
Fuller and Pinilla of their rights to free speech.
Fuller and Pinilla of their rights to association and assembly.
Fuller and Pinilla of their rights to seek redress of grievances from the Government.
629. Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla have suffered through more than five years of emotional
distress and mental anguish.
630. This emotional distress and mental anguish has been growing and compounding
with each retaliatory act by the Defendants.
631. Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla have been unable to sleep at night. They have spent
many nights awake. The little sleep they have gotten has been disturbed.
632. Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla became concerned for their safety and the safety of their
families.
633. On more than one occasion, Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla called the police
department to report suspicious vehicles parked near their homes or businesses.

634. Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla cannot escape the feeling that the Defendants are
seeking to fabricate evidence, complaints, and violations, all with the sole purpose of shutting their
businesses and destroying their lives, all because they supported Carollo’s political opponent and
then continued to speak out against the City.
635. The City has unlimited funds and resources to try to destroy Plaintiffs, their
businesses, and their families and to shut down their livelihood and their ability to provide for their
kids.
636. Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla spent a large part of their lives building a great business
with a great portfolio of properties and developed a stellar reputation in the community.
637. The injury has not only been mental or emotional. Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla’s
physical appearance and well-being has changed and their physical health has suffered.
638. In addition, Plaintiffs’ ability to conduct their daily business has become
significantly more difficult due to the Defendants’ actions. Potential business partners are
reluctant to do business with Plaintiffs for fear of becoming targets of Defendants.
639. In fact, one businessman who had committed to a major project with Plaintiffs
pulled out at the last minute specifically stating that he wanted to do the deal but could not take
the risk of becoming a target of Carollo and the City. This alone cost Plaintiffs $5 million.
640. Plaintiffs are also entitled to punitive damages to punish, penalize, and deter the
future recurrence of Defendants’ reprehensible conduct and to deter its future occurrence in an
amount to be proven at trial. Defendants’ acts are reprehensible in that it repeatedly violated the
City of Miami Charter and the United States Constitution. Defendants were reckless in their
disregard for Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. And Defendants were, and still are, motivated by
an evil intent to drive Plaintiffs out of business and deprive them of their constitutional rights.

641. Plaintiffs are also entitled to and hereby demand an award of attorneys’ fees
pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fee Award Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C. § 1988(b)).
COUNT XVII
ALL PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM OF CIVIL CONSPIRACY TO VIOLATE THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS
642. All Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 641 above as though fully set forth
herein.
643. Each and every Defendant, the City of Miami, Carollo, Noriega, Mendez, Dooley,
Marrero, Goldberg, Ortiz, Torres, Plasencia, Diaz, and Bayona, knowingly and willingly agreed
to and played a major role in Carollo’s retaliation against Plaintiffs.
644. Moreover, each Defendant benefited from their loyalty to Carollo and disloyalty to
the protections afforded by the United States Constitution.
645. First and foremost, each Defendant was afforded job security by Carollo and his
corrupt network and practice of ousting anyone who did not violate Plaintiffs’ First Amendment
Rights, as he had done to former City Manager Emilio Gonzalez, former Police Chief Colina,
former Police Chief Acevedo, and Maurice Pons.
646. But Defendants even benefited more from their involvement.
647. The City of Miami benefited from its involvement by imposing gross and
outrageous fines and fees, as well as by usurping Viernes Culturales’ event and goodwill.
648. Defendant Carollo benefited by having his personal animus against Plaintiffs Fuller
and Pinilla injected throughout the City Government like a disease.
649. Defendant Noriega was given the City Manager job because he supported Carollo’s
harassment against Plaintiff Viernes Culturales and agreed to assist Carollo’s targeting, replacing

the prior City Manager Emilio Gonzalez, who expressed views that the City was beginning to
specifically target Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla at Carollo’s direction.
650. Defendant Mendez benefited by having Carollo’s protection on her husband’s
fraudulent house flipping scheme.
651. Defendant Dooley was promoted for her involvement.
652. Defendant Marrero was promoted for his involvement.
653. Defendant Dan Goldberg got his job as Director of Zoning in exchange for agreeing
to participate in the conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.
654. Defendant Ortiz was eventually promoted and not terminated as Carollo’s Chief of
Staff.
655. Defendant Torres was promoted to Assistant Director of Building specifically
because he campaigned for Carollo and agreed to do Carollo’s targeting, replacing the demoted
Maurice Pons, who Carollo viewed as not hard enough on Plaintiffs.
656. Defendant Plasencia was promoted from Fire Marshal to Assistant Fire Chief.
657. Defendant Diaz, upon information and belief, received a raise for his involvement,
and protected his house from violations.
658. Defendant Bayona, upon information and belief, protected her house from
violations, and for not pulling permits including for renovations including new windows and
removed interior walls.
659. In fact, upon information and belief, some of Defendant Bayona’s permitless work
is visible on Google Maps’ view. Where in February of 2019, Defendant Bayona’s windows are
pictured below.

And in February 2021, Defendant Bayona’s windows are pictured below, with exposed
concrete showing from the renovations.
660. Also on information and belief, Defendant Bayona also benefited from the City
destroying an easement adjacent to her property which added land to her property.
661. Defendants reached an agreement to deny Plaintiffs their constitutional right to free
speech and freedom of association, in retaliation for, amongst other instances of protected
conduct, Plaintiffs’ support of Carollo’s political opponent during the 2017 election, Plaintiffs’

submission of an ethics complaint against Carollo and the City, Plaintiffs’ filing of a lawsuit
against Carollo and the City, and Plaintiffs’ vocal opposition to the retaliatory practices of the City.
662. Defendants possessed an independent personal stake in conspiring against Plaintiffs
and achieving the City’s unconstitutional objectives.
663. The individual Defendants were motivated by their personal animus and desire to
harm Plaintiffs’ businesses—actions which did not confer any benefit for or constitute a stake to
the City.
664. For example, Defendant Carollo’s conspiratorial acts were motivated in part by his
personal animus towards Plaintiffs for their support of his political opponent and Plaintiffs’ filing
of a complaint against him, and a desire to scare and deter Plaintiffs and other political opponents
and their donors from challenging his reign as commissioner. Defendant Carollo was also
motivated to shut down Plaintiffs’ Viernes Culturales festival so that he could put forth his own
festival at the same time and location.
665. By way of another example, Defendant Noriega was not a City employee (rather,
he was employed by the Parking Authority) but was promised the position of and eventually
became the City Manager when he agreed to engaged in the conspiracy to violate Plaintiffs’
constitutional rights.
666. In addition to their personal stakes, the Defendants possessed a peculiar power of
coercion by virtue of their combination and economic influence, which they did not possess
individually. Defendants exercised their peculiar power of coercion with a malicious motive to
target Plaintiffs in retaliation for their exercise of their First Amendment rights.
667. Moreover, Defendants’ conspiratorial conduct went beyond a single act of
retaliation, and instead involved a long series of retaliatory acts orchestrated by City employees

spanning almost five years. Defendants’ conspiratorial actions impinged upon Plaintiffs’ First
Amendment rights.
668. As a result of Defendants’ conspiracy to retaliate and violate Plaintiffs’ First
Amendment rights, Plaintiffs are reluctant to participate in the political process by supporting
candidates for office or by petitioning their local government for the redress of their grievances.
669. In addition, as a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ conspiratorial acts,
Plaintiffs have suffered out of pocket losses and other monetary damages associated with
disruption to their various businesses in an amount not less than $60 million which is in addition
of the compensatory damages awarded at Fuller I, said damages to be proven at the time of trial.
670. In addition to the monetary losses, Plaintiffs have suffered impairment to their
reputation, personal humiliation, emotional distress, and mental anguish and suffering.
671. Plaintiffs are also entitled to punitive damages to punish, penalize, and deter the
future recurrence of Defendants’ conspiratorial and reprehensible conduct and to deter its future
occurrence in an amount to be proven at trial. Defendants’ conspiracy was reprehensible in that it
repeatedly violated the City of Miami Charter and the United States Constitution. Defendants were
reckless in their disregard for Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights. And Defendants were, and still
are, motivated by an evil intent to drive Plaintiffs out of business and deprive them of their
constitutional rights.
DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiffs hereby demand a jury trial of all claims so triable.

Respectfully submitted,
AXS LAW GROUP PLLC

2121 NW 2nd Avenue
Miami, FL 33127
Tel: (305) 297-1878
By: /s/ Samuel Jacob Etkin Kramer

JEFFREY W. GUTCHESS
Florida Bar No. 702641
[email protected]
Samuel Jacob Etkin Kramer
Florida Bar No. 1059581
Attorney for Plaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on February 23, 2024, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was served on all counsel of records via the CM-ECF.
/s/ Samuel Jacob Etkin Kramer

Samuel Jacob Etkin Kramer, Esq.

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Case 1:23-cv-24251-FAM Document 77 Entered on FLSD Docket 02/23/2024 Page 1 of 124

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

THE CITY OF MIAMI,

AXS Law Group PLLC 1|Page

PLAINITFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

engaged in a well-known, widespread and pervasive custom of weaponizing City resources to

These Defendants – a government machine mobilized by Carollo – have used untold

TRES, LLC; and 14) La Gran Fiesta LLC.

AXS Law Group PLLC 2|Page

Ortiz, Torres, Plasencia, Diaz, and Bayona.

PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE

1. Plaintiff William O. Fuller is a resident of Miami-Dade County, Florida.

2. Plaintiff Martin Pinilla, II is a resident of Miami-Dade County, Florida.

3. Plaintiff Barlington Group, LLC is a Florida Limited Liability Company owned by

Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla, and is headquartered in the City of Miami.

4. Plaintiff Calle Ocho Marketplace, LLC is a Florida Limited Liability Company

by Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla, and is headquartered in the City of Miami.

owned by Fuller and is headquartered in the City of Miami.

7. Plaintiff Piedra Villas, LLC is a Florida Limited Liability Company owned by

Fuller, and is headquartered in the City of Miami.

Company owned by Fuller and is headquartered in the City of Miami.

AXS Law Group PLLC 3|Page

9. Plaintiff Brickell Station, LLC is a Florida Limited Liability Company owned by

Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla, and is headquartered in the City of Miami.

Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla, and is headquartered in the City of Miami.

11. Plaintiff Futurama, LLC is a Florida Limited Liability Company owned by

Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla, and is headquartered in the City of Miami.

12. Plaintiff El Shopping, LLC is a Florida Limited Liability Company owned by

Plaintiffs Fuller and Pinilla, and is headquartered in the City of Miami.

Fuller and Pinilla, and is headquartered in the City of Miami.

14. Plaintiff Viernes Culturales/Cultural Fridays, Inc. is a Florida Corporation

owned by Fuller and is headquartered in the City of Miami.

Plaintiff Fuller and is headquartered in the City of Miami.

Plaintiff Fuller and is headquartered in the City of Miami.

District 3 of the City of Miami.

AXS Law Group PLLC 4|Page

was the City Manager for the City of Miami.

was the City Attorney for the City of Miami.

was the Assistant City Attorney for the City of Miami.

the Building Director for the City of Miami.

was the Zoning Director for the City of Miami.

27. Defendant Torres is a prime example of how supporters of Carollo earned

AXS Law Group PLLC 5|Page

and at relevant times was the City of Miami Fire Marshall.

Senior Chief of the Unsafe Structures department.

a member of the City of Miami Code Enforcement Board.

and the parties are located within this district.

AXS Law Group PLLC 6|Page

Miami, Miami-Dade County, and the State of Florida.

understand that the neighborhood has a multilayered history.”

the era of segregation. 2

Havana a national treasure.

THE RACE FOR CITY COMMISSIONER AND THE STARTING GUN OF

taxpayers and using government resources to intimidate his political opponents.” 3

But Carollo – group.

45. Carollo’s five-year campaign of retaliation against Plaintiffs stemmed from:

CITY OF MIAMI CHARTER

City Manager and Commissioners as follows:

Except for the purpose of inquiry and as may be necessary as provided in